

ZOSTAVIL PETER JAŠEK



**PROTIKOMUNISTICKÝ
ODBOJ
v strednej
a východnej Európe**

ÚSTAV PAMÄTI NÁRODA



Protikomunistický odboj v strednej a východnej Európe

Anti-Communist Resistance in Central and Eastern Europe

Zborník z medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie
Bratislava 14. – 16. novembra 2011

Anthology of the international scientific conference
Bratislava November 14 – 16, 2011

Zostavil/Edited by Peter Jašek

ÚSTAV PAMÄTI NÁRODA
BRATISLAVA 2012

Zborník vyšiel s finančnou podporou Medzinárodného vyšehradského fondu.
Anthology was published with kind support of the International Visegrad Fund.



www.visegradfund.org

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Zostavil Peter Jašek

Vydal

Ústav pamäti národa

Námestie slobody 6

817 83 Bratislava 15

Slovakia

www.upn.sk

1. vydanie

Recenzenti / PhDr. Jan Kalous, PhD., Mgr. Matej Medvecký, PhD.

Zodpovedná redaktorka / Alžbeta Poparová

Jazyková úprava / Mária Vojtylová (slovenský text), Milica Hřebíčková, Perla Farkašová

SIMAK International s.r.o. (anglický text), Mária Vrabcová (český text)

Preklad summary / Milica Hřebíčková

Grafická úprava / Gabriela Smolíková

Grafická koncepcia obálok edície / Ján Pálffy

Návrh obálky / Pavel Kastl

Sadzba, tlač a knižárske spracovanie / Róbert Jurových – NIKARA

Printed in Slovakia

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Všetky práva vyhradené

ISBN 978-80-89335-50-3

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Úvod

Otázka protikomunistického odboja sa v slovenskej historiografii doteraz netešila pozornosti, akú by si vzhľadom na závažnosť témy zasluhovala. Ide v podstate o novú problematiku, ktorej doteraz z najrozličnejších príčin nebola venovaná dostatočná pozornosť bádateľov, či už z radov historikov, alebo príbuzných vedných odvetví. Toto konštatovanie platí aj napriek skutočnosti, že v ostatných rokoch bolo sprístupnených množstvo archívnych prameňov, ktoré popri dodnes žijúcich pamätníkoch umožňujú zmapovať najširšiu škálu protikomunistických aktivít, realizovaných či už na slovenskom území, alebo prostredníctvom exilových organizácií aj v zahraničí. Zatiaľ však na Slovensku existujú iba parciálne štúdie, zamerané predovšetkým na obdobie 50. rokov, ale ucelená publikácia, založená na systematickom výskume archívneho materiálu, absentuje. Tento vývoj kontrastuje so situáciou v zahraničí, napr. v Českej republike a Poľsku, kde je o problematiku protikomunistického odboja neporovnateľne väčší záujem. A čo je v dnešnej dobe zvlášť dôležité, nie je len predmetom záujmu profesionálnych historikov, ale púta aj pozornosť médií, ktoré stimulujú záujem laickej verejnosti.

Naproti tomu postoje slovenských historikov – ktoré často odzrkadľujú a niekedy priamo spoluvytvárajú aj postoje laickej verejnosti – voči protikomunistickému odboju sú v nepomere s pozornosťou, aká sa na Slovensku venuje protifašistickému odboju. Ten je aj vďaka 40 rokom panovania komunistického režimu v spoločenskom vedomí oveľa hlbšie zakorenený. Súvisí to s nerovnakým prístupom k obom totalitným režimom, ktoré tak výrazne poznamenali slovenské dejiny 20. storočia. Kým v prípade autoritatívneho režimu I. Slovenskej republiky môžeme hovoriť o tvrdom trestnoprávnom vyrovnaní sa s jeho predstaviteľmi hneď po 2. svetovej vojne, v prípade komunistického režimu prevažuje snaha o vytváranie „hrubých čiar“. To sa popri inom prejavuje aj na postavení a finančnej podpore veteránov tohto odboja, neporovnateľnej s postavením veteránov

protikomunistického odboja. Časť bádateľov sa dokonca snaží otázku protikomunistického odboja marginalizovať až spochybňovať. Ba čo horšie, istou časťou spoločenského spektra je otvorene a priamo označovaný ako nelegitímny. Preto treba oceniť postoj Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky, ktorá len v nedávnej minulosti prijala príslušné zákony legitimizujúce protikomunistický odboj a upravujúce postavenie jeho účastníkov a veteránov. V roku 1996 to bol zákon č. 125/1996 o nemorálnosti a protiprávnosti komunistického systému, ktorý definoval odpor občanov proti komunistickému režimu ako legitímny, morálne oprávnený a hodný úcty. Ešte ďalej šiel zákon č. 219/2006 o protikomunistickom odboji, ktorý uznal protikomunistický odboj ako „*pokračovanie národného boja za oslobodenie*“ a jeho účastníkov za aktívnych bojovníkov za slobodu a demokraciu s právom na plnú morálnu rehabilitáciu.

Predovšetkým z vyššie uvedených dôvodov, a v súlade so svojím poslaním vymedzeným zákonom, sa Ústav pamäti národa rozhodol pri príležitosti 22. výročia pádu komunistického režimu v Československu zorganizovať medzinárodnú vedeckú konferenciu zameranú na protikomunistický odboj v strednej a východnej Európe. Ústav pamäti národa organizoval konferenciu spolu s *Európskou sieťou Pamäť a Solidarita* a v spolupráci s ďalšími zahraničnými partnermi *Ústavom pre štúdium totalitných režimov* (Česko), *Ústavom národnej pamäti* (Poľsko) a *Ústavom pre dejiny maďarskej revolúcie 1956* (Maďarsko). Vďaka patrí aj slovenským partnerom, *Konfederácii politických väzňov Slovenska* a organizácii *Politickí väzni – Zväz protikomunistického odboja* za ich podporu. Trojdňová konferencia sa uskutočnila v dňoch 14. – 16. novembra 2011 v Bratislave v priestoroch historickej budovy Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky pod záštitou predsedu Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky Pavla Hrušovského a s finančnou podporou Medzinárodného vyšehradského fondu.

Na konferencii boli prezentované najnovšie výsledky výskumu o protikomunistickom odboji v krajinách strednej a východnej Európy. Celkovo na podujatí vystúpilo viac ako 40 prednášajúcich, čo predurčilo široký obsahový aj geografický rámec jednotlivých príspevkov. Táto šírka záberu umožní azda každému záujemcovi o protikomunistický odboj získať predstavu o formách odporu, ako aj komparáciu protikomunistického odboja v jednotlivých štátoch. Obsahovo podujatie priblížilo najširšie spektrum občianskych aktivít proti totalitnému režimu. Čitateľ nájde v zborníku príspevky o protikomunistickej činnosti jednotlivcov – známych disidentov či verejne málo známych aktivistov odboja –, skupín či dokonca pololegálnych organizácií. Osobitný blok príspevkov sa zaoberá

povstaniaми proti komunistickým režimom. Popri zaujímavej komparácii známych protirežimných vystúpení v Maďarsku, Poľsku a Československu a štúdií o pôsobení banderovcov na Slovensku sa čitateľ môže zoznámiť aj s menej známymi faktami o ozbrojenom protikomunistickom odpore v Bulharsku, Rumunsku či Chorvátsku, kde pôsobili partizánske formácie až do začiatku 60. rokov. Konferencia sa nevyhla ani otázke perzekúcií, ktorými komunistické režimy trestali svojich oponentov. Veľký priestor je venovaný otázke protikomunistických aktivít exilových predstaviteľov jednotlivých štátov a národov, ktoré sa ocitli v sovietskej mocenskej sfére. Štúdie sa zaoberajú nielen slovenskou emigráciou, ale aj menej známymi českými (československými) exilovými organizáciami. Popri tom budú pre čitateľa iste zaujímavé aj štúdie o pôsobení maďarských, poľských či chorvátskych exilových organizácií. Podobne ako obsahový, široký je aj chronologický záber, ktorý obsiahol celé povojnové obdobie až do pádu komunistických režimov koncom 80. rokov.

Záujem o tému protikomunistického odboja v bývalých štátoch sovietskeho bloku potvrdzuje aj množstvo prihlásených účastníkov. Organizátori dostali približne 100 oficiálnych prihlášok. Z pochopiteľných dôvodov museli počet aktívnych účastníkov zúžiť, pričom do programu konferencie napokon vybrali 46 prednášok od výskumníkov z 13 štátov celého sveta. Z hľadiska šírky medzinárodnej účasti išlo o výnimočné podujatie v podmienkach slovenskej historiografie. V predkladanom zborníku sa môže čitateľ zoznámiť s väčšinou príspevkov, ktoré na konferencii odzneli. Okrem toho sme sa rozhodli poskytnúť v zborníku priestor aj tým štúdiám a článkom, ktoré nemohli autori z najrozličnejších príčin na konferencii prezentovať. Výsledkom je zborník obsahujúci spolu 49 vedeckých štúdií, popri ktorých uverejňujeme aj príspevky, ktoré síce nespĺňajú kritériá vedeckej štúdie, ale na konferencii odzneli vo forme referátov či koreferátov a (alebo) majú memoárový charakter.

Pre lepšiu obsahovú ucelenosť sme niektoré príspevky presunuli do takej kategórie, ktorej svojím obsahom najviac vyhovujú, ako to bolo odporúčené aj recenzentmi zborníka. Rovnako na odporúčenie recenzentov boli niektoré štúdie presunuté do kategórie reflexií a spomienok (príspevok Aristida Zelenaya a Dumitru Lacatusa). Zároveň treba uviesť, že recenzenti mali voči jednej štúdií zásadné výhrady. Išlo o štúdiu Jána Bobáka, ktorú recenzenti neodporučili bez zásadných úprav publikovať, nakoľko je podľa ich názoru historicky nekorektná, a obsahujúca viaceré problematické až manipulujúce tvrdenia. Nakoľko však ide o vystúpenie z konferencie, rozhodli sme sa

zaradiť aj tento príspevok do predkladaného zborníka, zohľadňujúc zároveň možnosť rozličnej interpretácie dejinných udalostí.

V zborníku čitateľ nájde štúdie v troch jazykoch – v slovenskom, českom a v anglickom podľa toho, v akom jazyku boli prezentované na konferencii. Pri redigovaní jednotlivých príspevkov sme sa snažili dodržať a rešpektovať normy charakteristické pre daný jazyk. Zároveň sme sa rozhodli zaradiť do zborníka aj zoznam skratiek, nakoľko sa viackrát opakovali v rôznych štúdiách.

Veríme, že predkladaný zborník prinesie veľa nových a podnetných poznatkov o protikomunistickom odboji v krajinách bývalého sovietskeho bloku a podnieti ďalší záujem o túto tému. Jeho cieľom nie je komplexné spracovanie tejto zložitej problematiky, to napokon vzhľadom na jej rozsah a súčasný stav bádania ani nie možné.

Na záver by som sa chcel poďakovať spoluorganizátorom a partnerom konferencie, predovšetkým *Európskej sieti Pamäť a Solidarita* a *Medzinárodnému vyšehradskému fondu* za ich pomoc a podporu, bez ktorej by nebolo možné konferenciu usporiadať na takej odbornej a spoločenskej úrovni, ako sa uskutočnila. *Národnej rade Slovenskej republiky* by som sa chcel poďakovať za poskytnutie reprezentatívnych priestorov, v ktorých sa rokovania konferencie uskutočnili. Osobitne sa chcem poďakovať kolegyniam a kolegom z Ústavu pamäti národa. Vďaka ich spolupráci konferencia prebehla organizačne bez problémov a k maximálnej spokojnosti pozvaných hostí.

Peter Jašek

Introduction

Slovak historiography has not paid the attention to the issue of anti-communist resistance that such an important topic would deserve. It is a relatively new topic which the researchers, be it historians or others from related scientific areas, has not been paying due attention, for various reasons. This statement is valid despite the fact that recently many archive resources were made available, which, alongside those who still remember these, allow to map the very broad scope of anti-communist activities performed in Slovakia or abroad through exile organisations. So far, there were only partial studies prepared in Slovakia focusing on the 1950s, but a comprehensive publication based on a systematic research of archive documents has not been prepared, yet. This situation contradicts the developments in other countries; for example in the Czech Republic and in Poland the issue of anti-communist resistance is of much higher interest. Moreover, what is even more important nowadays, it is not only of interest of professionals-historians, but it is a very attractive topic for media that also stimulate the interest of the public.

Despite that the attitude of Slovak historians – that often mirror and, sometimes, also help shaping the attitude of the public – to the anti-communist resistance can only hardly be compared with the attention paid to anti-fascist resistance in Slovakia, which is much deeply rooted in the overall public awareness. One of the reasons is the 40 years of communist regime in the country. Also, it is related to the different approach to both these totalitarian regimes, which affected very significantly the history of the 20th century in Slovakia. In the case of authoritarian regime of the first Slovak Republic one can speak about harsh judicial settlement with its representatives that took place immediately after the WWII, whereas for communist regime, the attempts of “drawing a thick line” under that period prevail. This is also mirrored in the status and financial support provided to its veterans that is almost incomparable with that of anti-

communist resistance veterans. In fact, certain researchers try to marginalise the issue of anti-communist resistance, or even doubt it, fully. And, what is even worse, a certain part of the society claims openly and directly that it was illegitimate. Therefore, the attitude of the Slovak Parliament is highly appreciated; it adopted laws defining the anti-communist resistance as a legitimate activity, stipulating the status of its veterans and those who participated in the fight. In 1996, the Act N°125/1996 Coll. concerning immorality and unlawfulness of the communist regime was adopted, which defines the resistance of people against the communist regime as a legitimate and morally justified activity that is worth respect. The Act N°219/2006 Coll. concerning anti-communist resistance went even further and defines the anti-communist resistance as “*the continuation of national fight for liberation*”, considering its participants active fighters for freedom and democracy entitled to full moral rehabilitation.

In particular due to the above reasons and keeping in mind its mission, the Nation’s Memory Institute organised international scientific conference focusing on anti-communist resistance in the Central and Eastern Europe, on the occasion of 22nd anniversary of the fall of communist regime in Czechoslovakia. The conference was organised together with the European Network Remembrance and Solidarity and other foreign partners, namely *Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes* (Czech Republic), *Institute of National Remembrance* (Poland) and the *Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution* (Hungary). Gratitude shall also be given to the *Confederation of Political Prisoners of Slovakia* and *Political Prisoner. The Anti-Communist Resistance Association*, for their support. The three days conference was held from 14 to 16 November 2011 in Bratislava, in the historical building of the Slovak National Council under the auspices of Mr. Pavol Hrušovský, the Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak republic, and with financial support of the *International Visegrad Fund*.

The conference presented the latest results in the anti-communist resistance research in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. More than 40 lecturers held presentations discussing the very broad context and geographical scope and frame of the topic. Anyone interested in anti-communist resistance can develop an idea about the resistance forms in individual countries from such a broad scope of presentations. Moreover, these can be used to compare the anti-communist resistance in countries. Regarding its content, the conference outlined the very broad spectrum of civic activities performed against the totalitarian regime. In the conference proceedings, presentations about anti-communist resistance of individuals

- famous dissidents can be found, alongside the description of activities of those not known to the public, and even those of semi-legal organisation. A separate part of presentations dealt with open rebellion against totalitarian regimes. Alongside the very interesting comparison of the well-known anti-regime operations in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia and the activities of Bandera groups in Slovakia, readers can find also less known facts about an armed anti-communist resistance in Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, where insurgent groups were active until the early sixties. The conference also tackled the issue of persecutions, which the communist regimes applied to punish its opponents. Vivid discussion was held about anti-communist activities of exile representatives of individual countries and nations under the Soviet power sphere. Studies dealt with the Slovak exile and also less known Czech (Czechoslovak) exile organisations. Readers will find interesting the study dealing with Hungarian, Polish and Croatian exile organisations and comparing their activities in the Western countries. Similar to the content, the time-frame the conference encompassed was broad, starting with the after-war period and ending with the communist regime fall in the late eighties.

The number of participants who registered for the conference also proved the interest in the topic of anti-communist resistance in the former Soviet bloc countries; almost 100 official applications for a presentation were received. Naturally, the number of active participants had to be reduced, when finally 46 lectures were selected to be presented by researchers from 13 countries. Regarding the scope of the international participation, the conference was a special event in the Slovak historiography. Proceedings contain almost all lectures presented at the conference. Moreover, it also contains studies and articles that couldn't be presented directly at the conference, due to various reasons. The proceedings contains 49 scientific works, and also paper that do not meet the criteria of a scientific study but were presented at the conference as a paper or a supplementary report, and rather are a memoir type of document.

In order to reach a better coherence, certain lectures in the proceedings were moved to chapters that best match their content, following the recommendations by the proceedings peer reviewers. Also, based on their recommendations, certain studies were moved to the chapter of reflections and memoirs (e.g. the lecture by Aristid Zelenay and Dumitru Lacatus). It should also be noted that peer reviewers presented principal reservations to certain studies; in particular to that by Ján Bobák, which was not recommended to be published by peer reviewers unless principal corrections are

made, as they considered it historically incorrect, misleading and containing several very disputable even manipulating statements. Nevertheless, it is a presentation from the conference and therefore, we decided to include it to the proceedings, keeping in mind also the possibility of different interpretations of historical events.

Lectures are printed in the language of their presentation at the conference – Slovak, Czech and English languages. When editing these, we tried to adhere to and obey the standards features of each individual language. Moreover, we also decided to include the list of abbreviations to the proceedings as several were used repeatedly in different lectures and presentations.

We are convinced that the proceedings will reveal many new and important knowledge and information about anti-communist resistance in the former Soviet bloc, and will further encourage the interest in this topic. Nevertheless, it was not our goal to comprehensively tackle this very complex problem; which is quite impossible taking into account the overall scope and the latest development in its research.

Finally, I wish to express my thanks and appreciation to co-organisers and partners of the conference, in particular the *European Network Remembrance and Solidarity* and the *International Visegrad Fund* for all their support and assistance, which helped the conference to reach a very high professional standard and importance. I wish also to thank to the *National Council of the Slovak republic* for providing its historical building for the conference. I also wish to thank to my colleagues from the Nation's Memory Institute who contributed highly to smooth organisation of the conference and satisfaction of guests.

Peter Jašek

1. panel:
**Jednotlivci a malé skupiny
v protikomunistickom odboji**

1st Block:
**Individuals and Small Groups in
the Anti-Communist Resistance**

Protikomunistické aktivity profesora Kolakoviča a „Rodiny“

Vladimír VARINSKÝ

Problematike Kolakovičovho pôsobenia na Slovensku, respektíve tzv. Kolakovičovej afére bolo už venovaných viacero prác pochádzajúcich nielen z pera pamätníkov. Dokonca sa objavujú už aj prvé diplomové práce, čo by nasvedčovalo tomu, že výskum tejto problematiky je z hľadiska faktografie viac-menej ukončený. Domnievam sa, že nové dôkazy v tomto smere môže doniesť už len sprístupnenie archívov vo Vatikáne, resp. v Moskve. Problém však pretrváva v tom, že spolu s narastajúcim počtom publikácií venovaných Kolakovičovi narastá aj počet svojráznych až kontroverzných interpretácií, a to od jeho zatracovania až po glorifikáciu.

Pokiaľ negatívne hodnotenie osoby Kolakoviča bolo typické skôr pre historickú produkciu z obdobia pred novembrom 1989,¹ naopak pre neskoršie obdobie je skôr typická glorifikácia, hoci aj táto interpretačná rovina vznikla už v prednovembrovom období. Vznikla v čase, keď aj historická spisba prezentovaná formou samizdatov bola svojím spôsobom formou protikomunistického odboja, a tak v protiklade k jednostrannému hodnoteniu Kolakoviča marxistickou historiografiou rovnako jednostranne s ideologickým podtextom usilovala sa zbaviť Kolakoviča všetkých obvinení pochádzajúcich z dielne ŠtB s cieľom urobiť z neho výlučne nábožensky činnú osobu.²

Na škodu objektívnej rekonštrukcie Kolakovičovho pôsobenia na Slovensku a úsilia súčasnej historickej vedy o identifikáciu protikomunistického

1 PREČAN, V.: *Slovenský katolicizmus pred februárom 1948*. Bratislava 1961.

2 JABLONICKÝ, J.: *Podoby násilia*. Bratislava 2000, s. 35 a 49.

odboja aj ponovembrová historiografia v snahe dokázať neoprávnenosť obvinení Kolakoviča z protištátnej a protikomunistickej činnosti jednostranne poukazuje len na jeho empiricky preukázateľné náboženské aktivity a jeho snahu o rekrisianizáciu Ruska. Takýto empirizmus bez zjavného záujmu o racionálne vyhodnotenie prameňov bez ohľadu na ich pôvod, spojený s ideologickou predpojatosťou, a priori odmieta výpovednú hodnotu údajov pochádzajúcich z proveniencie ŠtB, čo však nebráni akceptovať z tohto zdroja tie fakty minulosti, ktoré ilustratívne potvrdzujú vopred vyhotovenú šablónu.

Ak vylúčime z analýzy glorifikujúcu produkciu Kolakovičovej osoby, ktorou sa prezentujú už len bývalí Kolakovičovi súpútnici, nemôžeme poprieť, že by renomovaní historici nepociťovali potrebu kritického prístupu k prameňom každého druhu. Vo svojej štúdií explicitne na tento problém upozorňuje autor Miroslav Klobučník, najmä pokiaľ ide o výpovednú hodnotu prameňov pochádzajúcich z proveniencie ŠtB, konkrétne Kolakovičových výpovedí obsiahnutých vo vyšetrovacích protokoloch.³ Autor si uvedomuje, že pramene nám vypovedajú len o tom, čo si tvorcovia prameňa mysleli, resp. chceli, aby si iní mysleli, a nie o tom, čo sa skutočne stalo, a preto, bohužiaľ, len v tomto prípade nabáda k opatrnosti pri percepcii Kolakovičovej výpovede. Riešenie celkom správne vidí v konfrontácii prameňa s prameňmi iného druhu. Problém je však v tom, že väčšina prameňov prezentuje Kolakoviča vo veľmi protirečivej podobe. Na jednej strane ukazujú Kolakoviča ako osobu, ktorá si plne uvedomovala nebezpečenstvo hroziace zo strany komunizmu pre kresťanstvo, a na svojich prednáškach komunizmus spolu s nacizmom a fašizmom ostro odmietal, ale aj ako človeka, ktorý sa neobmedzuje len na teoretické úvahy, ale prijíma aj konkrétne kroky, ktoré majú toto nebezpečenstvo eliminovať. Mám tu na mysli predovšetkým spomienky a protokolárne výpovede priamych účastníkov Kolakovičových prednášok a duchovných cvičení, tzv. exercícií, ale aj Kolakovičom vyhotovený dokument *Pastorácia pre ťažké časy*, ktorý predstavoval podrobné inštrukcie na vytvorenie tajnej cirkvi.⁴ Na druhej strane existujú pramene, ktoré ukazujú Kolakoviča ako osobu, ktorá verí

3 KLOBUČNÍK, M.: Kolakovič a československá ŠtB. In: LACKO, M. – DUCHOŇ, M. – VARŠO, I. (Eds.): *Historické rozhľady*, č. 4, 2008, s. 133 – 134.

4 Pozri protokolárne výpovede Jozefa Vicena z rokov 1957 – 1959 vyhotovené počas jeho výsluchov na Ruzyni. Archív Ústavu pamäti národa (ďalej iba A ÚPN) Bratislava, fond (ďalej iba f.) 509–1–3; VAŠKO, V.: *Profesor Kolakovič*. Bratislava 1996, s. 6; VAŠKO, V.: Profesor Kolakovič – mýty a skutočnosť. In: *Impulz – Revue pre modernú katolícku kultúru*, roč. 2, 2006, č. 3, s. 102 – 104.

v možnosť spolupráce katolicizmu s komunizmom na sociálnom poli, ako keby nevidel ich vzájomné ideologické nepriateľstvo. Základným prameňom v tomto smere je Kolakovičova výpoveď počas jeho vyšetrovania ŠtB, ale aj spomienky účastníkov jeho prednášok, resp. exercícií, ktorí spomínajú, že práve tieto myšlienky vyvolali u nich podozrenie, či Kolakovič nie je rafinovaný komunistický agent.⁵

Domnievam sa, že pochopiť túto takpovediac dichotómiu Kolakovičovej osobnosti nie je možné čisto empirickým postupom. Umožňuje nanajvýš len zviditeľniť obidve alternatívy a ponecháva na čitateľovi, nech si vyberie. Respektíve, a to je v ponovembrovej historickej produkcii venovanej Kolakovičovi často používaný postup, jednostranne bez akéhokoľvek úsilia o racionálne zdôvodnenie sa preferuje Kolakovičova ústretovosť voči komunizmu, čo tak rozladilo historika Jozefa Jablonického v súvislosti s interpretáciou takto podanou Robertom Letzom.⁶ Takýto postup sa dá pochopiť len tak, že umožňuje dodatočne s pomocou histórie očistiť Kolakoviča z obvinení ŠtB, veď s komunizmom sympatizoval a usiloval sa s ním spolupracovať na riešení sociálnych otázok. Na empirizme postavená snaha o hľadanie zmysluplnosti tejto dichotómie potom vyúsťuje až do absurdít, keď sa všestranne vzdelaný človek ohurujúci svojich poslucháčov okrem iného dovtedy neznámou komparáciou nacizmu a komunizmu považuje za naivného idealistu, ktorý nemal nič voči komunizmu až na jeho ateizmus a veril v možnosť zmeny cirkevnej politiky v ZSSR.⁷

Úplne krajným riešením tejto dichotómie je pokus vysvetľovať Kolakovičovo chovanie ako dôsledok pomäteného rozumu, na ktoré poukazuje článok historika Ivana Petranského⁸, odvolávajúc sa na údajný výrok Domenika Tardiniho, vysokého činiteľa Svätej stolice. Historická spisba prezentuje však aj ďalší pokus o interpretáciu, a to aj napriek tomu, že táto interpretácia nemá žiadnu oporu v prameňoch. Ide o snahu vnímať Kolakoviča, tak povediac, vo vývoji. Najprv to bol naivný idealista, ktorý však po návrate z Ruska pochopil nereálnosť svojich zámerov, a aj keď oneskorene aj on objavuje totalitnú a deštruktívnu podstatu ateistického

5 VICEN, J.: *Vo víroch rokov 1938 – 1988*. Bratislava 1999, s. 36. Tiež VAŠKO, V.: *Profesor Kolakovič*, s. 16; VAŠKO, V.: *Profesor Kolakovič – mýty a skutočnosť*, s. 99.

6 JABLONICKÝ, J.: *Podoby násilia*, s. 26.

7 KLOBUČNÍK, M.: Kolakovič a československá ŠtB, s. 134 a 145.

8 PETRANSKÝ, I. A.: Špión či blázon? In: *Národný kalendár*. Bratislava 2001, s. 174.

komunizmu.⁹ Obdobne ako František Vnuk aj Václav Vaško vo svojich spomienkach, resp. Petranský v citovanom článku považujú Kolakovičov návrat z Ruska za medzník v jeho postojoch voči komunizmu. Zhodne, ako dôkaz tohto obratu, považujú rozsiahlu pastoračnú činnosť, ktorú rozvinul (v skutočnosti *Rodina* pod jeho vedením) tentokrát už aj v českej časti republiky.¹⁰

Natíska sa otázka, čím sa táto činnosť sledujúca vytvorenie *Rodiny* v Čechách na jeseň 1945 a nového tzv. laického apoštolátu líšila od Kolakovičových aktivít v predchádzajúcom období? Domnievam sa, že ničím. Zo spomienok jeho súčasníkov, ale v podstate aj z jeho vlastných spomienok vydaných v roku 1949 v USA¹¹ jednoznačne vyplýva, že už v čase príchodu na Slovensko na jeseň 1943 si uvedomoval, aké nebezpečenstvo prinášajú víťazstvá Červenej armády, ktorá na obsadených územiach bude vnucovať sovietsky režim s charakteristickou intoleranciou voči cirkvám a náboženstvu ako takému. Problém videl najmä v tom, že cirkev bola voči tomuto nebezpečenstvu fatálne pasívna. Východisko videl v koncepcii širokého kresťanského sociálneho programu, ktorý by znemožnil masové rozšírenie ideového a politického vplyvu komunizmu a udržal obyvateľstvo pod vplyvom Katolíckej cirkvi. Preto sa usiloval presvedčiť cirkev na Slovensku, aby neobmedzovala svoju pastoračnú činnosť len na hlásanie evanjelia, ale prešla k odhaľovaniu sociálnych nedostatkov v spoločnosti a k ich riešeniu. Išlo teda o aplikáciu zásad jociizmu, moderného apoštolátu požadujúceho nielen *pozorovať a rozmyšľať*, ale aj *konať*, čo znamenalo angažovať sa vo všetkých oblastiach spoločenského života.¹² V priebehu jedného roka si Kolakovič na Slovensku vytvoril nevyhnutné teoretické predpoklady (mám na mysli teoretickú prípravu vysokoškolských študentov prostredníctvom pololegálnych prednášok, ďalej získanie stúpencov medzi predstaviteľmi cirkvi, ale aj medzi vybranými osobami činnými vo verejnom živote), ako aj organizačné predpoklady (vytvorenie tajného spoločenstva *Rodiny*) na realizáciu svojich zámerov. Len vďaka týmto vytvoreným predpokla-

9 VNUK, F.: Kolakovič, T.: Božie podzemie (O činnosti Kolakoviča na Slovensku v r. 1943 – 1946). In: *Historický zborník*, roč. 8, 1998, s. 155. (recenzia)

10 VAŠKO, V.: Profesor Kolakovič – mýty a skutočnosť, s. 114.; PETRANSKÝ, I. A.: Špión či blázon?, s. 174.

11 Mám na mysli predovšetkým myšlienku, ktorou jednoznačne potvrdzuje, že neverí v to, že by sovietska politika „náboženskej znášanlivosti“ realizovaná počas vojny znamenala priateľský vzťah k cirkvi. KOLAKOVIČ, T.: *Božie podzemie*. Nitra 1994, s. 30.

12 VAŠKO, V.: Profesor Kolakovič – mýty a skutočnosť, s. 105.

dom mohol potom Kolakovič po návrate z Ruska a jeho *Rodina*, aj vďaka tomu, že sa jej podarilo ovládnuť „kanceláriu katolíckej akcie“¹³, realizovať rozsiahlu pastoračnú a politickú činnosť s jednoznačným protikomunistickým zameraním.

Na potvrdenie myšlienky, že skúsenosti z ruskej cesty nemali zásadný vplyv na zmenu Kolakovičovej orientácie, akéhosi vytriezvenia z ilúzií, dovoľm si uviesť aj ďalšie dôkazy. Zaujímavé v tomto smere je Kolakovičom vytvorené spoločenstvo *Rodina*. Bývalý člen Rodiny Václav Vaško opisuje Rodinu ako neorganizované spoločenstvo katolíckej inteligencie, spájajúcej sa do jocistických profesijne organizovaných krúžkov, buniek, ktorá bola ochotná venovať sa apoštolátu.¹⁴ Na druhej strane, ďalší exponovaný člen *Rodiny* Jozef Vicen vo svojej protokolárnej výpovedi podáva *Rodinu* ako subordinovanú organizáciu, ktorej členovia sa pripravovali na prechod do ilegality, prijímali krycie mená, učili sa konšpiratívnu prácu, ako šifrovať správy, ako sa ukrývať a konečne, ako sa správať počas výsluchov.¹⁵ Natíska sa otázka – na čo bola členom *Rodiny* takáto príprava,

13 Do vedenia „kancelárie katolíckej akcie“ sa dostali Fronc, Záhoranský, Bartosiewicz a ďalší. A ÚPN, f. 509–1–3. Protokol o výpovedi J. Vicena z 26. 6. 1957.

14 VAŠKO, V.: Profesor Kolakovič - mýty a skutočnosť, s. 105 – 106. Paradoxne však na inom mieste citovaných spomienok uvádza, že *Rodina* na Slovensku mala „prísne organizačné smernice“, s. 115.

15 Aj keď písomné doklady o organizačnej štruktúre *Rodiny* nikdy neexistovali, dôkazy o jej existencii poskytujú protokolárne výpovede Vicena z rokov 1957 – 1959 vyhotovené počas jeho vyšetrovania na Ruzyni. Ústredná bunka predstavovala riadiaci štáb *Rodiny*. Tvorilo ho asi desať osôb, podľa Vicena Dominik Bartosiewicz, Dr. Vaško, prof. Bagan, prof. Mária Pecíková, J. Šrámek, Rudolf Šesták, Dr. Chura, údajne i biskup Škrábik a, samozrejme, aj Kolakovič. Tomuto štábu, ktorý sa nachádzal v Bratislave, podliehali početne neobmedzené primárne bunky, ktoré mali fungovať ako výkonný orgán štábu. Tieto profesijne organizované primárne bunky (študentské, lekárske, kňazské, právnické a pod.) boli vedené jednotlivými členmi štábu. Členmi týchto buniek sa stali výlučne osoby, ktoré mali s Kolakovičom bližšie styky a ktoré navštevovali jeho prednášky. Tak vznikli bunky na jednotlivých fakultách a v priebehu leta 1944 sa rozšírili po celom Slovensku. Členovia primárnych buniek mali za povinnosť vybudovať v prostredí, kde žili a pracovali tzv. sekundárne bunky, zložené zo štyroch až šiestich členov. Podľa Vicena vzniklo takýchto buniek pomerne veľké množstvo. Tie však neboli nijako organizačne úzko viazané a vedúci takejto bunky nemal povinnosť viesť zoznamy členov. V organizácii *Rodiny* predstavovali posledný článok, ktorého členovia mali vedieť, že sú členmi organizácie *Rodina*. V zásade malo ísť o osoby nábožensky uvedomelé, ktorých poslaním bolo šíriť program Rodiny, a mali preto vedieť, čo je jeho cieľom. Posledným článkom v organizačnej štruktúre *Rodiny* mali byť tzv. terciálne bunky. Tieto, nie väčšie ako dvadsaťčlenné skupiny budovali iba niektorí vybraní členovia sekundárnych buniek. I keď v podstate tieto bunky už netvorili organizovanú skupinu *Rodiny* (jej členovia nemali vedieť o jestvovaní *Rodiny*), mali pre realizáciu zámerov *Rodiny* veľký

pokiaľ sa pripravovali len na verejnú náboženskú činnosť? Dôležité je, že Vicen ani v neskoršom období počas našich osobných rozhovorov, resp. v predslove k monografii o Bielej légii¹⁶ túto svoju výpoveď nespochybnil ako vynútenú zo strany ŠtB. Uvedené nasvedčuje tomu, že Kolakovič pod rúškom jocistických buniek vytvoril konšpiratívnu organizáciu kopírujúcu svojou bunkovou štruktúrou ilegálnu sieť KSS z obdobia I. Slovenskej republiky.¹⁷ Podľa Vicena si členovia *Rodiny* svoje poslanie uvedomovali, avšak započatie konšpiratívnej práce spájali s odbojom, na ktorý sa len pripravovali po vojne v súvislosti s očakávanou komunistickou hrozbou. Aké však bolo ich prekvapenie, keď ich Kolakovič vyzval, aby sa aktívne zapojili do práve vypuknutého povstania (SNP) na strane povstalcov proti nacistom a s tým aj proti slovenskej štátnosti. Kolakovič predpokladal, že Nemecko už vojnu prehralo, a plne si uvedomoval, aký osud by čakalo ich úsilie o eliminovanie komunistického vplyvu, pokiaľ by svoje zámery realizovali na platforme hoci nechcenej spolupráce s Nemeckom. Charakter prebiehajúcej vojny aj vzhľadom na spoluprácu západných demokracií so Sovietskym zväzom nedával Kolakovičovi príliš veľký manévrovací priestor. Podľa Vicenovej interpretácie sa domnieval, že v tejto situácii záchrana Katolíckej cirkvi pred komunizmom je možná len v intenciách protinacistického boja. V účasti na povstaleckých akciách videl spôsob, ako previesť členov *Rodiny* do povojnového režimu ako ľudí so zásluhami s politickým vplyvom, ktorí budú môcť ovplyvňovať kreovanie povojnového režimu a zaujať v ňom adekvátne spoločenské postavenie.

Uvedené nasvedčuje tomu, že Kolakovičova prednášková a náboženská činnosť na území Slovenska nebola samoučelná, ale bola súčasťou širšie rozohranej hry, ktorá sledovala politické ciele. Jej obsahom bolo vytvoriť ideové a organizačné predpoklady na realizáciu protikomunistického odboja. Úspech takto rozohranej hry v mnohom závisel od toho, ako sa podarí ukryť protikomunistické zámery členov *Rodiny* do protinacistického odboja, aby potom títo v povojnovom režime mohli legálne ponúknuť

význam. Organizátori týchto buniek mali povinnosť nábožensky vplývať na pracujúcich v rôznych odboroch, aby ich tak ochránili pred komunistickým vplyvom. Zaradovanie do jednotlivých stupňov sa riadilo podľa náboženskej vyspelosti, aktivity a spoľahlivosti tej ktorej osoby. Riadiaci nižších buniek nemali povinnosť podávať hlásenia o stave členov alebo ich mená vyšším bunkám. Členovia ktorejkoľvek bunky nemali vedieť o iných bunkách; mali mať len všeobecnú predstavu, že niečo existuje pod pojmom Rodina. A ÚPN, f. 509–1–3. Protokolárne výpovede Jozefa Vicena.

16 VARINSKÝ, V.: *Jozef Vicen a Biela légia*. Banská Bystrica 2003, s. 7 – 14.

17 Pozri KLOBUČNÍK, M.: Kolakovič a československá ŠtB, s. 136.

spoluprácu na sociálnom poli. Samozrejme, opäť nemalo ísť o spoluprácu v pravom zmysle, ale o skrytú formu boja, v ktorom v presvedčení, že kresťania to dokážu lepšie, budú komunisti postupne politicky izolovaní. Predpokladal, že *Rodina* bude aj po vojne fungovať v hlbokjej ilegalite, t. j. bez úsilia o svoje inštitucionálne zviditeľnenie, ale súčasne svoje zámary bude realizovať prevažne legálnymi prostriedkami, a to v rozmeroch, ktoré demokratický priestor povojnového režimu umožní. Jednotliví členovia *Rodiny*, až na členov najvyšších buniek organizačnej štruktúry *Rodiny*, mali ako súkromné osoby aktívne vstupovať do verejného a politického života s cieľom tento v čo najširšom rozsahu ovplyvňovať v intenciách zámerov *Rodiny*. V žiadnom prípade teda nemalo ísť o kolaboráciu alebo fúziu s komunizmom, ale o veľmi rafinovaný spôsob boja v mnohom pripomínajúci taktiku jednotného frontu, resp. jej mutáciu v Národnom fronte uplatňovanú počas vojny, ale aj po vojne komunistami. Podotýkam, že na potvrdenie uplatňovania takéhoto spôsobu boja priame dôkazy chýbajú. Nepriamo to však potvrdzujú myšlienky z Kolakovičových spomienok, keď na margo spolupráce s Rusmi (komunistami, pozn. autora) v čase boja proti nacizmu požadoval zachovanie si ideovej nezávislosti, t. j. neprijať ich filozofiu, čo bola jedna zo základných požiadaviek úspechu komunistickej taktiky jednotného frontu.¹⁸

Z vyššie uvedeného ďalej vyplýva, že protikomunistická rezistencia *Rodiny* bola už súčasťou druhého, t. j. protifašistického odboja a nielen jeho pokračovaním, realizovala sa jeho prostredníctvom, aby v povojnových pomeroch, kreovaných protifašistickou koalíciou (t. j. v pomeroch so značným vplyvom komunistov), mohla legálne pôsobiť. Ústredie komunistov v Čechách a na Slovensku vzhľadom na svoje totalitné ambície vnímalo každú aktivitu sledujúcu obmedzenie vplyvu komunistov celkom prirodzene ako ohrozenie nielen bezprostredných, ale najmä svojich strategických zámerov ohľadne kontroly a tvorby štátnej politiky. Následne zneužívali všetky ovládnuté pozície, najmä represívne zložky, aby takúto činnosť identifikovali, často aj pomocou vykonštruovaných obvinení, ako protištátnu a tak ju zbavili legality. Len pripomínam, že v povojnovom režime nebolo možné trestnoprávne stíhať legálne uplatňované kroky, ktoré sledovali elimináciu vplyvu komunistov.

S vyššie naznačenou interpretáciou bagatelizujúcou protikomunistické zameranie Kolakovičových náboženských a prednáškových aktivít úzko súvisí aj snaha eliminovať akékoľvek prepojenie Kolakoviča s prípadom

18 KOLAKOVIČ, T.: *Božie podzemie*, s. 30.

Štefana Chalmovského,¹⁹ ktorý v lete 1945 v okrese Topoľčany založil ilegálnu ozbrojenú organizáciu na platforme Slovenskej tajnej ochrany. Zdá sa, že aj v tomto prípade jednou z príčin tohto stále pretrvávajúceho úsilia je neschopnosť rovnako nestranne kriticky vyhodnocovať všetky dostupné fakty minulosti. Aj keď triedny boj mal byť len výplodom komunistickej ideológie, pretrváva tendencia a priori spochybňovať všetko, čo pochádza z proveniencie ŠtB.²⁰ Z tohto dôvodu výsledky vyšetrovania ŠtB zo začiatku roka 1946, ktoré poukázali na prepojenie Chalmovského a Kolakoviča, sú a priori považované za vykonštruované a vytvorené na základe vynútených a zmanipulovaných výpovedí vyšetrovaných Štefana Chalmovského a Augustína Hubu.²¹ Zrejme v dôsledku nespochybniteľnej istoty o neexistujúcom prepojení týchto dvoch osôb pokúšajú sa historici nájsť zmysel zatknutia Kolakoviča v ďalších faktograficky nepodložených úvahách, ako napr. v snahe dokázať, že zatknutie Kolakoviča bolo iniciované Moskvou, resp. bolo iniciované vedením KSS, ktoré pociťovalo strach z narastajúceho politického vplyvu Kolakoviča.²² Zrejme, podľa Klobučníka, autora tohto názoru, bolo potom až dodatočne účelovo vykonštruované prepojenie týchto dvoch osôb, potvrdené vynútenými výpoveďami zatknutých osôb v prípade Chalmovského. Domnievam sa, že okrem pretrvávajúcej predpojatosti voči všetkému, čo pochádzalo od ŠtB, je príčinou týchto svojráznych interpretácií aj relatívne obmedzený diapazón informácií, ktoré pochádzajú výlučne z aktuálnej doby. K dispozícii sú však aj ďalšie vyšetrovacie zväzky týkajúce sa prípadu Chalmovského, ktoré však vznikli oveľa neskôr ako súčasť vyšetrovania iných prípadov. Zaujímavé však je, že tieto vyšetrovania v mnohom potvrdili pôvodné, ale málo dôkazné výsledky šetrenia v rokoch 1945 – 1946, a to v čase, kedy už nebol dôvod na kriminalizáciu Kolakoviča.

Zvlášť protokolárne výpovede Vicena realizované v rokoch 1957 až 1959, resp. aj v ďalších rokoch jednoznačne potvrdzujú, že Chalmovský ako absolvent Vyššej vodcovskej školy HM v rokoch 1943 – 1944 nielen chodil medzi členov *Rodiny* ako účastník prednášok Kolakoviča, ale bol

19 JABLONICKÝ, J.: *Podoby násilia*, s. 45 – 52.; MEDVECKÝ, M.: *Za červené Slovensko. Štátna bezpečnosť a politické spravodajstvo na Slovensku v rokoch 1945 – 1948*. Bratislava 2011, s. 205.

20 Zaujímavý postoj v tomto smere prezentoval V. Vaško, keď explicitne odmietol akýkoľvek údaj pochádzajúci od ŠtB. VAŠKO, V.: *Profesor Kolakovič – mýty a skutočnosť*, s. 117.

21 JABLONICKÝ, J.: *Podoby násilia*, s. 46 a 48.

22 KLOBUČNÍK, M.: *Kolakovič a československá ŠtB*, s. 135 – 137.

aj jej zakladajúcim členom a patril k obľúbencom Kolakoviča a ďalších členov *Rodiny*.²³ V tejto súvislosti je dosť problematické pochopiť, prečo práve Chalmovský a tiež Vicen, ktorý rovnako patril k dôverníkom a obľúbencom Kolakoviča, odmietli Kolakovičovú výzvu zapojiť sa do odboja na strane povstalcov (SNP) a v konflikte, ktorý vyvstal, sa rozhodli zapojiť do akcií umožňujúcich zachovanie, resp. znovu obnovenie Slovenského štátu, a to v súčinnosti s nemeckými protipovstaleckými akciami. To znamená, že vstúpili do odboja, ale na opačnej strane pomyslenej barikády a, na prvý pohľad, aj v konflikte so zámermi Kolakoviča a *Rodiny*. Vicen vo svojich spomienkach toto svoje rozhodnutie vysvetľuje ako viac-menej intuitívne.²⁴ Do istej miery to mohli ovplyvniť aj prevládajúce názory v politicky exponovaných katolíckych kruhoch o možnosti zachovania samostatného Slovenska, ak ho oslobodia západné mocnosti, a to otvorením balkánskeho frontu. Rovnako istý vyčkávací priestor v tomto smere ponúkali názory propagované Dr. Ferdinandom Ďurčanským o skorom vypuknutí nového vojnového konfliktu, tentoraz medzi Západom (s možnosťou využitia zvyškov nemeckej armády) a Sovietskym zväzom, ktoré sa nielen mladým stúpencom slovenskej štátnosti zdali ako racionálne a v zásade i reálne.²⁵ V súvislosti s týmito úvahami sa zdalo byť rozumné obmedziť rozsah slovenských obetí v záverečnej fáze vojny, aby sa tieto sily mohli aktívne zapojiť do novej fázy vojny na strane Západu a možno i v spolupráci s Nemcami, avšak už na novom základe.

Natíska sa však aj iné vysvetlenie. Ak uvážime, že následné protipovstalecké akcie realizované Vicenom, Chalmovským a ďalšími absolventmi Vyššej vodcovskej školy HM mali mať hoci len v konečnom dôsledku rovnako protikomunistické zameranie ako zámery Kolakovičovej *Rodiny*, potom rozdiel medzi nimi bol len v spôsobe realizácie. Tieto dva odlišné spôsoby vychádzali z rozdielneho hodnotenia vývoja vojny a v dobe, ktorú rozoberáme, nik nemohol jednoznačne tvrdiť, ako to nakoniec všetko

23 A ÚPN, f. 509–1–3, protokolárna výpoveď J. Vicena z 1. 6. 1957, s. 6.

24 Údajne rozhodlo označenie I. Slovenskej republiky povstaleckým rozhlasom za satelit Nemecka a slovenských politických predstaviteľov za zradcov, kolaborantov a vojnových zločincov. To Vicena najviac dráždilo. Až neskôr, s odstupom osemnástich rokov, keď sa z rozhovoru s Dr. Alexandrom Hirnerom dozvedel viac o pozadí vypuknutia SNP, ocenil správnosť svojho viac-menej intuitívneho rozhodnutia. VICEN, J.: *Vo víroch rokov*, s. 287 – 288, 290.

25 Išlo predovšetkým o vysokoškolákov, ale i exponentov tzv. *Klubu mladá generácia*, ktorí zaujímali v štátnom aparáte I. Slovenskej republiky významné funkcie. A ÚPN, f. 509–6. Politická činnosť slovenskej emigrácie.

dopadne. V tejto konštelácii nemôžeme vylúčiť aj vedomé účinkovanie *Rodiny* v protipovstaleckých akciách ako alternatívne riešenie. Zodpovedalo by to charakteru *Rodiny* ako tajného spoločenstva, ktoré nemalo byť verejne exponované, ale malo prenikať prostredníctvom svojich ľudí do verejných aktivít.

Túto hypotézu, hoci len ako nepriame dôkazy, potvrdzujú nasledujúce skutočnosti. Ako sme už uviedli, Vicen spolu s Chalmovským na rozdiel od Kolakoviča, ktorý v sprievode asi dvoch alebo troch ďalších členov *Rodiny*²⁶ odišiel do Banskej Bystrice, aby sa aktívne zúčastnil povstaleckých akcií, zahájili aktívnu spoluprácu s nacistickými protipovstaleckými akciami. Najvýraznejšie sa to prejavilo počas ich pôsobenia v spravodajskej organizácii tzv. *Hlások*.²⁷ Obaja boli členmi riadiaceho výboru tejto spravodajskej organizácie, ktorá postupne prechádzala od čisto spravodajskej činnosti k odhaľovaniu účastníkov SNP až po priamu účasť na zatýkacích akciách realizovaných orgánmi Hlinkovej gardy a nemeckými oddielmi.²⁸ Celkom logicky by sa dalo očakávať, že z tejto pozície budú mať maximálny záujem na odhalení každého, kto nejakým spôsobom pomáhal povstaniu. Výnimku nemali predstavovať ani členovia *Rodiny*, keďže väčšina z nich, aj keď do povstania aktívne nevstúpila, pomáhali povstalcom získavať lieky, ukrývali ich pred Nemcami a tiež zaobstarávali falošné doklady.²⁹

26 V tom, koľkých členov *Rodiny* a konkrétne koho Kolakovič prehovoril na odchod do Banskej Bystrice, sa materiály rozchádzajú. Vaško uvádza Vladimíra Jukla a V. Vaška mladšieho. VAŠKO, V.: *Profesor Kolakovič*, s. 25. Vicen spomína Dr. Poubisa, Záhoranského a ešte jednu nemenovanú osobu. Vladimír Jukl a medik Silvester Krčméry mali v tom čase byť už v Banskej Bystrici. A ÚPN, f. 509–1–3.

27 Spravodajská organizácia *Hlásky* vznikla približne v novembri 1944 z radov absolventov Vyššej vodicovskej školy HM z iniciatívy a pod vedením Dr. Jankoviča. Členmi riadiaceho výboru boli aj obaja spomínaní členovia *Rodiny* Vicen a Dr. Chalmovský. Ďalšími členmi výboru boli Dr. Fundárek – vedol administratívne a personálne záležitosti, J. Šiky – mal na starosti spolu s Dominikom Kvietkom hospodárenie organizácie, Viktor Magdolen a Kornel Piaček dbali na vytváranie siete informátorov na území Slovenska. A ÚPN, f. 509–1–5. V dôsledku koordinácie činnosti *Hlások* MNO, konkrétne vedúcim spravodajského oddelenia mjr. Alexandrom Matúšom, došlo k rozšíreniu pôvodne plánovanej čisto spravodajskej činnosti *Hlások* o policajné akcie pri odhaľovaní účastníkov SNP a tiež pri zatýkacích akciách realizovaných orgánmi Hlinkovej gardy a nemeckými oddielmi. Podrobnejšie pozri: VARINSKÝ, V.: *Jozef Vicen a Biela légia*, s. 24 – 27.

28 Policajné akcie riadil Chalmovský a najaktívnejšími skupinami v tomto smere boli skupiny Gosiorovského, Kohlmayera, Vernarceho a Kružliaka. A ÚPN, f. 509–1–5, s. 4.

29 Zrejme za jedinou akciu organizovanú *Rodinou* počas povstania možno považovať akciu s rozmnoženým obrázkom ruskej ikony Iverskej Bohorodičky, ktorý členovia *Rodiny*

Na počudovanie nič podobné sa nedialo. Práve naopak. Z prameňov, ktoré sú k dispozícii, vyplýva, že ich účinkovanie v protipovstaleckých akciách sa realizovalo v dvoch polohách. Na jednej strane sa aktívne angažovali v spravodajskej činnosti *Hlások* s cieľom získať údaje o činnosti a pohybe partizánov, ktoré potom odovzdávali Nemcom, až po policajné zatýkacie akcie podozrivých osôb, ale súčasne vykonali kroky, ktoré nijako nezapadali do ich protipovstaleckého zamerania a spolupráce s Nemcami. Potvrďuje to napr. široko organizovaná akcia na záchranu vysokoškolákov, ktorí sa z rôznych dôvodov dostali na povstalecké územie a po potlačení povstania im, resp. ich rodinám hrozil postih zo strany Nemcov.³⁰ Keď zoberieme do úvahy informáciu od Vaška, že ešte pred povstaním *Rodina* vytvorila svoje bunky na všetkých fakultách a stredných školách na Slovensku³¹, je veľmi pravdepodobné, že nešlo o záchranu hocijakých študentov, ale o členov tzv. terciálnych buniek *Rodiny*. Do tejto kategórie činnosti Vicena a zrejme aj Chalmovského spadá aj záchrana V. Vaška ml., rovnako člena *Rodiny*, ktorý sa potom, ako sa zapojil do povstania, dostal do rúk gestapa.³² Tieto skutočnosti nepriamo nasvedčujú tomu, že obaja pôsobili v protipovstaleckých akciách v intenciách zámerov *Rodiny*. Podľa Vicenovej výpovede z roku 1957 väčšina členov *Rodiny* vedela o existencii a činnosti *Hlások*. Naproti tomu z *Hlások* o *Rodine* vedelo len niekoľko osôb. Kolakovič a *Rodina* činnosť svojich členov v *Hláskach* striktné neodmietali, ale vzhľadom na možnú kompromitáciu ľudí pre povojnové obdobie *Rodina* ako celok sa neusilovala o spoluprácu s *Hláskami*. Inak povedané jednotlivcom bola spolupráca s *Hláskami* povolená, keďže túto činnosť nepovažovali za nepriateľskú pre svoje zábery. Túto dvojkoľajnosť *Rodiny* v prebiehajúcom zápase potvrdzuje aj viacerými zdrojmi potvrdená spravodajská spolupráca Kolakoviča s hlavným exponentom *Hlások* Dr. Ladislavom Jankovičom. Podľa protokolu o výpovedi Augustína Hubu, absolventa Vyššej vodcovskej školy HM a člena *Hlások*, mal byť tento spolu s istým Imrichom Bokorom vyslaný Dr. Jankovičom začiatkom

rozdávali ruským vojakom. Akciu riadil Fronc. A ÚPN, fond 509-1-3. Pozri tiež: VAŠKO, V.: *Profesor Kolakovič*, s. 26 – 28.

- 30 Vicen ako funkcionár v ZVŠ v spolupráci s Dr. Jozefom Mikulom poskytovali študentom – vysokoškolákom potvrdenia o ich prítomnosti v Bratislave v čase povstania a súčasne informovali vysokoškolákov nachádzajúcich sa v povstaleckom priestore o zámeroch Nemcov stíhať ich rodiny. VICEN, J.: *Vo víroch rokov 1938 – 1988*, s. 53 – 59.
- 31 VAŠKO, V.: *Profesor Kolakovič – mýty a skutočnosť*, s. 106.
- 32 VICEN, J.: *Vo víroch rokov*, s. 75 – 89. Ďalej VAŠKO, V.: *Profesor Kolakovič – mýty a skutočnosť*, s. 106.

septembra 1944 do Banskej Bystrice za Kolakovičom, aby od neho získal správu o politickej situácii na povstaleckom území. Údajne túto správu aj získal a priniesol aj ďalšie informácie.³³

Naznačená dvojkoľajnosť v činnosti *Rodiny* v posledných mesiacoch vojny je pozorovateľná aj v súvislosti so vznikom a činnosťou ďalšej spravodajskej organizácie Slovenskej tajnej ochrany. STO vznikla, aj keď nie z iniciatívy, tak isto s vedomím *Rodiny* ako pokračovateľka činnosti spravodajskej organizácie *Hlások* v období od januára 1945 do konca druhej svetovej vojny. Obe spravodajské organizácie vznikli z potreby zaistiť dostatok informácií pre slovenskú vládu. Avšak STO, na rozdiel od *Hlások*, mala tento zámer realizovať až po obsadení Slovenska Červenou armádou. Predpokladalo sa, že vtedy vznikne v západnej zóne slovenská exilová vláda, ktorá bude potrebovať správy o situácii na Slovensku až do doby, keď sa na Slovensko opäť vráti. Prípravu STO organizačne zabezpečoval štáb *Hlások*, v ktorom opäť figurovali obaja spomínaní členovia *Rodiny*. Jadro tejto organizácie mali tvoriť členovia *Hlások*, avšak výlučne tí, ktorí pracovali v mieste svojich bydlísk. Nábor prebiehal do marca 1945 pričom získaných bolo asi 150 bývalých členov *Hlások*, roztrúsených po celom území Slovenska, no najviac na západnom Slovensku. Členovia STO, vyškolení v troch spravodajských kurzoch realizovaných v období od februára do marca 1945 v Bratislave, mali vystupovať ako samostatní jednotlivci; mali krycie čísla a navzájom sa nemali poznať. Vo svojich bydliskách mali čakať na priamu výzvu štábu na Slovensku k započatiu činnosti. Tá mala spočívať výlučne v spravodajskej a politickej činnosti. Bola im však naznačená i možnosť organizovať ilegálne politické hnutie, ktoré by realizovalo i spravodajskú činnosť. Čo je dôležité, politickú propagandu vo svojom okolí za zachovanie samostatnosti Slovenska mali začať bez príkazu štábu, hneď po obsadení Slovenska. Táto činnosť však nesmela ohroziť ich bezpečnosť a možnosť ich využitia na spravodajstvo. V žiadnom prípade nesmeli vstupovať do ozbrojených bojov. Uvažovalo sa aj o vytvorení buniek pozostávajúcich z niekoľkých členov STO, no k bunkovej organizácii sa nakoniec nepristúpilo. Inštruovaní boli len

33 A ÚPN, f. B 9/II. Zoznam členov a spolupracovníkov spravodajského oddelenia HV HM, s. 5. O tomto stretnutí podáva informáciu aj protokol o výpovedi s J. Vicenom zo dňa 17. 8. 1957, s. 2 – 3, avšak potvrdzuje len stretnutie Hubu s Kolakovičom. A ÚPN, f. 509–1–5. Napriek tomu, že ide o informáciu pochádzajúcu z rôznych zdrojov a časových období historik Jablonický ju považuje za vykonštruovanú a vynútenú zo strany ŠtB. JABLONICKÝ, J.: *Podoba násilia*, s. 44.

v tom zmysle, že keď príde príkaz na započatie činnosti, mali si nájsť spolupracovníkov tak, aby sa poznali nanajvýš dve až tri osoby.³⁴

Organizačne bolo riadenie STO rozdelené na dve skupiny. Počítalo sa s tým, že hlavný štáb STO bude v zahraničí v úzkom spojení s exilovou vládou. Jeho veliteľom mal byť Dr. Jankovič a v štábe mali byť aj ďalšie osoby, ktoré STO budovali vrátane Dr. Chalmovského. Tomuto veleniu mal byť podriadený ilegálny štáb na Slovensku, ktorý mal podliehať ďalšiemu členovi *Rodiny* Vicenovi. Malo ísť asi o 10 osôb, z ktorých Vicen v roku 1957 menoval Ignáca Danáka, Ota Čačku, Kopeckého, Hnidku, Rudolfa Komanderu a Chrobáka. Neskôr, v roku 1962, vo svojej výpovedi svedka v prípade *Kaniok Martin a spol.* počet spolupracovníkov v ilegálnom vedení STO Vicen rozšíril o Antona Tunegu, Alberta Púčika, Vančíka a Hrušku.³⁵

A opäť sa natíska otázka. Bolo takéto exponovanie členov *Rodiny* v zahraničnom a domácom ilegálnom vedení STO úplne náhodné? Podozrenie, že mohli konať v intenciách ideových zámerov *Rodiny*, naznačuje sled ďalších udalostí. Potom, čo vedúci predstavitelia Hlinkovej mládeže a STO podľahli všeobecnej panike vyvolanej nepredpokladane rýchlym postupom Červenej armády a neplánovane emigrovali do zahraničia spolu s členmi slovenskej vlády, boli to práve títo dvaja, ktorí na jar 1945 prijali úlohu od Jankoviča vrátiť sa na Slovensko s cieľom započat spravodajskú činnosť na platforme STO. Táto iste pozoruhodná zainteresovanosť v otázke fungovania STO sa ešte zvýrazní, ak zoberieme do úvahy, že ich vyslanie na Slovensko sa neuskutočnilo súčasne, ale následne. Najprv bol touto úlohou poverený Vicen v máji 1945³⁶ a až potom, keď sa už vedelo, že Vicen 8. júna 1945 v Olomovci padol do sovietskeho zajatia, bol touto úlohou poverený Dr. Chalmovský.³⁷ Otázka znie, prečo práve Chalmovský?

34 A ÚPN, f. 590–1–4, s. 5.

35 A ÚPN, f. A 8, archívna jednotka (ďalej iba a. j.) 1687, Prípád Kaniok Martin a spol., s. 4.

36 S Vicenom odišli aj ďalší členovia domáceho ilegálneho vedenia STO, a to Ignác Danák, Oto Čačko a Anton Tunega. Na pranie matičiarov ako iniciátorov ich návratu na Slovensko, konkrétne prof. Hrušovského, sústredených v Kremšmünsteri, bola skupina rozšírená o ďalších mladých vysokoškolákov, členov Hlinkovej mládeže, ktorí v panike opustili Slovensko bez akéhokoľvek materiálneho zabezpečenia a naviac bezdôvodne, keďže sa v minulosti nedopustili kompromitujúcej činnosti. Títo však, rovnako ako matičiari, o pravom poslaní Vicenovej skupiny nič nevedeli. Podrobnejšie pozri: VARINSKÝ, V.: *Jozef Vicen a Biela légia*, s. 30 – 31.

37 Historik Medvecký sa domnieva, že Chalmovského návrat na Slovensko po skončení vojny, ako aj ďalších absolventov VVŠ HM bol bezprizorný, bez konkrétnych predstáv,

Podľa pôvodných plánov mal zostať v zahraničí a zostávajúcím členom Vicenovej skupiny Čáčkovi, Tunegovi, Púčikovi a Danákovi, ako členom ilegálneho vedenia STO, sa na Slovensko predsa nakoniec podarilo dostať. Nevedeli o tejto skutočnosti v zahraničí? Ak skutočne nevedeli, tak potom prečo Chalmovský práve s týmito osobami začne na Slovensku s oživovaním činnosti STO? Odpoveď na tieto otázky z dokumentov, ktoré sú k dispozícii, nie je možné jednoznačne zistiť. Nedá sa však vylúčiť, a vyššie naznačené skutočnosti to nepriamo potvrdzujú, že s veľkou pravdepodobnosťou *Rodina* mala záujem kontrolovať ilegálnu činnosť STO na Slovensku. Z dokumentov tiež vieme, že *Rodina* predpokladala pri realizácii svojich protikomunistických zámerov uplatňovať nielen legálne, ale aj ilegálne aktivity, čo by len potvrdzovalo, že v prípade Vicena a Chalmovského nešlo len o náhodnú osobnú iniciatívu.

S oživovaním protikomunistického odboja na Slovensku na platforme plánovanej STO sa teda začalo niekedy v júni 1945 a bolo spojené s príchodom Dr. Chalmovského na Slovensko.³⁸ Podľa hodnotenia ŠtB mal spolu s Čáčkom, Tunegom, Púčikom, Danákom a ďalšími členmi bývalej STO založiť ilegálnu ozbrojenú organizáciu Biela garda, ktorej štáb sa schádzal v poľovníckej chate na Tribeči. Štáb tejto organizácie vydával a rozširoval ilegálny časopis *Slovák* ako tlačový orgán ilegálnej HSLS a v rozpore s pôvodnými inštrukciami pripravovali sa údajne aj na ozbrojený odboj. Výzbroj tejto organizácie pochádzala z arzenálu Pohotovostných oddielov Hlinkovej gardy, ktoré ukryl Tibor Benkovič, ich bývalý člen.³⁹ Centrum ilegálnej skupiny sa nachádzalo v obci Bojná v okrese Topoľčany. No nemalo ísť len o obmedzenú pôsobnosť v tomto regióne. Podľa výpovede poručíka K. Baroša, ktorý spolu s ďalšími orgánmi ŠtB likvidoval Chalmovského organizáciu, malo ísť o pomerne rozvetvenú organizáciu, pôsobiacu vo viacerých mestách na Slovensku (napr. Bánovce nad Bebravou, Banská Bystrica), s dosahom v rozširovaní *Slováka* v takmer v celoslovenskom meradle.⁴⁰

čo budú na Slovensku robiť. Pozri: MEDVECKÝ, M.: *Za červené Slovensko. Štátna bezpečnosť a politické spravodajstvo na Slovensku v rokoch 1945 – 1948*. Bratislava 2011, s. 153 – 154.

38 Podrobnejšie pozri LETZ, R.: *Odkaz živým. Prípady Albert Púčik a spol.* Bratislava 2008, s. 34 – 55.

39 A ÚPN, f. A7, inventárne číslo (ďalej i. č.) 18, sekretariát námestníka MV plk. Klímu. BAROŠ, Karol (3. 6. 1917) bývalý poručík NB; poznatky k jeho osobe, s. 23.

40 Ilegálna tlačiareň *Slováka* sa nachádzala pri Motešiaciach v okrese Bánovce nad Bebravou. A ÚPN, f. A7, i. č. 18. Sekretariát námestníka MV plk. Klímu, s. 27.

Tieto informácie však pôsobia dosť nedôveryhodne. Takto realizovaná odbojová činnosť svojím charakterom a akčným rádiom prekračovala pôvodné zameranie činnosti STO, ako aj Kolakovičove odporúčania o politickej činnosti členov *Rodiny*. S ozbrojeným odbojom ani jedna z týchto organizácií nepočítala, dokonca členom STO sa takáto činnosť zakazovala. A aj keď išlo aj v povojnovom období o odboj svojím protikomunistickým zameraním ideovo blízky zámerom *Rodiny*, zásadné rozdiely v otázke spôsobu a metód vedenia odboja, ako aj v jeho zameraní začali pôsobiť kontraproduktívne, a celkove tak znižovali účinnosť protikomunistického úsilia *Rodiny*. Najmä Chalmovského oživovanie skompromitovanej HSLS a zameranie odboja proti Československej republike a Sovietskemu zväzu s cieľom obnoviť slovenskú štátnosť, keďže nerozlišovali medzi komunistami a členmi Demokratickej strany a útočili proti všetkým Slovákom, ktorí sa po vojne zapojili do politického a verejného života,⁴¹ vážne komplikovalo úsilie *Rodiny* o vytvorenie tretej politickej strany, ktorá by legálne vyjadrovala záujmy katolícky orientovaných Slovákov. Napriek tejto skutočnosti, aj keď *Rodina* aktivity Chalmovského podľa Vicena odmietala, neurobila nič pre zastavenie tejto činnosti, nevyhlásila ho zo svojich radov, len nebol prizývaný na schôdzky *Rodiny*. Naopak, potom ako bol Chalmovský zatknutý a spolu s ním ďalšie osoby, postarala sa, aby súdom vymieraný trest, napriek pretrvávaniu brannej pohotovosti štátu, bol čo najmiernejší. Vyšetrovanie totiž viedol člen *Rodiny* Dr. J. Šrámek.⁴² S pomocou *Rodiny* sa Chalmovskému následne podarilo utiecť z pracovného tábora v Ústí nad Oravou do zahraničia.⁴³

Rovnaký prístup uplatňovala *Rodina* aj k Vicenovi. Potom, ako sa mu podarilo dostať zo sovietskeho zajatia z pevnostnej väznice v poľskej Rati-bori, sa začiatkom augusta 1945 vrátil na Slovensko. Po príchode do Bratislavy kontaktoval členov *Rodiny*, aby zistil, aké sú možnosti na započatie odbojovej činnosti. Súčasne navštevoval aj členov STO v Bratislave a Trenčine, ktorí ho brali ako svojho vedúceho a žiadali od neho pokyny na ďalšiu činnosť.⁴⁴ Takto sa dozvedel, že na Slovensku ilegálny odboj na platfor-me STO jestvuje. Aj keď sa Vicen neskôr vo svojich protokolárnych

41 A ÚPN, f. A 17, Ilegálna činnosť na Slovensku v rokoch 1938 – 1947.

42 Nie je vylúčené, že Chalmovského vyšetroval aj ďalší člen *Rodiny* Dr. Chmelo. Rovnako však mohlo dôjsť aj k zámene týchto osôb v postupne realizovaných výpovediach Jozefa Vicena. A ÚPN, fond 59–1–3. Protokol o výpovedi Jozefa Vicena z 2. 7. 1957, s. 4.

43 A ÚPN, f. 509–1–3, protokol o výpovedi Jozefa Vicena z 1. 6. 1957, s. 6.

44 A ÚPN, f. 509–1–3, protokol o výpovedi Jozefa Vicena z 29. 6. 1957.

výpovediach snažil bagatelizovať svoju účasť v tomto odboji, dôkazy, ktoré mala ŠtB k dispozícii, hovorili proti nemu.⁴⁵ Bezprostredne, v súlade so svojím pôvodným poslaním, začal koordinovať činnosť jednotlivých odbojových skupín. Podľa jeho výpovede v roku 1957 mal byť iniciátorom úsilia o zjednotenie Chalmovského skupiny so skupinou Jozefa Bačkora v Bratislave. Táto výpoveď korešponduje aj s výsledkami operatívy ŠtB zo začiatku roka 1946. Podľa súhrnnej správy o existujúcich protištátnych organizáciách mal sa spolu s Chalmovským, Kšínantom⁴⁶ a Bačkorom zúčastniť tajnej schôdzky v Topoľčanoch, kde sa mali dohodnúť na zjednotení všetkých odbojových skupín pod jednotné velenie. Akt zjednotenia sa mal uskutočniť začiatkom decembra 1945 v chate na Tribeči.⁴⁷ Súčasne začal fungovať ako spojka medzi *Rodinou* a ilegálnym odbojom, čo umožňovalo skoordinať ilegálny odboj s legálnymi aktivitami *Rodiny*.⁴⁸ Formou spolupráce sa realizovala aj akcia zameraná na zistenie situácie, v akej sa nachádza bývalá slovenská vláda v zahraničí. A opäť je to Vicen, ktorý so súhlasom *Rodiny* sa podujal túto úlohu zrealizovať.

Cestu do Nemecka vykonal v októbri 1945 ako svoju druhú cestu do zahraničia, avšak tentokrát bola realizovaná legálnym spôsobom. Legality jej prepožičal Červený kríž, od ktorého Vicen za pomoci Márie

45 Počas zatýkacej akcie Chalmovského a jeho skupiny v novembri 1945, ktorý označil Vicena a Kolakoviča za svojich najbližších spolupracovníkov, bol vo Vicenovom pražskom byte nájdený plný kufor ilegálnych tlačív, ako i spravodajské smernice na ilegálnu činnosť HG a HSEŠ. A ÚPN, f. A7, i. j. 18. Sekretariát námestníka MV plk. Klímy, s. 27. Podľa Vicenovej výpovede z 29. 6. 1957 mal byť Bačkor, ktorý viedol odbojovú skupinu v Bratislave pre neho neznámy človek, s ktorým sa zoznámil viac-menej náhodne v auguste 1945 v Bratislave. Podľa našich zistení bol Bačkor absolventom VVŠ HM, a teda s veľkou pravdepodobnosťou aj členom *Hlások*, resp. STO. Z tohto dôvodu mohol byť Vicenovi známou osobou. Porovnaj: A ÚPN, f. 509–1–3. Protokol o výpovedi Jozefa Vicena z 29. 6. 1957, s. 1 – 3; A ÚPN, f. B9/II, i. j. 4. Zoznam absolventov VVŠ HM.

46 Anton Kšínant bol v období I. Slovenskej republiky obvodný tajomník HSEŠ a zástupcom veliteľa PO HG v Zlatých Moravciach. Po vojne bol odsúdený a uväznený, ale podarilo sa mu utiecť z väzenia a ukryť v horách. Následne sa kontaktoval so svojím spolužiakom Chalmovským.

47 Slovenský národný archív (ďalej iba SNA) Bratislava, f. Povereníctvo vnútra – prezídium/1946, škatuľa číslo (ďalej iba šk.) 37, Súhrnná správa o odhalených, sledovaných a existujúcich protištátnych organizáciách.

48 Túto skutočnosť postrehla aj operatíva ŠtB. Spomínaná správa konštatuje časovú zhodu prvých vystúpení ilegálnych skupín s prvým organizovaným vystúpením katolíckeho duchovenstva proti poštátneniu školstva. SNA, f. PV – prezídium/1946, šk. 37. Súhrnná správa o odhalených.

Búzkovej⁴⁹ získal potvrdenie o tom, že v Nemecku ide hľadať svojho príbuzného, ktorý bol v koncentračnom tábore. Svoje poslanie splnil. Našiel kontakt na slovenskú vládu a prostredníctvom kňaza, ktorý bol Tisovým svedníkom, odovzdal Tisovi správu o situácii v Československu, zvlášť o Benešových dekrétach, ktorú mali podľa ŠtB vyhotoviť Kšínant a Chalmovský.⁵⁰ V konečnom dôsledku táto akcia nemala predpokladaný vývoj. Krátko po prechode hraníc sa Vicen dozvedel, že Tiso bol vydaný do Československa.

Odhliadnuc od toho, ako celá akcia dopadla, význam Vicenovej cesty bol v tom, že potvrdila nejestvovanie slovenskej politickej reprezentácie v zahraničí. Ukázala tiež, že vojna medzi Západom a Východom v dohľadnej dobe nevypukne a že otázka samostatného Slovenska je neaktuálna – že Západ akceptuje len nerozdelené Československo. Z toho vyplývalo, že riešenie slovenskej otázky je vnútropolitickou záležitosťou a že pre jej medzinárodné zviditeľnenie je potrebné rozvinúť politickú prácu vo vnútri republiky s využitím zahraničnej tlače. O týchto výsledkoch svojej cesty Vicen informoval Kolakoviča, ako i ďalších členov *Rodiny* vrátane Bačkora. Zainteresovaným bolo zrejmé, že osud Slovenska je vnútropolitickou záležitosťou a bude v značnej miere závisieť od charakteru štátneho zriadenia v Československu.⁵¹

Pod vplyvom informácií získaných Vicenom *Rodina* zintenzívnila svoju protikomunistickú činnosť najmä legálnymi prostriedkami s cieľom vylúčiť všetkých komunistov a osôb marxistického zmysľania z riadenia štátnych záležitostí a tým i obmedzenia ich vplyvu na občanov. Prioritou sa stalo udržať a upevniť vplyv katolíkov proti narastajúcemu vplyvu marxizmu. V tomto smere sa v Čechách a na Morave počítalo s využitím Československej strany lidovej, ktorá by prijala Kolakovičov kresťansko-sociálny program. Za týmto účelom sa počítalo s vytvorením *Rodiny* v českej časti

49 M. Búzková v období I. Slovenskej republiky pracovala na HV HM. Zatknutá bola najprv v roku 1945 v prípade „Chalmovský“ a potom v roku 1947 a odsúdená na 13 rokov v roku 1950 v prípade „Komandera“. Porovnaj: A ÚPN, f. 509–1–1, a. j. 159. Vyhodnotenie spisov k osobe Komanderu Rudolfa; tiež A ÚPN, f. A 17, i. j. 13. Ilegálna činnosť na Slovensku v rokoch 1938 – 1947, s. 9.

50 SNA, f. PV – prezídium, šk. 37. Súhrnná správa o odhalených.

51 Prínos Vicenovej cesty do zahraničia spočíval aj v inom. Podarilo sa mu skontaktovať s prof. Antonom Buganom, členom *Rodiny*, ktorý žil v Regensburgu, a tiež s Dr. Polakovičom a Dr. Cincíkom. Dohodli sa, že ich Vicen bude príležitostne informovať o situácii na Slovensku. Vicen ako poznávacie znamenie pre informátora dostal od Dr. Cincíka polovicu papierika, ktorý Dr. Cincík pred roztrhnutím podpísal. A ÚPN, f. 509–1–3, protokol o vypovedi Jozefa Vicena z 29. 6. 1957, s. 4.

republiky, predovšetkým získaním stúpcov Kolakovičovho programu medzi funkcionármi tejto strany. Od infiltrácie Lidovej strany sa tiež očakávalo iniciovanie vzniku tretej politickej strany na Slovensku, ktorá by sa zásadne líšila od skompromitovanej Hlinkovej slovenskej ľudovej strany.

Spomínané legálne aktivity Rodiny, s ktorými sa začalo už v júli 1945, však nevyklúčovali, aby opäť len jednotlivci z jej radov nevyvíjali aj vlastnú ilegálnu iniciatívu. Konkrétne opäť Vicen sa v rámci akcií *Rodiny* v Čechách a na Morave pokúšal v súlade s Kolakovičovým odporúčaním nájsť informačný kanál na Západ, ktorý by umožnil poskytovať informácie o situácii v Československu, no najmä o Slovensku. Prostredníctvom nemenovaného redaktora *Lidové demokracie* podarilo sa mu kontaktovať istého Američana, ktorý pravdepodobne pracoval na veľvyslanectve. Viacmenej všeobecné správy o situácii na Slovensku vyhotovené Dr. Jurajom Rajcom z Bratislavy a Vicenom však zrejme Američanovi príliš nevyhovovali, keďže požadoval, aby nasledujúce správy pochádzali zo zákulisia politického života a mali teda viac spravodajský charakter. Táto sľubne sa vyvíjajúca aktivita nakoniec nebola dotiahnutá do konca, keďže začiatkom decembra bol *Rodinou* informovaný, že v súvislosti s prípadom Chalmovský ho hľadá ŠtB.⁵²

Od tohto obdobia až do svojej druhej emigrácie sa Vicen ukrýval na rôznych miestach na Slovensku. Začiatkom januára 1946 sa vybral na schôdzku *Rodiny* do Žiliny.⁵³ Bol to posledný pokus Vicena o koordinovanie svojej činnosti s *Rodinou*. Rokovaní sa nakoniec nezúčastnil, keďže na základe odporúčania Kolakoviča, Sýkora, ale i ďalších členov *Rodiny*, nemal sa až do vyjasnenia vecí s vydaním zatykača zúčastňovať činnosti *Rodiny* a ani vyhľadávať kontakt na členov *Rodiny*. Bolo zrejmé, že aj keď nebol z radov *Rodiny* vylúčený, *Rodina* sa musí rovnako ako v prípade Chalmovského v záujme svojich politických zámerov oficiálne od neho dištancovať. Preto už 2. januára 1946 opustil kláštor, kde sa schôdzka konala. Nový úkryt mu v obci Včeláry v okrese Modrý Kameň na hospodárstve svojich rodičov zaistil Sýkora. Tu vystupoval pod cudzím menom

52 A ÚPN, f. 509–1–3. Protokol o výpovedi Jozefa Vicena z 2. 7. 1957, s. 4. Informáciu Rodine poskytol Dr. Chmelo, ktorý ako vyšetrovací sudca Chalmovského vyšetroval. Vicenovi správu odovzdal Dr. Szabo (Braxátor).

53 Išlo o prvé väčšie zhromaždenie členov *Rodiny* (asi 60 ľudí) po skončení 2. svetovej vojny. Začalo sa 31. 12. 1945 a trvalo niekoľko dní pod pláštikom normálnych náboženských úkonov. Zmyslom stretnutia bolo prijatie programu pre ďalšiu činnosť Rodiny. A ÚPN, f. 509–1–3. Protokol o výpovedi Jozefa Vicena z 2. 7. 1957, s. 1.

Jozef Krajčo až do svojej emigrácie dňa 9. mája 1946, kedy emigroval do zahraničia.⁵⁴

Z naznačených skutočností vyplýva, že Kolakovič a jeho *Rodina* nemali za cieľ len náboženskú činnosť, ale pod jej rúškom sledovali politické ciele, ktoré mali jednoznačné protikomunistické zameranie. Diapazón aktivít *Rodiny* bol mimoriadne široký. Fungovala v hlbokjej ilegalite, súčasne však predpokladala realizovať svoje zámery prevažne legálnymi prostriedkami. Jednotliví členovia *Rodiny*, až na členov najvyšších buniek organizačnej štruktúry *Rodiny*, mohli ako súkromné osoby aktívne vstupovať do verejného a politického života s cieľom v čo najširšom rozsahu ho ovplyvňovať v intenciách zámerov *Rodiny*. Prípád Chalmovského s Vicenom potvrdzuje, že povolená bola aj ilegálna činnosť. Zdá sa, že Chalmovský hovoril pravdu, keď počas vyšetrovania označil Kolakoviča za ideologického zakladateľa hnutia odporu.

Summary

The presented paper is a continuation of the dialogue between the historians on the issue of the character of Tomislav Kolakovič (Pogljajen), the fellowship *Rodina* (*Family*) that he had established as well as the purposes of the organization. The author argues with the adverse opinions of other historians; by direct as well as indirect methods he proves that under the veil of religious activities the fellowship aimed to follow its political, i.e. anti-communist agenda. They aimed at eliminating the impact of communists in state affairs by using both legal and illegal means to achieve their goal. The presented data contribute to the identification of the so-called „third party” of anti-communist resistance.

54 A ÚPN, f. 509–1–3. Protokol o výpovedi Jozefa Vicena z 2. 7. 1957, s. 1.

„Byli jsme první vojáci i zajatci studené války“. Případ kurýra Miloslava Čapka

Petr BLAŽEK

Druhý den jsme zase pokračovali ve školení, a to nám Brauner přednášel, co je vlastně kurýr a co má za povinnosti. Říkal nám, že kurýr je osoba, která má za úkol přenášení zpráv od pramene zprávy, nebo důvěrníka na místo určení, kam má být zpráva doručena. Asi po hodině jej vystřídal Eminger, který nám vykládal o vlastnostech kurýra. Říkal nám, že kurýr má být spolehlivý, oddaný, nesobecký, inteligentní, mlčenlivý, nedůvěřivý, bystrý a pohotový. O každém bodě se ještě zmiňoval šíře. Tím naše dopolední školení skončilo a šli jsme do jídelny na oběd.

Z výslechu zatčeného kurýra Jiřího Formánka, 25. únor 1950¹

Mezi vzpomínkovými knihami bývalých politických vězňů z období komunistického režimu mají důležité místo dvě publikace Miloslava Čapka. První z nich má podobu paměti² a druhá je věnována životním příběhům, o nichž se dozvěděl během své dlouholeté poutě po pracovních táborech a věznicích, kam se dostal jako zatčený kurýr zpravodajské

1 Archiv bezpečnostních složek (dál pouze ABS), fond (dál pouze f.) Historický fond, H-664, podsvazek č. 1, Protokol výslechu Jiřího Formánka, 25. 2. 1950. Když byl Jiří Formánek po únoru 1948 propuštěn ze Sboru národní bezpečnosti, odešel ilegálně do Bavorska. Zde začal působit jako kurýr pro zpravodajskou skupinu, kterou řídil František Moravec. Při jedné ze svých cest do Československa byl 9. února 1950 zatčen. V prosinci 1950 byl následně odsouzen k 21 letům odnětí svobody za velezradu a špionáž. Propuštěn byl teprve v roce 1964. K jeho výcviku a zatčení srov. HRADILEK, A. – TICHÝ, M.: Osudová mise Moravcova kurýra. Příběh plukovníka letectva ve výslužbě Miroslava Dvořáčka. In: *Paměť a dějiny*, roč. 3, 2009, č. 1, s. 79.

2 ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*. Praha 2000.

skupiny, kterou ve Spolkové republice Německo řídil někdejší generál československé armády František Moravec.³

Při psaní obou knih vycházel Míla, jak mu přátelé říkali, pouze z vlastní paměti, literatury a dobového tisku. K archivním dokumentům se dostal teprve poté, když obě knihy vyšly. Zpřístupněn mu tehdy byl v pardubické badatelně pouze pozorovací svazek, který k němu vedla Státní bezpečnost v první polovině sedmdesátých let.⁴ I to byl patrně jeden z důvodů, proč je v jeho knihách poměrně málo konkrétních časových údajů a proč některé postavy vystupují pod smyšlenými jmény: „*Jejich jména nemusí vždy souhlasit, ale příběhy jsou skutečné a uváděné tak, jak je autor v době, kdy se udály, viděl.*“⁵

Druhým důvodem byla snad také jeho zpravodajská čest, na které si zakládal. „*O některých věcech se nemluví*“, často zdůrazňoval při našich setkáních. Seznámil jsem se s ním blíže v roce 2002, kdy jsem pořádal na Filosofické fakultě Univerzity Karlovy v Praze cyklus veřejných přednášek. Míla patřil mezi jejich pravidelné návštěvníky. Většinou sedával v zadní lavici u dveří společně s Milanem Paumerem, přítelem a spolupojovníkem bratrů Mašínových, a spisovatelem Janem Benešem. Když jsem projevil zájem o jeho vzpomínky, přinesl mi několik nevydaných rukopisů. Jeden z nich byl v květnu 2003 zveřejněn na internetovém portálu *Pražský web pro studenou válku*.⁶ Přibližně ve stejné době jsem na dvou schůzkách zaznamenal jeho životní příběh. Rozhovor byl na internetu zveřejněn v roce 2005, krátce po jeho smrti.⁷

3 ČAPEK, M.: *Poražení vítězové. Kapitoly z třetího odboje*. Praha 2003. K Moravcovým životním osudům blíže ŠOLC, J.: *Ve službách prezidenta. Generál František Moravec ve světle archivních dokumentů*. Praha 1994.

4 ABS, f. MV-KR, archivní číslo (dál pouze arch. č.) 629219 MV.

5 ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 10.

6 ČAPEK, M.: Protikomunistický odboj. In: *Pražský web pro studenou válku*, roč. 2, č. 5 (květen 2003). Dostupné na URL <<http://www.praguecoldwar.cz/capek2.htm>>(ověřeno 4. 6. 2012). Obdobný text vyšel také ve sborníku ČAPEK, M.: *Kšaft třetího (protikomunistického) odboje*. In: BABKA, L. – VEBER, V.: *Za svobodu a demokracii III. Třetí (protikomunistický) odboj*. Hradec Králové 2002, s. 341 – 352.

7 *Učili jsme se různé legendy pro případ zatčení. Rozhovor s Miloslavem Čapkem*, Praha 26. 3. a 2. 5. 2003. Dostupné na URL <http://www.totalita.cz/vzp/vzp_0007.php>(ověřeno 4. 6. 2012).

Když jsem před časem opět pročítal Čapkovy vzpomínky, napadlo mě, že by bylo zajímavé z dostupných archivních dokumentů⁸ zjistit další podrobnosti o jeho případu a dalších životních osudech.⁹

Značná část života Miloslava Čapka byla spojena se Slaným, kde se 14. prosince 1928 narodil. Jeho otec, Václav Čapek, provozoval v Husově ulici pekařství s obchodem. Maminka, Františka Čapková, rozená Balcarová, pocházela z rolnické rodiny z Poříčí u Náchoda.¹⁰ Míla měl ještě starší sestru Blanku, jež se po válce provdala za Jaroslava Seiberta.¹¹ Míla vychodil pět tříd obecní a čtyři třídy měšťanské školy. Poté začal studovat na Průmyslové škole chemické v Praze, která tehdy sídlila v Betlémské ulici.¹² Přes týden bydlel na privátu poblíž školy, v ulici Karolíny Světlé. Jako mladý student rád sportoval. Již od dětství byl členem Sokola, do něhož opět vstoupil po válce. V roce 1948 se jako zdravotník zúčastnil památného všesokolského sletu v Praze.¹³

Míla se od mládí také zajímal o politiku. Nejvíce sympatická mu byla národně socialistická strana, jež podle jeho názoru navazovala na humanistické prvorepublikové tradice.¹⁴ Na rozdíl od řady svých vrstevníků nepodlehł poválečným iluzím o komunismu: *„Poprvé jsem pochopil jeho podstatu již v roce 1945, když jsem se setkal se sovětskými vojáky, kteří k nám přišli do Slaného ještě trochu dříve než do Prahy. Brali lidem hodinky a chtěli jenom pít. Na podzim 1945 jsem potom viděl v Pařížské ulici opilé sovětské*

8 V ABS je dochován vyšetřovací spis (f. V-ČB, V-111 ČB) a v Národním archivu prokurátorský (f. Státní prokuratura Praha, SPT I/I 33/20), soudní (f. Státní soud Praha, TS I/VII 59/50) a rehabilitační spis (f. Státní soud Praha, 8 Rt 381/90).

9 Navštívil jsem ve Slaném také manželku Miloslava Čapka, která mi laskavě zprostředkovala jeho pozůstalost. Vedle osobních dokumentů jsou v ní uloženy zejména dokumenty ze soudní rehabilitace na počátku devadesátých let a několik osobních fotografií. Další snímky jsem získal od paní Blanky Seibrtové, sestry Miloslava Čapka, jež rovněž bydlel ve Slaném.

10 Václav Čapek se narodil 9. května 1892 ve Slaném. Byl synem Štěpána Čapka a Marie, rozené Fialové. Františka Čapková, rozená Balcarová, se narodila 30. října 1890 v Malém Poříčí. Byla dcerou Josefa Balcara a Františky, rozené Rýdlové. Národní archiv (dál pouze NA), f. Státní soud Praha, Soudní spis TS I/VII 59/50, Opis rodného listu Miloslava Čapka.

11 ABS, f. V-ČB, V-111 ČB, Vyšetřovací spis Tomášek Fr. a spol., Zápis o výpovědi Miloslava Čapka na Krajském velitelství StB České Budějovice, 6. 5. 1950.

12 Škola se v roce 1952 přestěhovala do Křemencovy ulice. Dnes na ni navazuje Masarykova střední škola chemická.

13 ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 11.

14 Tamtéž, s. 11 – 12.

*vojáky, jak ohrožovali kolemjdoucí lidi. Přijeli pro ně, odzbrojili je, zmlátili, naházeli je do auta a odvezli pryč.*¹⁵

Důležitým životním přelomem pro něho byl studentský pochod na Hrad, kterého se večer 23. února 1948 osobně zúčastnil. Stejně jako ostatní návštěvníci tehdy obdržel od prezidenta Beneše slib, že nepodlehne nátlakům komunistů. O dva dny později již bylo vše jinak a druhý studentský pochod byl v Nerudově ulici rozehnán. „Až dodatečně jsem si uvědomil, jak málo nás pražská veřejnost při naší demonstraci podporovala. Lidé byli zalezlí ve svých domech a čekali, jak to dopadne,“ popisoval po letech s trpkostí.¹⁶

Postupně se začala nová politická realita projevovat také na průmyslovce. V prosinci 1948 byl Míla dokonce společně s několika kamarády málem vyloučen ze studií. Po celé republice se tehdy uskutečnila velká organizovaná podpisová akce k šedesátým Stalinovým narozeninám. Míla pojal celou věc jako frašku a na podpisový arch napsal doktor Čapek. Jeho příkladu následovalo několik spolužáků. Student, který kampaň na škole organizoval, odnesl podpisy na místní stranický výbor. Recesisty zachránila nakonec profesorka fyziky, jejíž manžel byl paradoxně vysokým funkcionářem KSČ. Prohlásila, že se jedná pouze o klukovinu. Další konflikt Míla zažil o několik měsíců, když odmítl členství v nově vznikajícím Československém svazu mládeže, ačkoliv vedení školy vyhrožovalo, že nebude připuštěn k maturitě.¹⁷

Na podzim 1949 Mílova třída odjela na dvoutýdenní zemědělskou brigádu do pohraničí, kde po odsunu Němců chyběly pracovní síly. Míla byl společně s jedním spolužákem vybrán, aby dělali vedoucí. Teprve cestou vlakem do Lenory zjistil, že budou pracovat na statku v Kunžvartu v těsné blízkosti hranice s Bavorskem. Dohodl se rychle s pěticí kamarádů,¹⁸ že při první příležitosti utečou.

15 *Učili jsme se různé legendy pro případ zatčení. Rozhovor s Miloslavem Čapkem*, Praha 26. 3. a 2. 5. 2003.

16 ČAPEK, M.: *O muzích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 14.

17 Tamtéž, s. 22.

18 Ve svých pamětech Miloslav Čapek uvádí celým jménem pouze dva spolužáky, s nimiž uprchl: František Vlach a Josef Hanáček. Třetí je uveden pouze příjmením – Olmer. Tamtéž, s. 23, 30 a 31. Uvedená pětice je uvedena ve výpovědi Františka Tomáška, který se s Miloslavem Čapkem vrátil v květnu 1950 do Československa: Aleš Olmer, Zdeněk Rybišár, František Vlach, Jiří Mican a Josef Hanáček (ve spise uveden jako Haňáček). ABS, f. V-ČB, V-111 ČB, Vyšetřovací spis Tomášek Fr. a spol., Zápis o výpovědi Miloslava Čapka, 6. 5. 1950.

Málem ovšem zamířili místo za hranice do vězení. Dne 13. listopadu 1949 totiž brigádníci odjeli na taneční zábavu do Českých Žlebů, kde se jeden z nich svěřil s plánem na útěk jedné z místních dívek: „*Na této taneční zábavě kamarád Čapka, Vlach v podnapilém stavu prozpěvoval, že foukne za hranice. Pro tento zpěv Vlacha byli i jeho kamarádi vyslýcháni na PS útvaru v Českých Žlebech, kterýžto útvar po propuštění uvedených zdejší stanici SNB o této věci nepodal žádnou zprávu.*“¹⁹ Čapkovi a jeho přátelům se podařilo místního velitele Pohraniční stráže přesvědčit, že to jejich kamarád nemyslel vážně.

O čtyři dny později, 17. listopadu 1949, dostali za úkol hnát ovce z Českého Žlebu na statek, kde pracovali. Místo do vnitrozemí zamířila pětice studentů ke státní hranici směrem do bavorské obce Haidmühle. Útěk se jim se štěstím nakonec podařil, byť jen těsně dokázali uniknout zátahu pohraničnicků. Po úspěšném přechodu hranic byli mladí uprchlíci převezeni příslušníky německé hraniční policie do záchytného tábora ve městě Weiden. Zde byli vyslechnuti na služebně americké vojenské kontrarozvědky.²⁰

Stejně jako tisíce jeho krajanů strávil Miloslav Čapek následující měsíce po svém odchodu z vlasti ve sběrných táborech Mezinárodní uprchlické organizace (*International Refugee Organisation* – IRO). Z Weidenu byl podle svých vzpomínek nejdříve poslán do tábora Lechfeld u Augsburgu a nakonec skončil v Ludwigsburgu, které tehdy patřilo mezi hlavní exilová centra.²¹ Zde byl kontaktován vedoucím jedné z exilových zpravodajských skupin, které vznikly z iniciativy západních tajných služeb, pro něž získávaly informace zejména prostřednictvím kurýrů vysílaných tajně do Československa.

Zpravodajské operace namířené proti komunistickému režimu v Československu jsou doposud popsány pouze velmi málo. Pro jejich rekonstrukci historici používají takřka výhradně dokumenty z provenience komunistického bezpečnostního aparátu.²² Doposud totiž bohužel nebyly

19 ABS, f. V-ČB, V-111 ČB, Podsvazek, Tomášek Frant. a Čapek Miloslav zadržení, 8. 5. 1950.

20 ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 28 – 32.

21 Tamtéž, s. 44.

22 Srov. PEJČOCH, I. – TOMEK, P.: *Agenti-chodci na popravišti. Kurýři západních zpravodajských služeb, popravení v letech 1949 – 1958*. Cheb 2010; TOMEK, P.: *Zpravodajská skupina „IRON“ a její infiltrace československými bezpečnostními složkami 1948 – 1952*. In: VEBER, V. – BUREŠ, J. a kol.: *Třetí odboj. Kapitoly z dějin protikomunistické rezistence v Československu v padesátých letech 20. století*. Plzeň 2010, s. 295 – 302.

až na drobné výjimky zpřístupněny dokumenty z provenience západních tajných služeb. Dokumenty částečně nahrazují ojedinělé vzpomínky několika bývalých exilových zpravodajců, které se ovšem týkají pouze konkrétních případů.²³

Nejasnosti se týkají také exilové zpravodajské skupiny, jež na jaře 1950 vycvičila v Západním Německu Miloslava Čapka a vyslala ho do Československa. Podle jeho vzpomínek stál v jejím čele někdejší major Antonín Bartoš, úspěšný velitel paravýsadku „Clay-Eva“ a po válce poslanec národně socialistické strany, který v únoru 1948 odešel do Paříže.²⁴ V říjnu 1948 zde spoluzaložil Sdružení československého odboje, jehož předsedou se stal prof. František Kovárna.²⁵ V roce 1949 byl Radou svobodného Československa pověřen vedením její zpravodajské organizace. Následně pak v letech 1950–1952 pracoval v Západním Německu pro jednu z tajných amerických služeb.²⁶

Bartoš v Západním Německu působil pod krycími jmény „Braun“ či „Brauner“. Od počátku roku 1950 jeho skupina sídlila ve městě Bruchsal, ležícím asi 80 kilometrů od Ludwigsburgu. Kurýři byli cvičeni v jednopatrové vile na ulici Belvedere, které říkali „Okopanina“. Podle dokumentů Státní bezpečnosti, jež se o tomto místě dozvěděla nejpozději v únoru 1950 od zatčeného kurýra Jiřího Formánka, byla Bartošova skupina podřízena Františku Moravcovi, který v Západním Německu používal krycí jméno

23 Srov. PACNER, K.: *Československo ve zvláštních službách. Pohledy do historie československých výzvědných služeb 1941 – 1989. Díl III. 1945 – 1961.* Praha 2002; LUKEŠ, I.: *Operace velký metař.* In: PERNES, J. (Ed.): *Politické procesy v Československu po roce 1945 a případ „Slánský“.* Sborník příspěvků ze stejnojmenné konference, pořádané ve dnech 14. – 16. dubna 2003 v Praze. Brno 2005, s. 59 – 85.

24 ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo,* s. 44 – 45.

25 PACNER, K.: *Československo ve zvláštních službách.* Díl III. s. 97 a 221.

26 Podle výsledků dalšího ze zatčených kurýrů, Jiřího Kauera, působila Bartošova skupina v druhé polovině roku 1950 v Darmstadtu, které je vzdáleno okolo 80 km od Bruchsalu. Po rozchodu s Moravcem na počátku roku 1951 pracoval Bartoš jako náborář pro americkou armádu. V srpnu 1952 odjel do USA, kde se usadil v New Yorku. Do Československa se podíval až v březnu 1990. Zemřel v roce 1998 v New Yorku, kde je také pochován. PEJČOCH, I. – TOMEK, P.: *Agenti-chodci na popravisti,* s. 17, 184 – 186; PACNER, K.: *Československo ve zvláštních službách.* Díl III. s. 323; BARTOŠ, A. (zapsal Radomír Kunc): *Clay-Eva volá Londýn. Hlášení z let 1939 – 1945.* Praha 1992, s. 269 – 270.

„Arnold“ a pro americké zpravodajce hrál roli hlavního koordinátora exilových zpravodajských skupin.²⁷

Postavení Františka Moravce bylo ovšem ve skutečnosti složitější. V první polovině roku 1950 měl své hlavní sídlo v amerických kasárnách ve Frankfurtu. Pracovala pro něho přímo také Bartošova skupina v Bruchsalu, ostatní exilové zpravodajské skupiny pracující pro Američany měly údajně působit samostatně: „*Moravec byl vždy sólista. Proto s ostatními zpravodajskými skupinami nespolupracoval. Občas se stýkal s Kudláčkem-Hutníkem a s Kašparem-Königem. Jeho činnost řídil Katek, kopie přehledů o své činnosti posílal Moravec rovněž Ingrovi do Washingtonu. Jeho skupina měla neustále 10–20 kurýrů.*“²⁸ V Československu měli především plnit čtyři typy úkolů. Prvním bylo převádění osob do zahraničí, včetně rodinných příslušníků politických uprchlíků; druhým vybudování tajných úkrytů pro západní výsadkáře pro případ očekávané nové světové války; třetím vytvoření zpravodajských sítí, které měly tvořit malé samostatné buňky; posledním úkolem bylo získávání důležitých dokumentů, osobních legitimací a průkazů.²⁹

Není také zcela jasné, s jakou americkou tajnou službou vlastně Moravec na počátku padesátých let spolupracoval. V dokumentech StB a v textech některých historiků se nejčastěji hovoří o americké vojenské kontrarozvědce (*Counterintelligence Corps* – CIC), jejíž činnost ovšem nebyla již ze své povahy ofenzivní. Zmíněný plk. Charles Katek působil před únorovým převratem v roce 1948 jako vojenský přidělenec na Velvyslanectví USA v Praze. Dne 18. března 1948 byl na nátlak komunistických úřadů vyhoštěn z Československa. Odešel do Frankfurtu nad Mohanem, odkud organizoval od léta 1948 československé exilové zpravodajské skupiny. Oficiálně vystupoval jako vedoucí krycí organizace Jednotka ekonomického vývoje (*Economic Research Unit* – ERU). Jeho činnost se patrně odehrávala v rámci

27 ABS, f. Historický fond, H-664, podsvazek č. 1, Protokol výslechu Jiřího Formánka, 25. 2. 1950. Srov. TOMEK, P.: *Na frontě studené války. Československo 1948 – 1956. Katalog výstavy k 60. výročí zahájení zahraničního protikomunistického odboje*. Praha 2009, s. 16 – 23; PEJČOCH, I. – TOMEK, P.: *Agenti-chodci na popravěšti*, s. 17. Výcvikem ve vile Okopanina prošel také Miroslav Dvořáček (měl zde krycí jméno „Dostál“), při jehož zatčení 13. dubna 1950 příslušníky SNB sehrál podle dochovaných archivních dokumentů vedle jiných osob významnou roli také Milan Kundera. Srov. HRADILEK, A. – TICHÝ, M.: *Osudová mise Moravcova kurýra. Příběh plukovníka letectva ve výslužbě Miroslava Dvořáčka*. In: *Paměť a dějiny*, roč. 3, č. (2009), s. 78 – 80.

28 PACNER, K.: *Československo ve zvláštních službách*, č. 1 díl III. s. 307.

29 Tamtéž, s. 308.

Ústřední zpravodajské služby (*Central Intelligence Agency* – CIA), která byla v roce 1947 založena jako nová zastřešující zpravodajská služba USA.³⁰

Miloslav Čapek nenapsal přesně, kdy byl Antonínem Bartošem³¹ získán v Ludwigsburgu ke spolupráci. Bylo to zřejmě někdy na počátku jara 1950. Vycvičen byl ve výše zmíněné výcvikové vile v Bruchsalu. Patrový dům s garáží a terasou se nacházel na okraji parkové čtvrti. Původně ho vlastnil německý továrník, kterému byl po válce zabaven americkou armádou. O zásobování se staral Američan, který před kurýry vystupoval pod jménem „Rott“. O pořádek se staraly a vaření zajišťovaly dvě Němky. V přízemí vily byla Bartošova kancelář, kde se odehrávaly „*veškeré cvičné porady, tak i přípravy k přechodům*“. Ve vile pobývalo na jaře 1950 šest kurýrů – každý měl k dispozici samostatný pokoj s telefonem. Navzájem se znali pouze pod krycími jmény, Čapek vystupoval jako „Carlson“.³²

Fyzická příprava byla poměrně náročná. Odehrávala se většinou na hřišti nedaleko vily: „*Součástí cvičení byl i náročnější výcvik – například výskoky z jedoucího auta a různé pády a seskoky. Přípravovali nás na zdolávání různých překážek, které se vyskytují nejen při přechodu hranic, ale i při pobytu v nepřátelském území. [...] Prováděli jsme i výcvik orientačního zaměření. To znamená různé pochody v neznámém prostředí dle mapy a kompasu. Další variantou byl návrat z neznámého místa, kam jsme byli odvezeni. Dostali jsme pouze obálku, kde byly instrukce a cíle jednotlivých etap! Učili jsme se zakládat mrtvé schránky v terénu*

30 Třetí hlavní tajnou službou USA, která vysílala kurýry do Československa, byla vojenská zpravodajská služba (*Military Intelligence Service* – MIS). PEJČOCH, I. – TOMEK, P.: *Agenti-chodci na popravěšti*, s. 19 – 21.

31 Miloslav Čapek ve svých pamětech snad záměrně uvedl Bartošovo krycí jméno „Bauer“ nepřesně, ve skutečnosti znělo „Brauner“. Je ovšem také možné, byť málo pravděpodobné, že si spletl Bartoše s dalším velitelem paravysadku z 2. světové války („Carbon“), někdejším mjr. Františkem Bogatajem. Ten na počátku padesátých let také pracoval v Německu pro Američany (ovšem ve skupině Rudolfa „Ralph“ Drbohlava) a používal krycí jméno „Rudolf Bauer“. Srov. ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 45; ROKOSKÝ, J.: Bratři František a Josef Bogatajovi. Protikomunistický odboj na jižní Moravě. In: *Securitas Imperii*, č. 16, 2010, s. 126 – 127; PACNER, K.: *Československo ve zvláštních službách*, díl III. s. 259 – 261.

32 Tamtéž, s. 45; *Učili jsme se různé legendy pro případ zatčení. Rozhovor s Miloslavem Čapkem*, Praha 26. 3. a 2. 5. 2003. Uvedené krycí jméno je ve zkromolené podobě („Karlson“) uvedeno v zápisu o Čapkově zatčení na KV StB České Budějovice. ABS, f. V-ČB, V-111 ČB, Vyšetřovací spis Tomášek Fr. a spol., Zápis o zatčení Miloslava Čapka, 6. 5. 1950. Exilové zpravodajské skupiny, které řídil plk. Charles Katek, měly většinou podobné složení. Sestávaly se z vedoucího, dvou až tří asistentů („helprů“), kteří samostatně řídili několik kurýrů. Ve skupině byl písař, který působil také jako překladatel. PEJČOCH, I. – TOMEK, P.: *Agenti-chodci na popravěšti*, s. 22.

*a zakreslovat místa jejich umístění. Nebo jsme je museli podle plánu vyhledávat. Dostal jsem například za úkol dostat se nepozorovaně na poštu, která byla strážena. Bez peněz a potřebných dokladů jsme museli jezdit v dopravních prostředcích, ve vlaku apod., a nesměli nás chytit. Pistoli jsem měl, ale bez zbrojního pasu.*³³

Bartošovým asistentem a dalším blízkým Moravcovým spolupracovníkem, který se podílel na Čapkově výcviku, byl někdejší ředitel úřadovny Národní bezpečnosti v Plzni Josef Mainer,³⁴ který vystupoval pod krycím jménem „Munzinger“. Jeho úkolem bylo vycvičit kurýry v navazování kontaktů a dodržování konspirace.³⁵ Poslední školitel, jehož Čapek uvádí ve svých pamětech, byl „*rada ministerstva vnitra Skála*“, odborník na padělané osobní doklady.³⁶

Před vlastním vysláním do Československa hovořil s kurýry František Moravec, který s nimi probral jejich konkrétní úkoly: „*Stále nám zdůrazňoval: provádět práci v tichosti a s důvtipem. Jenom tak měly získané zprávy nejvyšší hodnotu. Nepřítel nesměl znát místo a zdroj úniku informací! Další jeho zásadou bylo, abychom použili zbraň pouze v krajním případě, kdy nám například umožní útek. Zároveň jsme byli upozorněni, že v případě použití zbraně a zatčení nám hrozí trest smrti!*“³⁷

Do Československa byl Miloslav Čapek poslán 4. května 1950 společně s šestadvacetiletým Františkem Tomáškem,³⁸ s nímž se seznámil v uprchlickém táboře v Ludwigsburgu a který byl také vycvičen ve vile v Bruchsalu. Tomášek byl vybrán především proto, že znal dobře místo plánovaného přechodu a v pohraničí měl řadu přátel a známých.

Tomášek pracoval původně jako národní správce prodejny se smíšeným zbožím v Chlumu u Volar. Dne 20. října 1949 byla prodejna převzata spotřebním a výrobním družstvem Vpřed. Tomášek, který v ní měl podle

33 ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 45 – 46.

34 Srov. ŽÁČEK, P.: „Drtina v Plzni: Pokus o organizování reakční mocenské akce“. Prověřování jedné fámy na pozadí reorganizace ministerstva vnitra v letech 1947 – 1948, In: *Paměť a dějiny*, roč. 2, 2008, č. 1, s. 60 – 75.

35 Miloslav Čapek vzpomínal nepřesně na „dr. Meinera-Munzigera“. ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 44. O Munzingerovi vypovídal po svém zatčení také kurýr Jiří Formánek. ABS, f. Historický fond, H-664, podsvarzek č. 1, Protokol výslechu Jiřího Formánka, 25. 2. 1950.

36 ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 45 – 46.

37 Tamtéž, s. 46.

38 V Čapkových vzpomínkách je uveden pouze jako „Franta“. Tamtéž, s. 49.

dohody pracovat nadále jako vedoucí, 9. listopadu 1949 odešel ilegálně do zahraničí. Důvodem byly patrně také jeho problémy s účetnictvím. Při kontrole v prodejně bylo totiž zjištěno poměrně rozsáhlé manko.³⁹ Tomášek měl také poškodit prachatické družstvo Jednota, pro něž zajišťoval vydávání seťového obilí místním rolníkům.⁴⁰ Současně ve stejné době probíhalo s Tomáškem trestní řízení za urážku stržm. Jana Zviefekhofera ze stanice SNB v Želnavě, s nímž se 14. května 1949 dostal do konfliktu.⁴¹

Oběma kurýrům v případě dopadení také hrozilo vězení za jejich předchozí ilegální přechod státní hranice. Miloslav Čapek byl trestně stíhán od 30. ledna 1950, kdy stanice SNB v Kunžvartu na něho za tento trestný čin podala u prokuratury v Prachaticích trestní oznámení.⁴² I z tohoto důvodu byla jejich cesta do Československa velmi riskantní. Navíc komunistický bezpečnostní aparát měl v tomto období při zadržování kurýrů (v dobové terminologii „agentů-chodců“) poměrně velké úspěchy.⁴³ Před cestou dostali finanční hotovost, kterou měli použít pro výlohy v Československu. Na jeden den to bylo 1 000 Kčs (celkem obdrželi 8 000 Kčs). S sebou měli také pistoli značky ČZ ráže 7.65 mm a devět nábojů.⁴⁴

Na hranice odvezl oba mladíky jeden z Moravcových mužů, jehož jméno není v Čapkových vzpomínkách, ani v archivních dokumentech uvedeno. Z Bruchsalu zamířili přes Norimberk a Řezno do Pasova. Zde měli delší přestávku, neboť čekali na setmění, aby nevzbudili pozornost západoněmecké hraniční policie. Poté odjeli směrem k Freyungu. Když cestou míjeli pohřební průvod, řidič se zeptal, zda se nechtějí vrátit

39 Manko bylo kontrolory vyčísleno ve výši 43 166,10 Kčs. ABS, f. V-ČB, V-111 ČB, Vyšetřovací spis Tomášek Fr. a spol., Opis ohlášení závady při inventuře v prodejně č. 20 v Chlumu u Volar, 17. 11. 1949.

40 Od rolníků měl František Tomášek vybrat za obilí 18 222,40 Kčs, které neodevzdal. Tamtéž, Trestní oznámení, 16. 12. 1949.

41 Tomáškoví byla v nepřítomnosti za uvedenou urážku vyměřena Okresním národním výborem v Prachaticích v přestupkovém řízení pokuta v celkové výši 1 800 Kčs. V případě nedobytnosti byl stanoven náhradní trest jedenácti dnů. Tamtéž, František Tomášek z Chlumu – administrativní tresty, 16. 5. 1950.

42 ABS, f. V-ČB, V-111 ČB, Vyšetřovací spis Tomášek Fr. a spol., Tomášek – Čapek zpráva, 8. 5. 1950.

43 Za období 1950 – 1960 evidovala StB nejméně 2 299 osob napojených na aktivity zpravodajských služeb USA. Zatčeno bylo několik set kurýrů, z toho bylo 42 popraveno. PEJČOCH, I. – TOMEK, P.: *Agenti-chodci na popravisti*, s. 23.

44 ABS, f. V-ČB, V-111 ČB, Podsvazek, Tomášek Frant. a Čapek Miloslav zadržení, 8. 5. 1950.

nazpátek. Oba kurýři odmítli s tím, že nejsou pověřiví. Po chvíli se odehrála druhá nepřijemná událost. Když jeli lesem, rozhodl se Čapek, že vyzkouší zbraň. Stáhnul okénko a chtěl vystřelit z okna. Náboj se mu však vzpříčil a zbraň selhala.⁴⁵

Když přijeli konečně do pohraniční vesnice Bischofsreut, odstavili automobil na okraj lesa. Nejdříve si obhlédli terén a pozorovali okolí. Na tomto místě také zřídili mrtvou schránku, do níž oba kurýři vložili své německé doklady a peníze pro návrat, který byl naplánován za čtyři dny. Zde na ně také měla čekat jejich spojka, jež je měla převézt nazpět do Bruchsalu.

Hranice přešli v okolí Černého Kříže u Stožce: „*Procházeli jsme hustým lesem připomínající prales. Vyvrácené a na nich další navršené stromy byly překážkami, které jsme překonávali. Museli jsme je přelézat a hned jsme zase padali do jam po vývrátech. Naše oči si zvykali na tmou, ale i tak nebylo možné vyhnout se všem překážkám.*“ Nejhorší místo cesty je však teprve čekalo za Černým Křížem, když přecházeli vřesoviště nazvané Mrtvý luh. Poté přebrodili Vltavu, která byla v tomto ročním období ještě velmi studená. Když se konečně dostali na druhou stranu řeky, začalo svítat.⁴⁶

Podle plánu zamířili po přechodu hranice nejdříve na samotu poblíž šumavské vesnice Horní Sněžná, kde bydlel Tomáškův známý. Kurýři se u něho chtěli zastavit a odpočinout si. Předpokládali také, že mu nabídnou spolupráci při vytváření zpravodajské sítě: „*Brzy ráno jsme dorazili k cíli naší cesty. Stáli jsme před domem muže, do kterého jsme vkládali tolik nadějí.*“⁴⁷ Domluvit schůzku šel pro jistotu pouze Miloslav Čapek, jehož v okolí nikdo neznal. K jeho překvapení mu po zaklepání otevřela žena (podle původních informací měl Tomáškův známý bydlet sám). Pootevřenými dveřmi viděl v místnosti ležet na stole nemluvně. Tomáškův známý, kterého žena zavolala, byl podle Čapkových vzpomínek nedůvěřivý, ale nakonec byl ochotný vyjít ven a promluvit si.

Po krátkém rozhovoru s Tomáškem oslovený muž souhlasil, že nečekaným návštěvníkům pomůže. Navrhl, aby si zatím odpočinuli v nedalekém opuštěném domě: „*Odešli jsme do určeného domu. Ze vzniklé situace jsme neměli žádnou radost. Tušili jsme komplikace, ale byli jsme přesvědčeni, že se k nám zachová slušně. Svým způsobem pomáhal připravovat útěk mého kamaráda do ciziny a to ho před StB kompromitovalo. Koloběh*

45 ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 51.

46 Tamtéž, s. 55 – 56.

47 Tamtéž, s. 56.

*života pořádně zamíchal karty v náš neprospěch. Plány dostaly bez našeho přičinění značnou trhlinu, aniž bychom nesli nějakou vinu.*⁴⁸

Teprve po mnoha letech se Miloslav Čapek dozvěděl, že je Tomáškův známý oznámil příslušníkům Pohraniční stráže ve Volarech. Měl za to údajně obdržet šedesát tisíc korun, za které si snad koupil motorku.⁴⁹ Archivní dokumenty potvrzují, že kurýry skutečně zradil Tomáškův známý (odměna v nich zmíněna není). V dobovém hlášení Krajského velitelství StB České Budějovice je uvedeno i jeho příjmení: „*Po Peškově odchodu si oba lehli a za malou chvíli zpozorovali, že se někdo blíží a později zjistili, že jsou to přísl. PS útvaru. Po vyzvání příslušníků PS útvaru oba se ukryli, načež tito začali do domku střílet. Když oba viděli, že únik jest nemožný, schoval Tomášek pistoli a vzdali se. Podotýkám, že výše zmíněný Pešek, který jmenovaným přinesl jídlo, je oznámil příslušníkům PS útvaru, kteří potom provedli jejich zadržení.*“⁵⁰

V archivních dokumentech není uveden konkrétní důvod zrady. Miloslav Čapek se domníval, že důvodem mohly být snad Peškovy osobní problémy: „*Žil ve volném svazku s jednou Němkou a měl s ní dítě. Naše úřady jim nechtěly povolit sňatek. S jeho družkou jsem mluvil po přechodu hranic, když jsem k nim přišel, a jejich dítě jsem viděl na stole. Není pochyb, že jí řekl, odkud jsme přišli. Měla strach a přiměla ho, aby nás udal! S odstupem doby a s nadhledem chápu jejich obavy. Pomáhat lidem jako my bylo velmi riskantní a v jejich situaci obzvlášť. Že měl ženu s dítětem, jsme ovšem nevěděli. Měl ovšem i jinou možnost, než nás prodat jako Krista. Mohl nás vzhledem k nové situaci odmítnout. Měl to udělat po vzájemné domluvě, za určitou dobu, abychom se mohli bezpečně vzdát.*“⁵¹

Zadržení dvou mladých mužů se vedle pohraničnicků zúčastnili také příslušníci SNB, kteří je poté převezli automobily do Volar. Podle Čapkových vzpomínek byli ještě předtím zmláceni. Někteří ze zasahujících dokonce zpočátku navrhovali, že zadržené muže přímo na místě zastřelí.

48 Tamtéž, s. 58.

49 Tamtéž, s. 69.

50 ABS, f. V-ČB, V-111 ČB, Podsvazek, Tomášek Frant. a Čapek Miloslav zadržení, 8. 5. 1950. K organizaci Pohraniční stráže, která tehdy přešla pod nově vytvořené Ministerstvo národní bezpečnosti a byla posílena o tisíce mladých vojáků základní vojenské služby srov. PULEC, M.: *Organizace a činnost ozbrojených pohraničních složek. Seznamy osob usmrcených na státních hranicích. 1945 – 1989.* Praha 2006, s. 18.

51 ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 70.

Další kolo fyzického násilí čekalo na neúspěšné kurýry na volarské stanici SNB. Čapkovi zde přerazili nos a prorazili ušní bubínky. Po několika hodinách si pro zatčené přijeli příslušníci Velitelství oddílu StB z Prachatic, kde brutální výslech pokračoval. Čapek v Prachaticích dokonce absolvoval fingovanou popravu: „*K tomuto účelu měli ve vrchním trámu dveří zabudovaný hák. Přehodili přes něj provaz se smyčkou. Pod tuto provizorní šibenici postavili stoličku. Musel jsem se na ni postavit a oprátku mi hodili na krk. [...] Slyšel jsem odpočítávat poslední vteřiny a vnímal, jak někdo podkopl stoličku a jak se propadám. Najednou mě kdosi pevně uchopil v pase. Ty parchante, ty bys chtěl, abychom tě oddělali, ale ty na nás budeš až do konce smrti makat a v kriminále chcípneš, slyšel jsem z dálky. Ani nevím, co se dělo potom.*“⁵²

Nakonec byli patrně ještě 5. května 1950 každý zvlášť převezeni do vyšetřovací vazby Krajského velitelství StB v Českých Budějovicích, kde byli následujícího dne formálně zatčeni „*pro protistátní činnost (špionáž)*“.⁵³ V dalších týdnech absolvovali řadu dlouhých výslechů. Zpočátku se Čapek a Tomášek drželi domluvené legendy o pašování cigaretových papírků, ale již za několik hodin podle vyšetřovacích protokolů uváděli, že měli převést ženu jednoho z exulantů a získat některé zpravodajské informace. Důsledně však odmítali, že by pracovali pro americkou tajnou službu.

Dne 8. května 1950 hlásilo Krajské velitelství StB České Budějovice do pražské centrály výsledky vyšetřování: „*Že by pracovali oba, jak Tomášek, tak i Čapek pro CIC zapírají, zrovna tak zapírají, že prodělali zpravodajskou školu, vymlouvají se neustále na neznámého pána. Podle jejich odborných výrazů, jako např. schránku umístiti na mrtvém bodě, že je někdo shodil atp., jest docela možné, že nějaký výcvik přece prodělali.*“⁵⁴

O dva dny později se podle nové zprávy situace příliš nezměnila: „*Na Vaše dožádání nemůžeme doposud sdělit, jestli se jedná přímo o agenty CIC, neboť se jmenovanými bude museti býti proveden ještě jeden výslech, neboť při prvním mnoho věcí nepřiznali a bylo viděti, že nemluví pravdu.*“⁵⁵ Téměř nic se nezměnilo ani v následujících týdnech. Ačkoliv byl jednadvaacetiletý mladík vystaven brutálním výslechům, nezlomil se a nevedl žádné konkrétní podrobnosti o prodělaném výcviku v Bruchsalu. Jeho

52 Tamtéž, s. 65.

53 ABS, f. V-ČB, V-111 ČB, Podsvazek, Zápis o zatčení Františka Tomáška, 6. 5. 1950.

54 Tamtéž, Tomášek Frant. a Čapek Miloslav zadržení, 8. 5. 1950.

55 Tamtéž, Tomášek Frant. a Čapek Miloslav – zpráva, 10. 5. 1950.

starší přítel sice uvedl některé ze zpravodajských úkolů, ale také nesdělil nic bližšího o svém výcviku.⁵⁶

Dne 8. září 1950 podalo Krajské velitelství StB České Budějovice u Státní prokuratury v Praze na oba zadržené muže trestní oznámení pro podezření „ze sdružování proti státu, nedovoleného zpravodajství ve prospěch cizí moci a neoprávněného opuštění čsl. území“.⁵⁷ Žalobu podal následně Státní prokurátor v Praze 14. listopadu 1950.⁵⁸

Miloslavu Čapkovi byla po skončení vyšetřování povolena návštěva otce. V polovině září 1950 byl také přeložen do jiné části českobudějovické věznice, kde byla tehdy umístěna soudní vazba.⁵⁹ V polovině listopadu 1950 byl konečně předveden do vězeňské kanceláře, kde mu prokurátor přečetl obžalobu. Podle zákona č. 231/1948 Sb. na ochranu lidově demokratické republiky se měl dopustit velezrady a špionáže. Za první trestný čin mu hrozil trest smrti, za druhý doživotí: „Bez připomínek jsem obžalobu přijal. Nijak mě nepřekvapila. Byl jsem naopak rád, že se věci dají do pohybu a budu konečně vědět, na čem jsem. S trestem smrti jsem samozřejmě nepočítal.“⁶⁰

Před soudním procesem byli oba obžalovaní eskortováni do pankrácké věznice v Praze. Dne 4. prosince 1950 byli vyslechnuti předsedou jednoho ze senátů Státního soudu v Praze JUDr. Josefem Hoškem,⁶¹ který jim oznámil, že soud začne již za tři dny.⁶² Ve stanovený den, 7. prosince 1950, bylo

56 Tamtéž, Tomášek Frant. a Čapek Miloslav – zpráva, 12. 6. 1950; Tamtéž, Zadržžený dopis u osoby vrátivší se z Německa USA zóny, 12. 6. 1950.

57 ABS, f. V-ČB, V-111 ČB, Vyšetřovací spis Tomášek Fr. a spol., Trestní oznámení, 8. 9. 1950.

58 ABS, f. V-ČB, V-111 ČB, Podsvazek, žaloba, 14. 11. 1950.

59 NA, f. Státní soud Praha, Soudní spis TS I/VII 59/50, Sdělení VO SVS Č. Budějovice o předání Miloslava Čapka a Františka Tomáška do soudní vazby, 15. 9. 1950.

60 ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 82.

61 V personálním přehledu soudců Státního soudu, který publikoval Úřad dokumentace a vyšetřování zločinů komunismu SVKP ČR před několika lety, je uvedeno, že Josef Hošek u zmíněného soudu v Praze působil v letech 1951 a 1952. Z případu Miloslava Čapka a Františka Tomáška je jasné, že tuto funkci vykonával již v roce 1950. Srov. VOREL, J. – ŠIMÁNKOVÁ, A. – BABKA, L.: *Československá justice v letech 1948 – 1953 v dokumentech*. Díl II. Praha 2004, s. 54.

62 NA, f. Státní soud Praha, Soudní spis TS I/VII 59/50, Výslech obviněného Miloslava Čapka, 4. 12. 1950.

v 10.30 hod. zahájeno hlavní přelíčení. Písemný záznam o jeho podobě vypovídá o tehdejší podobě třídní justice.⁶³

Státní prokurátor JUDr. Alexander Faltys nejdříve navrhl vyloučit z projednávání veřejnost, aby nebylo ohroženo „*státní tajemství*“. Jeho návrh byl okamžitě schválen přítomnými členy soudního senátu, který tvořili předseda JUDr. Josef Hošek, soudci z povolání JUDr. Karel Kruk a JUDr. Miroslav Bobek a soudci z lidu Josef Hromadník a Václav Kašpar. Poté se k obžalobě vyjádřili oba obžalovaní, kteří se víceméně snažili držet svých předchozích výpovědí o „*neznámém muži*“, který jim nabídl peníze za převedení jedné osoby z republiky a získání různých informací.⁶⁴

Miloslav Čapek ve svých pamětech napsal, že jeho původní představa o možnostech obhajoby záhy vzala za své. Z průběhu procesu pochopil, že byli odsouzeni již před jeho započítím. Přesto se údajně pokusil alespoň zpochybnit své výpovědi při vyšetřování s tím, že byly vynucené násilím.⁶⁵ V dochovaném zápisu však není o tomto výroku žádná zmínka. Naznačuje ji pouze jediná věta, kterou měl Čapek pronést na začátku své výpovědi před soudem: „*Necítím se vinen.*“

Oba obžalovaní na závěr požádali o mírný trest. Jejich obhájci (Dr. Sládek, který obhajoval Miloslava Čapka a Dr. Hořbolt, který obhajoval Františka Tomáška) byli pouhými statisty a měli pouze formální dotazy. Po krátké poradě vynesl předseda senátu rozsudek (podle dochovaného poradního protokolu se na něm shodli všichni členové senátu), který oba odsouzení přijali a vzdali se odvolání. V 14.30 hod. byl podle zápisu proces skončen. Za čtyři hodiny bylo rozhodnuto o dalších životních osudech dvou mladých mužů, jejichž odboj proti komunistickému režimu skončil na území Československa již po několika hodinách bez jakéhokoliv konkrétního projevu.⁶⁶

63 Jen v roce 1950 bylo před Státním soudem odsouzeno celkem 5 044 osob (z nichž 59 k trestu smrti). VOREL, J. – ŠIMÁNKOVÁ, A. a kol.: *Československá justice v letech 1948–1953 v dokumentech*. Díl I. Praha 2003, tabulka č. 3.

64 Miloslav Čapek uvedl, že při cestě na hranice je také požádal „*onen muž, abychom se hlavně při cestě do ČSR podívali, jak jsou obsazeny hranice, abychom sehnali speciální mapy kraje Č. Budějovic, různé čisté legitimace strany KSČ i jiných politických stran, brigádnické legitimace, policejní přihlášky a jízdní řád. Dále nás onen neznámý muž žádal, abychom na tábořsku založili tři mrtvé schránky.*“ NA, f. Státní soud Praha, Soudní spis TS I/VII 59/50, Hlavní přelíčení, 7. 12. 1950.

65 ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 88.

66 NA, f. Státní soud Praha, Soudní spis TS I/VII 59/50, Hlavní přelíčení, 7. 12. 1950.

Za spáchání velezrady a špionáže byl František Tomášek odsouzen k 17 letům odnětí svobody a k peněžitému trestu ve výši 10 000 Kčs, Miloslav Čapek ke 12 letům odnětí svobody a k peněžitému trestu ve stejné výši jako jeho společník. Oběma bylo navíc konfiskováno celé jmění a vyslovena ztráta čestných práv občanských. Čapkův nižší trest byl v rozsudku odůvodněn jeho „dosavadní zachovalostí“ a „mládím“.

Rozsudek byl napsán dobovým slovníkem, který zdůrazňoval údajnou zradu odsouzených: „*Obviněný Tomášek a Čapek dále, aby dokázali, že jsou zdatnými přísluhovači čsl. zrádců v zahraničí a jejich imperialistických chlebodárců, na návod agenta CIC rozhodli se odejít do ČSR k vybudování opěrných bodů pro tuto špionážní službu a k opatření spec. map a různých pomůcek pro tento účel. Byli ozbrojeni pistolí a patřičným počtem nábojů, z čehož je zřejmé, že se nezastavili ani před bezpečnostními orgány v případě, že by jim bylo bráněno v plnění jejich úkolů na území ČSR.*“⁶⁷

Miloslav Čapek strávil ve vězení dlouhých dvanáct let. Necelých pět roků strávil na Jáchymovsku, kde byl nucen k otročké práci v uranových dolech. V pracovním táboře Rovnost zažil nejhorší období na počátku padesátých let, kdy vězně trápil sadistický náčelník Albín Dvořák, kterému přezdívali „Paleček“. První návštěvu měl teprve po dvou letech, dopis směl napsat přibližně jednou za čtvrt roku. Přes těžké podmínky se zapojil do obdivuhodného společenství politických vězňů, kteří se nezlomili a navzájem si pomáhali.⁶⁸

Někteří z nich se dokonce snažili vyvíjet i odbojovou činnost.⁶⁹ Patřil mezi ně také Miloslav Čapek, který za pomoci jednoho z civilních zaměstnanců navázal kontakty s okolním světem. Do zahraničí se pokusil propašovat nejen zprávy o dobývání uranové rudy, ale i seznam politických vězňů, kteří s ním kopali v dole. V roce 1955 se zúčastnil proslulé stávk,

67 Tamtéž, Rozsudek Státního soudu, 7. 12. 1950.

68 Osobní vězeňský spis Miloslava Čapka nebyl podle vyjádření PhDr. Aleny Šimánkové bohužel do Národního archivu předán. Z tohoto důvodu není tomuto období Čapkova života věnována podrobná pozornost – k dispozici jsou zájemcům jeho publikované vzpomínky. Srov. ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomělo*, s. 93 – 299; *Učili jsme se různé legendy pro případ zatčení. Rozhovor s Miloslavem Čapkem*, Praha 26. 3. a 2. 5. 2003.

69 Srov. BLAŽEK, P.: „Proběhl jsem rychle oblakem“. Odbojové aktivity Ctirada Mašina v jáchymovském lágru. In: VEBER, V. – BUREŠ, J. a kol.: *Třetí odboj. Kapitoly z dějin protikomunistické rezistence v Československu v padesátých letech 20. století*. Praha 2010, s. 222 – 241.

jež otrásla celým vězeňským systémem. Prováděl také drobné sabotáže, jež komplikovaly těžbu rudy.

Krátce poté byl Miloslav Čapek zatčen a vyšetřován deset měsíců v Horním Žďáru za posílání motáků. Odtud byl záhy eskortován do soudní vazby v Karlových Varech a nakonec do Chebu, kde byl souzen. Měl štěstí, že necelé dva měsíce před novým soudem pronesl první tajemník ÚV KSSS Nikita Sergejevič Chruščov proslulý projev o Stalinových zločinech (byť jeho konkrétní znění nebylo téměř známé). Za prozrazení údajů o utajované těžbě uranové rudy mu totiž hrozil trest smrti. Nakonec byl Čapek 17. dubna 1956 odsouzen Krajským soudem v Chebu za velezradu k osmi letům odnětí svobody, které mu byly později v rámci amnestie prominuty.⁷⁰

Po druhém soudním procesu byl Čapek eskortován do Leopoldova, kde strávil následujících šest let. Většinu času strávil v galvanizovně, kde pro bratislavské Elektrotechnické závody kadmioval pod elektrickým napětím kovové součástky.

V květnu 1960 Miloslav Čapek nebyl – na rozdíl od řady jiných politických vězňů – propuštěn v rámci velké amnestie, kterou vyhlásil prezident republiky. Podle rozkazu ministra vnitra Rudolfa Baráka se totiž amnestie nesměla vztahovat „na přímé agenty imperialistických rozvědek, teroristy, sabotéry, záškodníky a organizátory protistátních skupin a dále na osoby, odsouzené pro vojenskou zradu a pro protistátní činnost, která měla za následek těžkou újmu na zdraví a smrtí“.⁷¹

Miloslava Čapka minula i další velká amnestie z 8. května 1962, neboť byl propuštěn o pouhé dva dny dříve, tedy po vykonání celého prvního trestu. Jeho komplic, František Tomášek, byl dokonce propuštěn až na další amnestii 10. května 1965 – ve vězení strávil celkem 15 let.⁷²

Po propuštění se Miloslav Čapek vrátil do Slaného, kde ještě žili jeho rodiče (otec zemřel v roce 1963 a maminka v roce 1978). V polovině šedesátých let koupil malý domek nedaleko hlavního náměstí, kam se nastěhovala s manželem také jeho sestra. Našel si dobré zaměstnání v Praze, kde

70 NA, f. Státní soud Praha, Soudní spis TS I/VII 59/50, Odsúdený Čapek Miloslav – hodnotenie ÚNZ Leopoldov, 30. 3. 1962. V Archivu bezpečnostních složek se bohužel vyšetřovací spis k tomuto případu nenachází.

71 Amnestie se neměla také vztahovat na osoby, odsouzené podle retribučních předpisů, pokud jejich čin měl za následek smrt. ROKOSKÝ, J.: Amnestie 1960. In: *Paměť a dějiny*, roč. 5, 2011, č. 1, s. 41.

72 NA, f. Státní soud, Rehabilitační spis 8 Rt 381/90, Návrh Františka Tomáška na zahájení rehabilitačního řízení, 13. 9. 1990.

pracoval jako montér elektrotepelných zařízení. Paradoxně tedy v práci využil zkušeností, které získal v Leopoldově. Jezdil na služební cesty po celé republice, několik let strávil také na Slovensku.

Ve volném čase četl knihy a jezdil do přírody. Oženil se a narodil se mu syn. Manželství však ztroskotalo. Po několika letech se opět oženil, tentokrát šťastněji. S druhou paní zůstal až do konce života.

V období Pražského jara se zúčastnil zakládajícího shromáždění K-231⁷³ na Žofíně. Stal se následně členem přípravného okresního výboru v Kladně. Ve stejné době se také pokusil o soudní rehabilitaci, ale žádost nakonec v roce 1969 stáhnul. Prostřednictvím exulanta Jaromíra Zástěry, jehož znal z vězení, opět navázal kontakty s americkou tajnou službou: „Když v roce 1968 přijel z USA na návštěvu, to už tady byla sovětská vojska, setkal jsem se s ním a domluvil s ním heslo pro případný zpravodajský kontakt. Měl jsem dělat mrtvého agenta a aktivizovat se v případě, že by za mnou někdo přišel a vykázal se tím heslem. Říkal jsem mu, že do té doby nebudu nic dělat, byl bych jako bývalý politický vězeň pro StB jenom mucholapkou. Mirek Zástěra potom pracoval jako redaktor v Hlasu Ameriky, pravidelně jsem ho poslouchal. Mám doma dochovanou korespondenci, poslal mi také ke svatbě dárek. V polovině osmdesátých let jsem najednou slyšel v Hlasu Ameriky, že zemřel.“⁷⁴

Na počátku sedmdesátých let se Miloslav Čapek opět dostal pod drobnohled Státní bezpečnosti. Důvodem byla jeho korespondence s přáteli. Dne 11. června 1971 navrhl referent 1. oddělení 7. odboru Správy StB Praha pprap. Josef Kekeši založit k Miloslavu Čapkovi pozorovací svazek pod heslem „Emigrant“: „Předběžným rozpracováním Čapka bylo zjištěno, že udržuje písemné styky na některé emigranty, bývalé funkcionáře ÚV K-231, zejména Jaroslava Brodského, Antonína Roubík, Otu Rambouska a další. Nejčastěji si dopisuje s emigrantem Jiřím Micanem, který žije v Kanadě, kam odešel ilegálně v roce 1949. K jeho útěku mu dopomáhal Čapek, o čemž se sám zmiňuje v dopisech. [...] Z důvěrného pramene bylo zjištěno, že Mican přijal 7. června do ČSSR a v současné době je ubytován u svých rodičů.“

Pprap. Kekeši se podle citovaného dokumentu domníval, že by se mohl dozvědět konkrétní informace o plánech Čapkova spolužáka. Navrhoval využít tajného spolupracovníka s krycím jménem „Černý“, kterým byl Čapkův dobrý známý z Jáchymovska František Houška. Ve svazku

73 Celý název této organizace zněl „Sdružení bývalých politických vězňů – Klub 231“.

74 *Učili jsme se různé legendy pro případ zatčení. Rozhovor s Miloslavem Čapkem*, Praha 26. 3. a 2. 5. 2003.

se dochovalo několik jeho zpráv, ve kterých popisuje Čapkovy názory. V první z nich popisoval také chování Miloslava Čapka ve vězení: „*Již ve výkonu trestu na táboře Rovnost byl Čapek jedním z nejaktivnějších odpůrců režimu, nenapravitelný v činnosti i na táboře. Neustále si vymýšlel a realizoval drobné škůdnické kousky při práci na šachtě.*“⁷⁵

Výsledky sledování Miloslava Čapka při Micanově návštěvě nepřinesly žádné informace, které by naznačovaly, že by se jednalo o zpravodajský kontakt. Se stejnými výsledky skončilo také další sledování při nové pražské návštěvě Jiřího Micana v červnu 1972. Další rok byl Čapek v souvislosti s Micanovým příjezdem pozván na výslech do Kladna, kde se od něho příslušníci tajné policie snažili především získat informace o někdejších představitelích K-231. Podle zápisu vypovídal opatrně. Opakovaně zdůrazňoval, že je velmi zaměstnán a nemá proto čas na schůzky se svými známými.⁷⁶ O tři týdny později byl svazek uložen do archivu s odůvodněním, že „*nebyly zjištěny konkrétní poznatky o jeho nepřátelské činnosti.*“⁷⁷

Až do listopadu 1989 nemohl Miloslav Čapek téměř vůbec cestovat do zahraničí. Správa pasů a víz FMV mu v sedmdesátých letech zamítla i žádost o turistickou cestu do Drážďan.⁷⁸ Jedinou výjimkou byl Sovětský svaz, kam začal jezdit v osmdesátých letech na montáže. V dubnu 1986 zde zažil velkou tragédii, když pracoval v rozestavěné továrně pouze několik desítek kilometrů od Černobylu. Teprve po několika dnech od výbuchu jaderného reaktoru byl odeslán domů.

V roce 1989 se Miloslav Čapek konečně dočkal zhroutilí komunistického režimu. Podle vzpomínek své paní byl zpočátku z vývoje velmi nadšený, euforicky se podílel ve Slaném na založení Občanského fóra a účastnil se většiny veřejných mítinků, kde se snažil veřejnost informovat o svých vězeňských zkušenostech. V roce 1990 vstoupil do Konfederace politických vězňů a působil v kladenské pobočce, kde měl řadu přátel.

Polistopadové změny umožnily také jeho soudní rehabilitaci. V září 1990 zaslal František Tomášek Městskému soudu v Praze žádost o zahájení rehabilitačního řízení na základě zákona o soudní rehabilitaci č. 119/1990.

75 ABS, f. MV-KR, arch. č. 629219 MV, Agenturní zpráva, 26. 5. 1971.

76 Tamtéž, Zápis o výpovědi Miloslava Čapka, 29. 6. 1973. O výslechu se Miloslav Čapek také zmínil ve svých pamětech. Podle jeho vzpomínek žádný zápis pořizen nebyl, ve skutečnosti je ovšem na čtyřech archivních listech jeho podpis. Srov. ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 306.

77 ABS, f. MV-KR, arch. č. 629219 MV, Návrh na ukončení akce „Emigrant“, 23. 7. 1973.

78 ČAPEK, M.: *O mužích, na které se zapomnělo*, s. 300 – 301.

Z dochované dokumentace je dobře patrné, jak byly soudy na počátku devadesátých let zahlceny rehabilitačním řízením a situaci nezvládaly. Tomáškovu podání putovalo nejdříve na Krajský soud v Praze a odtud bylo teprve v březnu 1991 podstoupeno Krajskému soudu v Českých Budějovicích, kde byl uložen soudní spis z roku 1950. Obdobnou žádost podal 29. listopadu 1990 nezávisle na Františku Tomáškovu také Miloslav Čapek. Také Čapkova snaha byla nakonec nadbytečná, neboť ve stejný den zasedl Krajský soud v Českých Budějovicích a oba muže soudně očistil v rámci plošné rehabilitace.⁷⁹

Zdánlivou tečku za jejich kauzou učinil na konci devadesátých let Úřad dokumentace a vyšetřování zločinů komunismu SVKP ČR, když bez úspěchu šetřil podání Miloslava Čapka, požadujícího potrestání příslušníků Státní bezpečnosti za vedení brutálních výslechů ve Volarech a v Prachaticích v roce 1950.⁸⁰ Pro Miloslava Čapka byla skutečnost, že se po listopadu 1989 nepodařilo potrestat takřka žádné komunistické zločiny, velkým zklamáním, kterým se nijak netajil. Zaznívá také v jeho dvou výše zmíněných knihách, v nichž popsal nejen svůj příběh, ale také osudy dalších politických vězňů v období padesátých let. K vydání rovněž připravil své filosofické úvahy a korespondenci s filosofem Pavlem Křivským,⁸¹ s nímž se sblížil v Leopoldově.⁸²

Nakonec se také dočkal poděkování od americké vlády, ve které už ani nedoufal.⁸³ Za pomoci dalšího kurýra a politického vězně Otakara

79 Příslušná dokumentace je uložena v rehabilitačním spise. NA, f. Státní soud, Rehabilitační spis 8 Rt 381/90.

80 NA, f. Státní soud, Rehabilitační spis 8 Rt 381/90, Žádost vyšetřovatele ÚDV por. Mgr. Tomáše Trnky o zapůjčení rehabilitačního spisu 8 Rt 381/90, 16. 9. 1998.

81 K dílu a životním osudům rozporuplné Křivského osobnosti srov. KŘIVSKÝ, P.: *Ars bene vivendi. Přednášky a meditace Pavla Křivského*. Praha 1992; POUSTA, Z. (Ed.): *Filosofie za mřížemi: Leopoldov, léta padesátá*. Praha 1995; KAVKA, J. – KOPT, M. (Eds.): *Akce StB POLOM. Proces se skupinou František Pavel Křivský a klatovští skauti v zrcadle dokumentů Státní bezpečnosti*. Praha 2008.

82 ČAPEK, M.: *Filosofie pochybností a jistot. Teorie o absolutní a subjektivní filosofii*. Slaný 2005.

83 Ještě v roce 2003 uvedl, že se mu po pádu komunismu Američané neozvali: „Trochu mě to mrzí, ale na druhou stranu je chápu. Mají jiné starosti, než děkovat veteránům. Byli jsme zvláštní lidé, nasazovali jsme své životy, ale věděli jsme, že nám nemohou vůbec pomoci. My jsme totiž nebyli v pravidelné armádě, nevztahovaly se na nás žádné konvence o válečných zajatcích. Navíc ti, se kterými jsme tehdy spolupracovali, už byli asi dávno mrtví. Byla to taková ranní směna, ta odpolední už asi neměla povědomí, co jejich předchůdci dělali.“ Na jiném místě doslova hovořil s nadsázkou o tom, že patřil

Rambouska získal Čapek kontakt na amerického právníka, jenž za něho vyjednal u amerických úřadů odškodnění za dlouhé roky ve vězení. Symbolicky byla činnost Miloslava Čapka ve prospěch americké vlády uznána na slavnostním ceremoniálu 29. června 2005 za účasti velvyslance USA v České republice Williama J. Cabanisse. Miloslav Čapek na tomto setkání převzal od představitele CIA čestnou medaili s nápisem v angličtině, který jistě není nutné překládat: „*With Gratitude and Respect for your Service*“.⁸⁴


Toužebná satisfakce přišla doslova na poslední chvíli a symbolicky uzavřela jeho nelehký životní osud. Dne 25. září 2005 Miloslav Čapek podlehl rakovině, jež byla patrně způsobena kombinací důsledků otroké práce v uranových dolech a černobylského ozáření. Místo posledního odpočinku statečného muže, který obětoval značnou část svého života pro svobodu své vlasti, se nachází na Slánských hřbitovech, kde jsou ve stejném hrobě pochováni také jeho předci.

Summary


This article examines the life story of Miloslav Čapek (1928 – 2005) who left the country in 1949 for the Federal Republic of Germany. After getting a special training he returned back to Czechoslovakia as a CIC courier, where he was arrested and sentenced to 12 years in prison. In May 1962, right before his sentence was over, he was released due to the President's amnesty. In 1968 he was one of K-231 representatives in Kladno district. Čapek was kept under review by the State Security because of keeping contacts with the exile. In 1989 he took part in establishing the Civil Forum in Slané. He became a member of the Confederation of Political Prisoners and dedicated himself actively to the history of the so-called Third Resistance. He published several studies and books on that topic.

k „prvním vojákům a zajatcům studené války“. Učili jsme se různé legendy pro případ zatčení. Rozhovor s Miloslavem Čapkem, Praha 26. 3. a 2. 5. 2003.


84 JUDLOVÁ, O.: Miloslav Čapek byl vyznamenán. In: *Slánská radnice*, roč. 8, 2005, č. 8, s. 2.




Miloslav Čapek v dětství (Archiv Blanky Siebertové)




Miloslav Čapek v polovině třicátých let (Archiv Blanky Siebertové)




Školní fotografie z Průmyslové školy chemické v Praze. Miloslav Čapek sedí čtvrtý zleva. Zanedlouho po jejím pořízení uprchl společně s pěti spolužáky do Bavorska (Archiv Blanky Siebertové)



Fotografie Františka Tomáška byla pořizena ve vyšetřovací vazbě StB (Archiv bezpečnostních složek)



**První strana výslechu Miloslava Čapka byla sepsána po jeho zatčení 5. května 1950
(Archiv bezpečnostních složek)**



První strana záznamu o soudním procesu s Františkem Tomáškem a Miloslavem Čapkem (Národní archiv)

-4-

Ts I/VI 59/50

17

R o z s u d e k .

J m é n e m r e p u b l i k y !

Státní soud v Praze, odd. VI, uznal po hlavním líčení,
vykonaném dne 7. prosince 1950 takto právem:

Obvinění :

- 1./František T o m á š e k ,
nar. 2.12.1924 v Redešově, okr. Vimperk, obchodní příručí
posledně bytem Chlum u Volar, okr. Prachatice,
- 2./Miloslav Č a p e k ,
nar. 14.12.1928 ve Slaném, drogist, posledně bytem, Blaný,
Husova 102, oba t.č.

ve vazbě státního soudu v Praze,

j s o u v i n n í , ž e :

I./ v době od listopadu 1949 až do svého zatčení
6.května 1950 v ČSR a západním Německu spolčili se navzájem
a s jinými osobami a vešli v přímý styk s cizími činiteli,
aby se pokusili zničit a rozvrátit lid.dem.zřízení, společens-
a hospodářskou soustavu republiky, zaručené ústavou.

II./za týchž časových a místních okolností vyzradili
státní tajemství přímo cizí moci a za tím účelem se spolčili
navzájem a vešli v přímý styk s cizí mocí, aby státní tajemství
vyzvěděvali v úmyslu vyzraditi j. cizí moci.

č í m ž . s p á c h a l i ,

ad.I./ zločin velezrady podle § 1 odst. 2, odst. 1 lit.c/
zák.č. 231/48 Sb.


ad.II./ zločin vyzvědačství podle § 5 odst. 1 cit.zákona,

a o d s u z u j í s e z a t o


za použití § 12 a 18 tr.z. se zřetelem na § 34 z.č.117/52 ř..

obv.František Tomášek podle § 1 odst. 1 a § 47 z.č. 231/48 Sb.


k trestu odnětí svobody na dobu 17 /sedmácti/ let a ku
peněžitému trestu v částce Kčs 10.000 .




**První strana žádosti Miloslava Čapka, kterou napsal v Leopoldově v roce 1960
(Národní archiv)**




Druhá strana žádosti Miloslava Čapka (Národní archiv)



V roce 1990 byli František Tomášek a Miloslav Čapek rehabilitováni (Národní archiv)



Obálka první knihy Miloslava Čapka (Archiv Petra Blažka)



Obálka druhé vzpomínkové Čapkovy knihy (Archiv Petra Blažka)



Miloslav Čapek se svou manželkou a synem z prvního manželství (Archiv Blanky Siebertové)



Hrob rodiny Čapkových se nachází na hřbitově ve Slaném (Archiv Petra Blažka)

Odboj: pomoc ohrozeným na ceste za slobodou. Prípád Jozef Macek

Ľubomír MORBACHER – Jerguš SIVOŠ

Po februári 1948 uskutočňovali emigrantské zoskupenia v spolupráci so CIC, protišpionážnou zložkou americkej okupačnej armády v Rakúsku, spravodajskú činnosť prostredníctvom spolupracovníkov, ktorí ilegálne prechádzali hranicu do ČSR. Časť týchto ľudí sa zameriavala na pomoc tým, ktorí sa chceli cez „zelenú“ hranicu dostať do Viedne a ďalej do americkej okupačnej zóny v Rakúsku. Pri každom prechode „zelenej“ hranice s utečencami riskovali život. Komunistický režim postupne vytvoril represívnu zložku Pohraničnú stráž a uzavrel hranice so Západom. V dostatočnom odstupe pred štátnou hranicou čakali na prevádzáčov drôtené záтары, od roku 1953 pod vysokým napätím 2 000 až 4 000 voltov, a mínové polia. Jeden muž medzi prevádzáčmi vynikal. Bol to Jozef Macek. Tomuto kontroverznému mužovi sa podarilo do roku 1955 to, čo sa nepodarilo nikomu pred ním a ani po ňom. Previedol cez slovensko-rakúsky úsek železnej opony stovky ľudí.

Jozef Macek sa narodil v júni 1909 v Borskom Sv. Petre pri Senici ako syn drobného roľníka a ženy v domácnosti. Po absolvovaní ľudovej školy sa živil poľnohospodárskymi prácami u roľníkov na Slovensku aj v Rakúsku. Od roku 1927 pracoval v továrni na výrobu umelého hodvábu v Senici. Začiatkom októbra 1931 nastúpil na vojenskú službu v Lipníku nad Bečvou. Po návrate z vojenskej služby pracoval nasledujúci rok v továrni na umelý hodváb. Neskôr sa opäť živil príležitostnými sezónnymi poľnohospodárskymi prácami u rôznych hospodárov. V roku 1935 sa oženil s Albínou Rotfabiánovou. Manželstvo však neskôr postihla tragédia (Albína v roku 1940 spáchala samovraždu zastrelením) a Macek sa v roku 1941 oženil so

Štefániou Drinkovou, s ktorou mal jedného syna. Podľa vlastných slov sa zúčastnil odboja a počas Slovenského štátu neslúžil v armáde. Pre nezhody s druhou manželkou odišiel s Máriou Cintulovou v roku 1946 do Rakúska, odkiaľ sa po 14 dňoch vrátil.¹

Jozef Macek sa po roku 1946 zaoberal pašovaním tovaru z ČSR do Rakúska a opačne. V lete roku 1948 odišiel do Rakúska na dlhší čas a začal spolupracovať so zložkou americkej okupačnej armády CIC vo Viedni (jej úradovňa sídlila v XVIII. viedenskom okrese na Michaelerstrasse 11). CIC pracovala s vlastnou agentúrnou sieťou v sovietskej okupačnej zóne Rakúska, najmä medzi utečencami z tzv. ľudovodemokratických krajín, kde odhaľovala „podstavených“ agentov týchto štátov a ZSSR. Pracovníci CIC prostredníctvom svojej agentúrno-prevádzачskej siete priamo organizovali úteky ohrozených osôb z tzv. ľudovodemokratických krajín vrátane ČSR.² Utečencov následne vo Viedni vypočuli pracovníci CIC a zabezpečili ich bezpečný prevoz a odchod cez zónovú hranicu: pri obci Waidhofen a. d. Ybbs priamo do americkej okupačnej zóny, pri Semmeringu do britskej okupačnej zóny a odtiaľ do americkej bez kontroly alebo cez rieku Enns rovnako do americkej zóny. ŠtB aktivity CIC monitorovala a v objektovom zväzku na viedenskú úradovňu CIC evidovala aj Jozefa Maceka ako jej agenta s krycím menom Schwarz.³ ŠtB zistila, že „*prevádzá agenty – chodce z Rakouska do ČSR a naopak. Previedl údajně už 200 lidí přes hranici*“.⁴ ŠtB disponovala aj jeho popisom a informáciou, že po zadržaní rakúskou políciou si úradovňa CIC vo Viedni vyžiadala jeho prepustenie.

V čase svojho pobytu v Rakúsku dostával Jozef Macek ďalšie inštrukcie na prevádzanie osôb od slovenských emigrantov spolupracujúcich s úradovňami CIC vo Viedni, ale aj priamo v americkom okupačnom pásme v Hornom Rakúsku a v Salzburgu, kde sa tiež pohyboval. Od roku 1949 pôsobil v americkej zóne v Hornom Rakúsku a Salzburgu Slovenský sociálny výbor (Slowakische Sozial Fürsorge), ktorý v Hornom Rakúsku viedol od roku 1949 kňaz – emigrant Karol Šumichrast. Jeho spolupracovníkmi

1 Archív Ústavu pamäti národa (ďalej A ÚPN), fond (ďalej iba f.) Krajská správa Zboru národnej bezpečnosti – Správa Štátnej bezpečnosti (ďalej KS ZNB S ŠtB) Bratislava, č. V – 204, Jozef Macek a spol.

2 A ÚPN, f. I. správa ZNB, r. č. 10212, Counter Intelligence Corps – Vídeň, Michaelerstr. 11.

3 Tamže.

4 Tamže.

boli slovenskí katolícki kňazi – emigranti: Augustín Záh, Ján Loydl, Imrich Fuzy, Štefan Fabera. Z civilných osôb to boli: Dr. Jozef Mikula, Tibor Pekarovič, Imrich Stolárik.⁵ Podľa výpovede Ernesta Strečanského zo 7. júla 1955 boli Jozef Macek a ďalší prevádzaci a spolupracovníci CIC prechádzajúci hranicu do ČSR so spravodajskými úlohami riadení „Štefanem Fáberou, Karolem Šumichrastem a Jozefem Vicenem, který byl řádovým zaměstnancem MIS ve Velsu [Wels] v Horním Rakousku. Jelikož Jozef Vicen byl vedoucím štvavého vysílání „Bílá legie“. Kromě převádění osob do zahraničí jak jsem již výše uvedl bylo úkolem Macka, Totka, Zemana získávat na území ČSR rovněž propagační materiál pro vysílání „Bílá legie“.⁶ Táto činnosť odbojovej skupiny Biela légia, ktorá pôsobila v Rakúsku a vysielala informácie o nebezpečných komunistoch a spolupracovníkoch, bola pre režim mimoriadne neželaná.

Koncom januára 1949 previedol Macek z ČSR do Rakúska skupinu 8 až 9 utečencov. V auguste 1950 nadviazal Macek kontakt s Titusom Zemanom a spoločne s Ferdinandom Totkom prišiel opäť na územie ČSR, kde sa ujal skupiny 6 klerikov sprostredkovaných Zemanom a previedol ich do Rakúska. Jeho činnosť pokračovala, keď v októbri 1950 prišiel opäť s Totkom do republiky a aj spoločne so Zemanom previedli do Rakúska ďalších 13 klerikov.⁷ Prevoz kňazov a seminaristov do Rakúska v rokoch 1950 – 1951 organizovali saleziánski kňazi prof. Titus Zeman a Dr. František Revesz v spolupráci s Jozefom Mackom, Ferdinandom Totkom a Jozefom Bizekom. Mnohí kňazi a seminaristi sa snažili odísť z Československa, pretože boli internovaní v táborech alebo sa skrývali na farách a u veriacich. Hrozilo im bezprostredné zatknutie ŠtB. Ferdinandovi Totkovi a prof. Titusovi Zemanovi sa stal osudným rok 1951, keď sa väčšia skupina seminaristov musela vrátiť od rozvodnenej rieky Morava na hranici a následne boli zadržaní. Prípado sa stal známym aj prostredníctvom po roku 1989 publikovaných spomienok katolíckych kňazov Antona Srhoľca a Viliama Mitošinku, ktorí boli uväznení na dlhé roky a prežili si „peklo“ v podobe metód fyzického a psychického týrania vyšetrovateľmi ŠtB.⁸ Jozef Macek sa tohto prechodu nezúčastnil a svoj

5 MORBACHER, L. – PEKAROVIČ, T. : Ilegálne úteky z Československa v rokoch 1948 – 1989. In: *Zločiny komunizmu na Slovensku 1948 – 1989 I. diel*. Prešov 2001, s. 532.

6 A ÚPN, f. KS ZNB S ŠtB Bratislava, č. V – 204, Jozef Macek a spol.

7 Tamže.

8 MITOŠINKA, V.: *Pamäti kňaza*. Bratislava 1992.

život na hranici riskoval aj naďalej. V júli 1952 nadviazal spojenie s jemu dobre známym úspešným prevádzачom Jozefom Bizekom z Borského Sv. Mikuláša a spoločne previedli do Rakúska ďalších sedem osôb. Spolu s Bizekom prepravili na podnet kňaza Revesza v roku 1953 ďalších šesť osôb. Približne v júli 1953 nadviazal Macek spojenie s ďalším známym prevádzачom Viktorom Filípekom a opäť prichádza do ČSR, aby prepravil do Rakúska rodinu Onuferových, dvoch neznámych manželov a ďalšie osoby. Táto cesta sa však skomplikovala, pretože na hranici narazili na prekážky a museli sa vrátiť späť. Krátko na to však cestu zopakoval a spolu s Jozefom Bizekom previedli do Rakúska sedem osôb, medzi ktorými bol aj Onufer.⁹ Na jeseň 1953 chceli prepraviť s Viktorom Filípekom a Jozefom Bizekom ďalšie osoby. Tesne po prechode z Rakúska na úseku 2. pohraničnej roty PS Malé Leváre ich však spozorovala hliadka Pohraničnej stráže. Filípkovi a Macekovi sa podarilo ustúpiť za hranicu. Bizeka pohraničníci zastrelili. V osudný deň 1. decembra 1953 pri vystupovaní na československý breh rieky Moravy ho pohraničná hliadka vyzvala, aby sa vzdal. Keď neuposlúchol a snažil sa dostať naspäť, použila hliadka PS voči nemu samopaly a v krátkych dávkach naňho vystrelala 20 nábojov. Jozef Bizek zraneniam podľahol.¹⁰

Dňa 12. mája 1955 boli Jozef Macek a Jozef Polanský po prechode hranice z Rakúska zadržaní Pohraničnou strážou v blízkosti Moravského Sv. Jána.¹¹ Vyšetrovatelia ŠtB z krajskej správy MV Bratislava po sérii výsluchov a konfrontácií zistili, že Jozef Macek previedol do Rakúska približne 60 osôb. Krajský súd v Bratislave dňa 25. októbra 1955 uznal Jozefa Maceka vinného z trestného činu velezrady podľa § 78 ods. 1 a ods. 2 vtedy platného trestného zákona a poslal ho na 20 rokov do väzenia. Z vysokými trestami v procese Jozef Macek a spol. obišli aj Jozef Polanský, Ján Šebesta, Mária Onuferová, Alžbeta Macková a Štefan Juva, ktorí Macekovi s utečencami pomáhali.¹²

Dňa 19. marca 1964 Krajský súd v Bratislave uznesením podľa § 327 ods. 2 tr. poriadku upustil od výkonu trestu Jozefa Maceka, pretože podľa

9 A ÚPN, f. KS ZNB S ŠtB Bratislava, č. V – 204, Jozef Macek a spol.

10 A ÚPN, f. Veliteľstvo PS v Prahe, inventárna jednotka (ďalej i. j.) 137.

11 A ÚPN, f. 11. brigáda PS v Bratislave – č. i. j. 8502346, Mesačné hlásenie a výkaz o výkone služby za mesiac máj 1955 – predloženie.

12 A ÚPN, f. KS ZNB S ŠtB Bratislava, č. V – 204, Jozef Macek a spol.

zistenia lekárov trpel nevyliciteľnou chorobou – rakovinou žalúdka v pokročilom štádiu, a podľa ich odborného odhadu mu ostával mesiac života.¹³

Za pozornosť stojí charakteristika Jozefa Maceka, ako aj jeho blízkeho spolupracovníka Jozefa Bizeka, ktorú, aj keď pod nátlakom totalitnej justičnej mašinérie, poskytol vo svojej výpovedi odsúdený bývalý emigrant Ernest Strečanský vyšetrovateľovi ŠtB por. Krčekovi 7. júla 1955 priamo v Jáchymove: „Všeobecne v utečeneckých kružích všal [k] prevládal názor, že Macek s Bizkem opustili Rakousko proto, že Rakouské úřady začali pátrat po jejich pašerácké činnosti a Americké úřady v Rakousku jim odmítli poskytnout patřičnou ochranu, kterou jim však poskytovali před tím. Toto bylo z toho důvodu, že jak Macek, tak i Bizek se nechtěli na trvalo vázat na jednoho řídicího orgána, ale dělali tyto služby pouze příležitostně což však nevyhovovalo Americkým úřadům, neboť [t] Macek s Bizkem podnikali do ČSR samostatné ilegální přechody což se vymíkalo kontrole Amerických orgánů. Takovéto cesty Macek s Bizkem konali na požádání uprchnuvši [ch] osob z ČSR, aby jim převedli do zahraničí jejich rodinné příslušníky neb známe osoby za což je finančně odměňovali.“¹⁴

Kto bol vlastne Jozef Macek? Nebojácny, vynaliezavý a bezškrupulózný pašerák ľudí a agent západných spravodajských služieb, ktorý riskoval vlastný život pre vidinu finančného prospechu? Odpoveď by určite poskytli stovky ľudí, ktorých bezpečne dopravil z územia totalitného štátu na Západ, kde mohli realizovať svoje predstavy o živote v slobodných a demokratických krajinách. Jozef Macek bol určite hrdinom protikomunistického odboja, ktorý napriek svojej komplikovanej osobnosti nestratil základnú schopnosť rozlišovať medzi dobrom – v podobe nedokonalej demokratickej spoločnosti za železnou oponou a zlom, ktoré predstavoval komunistický režim väzniaci tisíce ľudí za ich pôvod a presvedčenie.

Summary

In February 1948 emigrant groupings carried out intelligence activities in cooperation with the CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps), the counter

13 Archív Zboru väzenskej a justičnej stráže SR Leopoldov, osobný spis Jozefa Maceka, Lékařská zpráva KÚNZ – Fakultní nemocnice v Brně, Macek Jozef, nar. 1909, byl u nás v léčení od 22. 1. 1964.

14 A ÚPN, f. KS ZNB S ŠtB Bratislava, č. V – 204, Jozef Macek a spol.

intelligence unit of the American Occupation Army in Austria, with the help of people who crossed the border to Czechoslovakia illegally. Part of them focused on the help to those who wanted to get to Vienna through the green border, to get to the American occupation zone in Austria later. They risked their lives at each crossing the 'green' border with the refugees. Jozef Macek was one of them, a man who smuggled hundreds of people through the Iron Curtain from Slovakia to Austria until the year 1955. In the same year he was sentenced to 20 years of prison for the high treason. Other members of the group who helped him in his activities were also sentenced.

Ján Ševčík – súpútnik a obeť komunistického režimu¹

Jan PEŠEK

Komunistický režim v Československu sa počas svojej existencie opieral predovšetkým o štruktúry „štátostrany“, represívny aparát a ďalšie mocenské nástroje. K ovládaniu spoločnosti však využíval aj iné spôsoby vrátane pôsobenia rôznych súpútnikov. K typickým súpútnikom patrili predstavitelia satelitných politických strán, ktorých hlavným poslaním bolo navonok „reprezentovať šírku socialistickej demokracie“. Pozícia súpútnika bola pritom ako riskantná lotéria, nemali osud vo svojich rukách, či sa už usilovali viac alebo menej. Niektorým sa to vyplatilo, mali funkcie, určitý spoločenský status. Urobili si z prisluhovania režimu „živnosť“ na celý život. Boli však aj takí, ktorí na to tvrdo doplatili, a práve taký bol aj Ján Ševčík.

Ján Ševčík (narodený 12. marca 1896 v Bánovciach nad Bebravou, okres Topoľčany – zomrel 6. marca 1965 v Bratislave) vyštudoval právo na Karlovej univerzite v Prahe, v rokoch 1926 – 1934 pôsobil ako tajomník klubu poslancov Hlinkovej slovenskej ľudovej strany (nebol však jej členom), v rokoch 1933 – 1939 sa angažoval v agrárnych odboroch, v rokoch 1939 – 1942 pôsobil ako správca YMCA (Zväz mladých kresťanských mužov) v Bratislave. Po rozbití Československa v marci 1939 sa zapojil do občianskeho odboja, bol členom vojenskej odbojovej organizácie Obrana národa, v rámci ktorej pomáhal organizovať ilegálne prechody z Protektorátu Čechy a Morava. Vo februári 1942 ho zatkli, v júli 1942

1 Štúdia bola vypracovaná v Historickom ústave SAV v rámci projektu VEGA 2/0103/10 *Komunistická strana na Slovensku: cesta k moci, monopol moci (1945 – 1968)*.

prepustili na kauciu, do augusta 1944 žil pod policajným dozorom. Po vypuknutí SNP bol členom povstaleckej Slovenskej národnej rady, poverenikom pôšt a telegrafov. Po porážke Povstania ho vo februári 1945 krátko väznili v Banskej Bystrici.

Po oslobodení vstúpil Ševčík do Demokratickej strany. Do augusta 1946 vykonával funkciu poverenika zdravotníctva, pričom už od roku 1945 bol poslancom Národného zhromaždenia a v rokoch 1946 – 1948 jeho podpredsedom. Už v roku 1946 sa dostal do sporu s vedením DS. Pred parlamentnými voľbami v máji 1946 podporoval založenie štvrtej politickej strany, ktorá mala osloviť katolícke vrstvy obyvateľstva a byť protiváhou DS. Napokon Ševčík od zakladania novej politickej strany upustil a patril k tým, ktorí podpísali známu „aprílovú dohodu“ a zostal vo vedení DS. Na jeseň 1947, keď vypukla na Slovensku politická kríza, označil Ševčík „aprílovú dohodu“ za vážnu chybu a žiadal zmenu politickej línie. V tom čase už spolupracoval s komunistami, rovnako ako počas vládnej a politickej krízy vo februári 1948. Podieľal sa na rozbití Demokratickej strany, na ktorej troskách vznikla satelitná Strana slovenskej obrody, ktorej predsedom sa stal práve Ševčík.²

Ševčík zastával od 25. februára 1948 v rekonštruovanej vláde Klementa Gottwalda funkciu štátneho tajomníka v ministerstve národnej obrody a od 15. júna 1948 bol podpredsedom vlády Československej republiky. Jeho pozícia vyzerala honosne, no skutočne len vyzerala. Funkcia podpredsedu vlády bola formálna, nemal pridelenú žiadnu konkrétnu agendu. Tú dostal až vtedy, keď v septembri 1951 odvolali Ludvíka Svobodu z funkcie podpredsedu vlády povereného riadením Štátneho výboru pre telesnú výchovu a šport, a práve túto agendu prideliť Ševčíkovi. Bola to však len formálna reprezentácia, nakoľko sa tejto problematike nikdy nevenoval a nerozumel jej. Zakrátko však prišiel šokujúci úder, keď ho 30. mája 1952 zatkla Štátna bezpečnosť.

Ján Ševčík dovtedy slúžil komunistickému režimu, ale jeho predstavitelia mu nedôverovali. Štátna bezpečnosť ho dlhodobo „rozpracovávala“ tak, ako iných súpútnikov; nikto z nich si nemohol byť istý, či si ho „meč strany“, ako nazývali ŠtB, nevyberie za cieľ svojho úderu. Ševčíkovi priťažovalo, že stál na čele strany, ktorá niesla biľag nástupníckej strany po „reakčnej“ Demokratickej strane. Hlavné dôvody Ševčíkovho zatknutia

2 K osobe Jána Ševčíka pozri *Slovenský biografický slovník. Zv. V. R – Š. Martin 1992, s. 446 – 447; Tiež HLAVA, B.: Ján Ševčík. In: PEŠEK, J. a kol.: Aktéri jednej éry na Slovensku 1948 – 1989. Personifikácia politického vývoja. Prešov 2003, s. 312 – 313.*

však spočívali v tom, že bol predstaviteľom režimu, osobitne Viliamovi Širokému, i vedeniu Štátnej bezpečnosti „neprijemný“. Chceli ho iného, aký bol, prekážalo im jeho správanie, a to vo viacerých oblastiach. Vystupoval priveľmi sebaisto, možno si myslel, že je nenahraditeľný, že má „zásluhy“ (spolupráca s komunistami ešte pred februárom 1948, počas prevratu vrátane účasti v rekonštruovanej Gottwaldovej vláde) a nemôže sa mu nič stať. Bol to naivný omyl, ilúzia, z ktorej rýchlo vytriezvel.

Ševčík sa už v čase vojny, keď sa zapojil do odboja, dostal do kontaktu so spravodajskou sieťou sovietskej rozviedky, skupinou Hans Schwarz a Heinrich Karl Fomferra.³ Pomáhal jej získavať falošné doklady a spravodajský materiál a po jej odhalení vo februári 1942 Ševčíka zatkli. Po vojne podľa všetkého v spravodajskej spolupráci pre Sovietsky zväz pokračoval. Signálov o tom bolo viac, potvrdzovala to aj správa agenta V-101 z 25. októbra 1947; išlo o Valerija Vilinského, tajomníka, resp. vedúceho kabinetu ministra dopravy Ivana Pietora.⁴ Agent upozornil Štátnu bezpečnosť, že „Ševčík holduje celkom neobvyklou mierou alkoholu a v opilosti niekoľkokrát prezradil, že je človekom Rusov a že o všetkom, čo sa deje v DS podával správy ruskému konzulovi v Bratislave Demjanovovi“.⁵ Po februári 1948 Ševčík sám seba prezentoval ako „človeka Sovietov“, hoci ťažko posúdiť, či išlo len o sebaaprezentáciu alebo skutočnú spoluprácu. Obidve alternatívy však Ševčíkovu pozíciu problematizovali. Pokiaľ išlo len o sebaaprezentáciu, nemal nijakú reálnu oporu. V prípade skutočnej spolupráce je otázne, či o neho už príslušné orgány nestratili záujem, prípadne pri častej obmene jednotlivých garnitúr sovietskych poradcov v bezpečnosti a ich domácich spolupracovníkov nezostal bez svojich „patrónov“.

Úder proti Ševčíkovi sa nepochybne pripravoval dlhší čas, no konkrétne podobu rýchlo sa blížiaceho pádu ukázala situácia niekoľko dní pred jeho zatknutím. Bolo evidentné, že všetko prebieha s vedomím, respektíve za aktívnej účasti špičiek komunistického režimu. Potvrďuje to vystúpenie Viliama Širokého, predsedu KSS a podpredsedu vlády, na schôdzi predsedníctva a výkonného výboru SSO 28. mája 1952. Podal

3 O činnosti tejto skupiny pozri MEDVECKÝ, M.: *Spravodajské eso slovenského štátu: Kauza Imrich Sucký*. Bratislava 2007, s. 104 – 117.

4 K osobe V. Vilinského pozri ŽÁČEK, P.: V-101. Agent, ze kterého se dalo žít. In: MEDVECKÝ, M. (Ed.): *Posledné a prvé slobodné (?) voľby – 1946, 1990*. Bratislava 2006, s. 102 – 159.

5 BARNOVSKÝ, M.: *Na ceste k monopolu moc. Mocensko-politické zápasy na Slovensku v rokoch 1945 – 1948*. Bratislava 1993, s. 219.

tu tendenčnú, výrazne negatívnu správu o Ševčíkovi a vyhlásil: „*Vo vašej strane sa odohrávajú čudné veci. Pokiaľ si neurobíte poriadok, urobí to niekto iný za vás.*“ Vedeniu SSO dal na „urobenie poriadku“ tri dni. Niektorí jeho členovia (Jozef Mjartan, Jozef Kyselý) pritom boli o kritickom postoji voči Ševčíkovi informovaní ešte pred touto schôdzkou, a to práve Širokým.⁶ Pod týmto vplyvom sa jeho členovia okamžite uzniesli, že Ševčíka pozbavujú funkcie predsedu strany a vylučujú ho zo SSO; dovtedy na jeho adresu žiadne výhrady nevyjadrovali. Nasledujúceho dňa, 29. mája 1952, zastrašené Predsedníctvo SSO formálne požiadalo Ústredný akčný výbor Slovenského národného frontu, aby bol Ján Ševčík okamžite odvolaný z funkcie podpredsedu vlády a zbavený poslaneckého mandátu v Národnom zhromaždení. Do funkcie predsedu SSO zvolili Jozefa Kyselého.⁷

Verejnoscť pochopiteľne o zatknutí Ševčíka informovaná nebola, jeho odvolanie z funkcie podpredsedu vlády oznámila denná tlač bez akéhokoľvek zdôvodnenia. Denník ÚV KSS *Pravda* priniesol 1. júna 1952 (na s. 7) len nasledujúcu vetu: „*Prezident republiky Klement Gottwald pozbavil Dr. Jána Ševčíka úradu podpredsedu vlády a vedenia Štátneho úradu pre telesnú výchovu a šport.*“⁸ Rovnako neurčité bolo oznámenie zo 7. júna 1952, že za nového podpredsedu vlády bol vymenovaný Jozef Kyselý (na rozdiel od Ševčíka mu však nepridelili agendu Štátneho úradu pre telesnú výchovu a šport – pozn. J. P.), dovtedy poslanec SNR a povereník zdravotníctva. Vláda ho z tejto funkcie odvolala 3. júna 1952 a za nového povereníka vymenovala Vojtecha Töröka.⁹ V oznámení o vymenovaní Kyselého za podpredsedu vlády sa skutočnosť, že nahradil práve Ševčíka, nespomínala. Ševčíkovo meno sa vôbec neobjavilo.

Štátna bezpečnosť zatkla Ševčíka 30. mája 1952, pričom návrh na zatknutie bol operatívnym pracovníkom vypracovaný (potvrdil ho námestník ministra národnej bezpečnosti) až 4. júna 1952. V tomto návrhu sa ako dôvod na zatknutie uvádzalo, že Ševčík sa „*v spojení so slovenskými nacionalistami zaoberal získavaním a verejným rozširovaním tendenčne*

6 Národní archiv (ďalej iba NA) Praha, fond (ďalej iba f.) Generálna prokuratúra (ďalej iba GP), značka SGPt 20/54, Záznam o výpovedi Pavla Halabrína, vedúceho sekretariátu SSO dňa 6. 4. 1965.

7 NA, f. GP, zn. SGPt 20/54. Ján Ševčík, býv. podpredseda vlády ČSR – preskúmanie rozsudku Najvyššieho súdu v Prahe č. 1 T 16/54 zo dňa 25. 6. 1954 – informácia z 8. 1. 1965.

8 *Pravda*, 1. júna 1952. Rozhodnutie prezidenta republiky Kl. Gottwalda.

9 *Pravda*, 7. júna 1952. Dr. Jozef Kyselý novým podpredsedom vlády.

skreslených správ hanobiacich vládnych a stranických činiteľov, že zvlášť verejne prejavoval buržoázne nacionalistické stanovisko proti prítomnosti Čechov na Slovensku, v Prahe že bol v úzkom styku s tzv. Rotterovou skupinou, od ktorej získaval tendenčne skreslené správy o situácii v KSČ a o vládnych a stranických činiteľoch, takto získavané správy využíval ku svojej snahe odstrániť z verejného a politického života jemu nepohodlných vládnych a stranických činiteľov a na ich miesto dosadiť členov svojej skupiny, pomocou ktorých by mohol uskutočniť svoje buržoázne nacionalistické ciele“¹⁰

Takýto postup bol nezákonný nielen preto, že návrh bol vydaný až po vykonanom zatknutí, ale aj preto, že príkaz na zatknutie mohol podľa platného zákona vydať len predseda senátu na návrh prokurátora. Nijaký iný orgán na to nemal oprávnenie. Rovnako nezákonný bol aj rozkaz na zatknutie z 30. mája 1952, nakoľko v prípade Jána Ševčíka nebol dôvod na zatknutie bez príkazu predsedu senátu, pretože nebol pristihnutý pri nijakom trestnom čine. Zákon bol ďalej porušený v tom, že Ševčík nebol ihneď vypočutý a najneskôr do 48 hodín odovzdaný prokurátorovi; prokurátor rozhodol o väzbe až 27. júna 1952, a aj to formálne nezákonným spôsobom a postupom. V tlačive, ktoré malo nahradiť rozhodnutie formou uznesenia, uviedol, že ponecháva obvineného Ševčíka vo väzbe, hoci predtým nedošlo k nijakému úkonu, ktorý by bolo možné považovať za zákonné vzatie do väzby.¹¹

Štátna bezpečnosť nemala pri zatknutí Ševčíka žiadne dôkazy, ktoré by ho usvedčovali z trestnej činnosti. S cieľom získať takého „dôkazy“ 15. júna 1952 minister národnej bezpečnosti Karol Bacílek uskutočnil rozhovor s vedúcimi funkcionármi SSO. Rozhovoru sa zúčastnil Jozef Kyselý, Jozef Mjartan, Vojtech Török a Jozef Gajdošík. O priebehu tohto rozhovoru bol spísaný „záznam“, ktorý bol odovzdaný orgánom ŠtB a použitý ako dôkazový materiál. V zázname sa uvádza: „*Súdruh Karol Bacílek osvetlil prítomným účel rozhovoru. Ide o prípad Jána Ševčíka a o to, čím činitelia strany OBRODA môžu prispieť jednak k rýchlemu došetreniu celej Ševčíkovej nepriateľskej činnosti a jednak pomôcť strane OBRODA, aby lepšie plnila svoje zodpovedné úlohy v rámci obrodeneho Národného frontu*

10 NA, GP, zn. SGPt 20/54. Ján Ševčík, býv. podpredseda vlády ČSR – preskúmanie rozsudku Najvyššieho súdu v Prahe č. 1 T 16/54 zo dňa 25. 6. 1954 – informácia z 8. 1. 1965.

11 NA, f. GP, zn. SGPt 20/54. Sťažnosť pre porušenie zákona podaná predsedom Najvyššieho súdu proti rozsudku Najvyššieho súdu sp. zn. 1 T 16/54 z 25. júna 1954 v tr. veci proti Jánovi Ševčíkovi, 8. 6. 1965.

*Čechov a Slovákov. Súdruh Bacílek sa odvolal na príklad KSČ a na výzvu, ktorú po odhalení Slánskeho adresoval predseda strany s. Gottwald všetkým členom, aby svojimi poznatkami, hoci i najmenšími, prispeli strane pri vyšetrovaní. Prítomní mali oznámiť v rozhovore všetko, čo im je o Ševčíkovej činnosti známe a prípadne písomne dať našej národnej bezpečnosti správu o veciach, na ktoré by v rozhovore neprišlo a na ktoré by sa dodatočne rozpamätali. (...) Súdruh Bacílek naznačil niektoré body, ktoré by mali byť v rozhovore vodidlom a povedal, že podrobné vyjasnenie všetkých okolností Ševčíkovej nepriateľskej činnosti pomôže správne určiť jej motív a cieľ. Potom prítomní v rozhovore oznamovali svoje jednotlivé osobné poznatky o Ševčíkovi (...)*¹²

Prítomní predstavitelia SSO „žalovali na Ševčíka“ predovšetkým v dvoch základných rovinách. Török a Gajdošík sa sústredili na údajné kontakty Ševčíka s „reakčnou cirkevnou hierarchiou“, najmä trnavským biskupom Ambrózom Lazíkom. Podľa Töröka sa vraj Ševčík tváril ako spojka medzi vládou a biskupmi, akoby tu boli dve línie cirkevnej politiky, jedna oficiálna a druhá neverejná. A práve tú neverejnú mal na Slovensku uskutočňovať Ševčík prostredníctvom bývalého generálneho tajomníka strany Jána Válka s väzbou na Lazíka. Gajdošík uvádzal, že SSO mala problémy s rímskokatolíckymi kňazmi, no keď prišiel Ševčík, situácia sa „cez noc“ zmenila a kňazi akoby na povel začali javiť záujem o angažovanie sa v strane. Výpovede Kyselého a Mjartana smerovali k samoprezentácii Ševčíka ako „človeka Sovietov“. Kyselý uvádzal, že Ševčík všade „zdôrazňoval, že má spojenie so sovietskymi orgánmi a varoval pred spoluprácou s komunistami, pretože vraj budú likvidovaní nielen komunisti, ale i tí, ktorí s nimi spolupracujú, pretože zo sovietskej strany nie je vraj k čl. komunistom dôvera.“ Ševčík im povedal: „Bašťovanský padol a tí, ktorí s ním spolupracovali, pôjdu tiež.“ Podľa Mjartana sa vytvárala atmosféra strachu a obáv, podložená údajnými stykmi Ševčíka so sovietskymi občanmi: „Výsledkom bolo úsilie predstavovať Ševčíka ako sovietskeho obľúbenca, že vraj Rusi majú Ševčíka ako pána boha a že sa ho všetci boja, aj komunisti.“¹³

Bacílek z výpovedí funkcionárov SSO vykonštruoval, že Ševčíkova koncepcia je „titovština na ruby“, že vraj chcel postaviť do rozporu záujmy ZSSR a záujmy ľudovodemokratických štátov. Podľa neho „sa potvrdilo, že

12 Archív Ústavu pamäti národa (ďalej iba A ÚPN) Bratislava, f. sekretariát FMV Praha A 2/1, inventárna jednotka (ďalej iba i. j.) 79, Záznam z rozhovoru súdruha Karola Bacílka s vedúcimi pracovníkmi strany OBRODA v Bratislave dňa 15. 6. 1952.

13 Tamže.

ŠtB urobila správne, keď Ševčíka zatkla.“¹⁴ Bacílka muselo veľmi iritovať, že niekto, v tomto prípade Ševčík, sa prezentuje ako väčší priateľ Sovietov ako on a garnitúra, ku ktorej patrila, rovnako ako tvrdenie, že im Sovieti neveria. Pociťoval to ako osobnú urážku a podľa toho sa aj k Ševčíkovi správal. Spolupôsobila tu aj osobná averzia, rovnako ako v prípade Širokého, voči tým, ktorí sa v rôznych funkciách zúčastnili Slovenského národného povstania, kým oni sa ho zúčastniť nemohli (Široký) alebo im „nepridelili“ významnejšie funkcie (Bacílek).

Ševčíka po zatknutí vyšetrovali vo väznici ŠtB Praha-Ruzyň. Bolo charakteristické, že pre neexistenciu dôkazov o údajnej trestnej činnosti sa prvé vypočúvanie uskutočnilo až 19. júna 1952, pri ktorom bol spísaný jeho životopis. Dovtedy prebiehali len domové prehliadky a bol zaistený Ševčíkov majetok. Druhé vypočúvanie sa uskutočnilo 29. septembra 1952 a potom Ševčíka vyšetrovatelia „odložili k ľadu“; nebol vypočúvaný viac ako 13 mesiacov. Dôvodov bolo viac, no zrejme hlavný spočíval v tom, že Ševčíkov prípad bol v danej spoločensko-politickej situácii marginálny a „prednosť“ mali iné, podstatne závažnejšie prípady. Vypočúvanie Ševčíka bolo obnovené až na jeseň 1953, po nástupe nového ministra vnútra Rudolfa Baráka. Keď robil „inventúru“, čo mu zostalo po Bacílkovi, objavila sa aj „skupina spoločníkov Ševčíka“.¹⁵ Prvé vyšetrovanie po nástupe Baráka, v poradí celkom tretie, prebehlo 23. novembra 1953 a potom rýchlo pokračovalo (od 23. novembra 1953 vrátane vyšetrovali Ševčíka celkom 11-krát) smerom k zinscenovanému procesu. Štátna bezpečnosť celkom 8-krát požiadala o predĺženie vyšetrovacej väzby; tá celkovo trvala viac ako 2 roky.

V priebehu vyšetrovacej väzby sa menila koncepcia dôvodov trvania väzby i zámery vyšetrovania, čo jasne vyplýva zo žiadostí ŠtB o predĺžovanie väzby. Dňa 21. augusta 1952 sa uvádza, že Ševčík doposiaľ nedoznal všetku svoju trestnú činnosť. Materiál dokazuje nepriateľské spojenie s frakčnými skupinami a nacionalistami, zbieranie nepravdivého a ohováračského materiálu proti vládnym činiteľom a podobne, čo menovaný nedoznal. To isté sa uvádza aj v žiadosti z 25. novembra 1952. V žiadosti z 26. februára 1953 sa však už uvádza, že prípad Jána Ševčíka je rozsiahly

14 Tamže.

15 V „skupine spoločníkov Ševčíka“ bolo okrem neho samotného celkom 6 osôb (Andrej Fillo, Eugen Korunka, Karel Rotter, Jan Nemčok, Michal Zigo a Matej Pätoprstý). A ÚPN, f. sekretariát FMV Praha A 2/2, i. j. 188, Prehľad o stave hlavných prípadov vyšetrovaných v Praha-Ruzyň v r. 1953.

komplot organizovaný Vatikánom na Slovensku a jeho vyšetovanie nie je možné doposiaľ ukončiť, nakoľko ide o rozsiahle sprisahanie ako po línii vatikánskej politiky, tak po línii nacionálno-buržoáznej. To isté sa opakuje v žiadostiach o predĺženie vyšetovacej väzby z 25. mája 1953 a 30. júla 1953. V žiadosti z 25. septembra 1953 sa uvádza, že Ševčík je zakuklený nepriateľ, ktorý bol už pred februárom 1948 exponentom vysokej cirkevnej hierarchie, a spolu s bývalým prezidentom Benešom, národným socialistom Zenklom a ľudovcom Háloom organizovali protisocialistický blok. Po februári 1948 vraj zamaskoval svoju nepriateľskú činnosť a votrel sa do vlády, odkiaľ sabotoval výstavbu socializmu v ČSR na úseku telovýchovy, zameriavajúc sa predovšetkým na znemožnenie socializácie Slovenska. Navyše boli zistené styky Ševčíka s bielogvardejcami. V žiadosti ŠtB o predĺženie väzby z 13. novembra 1953 sa uvádza, že vec je v štádiu konečného vyšetovania. Preukázalo sa, že Ševčík je dlhoročným zakukleným nepriateľom robotníckej triedy a ako taký sa už od roku 1945 usiloval o znemožnenie výstavby socializmu v ČSR. Na tento cieľ sa usiloval zneužiť stranu Obroda, aby vytvoril protikomunistický blok, ktorý by brzdil výstavbu socializmu, najmä na slovenskom vidieku. Vo svojom nepriateľskom úmysle ohováral a hanobil členov vlády a KSCĽ, sabotoval spoluprácu s Národným frontom, sabotoval výstavbu socialistickej telovýchovy a usiloval sa spútať stranu Obroda s cirkevnou hierarchiou.¹⁶

Z obsahu zápisníc spísaných s obvineným Ševčíkom v priebehu vyšetovania orgánmi Štátnej bezpečnosti vyplývalo, že hoci sa bránil proti vzneseným obvineniam, nakoniec sa väčšinou doznal k trestnej činnosti. K tomu, akým spôsobom vyšetovanie prebiehalo a ako to bolo s jeho údajným doznáním sa k trestnej činnosti, sa Ševčík vyjadril do zápisnice pred predsedom senátu Najvyššieho súdu 19. júna 1954, t. j. bezprostredne pred vlastným procesom. Všetky protokoly spísané s ním na ŠtB označil za tendenčné s tým, že „*podpisy na zápisniciach boli na ňom vynútené urážkami, bitím a škrtením zo strany vyšetrujúceho orgánu*“.¹⁷ Nástup nového ministra vnútra Baráka v septembri 1953 nič na metódach vyšetovania ŠtB nezmenil, naďalej pokračovala s tou brutalitou, ktorú si osvojila v predchádzajúcom období.

16 NA, f. GP, zn. SGPt 20/54. Ján Ševčík, býv. podpredseda vlády ČSR – preskúmanie rozsudku Najvyššieho súdu v Prahe č. 1 T 16/54 zo dňa 25. 6. 1954 – informácia z 8. 1. 1965.

17 NA, f. GP, zn. SGPt 20/54. Sťažnosť pre porušenie zákona podaná predsedom Najvyššieho súdu proti rozsudku Najvyššieho súdu sp. Zn. 1 T 16/54 z 25. 6. 1954 v tr. veci proti Jánovi Ševčíkovi, 8. 6. 1965.

Návrh žaloby na Jána Ševčíka bol predložený na rokovanie Politického sekretariátu ÚV KSČ 21. apríla 1954. Žaloba ho vinila z trestných činov velezrady, sabotáže, prezradenia štátneho tajomstva a rozkrádania národného majetku. Velezrady sa mal dopustiť tým, že sa po dohode s bývalým predsedom DS Jozefom Lettrichom ako prisluhovač vysokej cirkevnej hierarchie votrel do funkcie predsedu SSO, kde presadzoval prijatie programu odporujúceho zásadám Národného frontu, úmyselne neprenášal na vedenie SSO smernice NF, umožnil bývalému povereníkovi Kornelovi Filovi emigrovať, čím sa zúčastnil za zvlášť priťažujúcom pokuse zničiť a rozvrátiť ľudovodemokratické štátne zriadenie a spoločenský poriadok. Podstata sabotáže bola v tom, že ako podpredseda vlády, poverený riadením Štátneho výboru pre telesnú výchovu a šport, záškodníckou kádrovou politikou, zámerným obchádzaním sovietskych skúseností a mrhaním vecnými prostriedkami maril výstavbu zjednotenej telovýchovy. Prezradenia štátneho tajomstva sa údajne dopustil tým, že úmyselne informoval nepovolane osoby o obsahu zasadaní vlády, čo malo zostať utajené. Rozkrádanie národného majetku spočívalo v tom, že ako podpredseda vlády, t. j. verejný činiteľ, si neoprávnene prisvojil financie určené na štátnu reprezentáciu.¹⁸

Politický sekretariát ÚV KSČ 21. apríla 1954 návrh žaloby schválil s tým, že „a/ bude doplnená a upravená podľa pripomienok sekretariátu ÚV KSČ; b/ proces bude neverejný a o výsledku daná správa do tlače“.¹⁹ Proces bez účasti verejnosti bol zdôvodňovaný tým, že „zo strany Ševčíka nie je vylúčená možnosť provokatívneho ohovárania stranických a štátnych činiteľov“.²⁰ Takéto „nebezpečie“ reálne hrozilo, no hlavným dôvodom na neverejnosť procesu zrejme bolo, že v tomto čase už stranické a štátne vedenie nemalo záujem na usporadúvaní verejných monstreprocesov; aj proces s tzv. buržoáznymi nacionalistami v apríli 1954 prebehol ako neverejný.

Proces s Jánom Ševčíkom sa uskutočnil v Prahe pred senátom Najvyššieho súdu 25. júna 1954. Zo „skupiny spoločníkov Ševčíka“ zostal len

18 A ÚPN, f. sekretariát FMV Praha A 2/1, i. j. 131. Ševčík Ján, býv. nám. predsedu vlády, obvinený z vlastizrady, sabotáže, ohrozovania štátneho tajomstva a rozkrádania národného majetku – návrh žaloby.

19 Tamže. Uznesenie Politického Sekretariátu ÚV KSČ 21. apríla 1954. V pripomienkach Politického sekretariátu išlo len o detaily, nič podstatného sa na obsahu žaloby nezmenilo (pozn. J. P.).

20 Tamže. Ševčík Ján, býv. nám. predsedu vlády, obvinený z vlastizrady, sabotáže, ohrozovania štátneho tajomstva a rozkrádania národného majetku – návrh žaloby.

on sám, ostatných vrátane jeho manželky súdili neskôr, ako tzv. Rotterovu skupinu. O spôsobe vedenia procesu svedčí už samotná skutočnosť, že prebehol počas jedného dňa. Súd vôbec nezobral na vedomie vyhlásenie Ševčíka, že zápisnice o vypočúvaní podpísal pod psychickým a fyzickým nátlakom zo strany ŠtB a pod. Niektorí svedkovia ešte pred súdom odvolali svoje svedectvá, no súd to vôbec neakceptoval. Napr. bývalý tajomník klubu poslancov DS v Ústavodarnom národnom zhromaždení Ondrej Fillo pri vyšetrovaní 31. júla 1953 usvedčoval Ševčíka, že v čase februárového prevratu 1948 prebral od J. Lettricha poverenie „zachraňovať, čo sa dá“, a to potom na pôde SSO aj plnil. Fillo túto svedeckú výpoveď 23. júna 1954 pri výsluchu pred prokurátorom Generálnej prokuratúry odvolal, respektíve jej obsah poprel s odôvodnením, že v čase, keď túto výpoveď pred orgánmi ŠtB urobil, bol nervovo vyčerpaný a nevnímal obsah svojej výpovede. Ševčík bol „uznaný za vinného“ ešte pred tým, ako sa proces s ním uskutočnil. Najvyšší súd svojím uznesením na návrh generálneho prokurátora ustanovil, že za trestné činy velezrady, sabotáže a rozkrádania národného majetku sa určuje trest odňatia slobody na 17 rokov a za trestný čin ohrozenia štátneho tajomstva trest odňatia slobody na jeden rok. Tento jeden rok väzenia bol Ševčíkovi v dôsledku amnestie prezidenta republiky z 4. mája 1953 odpustený, zostal mu však právoplatný trest odňatia slobody na 17 rokov. Okrem toho mu bola vyslovená strata občianskych čestných práv na 10 rokov a bol zaviazaný k úhrade nákladov trestného konania vedeného proti nemu.²¹

Verejnosť sa až po vynesení rozsudku dozvedela, čo sa vlastne so Ševčíkom stalo; od jeho zatknutia 30. mája 1952 o ňom oficiálne nebolo nič oznámené. Dňa 29. júna 1954 vyšiel v *Pravde* (s. 2) tendenčný a ohováračský článok o procese s ním, pričom charakteristický bol jeho záver: „*Pri hlavnom pojednávaní bol tento nepriateľ ľudu zo žalovaných trestných činov usvedčený, takže sa pod farchou dôkazov priznal.*“²² Ševčík naopak pred súdom jednoznačne vyhlásil, že sa cíti nevinný. Trest si odpýkával najskôr vo väznici v Ilave, od roku 1958 v Leopoldove. Keď sa v roku 1960 pripravovala amnestia, rozhodlo v apríli 1960 Politické byro ÚV KSČ prepustiť „významných väzňov“, medzi nimi aj Ševčíka.²³ Rozhodnutím

21 NA, f. GP, zn. SGPt 20/54. Ján Ševčík, býv. podpredseda vlády ČSR – preskúmanie rozsudku Najvyššieho súdu v Prahe č. 1 T 16/54 zo dňa 25. 6. 1954 – informácia z 8. 1. 1965.

22 *Pravda*, 29. júna 1954. Proces so zradcom ľudu Jánom Ševčíkom

23 A ÚPN, f. sekretariát FMV Praha A 2/2, i. j. 192. Uznesenie PB ÚV KSČ z 12. 4. 1960.

prezidenta republiky o amnestii z 9. mája 1960 mu bol odpustený trest odňatia slobody v trvaní 9 rokov, 21 dní a trest straty občianskych čestných práv; 10. mája 1960 ho z výkonu trestu prepustili na slobodu. Občiansky a právne ho Najvyšší súd rehabilitoval 15. júna 1965, po stránickej línii ho vedenie SSO rehabilitovalo 2. decembra 1965. Ševčík sa už toho nedožil, nakoľko v marci 1965 zomrel.

Summary

Ján Ševčík was politically active during the First Czechoslovak Republic, later in Hlinka Slovak People's Party and in the agrarian trade unions. He took part in the resistance; during the Slovak National Uprising he was the Commissioner for Posts and Telegraphs. After the liberation he became a member of the Democratic Party, he was the Commissioner for Health Care, Deputy in the National Assembly and in the period of 1946 – 1948 he became its Chairman. During the February 1948 crisis he opposed the leadership of the Democratic Party and collaborated with the Communists. He participated in establishing a satellite political party called the Slovak Revival Party and became its chairman. In the reconstructed government created by Klement Gottwald he was the State secretary at the Ministry of National Defense for several months; in June 1948 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the government. He served the Communist regime, but its representatives did not trust him and he was monitored by the State Security. In May 1952 he was arrested. He was deprived of all governmental and political positions. The investigation in prison took two years, and both physical and mental violence was used in the interrogations. He confessed only partially to the constructed accusations. He was accused of the high treason, sabotage, jeopardizing the state secret and of the state property larceny crimes. On 25 June 1954 the Supreme Court in Prague sentenced him to 18 years in prison in a non-public trial. He was released from the prison in May 1960 due to an amnesty. The Supreme Court Presidium nullified his punishment to the full extent on 15 June 1965; in November 1965 he was politically rehabilitated by the Slovak Revival Party, but meanwhile he died in March 1965.

2. panel:
**Činnost ilegálních skupín a disidentů
v protikomunistickém odboji**

2nd Block:
**Activities of Illegal Groups and Dissidents
in the Anti-Communist Resistance**

Ilegálne aktivity Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi v Československu v rokoch 1951 – 1958

Peter BORZA

Päťdesiate roky minulého storočia v Československu charakterizuje nespravodlivosť, nesloboda a všadeprítomný strach sprevádzaný terorom voči obyvateľstvu, ktoré sa nestotožnilo s vládou jednej strany. Medzi nepriateľov nového režimu sa zaradila aj cirkev a jej predstavitelia. Dnes dobre známe akcie z roku 1950, akými boli Akcia K alebo Akcia P smerovali k diskreditácii, oslabeniu a napokon likvidácii cirkvi komunistickým režimom. Výsledkom bol zánik kláštorov v Československu, násilná pravoslavizácia gréckokatolíkov a väzenia plné statočných biskupov, kňazov, rehoľníkov a veriacich. Politické monsterprocesy s rehoľníkmi, biskupmi a politikmi ukazujú pravú, nehumánnu tvár režimu, ktorý si za cenu nespravodlivých rozsudkov a justičných vrážd upevňoval postavenie v spoločnosti. V roku 1950 sa obeťou proticirkevnej politiky stala aj Gréckokatolícka cirkev. Tá po realizácii Akcie P, ktorej vrcholom bol tzv. Prešovský sobor konaný dňa 28. apríla 1950, de iure prestala existovať, ale de facto žila v zložitých podmienkach ďalej, keďže hierarchia a veriaci sa nestotožnili s násilnou pravoslavizáciou. Biskupi a mnohí kňazi boli uväznení v internačných táboroch, prípadne sa pred štátnymi orgánmi ukrývali.¹

Archívne dokumenty vytvorené v 50. rokoch štátnymi orgánmi odkrývajú situáciu na východnom Slovensku z ich pohľadu a zároveň nám pred-

1 ŠTURÁK, P.: *Dejiny Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi v Československu v rokoch 1945 – 1989*. Prešov 1999.

stavujú činnosť (v očiach totalitného systému ilegálnu) kňazov a veriacich, ktorí sa usilovali o zachovanie a obnovenie Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi.

Štátne orgány si gréckokatolíkov rozdelili do troch skupín:

1. veriaci, ktorí prijali pravoslávie,
2. veriaci, ktorí odmietli pravoslávie a vo svojich náboženských potrebách sa obrátili na Rímskokatolícku cirkev,
3. veriaci, ktorí neprešli ani do Pravoslávnej ani do Rímskokatolíckej cirkvi. Stretávali sa na cintorínoch, pri poľných kaplnkách alebo krížoch a pod vedením bývalých kurátorov a kantorov sa spolu modlili, prípadne si vysluhovali sviatosť krstu, pochovávali a pod. Zároveň týchto veriacich štátna moc vnímala aj ako politických odporcov nového režimu.²

Dôvodom na to boli petície, ktoré veriaci na podnet kňazov písali s cieľom obnoviť Gréckokatolícku cirkev. Dialo sa to najmä pred voľbami a počas vytvárania jednotných roľníckych družstiev v rokoch 1951 – 1958. Za touto aktivitou veriacich bola ilegálna práca kňazov, z ktorých najvýraznejší boli dnes emeritný pražský biskup Ivan Ljavinec a po jeho zatknutí v roku 1955 zasa bývalý prešovský farár Miron Petrašovič, ktorého zatkli v roku 1958 a ktorý zomrel vo väzení v roku 1959. Bezpečnostné orgány oboch vnímali ako vodcov ilegálneho vedenia zrušenej Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi a vzhľadom na to im venovali aj značnú pozornosť.

Prechod do ilegality

Úvahy o prechode do ilegality v súvislosti s komunistickou ideológiou možno badať vo vedení Prešovského biskupstva ešte pred koncom vojny, keď bola v roku 1944 vypracovaná inštrukcia pre kňazov, ako sa majú zachovať počas prechodu frontu. V inštrukcii je Červená armáda vnímaná ako nositeľka boľševickej ideológie.³ Za prvý konkrétny krok však možno pokladať až žiadosť biskupa Pavla Petra Gojdiča o pridelenie pomocného biskupa, ktorým sa v roku 1947 stal Vasiľ Hopko. Biskup Gojdič v žiadosti

2 Národní archiv (ďalej iba NA) Praha, fond (ďalej iba f.) Státní úřad pro věci církevní 1949 – 1956 (ďalej iba SUC), škatuľa číslo (ďalej iba šk.) 208, Pravoslávna cirkvev 1951 – 1954. Situační zpráva o pravoslávne cirkvi, Praha 23. januára 1954.

3 Archiv Gréckokatolíckeho arcibiskupstva (ďalej iba AGA) Prešov, Prezidiálne spisy, inventárne číslo (ďalej iba inv. č.) 79, signatúra (ďalej iba sign.) 58, rok 1944. Inštrukcia farárom, ako sa zachovať vo vojnovom stave, miesto a dátum neuvedené.

do Ríma vyjadril obavu o svojich veriacich, aby v prípade jeho choroby alebo smrti nezostali bez biskupa.⁴

Po februárových udalostiach v roku 1948 zaznamenala proticirkevná politika štátu v nasledujúcom období stúpajúcu tendenciu. V takejto neistej atmosfére niekedy v roku 1949 určil biskup Gojdič piatich kňazov za svojich zástupcov – vikárov v tomto poradí: pomocný biskup Vasiľ Hopko, Mikuláš Russnák, Ján Kokinčák, Michal Sabadoš a Miron Podhajecký. Okrem toho pre prípad, že by centrálné spravovanie eparchie nebolo možné, respektíve keby ani jeden zo spomenutých nemohol vykonávať svoju funkciu, rozdelil eparchiu na 12 obvodov a do každého určil kňaza s biskupskými právomocami.⁵ V roku 1950 pribudol Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi ešte tajný biskup, ktorým sa z vôle Svätej stolice stal Miron Podhajecký.⁶

Prezieravé a sčasti aj účinné kroky vedenia Prešovského biskupstva zabezpečili podmienky na život Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi v ilegálite. Po zatknutí a odsúdení biskupa Gojdiča sa ujal vedenia biskupstva V. Hopko, ktorý bol internovaný v Hlohovci a bol prvým spomedzi piatich tajných vikárov určených ešte v roku 1949. Zároveň bol oficiálnym generálnym vikárom zastupujúcim biskupa v jeho neprítomnosti. Štátna bezpečnosť bola o ustanovení vikárov informovaná a venovala im náležitú pozornosť. Biskupa V. Hopka zatkli v internačnom tábore 18. októbra 1950 a odsúdili na 15 rokov väzenia. Ešte predtým však stihol vydať písomné poverenie na vedenie cirkvi pre kňaza Ivana Ljavinca, ktorý unikol interncii a zdržiaval sa pre ŠtB na neznámom mieste.⁷

Ivan Ljavinec

Mladý kňaz Ivan Ljavinec⁸ mal 27 rokov a dôveru biskupa nesklamal. Stal sa dušou a motorom úsilia gréckokatolíkov obstáť v hodine veľkej

4 AGA, Prezidiálne spisy, rok 1947, sign. 32. Vysviacka Dr. Vasiľa Hopka za sviatiaceho biskupa (Oznamy a súčasť).

5 Archiv bezpečnostních složek (ďalej iba ABS) Praha, f. H 428 – 1. Akce Tajný fond. Protokol o výpovedi, Leopoldov 6. 5. 1955.

6 BUKOVSKÝ, J.: *Spomienky spoločníka*. Nitra 2006, s. 85.

7 PEŠEK, J. – BARNOVSKÝ, M.: *Pod kuratelou moci. Cirkvi na Slovensku v rokoch 1953 – 1970*. Bratislava 1999, s. 57.

8 Mons. Ivan Ljavinec sa narodil 18. 4. 1923 vo Volovci v Podkarpatskej Rusi. Študoval v Mukačeve, Užhorode a Viedni. Sviatosť kňazstva prijal 28. 7. 1946 z rúk blahoslaveného prešovského biskupa Pavla Petra Gojdiča OSBM. Pôsobil po boku biskupa v Prešove ako jeho sekretár a zároveň bol redaktorom časopisu *Blahovistník* a *Zorja*. Od roku

skúšky prenasledovania. Vydával pokyny pre prácu kňazov ukrytých v ilegálite a kňazov, ktorí boli deportovaní do Čiech.⁹

Tí tajne navštevovali svoje bývalé farnosti na Slovensku, čo neuniklo pozornosti pracovníkov štátnych úradov, niekedy aj za aktívnej pomoci pravoslávnych duchovných, ktorí v novembri 1953 upozorňovali Štátny úrad pre veci cirkevné v Prahe na protipravoslávnu činnosť 25 kňazov: Dezidera Tinka, Jozefa Šeregyho, Jána Semana, Eugena Dohoviča, Jozefa Kňeža, Michala Ďurišina, Jána Fazekaša, Michala Čarného, Juraja Podhajeckého, Štefana Puza, Michala Velikého, Jozefa Želinského, Michala Fitza, Jána Michaloviča, Jozefa Dandára, Jozefa Borovského, Štefana Čizmára, Jána Zuberu, Vasila Nevického, Štefana Molčányiho, Michala Sabadoša, Jozefa Saba, Jána Nemčíka, Jozefa Dubjaka a Júliusa Zachariáša. Pritom návratu na Slovensko bránili vysoké pokuty a určenie pobytu trestnou komisiou, prípadne väzenie. A keď už nemohli prichádzať, tak s veriacimi udržiavali písomný kontakt.¹⁰

Ivan Ljavinec sa spolu s ďalšími staral o výchovu dorastu gréckokatolíckeho duchovenstva, zabezpečil tajné vysvätenie bývalých bohoslovcov za kňazov a veriacich povzbudzoval k vernosti prenasledovanej Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi. Úspešnú činnosť ilegálneho vedenia dokumentuje aj správa pre SÚC z 8. júna 1954, kde sa konštatuje, že na prelome rokov 1953 a 1954 rozpútali nepriatelia Pravoslávnej cirkvi na východnom Slovensku spolu s tajnými prívržencami Únie akciu s cieľom obnoviť Gréckokatolícku cirkev v Československu. Do akcie sa zapojili bývalí gréckokatolícki kňazi, ich

1949 pôsobil ako špirituál v prešovskom kňazskom seminári. Po násilnej likvidácii Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi v Československu z poverenia pomocného prešovského biskupa Vasila Hopka pôsobil ako tajný generálny vikár až do svojho zatknutia v roku 1955. O rok neskôr bol spolu s ďalšími šestnástimi obvinenými odsúdený vo vykonštruovanom procese na štyri roky väzenia. Po prepustení pracoval v Prahe ako robotník v rôznych profesiách – smetiár, kurič a sprievodca. Znova sa zapojil do práce na obnove Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi. V spolupráci s pražským arcibiskupom Františkom Tomáškom zorganizoval celoštátnu petičnú akciu za obnovu Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi, ktorá prispela k legalizácii Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi v Československu v roku 1968. V apríli 1969 bol vymenovaný za kňaza farnosti sv. Klimenta v Prahe a po vzniku Českej republiky v roku 1993 sa stal biskupským vikárom Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi v Česku. Po ustanovení Apoštolského exarchátu pre katolíkov byzantsko-slovanského obradu ho blahoslavený pápež Ján Pavol II. vymenoval za apoštolského exarchu a dňa 30. 3. 1996 prijal biskupské svätenie v Ríme. Vo vedení exarchátu pôsobil do roku 2003 a v súčasnosti je emeritným biskupom. *Emeritní biskupové Mons. Ivan Ljavinec.* [2011-12-23] Dostupné na URL <<http://www.exarchat.cz/>>

9 ABS, f. H – 428 – 1. Akce Tajný fond.

10 NA, f. SÚC, šk. 200, inv. č. 175. Akce 100.

rodiny a veriaci. Pripojili sa taktiež niektorí formálne zjednotení duchovní, pričom výsledkom akcie bolo zasielanie množstva žiadostí a petícií žiadajúcich obnovu Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi do Kancelárie prezidenta Československej republiky a na Úrad predsedníctva vlády. Ďalším výsledkom akcie ilegálneho vedenia bolo zvýšenie odporu proti Pravoslávnej cirkvi a tvrdošíjný odpor veriacich proti zakladaniu JRD alebo destabilizácia už existujúcich.¹¹

Úspešnú ilegálnu činnosť gréckokatolíckych duchovných a jej podoby nám predstavuje cirkevný odbor Krajského úradu v Prešove, ktorý v roku 1954 vypracoval správu o príčinách opozície gréckokatolíckych veriacich proti Pravoslávnej cirkvi. V nej konštatuje na príklade vybraných 12 farností prípravu a vplyv odsunutých duchovných na veriacich v zmysle narušania konsolidačného procesu po tzv. Prešovskom sobore. Správa odhaľuje spôsob, akým sa kňazi snažili pôsobiť a kladne vplývať na svojich veriacich v zmysle zachovania gréckokatolíckej identity, ako aj vernosti Katolíckej cirkvi. Dokument zaznamenáva nasledovné skutočnosti:

Matysová – pôsobil tam o. Štefan Šimko, ktorý sa stiahol do ilegality a bezpečnostné orgány ho chytili až v roku 1953, dovtedy povzbudzoval veriacich k vernosti Katolíckej cirkvi. Veriaci podľa správy prehlásili, že oni žiadneho farára nepotrebujú. Proti pravoslavizačnej akcii sa postavila celá obec.

Malý Lipník – pôsobil o. Andrej Zima, bol internovaný v Podolínci a po prepustení žil pri rodine v Moldave, odkiaľ písomne veriacich povzbudzoval k vernosti.

Veľký Sulín – pôsobil o. Ján Nemčík, bol internovaný v Podolínci a neskôr aj s rodinou presídlený do Čiech. Autor správy uvádza, že veriacich asi zaprisahal, aby pravoslávneho farára neprijali. Pritom konštatuje, že veriaci riadne navštevujú chrám, ale obrady si konajú sami.

Rudlov – pôsobil o. Jozef Želinský – presídlený do Čiech. Veriacich povzbudzoval k vernosti. K Pravoslávnej cirkvi v roku 1954 prestúpilo len 40 % veriacich.

Petkovce – pôsobil o. Michal Veliký – presídlený do Čiech. Pred odchodom veriacich poučil, aby zostali verní a pravoslávneho farára neprijali, čo aj dodržali.

Davidov – pôsobil o. Juraj Bujňák – internovaný v Podolínci a presídlený do Čiech. S veriacimi stále udržiaval osobný či písomný kontakt,

11 Tamže.

pričom ich povzbudzoval k vernosti. Vo farnosti tiež tajne pôsobil (podľa správy šarapatil) o. Michal Ihnát.

Voľa – pôsobil o. Dezider Tink, presídlený do Čiech. Viackrát potom navštívil farnosť a veriacich povzbudzoval k vernosti.

Trhovište – pôsobil o. Alexander Mirošay, internovaný v Podolínci, presídlený do Čiech. Počas internácie v Podolínci rodina zostala vo farnosti a veriacich aktivizovala proti pravoslávii.

Rakovec nad Ondavou – pôsobil o. Anton Tink, štátna moc ho vnímala ako blízkeho spolupracovníka bl. P. P. Gojdiča a veľkého odporcu Pravoslávnej cirkvi, čo sa odzrkadlilo aj u väčšiny veriacich. Osobne alebo písomne s nimi udržiaval kontakt, prípadne prostredníctvom svojich dcér veriacich povzbudzoval k odporu.

Vysoká nad Uhom – pôsobil o. Jozef Kňežo, internovaný v Podolínci, presídlený do Čiech. Počas internácie rodina ostala vo farnosti a povzbudzovala veriacich vo vernosti.

Okružná – pôsobil o. Emil Kelly, ktorý sa im javil nerozhodný. Napokon sa však rozhodol radšej odísť do výroby, ako slúžiť Pravoslávnej cirkvi. Veriacich pripravil proti prijatiu pravoslávia natolko, že odmietali prijať pravoslávneho farára do farnosti.

Fulianka – pôsobil o. Hilár Ilkovič, internovaný v Podolínci a po prepustení býval u svojho syna v Bratislave. Autor správy za vinníkov odporu proti pravoslávii považoval bohoslovcov, ktorí pochádzali z farnosti a ktorí nielen svojich príbuzných, ale celú obec udržiavali v opozícii proti Pravoslávnej cirkvi.¹²

Petície

Odvážnym krokom k obnoveniu Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi boli petície adresované z farnosti najvyšším štátnym úradom s cieľom dosiahnuť legalizáciu utlačanej cirkvi. Dňa 26. marca 1954 odoslali gréckokatolíci z Humenného žiadosť o obnovu svojej cirkvi podporenú 650 podpismi. Adresátom bola Kancelária prezidenta republiky. Pracovníci kancelárie následne podstúpili žiadosť na SÚC v Prahe s odôvodnením, že ide o podpisovú akciu so značným rozsahom, a preto má SÚC danému problému venovať pozornosť.

12 NA, f. SÚC, šk. 208, Pravoslávna cirkev 1951 – 1954. Správa o príčinách opozície býv. gréckokat. veriacich proti Pravoslávnej cirkvi v niektorých farnostiach, Prešov 20. októbra 1954.

Gréckokatolíci sa v žiadosti odvolávali na československú ústavu, ktorá zaručovala každému občanovi náboženskú slobodu, avšak gréckokatolíkom bola táto sloboda upieraná. Bez toho, aby sa prihlásili k inému náboženstvu, boli pridelení Pravoslávnej cirkvi a na ich fary boli dosadení pravoslávni duchovní, pričom ich gréckokatolícky kňaz bol odvečnený a zatknutý. Požadovali preto obnovenie Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi a návrat odsunutých alebo zatknutých duchovných. Veriaci na doručenie žiadosti poverili dvoch gréckokatolíkov z Humenného, a to Demetera Stanka a Juraja Onufera.

Petícia napokon viedla k stretnutiu zástupcov gréckokatolíckych veriacich na pôde Okresného národného výboru v Humennom s okresným a krajským cirkevným tajomníkom, ako aj generálnym vikárom Pravoslávnej cirkvi.¹³

Podobné petície vznikali aj v iných farnostiach, a aj keď zdanlivo nedosiahli svoje požiadavky, predsa boli verejnou manifestáciou prítomnosti gréckokatolíkov v Československu a demonštrovali záujem o obnovenie totalitným režimom neúspešne likvidovanej Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi.

Miron Petrašovič

Po zatknutí a odsúdení Ivana Ljavinca v roku 1955 ho nahradil Miron Petrašovič¹⁴, ktorý v mene ilegálneho vedenia zasielal rezolúcie vláde ČSR a pravoslávny cirkevný úradom za obnovenie Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi a podobne nabádal veriacich, aby písali hromadné žiadosti. Spolu s Teodorom Rojkovičom vypracovali pre kňazov niekoľko inštrukcií, v ktorých

13 NA, f. SÚC, šk. 208, Pravoslávna cirkev 1951 – 1954. Spis č. 107.177/54 zo dňa 9. 6. 1954, Žádost býv. příslušníků řecko-katolické cirkev v Humenném.

14 Miron Petrašovič sa narodil 28. 9. 1890 v Medvedom na východnom Slovensku. Študoval v Brezničke a Prešove. V roku 1931 vstúpil do manželstva s Helenou Halkovou, s ktorou mali šesť detí. Sviatosť kňazstva prijal 21. 9. 1913 v Užhorode z rúk biskupa Antona Pappa. Po vysviacke pôsobil 15 rokov v Stročíne na východnom Slovensku a od roku 1928 v Prešove. Štátna bezpečnosť ho zatkla ešte pred konaním tzv. Prešovského soboru v noci z 27. na 28. 4. 1950. Internovaný bol v Tábore nútených prác Nováky, neskôr v disciplinárnych kláštoroch Hlohovec, Podolíneč, Mučeníky a Bač. Odtiaľ ho v roku 1952 prepustili, krátko býval na západnom Slovensku a potom sa vrátil do Prešova, kde mu v roku 1954 zomrela manželka. Po prepustení sa zapojil do práce na obnovení Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi, zvlášť po zatknutí Ivana Ljavinca až do svojho zatknutia v roku 1958. Súd v Prešove a neskôr v Prahe ho v roku 1959 ako „vatikánskeho špióna“ odsúdil na dva roky väzenia. Krátko nato dňa 9. 8. 1959 zomrel údajne na mozgovú príhodu vo väzenskej nemocnici v Brne. LAGOVÁ, V.: Miron Petrašovič. Výnimočne veľký optimista. In: LAGOVÁ, V. a kol.: *Smrť za mrežami*. Prešov 2006, s. 113 – 136.

radili, aby neprestupovali na pravoslávie, aby obnovenie Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi kládli ako podmienku na vstup do JRD. Na požiadanie svojich bývalých veriacich im mali vysluhovať sviatosti a povzbudzovať ich pri písaní žiadostí vláde za obnovenie činnosti cirkvi. Úsilie skupiny kňazov zhromaždenej okolo M. Petrašoviča nebolo márne. Veriaci v obci Matisová, okr. Stará Ľubovňa, odmietli v roku 1957 voliť kandidátku Národného frontu. Veriaci pred voľbami napísali žiadosť o obnovenie cirkvi a zaslali ju kancelárii prezidenta. Podobné žiadosti boli zaslané z obcí Ruské Pekľany, Trhovište, Čičarovce, Banské, Davidov a Veľký Bukovec.¹⁵

Úsilie o obnovu presiahlo hranice Československa, keď T. Rojkovič prostredníctvom svojho príbuzného v Maďarsku, generálneho vikára v Nyiregyházi Štefana Rojkoviča, informoval Vatikán o postavení Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi. Informácie o situácii Gréckokatolíckej a Rímskokatolíckej cirkvi v Československu podal vo Vatikáne aj poľský kardinál Štefan Wyszyński, ktorému tieto správy od M. Petrašoviča doručil slovenský jezuita Michal Potocký.¹⁶

Ilegálnu činnosť skupiny kňazov zhromaždenej okolo M. Petrašoviča ukončila ŠtB v rámci akcie DEKAN, keď dňa 6. mája 1958 zatkla a uväznila M. Petrašoviča a T. Rojkoviča. V rámci akcie bolo zatknutých sedem kňazov, okrem už spomínaných dvoch to boli: bazilián Ján Marián Potaš, Michal Székely, Ján Zuber, Štefan Simko a jezuita Michal Potocký. Odsúdení boli v Prešove koncom roka 1958 za trestný čin podvracania republiky podľa § 79a ods 1 a ods 2 písm. b) trestného zákona alebo za trestný čin marenia dozoru nad cirkvami a náboženskými spoločnosťami podľa § 173 trestného zákona. Súd im vymeral trest väzenia v rozmedzí 1 až 4 rokov. Miron Petrašovič zomrel o rok nato v brnianskej väznici vo veku 69 rokov.¹⁷

Na ilegálnom živote cirkvi sa okrem eparchiálnych kňazov aktívne zúčastňovali aj reholníci, ktorí sa vrátili z internácie, väzenia alebo Pomocných technických práporov. Viacerí redemptoristi a baziliáni sa zapojili do tajnej pastorácie medzi gréckokatolíckmi, podobne ako ďalší gréckokatolícki kňazi. Tajne navštevovali veriacich a vysluhovali sviatosti, teda krstili, sponedali, sobášili, slúžili sv. liturgie. V ilegálite pre život cirkvi pracovalo a zapájalo sa aj mnoho laikov, ktorí svojimi postojmi zabezpečili,

15 Archív Ústavu pamäti národa (ďalej iba A ÚPN) Bratislava, f. Krajská správa Ministerstva vnútra (ďalej iba KS MV) Prešov B 10-7, inv. č. 31. Správa o prípade DEKAN.

16 Tamže. Vyhodnotenie prípadu „DEKAN“, s. 12. Prešov 22. 12. 1959.

17 LAGOVÁ, V.: Miron Petrašovič. Výnimočne veľký optimista, s. 127 – 136.

že v príhodnom období šesťdesiatych rokov sa podarilo dosiahnuť legalizáciu prenasledovanej Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi v Československu.¹⁸

Záver

Ilegálnu činnosť duchovenstva a veriacich môžeme zhrnúť do niekoľkých oblastí. Na prvom mieste to bola podpora veriacich a kňazov vo vernosti Katolíckej cirkvi. Potom konkrétna činnosť smerovaná k obnoveniu Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi najmä v súvislosti s voľbami a kolektivizáciou poľnohospodárstva. Informovanie zahraničia o situácii Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi v Československu. A v neposlednom rade to bola praktická starostlivosť o veriacich udeľovaním sviatosti, akými boli krst, sviatosť zmierenia, eucharistia a manželstvo.

Tieto aktivity vnímala štátna moc ako ilegálne, keďže sa diali bez jej súhlasu a boli smerované proti jej oficiálnym zámerom. Narúšali v očiach režimu konsolidačný proces po tzv. Prešovskom sobore a vyvolávali opozičné postoje nielen k Pravoslávnej cirkvi, ale zasahovali aj do politického diania.

Odvážne aktivity duchovných v rokoch 1951 – 1958 zabezpečili kontinuitu náboženského života gréckokatolíkov v ilegálite a tým vytvorili priestor na obnovu likvidovanej cirkvi v príhodných podmienkach, ktoré nastali v roku 1968.

Summary

The illegal activities of the Greek Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia in the years 1951 – 1958 focused primarily on the issue of preserving the identity of the Greek Catholics and strengthening their loyalty towards the Catholic Church. The most important personalities of the illegal live of the Church in that period were Ivan Ljavinec, today the Apostolic Exarch Emeritus of Prague, and after he was arrested in 1955 it was Miron Petrašovič, the former priest in Prešov, arrested in 1958 that died in prison in 1959.

The illegal activities of the clergy and churchgoers were first expressed in supporting the believers and priests to remain loyal towards the Catholic Church. And later in the activities aiming to recover the Greek Catholic Church taking place in 1954 before the elections, and in 1958 in relation to

18 ABS, f. H – 428 – 1. Akce Tajný fond.

the petitions organised among the Greek Catholics. Sending information about the situation of the Greek Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia out of the country was an important part of the illegal work. And finally, it was the practical care about the churchgoers by giving them the sacraments: Baptism, Penance, Holy Eucharist and Matrimony.

The state power considered these activities as illegal, as they took place without its consent and they were directed against its official intentions. In the eyes of the regime they violated the consolidation process after the so-called Prešov Sobor and inspired opposition attitudes not only against the Orthodox Church, but they also interfered with the political life, especially in relation to the elections and collectivisation in the agriculture.

The courageous illegal activities of the clergymen and churchgoers in the years 1951-1958 prepared good basis for the liquidated church to be renewed under suitable conditions that occurred in 1968.

Levels and Forms of Anti-Communist Resistance in the Romanian Orthodox Church between 1945 – 1964

George ENACHE

When one analyses the relationships between cults and Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, we often notice the tendency to regard religious cults as any other organisation, similar to political parties. Also, the dogma of the Church is frequently narrowed down to the dimensions of social-political thinking.

Whether we want to or not, when we put these terms into discussion, we approach the Communist conception more than we would think. In terms of its attitude towards religion and religious cults, Communism is the aberrant heir of an entire European tradition, which fully manifests itself at once on the stage of history with the French Revolution.¹ There were people who then claimed that Christian religion was an obstacle to human progress (in terms of doctrine and morale) and that churches were nothing but organisations that identified themselves with the ‘Former Regime’, being its allies in the oppression of people. Later, when Napoleon tried to tame the revolutionary spirit, he decided that, for those citizens of France who still had the naivety to believe in God, there should be an ecclesiastical structure able to administer these needs, just as the hospital system takes care of health and the police of citizens’ safety.² The Church was becoming

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- 1 NICOARĂ, S.: *O istorie a secularizării (sec. XIX-XX). Avatururile creștinismului și triumfalismul mesianismelor noilor ere, vol. II.* Cluj-Napoca 2006.
 - 2 SHUSTERMAN, N.: Une loi de l’Eglise et de l’Etat: Napoleon and the central administration of religious life, 1800 – 1815. In: *French History*, Vol. 21, 2007, no. 3, pp. 313 – 330.

a simple provider of social services and part of a bureaucratic apparatus, no longer considered as a supreme institution, equal or even superior to the State. Although allowed to function within precise limits, the Church was considered a body foreign to modernity, a relic of past ages.

In essence, the Communists did nothing more than bring this idea to its last consequences. Initially, Lenin and his adepts were in favour of destroying religious organisations on the grounds that they were 'reactionary', and of completely eliminating religion from people's consciousness ("religion – people's opium").³ Stalin would change this policy in 1943 when, under the pressure of war, he declared that, 20 years after the Bolshevik revolution, churches in the USSR would have been 'purified'.⁴ Religious faith continues to remain a real problem for a true Communist, but believers have learned to respect and to integrate themselves within the Soviet practice. Also, the clergy, although still preaching 'wrong' lessons, has purged the doctrine of those ideas that were tying religion to various political doctrines. By hiding behind his cold geopolitical interests, Stalin granted churches the right to exist in a communist state⁵. Essentially, this is the pattern of the perception of religion and religious cults that was exported to Eastern European countries subject to the process of Sovietisation after 1945.

In the case of Romania, it counted around 18 million inhabitants in 1930, out of which: over 13 million were Orthodox, pertaining to the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Romania; 1.5 million were Greek-Catholics (Romanians); 1.2 million were Roman-Catholics (most of them Magyars, but also Germans, the number of Romanians belonging to the Roman-Catholic confession being around 150,000); approximately 700,000 were Calvinists (most of them Magyars); Lutherans (Germans) counted 400,000 members; Jews 760,000; and Moslems (Turks, Tatars) approximately 200,000.⁶ The inter-war Romanian authorities had two fundamental goals: to strengthen State authority and emphasise its Roma-

3 *Călăuza ateistului*. București 1961, p. 533.

4 ENACHE, G.: *Ortodoxie și putere politică în România contemporană*. București 2005, pp. 19 – 21.

5 ENACHE, G. – PETCU, A.: *Patriarhul Justinian și Biserica Ortodoxă Română în anii 1948 – 1964*. Galați 2009, pp. 192 – 195.

6 See MANUILĂ, S.: *Recensământul general al populației României din 29 decembrie 1930. Neam, limbă maternă, religie*. *Monitorul Oficial, Imprimeria Națională*. București 1938, vol. II, p. 24.

nian ethnic character.⁷ Because of this, among the religions that existed in the Romanian State, the ‘Romanian’ cults – that is the Orthodox and Greco-Catholics – were encouraged (theoretically).⁸ At the same time, the authorities aimed to increase the control of the State over religious cults, especially in two sensitive fields: the election of cult chiefs and the control over ecclesiastical patrimonies.

The Romanian Orthodox Church was tied by multiple strings to the Romanian State. In the inter-war period, a strong movement fought to win real autonomy for the Orthodox Church, however, the historical context interrupted this process.⁹ The State continued to have enough means to interfere in the life of the Church. One of these was the presence of politicians in Church gatherings, including when electing hierarchs. Another was control over the economic activities of the Church, any error in the administration of their patrimonies being reason enough to interfere in ecclesiastical matters.¹⁰ The Orthodox Church owned very few properties, depending, in overwhelming proportion, on the economic support of the State.¹¹

These mechanisms were started several times during the inter-war years, when King Carol II wanted to eliminate certain hierarchs who had criticised some of his ideas and gestures. These were Metropolitan Bishop Gurie Grosu of Bessarabia and Bishop Vartolomeu of Râmnic, who were forced to leave their Episcopal sees when they were charged with tax fraud.¹²

When Romanian Communists, supported by the Soviet armies, started to take control of Romania, they profited by many of the inter-war traditions.¹³ In fact, Romanian Communists were less interested in erasing religion from people’s conscience than their Soviet contemporaries. In

7 ENACHE, G.: Biserică – societate – națiune - stat în România interbelică. I. Explorări în orizont liberal. In: *Revista Teologică*, 2010, No. 2, pp. 166 – 169.

8 See Article 22 of the Romanian Constitution of 1923.

9 ENACHE, G.: Biserică – societate – națiune - stat în România interbelică, pp. 175 – 184.

10 *Ibid.*, pp. 184 – 191.

11 *Ibid.*, pp. 188 – 189.

12 ENACHE, G.: Amestecul puterii politice în alegerea ierarhilor Bisericii Ortodoxe Române. In: *Arhivele Totalitarismului*, 2004, pp. 7 – 33.

13 ENACHE, G. – PETCU, A.: *Patriarhul Justinian și Biserica Ortodoxă Română în anii 1948-1964*. Galați, 2009, no. 1-2, pp. 31 – 33.

Romania, focus was more on power and less on ideology and this decisively shaped the policy towards the Romanian Orthodox Church.

The Romanian Orthodox Church rejoiced at an unequalled fame among the population. This was grounded in the strong religiousness of the believers as well as in the idea that Orthodoxy was one of the foundations of the Romanian people. Moreover, the Orthodox Church was by far the largest of the confessions in Romania. Consequently, a head-on confrontation between Communists and the Church would have been extremely difficult. Therefore, in the case of the Orthodox Church, Communists resorted to subversion, unlike in the case of the other cults, such as the Catholic and the neo-Protestant ones, against which an open offensive was carried out – fact proved by the numerous trials directed against them.¹⁴ The difference of treatment was also motivated by the fact that Catholic churches and neo-Protestant confessions were regarded as agents of the Occident, while Stalin had reserved a role for the Orthodox churches of the Communist camp in a possible Orthodox ‘International’, for propaganda purposes.¹⁵

Specifically, during the election campaign of 1946, the Romanian Communists did their best to reassure the Church and believers that in Romania things would not be like in the Soviet Union. The Communist leader himself, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, spoke in public several times, stating that he understood the major role played by the Church in the life of the State, that he would respect religious freedom and that Communists would continue to support the Church financially.¹⁶ For more credibility, the propaganda among believers was entrusted to the Prime Minister, Petru Groza, the son of a priest and leader of the Ploughmen Front, a satellite formation of Romanian Communists. He even elaborated a *sui generis* doctrine on the possibility of bringing the Church nearer to

14 BOZGAN, O.: *Cronica unui eșec previzibil. România și Sfântul Scaun în epoca pontificatului lui Paul al VI-lea (1963-1978)*. București 2004, pp. 35 – 101; NEAGOE-PLEȘA, E. – PLEȘA, L.: *Culte neoprotestante din România în perioada 1975 – 1989*. In: *Partidul, Securitatea și Cultele. 1945 – 1989*. București 2005, pp. 350 – 394; VASILE, C.: *Istoria Bisericii Greco-catolice sub regimul comunist: 1945 – 1989. Documente și mărturii*. Iași 2003.

15 ENACHE, G.: *Relațiile cu Patriarhia Moscovei, pe baza studiilor de arhivă*. In: *Autocefalie și comuniune. Biserica Ortodoxă Română în dialog și cooperare externă (1885 – 2010)*. Editura Basilica, 2010, pp. 158 – 163.

16 ENACHE, G.: *Strategii de infiltrare și atragere la colaborare a cultelor religioase elaborate de autoritățile procomuniste din România în perioada 1945 – 1948, cu o privire specială asupra cazului Bisericii Ortodoxe Române*. In: *Caietele CNSAS*, Vol. 1, 2008, No. 1, p. 82.

the Communists, based on a ‘dialectic conception’: “*Among the great realities of life, we rank religious faith as well, which presents itself in religious cults, religious societies and, more specifically, in the Church. Dialectics is not against the Church. Operating exclusively with life realities, dialectics must take into account this great and significant achievement of life which is the Church [...] the Church cannot oppose the dialectic evolving course of life*”.¹⁷ This is how, in Groza’s view, one could be Communist and Christian at the same time, which would have been unimaginable to an authentic Bolshevik. It was not these promises that won Communists the elections, but fraud, however, as in no other Eastern European country, the Romanian Orthodox Church benefitted, even after the full instauration of the Communist regime, of remuneration from the State, of a great number of churches and of many clerics.¹⁸ This fact was due to the attitude of certain people like Groza, as well as to the power equilibrium established after 1948, which the regime fundamentally refused to question.

By all these gestures, Romanian Communists wanted to preserve the myth of Orthodox Church freedom and of the continuation of the good relationships between State and Church, just as during the inter-war years. This mask was hiding, however, a perverse tactic for undermining the Church, by various apparently disparate measures but which, together, weakened the message of the Church, separated it from the believers and, finally, compromised it.

Romanian Communists claimed to respect freedom of faith and religious organisations. In spite of this, more than a quarter of the Orthodox clergy had to deal, one way or other, with the Communist repressive system. The authorities pretended that all these convictions were based on criminal grounds (most of them political), stating that these arrests ‘purified’ the Church of its reactionary elements hiding among the clergy in order to act against the government.¹⁹ In fact, many of them were prisoners of conscience, arrests being directed at the most capable of the clerics who had great influence over the believers.²⁰

17 ENACHE, G.: *Jocurile dialecticii și regândirea rolului Bisericii la început de ev comunist*. In: *Tabor*, vol. 3, 2009, No. 9, pp. 47 – 48.

18 ENACHE, G.: *Ortodoxie și putere politică în România contemporană*. București 2005, pp. 97 – 110.

19 ENACHE, G. – PETCU, A.: *Patriarhul Justinian și Biserica Ortodoxă Română în anii 1948 – 1964*. Galați 2009, pp. 203 – 221.

20 See *Martiri pentru Hristos, din România, în perioada regimului comunist*. București 2007.

Another direction for undermining the presence of the Church in society included measures such as: taking religion out of school, limiting public religious ceremonies, reducing religious publications, atheist propaganda, etc.²¹ They were similar to the ones adopted in other Eastern European countries, however, in Romania, the atheist public propaganda did not acquire the grotesque characteristics it had in other regions (church profanations, parodies of the Saint Mass, etc.).²²

The most important of these tactics was the infiltration within the hierarchy of certain docile people, ready to strike the Church from the inside. However, in order to reach this goal, several Episcopal sees had to be cleared. The Communist power did not refrain from changing the law in order to force certain hierarchs to retire and resorted even to assassination.²³ There is no clear proof to that effect, but there are countless clues that at least three Orthodox hierarchs died in suspicious circumstances, to say the least, at the beginning of the Communist regime.²⁴ Obviously, it was not difficult to find people willing to help in the destruction of the Church from the inside, in exchange for a Bishop position. Among these, we note Emilian Antal²⁵, Valerian Zaharia²⁶ and Nicolae Corneanu.²⁷ Some of them were blocked in ascension and did not get to where they had dreamed of being, however, the documents show their zeal in proposing to the Communist authorities various solutions for undermining the Church. We will not go into any detail right now, because our interest focuses on those who resisted the Communist assault, the first we will refer to being Patriarch Justinian Marina.

For many historians, counting Patriarch Justinian Marina – who led the Romanian Orthodox Church between 1948 and 1977 – among the opponents of the Communist regime is a mistake to say the least, if not

21 ENACHE, G. – PETCU, A.: *Patriarhul Justinian și Biserica Ortodoxă Română în anii 1948 – 1964*, pp. 23 – 38.

22 See LEUSTEAN, L. N. (Ed.): *Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, 1945 – 1991*. Routledge 2010.

23 ENACHE, G.: *Strategii de infiltrare și atragere la colaborare a cultelor religioase elaborate de autoritățile procomuniste din România în perioada 1945 – 1948*, pp. 74 – 90.

24 Bishop Irineu Mihălcescu, Bishop Grigore Leu and Bishop Sebastian Rusan.

25 ENACHE, G.: *Ortodoxie și putere politică în România contemporană*, pp. 119 – 140.

26 Ibid.

27 See URL <<http://hristofor.wordpress.com/2008/06/07/dosarul-nicolae-corneanu-extrase-zguduitoare/>>.

blasphemy. In Europe, he is known from Czesław Miłosz's book, which attributes to Justinian a statement that is found nowhere else in any of his speeches or articles. At a certain moment, Miłosz speaks of the Communists' belief that "*humanity can be renewed only in the way it was renewed on the territory of Russia, this is why a Christian cannot act against the only idea – terrible, indeed – which will create a new species of man on the entire planet. Such reasoning is often used publicly by those clerics who were no more than tools in the party's hands. «Christ is a new man. The new man is the Soviet man. Therefore, Christ is the Soviet man» – said the Romanian Patriarch, Justinian Marina*".²⁸

Miłosz was one of the greatest consciences of Eastern Europe; his reasoning starts however from certain social-political conceptions which have little in common with those of the theologians. Coming from a Catholic milieu very attentive to the social aspects of Christian thought, Miłosz understood less Orthodox thinking; he was more preoccupied with the mystical dimension. Things can be better understood if we read the fundamental book of Nikolai Berdiaev *The Origins and Meaning of the Russian Communism*, which deserves a larger debate, unfortunately not to be dealt with in the present paper. Essentially, Berdiaev shows that the notion of Church has two distinct meanings "*and to confound the two characters or to deny one in favor of the other would lead to fatal consequences*".²⁹ The Church means, on the one hand, "*the mystic body of the Savior and His spiritual reality, proceeding to the historical prolongation of Christ's life*".³⁰ "*The Church means, at the same time, a social phenomenon and a social institution, tightly connected to a certain milieu: it will exist in a plane parallel to the one of the State, having, like it, its own law, its own economy, or its own social antecedents*".³¹ Along the years, the Christian Church insisted on this second meaning, laying too much emphasis on ephemeral structures and forgetting about its fundamental dimension. This is why, paradoxically, Communism is a product generated by the historical oblivions of the Church and now this Communism strikes at the Church. Under these circumstances, the only thing that the Church could do was to repent, to purify itself and to retrieve Christ. At the same time, Berdiaev

28 MIŁOSZ, C.: *Gândirea captivă. Eseu despre logocrațiile populare*. București 1999, pp. 202 – 203.

29 BERDIAEV, N.: *Originile și sensul comunismului rus*. Cluj-Napoca 1999, p. 178.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

suggests that, inevitably, the Church as a social phenomenon will be subject to mistakes and compromise, however it will be able to save itself as long as its mystical body remains intact³².

Knowing these things, we can say that Czeslaw Milosz is the victim of a 'dialectical' conception, like the ones enunciated by Petru Groza, while Patriarch Justinian was, by his actions, nearer to the ideas stated by Berdiaev.

Before he became a Patriarch, Justinian was a priest in Râmnicu Vâlcea, under the name of Ioan. He was one of the leaders of the Romanian clergy during the inter-war years and was also among those who introduced the social dimension of the priestly service into the Orthodox Church. After the death of his wife, he was several times nominated for an Episcopal see.³³ He was an important member of the National Peasants' Party and, in this capacity, was involved in liberating the Romanian Communists from the camp near Râmnicu Vâlcea. During this action the future leader of Communist Romania, Gheorghiu Dej, was hidden by priest Marina. A strong friendship was then formed between the two of them, which was to last until Dej's death.

It is certain that priest Ioan Marina, who became Bishop Justinian, was supported by the Communists in his ascension, however he made it to the Patriarchal seat following a compromise within the Church, most of the hierarchs accepting that, given the situation of the time, he was the best solution.³⁴

As a Patriarch, Justinian stated his ideas in public speeches and articles, gathered under the generic title of 'Social Apostolate'. In essence, his speech focuses on the following aspects: the Church is a distinct structure, with the mission of preaching Christ to the people; people are shared between the Church and the State, both institutions aiming at the same goal: the wellbeing of the people; even if they start from different conceptions, the State and the Church have no reason to oppose one another, but they must collaborate for people's welfare; the Church can play an important social role, accepted by the State, and the Church must applaud every measure adopted by the State for the wellbeing of the citizens.³⁵

32 Ibid., p. 179.

33 ENACHE, G. – PETCU, A.: *Patriarhul Justinian și Biserica Ortodoxă Română în anii 1948 – 1964*, pp. 38 – 42.

34 Ibid.

35 ENACHE, G.: *Ortodoxie și putere politică în România contemporană*, pp. 35 – 66.

Two remarks: the speech of the Romanian Patriarch does not mix Christianity and Communism, as is erroneously stated by Czeslaw Milosz, the meeting point between the two being the field of their deeds. Or, this is the fundamental weakness of Justinian's conception, because during the Communism years, the Church was silent when the State took a series of measures which seriously affected citizens and praised things that should not have been appreciated. Also, Patriarch Justinian avoided speaking openly even of the breaches to the freedom of faith.³⁶

However, on close examination of all of his actions, Patriarch Justinian cannot be qualified as a collaborator. If anything at all can be imputed to him, it is his more political than theological way of approaching the matter. An informative note of the Communist secret services briefly records his strategy: "*listen to them (to the Communists), but do as you know*".³⁷ Justinian succeeded at first in persuading Communist leaders that, with his appointment as Patriarch, the Romanian Orthodox Church ended the 'purification' process and became a credible partner for the authorities. In exchange, he wanted to stop any involvement of the political power in the Church, seeking to become the only intermediate between the Church and the State, a sort of shield for the other members of the clergy. With an extremely keen political sense and a well-exercised diplomacy, Patriarch Justinian succeeded in obtaining absolutely remarkable results in the first ten years of his direction: open churches, numerous clerics, prestigious theological publications, an advanced system of theological schools, increase in the number of monasteries and monks which were at their peak during his time. At the same time, Security documents show that Justinian spoke up for the arrested clerics. Even if he did not succeed every time, he took care that those who were liberated could find a means to earn their living. In fact, during his time, the Romanian Patriarchy became the refuge of many intellectuals chased out of the system by the Communist power.³⁸

In 1956, Patriarch Justinian managed to send abroad one of his most important collaborators: monk Andrei Scrima. Once he got to the Occident, he started to speak in certain milieus of the Patriarch's resistance project. This project was founded essentially on the following elements: the

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., p. 216.

38 ENACHE, G. – PETCU, A.: *Patriarhul Justinian și Biserica Ortodoxă Română în anii 1948 – 1964*, pp. 70 – 128.

salvation of all the valuable individuals who could carry on the Romanian faith and spirit; a thorough educational system, tightly connected to spirituality, which would bring young people close to God.³⁹ Unlike others, Justinian did not believe that the Communist regime would fall quickly (he estimated correctly that this regime would last for about 40 years!) and his opposition to martyrdom was based on the idea that the death of the best in prison would deprive the people and the Church of their contribution. Although ‘mystics’ was a notion categorically rejected by Communists, Andrei Scrima was showing that the Romanian Orthodox Church had a genuine spiritual programme. Even he himself was part of a group of ecclesiastical figures, called the ‘Burning Pyre’, supported by Patriarch Justinian.⁴⁰

The imprudent disclosures of Andrei Scrima had serious consequences. The Communist authorities elaborated an entire plan meant to destroy what the Patriarch had built. Between 1958 and 1962 thousands of priests were arrested and by decree 410/1959 the best of the monks were ordered out of the monasteries.⁴¹ The official motivation was that they were carrying out actions hostile to the regime. In a way, the Communists were right; however, this was not a political battle, but an opening of the mind to horizons incompatible with the Communist ideology. Many of the arrested confessed that they educated young people in the Christian spirit, refuting Communist atheism.⁴²

It seems that during the persecution period, the question was raised of Patriarch Justinian’s elimination, and even assassination. If he continued to keep his position, it was due to the party’s interest in saving the appearance of normality.⁴³

In conclusion, if we analyse Patriarch Justinian’s policy, we notice that it reached the essential purpose of the Church: the confession of Christ. However, in opposition to him, other bishops considered his tactics too covert and confusing. His strongest opponent (in ideas and not in person) was the Bishop of Oradea, Nicolae Popovici.

39 SCRIMA, A.: *Ortodoxia și încercarea comunismului*. București 2008, pp. 153 – 324.

40 ENACHE, G.: *Ortodoxie și putere politică în România contemporană*, pp. 381 – 434.

41 ENACHE, G. – PETCU, A.: *Monahismul ortodox și puterea comunistă în România anilor '50*. Galați 2009, pp. 38 – 62.

42 Ibid., pp. 68 – 77.

43 ENACHE, G. – PETCU, A.: *Patriarhul Justinian și Biserica Ortodoxă Română în anii 1948 – 1964*, pp. 223 – 228.

Nicolae Popovici chose open opposition, being sure that the Communist State would not settle for the simple submission of the Church, but would try to ruin it. His opposition did not have a political character, but was confined strictly to Church canons. Popovici started from the idea that the Church must not interfere with State affairs, its role being solely to expand religious life. At the same time, the Church has its autonomy in taking decisions in ecclesiastical matters and the freedom to spread its doctrine. When all of these are breached by the State, the Church has the right to react because it is prevented from fulfilling the task given by Christ: “*go and preach*”.⁴⁴

Bishop Popovici militated in many ways for exposing and stopping the abuses of the Communist State. Through Memoirs addressed to the Ministry of Cults, he stated the Bishop’s sovereign right to name protopopes; he demanded that priests no longer be arrested without the hierarch’s knowing it and the latter’s right to intervene in their defence. He asked that manifestations be forbidden on Sundays so as not to disturb the peace of the Mass. He opposed the unification of the Greco-Catholic and Orthodox Churches, considering that things achieved by force are short-lived. Moreover, he sought to limit the influence of the syndicate within the Bishopric, the Communists’ Trojan horse, in the life of the Church.⁴⁵

In regard to his preaching, he constantly refused to comply with the indications given by the Ministry of Cults, stating that untruths cannot be told in the Church. Thus, he refused to speak of the benefits of collectivisation, of the fight for peace or other aspects that the Communists wanted to be promoted by priests. In exchange, he spoke of the greatness of the Christian faith, of hope for the better, of national values. Here is a fragment of one of Nicolae Popovici’s sermons: “*Nowadays leaders do not stand with God and do not believe in Him, these people will not see their goals fulfilled because nothing can be done without God [...] People forget about God and rise from nothing to leading positions and seek to advance to higher and higher positions, without thinking that they can lose those ranks, but they can never lose God, because believers must fight against the enemy who is against God. Let us follow Christ’s path, a path washed in blood. The proof is given by the apostles who were burnt on pyres and killed in the most atrocious tortures. Therefore, every Christian, every believer must fight for*

44 ENACHE, G. – PETCU, A.: *Despre curajul de a rosti: Episcopul Nicolae Popovici al Oradiei*. Galați 2009, p. 25.

45 *Ibid.*, pp. 25 – 68.

faith". At the end of the sermon, notes the informant, Popovici urged his audience to fight, along religious lines, against the enemy who does not want to know about God and about Christ's sufferings.⁴⁶

For the Security who was diligently recording these sermons, they were nothing else but counter-revolutionary instigations. In the eyes of the authorities, the Bishop of Oradea became a *non grata* person. Following great pressures, the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church was forced to retire him on 4 October 1950. Patriarch Justinian's efforts to save him smashed against the rigidity of Dej and Groza who stated that if Popovici did not retire, he would be arrested.⁴⁷

Nicolae Popovici spent the rest of his days as a true exile in Cheia Monastery. He died here on 20 October 1960, only 57 years old. More than once, Popovici stated that he was ready to go to jail and to suffer as a martyr. The measure taken by the authorities was meant precisely to avoid turning him into a martyr and to give him an (apparently) inglorious end.⁴⁸

Bishop Popovici's gesture was not singular. His example was followed by many clerics. One of them was monk Ioan Iovan from Vladimirești Monastery (Galați County), the author of the most complete critiques of Communism from a theological standpoint.

Vladimirești Monastery was founded in the inter-war period, following the visions of a young woman who would become the monastery prioress, under the name of Veronica. Soon, the monastery became one of the most popular in Romania. In 1947, Ioan Iovan settled in Vladimirești, becoming the priest of the monastery. With an ardent faith, proclaimed with no reserves, with excellent preaching skills, promoting forms of religious expression of great impact (group confession, frequent communion), seeing in nun Veronica, a God-gifted person and in her visions a source of faith orientation, father Iovan succeeded in creating an amazing mass movement.⁴⁹ Vladimirești became the destination of thousands of pilgrims from all social classes.

Father Ioan saw Vladimirești as a gate of salvation, welcoming all the people who felt they were losing their soul in the Communist inferno. Father Ioan's sermon was blunt, with no room for compromise in the

46 Ibid., p. 52.

47 Ibid., pp. 70 – 78.

48 Ibid., pp. 78 – 106.

49 ENACHE, G.: *Ortodoxie și putere politică în România contemporană*, p. 585.

confession of faith and with a significant eschatological component. Ioan fought against Communism and refuted it, although not in its worldly aspects, but the main stake was salvation.⁵⁰

The spread of the type of religiousness promoted by nun Veronica and father Ioan in other monasteries determined the political authorities to intervene in order to put an end to the phenomenon. The fight lasted for several years because Patriarch Justinian was protecting the monastery while the other hierarchs were willing to sacrifice Vladimirești.⁵¹

The pressures which were exercised over the monastery did no more than radicalise father Ioan's speech, which started to speak openly about the 'Communist Satan' who wanted to destroy Christ's Church, urging people to defend faith. Under these conditions, the political power asked the Synod to settle this matter by any means possible, otherwise the other monasteries would be affected as well. Justinian tried to smooth things out by calling father Ioan to Bucharest. He refused the Patriarch's demand and, consequently, was defrocked. As a reply to his exclusion of clergy, on 25 January 1955, he prepared a Memoire addressed to the Holy Synod, from which we quote: "*All the decisions are taken by the order of certain apostate or renegade atheists from the party or the government [...] Why do you sell God's and Church interests to the atheist State for keeping your wages and give up the fight to preach faith?*". "*The State, by the Ministry of Cults, tolerates its representatives to carry out a sometimes open persecution against faith. If there is a relationship of collaboration between the Church and the State, why does the State have unlimited rights and why does it interfere grossly in all Church matters and why is the Church not allowed full freedom to fulfill its mission of spiritualizing souls?*"⁵²

Against greater and greater State pressures, the Church had to be prepared: "*we want to preach Orthodoxy not only in our hearts and with our lips, but if need be, with our blood*". For this, he calls bishops to risk "*up to the ultimate sacrifice for confessing Christ*". Compromise and caution have no place here: "*Making pacts with the wolves leads to the scattering of the sheep*".⁵³

50 Ibid., pp. 585 – 586.

51 Ibid., p. 586. ENACHE, G. – PETCU, A.: *Monahismul ortodox și puterea comunistă în România anilor '50*, pp. 64 – 66.

52 ENACHE, G.: *Ortodoxie și putere politică în România contemporană*, pp. 587 – 588.

53 Ibid., p. 588.

As the entire monastery sympathised with father Ioan, the Communist power had to intervene directly, by an ample armed action on the night of 30 March 1955, arresting father Ioan. Eventually, the monastery was closed.⁵⁴

In the light of the above, it seems that, generally, the anticommunist resistance of the Romanian Orthodox Church represented the defence of its right to confess its faith against all sorts of obstacles raised by the Communist regime. This attitude falls within the scope of the general phenomenon of Eastern Europe because no cult became the defender of certain political ideas, but of the freedom of conscience and of the right to confess to God. Also, we must note that the resistance was one of conscience and not of violence.

Equally true is that many clerics participated, in various ways, in anti-communist resistance armed actions. In Romania at least, where anti-communist armed resistance was strong, many priests were involved in resistance groups and executed by Security troops.⁵⁵ This type of resistance is not specific to the Church and the clerics took part in these actions as citizens and not as Church representatives.

The spirit of the Orthodox Church, mystic by excellence, can be found in the biography of one of the greatest spiritual figures of 20th-century Romania: monk Arsenie Boca. Although arrested several times, he was not found guilty. Eventually, he was forced to leave the monastery because he attracted too many people. He continued to do the same elsewhere and was pursued for 40 years.⁵⁶

Arsenie Boca never criticised the Communist regime. He simply abided by the Christian commands as if Communism had never existed. As the Security would often send informants to provoke him, in Arsenie Boca's file we find many ideas expressed by him before people. One excerpt is truly remarkable, revealing a spirit similar to that of the first Christians:

54 ENACHE, G.: Misiunile Securității în problema „Culte” la începuturile regimului comunist. In: *The Annals of «Dunărea de Jos» University of Galați*, fascicle 19 – History, Vol. 8, 2009, pp. 174 – 180.

55 ENACHE, G. – PETCU, A.: *Patriarhul Justinian și Biserica Ortodoxă Română în anii 1948 – 1964*, pp. 203 – 220; ENACHE, G. – PETCU, A.: *Monahismul ortodox și puterea comunistă în România anilor '50*, pp. 24 – 37; PETCU, A.: *Participarea Bisericii Ortodoxe Române la rezistența anticomunistă*. In: *Mișcarea armată de rezistență anticomunistă din România, 1944 – 1962*. București 2003, pp. 182 – 222.

56 See ENACHE, G. – PETCU, A.: *Părintele Arsenie Boca în atenția poliției politice din România*. Galați 2009.

*“Communists will gain the entire planet and will rule the world. Until then, we will be all right. Then it will be clear who is a true Christian, the one who suffers everything. Who does not, will fall into the waves of the world. I (the informant) said: I do not think they will win the entire world, especially since they have no faith. Arsenie Boca answered: God lets them seize the planet [...] Do not fall foul of them, but be faithful, for God is everywhere, in Jerusalem and here. For the Church in our hearts no one can ruin”.*⁵⁷

Resumé

Odboj proti komunizmu je veľmi komplexným javom, ktorý nemožno interpretovať podľa zjednodušených vzorcov. Ak studená vojna nastolila čierno-bielu reč antagonizmu, tak pád komunizmu a to, že sme sa zbavili tlaku minulosti, si žiada holistické hodnotenie. Sledujúc výskumné práce, činnosť istých jednotlivcov a inštitúcií z obdobia komunizmu si žiada nové významy a chápania.

V Sovietsmi okupovanej Európe sa po roku 1948 skutočná a konzistentná opozícia voči komunistickému režimu prejavovala mimo štátnych inštitúcií, ktoré kontrolovali komunisti. Armáda, polícia a ekonomické štruktúry prešli rýchlou a starostlivou deštrukciou. Jedinými inštitúciami, ktoré fungovali ďalej aj v komunistickom štáte a zároveň sa zdalo, že unikli kontrole, boli cirkvi.

Ako je dobre známe, politika úplného vyhladenia cirkví sa vo východnej Európe neuplatňovala tak, ako tomu bolo v samotnom Sovietskom zväze v medzivojnovom období. Z politicko-strategických a propagandistických dôvodov sa hlásala náboženská sloboda a sloboda svedomia. To však komunistickým orgánom nebránilo vytvárať na cirkvi tlak rôznymi nástrojmi, legálnymi i nelegálnymi. Cieľom komunistov bolo získať kontrolu nad cirkvami a využiť ich na dosiahnutie svojich politických cieľov. Infiltrácia do cirkví bola najväčším nebezpečenstvom, dokonca väčším ako samotná deštrukcia.

Cirkvi sa, samozrejme, tak ako aj iné štruktúry snažili odolávať, existovali rôzne smerovania a názory na ciele a prostriedky, ako ich dosiahnuť. V tomto príspevku sme zhrnuli tie najdôležitejšie názory vo vnútri Rumunskej pravoslávnej cirkvi na jej konfrontáciu s komunistickým režimom v rokoch 1945 – 1964.

57 Ibid., p. 87.

V Rumunskej pravoslávnej cirkvi, tak ako tomu bolo aj v ostatných cirkvách, jestvoval „kolaborantský“ názor, ktorý chcel cirkev podriadit štátu. Komunisti najprv medzi kňazmi nižšieho stupňa našli kolaborantov, ktorým sa dostalo pomoci, aby stúpali po rebríčku cirkevnej hierarchie.

Vyššie nad touto úrovňou existovali isté postoje, ktoré tak či inak predstavovali odboj voči zneužívaniu komunistickým štátom. Ide aspoň o tri významné úrovne:

– Zapájanie kňazov do ozbrojeného odboja voči komunizmu. Rumunsko zažilo výrazný ozbrojený odboj voči komunizmu, do ktorého sa zapojili mnohí kňazi, či už so zbraňou v ruke, alebo logistickou podporou.

– Názor, ktorý zastával biskup Nicolae Popovici a kňaz Ioan Iovan, ktorí verejne vyzývali k slobode viery, jasne definovaným vzťahom medzi cirkvou a štátom a skoncovaniu zneužívania cirkvi. Je to trend najbližší náboženským princípom.

– Trend, ktorý zosobňoval patriarcha Justinián a jeho spolupracovníci. Patriarchu Justiniána inštalovali do funkcie so súhlasom komunistov, ale on vedel, ako využiť ich dôveru, a podarilo sa mu znížiť straty, a dokonca zabezpečiť rozvoj duchovného života. I keď navrhoval „politickejšie“ riešenie, patriarchovi sa podarilo cirkev úspešne brániť takmer desať rokov. Strana a politická polícia („bezpečnosť“) začala v roku 1958 komplexnú a systematickú kampaň s cieľom zničiť Rumunskú pravoslávnu cirkev potom, ako zistila, že do chrámov chodí stále veľké množstvo ľudí, že počet mníchov a kláštorov vzrástol a že kňazov spoločnosť stále považuje za dôležitých. Štúdia osvetľuje dynamiku vzťahu medzi týmito prúdmi v rámci Rumunskej pravoslávnej cirkvi.

Odpor gréckokatolíckych laikov voči záverom tzv. Prešovského soboru v roku 1950

Daniel Atanáz MANDZÁK

Gréckokatolícka cirkev v Československu po skončení 2. svetovej vojny požívala zaslúžený obdiv a tešila sa uznaniu celej vtedajšej spoločnosti. Táto situácia však netrvala dlho. Príčinou bolo zvlášť to, že prešovský vладыka Peter Pavol Gojdič OSBM podporil pri voľbách Demokratickú stranu a následne bola v prostredí Štátnej bezpečnosti vytvorená konšpiračná teória o spolupráci Gojdiča s tzv. banderovcami.¹ Dôveru štátnych úradov stratil nielen prešovský vладыka, ale aj celá Gréckokatolícka cirkev. Zároveň to bol čas, keď v krajinách tzv. sovietskeho bloku bola radikálne riešená otázka gréckokatolíkov. Komunisti v spolupráci s Pravoslávnuou cirkvou postupne zlikvidovali cirkevnú úniu gréckokatolíkov s Rímom: v roku 1946 vo Lvove na Ukrajine, v roku 1948 v Rumunsku, v roku 1949 v Mukačeve a v roku 1950 aj v Československu. Akcia zameraná proti

1 Banderovci (alebo benderovci) boli členovia Ukrajinskej povstaleckej armády, vojenskej formácie Organizácie ukrajinských nacionalistov, vedení vojenským veliteľom Štefanom Banderom. Ich najdôležitejším cieľom bolo vytvorenie nezávislého ukrajinského štátu, čo sa im však nepodarilo. Po skončení 2. svetovej vojny sa pokúšali uniknúť z Ukrajiny a Poľska. Až do novembra 1947 sa cez územie Československa presúvali ďalej na západ do Rakúska a Nemecka. Československé vojsko v spolupráci s bývalými partizánmi a špeciálnymi jednotkami ministerstva vnútra sa snažilo tomuto prechodu zabrániť a banderovcov zlikvidovať. Komunisti v Československu nesprávne považovali za banderovcov aj gréckokatolíckych kňazov s ich rodinami, rehoľníkov a laikov, ktorí utiekali z Ukrajiny a Poľska pred nastupujúcim komunistickým režimom. Keďže vладыka Gojdič pomáhal týmto utečencom, a spolu s ním aj ďalší gréckokatolícki kňazi a rehoľníci, boli komunistickým režimom považovaní za nepriateľov. Za tieto „protištátne zločiny“ boli odsúdení štátnym súdom napríklad Pavol Gojdič, Pavel Pankratij Hučko, Ján Ivan Mastiliak či Dominik Metod Trčka.

Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi v Československu bola označovaná v dokumentoch skratkou „VS“ (východné Slovensko) alebo „P“ („pravoslavizácia“ či „prestup“ alebo „prechod“ gréckokatolíkov do Pravoslávnej cirkvi). Občas bola používaná aj skratka „VS 2“, čím sa myslel „prechod“ gréckokatolíkov do Pravoslávnej cirkvi v Česku a na Morave.

Prvé konkrétne plány likvidácie gréckokatolíkov boli tajne pripravované už v jeseni 1949. Po odchode delegácie Pravoslávnej cirkvi z Moskvy vedenej krutickým a kolomejským metropolitom Nikolajom Borisom Jaruševičom, ktorá navštívila Československo v dňoch 31. januára až 15. februára 1950, cirkevná šestka ÚV KSČ vyhodnotila situáciu ako priaznivú a 27. februára 1950 naplánovala – v súčinnosti s Pravoslávnou cirkvou – Akciu „P“ v štyroch bodoch:

1. začať veľkú vysvetľovaciu kampaň v miestnej tlači;
2. založiť akčné návratové výbory, ktoré by získali gréckokatolíkov pre prestup na pravoslávie;
3. akčné návratové výbory by zvolali snem;
4. snem by sa uzniesol o prechode na pravoslávie a vyzval by pravoslávneho vladyku z Prahy, aby sa presťahoval do Prešova.²

Predsedníctvo ÚV KSČ v ten istý deň rozhodlo o začatí Akcie „P“.³ O Akcii „P“ a konkrétnych úlohách pri jej realizácii rokovalo 3. marca 1950 aj Predsedníctvo ÚV KSS. Povereník Gustáv Husák tam vyslovil myšlienku, že akcia by mala trvať dva až tri mesiace.⁴

Keď 9. marca 1950 podal prednosta I. odboru Štátneho úradu pre veci cirkevné v Prahe (SÚC) Vladimír Ekart 16-bodový návrh na postup v Akcii „P“, zároveň navrhol aj harmonogram, podľa ktorého do konca apríla sa mal uskutočniť malý „sobor“ duchovných, na ktorom by bolo vydané vyhlásenie k duchovným a laikom. Veľký „sobor“ bol plánovaný na 24. júna 1950. Duchovní a zástupcovia laikov by na ňom vyhlásili

- 2 Národní archiv (ďalej iba NA) Praha, fond (ďalej iba f.) Ústřední výbor Komunistické strany Československa (ďalej iba ÚV KSČ), 100/24, svazek (ďalej iba sv.) 47, archivní jednotka (ďalej iba a. j.) 862. Zápis z 20. schůzdy církevní šestky ÚV KSČ, Praha 27. 2. 1950.
- 3 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/1, sv. 16, a. j. 210. Usnesení schůze předsednictva ÚV KSČ k případu J. Decheta, k návrhu SÚC na další represivní opatření proti biskupům, k tzv. akci K, k přestupu řeckokatolícké církve k pravoslaví a k některým dalším otázkám (1. bod programu). Praha 27. 2. 1950.
- 4 Slovenský národný archív (ďalej iba SNA) Bratislava, f. Ústredný výbor Komunistickej strany Slovenska (ďalej iba ÚV KSS), Predsedníctvo ÚV KSS, Zasadnutia predsedníctva, január – marec 1950, škatuľa číslo (ďalej iba šk.) 794. Zápisnica zo zasadnutia predsedníctva ÚV KSS, 3. 3. 1950.

odtrhnutie sa gréckokatolíkov od Ríma a prijatie do Pravoslávnej cirkvi.⁵ Tento plán síce schválilo aj predsedníctvo ÚV KSČ, ale komunisti aj tak neboli názorovo jednotní, ako a kedy „sobor“ uskutočniť.

Po počiatočnej tajnej fáze sa v apríli 1950 prešlo do ďalšej etapy. Akcia „P“ už teda prebiehala verejne a v obciach boli s masívnou podporou komunistickej strany zakladané „návrátové výbory“. Na piatok 28. apríla bola naplánovaná konferencia, na ktorej sa malo zúčastniť okolo 50 gréckokatolíckych kňazov a 650 laikov. Napriek jasným signálom, že Akcia „P“ ešte nie je dobre pripravená, konferencia sa uskutočnila 24. apríla 1950 v Ružbachoch. Jej výsledok bol rozpačitý, keďže príhovory vyzneli kladne, ale veľa kňazov bolo nerozhodných alebo aj priam negatívne nastavených voči „prechodu“ gréckokatolíkov do Pravoslávnej cirkvi. V takejto situácii s neistým koncom sa mal uskutočniť „malý sobor“, teda *„konference všech návratových výborů, která měla zvolit ústřední návratový výbor a vydat provolání k duchovenstvu i k věřícím“*.⁶

V noci z 27. na 28. apríla 1950 bolo na Krajskom sekretariáte KSS v Prešove prijaté rozhodnutie, že pripravovaný „malý sobor“ bude zmenený na „veľký sobor“. Vladimíra Ekarta o tejto zmene informovali Arnošt Pšenička, Ivan Rohal-Ilkiv a Vasiľ Kapišovský, pretože *„odklad by měl na akci vliv nepříznivý, že zlepšení posice nenastane, naopak, že je nutno počítat s tím, že další duchovní odpadnou“*. Konzultácie prebehli aj s Jaroslavom Havelkom, Zdeňkom Fierlingerom, Viliamom Širokým a Ladislavom Holdošom, informovaní boli aj Klement Gottwald a Rudolf Slánsky. Do zmeny plánu zasvätili aj Alexeja Dechtereva, pravoslávneho vладыку v Prešove. V noci sa konala porada, na ktorej sa zúčastnil predseda Krajského výboru KSS v Prešove Arnošt Pšenička, zástupca kontrolnej komisie Zubčík, predseda Krajského národného výboru Košice Michal Chudík, predseda KNV Prešov Ľudovít Medveď, podpredseda SNR a predseda Ukrajinskej národnej rady Ivan Rohal-Ilkiv, za Slovenský úrad pre veci cirkevné v Bratislave Andrej Gombala a za SÚC Vladimír Ekart. Rohal-Ilkiv a Kapišovský pripravili text uznesenia „soboru“ a manifest, o ktorých sa na konci porady ešte diskutovalo. Pšenička a Rohal-Ilkiv potom odišli do hotela Čierny orol, kde viedli poradu so skupinou *„michaloveckých duchovních a se skupinou těch duchovních, kteří již složili slib biskupu*

5 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 100/52, sv. 16, a. j. 110. Návrh Vladimíra Ekarta na postup na východnom Slovensku. Praha 9. 3. 1950.

6 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 100/24, sv. 49, a. j. 871. Správa Vladimíra Ekarta o „sobore“ v Prešove. Praha 29. 4. 1950.

Děchtějovi“. Ekart pripravil pozdravné telegramy, ktoré boli odoslané zo „soboru“. Po príchode Holdoša s ním ešte prebral „*situaci a text manifestu, který [Holdoš] přivezl z Bratislavy*“.⁷

Prešovský „sobor“ a jeho uznesenia

Dňa 28. apríla 1950 sa v sále Čierneho orla v Prešove zhromaždilo na pracovnej konferencii 820 delegátov návratových výborov, medzi ktorými bolo započítaných aj 73 duchovných.⁸ Na konferencii síce nebola urobená prezenčná listina, ale zachoval sa zápis⁹ o jej priebehu, ktorý je základným dokumentom, na báze ktorého môžeme rekonštruovať priebeh a obsah „soboru“. Konferenciu viedol Ján Benický, prednosta IV. referátu (školsťvo, šport a kultúra) KNV v Prešove. V mene prípravného výboru privítal Michala Chudíka a Ludovíta Medveďa. Potom navrhol, aby na pracovnej konferencii zvolili pracovný výbor, respektíve pracovné predsedníctvo. Prípravný výbor navrhol do pracovného predsedníctva gréckokatolíckych kňazov Pavla Bobalíka, dekana Mikuláša Kellöho, Michala Knapa, Petra Dudinského, Antona Havrillu, Eliáša Kačura, Jozefa Anďala, Dezidera Schudicha, Jozefa Molčana¹⁰ a Andreja Tótha, predsedu a podpredsedu KNV v Prešove Ludovíta Medveďa a Jána Pivovarníka, Andreja Rudlovčáka, Jána Benického a všetkých predsedov okresných návratových výborov. Ako hostí ešte do výboru navrhol predsedu KNV z Košíc Michala Chudíka, podpredsedu SNR Ivana Rohaľa-Ilkiva a Vasíla Karamana, predsedu Krajskej rady družstiev a predsedu Ukrajinskej národnej rady Prjaševščiny.

Najprv sa ujal slova Benický, po ňom prehovorili duchovní Knap a Kačur, učiteľ Ján Štefanik, kňaz Ján Bihun, učiteľ Andrej Dribňak a napokon kňaz Havrilla. Po týchto príhovoroch Benický navrhol, aby konferencia bola vyhlásená za „sobor“. Zároveň predsedníctvo konferencie

7 Tamže.

8 Keďže nebola robená prezenčná listina, počet „delegátov“ a duchovných bol urobený iba odhadom.

9 NA, f. Státní úřad pro věci církevní 1949 – 1956 (ďalej iba SÚC), škatuľa (ďalej iba šk.) 116, inventárne číslo (ďalej iba inv. č.) 137. Opis zápisnice napísanej dňa 28. 4. 1950 na pracovnej konferencii gréckokatolíckeho duchovenstva v Prešove.

10 V návrhu programu je uvedené priezvisko „Molčan“, v texte zápisnice je priezvisko „Molčan“. Rôzni autori pri výpočte mien kňazov, ktorí boli v pracovnom predsedníctve, uvádzajú toto priezvisko ako: Molčan, Molčani, Molčany, Molčanij, Mikuláš Molčányi a J. Molčan. S najväčšou pravdepodobnosťou má byť Jozef Molčan.

navrhlo trojčlennú návrhovú komisiu (Knap, Havrilla a Rohaľ-Ilkiv), ktorá mala prerokovať návrhy a pripraviť uznesenie. Tieto rozhodnutia sa navonok javili ako logický dôsledok vyplývajúci z vývoja na konferencii, ale v skutočnosti všetko bolo umelo vyvolané, predtým dôkladne naplánované, ako o tom svedčia archívne dokumenty a svedectvá. Komisia nemala nič diskutovať a pripravovať, keďže uznesenia „soboru“ boli vypracované už vopred.

K slovu sa dostali aj kňaz Tóth a zástupca delegácie z Michaloviec, ktorí tiež vystúpili so svojím príhovorom. Potom Benický oznámil, že prišiel návrh, aby sa upustilo od ďalšej diskusie. Vyzval Ivana Rohaľa-Ilkiva, aby sa ujal slova a predniesol uznesenie a návrh, ktoré boli zostavené návrhovou komisiou. Rohaľ-Ilkiv konštatoval, že komisia ho zmocnila, aby predniesol jej návrh, ktorý vážne skúmala. Zaoberala sa návrhmi, ktoré jednak predniesli diskutujúci v diskusii, jednak ich dostalo predsedníctvo písomne, aby vec návratu gréckokatolíkov do pravoslávia bola na konferencii vybavená definitívne. *„Komisia uznala túto žiadosť za odôvodnenú z nasledujúcich dôvodov. Aj keby sme ako dlho sa radili, nič nového by sme nevymysleli. Táto otázka bola postavená pred naše duchovenstvo a ľud nie teraz, ona už stojí stáročia a veľmi aktuálnou stáva sa už po prvej svetovej vojne. Dávno už každý z nás k tomuto problému zaujal stanovisko. Niet duchovného a veriaceho, ktorý by s touto otázkou nebol počítal. Myslím, že každý mal dosť času, aby sa rozhodol.“*¹¹

Následne Rohaľ-Ilkiv predniesol text výzvy ku gréckokatolíckemu duchovenstvu a veriacim Československa a návrh na uznesenie, ktorý obsahoval päť bodov:

1. zrušiť ustanovenia Užhorodskej únie z roku 1646;
2. odísť od Ríma a vrátiť sa do „otcovskej“ Pravoslávnej cirkvi;
3. požiadať moskovského patriarchu o prijatie pod jeho cirkevnú jurisdikciu;
4. poslať telegramy cirkevným hodnostárom Ruskej a Československej pravoslávnej cirkvi, ako aj štátnym činiteľom ČSR;
5. vydať výzvu – Manifest ku gréckokatolíckemu duchovenstvu a veriacim Československa.

Podľa manifestu bola únia zrušená a všetci gréckokatolícki duchovní a veriaci sa od toho dňa stali súčasťou Pravoslávnej cirkvi.

11 NA, f. SÚC, šk. 116, inv. č. 137. Opis zápisnice napísanej dňa 28. 4. 1950 na pracovnej konferencii gréckokatolíckeho duchovenstva v Prešove.

Po skončení „soboru“ bola zabraná gréckokatolícka katedrála v Prešove, v ktorej sa pravoslávny vladyka Alexej Dechtereov po spoločnej modlitbe prihovril prítomným a v mene Pravoslávnej cirkvi chrám prebral. Po skončení slávnostných bohoslužieb bola členmi výboru pre zrušenie únie prevzatá rezidencia vladyku Gojdiča. Slávnostný obed sa podával v hoteli Savoy, odkiaľ delegácia pravoslávnych a gréckokatolíckych duchovných osobnými autami odišla do kúpeľov vo Vyšných Ružbachoch, kde podľa plánu pokračovala v „poradách“ o „prestupe“ gréckokatolíkov na pravoslávie.

Pravoslávna cirkev v Československu a moskovský patriarchát boli s výsledkami Prešovského „soboru“ samozrejme spokojní. Isté obavy, či rýchla zmena z „malého“ na „veľký sobor“ bola dostatočne pripravená a či jeho uznesenia budú aj prijaté, však zostali.¹²

Tieto obavy rezonovali zvlášť v najvyšších kruhoch komunistickej strany, ktorej predstavitelia síce zmenu priamo schválili, na druhej strane však s obavami pozerali na jej výsledky. Dňa 3. mája 1950 na schôdzi „cirkevnej rady“ ÚV KSČ vystúpil s referátom aj Zdeněk Fierlinger, ktorý informoval o rýchlej zmene plánu z „malého“ na „veľký“ sobor a o priebehu uskutočneného „soboru“. Aj keď komunisti mali obrovský podiel na príprave a realizácii Prešovského „soboru“, jeho výsledky – či radšej nečakaný neúspech – zaskočil aj najväčších radikálov a expertov v cirkevných otázkach. Alexej Čepička požadoval aj vyvodenie osobnej zodpovednosti za nezvládnutie akcie.¹³

Keď 9. mája 1950 predsedníctvo KV KSS v Košiciach hodnotilo Prešovský „sobor“, vedúci tajomník KV KSS Ladislav Priesol konštatoval, že boli urobené dve zásadné chyby: 1. na „sobore“ nebol podpisovaný text manifestu a 2. bola schválená a urobená široká politická kampaň medzi obyvateľmi, ale potom sa neurobilo takmer nič, lebo sa pripravovali oslavy 1. mája. Ďalej konštatoval, že hlavná chyba bola urobená na „sobore“, na čo predseda KNV Michal Chudík odpovedal, že „*chyba bola zapríčinená*

12 Государственный архив Российской Федерации, Фонд 6991, Опыт 1, Дело 724. Služobné hlásenie V. S. Karpoviča predsedovi Rady pre záležitosti Ruskej pravoslávnej cirkvi pri Rade ministrov ZSSR G. G. Karpovovi o kádrovej situácii v Pravoslávnej cirkvi v Československu po likvidácii Užhorodskej únie a návrhoch po jej regulácii. Moskva 8. 5. 1950 a Дело 735. Správa exarchu a metropolitu pražského a celého Československa Jeleverija moskovskému patriarchovi a celej Rusi Alexijovi o „návrate“ gréckokatolíckeho duchovenstva a veriacich východného Slovenska do Pravoslávnej cirkvi. Praha 16. 5. 1950.

13 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 100/24, sv. 47, a. j. 862. Zápis zo schôdze cirkevnej rady ÚV KSČ, Praha 3. 5. 1950.

kolektívne“. Potom vypovedal veľmi dôležité slová: „*O pol 12 hod. sme ešte nevedeli, že čo je to, až potom nám bolo povedané, že je to už veľký sobor.*“¹⁴

Faktom však zostáva, že hoci vzájomným obviňovaniam nebolo konca kraja, za neúspech akcie osobná zodpovednosť vyvedená nebola.

Trvalo to takmer mesiac, kým minister a predseda SÚC Zdeněk Fierlinger 26. mája 1950 odpovedal na list pravoslávneho exarchu Jelevferija. Po konzultáciách so sekretariátom ÚV KSČ a prezidentom Klementom Gottwaldom v odpovedi uviedol, že výsledok Prešovského „soboru“ sa berie na vedomie a Pravoslávna cirkev sa majetkovo-právne stala nástupkyňou Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi.¹⁵ Toto vyhlásenie nebolo presvedčivé, lebo vláda sa akoby od celej udalosti dištancovala, akoby s tým komunisti a nimi riadené najvyššie orgány nemali nič spoločné. Pokračovalo vyčkávanie, ako sa bude situácia ďalej vyvíjať a ako sa podarí realizovať ďalšie prijaté úlohy.

Je zaujímavé, že uznesenie z Prešovského „soboru“ hovorilo, že všetci gréckokatolíci sa týmto dňom stávajú pravoslávny, čo komunisti viac-menej akceptovali, ale zároveň „cirkevná rada“ ÚV KSČ dňa 3. mája prijala uznesenie o potrebe individuálneho získavania gréckokatolíckych duchovných na pravoslávie, čo na schôdzi rady 17. mája 1950 bolo zopakované a rozšírené aj so zreteľom na laikov.¹⁶

Postoj gréckokatolíckych kňazov a veriacich voči uzneseniam tzv. Prešovského soboru

Zlé výsledky „soboru“ následne odštartovali vlnu nátlaku na gréckokatolíckych kňazov a veriacich zo strany komunistickej strany, štátnych úradov, Národného frontu a Pravoslávnej cirkvi, aby podpísali manifest. Je mnoho svedectiev o tom, že toto podpisovanie bolo zmanipulované, že kňazi a laici podpisovali manifest pod hrozbou prísnych trestov alebo za príslubu, že stačí iba podpis, ale pravoslávnu vieru praktizovať nemusia.

14 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 100/4, sv. 90, a. j. 488. Zápisnica zo zasadnutia predsedníctva krajského výboru Komunistickej strany Slovenska v Košiciach, Košice 9. 5. 1950.

15 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 100/24, sv. 49, a. j. 871. List Gustáva Bareša Klementovi Gottwaldovi v veci predloženia konceptu listu SÚC Pravoslávnej cirkvi k „prestupu“ uniatov na pravoslávie, Praha 25. 5. 1950; Koncept listu SÚC Pravoslávnej cirkvi k „prestupu“ uniatov na pravoslávie, Praha 26. 5. 1950.

16 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 100/24, sv. 47, a. j. 862. Zápisnica zo schôdze Cirkevnej rady ÚV KSČ, Praha 3. 5. 1950; Zápisnica zo schôdze Cirkevnej rady ÚV KSČ, Praha 17. 5. 1950.

V priebehu podpisovania manifestu sa ukázalo, že samotný podpis pod ním nič neznamená: že to v skutočnosti nie je právny akt, ktorý by k niečomu konkrétnemu zaväzoval. Väčšina kňazov, ktorí ho podpísali, nechápali svoj podpis ako súhlas s „prechodom“ do Pravoslávnej cirkvi a po podpise sa odmietali zjednotiť s Pravoslávnou cirkvou. Toto naznačovali aj predstavitelia Pravoslávnej cirkvi, preto komunisti začali nútiť kňazov nielen k podpisu manifestu, ale aj k návšteve pravoslávneho vladyku na eparchiálnom úrade, aby sa aj takto zjednotili s Pravoslávnou cirkvou.

Gréckokatolícki kňazi reagovali na uznesenia tzv. Prešovského soboru rozličným spôsobom, pričom ich postoj možno rozdeliť do niekoľkých skupín:

1. dobrovoľne aktívne spolupracovali na Akcii „P“, podieľali sa na príprave a realizácii „soboru“;
2. dobrovoľne aktívne spolupracovali na Akcii „P“, ale nezúčastnili sa prípravy a realizácie „soboru“;
3. nič nepodpísali a zostali verní Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi a jednote s Rímom;
4. podpísali manifest, ale svoj podpis odvolali;
5. podpísali manifest, ale nezjednotili sa;
6. podpísali manifest a zjednotili sa;
7. podpísali manifest a zjednotili sa, ale potom všetko odvolali.

Toto rozdelenie do skupín však nebolo konečné, pretože duchovní menili svoj postoj, respektíve často nevedeli alebo ani nechceli zaujať jasný postoj. Išlo o individuálne rozhodnutie, pri ktorom nebolo vždy jasné, kto bol ešte gréckokatolíckym kňazom a kto už bol pravoslávnym duchovným. Často bol nesúlad medzi tým, za člena ktorej cirkvi sa kňaz považoval, za koho ho považovali jeho veriaci a ako ho vnímali štátne úrady. Nebolo výnimkou, že kňaz pred štátnymi úradmi a Pravoslávnou cirkvou vystupoval ako zjednotený duchovný, ale pred svojimi veriacimi sa prezentoval ako gréckokatolík.¹⁷

17 Ján Babjak ponúka aj iné rozdelenie gréckokatolíckych kňazov: 1. tí, ktorí sa podieľali na jej likvidácii (sedeli za predsedníckym stolom), 2. tí, ktorí jednoznačne odmietli podpísať prestup do Pravoslávnej cirkvi, 3. tí, ktorí sa istý čas skrývali pred nahováračmi, 4. tí, ktorí taktizovali s nahováračmi a 5. tí, ktorí (pod nátlakom) podpísali prestup do Pravoslávnej cirkvi. BABJAK, J.: *Zostali verní. Osudy gréckokatolíckych kňazov. II. zväzok*. Prešov 2011, s. 495 – 498. Podobné rozdelenie ponúka aj v príspevku BABJAK, J.: Ľudskú zlobu zničenia Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi Boh obrátil na jej rozkvet. In: CORANIČ, J. – ŠTURÁK, P. – KOPRIVŇÁKOVÁ, J. (Eds.): *Cirkev v okovách totalitného*

Doteraz nie je objasnené, akým spôsobom prijímala Pravoslávna cirkev gréckokatolíckych kňazov, aby to spĺňalo kritériá právneho aktu. Komunisti si totiž predstavovali, že duchovní po podpísaní manifestu sa po nejakom čase sami prihlásia u pravoslávneho vladyku a zjednotia sa s Pravoslávnou cirkvou. Ešte 9. mája 1950 mali pracovníci SÚC v Prahe predstavu, že okresní funkcionári budú navštevovať duchovných s kladnejším postojom k Akcii „P“ a vyzývať ich, aby šli k prešovskému vladykovi Alexejovi zložiť sľub vernosti.¹⁸ Podľa ich príkladu tak mali potom urobiť aj ďalší duchovní. Toto sa však nestalo, preto sa hľadalo konkrétnejšie riešenie.

Po dohode pravoslávneho kancelára Borisa Čerkesa s povereníkom Ladislavom Holdošom, predsedom SIÚC, malo byť do 7. júna 1950 všetkým gréckokatolíckym duchovným rozoslané posolstvo¹⁹ exarchu Jeleverfija. Kňazom, ktorí podpísali manifest, mala byť doručená aj výzva vladyku Alexeja, aby si prišli na eparchiálny úrad prebrať menovacie dekréty a finančnú zálohu na administratívne účely farnosti. Predtým, ako by dostali dekréty a peniaze, mali byť títo duchovní zjednotení.²⁰ V ďalšom období, teda od 7. do 15. júna 1950, mali predsedovia a vedúci tajomníci cirkevných, organizačných a misijných odborov oboch pravoslávnych eparchií navštíviť všetkých gréckokatolíckych duchovných, ktorí manifest stále nepodpísali, vysvetliť im situáciu a vyzvať ich k podpisu manifestu a návšteve u pravoslávneho vladyku Alexeja.²¹

V ďalšej situačnej správe z prostredia SÚC v Prahe sa konštatuje, že k 12. júnu 1950 sa s Pravoslávnou cirkvou zjednotilo 63 bývalých gréckokatolíckych kňazov. Títo kňazi navštívili pravoslávneho vladyku a „*provedli*

režimu. Likvidácia Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi v Československu v roku 1950. Prešov 2010, s. 23 – 25.

18 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 100/24, sv. 49, a. j. 871. Správa o stave „prestupovej“ akcie na pravoslávie na východnom Slovensku, Praha 9. 5. 1950.

19 Posolstvo exarchu moskovskej patriarchie metropolitu pražského a celého Československa Jeleverfija k Boha milujúcemu duchovenstvu a veriacim, navrátiť sa do svätej pravoslávnej cirkve z gréckeho katolíctva. NA, f. SÚC, šk. 208, inv. č. 200.

20 V zázname je doslova napísané: „*Při jednání s těmito duchovními, dříve než jim budou vydány dekrety a peníze, budou tito duchovní sjednoceni.*“ Konkrétna forma zjednotenia sa kňazov s Pravoslávnou cirkvou ani tu nie je uvedená.

21 NA, f. SÚC, šk. 208, inv. č. 200. Záznam o jednaní Borisa Čerkesa s povereníkom Ladislavom Holdošom dňa 3. 6. 1950 v Košiciach, Praha 5. 6. 1950.

s ním krátkou modlitbu“.²² Keďže počet gréckokatolíckych kňazov, ktorí by sa zjednotili s Pravoslávnu cirkvou, sa ani naďalej nedarilo zvyšovať, na predsedníctvo ÚV KSČ prišiel koncom augusta 1950 návrh, že „Pravoslávna cirkev bude žadať pouze formální sľib, ale nebude trvať na jakýchkoliv změnách obřadů, odvolání bludů a pod.“²³

Z citovaných dokumentov by teda vyplývalo, že prijatie menovacieho dekrétu, zloženie sľubu vernosti a spoločná modlitba s pravoslávny m vladykom boli považované za akt zjednotenia sa gréckokatolíckeho kňaza s Pravoslávnu cirkvou. Zostáva stále otvorená otázka, čo obsahoval Pravoslávnu cirkvou vyžadovaný sľub vernosti, a či to bola modlitba vladyku, alebo spoločná modlitba s vladykom.

Komunistom sa ani v spolupráci s Pravoslávnu cirkvou nedarilo presvedčiť väčšiu časť gréckokatolíckych kňazov zjednotiť sa s Pravoslávnu cirkvou, preto sa Akcia „P“ dostala do slepej uličky. Riešenie sa hľadalo aj 11. septembra 1950 na porade vedúcich činiteľov Košického a Prešovského kraja s povereníkom Ladislavom Holdošom. Duchovným, ktorí podpísali manifest, ale s Pravoslávnu cirkvou sa nezjednotili, malo byť opäť vysvetlené, že Prešovským „soborom“ Gréckokatolícka cirkev prestala existovať a „ďalšie zotrúvanie v tejto cirkvi, poťažne znovutvorenie je trestné, keďže ide o cirkev zaniklú a vytváranie novej nie je povolené“.²⁴ Ak by toto duchovní odmietali prijať, budú zatknutí a ich rodiny okamžite vykázané z obcí, kde pôsobili, alebo budú úradne vysťahované. Cieľom tohto radikálneho kroku mal byť „sledovaný ten účel, aby z obavy pred

22 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 100/52, sv. 16, a. j. 110. Situačná správa o Akcii „P“ k 12. júnu 1950. [Praha 12. 6. 1950 ?]. Peter Priputen z Matiašky síce podpísal „manifest“, ale odmietol ísť na „modlitebné zjednotenie a prebratie dekrétu“ k pravoslávny m vladykovi, teda pravoslávny m duchovným sa nestal. SNA, f. Slovenský úrad pre veci cirkevné v Bratislave (1926) 1949 – 1956 (1958) (ďalej iba SIÚC), šk. 274, inv. č. 160, číslo spisu (ďalej iba č. sp.) 861/51 dôv.

23 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/1, sv. 21, a. j. 233. Materiál na zasadnutie predsedníctva ÚV KSČ. K informácii. Bod 8/3. Správa o situácii Pravoslávnej cirkvi na východnom Slovensku, Praha pred 28. 8. 1950.

24 Toto tvrdenie bolo nepravdivé, čo potvrdzujú štúdie HORŇÁČEK, J.: Prešovský sobor – jeho zákonnosť a právne následky. In: ČORANIČ, J. – ŠTURÁK, P. – KOPRIVŇÁKOVÁ, J. (Eds.): *Cirkev v okovách totalitného režimu. Likvidácia Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi v Československu v roku 1950*. Prešov 2010, s. 113 – 120; HORŇÁČEK, J.: Právne aspekty zrušenia Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi v ČSR. In: FIAMOVÁ, M. – JAKUBČIN, P. (Eds.): *Prenasledovanie cirkví v komunistických štátoch strednej a východnej Európy. Zborník z medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie. Bratislava 30. september – 2. október 2009*. Bratislava 2010, s. 221 – 232.

*podobnými následkami zložili sľub i ostatní duchovní, ktorí podpísali manifest a zdráhajú sa podpísať, poťažne zložiť sľub“.*²⁵

Aj gréckokatolícki veriaci laici boli štátnou správou nútení podpísať manifest. Je zaujímavé, že v dokumentoch sa nezachovali informácie o tom, že by aj títo laici boli štátnou správou nútení ísť sa zjednotiť k pravoslávneému vladykovi. Akoby automaticky sa počítalo s tým, že budú v „prechode“ do pravoslávnej cirkvi nasledovať svojho kňaza.²⁶ Aj keď to bolo častým javom, nebolo to pravidlom. Zostáva stále neobjasnené, ako boli gréckokatolícki veriaci prijímaní do Pravoslávnej cirkvi, aby to bol akt spĺňajúci požiadavky cirkevného práva.

Už koncom apríla 1950 bolo jasne zadefinované, že ak Pravoslávna cirkev chce získať na „prestup“ do svojej cirkvi gréckokatolíckych duchovných a veriacich, musí aspoň nejaký čas rešpektovať tradície a zvyky Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi. Duchovným mali byť ponechané ich hodnosti, dokonca im mali byť ponúknuté aj ďalšie, čo sa malo stať lákadlom na „prestup“. Spôsob slúženia bohoslužieb sa nemal zmeniť, vynechalo by sa v nich iba to, čo sa týka pápeža.²⁷ Toto bolo zopakované aj pri iných príležitostiach, totiž že pre gréckokatolíkov sú pravoslávne dogmy neprijateľné. Pravoslávna cirkev si tento fakt uvedomovala, preto robila v tejto veci výrazné ústupky, vediac, že inak gréckokatolíkov nezíska.²⁸ Tento postoj bol potom

25 SNA, f. SlŮC, šk. 215, inv. č. 138. Prípís Krajského národného výboru v Košiciach na Krajské veliteľstvo Štátnej bezpečnosti v Košiciach vo veci ďalších opatrení v Akcii „P“, Košice 12. 9. 1950.

26 Napríklad cirkevný tajomník ONV v Sabinove Juraj Cmarík ešte koncom apríla 1950 písal, že veriaci budú súhlasiť „s tým, čo urobia ich cirkevní predstavitelia, a pridajú sa na stranu väčšiny“. Podal preto návrh, aby „reakční kňazi“, teda odporcovia Akcie „P“, boli „pozbavení duchovenskej činnosti a ako buriči súdení podľa zákona na ochranu republiky“. SNA, f. SlŮC, šk. 207, inv. č. 138, č. sp. 1712. Cirkevno-politická správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV v Sabinove Juraja Cmaríka na SlŮC v Bratislave za obdobie 14. – 30. apríl 1950. Sabinov 26. 4. 1950.

27 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 100/52, sv. 16, a. j. 110. Správa Vladimíra Chmelařa o priebehu akcie „P“, dnešnom stave a koordinácii v českých krajoch, Praha 21. 4. 1950.

28 „Dále se vyskytla menší skupinka oportunistů inspirovaná zřejmě arciděkanem Tóthem, která snad z většího popudu znovu rozvinula agitaci s autokefální uniatskou církví dovolávající se toho, že pro mnohé duchovní jsou pravoslavná dogmata nepřijatelná. Mohl jsem sdělit přítomným funkcionářům (a druhého dne i duchovním, kteří byli pozváni na poradu), že se mi dostalo znovu ujištění se strany vedení pravoslavné církve, že tato – i když se nemůže vzdát svých dogmat – bude nejméně tolerantní vůči duchovním, kteří by snad v tom ohledu ještě měli nějaké pochybnosti. Na starém způsobu bohoslužeb nebude samozřejmě nic měněno. Poradě přítomný kancléř exarchátní rady ing. Čerkes slíbil také, že úřední tisk zdejší pravoslavné církve si uloží ve věcech pravoslavných dogmat největší rezervu. Jinak ovšem Slovenský úřad pro věci církevní přísně zakročí vůči všem

propagačne využitý na získanie ďalších gréckokatolíkov, zvlášť laikov, ktorí s „prechodom“ na pravoslávie ešte váhali.

Uvedené výrazné kompromisy voči gréckokatolíkom však boli prijaté len preto, aby títo nemali pocit, že v praktizovaní ich viery sa niečo zmenilo. Mala sa využiť ich veľká naviazanosť na chrám, obrad a tradície a ponechaním týchto „vonkajších“ znakov sa mala zahmlieť podstata „prechodu“ na pravoslávie. Na použitie tejto taktiky dal neskôr súhlas aj moskovský patriarcha Alexij, hoci takzvaným staropravoslávny v Československu nebol daný postup príliš po vôli. Ako sa neskôr ukázalo, uvedená taktika sa osvedčila pri veriacich rusínskej a ukrajinskej národnosti, no veriacich slovenskej národnosti – zvlášť na Zemplíne – obalamutiť nedokázala.

Gréckokatolícki veriaci boli o týchto veciach informovaní nedostatočne. Ich rozhodovanie často záviselo od postoja kňaza, respektíve s rozhodnutím kňaza sa stotožnili aj jeho farníci. Sú aj príklady farností, kde sa veriaci rozhodli inak ako kňaz, či už za vernosť Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi a – Rímu, alebo za „prechod“ do Pravoslávnej cirkvi. Je tiež dôležité si uvedomiť, že prakticky ani v jednej farnosti toto rozhodnutie nebolo jednoznačné, to znamená, že v každej farnosti sa našli veriaci za „prechod“ do Pravoslávnej cirkvi a proti nemu.

Postoj gréckokatolíckych veriacich voči uzneseniam tzv. Prešovského soboru a následnému vývoju udalostí možno rozdeliť do týchto skupín:

1. veriaci navštevovali rímskokatolícke chrámy a obrady aj za cenu odcudzenia sa liturgickému obradu a tradíciám, ktoré im boli blízke;
2. veriaci si chceli zachovať liturgický obrad a tradície, ale chceli zachovať aj jednotu s Rímom, preto sa modlili sami bez kňaza, najprv v chrámoch, potom aj pri krížoch a kaplnkách, krstili a pochovávali sami;
3. veriaci si chceli zachovať liturgický obrad a tradície, preto naďalej chodili do chrámu, v ktorom vyrastali, v ktorom prijímali sviatosti a modlili sa, ktorý vybudovali ich predkovia alebo oni sami;
4. veriaci boli naviazaní na svojho kňaza, teda ak kňaz zostal verný, aj oni zostali gréckokatolíckmi, ak sa kňaz zjednotil s Pravoslávnu cirkvou, aj oni šli za ním;
5. veriaci, ktorí zároveň boli aj komunistami alebo sympatizantmi komunizmu, „prechod“ do Pravoslávnej cirkvi brali ako stranícku úlohu (zvlášť členovia komunistami založených návratových výborov, členovia

frakčným směrům.“ NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 100/24, sv. 49, a. j. 871. List Zdeňka Fierlingera Klementovi Gottwaldovi o aktuálnej situácii v Akcii „P“ na východnom Slovensku, Praha 27. 7. 1950.

organizácií patriacich do Národného frontu, štátni úradníci a zamestnanci, členovia JRD, príslušníci ZNB a pod.);

6. veriaci uvítali Prešovský „sobor“ a dobrovoľne prijali jeho uznesenia (viedol ich k tomu napríklad nesúhlas s používaním slovenčiny v liturgii, so zmenou juliánskeho kalendára na gregoriánsky, spory s gréckokatolíckym kňazom a pod.).²⁹

Stráženie duchovných a farských budov

Jedným zo spôsobov, ako gréckokatolícki veriaci prejavovali svoj nesúhlas s Prešovským „soborom“ a jeho uzneseniami, bolo stráženie duchovných a farských budov. Tento obranný postoj veriacich, ktorí chceli zostať verní svojej viere a cirkvi, nebol pri Akcii „P“ žiadnou novinkou. Veriaci podobne reagovali už pri tzv. Katolíckej akcii, keď boli prenasledovaní duchovní, ktorí nechceli podpísať jej dokument zvaný *Ohlas Katolíckej akcie* a zároveň uplatňovali exkomunikačné dekréty. Situácia sa opakovala aj po Akcii „K“, keď boli likvidované mužské rehoľné spoločnosti.

Stráženie fár bolo opäť intenzívne zvlášť v máji 1950, teda v čase, keď štátna správa gréckokatolíckych kňazov nútila podpísať manifest a zjednotiť sa s Pravoslávnu cirkvou. Duchovní, ktorí tak nechceli urobiť, sa stali terčom prenasledovania. Štátni úradníci, okresná cirkevná päťka a členovia návratových výborov, neskôr aj bývalí gréckokatolícki kňazi, ktorí sa zjednotili s Pravoslávnu cirkvou, navštevovali týchto duchovných s cieľom za každú cenu ich presvedčiť o „prechode“ na pravoslávie. Kňazi sa na tento nátlak sťažovali veriacim v osobných rozhovoroch alebo priamo v chráme počas bohoslužieb, čo im štátni úradníci zazlievali a považovali to za poburovanie ľudí. Veriaci však chceli svojho duchovného chrániť, preto faru strážili. O týchto aktivitách svedčia správy z proveniencie cirkevných oddelení okresných a krajských národných výborov a zložiek Slovenského národného frontu.

Cirkevný tajomník KNV v Prešove František Čillík mal k dispozícii hlásenia z jednotlivých okresov. Na tomto základe sa v cirkevno-politickej

29 Ján Babjak ponúka aj iné rozdelenie gréckokatolíckych veriacich: 1. veriaci chodili k rímskokatolíckom, 2. veriaci naďalej chodili do svojho chrámu, lebo ho stavali ich predkovia alebo oni sami, v ňom sa modlili a prijímali sviatosti a 3. veriaci zostali verní svojej viere a liturgickému obradu, stretávali sa pri krížoch, kaplnkách, na cintorinoch, v domoch, kde sa spoločne modlili bez účasti kňaza. BABJAK, J.: *Zostali verní*, zv. II, s. 500 – 501. Podobné rozdelenie ponúka aj v príspevku: BABJAK, J.: *Ľudskú zlobu zničenia Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi Boh obrátil na jej rozkvet*, s. 29.

správe a v správe o priebehu Akcie „P“ adresovanej SIÚC zmienil, že v obciach sa vyskytujú prípady, keď duchovní sú strážení veriacimi z obavy, aby neboli zatknutí.³⁰ Podobnú situáciu konštatoval aj v ďalšej správe.³¹

Z okresu Sabinov poslal cirkevný tajomník Juraj Cmarík koncom apríla³² a potom aj v polovici mája 1950 hlásenie, že v niektorých farnostiach sú kňazi strážení veriacimi. Keď do obce prišiel nejaký verejný činiteľ, ľudia ho obstúpili, ale k výtržnostiam nedošlo.³³ Nebola to celkom pravda, pretože napríklad v obci Tichý Potok 5. mája 1950 veriaci bránili miestneho kňaza a dekana Michala Jozefa Čabiňáka. Násilnosti síce nenastali, keďže štátni úradníci utiekli z obce, ale v marci 1951 boli Okresným súdom v Sabinove pre vzburu súdení štyria gréckokatolícki veriaci.³⁴

Nepokojná bola aj situácia v Jakubanoch v Staroľubovnianskom okrese. František Čillík hlásil SIÚC, že veriaci odmietali zatknutie ich

30 SNA, f. SIÚC, šk. 209, inv. č. 138. Situačná cirkevno-politická správa cirkevného oddelenia Krajského národného výboru v Prešove na Slovenský úrad pre veci cirkevné v Bratislave za obdobie 28. 4. – 14. 5. 1950. Prešov 23. 5. 1950; Tiež SNA, f. SIÚC, šk. 21, inv. č. 15. Správa cirkevného oddelenia Krajského národného výboru v Prešove na Slovenský úrad pre veci cirkevné v Bratislave o vývoji návratu gréckokatolíkov do pravoslavia, Prešov 24. 5. 1950.

31 Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky (ďalej iba MV SR), Štátny archív v Prešove (ďalej iba ŠA Prešov), f. Krajský národný výbor v Prešove – cirkevné oddelenie (ďalej iba KNV CO), šk. 3, inv. č. 250. Situačná cirkevno-politická správa cirkevného oddelenia Krajského národného výboru v Prešove na Slovenský úrad pre veci cirkevné v Bratislave za obdobie 14. – 28. 5. 1950, Prešov [pravdepodobne 28. máj] 1950.

32 SNA, f. SIÚC, šk. 207, inv. č. 138, č. sp. 1712. Cirkevno-politická správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV v Sabinove Juraja Cmaríka na SIÚC v Bratislave za obdobie 14. – 30. apríl 1950, Sabinov 26. 4. 1950.

33 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 265. Cirkevno-politická správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Sabinov Juraja Cmaríka na SIÚC v Bratislave, zaslaná na vedomie aj CO KNV v Prešove, za obdobie 1. – 14. 5. 1950, Sabinov 13. 5. 1950.

34 „Dne 5. května 1950 přijeli do obce Tichý Potom autem politický tajemník OV KSS, církevní referent a okresní instruktor, kteří chtěli s místním řecko-kat. farářem Čabiňákem projednat podepsání přestupu na pravoslavnou církev. Před farou shromáždil se dav 100 až 150 lidí, kteří mylně předpokládali, že farář bude zatčen a chtěli faráře bránit. Ze zástupu se ozývaly výhrušné výkřiky; k násilnostem nedošlo, protože úřední zástupci, když viděli hrozivost situace, upustili od zamýšleného jednání s farářem a z obce odjeli. Rozsudkem Okresního soudu v Sabinově ze dne 16. 3. 1951, T 325/50-12 byli Ján Semančík a Andrej Novák odsouzeni podle žaloby – Semančík na 3 měsíce, Novák na 4 měsíce odnětí svobody a k peněžitému trestu 10.000 Kčs, nepodm. Obvinění Michal a Marie Jarabincovi byli zproštěni žaloby, protože nebylo prokázáno, že by se i oni účastnili vzbourění. O.[kresní] p.[rokuratura] podala odvolání pro výrok o trestu.“ NA, f. SÚC, šk. 7, inv. č. 64, Situační zpráva oddělení I/1 Generální prokuratury – oddělení pro věci církevní za měsíc červen 1951.

farára Edmunda Guloviča. Podľa Čillíka sa však situácia v obci upokojila. V skutočnosti to nebola pravda, o čom svedčia aj hlásenia Antona Jeleňa, bezpečnostného referenta ONV v Starej Lubovni. V správe z apríla 1950 konštatoval, že po obciach v okrese sa šíria chýry, že z chrámov budú zbrané bohoslužobné predmety (čaje, monštrancie a podobne). Gréckokatolíci mali strach, niekde ľudia aj plakali, že budú musieť pravoslávnu vieru „prijat“ násilím. Komunisti sa síce v obciach snažili ľudí cestou dôverníkov presvedčiť, že kňazov a bohoslužobné veci nikto brať nebude, ale veriaci v niektorých obciach svoj chrám a miestneho kňaza aj tak nenápadne strážili. Napokon v správe za máj 1950 Jeleň hlásil, že duchovný Edmund Gulovič bol zatknutý, prevezený do Prešova a zaradený do Tábora nútených prác v Hronci. Dôvodom na zaistenie bolo, že poburoval miestnych občanov a na fare ukrýval aj iných kňazov. Nepokoje medzi gréckokatolíckmi v Jakubanoch zatknutím Guloviča neprestali, práve naopak, dianie v obci vyústilo do udalosti, počas ktorej v auguste 1950 zblil bezpečnostného referenta Antona Jeleňa.³⁵

Aj Ján Bánoci z Michalovského okresu upozorňoval, že duchovní sú zvlášť v noci strážení veriacimi, ale aby sa tomu predišlo, boli „z niektorých obcí ľudia, a tiež pre organizovanie provokačných zhromaždení, zaistení“.³⁶

Podobná situácia bola aj v okresoch Košického kraja. V okrese Trebišov cirkevné oddelenie ONV fungovalo nedostatočne, avšak dôležité informácie sa zachovali v správe tajomníka Okresného akčného výboru Slovenského národného frontu Tibora Rozáka, ktorý hlásil, že aj v obciach tohto okresu ľudia strážia duchovných. Keď do dediny prišlo nejaké auto, veriaci sa hneď zbehli v presvedčení, že im berú kňaza. Rozák bol presvedčený, že toto zapríčiňujú farári, keďže z kazateľníc viackrát vyhlásili veriacim, že dnes posledný raz slúžia bohoslužbu, lebo už budú zatknutí. Takto poburujú ľud na dedinách, že „*tento niekedy aj celú noc sa modlí v kostole za farára*“.³⁷

35 MV SR, Štátny archív v Levoči – pobočka Stará Lubovňa (ďalej iba ŠA Levoča – pobočka Stará Lubovňa), f. Okresný národný výbor v Starej Lubovni 1945 – 1960, šk. 119, inv. č. 303, zn. 117.

36 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 263. Správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Michalovce Jána Bánociho na SIÚC v Bratislave, zaslaná aj na vedomie CO KNV v Prešove, o priebehu Akcie „P“ v okrese, Michalovce 22. 5. 1950.

37 MV SR, Štátny archív v Košiciach – pobočka Trebišov (ďalej iba ŠA Košice – pobočka Trebišov), f. OAV SNF v Trebišove 1948 – 1955, neusporiadané, 1950, č. sp. 172/50.

Z obce Cestice v okrese Moldava nad Bodvou veriaci nepustili farára Vojtecha Kosteckého na „sobor“ do Prešova. Báli sa totiž, že sa už do obce nevráti. Potom niektoré ženy a dievčatá, ktoré odmietali násilnú pravoslavicizáciu, strážili duchovného aj faru.³⁸

Odporcom podpisovania manifestu bol aj Emil Zorvan, gréckokatolícky farár na Závadke, ktorý sa nechcel zjednotiť s Pravoslávnu cirkvou a žiadal sa radšej do civilného zamestnania. Veriacich údajne pobúrili proti návratovému výboru, takže ten nemohol vykonávať svoju činnosť.³⁹ Po fyzickom násilí a „presviedčaní“ na Štátnej bezpečnosti v Košiciach na krátky čas zmiernil svoj odpor voči Akcii „P“, ale s Pravoslávnu cirkvou sa aj tak nezjednotil.⁴⁰

V Helcmanovciach zasa 7. mája 1950 farár z Gelnice Július Župan vyzval veriacich v chráme, aby pristúpili ku sviatosti zmierenia, pretože na budúci týždeň už môže byť zatknutý. Zdôraznil, že zlí ľudia prenasledujú Gréckokatolícku cirkev. V prípade potreby nech veriaci obetujú aj svoj život, ale nech sa nevzdajú svojej viery.⁴¹

Sumár z týchto hlásení sa dostal aj do bulletinu SIŮC, ktorý pripravovalo jeho spravodajské oddelenie. Zo správy vyplýva, že fary boli strážené zvlášť v nočných hodinách. *„Príčinou tohoto sú duchovní, ktorí nie aby túto*

Správa tajomníka OAV SNF Trebišov Tibora Rozáka na ÚAV SNF Bratislava a v odpise na KAV SNF Košice za apríl 1950, Trebišov 9. 5. 1950.

- 38 SNA, f. P-2 Povereníctvo vnútra Bratislava 1947 – 1951 (ďalej iba P-2), šk. 6, inv. j. 179. Dalekopis Krajského veliteľstva Zboru národnej bezpečnosti v Košiciach na odbor Verejnej bezpečnosti Povereníctva vnútra v Bratislave vo veci Akcie „P“ a bezpečnostných opatrení v košickom kraji, Košice 11. 5. 1950.
- 39 ŠA Košice, f. Odbor pre vnútorné veci Rady Krajského národného výboru košického kraja a jeho zložky (1933) 1949 – 1960, šk. 93, inv. č. 97, č. sp. 65. Správa bezpečnostného referenta ONV Spišská Nová Ves na bezpečnostný referát KNV Košice za máj 1950, Spišská Nová Ves 20. 6. 1950.
- 40 *„Neskôr ho tun. ŠB zaistila a predviedla do Košíc. Tam dostal ako sa hovorí poriadnu lekcii a prepustili ho nazad. Teraz je celkom zmenený.“* Cirkevný tajomník predpokladal, že Zorvan po „príučke“ na ŠtB v Košiciach bez väčších problémov podpíše manifest a zjednotí sa s Pravoslávnu cirkvou. SNA, f. SIŮC, šk. 207, inv. č. 138, č. sp. 1764/50. Správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Spišská Nová Ves Milana Žalúdeka na SIŮC v Bratislave, zaslaná aj na vedomie KNV CO v Košiciach, za obdobie 1. – 13. máj 1950, Spišská Nová Ves 15. 5. 1950. Ako ukázali ďalšie udalosti, veľmi sa mylil.
- 41 SNA, f. P-2, šk. 6, inv. j. 179. Dalekopis Krajského veliteľstva Zboru národnej bezpečnosti v Košiciach na odbor Verejnej bezpečnosti Povereníctva vnútra v Bratislave vo veci Akcie „P“ a bezpečnostných opatrení v košickom kraji, Košice 11. 5. 1950.

*situáciu ukludňovali a ukludnili, ale naopak, snažia sa okolo vytvoriť silnú masu veriacich, ktorá by mala byť ochrankyňou ich bezpečnosti.*⁴²

Situácia sa nezmenila ani v júni 1950. František Čillík písal, že v obciach, kde duchovný manifest nepodpísal, ho ľudia chránia, alebo aj sám ich prosí o ochranu, aby sa k nemu nikto cudzí nedostal. Keď prišlo do dediny nejaké auto, ľudia vyzbrojení rôznymi pracovnými nástrojmi zbehli sa k fare, aby chránili kňaza.⁴³

Postoje duchovných v tom čase neboli vždy jasné: akoby sa nevedeli rozhodnúť, či chcú trpieť pre vernosť Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi a jednotu s Rímom, alebo prijmú pravoslávie, s ktorým v podstate neboli stotožnení. Časť kňazov podpísala manifest a zjednotila sa s Pravoslávnou cirkvou, ale niektorí tento skutok oľutovali, svoje zjednotenie odvolali a často sa skrývali pred štátnymi úradmi. Niektorí sa po čase opäť „vrátili“ k pravosláviu, ďalší už nezakolísali a zostali verní Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi. Keď napríklad farár vo Vyšnej Rybnici zložil sľub pravoslávneho vladykovi, manželka a veriaci mu to vyčítali, preto sa od 7. mája 1950 začal skrývať. Bohoslužby mal iba tajne vo filiálnej obci. Veriaci kňaza bránili, a keď do obce prišlo akékoľvek auto, zhrkli sa okolo auta v presvedčení, že im prišli zobrať kňaza.⁴⁴ Keď mu bolo dané na vedomie, že na jeho miesto bude menovaný iný pravoslávny kňaz, zúčastnil sa na voľbe pravoslávneho michalovského vladyku, čím dal jasne najavo, že napriek nesúhlasu veriacich a rodinných príslušníkov prijal pravoslávie.

Podľa Čillíka prestalo stráženie fár až v októbri 1950. V správe SIÚC písal: *„Nervozita a nespokojnosť, ktorá panovala v radoch veriacich*

42 SNA, f. SIÚC, šk. 223, inv. č. 138. Bulletin č. 20 spravodajského oddelenia III. odboru SIÚC Bratislava. 22. – 23. 5. 1950. *„Pred gréckokatolíckymi farami zastavovali autá – a kňazi, ktorí ani po „presvedčovaní“ na bývalom KNV v Prešove neboli ochotní podpísať „prestup“, sa ocitli vo väzení. Dostať ich tam nebolo jednoduché. Veriaci, prosť východniari, s ktorými sa život nikdy príliš nemaznal, boli odhodlaní brániť svojich kňazov vlastnými telami. Chlapi stáli pred farou s vidlami a jednoduché ženičky držali motyky. Štátna moc sa v týchto časoch predstavila vynaliezavosťou priam zázračnou, na gréckokatolíckych kňazov sa poriadal doslova hon.“* BOMBOVÁ, E.: Vysoká škola pokory alebo keď biskup obšívá matrace. In: *Smena*, roč. 20, 8. 5. 1968, č. 123, s. 3. Pozri tiež: KNEŽO, J.: *Životná cesta kňaza*. Košice 2011, s. 45.

43 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 252. Správa cirkevného tajomníka KNV v Prešove Františka Čillíka na SIÚC v Bratislave o priebehu Akcie „P“. Prešov 2. 6. 1950; SNA, f. SIÚC, šk. 21, inv. č. 15. Správa cirkevného tajomníka KNV v Prešove Františka Čillíka na SIÚC v Bratislave o priebehu Akcie „P“, Prešov 21. 6. 1950.

44 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 267. Návrh cirkevného tajomníka ONV Sobrance Jána Vatahu na SIÚC v Bratislave, zaslaná aj na vedomie CO KNV v Prešove, na preloženie Alexeja Deáka na iné pôsobisko, Sobrance 15. 6. 1950.

*a prejavovala sa v strážení fár, častých zhluknutiach obyvateľov pri objavení sa cudzích osôb v obci úplne prestala a ľud sa zase vrátil ku svojej práci.*⁴⁵

Odpor proti odovzdávaniu gréckokatolíckych chrámov Pravoslávnej cirkvi

Dokumenty zo štátnych archívov sú dostatočným svedectvom, že Pravoslávna cirkev poslušne spolupracovala s komunistickým režimom v Československu, preto jej tento režim vychádzal v ústrety. Jednou z týchto oblastí bola aj materiálna podpora. Už pred tzv. Prešovským „soborom“ Pravoslávna cirkev prebrala niekoľko gréckokatolíckych chrámov.⁴⁶ Veriaci z niekoľkých gréckokatolíckych farností „prestúpili“ do Pravoslávnej cirkvi a s nimi akoby automaticky Pravoslávna cirkev získala aj chrámy a farské budovy, ktoré boli vlastníctvom Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi. Medzi najdôležitejšie argumenty takéhoto postupu patrilo, že celá farnosť prešla na pravoslávie a tak má aj právo na majetok, ktorý predtým veriaci užívali ako príslušníci Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi. Lenže bolo skôr výnimkou, že „prešli“ všetci, pretože zvyčajne sa našli aj veriaci, ba celé rodiny, ktoré chceli zostať gréckokatolíckmi a tí mali naďalej právo užívať majetok svojej cirkvi, akým bol bezpochyby chrám, farská budova, cirkevná škola, pozemky, lesy a pod. Toto si uvedomovali aj komunisti, preto hľadali spôsob, ako práva týchto gréckokatolíkov obísť. Štátne úrady už pred „soborom“ zaviedli prax, že Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi bol chrám úradne odobratý, keďže po „prechode“ veriacich do Pravoslávnej cirkvi už nemá v obci členov svojej cirkvi, alebo sú vo výraznej menšine. Štát potom ako „vlastník“ takýto chrám zveril do výlučného užívania Pravoslávnej cirkvi, keďže tá v obci má veriacich. Po čase bol majetok prevedený na Pravoslávnu cirkev. Bol to samozrejme nezákonný postup, ale v tých časoch sa proti tomu nedalo nijako brániť.⁴⁷

45 SNA, f. SIÚC, šk. 220, inv. č. 138. Situačná cirkevno-politická správa cirkevného oddelenia Krajského národného výboru v Prešove na Slovenský úrad pre veci cirkevné v Bratislave za obdobie 1. – 15. 10. 1950, Prešov 25. 10. 1950.

46 Klasickým príkladom v tejto veci je napríklad farnosť Olšinkov, kde z 265 obyvateľov obce 238 podpísalo žiadosť o prevedenie gréckokatolíckeho chrámu do vlastníctva Pravoslávnej cirkvi.

47 Pravoslávna cirkev tieto udalosti zľahčovala a interpretovala ich tak, aby sa aj po rokoch zdalo, že dobrovoľný „prechod“ gréckokatolíkov na pravoslávie bol túžbou väčšiny veriacich a duchovenstva, čo v skutočnosti nebola pravda. Napríklad v roku 1981 mesačník Pravoslávnej cirkvi uverejnil príspevok, v ktorom autor okrem iného tvrdil:

Po skončení tzv. Prešovského „soboru“ bola hneď slávnostne prevzatá Pravoslávnu cirkvou gréckokatolícka katedrála v Prešove. Tento akt bol síce predstavovaný komunistickou propagandou ako spontánný, ale opak bol pravdou, keďže celá akcia bola pripravená špeciálnou komisiou, v ktorej mala zastúpenie aj Pravoslávna cirkev.

Následne, na základe „soborových“ uznesení, Pravoslávna cirkev zaberala ďalšie gréckokatolícke chrámy. Nebolo výnimkou, že pri tom asistovali príslušníci bezpečnosti. Bol to proces, ktorý niekde prebehol bez väčších problémov, niekde sa veriaci vzbúrili, hoci nakoniec museli ustúpiť. Na niekoľkých miestach bol chrám až do obnovenia Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi v roku 1968 zatvorený.

Viacerí gréckokatolícki kňazi ešte pred internovaním alebo zatknutím žiadali od kurátorov vo farnosti, aby zložili sľub, že do chrámu dobrovoľne nepustia pravoslávneho duchovného a chrám neodovzdajú Pravoslávnej cirkvi.⁴⁸ Hoci sa snažili tento sľub dodržať, často museli ustúpiť tlaku štátnych orgánov a Pravoslávnej cirkvi.

Farnosť Humenné bola jedným z príkladov, kde gréckokatolícki veriaci neprijali násilnú pravoslavizáciu a vzopreli sa proti zabratiu chrámu Pravoslávnu cirkvou. Dňa 29. apríla 1950 o 20.00 hod. prišiel na OS KSS v Humennom bývalý gréckokatolícky kňaz Eliáš Kačur, ktorý oznámil, že nasledujúci deň úradne prevezme v mene Pravoslávnej cirkvi gréckokatolícky chrám v Humennom. Cirkevný referent po dohode s OV KSS

„V 50. rokoch pred Pravoslávnu cirkvou vyvstal nový problém – prijať alebo neprijať bývalé ga.-kat. [správne má byť gr.-kat., pozn. D. A. M.] farnosti, či obsadiť tieto farnosti svojimi duchovnými po tom, čo na historickom sneme bola zrušená násilne nanútená únia z roku 1946 – 1949 [správne má byť 1646 – 1649, pozn. D. A. M.]? Pravoslávna cirkev pristupovala k tejto otázke s istými obavami, aby to neuškodilo pôvodnému hnutiu za návrat do Pravoslávnej cirkvi. Vedelo sa totiž, že mnohí z gr.-kat. na túto chvíľu už dávno čakali, mnohí z duchovných tejto cirkvi sami sa organizovali a vytvárali podmienky pre zrušenie únie, lebo dobre poznali dejiny našich národov i cirkvi a veľmi dobre si uvedomovali ciele, aké mala únia. Ale súčasne s tým naša cirkev si uvedomovala, že za vyše 300 rokov únie stačila za pomoci Vatikánu vychovať mnoho oddaných služobníkov a propagátorov únie, najmä v posledných rokoch (o. redemptoristi a iní). Všetko toto si vyžadovalo premyslený prístup k veci a veľkú trpezlivosť, toleranciu a pod.“ Tridsať rokov samostatnosti Pravoslávnej cirkvi. In: *Odkaz sv. Cyrila a Metoda*, roč. 28, 1982, č. 2, s. 34. *„Premysleným prístupom k veci“* sa stala spolupráca s komunistickým režimom na likvidácii Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi a „*veľkou trpezlivosťou a toleranciou*“ bolo, že Pravoslávna cirkev vzala do úvahy príhovor komunistov, ponechala bývalým gréckokatolíkom ich zvyky a tradície, na ktoré boli zvyknutí v Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi, aby títo nemali dojem, že sa pre nich „*prechodom*“ do Pravoslávnej cirkvi niečo zmenilo.

48 Takto postupoval napríklad Ján Kračik v Novosade. SNA, f. SIÚC, šk. 272, inv. č. 160, č. sp. 266/51 dôv.

rozhodli, že o 7.30 hod. bude slúžiť sv. liturgiu gréckokatolícky kňaz Michal Šutaj. O 9.30 hod. mali slúžiť liturgiu bývalí gréckokatolícki kňazi Peter Bunganič a Michal Knap a po nich o 10.30 hod. mal slávnostnú liturgiu celebroida Eliáš Kačur. Okresný veliteľ SNB poručík Róbert Klinger navrhol, že urobí bezpečnostné opatrenia a posilní hliadky pri chráme, s čím komisia nesúhlasila. V chráme teda v čase incidentu boli na ochranu pravoslávnych kňazov iba štyria príslušníci SNB v civile a dvaja uniformovaní príslušníci boli v ulici vedúcej ku chrámu. Ranné bohoslužby však mali časový sklz a veriaci z chrámu neodchádzali, iba prichádzali ďalší na druhú bohoslužbu. Šutaj chcel totiž slúžiť aj druhú liturgiu, ktorá mala byť pôvodne o 9.30 hod. Podpredseda OV KSS a riaditeľ Štátneho ruského gymnázia v Humennom Štefan Bunganič mu však povedal, aby liturgiu neslúžil, že ju budú celebroida iní kňazi. Šutaj sa naozaj vyzliekol a liturgické rúcho odniesol do sakristie. Potom sa vrátil do chrámu, zobral si svoju modlitebnú knižku a lention na utieranie čaše a vyšiel z chrámu. Prítomní veriaci na to začali z chrámu brať cirkevný inventár (obrazy, zástavy, čašu, svietniky, kvety a ďalšie veci) a vychádzali s ním cez bočné dvere von z chrámu. Boli veľmi rozrušení, pričom kričali, že im berú kňaza a vieru, a mnohí aj plakali. Štyria príslušníci SNB v civile, ktorí boli v chráme, snažili sa o nastolenie poriadku a pokoja, ale to sa im nedarilo. Bezpečnostný referent ONV Petrušovský rýchlo zavolať posily. Do chrámu prišlo ďalších 10 príslušníkov SNB v civilnom oblečení, ktorým sa podarilo zatvoriť dvere chrámu, čím zabránili ďalšiemu vynášaniu cirkevného inventára. Lenže medzitým prichádzali veriaci na liturgiu, ktorá mala byť o 10.30 hod. Keď sa nemohli dostať do chrámu a zistili, čo sa deje, spoločnými silami sa im podarilo dvere uvoľniť, a keď vošli do chrámu, aj oni sa dožadovali svojho gréckokatolíckeho kňaza. Aj keď 16 príslušníkov SNB v civile nemalo situáciu pod kontrolou, začala sa sv. liturgia, ktorú síce slúžil pravoslávny kňaz Eliáš Kačur, ale k úradnému prevzatíu chrámu Pravoslávnu cirkvou už v tejto napätej atmosfére nedošlo. Najviac aktívni boli veriaci z Valaškoviec, pričom chceli prísť brániť chrám a cirkev aj počas popoludňajších bohoslužieb a nasledujúci deň. Veliteľ SNB Klinger preto posilnil stav príslušníkov, keď o 12.00 hod. sústredil do Humenného 20 príslušníkov SNB a OV KSS povolalo do zbrane ľudové milície. Keď sa o 15.00 hod. začala popoludňajšia bohoslužba, pravoslávni už bez väčších ťažkostí prevzali chrám. Gréckokatolíci sa v skupinách po 30 – 60 osôb modlili pred chrámom a pri kaplnkách krížovej cesty. Keď pravoslávni skončili preberanie chrámu a odchádzali domov, gréckokatolíci v počte asi 380 – 450 osôb sa k nim zbehli, kričali na nich, že sú zradcovia, a niektorí

na nich aj pluli. Príslušníci Róbert Klinger, Jozef Mihalík, Lazor a ešte ďalší dvaja zakročili proti najviac vykrikujúcim osobám, takže asi po 4 až 5 minútach sa dav rozišiel. Pri tomto zákroku bolo zaistených 5 žien, ale celkovo vo večerných hodinách bolo príslušníkmi SNB a Ľudovou milíciou zaistených 44 osôb. Po vyšetrení bolo zatknutých 8 osôb, z toho 4 mužovia a 4 ženy, ostatní boli 1. mája o 21.00 hod. prepustení. Cirkevný inventár bol asi z dvoch tretín nájdený, donesený na stanicu SNB v Humennom a následne vrátený do chrámu na pôvodné miesto.⁴⁹

Situácia na východnom Slovensku bola skutočne napätá a komunisti nevedeli, čo prinesú ďalšie dni. Čakali odpor gréckokatolíckych veriacich proti Akcii „P“ a záverom tzv. Prešovského soboru, ale nevedeli odhadnúť jeho rozsah. Povereník vnútra Daniel Okáli už 1. mája 1950 vedel o incidente v Humennom. Dostal informáciu od škpt. Borguľu z Michaloviec, že BK odbor Povereníctva vnútra⁵⁰ odvolal 30 členov Pohotovostného oddielu Prešovského kraja, čo podľa Borguľu vzhľadom na udalosti v Humennom a na prebiehajúcu Akciu „P“ bolo nesprávne rozhodnutie. Žiadal povereníka, aby bol špeciálny oddiel ponechaný na východnom Slovensku až do času, kým Akcia „P“ nebude skončená. Povereník sa s týmto názorom nielenže stotožnil, ale pridal aj ďalší argument: oddiel bol potrebný v prípade mimoriadnej udalosti aj na zásah v Podolínci, kde boli sústredení rehoľníci.⁵¹

Zaujímavé je aj to, ako bola udalosť predstavená v správe ÚV KSČ a prezidentovi Klementovi Gottwaldovi. Autor správy o stave „prestupovej“ akcie na pravoslávie na východnom Slovensku písal aj o reakcii veriacich, kde spomenul aj udalosť v Humennom: *„K incidentu došlo pouze v Humenném, kde po reakčním uniatském faráři sloužil druhé bohoslužby uniatský kněz, který přestoupil na pravoslaví. Během bohoslužeb se pokusila do chrámu vtrhnout skupina uniatských fanatiků a ztropit výtržnost, byla*

49 K udalosti pozri: Archív Ústavu pamäti národa Bratislava, f. Krajská správa Ministerstva vnútra Prešov, B 10-7, šk. 5, inv. č. 85. Hlásenie Okresného veliteľstva SNB v Humennom na Krajské veliteľstvo Národnej bezpečnosti v Prešove vo veci vzbury v gréckokatolíckom chráme v Humennom, pri príležitosti odovzdávania chrámu Pravoslávnej cirkvi. Humenné 2. 5. 1950; SNA, f. SIUC, šk. 208, inv. č. 138. Správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Humenné Andreja Salamona na SIUC v Bratislave, zaslaná na vedomie aj CO KNV v Prešove, za obdobie 15. – 30. 4. 1950, Humenné 16. 5. 1950.

50 BK odbor bol koordinačný odbor na Povereníctve vnútra v Bratislave.

51 SNA, f. P-Z, sekretariát/taj. 1950, šk. 207, inv. č. 121. Prípis povereníka vnútra v Bratislave Daniela Okáliho prednostovi odboru BK Rudolfovi Viktorinovi a prednostovi odboru VB Jozefovi Vraždovi vo veci ponechania pohotovostného oddielu SNB v Prešove, Bratislava 2. 5. 1950.

však vytláčena studenty, ktorí s prestupem souhlasí. Po skončení bohoslužeb však skupina do kostela vtrhla a vyrabovala jej (odnesli obrazy, náčiní a pod.). Organizátori byli na 24 hod. zajištěni. Pak litovali svého činu a vrátili odnesené předměty.⁵²

V Medzilaborciach sa preberanie gréckokatolíckeho chrámu Pravoslávnu cirkvou uskutočnilo 14. mája 1950. Jedným z hlavných protagonistov bol opäť pravoslávny duchovný Eliáš Kačur. Na bohoslužbe za prítomnosti zástupcov ONV Medzilaborce, KNV Prešov a kpt. Gulu začali ženy z ružencového arcibratstva a dievčatá plakať, pričom sa domáhali svojho gréckokatolíckeho kňaza baziliána Jozafata Štefana Kuzmiaka. Kačur sa veriacim prihovoral a tí sa na čas upokojili. Po skončení liturgie došlo k incidentu, keď ženy a dievčatá „začali plávať na pravoslávne dievča M. Protivňakovu, ktorá niesla kríž“. Vinníkov sa nepodarilo hneď odhaliť, ale potrestaní boli najviac podozriví (H. Kavčaková, Basarabová, Fecurová, Vagneová, Žolnová a Peter Suško), takže museli odpracovať 6 mesiacov na brigáde. Podľa tvrdenia cirkevného tajomníka ľud sa po čase uspokojil a neskôr na pravoslávne bohoslužby prichádzali aj ženy z ružencového arcibratstva.⁵³

Počas mesiaca máj mali aj gréckokatolícki veriaci zvyk modliť sa májovú pobožnosť. V obci Kremná sa však 5. mája veriaci zostali modliť pred chrámom, pretože vo svätyni bol bývalý gréckokatolícky kňaz Ján Ferenc, ktorý sa stal pravoslávnym. Veriaci sa nechceli stať pravoslávnymi, preto sa s ním ani nechceli modliť. V noci z 5. na 6. mája uzamkli chrám visiacim zámkom. Boli privolaní príslušníci SNB, ktorí záležitosť vyšetrovali. Veriaci ráno 6. mája vôbec nešli na bohoslužbu do svojho chrámu, ale šli do susedných obcí Veľkého Sulína a Matysovej, kde kňazi neprijali pravoslávie. Ani Ján Ferenc v ten deň do chrámu nevošiel, ale po dohode s predsedom miestneho národného výboru a kurátorom udalosť hlásil cirkevnému oddeleniu ONV v Starej Lubovni. V priebehu niekoľkých dní sa však situácia upokojila, teda v chráme opäť slúžil Ján Ferenc už ako pravoslávny kňaz a aj časť veriacich k nemu prichádzala na bohoslužby.⁵⁴

52 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 100/24, sv. 49, a. j. 871. Správa o stave „prestupovej“ akcie na pravoslávie na východnom Slovensku, Praha 9. 5. 1950.

53 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 262. Cirkevno-politická správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Medzilaborce Emila Džugana na SIÚC v Bratislave, zaslaná aj na vedomie CO KNV v Prešove, za obdobie 15. – 28. 5. 1950, Medzilaborce 31. 5. 1950.

54 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 269. Cirkevno-politická správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Stará Lubovňa Štefana Kundráta na CO KNV v Prešove za obdobie 1. – 14. 5. 1950, Stará Lubovňa 16. 5. 1950.

Krajský cirkevný tajomník Čillík v správe SIÚC v Bratislave neuviedol, že veriaci vymenili zámok na chráme.⁵⁵ Podobne ako v iných farnostiach, aj tu boli veriaci naviazaní na svoj chrám, a tak nehľadiac na to, že budú považovaní za pravoslávnych, začali postupne prichádzať na bohoslužby.

Stávalo sa, že nie všetky dôležité informácie z hlásení okresných cirkevných tajomníkov sa dostávali do správy, ktorá bola posielaná do Bratislavy. František Čillík v správe za okres Bardejov napríklad vôbec neuviedol udalosť, ktorá sa stala v Hrabskom, hoci okresný cirkevný tajomník v Bardejove Jozef Popovec jej venoval dostatočnú pozornosť. Popovec v správe písal, že v gréckokatolíckom chráme v Hrabskom mala byť 13. augusta 1950 slúžená svätá liturgia pravoslávny duchovným. V noci z 12. na 13. augusta však „*dedinský boháči zatvorili kostol druhým zámkom – klatkou*“ (visiacim zámkom), takže liturgia sa musela konať v pravoslávnom chráme, hoci sa na nej zúčastnili aj niekoľkí bývalí gréckokatolíci. Podozriví gazdovia boli vyzvaní, aby chrám dobrovoľne otvorili, čo v noci 13. augusta aj urobili. Štátna bezpečnosť a SNB záležitosti venovali pozornosť a 15. augusta boli vzaté na vyšetrovanie štyri osoby. Cieľom vyšetrovania bolo, aby sa priznali, kto ich na tento čin naviedol.⁵⁶ Okres Bardejov bol však po stránke Akcie „P“ konsolidovaný, teda nebol tam zaznamenaný nejaký väčší odpor duchovných alebo laikov, čo mohlo byť príčinou, že Čillík túto informáciu do svojej správy nezaradil. Situácia v tejto obci ani ku koncu roka nebola uspokojivá, pretože staropravoslávni veriaci sa vysmievali z novopravoslávnych, teda bývalých gréckokatolíkov, že odporom aj tak nič nedosiahli a museli prejsť na pravoslávie. Cirkevný tajomník Popovec sa preto stretol so staropravoslávny kantorom a kurátormi. Usmernil ich a inštruoval, aby sa takéto štvavé reči neopakovali. V obci zabezpečil pokoj a dobré spolunažívanie.⁵⁷

V správach cirkevných tajomníkov sú zmienky aj o tom, že gréckokatolícki kňazi alebo i veriaci odnášali z chrámu bohoslužobné predmety a zariadenie interiéru, aby ho nemohla používať Pravoslávna cirkev,

55 SNA, f. SIÚC, šk. 21, inv. č. 15. Správa cirkevného oddelenia Krajského národného výboru v Prešove na Slovenský úrad pre veci cirkevné v Bratislave o vývoji návratu gréckokatolíkov do pravoslavia, Prešov 24. 5. 1950.

56 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 255. Správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Bardejov Jozefa Popovca na CO KNV v Prešove za prvú polovicu augusta 1950, Bardejov 15. 8. 1950.

57 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 255. Správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Bardejov Jozefa Popovca na CO KNV v Prešove za prvú polovicu novembra 1950, Bardejov 15. 11. 1950.

čím aspoň na čas znemožnili vykonávať vo svojom chráme pravoslávne bohoslužby.

V Sobranciach kolovala správa, že ak štátne úrady preložia miestneho gréckokatolíckeho kňaza na iné miesto a na jeho miesto príde „pokrokový“ duchovný, teda pravoslávny kňaz spolupracujúci s komunistami, „*odcudzia z gréckokatolíckej kaplnky všetko zariadenie*“.⁵⁸

Duchovný Vojtech Molčan z Kružlova dal poodnášať z chrámu rôzne predmety, ktoré boli ukryté u obyvateľov Kružlova a u jeho svokrovcov v Solivare pri Prešove. Keďže to cirkevný tajomník v Bardejove nahlásil Štátnej bezpečnosti, tá udalosť vyšetrovala.⁵⁹

V Helcmanovciach traja veriaci povynášali z gréckokatolíckeho chrámu cenné zlaté veci, ktoré potom odviezli do Prešova. Urobili to z dôvodu, že do obce mal prísť pravoslávny farár. Keďže veriaci v obci nechceli byť pravoslávny, skryli bohoslužobné predmety, bez ktorých pravoslávny farár nemohol konať bohoslužbu. Prípado vyšetrovala SNB.⁶⁰

Dňa 29. júna 1950 sa cirkevný tajomník Jednotného národného výboru v Prešove Ján Novák obrátil na Veliteľstvo stanice SNB v Mereticiach cestou bezpečnostného referátu JNV v Prešove, aby bolo vyšetrené, kto poroznášal veci z gréckokatolíckej fary v Lubovci. V žiadosti zdôraznil, že „*po uznaní vládou prehlásenia Soboru prešli všetky majetky býv. gr. kat. cirkvi do vlastníctva pravoslávnej cirkvi*“. Výsledky vyšetrovania mu mali byť hlásené cestou bezpečnostného referátu JNV v Prešove.⁶¹

Veriaci v obci Čirč potom, čo sa dozvedeli, že v ich chráme má mať bohoslužby gréckokatolícky kňaz z Orlova Jozef Šoltýs, ktorý sa zjednotil s Pravoslávnu cirkvou, nielenže odmietli prísť do chrámu, ale v noci

58 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 6, inv. č. 336. Správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Sobrance Jána Vatahu na SIÚC v Bratislave, zaslaná aj na vedomie CO KNV v Prešove, o vývoji návratu na Pravoslávnu cirkev, Sobrance 9. 5. 1950.

59 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 255. Mimoriadna správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Bardejov Jozefa Popovca na SIÚC v Bratislave, Bardejov 18. 5. 1950

60 SNA, f. ÚV KSS, Generálny tajomník ÚV KSS 1945 – 1951/52 (Štefan Baššovanský), šk. 2158, a. j. 252. Bulletin číslo 23. Spravodajského oddelenia III. odboru Slovenského úradu pre veci cirkevné v Bratislave, Bratislava 27. 5. – 5. 6. 1950.

61 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 16, inv. č. 766. Správa cirkevného tajomníka KNV Prešov Jána Nováka na Veliteľstvo stanice SNB v Mereticiach vo veci vyšetrovania poroznášania inventárnych vecí z bývalého gréckokatolíckeho farského úradu v Lubovci, [Prešov] 29. 6. 1950.

poodnášali časť bohoslužobných predmetov, bez ktorých nemohla byť slúžená svätá liturgia. Aj v tomto prípade udalosť vyšetrovala bezpečnosť.⁶²

V Giraltovciah z chrámu bohoslužobné predmety odniesli cerkovník, kurátor a niektorí veriaci, ktorých cirkevný tajomník nazýva v správe „fanatikmi“. SNB tieto osoby vypátrala, takže veci boli vrátené do chrámu a udalosť bola ďalej vyšetrovaná.⁶³

Koncom novembra 1950 Okresná prokuratúra v Michalovciach oznamovala na SIÚC v Bratislave, že zastavila trestné stíhanie gréckokatolíckeho kňaza Jána Fedorka a cerkovníka Michala Figlára, pretože sa počas vyšetrovania proti obvineným nepodarilo zhromaždiť usvedčujúce dôkazy. Podľa obvinenia menovaní od konca apríla do približne 4. júla 1950 skrývali cirkevné veci z farského chrámu v Michalovciach.⁶⁴

„Zhluknutia“ veriacich a útoky proti verejným činiteľom

Na zasadnutí predsedníctva KV KSS v Košiciach František Košek informoval prítomných o aktuálnej cirkevnej situácii, pričom spomenul aj udalosť v Košickom Klečenove, kde došlo k „zhluknutiu“ veriacich.⁶⁵ Škoda, že zápis o udalosti neuvádza ďalšie detaily. Dozvedáme sa ich z hlásenia KV SNB v Košiciach. V čase, keď okresní činitelia boli na miestnej gréckokatolíckej fare, pri moste neďaleko fary sa zhromaždilo asi 20 osôb. Muži aj ženy si priniesli sekery, motyky a iné predmety a pod zámienkou, že opravujú most, pozorne sledovali, čo sa dialo pri fare. Po odchode okresných činiteľov sa síce pokojne rozišli, ale bezpečnosť prípad aj tak vyšetrovala.⁶⁶

62 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 265. Správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Sabinov Františka Čirča na CO KNV v Prešove za obdobie 15. – 30. 8. 1950, Sabinov 4. 9. 1950.

63 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 6, inv. č. 330. Správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV v Giraltovciah Štefana Jurička na cirkevné oddelenie KNV v Prešove za druhú polovicu septembra 1950, Giraltove 29. 9. 1950.

64 SNA, f. SIÚC, šk. 220, inv. č. 138, č. sp. 4686/50 dôv. prípis Okresnej prokuratúry v Michalovciach na SIÚC v Bratislave vo veci zastavenia trestného stíhania Jána Fedorka a Michala Figlára, Michalovec 29. 11. 1950.

65 ŠA Košice, f. Krajský výbor Komunistickej strany Slovenska (ďalej iba KV KSS) v Košiciach (1948) 1949 – 1960, šk. 5, inv. č. 13. Zápisnica zo zasadnutia predsedníctva krajského výboru Komunistickej strany Slovenska v Košiciach, Košice 9. 5. 1950.

66 SNA, f. P-2, šk. 6, inv. j. 179. Ďalekopis Krajského veliteľstva Zboru národnej bezpečnosti v Košiciach na odbor Verejnej bezpečnosti Povereníctva vnútra v Bratislave vo veci Akcie „P“ a bezpečnostných opatrení v Košickom kraji, Košice 11. 5. 1950.

V Kráľovciach pôsobil gréckokatolícky kňaz Ján Leukanič. Dňa 7. mája 1950 okolo 17.00 hod. prišli za ním cirkevný tajomník JNV Košice Jozef Filakovský a kádrový referent na cirkevnom oddelení KNV v Košiciach Štefan Przybytovič, ktorí mu chceli dať podpísať „manifest“. Keďže vedeli, že auto by v obci mohlo vzbudiť pozornosť, nechali ho na okraji dediny a na faru sa vybrali pešo. Z fary im však v ústrety vyšla kňazova manželka. Oznámila im, aby prišli inokedy, pretože farár nie je doma. Zdržali sa tam krátko, asi 15 minút, ale aj to stačilo na to, aby sa pred farou zhromaždila skupina asi 30 ľudí rôzneho veku a pohlavia, prevažne však ženy. Ľudia na neželaných návštevníkov pokrikovali – podľa správy ich aj hanobili –, keďže boli presvedčení, že úradníci prišli po ich kňaza a chcú im zobrať aj chrám. Z davu ktosi vykrikoval, že márne čakajú na svoje auto odstavené pred dedinou, pretože ho už rozbili. Referenti si uvedomili, že dav sa rýchlo zväčšuje, preto z farského dvora prešli na cestu. Filakovský sa opýtal, či je v obci úrad predsedu MNV, na čo dostal odpoveď, že to veľmi dobre vie, lebo v obci už bol asi štyrikrát. Jeden muž v stredných rokoch po úradníckoch začal hádzať kamene. Pridali sa k nemu aj ďalší, takže dav úradníkov napadol a začal ich biť. Ktosi medzitým začal zvoniť na poplach, takže keď sa úradníci dali na útek smerom k obci Ploské, už ich prenasledovalo asi 150 ľudí, väčšinou ženy a deti. V Ploskom sa k prenasledovateľom pridali aj domáci z obce a početná skupina ich krikom sprevádzala po celej obci, kým neprišli k rieke Torysa. Referentom sa podarilo prejsť cez lávku a pokračovali smerom k ceste Prešov – Košice. Tam ich však čakalo 6 – 8 mládencov z Kráľoviec, ku ktorým sa pridalo aj niekoľko ľudí z Ploského, ktorí sledovali futbal na neďalekom ihrisku. Spoločne začali po úradníkoch hádzať kamene a potom ich biť, pričom niekto vytrhol Filakovskému tašku s úradnými spismi a časť z nich úplne roztrhal. Úradníkov ďalej prenasledovali takmer až po Budimír, kde ich zobralo auto. V Košiciach podali správu cirkevnému tajomníkovi KNV Jánovi Šuťákovi a Štátnej bezpečnosti. Záležitost' riešila aj bezpečnostná päťka. Dňa 10. mája 1950 v ranných hodinách KV SNB vzala na vyšetrovanie 21 osôb⁶⁷, ktoré boli najviac podozrivé z účasti na spomínanej udalosti. Vyšetrovanie prípadu

67 Bezpečnostný referent JNV v Košiciach Ján Turčáni síce v hlásení písal, že „následkom pobití bol Filakovský odvezený do nemocnice na ošetrovanie“, ale evidentne zveličoval, aby situáciu viac zdramatizoval a útočníkov ukázal v najhoršom svetle. Podľa rukopisných poznámok, pravdepodobne to bol konšpekt neskôr odoslanej správy, z obce Ploské bolo zatknutých 12 osôb a z obce Kráľovce 8 osôb. Archív mesta Košíc, f. Jednotný národný výbor v Košiciach 1949 – 1954, šk. 72, inv. č. 240. Správa bezpečnostného referenta JNV Košice Jána Turčániho za máj 1950, Košice 2. 6. 1950.

viedla KV ŠTB, pričom na celej akcii sa zúčastnilo 39 príslušníkov SNB.⁶⁸ Za obranu kňaza boli odsúdené dve ženy, ktoré si vo väzení odpykali šesť týždňov, a dvaja muži, ktorí vo väzení strávili jeden rok.⁶⁹

Podobnú skúsenosť ako Przybytovič mala aj Mária Haduchová, čo tiež predstavila na schôdzi KV KSS v Košiciach. Bola poslaná do Belže, kde tiež nenašla farára doma. Manželka kňaza jej povedala, že duchovný nie je doma, ale zároveň sa opýtala, či má po neho poslať, aby prišiel. Medzitým však poslala aj sluhu do dediny pre ľudí, že vraj im prišli zobrať kňaza. Zhromaždila sa skupina ľudí, ale situácia sa nevyostřila až natolko ako v Kráľovciach.⁷⁰ Aj tak však, podľa neskoršej správy, boli niektorí občania obce zatknutí.⁷¹

K „zhluknutiam“ dochádzalo aj v Prešovskom kraji. Boli obce, kde sa dарило tieto „zhluknutia“ kontrolovať, inde sa zasa vymkli spod kontroly. V okrese Michalovce došlo ku „zhluknutiam“ v Trhovišti, Falkušovciach, Šamudovciach, Strážskom a Iňačovciach;⁷² v okrese Stropkov to bolo v Miňovciach⁷³ a vo Valkove⁷⁴.

68 SNA, f. SIÚC, šk. 207, inv. č. 138. Správa referátu pre všeobecné veci vnútorné Krajského národného výboru v Košiciach na katolícke oddelenie kultového odboru Slovenského úradu pre veci cirkevné v Bratislave vo veci mimoriadnej správy o udalostiach v obci Kráľovce v súvislosti s podpisovaním manifestu Pravoslávnej cirkvi. Košice 9. 5. 1950; SNA, f. P-2, šk. 6, inv. j. 179. Ďalekopis Krajského veliteľstva Sboru národnej bezpečnosti v Košiciach na odbor Verejnej bezpečnosti Povereníctva vnútra v Bratislave vo veci Akcie „P“ a bezpečnostných opatrení v Košickom kraji, Košice 11. 5. 1950.

69 BABJAK, J.: *Zostali verní, II. zv.*, s. 75.

70 ŠA Košice, f. KV KSS, šk. 5, inv. č. 13. Zápisnica zo zasadnutia predsedníctva krajského výboru Komunistickej strany Slovenska v Košiciach, Košice 9. 5. 1950.

71 NA, f. SÚC, šk. 208, inv. č. 200. Prehľad o postoji gréckokatolíckych kňazov v kraji Košice, bez miesta a dátumu [pravdepodobne september alebo október 1950].

72 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 263. Cirkevno-politická správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Michalovce Jána Bánociho na SIÚC v Bratislave, zaslaná aj na vedomie CO KNV v Prešove, za obdobie 10. – 22. máj 1950, Michalovce 22. 5. 1950; Tiež ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 6, inv. č. 333. Správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV v Michalovciach Jozefa Halušku na cirkevné oddelenie KNV v Prešove o Akcii „P“ za obdobie 1. – 26. 10. 1950, Michalovce 26. 10. 1950.

73 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 270. Cirkevno-politická správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Stropkov Jána Širokého na SIÚC v Bratislave, zaslaná aj na vedomie CO KNV v Prešove, za obdobie 1. – 10. 6. 1950. Stropkov 10. 6. 1950; Tiež ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 6, inv. č. 323. Plán postupu práce v Akcii „P“ – situácia v III. obvode Gíraltovcie, okres Stropkov, bez miesta a dátumu.

74 Michal Ďurišin vyzval veriacich v chráme, aby ho stráždili. Keď za ním prišli funkcionári z okresu, došlo ku „zhluknutiu“, takže „museli ujsť, pritom niekoľkí boli aj zranení“.

Zaujímavá udalosť sa stala v piatok 12. mája 1950 na ONV vo Vranove nad Topľou. Prišli tam gréckokatolícki kňazi z okresu, ktorí boli pozvaní na pracovné stretnutie, kde sa od nich očakávalo podpisovanie manifestu. „Ve Vranově při tom došlo ke shluknutí asi 500 žen, které kně[ze] provázely do okresního města a čekaly na ně před budovou ONV. Když duchovní dlouho nevycházel, začaly se ženy chovat hrozivě a chtěly vniknout do budovy. Neodstrašilo je ani ostentativní nabíjení zbraní příslušníků SNB, ani vržení jedné slzotvorné pumy. Ježto ve městě byl trhový den a mohlo dojít ke krveprolití, pozvali soudruzi několik žen do místnosti, kde s duchovními bylo jednáno. Ženy se pak velmi rozčilovaly nad tím, že kněží si popíjeli víno a jedli maso v pátek, zatímco ony se vydávaly v nebezpečí. Pod dojmem těchto událostí bylo nutno schůzku s duchovními rychle ukončit, takže nebylo možno předložit již manifest k podpisu. Nálada při jednání s duchovními byla velmi srdečná, pouze jediný duchovní se otevřeně stavěl proti, takže se dalo předpokládat, že by mnoho ze 12 přítomných duchovních bylo manifest podepsalo.“⁷⁵ Keďže sa akcia s podpisovaním manifestu prakticky nepodariła, ONV vo Vranove vydal obežník, ktorým nielen upozorňoval na túto udalosť, ale zároveň aj pripomínal trestnoprávnu zodpovednosť za organizovanie takýchto „zhluknutí“: „Vysokí představitelia štátnej moci, ako aj zástupcovia ONV konštatovali, že iniciátormi tejto nepravnej skutočnosti boli naši bývalí gr. kat. farári. Nevyvodíme zatiaľ z toho žiadne dôsledky a konzekvencie, no, upozorňujeme veládostojných pánov farárov, že použijeme v budúcnosti všetky prostriedky, aby k podobným zhluknutiam ľudu nedošlo, a že urobíme všetky opatrenia, aby dôstojní páni farári nemali možnosť organizovať podobné neprístojnosti. Každého dôstojného pána farára budeme brať osobne na zodpovednosť za celkovú náladu veriacich na našich obciach a použijeme prísne trestné sankcie tam, kde by táto naša výzva nenašla dostatočného porozumenia.“⁷⁶

ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 6, inv. č. 323. Plán postupu práce v Akcii „P“ – situácia v III. obvode Giraltovce, Prešov 25. 11. 1950. V inej správe je uvedené, že ľudia na farskom dvore zaútočili palicami, pričom boli zranení dvaja politickí inštruktori z okresu. ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 6, inv. č. 323. Plán postupu práce v Akcii „P“ – situácia v III. obvode Giraltovce, okres Stropkov, bez miesta a dátumu.

75 NA, f. SÚC, šk. 208, inv. č. 200. Správa prednostu I. odboru zo Štátneho úradu pre veci cirkevné v Prahe Vladimíra Ekarta o aktuálnej situácii „prechodu“ gréckokatolíkov na pravoslávie na východnom Slovensku, Praha 18. 5. 1950.

76 ŠA Prešov – pobočka Vranov nad Topľou (ďalej iba p. VT), f. ONV Vranov nad Topľou 1949 – 1954 (ďalej iba ONV VT), prezidiálne spisy, 1950, šk. 54, inv. č. 136. Prípis vo forme obežníka duchovným vranovského okresu vo veci podpísania manifestu

Aj v okrese Prešov nebola situácia na poli cirkevnej politiky ideálna. Cirkevný tajomník JNV v Prešove Ján Novák koncom mája 1950 hlásil, že keď navštívil duchovných vo Fulianke a Okružnej, bol tam „*nebezpečne napadnutý občanmi*“.⁷⁷ V správe síce neuviedol ďalšie podrobnosti, ale podobnú skúsenosť mal aj referent cirkevného oddelenia JNV František Čirč. Keď navštívil farára Emila Kellöho v Okružnej, zbehli sa na jeho obranu veriaci. Podobne sa to stalo aj vo Fulianke, kde v ten istý deň chcel priviesť miestneho kňaza Hilára Ilkoviča autom do Prešova k predsedovi JNV. Ľudia ho však nepustili, vytiahli ho z auta a referentovi sa podarilo odísť autom iba vďaka šikovnosti. Z ľudí, ktorí sa postavili na ochranu kňaza, bolo šesť osôb zatknutých a napokon bol zatknutý aj farár Hilár Ilkovič.⁷⁸ Cirkevný tajomník JNV v Prešove písal, že ku dňu 17. júna situácia vo Fulianke bola už relatívne pokojná, lebo väčšia časť je so zatknutím kňaza „*pre majetkové záležitosti*“ spokojná.⁷⁹

Cirkevný tajomník Ján Vataha v správe o Akcii „P“ v okrese Sobrance 30. júla 1950 písal, že v obci Hlivišťa sa 28. júla stalo „*väčšie zhluknutie žien a mužov*“, pričom v obci aj naďalej trvá napätie.⁸⁰ Keď v obci navštívil spoločne s Teodorom Blašinom a Kornelom Michaličom gréckokatolíckeho kňaza Andreja Karcuba, ľudia duchovnému prišli na pomoc.⁸¹ Počas zatýkania Andreja Karcuba ho chceli veriaci (za hlavných „buričov“ boli považovaní Michal Olexa, Ján Lukáč, Michal Ferko, Mária Landovská

gréckokatolíckych duchovných a veriaciach prijatý na „sobore“ dňa 28. apríla 1950 v Prešove, Vranov [nad Topľou] 12. 5. 1950.

77 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, inv. č. 264, šk. 3. Informačná správa cirkevného tajomníka JNV Prešov Jána Nováka na SlÚC v Bratislave, zaslaná na vedomie aj CO KNV v Prešove, za obdobie 14. – 31. 5. 1950. [Prešov 31. 5. 1950 ?].

78 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 264. Správa o činnosti cirkevného oddelenia JNV v Prešove k 3. 6. 1950, Prešov 10. 6. 1950; SNA, f. SlÚC, šk. 213, inv. č. 138. Cirkevno-politická správa cirkevného oddelenia Krajského národného výboru v Prešove na Slovenský úrad pre veci cirkevné v Bratislave za obdobie 14. – 28. 6. 1950, Prešov 11. 7. 1950.

79 ŠA Prešov, f. Mestský národný (Jednotný národný) výbor v Prešove 1949 – 1954, šk. 8, inv. č. 8. Správa o činnosti cirkevného referátu JNV v Prešove ku dňu 17. 6. 1950.

80 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 267. Správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Sobrance Jána Vatahu na SlÚC v Bratislave, zaslaná aj na vedomie CO KNV v Prešove, za obdobie 10. – 30. 7. 1950 o Akcii „P“, Sobrance 30. 7. 1950.

81 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 267. Informačná správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV Sobrance Jána Vatahu na SlÚC v Bratislave, zaslaná aj na vedomie CO KNV v Prešove, za obdobie 10. – 30. 7. 1950, Sobrance 30. 7. 1950. Podľa Jána Babjaka to bolo „*asi 15 žien s palicami*“, ktoré sa s krikom postavili na obranu svojho duchovného. BABJAK, J.: *Zostali verní, II. zv.*, s. 524.

a Jozef Lendáč) brániť. Privolaným oddielom Štátnej bezpečnosti a SNB sa spoločnými silami podarilo situáciu opanovať. Spomenutí laici sa po zatknutí farára ukrývali v lese alebo na iných miestach, pričom dedinčania ich všemožne podporovali, takže príslušníkom bezpečnosti sa nedarilo ich zatknúť.⁸² Záležitosť bola nahlásená Okresnému veliteľstvu SNB v Sobranceiach a bezpečnostnému referátu v Prešove, ktoré udalosť ďalej vyšetrali.

Okres Vranov bol považovaný za jeden z „najreakčnejších“⁸³, preto pochopiteľne aj v tomto okrese dochádzalo ku „zhluknutiam“ veriacich. Dňa 24. októbra 1950 cirkevný tajomník Vasil Petrovský navštívil Jozefa Želinského, gréckokatolíckeho kňaza v Rudlove, ktorý radikálne odmietal „prechod“ na pravoslávie. Na faru sa za krátky čas zbehlo asi 50 osôb, muži, ženy a mládež, ktorí hlasno dávali najavo, že si nenechajú zobrať kňaza. Zdôrazňovali, že chcú zostať gréckokatolíckmi. V obci Petkovce cirkevný tajomník navštívil farára Michala Velikého. Na faru hneď prišlo veľa žien, ktoré „*stále vykrikovali, aby cirkevný tajomník opustil faru, že inak všetko najhoršie sa môže stať*“. Tajomník k prípadu poznamenal, že „*len ženy robili rámus, že im chcú pána zobrať*“.⁸⁴ Podobné situácie tajomník zažil aj v Poši a Davidove. Akcia „P“ v okrese podľa jeho názoru ani zďaleka nebola ukončená, práve naopak, pretože najmä medzi veriacimi sa neujala. Príčinu toho videl, podobne ako aj iní cirkevní tajomníci, v „reakčných“ gréckokatolíckych kňazoch, ktorí zostali na svojich farách a „*ľud pridržujú na starom a štvú proti terajším pokrokom*“. Riešenie videl v odstránení spomínaných kňazov a menovaní nových pravoslávnych vlasteneckých duchovných.⁸⁵ Zároveň vydal obežník pre všetky farské úrady v okrese,

82 ŠA Košice – pobočka Michalovce, f. ONV Sobrance 1945 – 1960, Tajné spisy 1950, šk. 72, inv. č. 77. Situačná správa referenta pre vnútro a bezpečnosť ONV Sobrance Jozefa Modráka na referát pre veci vnútorné a bezpečnosť KNV Prešov za september 1950, Sobrance 2. 10. 1950.

83 „*Ako vysvitá zo správ bezpečnosti, ako aj cirkevných tajomníkov, ukazuje sa, že práve vo Vranovskom okrese je stredisko odporu proti zjednoteniu.*“ NA, f. SÚC, šk. 208, inv. č. 200. Správa Štefana Gažika o prevedení inštrukčie ďalšieho postupu zjednotenia pravoslávia na východnom Slovensku, bez miesta a dátumu [pravdepodobne august 1950].

84 Podľa Jána Bánociho bola v Petkovciach hlavnou organizátorkou „zhluknutí“ Anna Ragančíková, rodená Danková. SNA, f. SlÚC, šk. 274, inv. č. 160, č. sp. 814/51 dôv. Prípís Jána Bánociho na SlÚC v Bratislave vo veci návštevy obce Petkovce, Michalovce 22. 3. 1951.

85 ŠA Prešov – p. VT, f. ONV VT, šk. 78, inv. č. 162. Správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV vo Vranove nad Topľou Vasilá Petrovského na KNV v Prešove o Akcii „P“ v okrese,

v ktorom okrem iného upozornil aj na „zhluknutia“ veriacich, ktoré škodia im samotným, a aj ich duchovnému: *„Na niektorých farách sa po príchode verejného orgánu z ONV a KNV, po prípade pri príchode auta sa ľud zhlu-kuje a vyhráža verejným orgánom. Táto vec škodí ako samým veriacim, taktiež duchovnému. Vzhľadom na konsolidáciu pomerov medzi veriacimi a duchovnými je aktuálne, aby podobné prípady sa neopakovali.“*⁸⁶

V okrese Michalovce boli farnosti, kde ani v druhej polovici novembra nebola situácia podľa predstáv štátnych úradov. Veriaci síce už podľa mienky cirkevného tajomníka nesledovali priebeh Akcie „P“, ale výnimky sa ešte našli, zvlášť v obciach Falkušovce a Markovce. Vo Falkušovciach gréckokatolícki veriaci vošli do chrámu po skončení svätej liturgie slúženej pravoslávnym duchovným. Podľa cirkevného tajomníka sa usilovali skaziť napravenú situáciu, teda prakticky vysloviť nesúhlas s násilnou pravoslavizáciou. Proti týmto osobám zakročila štátna moc, boli zatknuté a odsúdené, aby už k takýmto udalostiam v obci nedochádzalo. Oficiálne však tieto osoby boli odsúdené ako kulaci, pre nedodržanie predpísaných kontingentov. Aj v Markovciach došlo ku „zhluknutiu“ žien, ktoré podľa cirkevného tajomníka vyvolala manželka duchovného. Cirkevný tajomník sa stále sťažoval, že dochádza ku „zhluknutiam“ aj v iných obciach, vydal preto obežník, aby všetci funkcionári, keď prídu do obce autom, zaparkovali pred farou, aby si na to ľudia zvykali. V praxi však tento obežník nebol dodržiavaný, preto stále dochádzalo ku „zhluknutiam“.⁸⁷

Záver

Tento príspevok mal za cieľ predstaviť reakciu zainteresovaných strán, predovšetkým gréckokatolíckych laikov, na tzv. Prešovský sobor a jeho uznesenia. Pracovná konferencia delegátov návratových výborov síce bola zmenená na „veľký sobor“, ale to nemohlo automaticky nanútiť gréckokatolíkom, aby sa stali pravoslávni. Na „sobor“ totiž neboli pozvaní vladykovia Pavol Gojdič a Vasil Hopko, ktorí v tom čase už boli izolovaní Štátnou

Vranov nad Topľou 26. 10. 1950.

86 ŠA Prešov – p. VT, f. ONV VT, šk. 78, inv. č. 162. Obežník CO ONV Vranov pre všetky farské úrady v okrese, Vranov nad Topľou 25. 10. 1950.

87 ŠA Prešov, f. KNV CO, šk. 3, inv. č. 263. Správa cirkevného referenta ONV Michalovce Jozefa Halušku na CO KNV v Prešove za obdobie 15. – 30. 11. 1950. Michalovce 1. 12. 1950 a šk. 6, inv. č. 333. Správa cirkevného tajomníka ONV v Michalovciach Jozefa Halušku na cirkevné oddelenie KNV v Prešove o Akcii „P“ za obdobie 1. 7. – 26. 10. 1950, Michalovce 26. 10. 1950.

bezpečnosťou. Z gréckokatolíckych kňazov, ktorí sa „soboru“ zúčastnili, iba malá časť prišla dobrovoľne a jeho uzneseniam nevyjadrovali jasnú podporu. Vystúpenie z Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi bolo individuálnym rozhodnutím a často nebolo jasné, kto bol ešte gréckokatolíckym kňazom a kto už bol pravoslávny duchovný. Stávalo sa, že kňaz pred štátnymi úradmi a Pravoslávnu cirkvou vystupoval ako zjednotený duchovný, ale pred svojimi veriacimi sa prezentoval ako gréckokatolík. Keďže rozhodovanie veriacich často záviselo od postoja miestneho kňaza, respektíve s rozhodnutím kňaza sa stotožnili aj jeho farníci, ani postoje veriacich neboli jednoznačné. Je tiež dôležité si uvedomiť, že prakticky ani v jednej farnosti toto rozhodnutie nebolo jednoznačné, to znamená, že v každej farnosti sa našli veriaci za „prechod“ do Pravoslávnej cirkvi i proti nemu.

Komunisti a Pravoslávna cirkev dokázali osloviť predovšetkým gréckokatolíckych veriacich rusínskej a ukrajinskej národnosti, kde v mnohých farnostiach bol „sobor“ a jeho uznesenia prijaté bez väčších problémov. Jedným z dôležitých dôvodov bolo, že práve v týchto farnostiach gréckokatolícki duchovní podľahli tlaku a „prešli“ na pravoslávie.

Úplne iná situácia bola vo farnostiach, kde sa veriaci hlásili predovšetkým k slovenskej národnosti. Duchovní sa zdráhali prijať pravoslávie, veľká časť bola dokonca radikálne proti, čo pomohlo veriacim vydržať tlak štátnych úradov. Na tomto území žilo aj viac rímskokatolíkov, teda rodiny boli viac obradovo zmiešané, čo malo veľký vplyv na to, že gréckokatolíci sa mohli zúčastňovať na rímskokatolíckych bohoslužbách.

V archívnych dokumentoch nájdeme plány, podľa ktorých mala byť Akcia „P“ definitívne ukončená. Lenže tieto plány zlyhali. Likvidácia Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi nebola završená ani počas cyrilometodského odpustu v Michalovciach, nepomohlo ani založenie pravoslávnej eparchie v Michalovciach⁸⁸ a vysviacka bývalého gréckokatolíckeho kanonika na pravoslávneho vladyku. Keďže ani rok po Prešovskom „sobore“ sa komunistom nepodarilo definitívne zlomiť Gréckokatolícku cirkev, prišli k radikálnemu riešeniu nazvanému Akcia „P 100“⁸⁹, násilnému vysťahovaniu nezjednotených gréckokatolíckych kňazov a ich rodín do českého pohraničia. Ani toto Gréckokatolícku cirkev nezlomilo.

88 MANDZÁK, D. A.: Založenie pravoslávnej eparchie v priestoroch kláštora redemptoristov v Michalovciach. In: ADAM, J. – MOLNÁR, M. – STARJÁK, M. (Eds.): *Kresťanstvo v dejinách Zemplína. Zborník z rovnomennej vedeckej konferencie, konanej 17. – 18. septembra 2010 v Michalovciach*. Prešov\ 2011, s. 272 – 297.

89 Táto akcia dostala názov podľa predpokladaného počtu vyvezených kňazských rodín.

Komunisti boli svedkami ďalších prejavov nespokojnosti, ktoré boli zamerané na žiadosť o obnovu Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi.

Odpor gréckokatolíkov proti „soboru“ a jeho uzneseniam síce nebol ozbrojeným povstaním, nevyznieval ani nejako mohutne, ale bol dôležitým signálom nesúhlasu s proticirkevnou politikou vtedajšieho komunistického režimu. Komunisti a Pravoslávna cirkev tento odpor podcenili. Mysleli si, že časom sa situácia upokojí a veriaci sa budú zaoberať inými témami. Bola to čiastočne pravda, pretože nasledovali ďalšie udalosti ako napríklad zakladanie jednotných roľníckych družstiev, kde obyčajní ľudia stratili aj to málo, čo mali. Navonok už téma viery a príslušnosti ku konkrétnej cirkvi nebola na prvom mieste, čo však neznamenalo, že pre ľudí už nebola dôležitá. Opak bol pravdou, pretože aj napriek enormnej snahe komunistov a Pravoslávnej cirkvi, Akcia „P“ nebola nikdy dokončená. Po udalostiach tzv. Pražskej jari prišlo uznesenie vlády č. 205/1968 o povolení Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi a vládne nariadenie č. 70/1968 Zb. o jej hospodárskom zabezpečení zo dňa 13. júna 1968, ktoré boli výsledkom osemnásťročného zápasu duchovenstva a veriacich o svoju cirkev.

Summary

The first specific plans to destroy the Greek Catholics in Czechoslovakia were secretly prepared already in the autumn of 1949. The Communists in cooperation with the Orthodox Church prepared for the end of the February of 1950 the action „P“.

The working conference of the „Repatriating committees“ was organized in April 28th 1950 in Prešov. The conference was changed into a „Sobor – Synod“, which only externally „accepted“ the already prepared text of the Manifest to the Greek Catholic clergy and faithful in Czechoslovakia and decisions. According to the manifest, the Union with Rome was abolished and all the Greek Catholic clergy and the faithful were from that moment on members of the Orthodox Church. No attendance – list was done during the „Synod of Prešov“, which was in fact illegitimate and refused by the majority of the Greek Catholics. No one from those presented signed the manifest, and thus was not obliged to anything. The Communists understood their big mistake and consequently, after the „Synod“ forced Greek Catholics to sign the manifest. As a response to these activities, the faithful started to protect the clergy, parish houses and churches and resisted against the public agents, which in turn brought them persecutions and imprisonments.

The resistance of the Greek Catholics against the „Synod“ and its decisions was not a mass armed uprising, not only it looked massive, but it was an important signal of the disapproval with the antichurch politics of the then Communist regime. The Communists, together with the Orthodox Church underestimated this resistance, and thus the action „P“ was never successfully finished, and so the Greek Catholic Church was not liquidated.

Between the Compromise and the Disagreement: Reaction Forms of the Greek Ethnic Minority of the Soviet Ukraine to the Assimilation Policy of the Communist regime (1950 – 1980)

Sergii PAKHOMENKO

The condition of Greek ethnic minorities in the Soviet Ukraine from 1950 – 1980 has been studied in the article. The threats to the ethnic identity of the Greeks of Ukraine have been considered in conditions of the denationalisation and Russification policy of the Communist party. The forms of reaction of Greek intelligentsia to this policy have been shown; the main directions of social and cultural activity aimed at saving the Greek identity have been considered. It has been noted that the protest activity of representatives of Ukrainian Greek ethnos had ill-defined forms; it was limited by issues of ethno-cultural life and directed not against the Communist regime as a whole, but against its ethno-national policy. Only Raisa Moroz and Irina Goloborodko-Linardato, Greeks who took part in Ukrainian national and human rights movement, were exceptions.

The studies on anti-communist activities of ethnic minorities of the Soviet Ukraine are poorly represented in historiographical discourse. To a certain extent this situation arises from the fact that during this period of time there was no significant and widespread resistance, based on the ethnic factor. Nevertheless, some separate facts of dissent can be found, primarily related to the ethnic policy of the Soviet state, which was very important for the preservation of the ethnic identity of small nations. In this context, the case of the Greeks in Ukraine can illustrate a trend.

The Greek minority in Ukraine amounts to 91,500 people (0.2% of the total population of Ukraine) and they live compactly in the South-East of the country, in the Donetsk region, which is named Northern Priazov'e (Northern sea coast of Azov sea).¹

Greeks of Priazov'e represent a distinctive group in ethnic and cultural relations, which differ from other Greek Diasporas that have been historically formed in different countries. Greeks appeared in Priazov'e at the end of 18th century, when these territories were part of the Russian Empire. Greek inhabitants migrated from the Crimean Khanate on the Russian government's initiative. Two sub-ethnic groups of the Greek community were formed in Crimea; they differed on the basis of linguistics. They were rumeys (the original name of Greeks that speak a dialect similar to Modern Greek) and urums (that speak the Turkic dialect). These differences remained among Greeks after their migration to Priazov'e.

In the period of establishment of the Communist regime in the territory of the former Russian Empire, the territory of Priazov'e was included in Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which was one of republics of the USSR and had only nominal sovereignty. In the first years of Soviet authority (1920-the beginning of the 1930s) the Communist government of Ukraine held the policy of encouraging cultural development of national minorities including the Greeks of Priazov'e. They were allowed to study native language at schools, to found newspapers, folkloric and literary groups using the Greek-language presses. In the second half of the 1930s, due to the consolidation of Stalin's totalitarian regime, such policies were changed entirely. The term "national minority" was excluded from legislation and its representatives found themselves under persecution because of a farfetched pretext. So, by 1937 – 1938 more than 3,000 Greeks of Priazov'e were repressed, which was a heavy blow for such a small ethnic group.²

After Stalin's death in 1953 the ethnic policy of the Communist party, in spite of their release from a frankly repressive character, still saved the main priorities of Stalin's age. According to the logic of development of the command system that supposed the most centralised, unanimous structures, the main aim of national policy in that period did not include the realisation of the national and cultural needs of the USSR's numeral

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- 1 Pro kil'kist' ta sklad naselennya Ukraini za pidsumkami Vseukrainskogo perepisu naselennya 2001 r.: <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality>.
 - 2 NIKOESKIY, V. – BUT, A. – DOBROV, P. – SHEVCHENKO, V.: *Kniga pamjati grekov Ukraini*. Donetsk 2005, p. 6.

[154] Between the compromise and the disagreement: reaction forms of the Greek ethnic minority of the Soviet Ukraine to the assimilation policy of the Communist regime (1950 – 1980)

nations; it included formation of the sense of their community, identity, and the unification of national peculiarities.

It is important to specify the following threats to the ethnic identity of Ukrainian Greeks after the Second World War.

1) The Communist government ignoring their ethnic and cultural needs, and the implementation of de-ethnisation, new Russification and assimilation policies under the slogans of “the rise and approach” of nations and building a new historical community of the Soviet people.

In the post-war years, the non-structures of national and cultural development that were destroyed during Stalin’s terror – Greek schools, periodicals, national and cultural institutions, theatres, etc. – were renewed. De-ethnisation of the educational system, absence of national and cultural centres, and the introduction of new “socialist ritualism”, which were called up to supplant traditional national rituals, recreated the formation of national consciousness into a private affair on the family level without any practical meaning. Assimilation trends in Greek society became stronger. In 1926 81.4% of Ukrainian Greeks called Greek their native language, but by 1959 there were only 7.9%, in 1970 it was 6.7%, and in 1979 it was 8.5%.³ Language assimilation of Greeks was characterised by Russification, due to the Russian-speakers in industrial Priazov’e, the corresponding policy of the central government, and the high level of region urbanisation. Russian was considered as the language of international communication, as an instrument for drawing together the nations, and was one of the most important components of the concept of the “unitary soviet nation”. Use of languages of indigenous republics’ nationalities was limited, and the languages of ethnic minorities lost the majority of their social functions and became an instrument for communication at most at an everyday level. Due to all of this by 1959 Russian became the native language for 88.8% of Ukrainian Greeks, by 1970 for 90.5%, and by 1979 for 88.7%.

Renaming almost all settlements of the Priazov’e with historically Greek names was a display of the “internationalisation” of social life, and one of the means to influence the historical memory and consciousness of Greeks. Thus, Mariupol became Zhdanov (in honour of A. Zhdanov, Communist figure and companion-in-arms of Stalin), the village of Velyka Yanisol’ became Velyka Novoselivka, the village of Mala Yanisol’

3 *Itogi Vsesouznoy perepisi naselenia 1979 goda. T. 4. Nacionalnij sostav naselenia SSSR – souznh i avtonomnih respubliki, krayov, oblastey i nacionalnih okrugov. Kniga 2.* Moskva, 1989, p. 3.

became Kuybysheve, the village of Mangush became Pershotravneve, the villages of Sartana and Gurzuf received the same name of Prymors'ke. Though renaming was held at the end of the 1940s the authority continued to be sure in the expedience of this decision.

2) Widespread suppression of Greek identity because of its belonging to a low social class and fear of the possible return of repression.

The numbers show the absence of a Greek population increase and its decrease in quantity from 1970 – 1979 and 1979 – 1989. In 1926 104,700 Greeks lived in Ukraine (without Crimea),⁴ In 1959 there were 140,300 (with Crimea).⁵ And further the quantity of Greeks remained approximately at the same level. In 1970 106,900 Greeks lived in Ukraine (93,900 lived in the Donetsk region),⁶ in 1979 there were 104,100 (90,500),⁷ and in 1989 it was 98,600 (83,600).⁸ The effect of the ruling ideology and the socially prestigious nature of Russian culture caused the supplanting of national problems to the periphery of mass consciousness. First of all, this became apparent in the transition of Greeks (particularly of city residents) and their children to Russian, rarely to Ukrainian, identities.

The researchers qualify the situation as related to the realisation of social rights of ethnic minorities in the USSR in different ways. Kleyner says that there were secret instructions that limited the promotion of representatives of separate ethnic groups. At the same time, he recognises that in Soviet society there were no obstacles for self-realisation under the terms of loyalty to the regime and the absence of nationality demonstration.⁹ Terent'eva notes the existence of secret restrictions in Greeks and representatives of other ethnic minorities holding governing offices. At the

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- 4 TERENTYEAVA, N.: *Greki Ukraini: ekonomicheskaja I kulturno-prosvetitel'skaja deyatelnost (XVII - XX)*. Kyjiv 1999, p. 271.
 - 5 *Itogi Vsesouznoj perepisi naselenia 1959 goda. Ukrainskaja SSR*. Moskva 1963, p. 168.
 - 6 *Itogi Vsesouznoj perepisi naselenia 1970 goda. Nacionalnij sostav naselenia SSSR – souznh i avtonomnih respUBLIC, krayov, oblastey I nacionalnih okrugov*. Moskva 1970, pp. 152 – 173.
 - 7 *Itogi Vsesouznoj perepisi naselenia 1979 goda. T.4. Nacionalnij sostav naselenia SSSR – souznh i avtonomnih respUBLIC, krayov, oblastey i nacionalnih okrugov, Kniga. 2*. Moskva 1979, pp. 3 – 29.
 - 8 *Nacionalnij sostav naselenia SSSR. Po dannym Vsesouznoj perepisi naselenia 1989 goda / Gosudarstvennyy komitet SSSR po statistike*. Moskva 1991, pp. 78–80.
 - 9 KLEINER, I.: *Nacionalni problemi ostannjoi imperii (Nacionalne pytannya v CRCR ochima radyanskikh dissidentiv)*. Paris 1978, p. 25.

same time, there are known examples of the successful careers of persons with Greek nationality.¹⁰

3) Interpretation of most manifestations of national identity as hostile, nationalist and anti-communist.

In 1968, Maria Gaytan, the Director of the palace of culture of the village of Prymors'ke (Sartana), started trying to recreate Sartana's folk group that had existed in the 1930s and the inhabitants supported her efforts. "Sartans'ki samotsvity" (the name of this group) sang historical songs, lullabies, ballads, and songs with poems by Shapurma, Kir'yakov and Papush, who were all Greek poets. The group had strongly pronounced the national colouring that determined certain conflicts of its directorate with local authority. So, in 1968 the Village Council made the decision to dismiss Gaytan from the office of palace of culture "because of the dis-integration of ideological work".¹¹

Also, Gaytan protested against falsification in the census of the population in 1970, when bodies that took the census consciously ignored Greek identity, and Greeks by descent were put down as Russians. Gaytan with Eduard Khadzhunov, a scientist of folklore, addressed this with party bodies and the press. However, the results of such activity gained negative attention. Gaytan and Khadzhunov were called to the KGB (the Committee of National Security) for "preventive conversations" and accused of "nationalism"; Khadzhunov was dismissed from his office in the school.¹²

In the context of such attitudes to ethnic and national themes any statement or recollection concerning the national problem was the reason for immediate accusations of nationalism or persecution. It is important to emphasise that representatives of the Ukrainian national movement, human rights activists and non-conformists, such as Levko Lukyanenko, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Petro Grygorenko, Ivan Svitlychnyy, Oleksa Tyhyy, etc., in their letters to party leaders and samizdat (dissident activity) works spoke in support of the national rights both of Ukrainians and

10 TERYTYEVA, N. – BALABANOV, K.: *Greki Ukraini: istoria ta suchasnist'.* Navchalnij posibnyk dlya vyshyh navchalnyh zakladiv. Kyjiv 2008, p. 175.

11 Derzhavnyy arkhiv Doneckoy oblasti (further only DADO), fond P - 3071. *Ispolkom poselkovogo soveta poselka Primorskoe goroda Zhdanova*, opis 1., sprava. 234. Protokoly zasedanij ispolkoma poselkovogo soveta poselka Primorskoe goroda Zhdanova za 1968 god, p. 123.

12 KHADZHUNOVA, O. – GAYTAN, M. G.: *Zhizneopisanie zasluzhennyh grekov Ukrainy.* Mariupol 2009 pp. 110 – 112.

of other ethnic groups in Ukraine.¹³ So, in 1979 Oleksa Tyhyy, a literary man in Donetsk, who later was accused and convicted of raising national problems in his appeals to party leaders, artistic and public works, wrote: “*National issue in Donetsk region is not solved, it will be solve only when every Ukrainian will be conscious person who is the part of nation, when friendly foreigner (Greeks, Jews, German) will have their national and cultural communities, newspapers, books in their native language, schools*”.¹⁴

Separate representatives of Greek creative intelligentsia tried to counter these threats. These attempts were characterised both by seeking compromises with the regime and by certain demonstrations of disagreement with its policy. This activity showed itself in the following way.

1. Aspiration to adjust to the officially permitted rules of cultural creativity (so-called “socialist realism”) in the literature to have an opportunity to publish works in the Greek language. Partially, they succeeded to do it.

Leontiy Kyryakov and Anton Shapurma, Greek writers, were officially recognised by authority; they were published permanently, but mainly in Russian. Communist themes in their creative work, and the glorification of Lenin and the Soviet authority, were especially encouraged. It is this collection, which was dedicated to the 100 year anniversary of Lenin’s birth that became the single work of Greek poets published not in translation but in their native language during the end of 1930s to the end of the 1980s.¹⁵

2. Ignoring the Communist ideology in their sphere of culture, and attempting to demonstrate their belonging to the Greek ethnic culture through both their official and informal activities.

It was typical that the above-mentioned activity of Maria Gaytan, the scientific work of Eduard Khadzhynov, a linguist and folklorist, partly for the work of artists Lelya Kuz’menkova and Valentina Konstantinova that such behavior was suppressed. People who demonstrated it were discharged from their jobs and were put under the control of security services.

3. Activity of informal ethnic-culture group (writers, journalists, artists) in Mariupol, which held meetings in private apartments and country cottages, where they discussed the problem of the preservation of Greek

13 RAFALSKIY, O.: *Nacional’ni menshini Ukraini u XX st.: istoriografichnyi naris*. Kyjiv, p. 128.

14 TYHYIY, O.: *Dumky pro ridny doneckiy kray*. Donbass 1999, p. 20.

15 BALABANOV, K. – PAKHOMENKO, S.: *Nacionalno- kulturne ta gromadske zhyttya grekiv Ukraini u drugiy polovyni XX – na pochatku XXI st*. Mariupol 2006, p. 46.

[158] Between the compromise and the disagreement: reaction forms of the Greek ethnic minority of the Soviet Ukraine to the assimilation policy of the Communist regime (1950 – 1980)

culture and some creative issues; they also criticised the policy of the Communist Party as related to the ethnic question.

The scientific plan of the Greek nation created by Khadzhyinov at the end of the 1960s may be considered as a complete enough concept of the Greeks of Priazov'e revival. It enclosed practically all spheres of cultural and social life. Several of its provisions were implemented at the beginning of the 1990s, such as the foundation of national and cultural organisations, schools studying Modern Greek, ethnographic museums, publication of dictionaries, works of national literature and folklore, and returning villages to their historical names.¹⁶

However, *The scientific plan of the Greek nation* was not like the generally recognised action program for national intelligentsia. It was a vision of the development of Greek ethnos given by one of its representatives. Separate tasks were more urgent among activists of national culture, where literary men created the core. The foundation of Greek periodicals and the possibility of publishing in the native language was the main task.

It is important to underline the absence of social and political accents in the Greek cultural movement. Returning to the principles of Lenin's national policy, with which Hellenisation in the 1920s – 1930s was associated, was the single claim of activists of the Greek culture of Priazov'e to authority (besides, it was not fixed in any document, it was spoken during private meetings). This period of ethnos history was the stuff of dreams and the hopes of national intelligentsia in the post-war years till the beginning of 1990. In the consciousness of intelligentsia it was idealised as a myth.

4) Mass signature-collecting campaign to support the establishment of learning the Greek language in the Greek villages in the Donetsk region. The campaign was organised in 1985, but was not crowned with success.

In 1985 Maria Gaytan, the Director of "Sartanski samotsvity" initiated in the village of Prymorske (Sartana) the collection of signatures on for a letter to the Ministry of Education of the USSR with a request to organise the studying of Greek. The workers of the Regional Authority of Education, along with Communist party workers, during meetings with village inhabitants, tried to convince the community of the absence of

16 KHADZHUNOVA, O.: Ocherk o zhyzni i deyatelnosti E. V. Khadzhyunova. In: *Elliny Ukrainy*, 1998, No. 5, p. 4.

any prospect of studying the national language and compelled them from starting further petitions for this issue.¹⁷

The first public demonstrations of anti-communist activity in Greek society began at the end of the 1980's, the time of Gorbachev's perestroika. Then the Greeks joined a number of democratic and ecological movements in the region including movements in Mariupol. A specific character of the participation in these movements consisted of placing an emphasis on the requirements of the free cultural advancement of Greek life.

A Greek national organisation (the Mariupol Greek Community) was founded in Mariupol in 1989 on the basis of general democratic movement "For a clean Mariupol", that together with problems of ecological security demanded that power structures return Zhdanov to its historical name. A specific character of the participation in these movements consisted of placing an emphasis on the requirements of the free cultural advancement of Greek life.

The Mariupol Greek Community's first meetings were held semi-legally, in private apartments, where its representatives were watched. The organisation, representatives of which took part in anti-communist moves in Mariupol and demonstrated their opposition to the local authority, did not receive juridical registration.¹⁸

Practically from the first days of its existence the organisation started active operation, directed at the integration of Greek community, the realisation of ideas of national and cultural revival, in particular of national education revival. By then this organisation had received the status of being a basic primary institute of national and cultural movement of ethnic Greeks.

The activity of participants of the Ukrainian dissident movement, who are of Greek origin, takes absolutely special place in context of this theme. Though some of them were from Priazov'e, they had no connection with the cultural movement of Priazovian Greeks. Under their circumstances of living, these people were found in different regions of the Ukraine and were engaged in human rights movements. This way, Raisa Moroz (native Lefterova) left her native Priazovian Greek village Velika Karakuba in 1955 after graduating from school to study at Lviv State University. She

17 DADO, Fond 326, opis 136., sprava 13. Protokol No. 26 Plenuma Doneckogo oblastnogo komiteta Kommunisticheskoy partii Ukraini, 23. 11. 1989 goda., pp. 51 – 52.

18 KONOP, V.: *Mariupolskomu grecheskomu obshestvu – 10 let: istoricheskaya spravka*. Mariupol 1999, p. 4.

got involved in Ukrainian culture quickly. In Lviv she became acquainted with a historian and future dissident called Valentin Moroz and they got married. With her husband and his friend she joined the Ukrainian national idea and became an active participant of the Ukrainian national movement.¹⁹ Moroz was the author of many underground works in which he criticised the Communist regime and the Soviet leader's personality cult, as well as the denationalisation policy of the Soviet government. For anti-Soviet activity and propaganda Moroz was sentenced to nine years of imprisonment. Despite this, Raisa didn't leave her husband and supported him in every way that she could. With help of her friends (dissidents) she distributed samizdat works and was even interviewed by Western journalists at a private flat in Moscow. In the interview she talked about the destiny of her husband and the violation of human rights in the USSR where she had been fired from work, watched over, and her relatives were pressured.

The interview had worldwide resonance. In Canada, the USA, Australia, Argentina, and other countries committees were created devoted to the protection of Valentine Moroz. Andrey Sakharov, the Soviet physicist and human rights activist, even stood up for him.²⁰

Finally, within the scope of international détente policy between the USA and the USSR, it was agreed to interchange 5 political prisoners of the Communist regime, including Moroz, for two Soviet UN officers who were accused of spying and sentenced to long terms. The exchange took place on the nights of 27 to 28 April 1979 in New York at John F. Kennedy International Airport. Subsequently, Raisa Moroz left the USSR with her husband. Having settled in New York, she immediately joined in with human rights activities. From 26 to 29 September 1979 Petro Grygorenko, Nadiya Svitlichna and Raisa Moroz gave testimonial evidence on political victimisation in the Ukraine, at the international proceedings of Sakharov. Invited by Ukrainian organisations she went to America and Canada, where she talked about the destiny of Ukrainian political prisoners and the terrible atmosphere in Ukraine.

From 1980, Moroz worked for the Ukrainian socio-political journal *Suchasnist* and as a non-staff correspondent of *Voice of America*.

In her works, Moroz talked about the colonial situation of the Ukraine within the USSR, the fate of Ukrainian political prisoners, and reported

19 OVSIENKO, V. – MOROZ, R.: <http://archive.khpg.org/index.php>

20 MOROZ, R.: *Proty vitru. Spogady druzhyny ukrainskogo polityvaznyia*. Lviv 2005.

on the translations of their works and appeals to foreign languages. She was the only one who for 50 years from the late 1930s to the end of the 1980s drew the attention of the general public using Western assimilative processes among its native people – the Azov Greeks.

In 1980 in the journal *Suchasnist* Moroz pointed to the Ukraine's lack of Greek schools, national centres, that youth don't know the national language and traditions, and summed up the situation with a disturbing conclusion: "*Catastrophic trends continue for the Greek minority. That's the way 'the flowering' of nations and national languages looks for socialism*".²¹

Another Greek woman – Irina Goloborodko-Linardato was one of the founders of the Odessa department of a Ukrainian human rights organisation – the Ukrainian Helsinki group. Goloborodko was born in Crimea; despite the fact that the majority of Crimean Greeks had moved to Priazov'e in the 18th century a small group of Greeks were joined by new expatriate Greeks in the late 19th - early 20th century.

In the years of Communist rule the fate of the Crimean Greeks, too, was tragic. In 1944, on the orders of Stalin, they were deported from Crimea to Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the South Urals.²² As a child Goloborodko was deported and after Stalin's death she returned to Ukraine, moved to Odessa and worked as a doctor in Critical Care Medicine.²³

In the second half of the 1970s, Goloborodko joined the Odessa department of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and, in the beginning of perestroika, became a founding member of the Odessa Branch of Narodnyy Rukh Ukraini – a socio-political movement of the national-democratic orientation, which was the main opposition force of the Communist government in the Ukraine.²⁴

Thus, excluding Raisa Moroz and Irina Goloborodko, the representatives of the general Ukrainian dissident movement for human rights, the opposition activity of the Greek ethnic groups had inexpressive forms and

21 MOROZ, R.: Z zhyttya nacionalnyh menshostey Ukrainy: Greky. In: *Suchasnist. Almanah (literatura, mystectvo, suspilne zhyttya)*. New York 1980, p. 12 and pp. 77 – 78.

22 BALABANOV, K. – PAKHOMENKO, S.: *Nacionalno- kulturne ta gromadske zhyttya grekiv Ukraini*, p. 23.

23 KOLTUNOVA, V.: *Nuzny li chynovnikam zhurnalisty? Eshe kak! Tolko zdorovyel!*. See URL <http://zahvat.net/15/3389/>

24 MAKSIMOVICH, V.: *Kak vse nachinalos v Odesse. V oznamenovanie 20-letia Narodnogo Ruha Ukraini*. See URL http://politikym.net/asosiasia/kak_vse_nachinalos.htm

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was limited to cultural life, and generally the activity wasn't against the Communist regime, but against its ethno-national policy.

Conclusion

- 1) The nature of Soviet ethnic policy after WWII – in particular, its course towards “*convergence and merging of the nations*” and creating “*a unified entity of the Soviet people*” – resulted in effectively “erasing” the issue of ethnic minorities from both legal and political spheres through an almost complete disregard for their need to maintain ethnically centered cultural and political practices. It negatively impacted the ethnic identity of the Greek people in Soviet Ukraine, thus encouraging assimilation tendencies within their community.
- 2) The attempts made by individual members of the national intelligentsia to bring the issue of Greek identity into the public arena and restore some of the elements of their cultural infrastructure were prevented by the Communist party.
- 3) Under such conditions, the officially approved forms of cultural expression for the Greeks of Ukraine were quite fragmented; they were forced to conform to the criteria and norms of the so-called international social culture (especially characteristic of literary creations). Thus, Greek culture was supported only through the efforts of a small albeit nationally conscious group within the community.
- 4) Centers of ethnic and cultural life in the form of gatherings maintained by prominent personalities within the local Greek communities did not take on a more stable organisational structure. In turn, the demands, objectives and activities of the members of the national intelligentsia did not transcend their cultural context and become oppositional and socio-political in nature.
- 5) The liberalisation of both social and political life in the late 1980s resulted in a surge of activity within the Greek community: it underwent further ethnic consolidation, which was expressed by establishing civic associations and openly articulating the dissatisfaction with the national and cultural situation of Greeks in Ukraine.
- 6) Among the Greek intelligentsia in Ukraine, Raisa Moroz and Irina Goloborodko-Linkordato deserve a special mention as active participants of the Ukraine's national and human rights movement. By virtue of circumstances they found themselves disconnected from the Greek community in the region of Northern Asov, and thus were out of touch

with the centre of the Greek cultural movement. However, they realised their civic potential and democratic beliefs by taking an active role in the activities of Ukrainian dissidents, but at the same time remembering and honoring their Greek roots.

Resumé

Tento článok skúma podmienky gréckej etnickej komunity na sovietskej Ukrajine v období od druhej polovice 40. rokov po 80. roky minulého storočia. Hrozbou pre etnickú identitu Grékov na Ukrajine boli podmienky politiky denacionalizácie a rusifikácie, ktorú realizovala komunistická strana. Poukazujeme na formy reakcie gréckej inteligencie, na hlavné smery spoločenskej a kultúrnej činnosti, ktorej cieľom bolo zachovať grécku identitu. Poznávame, že protestná činnosť zástupcov ukrajinského gréckeho etnika mala nesprávne definované formy; obmedzovala sa iba na etnicko-kultúrny život a nebola namierená proti komunistickému režimu ako takému, ale proti jeho etnicko-národnostnej politike. Výnimkou boli iba Raisa Moroz a Irina Goloborod'ko-Linardato, Grékyne, ktoré sa zúčastnili Ukrajinského hnutia za národné a ľudské práva.

Osobitosti opozičného hnutia na Ukrajine v kontexte protikomunistického odboja v krajinách strednej a východnej Európy (v 60. a 80. rokoch 20. storočia)

Anatolij KLJUČKOVIČ

Problematika ukrajinského opozičného hnutia v rokoch 1960 – 1980 až donedávna takmer nemala vyhliadky na dostatočné vysvetlenie v domácej vede. Do začiatku „perestrojky“ v ZSSR oficiálna sovietska historiografia sa snažila ignorovať fakt opozičného hnutia, veľmi naliehavo presvedčujúc občanov a medzinárodné spoločenstvo, že na Ukrajine, rovnako ako v celom ZSSR nemôže existovať žiadna opozícia. Len s utvrdením ukrajinskej štátnosti nastala zmena ideologických vektorov a stereotypov a problematika opozičného hnutia našla svoje právoplatné miesto vo vedeckých výskumoch. Činnosť ukrajinského opozičného hnutia našla mnohostranné vysvetlenie v dielach G. Kasjanova¹, A. Rusnačenka², V Zacharova³, O. Bažana⁴, Y. Danyľuka⁵ a ďalších.

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- 1 KASJANOV, H.: *Nezhodni: ukrajinska intelihencija v rusi oporu 1960-1980-ch rokov*. Kyjiv 1995.
 - 2 RUSNAČENKO, A. M.: *Nacionalno-vyzvolnyj ruch v Ukrajinu seredyna 1950-ch – pochatok 1990-ch rokov*. Kyjiv 1998.
 - 3 ZACHAROV, B.: *Narys istoriji dysydentskoho ruchu v Ukrajinu (1956-1987 roky) / Charkivska pravozachysna hrupa*. Charkiv 2003.
 - 4 BAŽAN, O. H.: Opozycijnyj ruch v Ukrajinu v umovach systemnoji kryzy SRSR. In: *Istorija Ukrajinu. Malovidomi imena, podiji, fakty*. Kyjiv 2005, č. 31, s. 189 – 199.
 - 5 BAŽAN, O. H. – DANYLJUK, J. Z.: Opozycja v Ukrajinu (druha polovyna 50-ch-80-ti rr. XX st.). Kyjiv 2000.

Obdobie rokov 1960 – 1980 má osobitné miesto vo vývoji opozičného hnutia na Ukrajine, lebo sa pokračovalo v predošlých tradíciách opozičného boja a charakterizuje sa aktivizáciou rôznych foriem protiporiadkovej činnosti pod vplyvom vnútorných a vonkajších faktorov. Medzi hlavné vnútorné podmienky aktivizácie opozičného hnutia v rokoch 1960 – 1980 patria: politický smer sovietskeho vedenia na čele s Leonidom Brežnevom, ktorého účelom bolo redukovanie procesu destalinizácie sovietskej spoločnosti; takmer nešťatný štatus Ukrajiny v rámci Sovietskeho zväzu; rusifikácia a útok na kultúrny a duchovný život ukrajinskej spoločnosti; významné nedostatky v sociálno-ekonomickej politike KSSZ.

Významnú úlohu pri formovaní opozície zohrávali aj vonkajšie faktory, ako napríklad: globálne procesy dekolonizácie v rokoch 1950 – 1960; silné medzinárodné hnutie za ľudské práva; antikomunistické prejavy v krajinách „socialistického tábora“ strednej a východnej Európy, najmä v Maďarsku, Československu, NDR, Poľsku a iných.

Základnými smermi opozičného hnutia v ZSSR počas rokov 1960 – 1980 boli: národno-oslobodenecký, národno-kultúrny, hnutie na obranu ľudských práv, hnutie za sociálne a ekonomické práva, náboženské hnutia. Tieto smery sa často zásadovo prelínali a všetky mali vplyv na podlamovanie základov sovietskeho systému. Okrem toho, súbor smerov ukrajinského opozičného hnutia je typologicky podobný opozičnému boju v krajinách strednej a východnej Európy v rokoch 1950 – 1980.

Významné miesto v dejinách opozičného hnutia je venované národno-oslobodeneckému hnutiu za obnovenie nezávislosti Ukrajinského štátu, ktoré sa nezastavovalo po nástupe sovietskej moci na území Ukrajiny. V ukrajinskom oslobodeneckom hnutí vynikal radikálny smer, ktorý bol založený na programových dokumentoch OUN – UPA (Organizácie ukrajinských nacionalistov a Ukrajinskej povstaleckej armády). Tento smer predstavovali také podzemné (ilegálne) organizácie, ako Ukrajinský národný výbor (1956 – 1961), Ukrajinská nacionalistická organizácia Stepana Bandery (1958 – 1961), Chodorivská skupina (1960 – 1961), Ukrajinská národná strana (1961 – 1962), Ukrajinský národný front (1964 – 1967), Zväz ukrajinskej mládeže Galyčina (1972 – 1973), Homin (1973), Armáda (1974) a ďalšie.⁶ Ich aktivity mali do značnej miery anonymný charakter, uskutočňovali sa prostredníctvom rozširovania letákov, národnej symboliky. Tieto tajné nacionalistické organizácie sa zakladali

6 BAŽAN, O. H.: Opozycijnyj ruch v Ukraini v umovach systemnoji kryzy SRSR, s. 191.

na antikomunistických pozíciách, aj keď programové požiadavky niektorých z nich boli trochu v rozpore s uznávanými demokratickými normami (napr. budovanie mononárodného štátu alebo vhodnosť akýchkoľvek teroristických úkonov na sovietskych vodcov). Podzemné (tajné) hnutie nebolo zastavené od času OUN až do konca 80. rokov – doby „perestrojky“. Počas tohto obdobia boli odkryté stovky podzemných organizácií, ale mnoho prípadov ostalo nevyriešených.⁷

Národno-kultúrny smer opozičného hnutia je zastupený v prvom rade hnutím tzv. „šesťdesiatnikov“. „Šesťdesiatnici“ – sú zástupcovia sovietskej a ukrajinskej inteligencie, ktorí sa prebudili v dôsledku „chruščovského odmäku“ a predstavovali svojráznu morálnu opozíciu voči sovietskemu totalitnému režimu. Šesťdesiatnici boli vo svojich prejavoch a dielach proti rusifikácii, bránili národný jazyk a kultúru, slobodu umeleckej tvorby. K slávnym šesťdesiatnikom patrili L. Kostenko, V. Simonenko, I. Svitlyčný, I. Dziuba, I. Drač, M. Vingranovský a iní. Svoje názory a protesty národno-kultúrna opozícia šírila prostredníctvom kníh a časopisov (Sloboda a vlasť, Ukrajinský vestník), ktoré si sami tlačili, činnosti klubov, usporiadania konferencií, literárnych večerov (Ševčenkove dni, večer pamäti Lesi Ukrajinky, Ivana Franka) a iné. Aktívne sa používali také spôsoby vplyvu, ako zasielanie písomných žiadostí, petícií na vyššie orgány vlády ZSSR a medzinárodných organizácií.

Od roku 1963 vláda začala útok na šesťdesiatnikov v tlači, na schôdzkach rôznych spolkov a zhromaždení. Mnohí boli zatknutí a potrestaní dlhodobým odňatím slobody (I. Svitlyčný, V. Stus, V. Marčenko atď). Do začiatku 1970 bolo hnutie „šesťdesiatnikov“ potlačené. Od polovice 60. rokov začali šesťdesiatnici formovať politickú opozíciu voči komunistickému režimu a čoskoro sa stali aktívnymi členmi disidentského hnutia za ľudské práva na Ukrajine.

Porážka hnutia šesťdesiatnikov na začiatku 70. rokov prinútila účastníkov odporového hnutia, ktorí zostali na slobode, premýšľať o obnovení bojových taktík. Príležitosti na takéto zmeny sa objavili potom, čo bol v Helsinkách 1. augusta 1975 podpísaný Záverečný akt Konferencie o bezpečnosti a spolupráci v Európe, čoskoro zverejnený v ZSSR. Občania sa dozvedeli o medzinárodných záväzkoch svojich vlád z humanitných otázok, najmä pokiaľ ide o ľudské práva. To dalo impulz k zaktivizovaniu legálneho hnutia za ľudské práva.

7 ZACHAROV, B.: *Narys istoriji dysydentskoho ruchu v Ukrajinii (1956-1987 roky)*, s. 84.

Smer odporového hnutia na obranu práv na Ukrajine bol zastúpený predovšetkým Ukrajinskou helsinskou skupinou (UHS), ktorá bola založená v roku 1976. Jej členmi boli – M. Rudenko, P. Grigorenko, L. Lukjanenko, I. Kandyba, O. Meško atď. UHS zverejňovala memorandá, deklarácie, oslovenia, v ktorých sa pozdvihovali pred ukrajinským a svetovým spoločenstvom dôležité otázky ľudských práv a slobôd, obrany národných práv, otázky ukrajinskej štátnosti, demokratizácie spoločnosti. Špecifikum UHS je kombinácia dvoch smerov: národno-oslobodenecký a obrana ľudských práv. Podľa G. Kasjanova môže byť činnosť UHS hodnotená ako svojrázna záverečná etapa vývoja odporového hnutia 60. – 80. rokov 20. storočia na Ukrajine.⁸

UHS sa líšila od predchádzajúcich predstaviteľov opozície tým, že po prvé, bola legálnou občianskou organizáciou a po druhé, bola v kontakte s podobnými skupinami po celom Sovietskom zväze s cieľom „internacionalizovať“ ochranu občianskych a národných práv. Avšak ani umiernenosť a otvorenosť UHS, ani požiadavky západných krajín dodržiavať záväzky, ktoré ZSSR získal po Helsinskej dohode, nezabránili sovietskej vláde opäť použiť represie proti disidentom. Podľa G. Kasjanova bol vrchol opozície ukrajinských obrancov ľudských práv voči sovietskej vláde v roku 1979.⁹ Do roku 1980 bola väčšina členov UHS uväznená, niektorí z nich boli vyhnaní zo ZSSR. Porážka UHS ukázala na nutnosť prechodu opozičného hnutia na novú úroveň boja, ktorá by sa odlišovala sformovanou organizačnou štruktúrou a presne stanoveným akčným programom. Zrealizovalo sa to v druhej polovici 80. rokov.

Spoločnou črtou helsinských organizácií ako v ZSSR, tak aj v krajinách strednej a východnej Európy bola sociálno-triedna obmedzenosť, v ktorej prevládali zástupcovia inteligencie, a nestrannosť účastníkov, čo neumožňovalo hnutiu prerásť do masového.

V rokoch 1960 – 1980 bolo na Ukrajine aktívne hnutie za sociálne a ekonomické práva, čo sa prejavilo vo forme štrajku a založení odborov. Podľa A. Rusnačenka bolo v roku 1960 šesť štrajkov, v roku 1962 deväť a v roku 1963 spolu 15 štrajkov. Celkový počet účastníkov štrajku neprekročil 5 000 ľudí v období od 1956 do 1983.¹⁰ Štrajkujúci nemali za úlohu bojovať za reformu hospodárskej a sociálnej politiky v ZSSR,

8 KASJANOV, H.: *Nezhodni: ukrajinska intelihencija v rusi oporu*, s. 177.

9 Tamže, s. 167.

10 RUSNAČENKO, A. M.: *Nacionalno-vyzvolnyj ruch v Ukraini seredyna 1950-ch – pochatok 1990-ch rokov*. Kyjiv 1998, s. 236.


ale za lepšie pracovné podmienky, zvýšenie mzdy, výhod a iné. V rámci robotníckeho opozičného hnutia vznikli a konali nezávislé odbory (Asociácia voľného odboru obrany zamestnancov či Slobodné medziodborné združenie pracovníkov). Rozsah ich činnosti bol oveľa skromnejší ako v iných socialistických krajinách strednej a východnej Európy. Popri tom, že ukrajinské robotnícke a odborové hnutie malo tzv. „doháňajúci“ charakter voči krajinám „socialistického tábora“, zodpovedal pre tieto krajiny typickému modelu prerastania sociálno-ekonomických požiadaviek pracovníkov do politických motívov.

Ďalšou formou „antiporiadkového protestu“ bola náboženská opozícia. Formálne sovietska vláda uznávala slobodu vierovyznania, ale prakticky sa režim uchýľoval k celému radu opatrení na boj proti náboženskému vierovyznaniu a praxe. V dôsledku štátnej politiky pre oblasť náboženstva a cirkvi boli zástupcovia pravoslávnych, katolíckych a protestantských spoločností, ktoré šíрили samostatne vydávanú náboženskú literatúru, vykonávali tajné obrady pre veriach, apelovali na svetovú verejnú mienku, v opozícii voči režimu. Ak v socialistických krajinách strednej a východnej Európy boli rôzne náboženské inštitúcie do roku 1970 zlegalizované a pôsobili otvorene, tak v ZSSR sa to začalo až počas „perestrojky“ v druhej polovici 80. rokov.

V období 1960 – 1980 boli hlavné opozičné sily sústredené v západných a centrálnych ukrajinských oblastiach, hoci geografia opozičného hnutia mala celoštátny charakter (mapa).

Opozičné hnutie na Ukrajine malo jasne sformulované protiporiadkové antikomunistické a národno-oslobodenecké štátotvorné zložky. V tom spočíva jeho ideologická zložitosť a zásadná odlišnosť od opozičného hnutia v krajinách strednej a východnej Európy, pretože tam bol predovšetkým antikomunistickým, pretože štátna nezávislosť už existovala. Ukrajinskí predstavitelia opozície mali vždy túžbu neustále skúmať svoju vlastnú antirežimovú činnosť v rámci antisystémového boja národov utláčaných komunizmom v Maďarsku, Československu, Poľsku a inde.

V rokoch 1960 – 1980 sa opozičnému hnutiu na Ukrajine, a to napriek represiám, podarilo udržať všeobecné tendencie, zamerané na politické, duchovné a kultúrne obrodenie národa. Pritom opozícia nemala žiadnu jednotnú organizačnú štruktúru, žiadny ucelený program ani koordináciu činov. Do značnej miery to bolo podmienené represívnymi opatreniami orgánov vlády proti disidentom.



Мапа
 Географія опозиційного руху на Україні в 50. – 80. роках 20. сторіччя¹¹

11 Atlas z istorii Ukrainy (1939 – 2005 rr.). Kyjiv 2008, s. 9.

Opozičné hnutie 1960 – 1980 pokračovalo v tradíciách národno-oslobodeneckého boja minulých rokov, pričom skúsenosti s opozičnou činnosťou boli použité pri „perestrojke“ a získaní ukrajinskej nezávislosti.

Na záver treba poznamenať, že vo väčšine krajín strednej a východnej Európy boli antitotalitné revolúcie z konca 80. rokov poznamenané tým, že moc prevzali vodcovia opozičného hnutia, ktorí určili vývoj svojich krajín, zatiaľ čo na Ukrajine vodcovia demokratickej opozície, realizujúc národno-oslobodeneckú myšlienku, nemohli prejsť z disentu do vládnucej elity.

Summary

The author analyzes the problems of the opposition movement in Ukraine in 1960-1980. The article focuses on the main forms of the opposition movement in Ukraine, such as national liberation, national-cultural, the movement for social and economic rights, religious movements. The author notes that there is a typological similarity of directions of the opposition movement in Ukraine and in countries of Central-Eastern Europe.

Comparing to the opposition movement in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, a feature of the opposition movement in Ukraine lied in the fact that the movement had strong development not only anti-communism, but also national liberation activities. The author draws the conclusion about the influence of the opposition movement on social and political transformation in Ukraine and in countries of Central-Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

To the Question of the Dissent in Soviet Belarusian

Natallia PRYSTUPA

During the discussion started among Russian scientists in 2008 a new term “raznomyslie” (different opinions) was put into scientific circulation by Firsov. “Raznomyslie” (difference of opinion, disagreement – Ozhegov’s dictionary),¹ the variety of mentality (sociologist Alexeev)² is a peculiarity of democratic society first of all. But it is impossible to eradicate it altogether in authoritarian and totalitarian societies. The Belarusian society in 1960s and 1970s was no exception. Moreover, in spite of the fact that after the Second World War and the wave of repressions caused by the violent sovietisation of the western regions of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR), the absolute majority of the population accepted conformist behaviour as a basic strategy for survival, a dissident movement developed in the republic. It was a more serious confrontation with the authorities (with emphasis on an activity component).

The dissident movement among the Belarusian intellectuals differed from the movements which existed in “the centre of the empire”. First of all, it was a national-patriotic movement. In terms of total Russification, the usage of

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- 1 Ожегов, С. И. Толковый словарь русского языка [Electronic resource]. /С. И. Ожегов, Н. Ю. Шведова – See URL <http://www.classes.ru/all-russian/russian-dictionary-Ozhegov-term-28998.htm>. Date of access: 15.06.2011.
 - 2 Алексеев, А. Разномыслие как социологическое понятие и характеристика социума (опыт теоретического рассмотрения) / А. Алексеев // Разномыслие в СССР и России (1945-2008): сб. матер. науч. конф., 15-16 мая 2009 года, Европейский ун-т в Санкт-Петербурге / Под общ. Ред. Б. М. Фирсова. – СПб: Изд-во Европейского университета в Санкт-Петербурге, 2010. – С. 58-60.

the Belarusian language as a language of interpersonal communication was a specific form of resistance to the regime. It was extremely significant that the director of the Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR did not know the Belarusian language; the scientific literature, with the occasional exception, was written only in Russian³. Native speakers of the literary Belarusian language were under supervision for their “anti-Sovietism” and as “nationalists”, even if not obvious, potential.

Another essential difference was that the active participants of anti-communist resistance were not well-known among the general public of Belarus. This made the struggle against dissent easier: dissenting people were discharged from office, sentenced to imprisonment and compulsory treatment in psychiatric clinics. However, this did not draw a wide response. Not long ago it became known that the teacher of Hrodno pedagogical institute, Branislav Rzheusky⁴, was sent to a camp because of his protest actions against Russification. Another teacher, Anatol Sidarevich⁵, was put

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- 3 Чарняўскі, М. Беларускія антыкамуністычныя рухі нацыянальна-патрыятычнай скіраванасці. Лекцыя 2. / М. Чарняўскі // Беларускія антыкамуністычныя рухі ў час позняга сталінізму (ад Сталіна да перабудовы Гарбачова: 1953-1987 гг.) [Electronic resource]. 2007. See URL http://baj.by/belkalehium/lekcyji/historyja/czarniauski_02.htm. – Date of access: 14.09.2011.
- 4 Branislau (Barys) Rzheusky was born on 25 March 1905 in Barysau district (Minsk region) and died on 10 February 1980. He was a Belarusian literary critic and teacher who constantly criticised communist national politics. He used different forms of protest. During the Great Patriotic war he formed the Anti-Nazi group “Barys” and contacted other partisans, and was appointed an editor of the newspaper “Peramoha” (“Victory”). He was awarded for that activity. From 1944 till 1955 he was a lecturer and even head of the department of language and literature at Baranavichy Pedagogical Institute. In 1952 he defended his thesis about the Belarusian poet Tank’s work. In 1957 he started to teach in Hrodno Pedagogical Institute named after Kupala. He continually appealed to the authorities on national politics. He was very popular among his students. On February 16th 1957 he was arrested while he was lecturing. There was a house search. His awards and manuscripts of the poems where he called Stalin a “murderer”, “Chingiskhan”, “Nero” were confiscated. He was taken to GULAG (1957). When he returned to Hrodno (1961) he was only allowed to work at a secondary school. He was rehabilitated in 1990.
- 5 Anatol’ Sidarevich was born on March 1st 1948 in the Pinsk district (Brest region). He was a literary critic, historian and essayist. He criticised communist ideology because he was subjected to it in the 1960s. He finished at the history department of Belarusian State University. He lost his job (journalism) in 1967 because of his diaries’ criticisms of Lenin. Later he worked in a village club but was also dismissed because he openly declared against the Czechoslovak occupation in 1968. Due to his friends he was able to find jobs (at a school and in a district newspaper) even with his mentally ill diagnosis. During “perestrojka” he worked as a head of the critique section of the journal

into a mental clinic because of his protests against the invasion by troops of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation into Czechoslovakia, etc.⁶. After his public protest in August 1968, Sidarevich was brought to the Baranovichy department of the KGB for a “preventive conversation”. Sidarevich was warned against spreading anti-Soviet propaganda (criticism of the one-party system) and supporting foreign counter-revolution (support of the Prague Spring). In September 1968, Sidarevich fell ill with pneumonia and was transported from Hantsevichy to the mental department of the second Minsk clinical hospital by fraud. His illness was diagnosed as “Bleuler’s illness” (schizophrenia). He left the mental clinic on 13 January 1969, but the psychiatrists proceeded to further “control” his condition⁷.

In the early sixties among young scientists (mostly of humanitarian institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR) informal associations became popular. These went down in history as “Academic milieu”. Enlightenment, propaganda in the Belarusian language and the popularisation of Belarusian history were assumed as a basis of this activity. The participants of this association were Kaurus⁸, Laput’ (the chief of a department of the Institute of Geology of the

“Krynitsa” (“Origins”). He studies the XX. century in Belarusian history. He was one of the founders of the Belarusian Social Democratic party.

- 6 Чарняўскі, М. Акадэмічны пагрытычны асяродак (1960-я гады) / М. Чарняўскі // Шуфляда [Electronic resource]. 1999. – № 1. See URL http://kamunikat.fonitel.net/www/czasopisy/szuflada/01/01dysk_czarniauski.htm. Date of access: 10.08.2011.
- 7 Дэмакратычная апазыцыя Беларусі: 1956-1991. Пэрсанажы і кантэкст. – Менск: Архіў Найноўшае Гісторыі [Electronic resource]. 1999. See URL: <http://slounik.org/153726.html>. Date of access: 10. 8. 2011.
- 8 Ales’ (Aliaksandr Aliaksandravich) Kaurus was born on 18 May 1935 in today’s Minsk region. He is a linguist. He studied at Myadel secondary school (Minsk region). In 1959 he finished Minsk State Pedagogical Institute, then worked as a teacher and director at schools in the Myadel district. After his postgraduate at Minsk State Pedagogical Institute in 1965 he defended a thesis. He worked as a senior lecturer in Mozyr’ Pedagogical Institute (Homel region) (1965 – 1968), senior researcher in the Institute of Linguistics named after Kolas (1968 – 1974). In 1974 he was dismissed. At those times his monographs and articles were not allowed to be printed. His name was deleted from the publications of other authors. By means of the vice-chairman of the Council of ministers of BSSR N. Sniazhkova he was able to get a position as the editor of publishing house the “Narodnaya asveta”. Only in 1981 did he start to work at the department of the Belarusian linguistics of Belarusian State Pedagogical University.

Academy of sciences of the BSSR), Mis'ko⁹, Paz'niak¹⁰, Charniausky¹¹,

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- 9 Sciapan Mis'ko was born on 18 December 1930 in the Hrodno region. He is a theatre expert and essayist. As a teenager he took part in the partisan war in Belarus (1941 – 1944). He was awarded the order of the Great Patriotic war of the 2nd degree and other medals. He finished Minsk Institute of Foreign Languages (1952, French department). He taught French, German, Belarusian and Russian at a secondary school in the Slonim district (Hrodno region) (1952 – 1958). After his postgraduate study (specialisation – “Drama study”) at the Academy of Sciences of BSSR (Institute of Arts, Ethnography and Folklore) he defended a thesis “The origins of the Belarusian folk theatre” and received the degree of the candidate of study of art (1962). From 1963 he was a senior researcher in the theatre department in the Institute of Study of Arts, Ethnography and Folklore. In 1974, he was excluded from the Communist Party and was dismissed. Later he worked in the Belarusian State museum; Book chamber, after 1987 – the editor in “Universitetskoye” publishing house.
- 10 Zianon Paz'niak was born on 24 April 1944 in Iuje (Hrodno region). He is an art critic, archeologist, politician and essayist. His grandfather, Jan Paz'niak, was an editor of the Christian newspaper edited in Vilno (today's Vilnius). In 1939 he was arrested and executed. His father died in December 1944 at the front in the ranks of Red Army. On finishing school in 1961 he worked in a village club and then he studied art in the Belarusian State Theatrical and Art Institute. For his views he was twice excluded (1964, 1967). He worked as a scene worker at the Opera theatre, a photographer in the State museum and Kupala's Literary museum, etc. For a certain period he was unemployed. In 1969 – 1972 he was a postgraduate student at the Institute of Study of Arts, Ethnography and Folklore of the Academy of sciences of BSSR. He always struggled for the preservation of the monuments and historical buildings of old Minsk and its outskirts. In 1975 he was dismissed. In 1976 he was reinstated, but in the Institute of History. In 1981 he defended his thesis “The problems of the origins and development of the Belarusian professional theatre in the beginning of the XX century (1900 – 1917)” in Leningrad. In the 1980s he carried out archeological excavations in Minsk, Myadel, etc. In 1988 he revealed the tragedy of Kuropaty (the place of numerous Stalin victims) to the Belarusians and the whole world. He was one of the founders of the Belarusian National Front “Renaissance”. In 1990 – 1995 he was a deputy, the leader of opposition in the Supreme Council of Belarus. In 1994 he proposed himself as a candidate for the president of the Republic of Belarus. In 1996 he immigrated to the USA.
- 11 Mihas' (Mihail Mihajlavich) Charniausky was born on 7 March 1938 in the Myadel district (Minsk region). In 1957 – 1961 he taught history at a school in the Myadel district. He finished Minsk State Pedagogical Institute. He is an archeologist. His scientific interest is the material and spiritual cultures of the tribes of Lithic and Bronze Age of the northwest of Belarus and primitive art. Since 1966 he has worked at the Institute of History of the Academy of sciences of BSSR. He is a candidate of historical science (1971). In 1990 – 2001 he was a head of the Department of Archeology of Lithic and Bronze Age. In 1974 he was dismissed. He could get only an unskilled job. He was reinstated in his former job in the period of “perestrojka”. He was a member of the organising committee of Belarusian National Front (1988 – 1989), member of the organising committee of the Belarusian Social Democratic party (the end of 1990 – the beginning of 1991), chairman of the Central Control and Check-up committee, and chairman of Minsk organisation of the Belarusian Social Democratic party (1991 – 1996).

Prashkovich¹², Rabkevich¹³, etc. The movement was not formal. No list of its participants existed.

As to the activity of the “Academic milieu”, its participants were engaged in the researching and gathering of memoirs, books and magazines published in Vilna (Vilnius) or at the time of so-called Inbelkult (the highest multisectoral research institute, formed in 1922, and in 1928 transformed into the Academy of Sciences). The most fruitful trips were those which were arranged to Western Belarus and to Vilnius also. The collected material was multiplied (by means of carbon copies, photocopies or on typewriters), and then distributed among persons holding the same views. Besides this, they organised meetings with veterans of the Belarus Renaissance (at the apartments of Sushinsky, Korotkevich, etc.). Special attention was given to working with students.

As Charniauský remembered: *“We consciously sought to avoid possible charges of anticommunism. We believed that the Belarusian intellectuals, ready for action, were not many at that time. Our movement, weak enough, was easy to strangle, and that is why we could not waste our energy deciding general democratic issues [...] Even during the occupation of Czechoslovakia*

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- 12 Mikola (Mikalaj Ivanavich) Prashkovich was born on 4 May 1932 in the Berezino district (Minsk region) and died on 2 February 1983. He was a literary critic and translator. He finished at the philology department of Belarusian State Institute in 1957. Then he worked as a teacher for three years. He was a postgraduate student at the Institute of Literature named after Y. Kupala of the Academy of sciences of BSSR. He specialised in Belarusian ancient literature. In 1965 he defended his thesis about Sjamjon Polacki. He tried to help Ukrainian patriots (M. Kacubinska, Z. Franko etc.) gathering money for them. In 1974 he was dismissed. He was unemployed for a certain period, then he was a loader and later proofreader in the newspaper “Vechernij Minsk” (“Evening Minsk”) and journal “Rodnaja pryroda” (“Native nature”). He tragically died in a fire.
- 13 Valyantsin Ivanovich Rabkevich was born on 15 February 1937 in the Minsk region, died in 1995. He was a literary critic, translator and poet. In 1959 he finished at the history and philology department of Minsk State Pedagogical Institute. From 1959 till 1960 he worked as a teacher in the Braslav district, from 1960 till 1965 as a head of the organising educational process work in a number of schools of the Braslav and Volozhin districts (Minsk region). 1965-1968 were the years of his postgraduate study in Minsk State Pedagogical Institute. He was a candidate of philology (1973). Since 1967 he has worked as a senior editor, since 1970 – a head of the editorial staff of the department of literature, language, folklore and ethnography in the publishing house “Belaruskaja Savetskaja Encyklopedyja” (“Belarusian Soviet Encyclopedia”). He translated M. Zoshchenko, N. Gogol, S. Yesenin, A. Akhmatova and others’ works into the Belarusian language. In 1974 he was dismissed. After six months of many trials he unexpectedly received a job in the publishers “Mastatskaya litaratura”. He worked as an editor and a head of the editorial staff there.

in 1968 it was decided to abstain from public protest actions".¹⁴ That position had its opponents. Thus, there was a controversy among the participants of the "Academic milieu" with Sidarevich. The latter charged the colleagues of the democratic camp with "culturing" (cultural work in isolation from politics). He has recently said of the Belarusian opposition that "*our patriotic nationalists did not study the politics. Now the politics punishes them [...]* Unfortunately, this movement which could arise as a human rights movement, has to start from the very beginning [...]"¹⁵

The KGB of the BSSR got down to the "Academic milieu" in real earnest in the summer of 1973. The matter was the "Belarusian trace" revealed during interrogations of Ukrainian dissidents: the letters of the participants of the "Academic milieu" with their estimation of the national policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and plans to organise the anticommunist resistance got into the hands of state security.

About a hundred scientists, teachers of higher educational institutes, teachers of secondary schools and students were interrogated in Minsk. According to Charniausky's point of view, the version of the existence of an underground nationalist organisation, which had stable relations with foreign organisations, was worked out. However, the leaders of the BSSR were not interested in expanding the "nationalist" case.

But already in 1974 a special commission from Moscow had placed the so-called "Case of five" (i.e. the "Academic milieu") on a broad footing. It got its name from the quantity of the main (according to the KGB) organisers (Kaurus, Misko, Prashkovich, Charniausky, Rabkevich).¹⁶ As Misko remembered later, "we were called a nationalist group which called for secession of the BSSR from the USSR", insisting on "transfer of all Russians, Jews and Poles from Belarus"¹⁷ and even demanding the "Smolensk and Bransk regions" to be returned to Belarusians.¹⁸

14 Дэмакратычная апазыцыя Беларусі: 1956-1991. Пэрсанажы і кантэкст. – Менск: Архіў Найноўшае Гісторыі [Electronic resource]. 1999. See URL <http://slounik.org/153726.html>. Date of access: 10.08.2011.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Гісторыя Беларусі найноўшага часу ў дакументах і матэрыялах. Хрэстаматыя / Ю. Бачышча (уклад.); А. Смалянчук (нав. рэд.). – Вільня: ЕГУ, 2008. – 366 с.

18 Арлоў, У. Мікола Прашкковіч. Сэрыя «Імёны Свабоды» / У. Арлоў // Радыё Свабода [Electronic resource]. 2011. See URL <http://www.svaboda.org/content/transcript/771007.html>. Date of access: 14.09.2011.

The participants of the “Academic milieu” were persecuted. One of Prashkovich’s closest friends, Chamaritsky, supposed that in order to pass final sentence the authorities wanted “*not simple information against those people but certain arguments*”. Thereupon, he refers to the manuscript found after the death of the head of the department of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of BSSR (Shabunia). The unknown author wrote that Prashkovich’s tendentious approach to Belarusian history was a characteristic one. In his scientific works Prashkovich “*persistently underlines the distinction between the historical destinies of Belarus and Russia, represents Belarus as an integral part of Western Europe, and the Belarusian culture as part of western culture, opposing it to Russian culture stiff in orthodox routine*”.¹⁹

As a result, Kaurus, Mis’ko, Prashkovich, Rabkevich and Charniausky were discharged. The “participants” of the organisation and members of their families were shadowed. At the same time, Paz’niak wrote an analytic review *The situation in Belorussia. 1974* under the pseudonym “Henrykh Rakutovich” and revealed the repressive policy of the authorities towards Belarusian intellectuals. Its reprints and photocopies were circulated in Belarus and abroad.²⁰

Later Pazniak, along with as Laputs and the teacher of the Institute of Foreign Languages, Diadiulia, were discharged.

In the case of some participants of the “Academic milieu” their punishment was limited to “preventive conversations” and intimidation.

The specific form of punishment was a “blockade”: the manuscripts of books and articles written by the participants of the “Academic milieu” were thrown out from publishing plans; other scientist could not refer to their works, etc. Discharged from the academy, scientists could be engaged only in a physical work. They were not able to go abroad till the beginning of “perestroika” in the USSR.

As to the further destiny of the participants of the “Academic milieu”, Kaurus, for example, started to work in one of the publishing houses after a while, and later as a teacher in the pedagogical institute; Rabkevich got a job in the publishing house “Mastatskaia litaratura”; Mis’ko, as a veteran

19 Чамярыцкі, В. Рукапіс, знойдзены ў рабочым стане / В. Чамярыцкі // Шуфляда [Electronic resource]. 2001. – № 2. See URL http://kamunikat.fontel.net/www/czasopisy/szuzflada/02/02dok_czamiarycki.htm. Date of access: 10.08.2011.

20 Дэмакратычная апазыцыя Беларусі: 1956-1991. Пэрсанажы і кантэкст. – Менск: Архіў Найноўшае Гісторыі [Electronic resource]. 1999. See URL <http://slounik.org/153726.html>. Date of access: 10.08.2011.

of the Great Patriotic War, achieved reinstatement at his previous place of work, and retired later. Pažniak returned to work in the Academy, but to the Institute of History already, as well as Charniausky. Prashkovich had the hardest fate. After the defeat of the “Academic milieu” he had a mental breakdown, suffered from paralysis of the legs and was burnt down in his rural house.

Thus, the “Academic milieu” was an example of the intellectual, spiritual and moral resistance, but not a political opposition to the regime. The participants of the “Academic milieu” were not only people with independent beliefs, but also people of action because public statements and publications of scientific works are also a form of action.

Resumé

Článok sa venuje disidentskému hnutiu v sovietskom Bielorusku. Autorka poukazuje na to, že disidentské hnutie v Bielorusku malo v rokoch 1960 – 1970 isté osobitosti. Približuje vytvorenie a následnú činnosť tzv. „Akademického milieu“. Členmi tohto združenia boli mladí vedci (väčšinou na ústavoch humanitných vied Bieloruskej akadémie vied). Bolo to neformálne združenie, ktorého základom činnosti bola osveta, propagácia bieloruského jazyka či popularizácia dejín Bieloruska. Členmi združenia boli A. Kaurus, S. Miško, Z. Pazniak, M. Charniavsky a iní. Neskôr začalo prenasledovanie najaktívnejších členov a potom činnosť „Akademického prostredia“ ukončili.

„Češi, jsme vaši bratři“: příspěvek k dějinám vzájemných kontaktů SSSR a Československa v letech 1968 – 1989

Elena GLUŠKO

V tomto příspěvku se pokouším spíše o výzvu k diskusi, k ještě jednému zamyšlení nad otázkami kolektivní viny a kolektivní zodpovědnosti – samozřejmě, téma *Rok 1968 a jeho vnímání v ČSSR a SSSR* v žádném případě není pro historiky novinkou. V tomto příspěvku se budu věnovat širšímu tématu vztahů mezi československými a sovětskými disidenty, a to v několika aspektech: vnímání intervence do Československa v Sovětském svazu (a především v Rusku) mezi disidenty a ochránci lidských práv (nebudu ale mluvit o „sedmi statečných“ na Rudém náměstí, protože jejich příběh je obecně známý); pak „sovětské motivy“ v dokumentech Charty 77 a konečně otázka kontaktů katolického disentu v Československu se Sovětským svazem. Je třeba poznamenat, že, samozřejmě, v Rusku se Slovensko nevnímalo jako zvláštní území s vlastní kulturou a mentalitou.

První polovina 60. let v SSSR byla obdobím uvolnění; v roce 1965 se uskutečnil veřejný soudní proces s Andrejem Siňavským a Julijem Danielem, kteří publikovali své texty v zahraničí; právě tento proces se považuje za začátek širokého disidentského hnutí v SSSR. Na konci 60. let byl v sovětské společnosti kritický postoj k režimu celkem běžný – alespoň v určité sociální vrstvě. Na otázku Josefa Pazderky o tom, jak se člověk stane disidentem, Natalia Gorbaněvská odpověděla: *“V mém okolí moskevské inteligence, překladatelů a básníků to bylo tak trochu samozřejmé [...] V Moskvě četli samizdat snad všichni. V té době byl oblíbený vtíp o tom, jak babička nutí svého vnuka přepsat na stroji Vojnu a mír, protože nečte*

*knihy, ale pouze to, co je napsané na stroji“.*¹ Právě v roce 1968 vzniká v samizdatu *Kronika současných událostí*² s podtitulkem (nebo bylo tomu naopak?)³ *Rok lidských práv v Sovětském svazu*.

Jak vyplývá ze vzpomínek pamětníků, v té době sovětská, zejména moskevská inteligence pozorně sledovala, jak se v Československu buduje „socialismus s lidskou tváří“ – měla totiž naději, že Praha může ukázat cestu i sovětské společnosti. Obránce práv krymských Tatarů, generál Petr Grigorenko vzpomínal, že v létě roku 1968 *“naše společenské hnutí mělo velký zájem o to, co se dělo v Československu. Veřejný prodej československých novin byl přerušen. Ty, které jsme přece dostávali i nadále, kolovaly mezi lidmi, pokud se neroztrhaly.*⁴ *Nejvýznamnější texty, jako je 2000 slov, překládají se do ruštiny a jsou distribuovány v samizdatu. To, co vyprávějí zřídkaiví turisté, posloucháme jako pohádku [...] Někdo z posluchačů si povzdchl a smutně zažertoval: Kdybyste nás jen okupovali. Smál jsem se spolu s jinými. Ani mě nenapadlo, že okupantem může být naše země. Sympatie k ČSSR byli tak obrovské, že se zdálo, že jen blázen riskne intervenovat. V metru, ve vlacích, trolejbusích, na ulicích, když někdo mluvil o událostech v Československu, což se stávalo často, lidé poslouchali s hlubokým zájmem a pochopením. Avšak sovětský tisk se s tím nepočítal a nadále eskaloval nedůvěru a zaséval podezření ohledně československého vedení“.*⁵

Samizdatová *Kronika současných událostí*⁶ uvádí seznam překladů a originálních textů, vzniklých ve spojení s Pražským jarem a invazí do Československa. Překládaly se ovšem jen ty texty, které byly k přečtení v necenzurovaných novinách roku 1968. *Kronika* svědčí, že v sovětském samizdatu kolovalo vystoupení Ludvíka Vaculíka na IV. sjezdu spisovatelů, pak rozhovory s vdovami Vladimíra Clementisa a Rudolfa Slánského, další materiály o procesech z 50. let; některé projevy Alexandra Dubčeka,

1 PAZDERKA, J. (ed.): *Invaze 1968: Ruský pohled*. Praha 2011, s. 229.

2 *Chronika tekušičich sobytij* je přístupná na webu Společnosti Memorial: <<http://www.memo.ru/history/diss/chr/index.htm>> .

3 Tuto možnost připustil Alexander Daniel (historik, syn Julije Daniela a Larisy Bogorazové) ve svém vystoupení na mezinárodní konferenci *Andrej Sacharov: Neklid a naděje 2011. 90 let Andrejovi Sacharovi*, kterou pořádalo Sacharovské centrum v Moskvě 20. – 21. května 2011.

4 Podle jiných informací, prodej československých novin přerušen nebyl, jen dodávka neuspokojovala poptávku.

5 GRIGORENKO P.: *V podpolje možno vstretit' tolko krys*. Moskva 1997, s. 476.

6 *Chronika tekušičich sobytij*, roč. 1, č. 5 (31.prosince 1968) <<http://www.memo.ru/history/diss/chr/chr5.htm>>

Josefa Smrkovského, Čestmíra Císaře aj.; ovšem text *Dva tisíce slov*, který sovětský tisk prezentoval nepravdivě, a také odpověď Josefa Smrkovského *1000 slov*. V prvních dnech po invazi se k sovětským občanům dostaly též některé letáky, výzvy k okupačním armádám apod. Existoval též překlad projevu Josefa Smrkovského z 29. srpna, po návratu z Moskvy, a taky *Deset bodů* Svazu vysokoškolského studentstva Čech a Moravy. Samozřejmě že bezpečnost tento samizdat neviděla ráda, zvláště po invazi: podle informace *Kroniky současných událostí*, v listopadu 1968 v městě Gorkij (nyní Nižnij Novgorod) za šíření textu *2000 slov* byli čtyři studenti vyloučeni ze studií.⁷

29. července 1968⁸ byl na československé velvyslanectví v Moskvě odevzdán tzv. *dopis pěti* na podporu politických změn v Československu (viz Přílohu 1). Autoři tohoto dopisu ujišťují členy KSČ, že invaze není možná, protože přátelství sovětského národa k národům Československa je příliš silné; ale ještě před odevzdáním tohoto dopisu na československé velvyslanectví v Moskvě generál Pjotr Grigorenko, podle vlastních vzpomínek, rozhodl, že přece napíše osobní dopis Dubčekovi, ve kterém ho před touto invazí varuje; tento dopis nebyl v samizdatu zveřejněn, víme o jeho existenci jen ze vzpomínek Grigorenka (viz Přílohu 2). Stejně varování obsahoval i dopis Anatolije Marčenko na podporu Pražského jara.⁹ Za několik dní po publikaci tohoto dopisu na Západě byl Marčenko uvězněn. Odcituju tu několik důležitých vět: *“Půl roku se naše noviny snaží dezinformovat veřejné mínění naší země a současně dezinformovat světové veřejné mínění o vztahu našeho lidu k těmto událostem“*. Jak se zdá po letech, oba tyto úkoly (nebo alespoň ten druhý) se perfektně podařily...

21. srpen byl tragédií a zlomem pro velký počet lidí v SSSR, kteří se aspoň nějakým způsobem zajímali o mezinárodní politiku. V posledních letech se téma protestů proti okupaci v SSSR stala populárnější především asi díky samozřejmě neúplné a založené na dost náhodném výběru, ale přece průkopnické webové publikaci *Lidé srpna 1968*¹⁰, kterou pamětníci

7 *Chronika tekoučích sobytij*, roč. 2, č. 1 (28. února 1969) <<http://www.memo.ru/history/diss/chr/chr6.htm>>

8 Datum je uveden v samizdatové *Chronika tekoučích sobytij*, roč. 1, č. 3 (30. srpna 1968) <<http://www.memo.ru/history/diss/chr/chr3.htm>>

9 Český překlad MARČENKO A.: Otevřený dopis Anatolije Marčenko světovému tisku na podporu Pražského jara, 22. července 1968, Alexandrov. In: HRADILEK, A. (ed.): *Za vaši a naši svobodu*. Praha 2010, s. 189 – 192.

10 KUZOVKIN, G. – MAKAROV, A. – ZUBAREV, D. (Eds.): *Ludi avgusta 1968... Spisok graždan, vyrazivšich protest ili nesoglasie s vtorženiem v Čechoslovakiju*. 2. 9. 2008. URL

rádi doplňují.¹¹ Tuto publikaci připravila moskevská Společnost Memorial a dobrovolníci. V češtině nejuplněnější dokumentaci protestů se nachází v článku A. Daniela, přeloženém v knize A. Hradilka.¹² Otázce těchto protestů se věnoval odborně taky Tomáš Glanc v článku *Pozor! Pozor! Ruská inteligence a sovětská okupace*¹³, který ale je víc zaměřen na literární ohlasy invaze.

Nejznámějším v Čechách a na Slovensku zůstává ovšem příběh osmi demonstrantů na Rudém náměstí 25. srpna 1968 – byli to Konstantin Babickij, Larisa Bogorazová, Vadim Delone, Vladimír Dremljuga, Viktor Fainberg, Natalja Gorbaněvská, která přišla s dítětem, Pavel Litvinov a Tatjana Baevová – která není zmiňovaná v raných zprávách o demonstraci.¹⁴ Zmíněné české publikace obsahují hodně dokumentace k této demonstraci, a také překlady rozhovorů s jejich žijícími účastníky, proto se v tomto článku nebudu tomuto příběhu podrobněji věnovat.

Víme, že pro – doslova – miliony lidí v SSSR byl rok 1968 posledním mezníkem na cestě vnitřního rozloučení se s režimem. Historik Andrej Zorin vzpomíná: *“Byl jsem docela zpolitizovaný kluk, a vlastně do 22. srpna 1968, když jsem se dozvěděl o událostech v Československu, vždycky jsem se identifikoval s touto zemí a cítil jsem se v ní zcela pohodlně. Ale v tento den jsem si uvědomil, že jsem obklopen nepřáteli, že moc v mé zemi je mým osobním nepřítelem. To vyvolalo ve mně vnitřní pocit „otščepenščestva“, což hodně poznamenalo celý můj budoucí život [...] Pocit obrovské osobní tragédie, pocit zhroucení života [...] jak je to možné, opravdu to jim projde, a zůstane to tak? – tohle jsem pociťoval s nezvyklou silou, pálilo mě to [...] 22. srpna 1968 – to byl den, kdy skončila 60. léta a začala 70. Můžeme hledat k tomu úvodníky – odstranění Chruščova v říjnu 1964, proces s Danielem a Siňavským v roce 1965, oslava výročí Sovětského svazu v roce 1967 [...]*

<<http://www.polit.ru/article/2008/09/02/people68/>>

- 11 Viz blog Natalie Gorbaněvské na URL: <<http://ng68.livejournal.com/241277.html>>, <<http://ng68.livejournal.com/241518.html>>
- 12 DANIEL, A.: Sovětský svaz a Pražské jaro. In: HRADILEK, A. (ed.): *Za vaši a naši svobodu*. s. 37 – 51.
- 13 PAZDERKA, J. (ed.): *Invaze 1968: Ruský pohled*, s. 188 – 215.
- 14 BAEVA T.: Rasskaz Tani Baevoj, vosmogo učastnika demonstracii. In: GORBANEV-SKAJA, N.: *Poldeň: Delo o demonstracii na Krasnoj ploščadi 25 avgusta 1968 goda*. Moskva 2007, s. 44 – 46; PAZDERKA, J. (ed.): *Invaze 1968: Ruský pohled*, s. 203.

Myslím, že tento den určil osud Sovětského svazu. Víte, někde v nebesích byl v tento den osud Sovětského svazu zpečetěn.¹⁵

Lidé vyjádřovali svůj nesouhlas se státní politikou vůči Československu různě. Šířily se protestní letáky (viz Přílohu 3). Samozřejmě všechny případy vyjádření nesouhlasu se nedá zdokumentovat: sotva se dozvíme, kdo byl člověk, o kterém se v *Kronice* říká: “*V Moskvě na Oktiabrském náměstí nějaký občan 24. srpna vykřikl slogan proti invazi do Československa a byl krutě zbit neznámými lidmi v civilu. Dva z nich ho nacpali do auta a odvezli*”.¹⁶

Po celém Sovětském svazu stranické organizace pořádaly schůze, kde se přijímaly rezoluce na podporu invazi do Československa. Hlasovat proti znamenalo skoro jistou ztrátu práce, byly možné i další postihy.¹⁷ Nicméně dost lidí bylo připraveno to podstoupit (svědčí o tom i stejné číslo *Kroniky*). Někteří členové strany vrátili stranický průkaz (jako třeba obránce práv krymských Tatarů Alexej Kosterin, přítel Grigorenka). Několik nesouhlasných reakcí, které se dostaly do povědomí sovětských bezpečnostních služeb a pak až na vyšší stranické úřady, uvádím v Příloze 4.

Lidé psali po městech na zdích hesla proti invazi; skoro vždycky je za to čekala odvěta KGB. Například čtvrté číslo *Kroniky* uvádí: “*V noci z 21. na 22. srpna 1968 20-letý obyvatel Leningradu Bugoslavskij napsal na třech Klodtových koních Pryč s Brežněvem z Československa. Přimo tu, na Aničkovém mostu, byl zadržen a [...] odsouzen na 3 roky*”.¹⁸ Z *Kroniky* též víme, že 25. srpna 1968 v noci v Novosibirsku na několika budovách někdo udělal nápisy s protestem proti invazi. Jedna z nich byla *Barbaři, pryč z Československa!* Autory nápisů se pro změnu nepodařilo najít.¹⁹ Titulek mého článku je trochu zavádějící a je taky převzat ze 4. čísla *Kroniky*: „*Estonský student, který v Tartu na zdi kina v noci z 21. na 22. srpna napsal Češi, jsme vaši bratři byl krutě zbit během zadržení. Pohmoždili*

15 Revolucii 1968 goda: obščestvo i kultura. „Nejtraľnaja territoria” s Andrejem Zorinym. 24. 9. 2008. <http://www.polit.ru/article/2008/09/24/finam_zorin/>

16 *Chronika tekušćich sobytij*, roč. 1, č. 3. <<http://www.memo.ru/history/diss/chr/chr3.htm>> Jinak informace o protestech, uvedená v *Kronice*, je přetištěna též v zmiňované knize Natalie Gorbaněvské. Na Oktiabrském náměstí stojí socha V. I. Lenina.

17 Viz například *Chronika tekušćich sobytij*, roč. 1, č. 5. <<http://www.memo.ru/history/diss/chr/chr5.htm>>

18 *Chronika tekušćich sobytij*, roč. 1, č. 4 (31. října 1968). <<http://www.memo.ru/history/diss/chr/chr4.htm>>

19 *Chronika tekušćich sobytij*, roč. 2, č. 1 <<http://www.memo.ru/history/diss/chr/chr6.htm>>

mu ledviny, a je pořád v nemocnici.“ Vcelku se musí pamatovat, že vztah Estonců k Československu je zvláštní téma. Z *Kroniky současných událostí* víme, že v dubnu 1969 se v Rize estonský student Ilja Rips²⁰ pokusil o sebeupálení. Tomáš Glanc poukazuje na to, že Estonci měli tendenci se identifikovat s okupovaným Československem.²¹

Pořádaly se i další demonstrace: z *Kroniky* víme, že 25. ledna 1969, kdy se v Praze konal pohřeb Jana Palacha, dvě studentky Moskevské státní univerzity vyšly na náměstí Majakovského (dnes Triumfální) s plakátem, kde stálo *Věčná paměť Janu Palachovi a Svobodu Československu*. Kolem nich se začali mlčky shromažďet lidé. Pak nějací mladí lidé jim sebrali plakát a pustili je.²²

V letech 1968 – 1969 se objevila celá řada samizdatových textů věnovaných odsouzení okupace a pokání za roli Sovětského svazu v této věci. V knize Natalie Gorbaněvské *Poledne* se vyskytuje též několik překladů takových textů, jako výzva Předsednictva ÚV KSČ z 21. srpna 1968, výzva pražského MV KSČ z téhož data, výzva XIV. mimořádného sjezdu KSČ aj. V samizdatu koloval, například, vícestránkový *Otevřený dopis ohledně okupace Československa*²³, jehož autorem byl Leonard Ternovskij, který psal pod pseudonymem Valentin Komarov. Autor tvrdí, že invaze do Československa nepřinesla Sovětskému svazu žádný užitek, jenom vážně poškodila jeho pověst. Soudí, že okupace znamenala další krok na cestě návratu k stalinským metodám, a věští „*nový rok 1937 a novou válku*“. Článek se ale končí výzvou: *“Zkusíme! Zkusíme se pokládat za svobodné a odvážné lidi. Ne otroky žijícího uvnitř strachu. Zkusíme prostě stát jeden za druhého a nezrazovat kamarády. Přece dokázal to udělat národ Československa!! Dokážeme to i my? ZKUSÍME!”*

V podobném duchu byl koncipován text Ivana Jachymoviče²⁴ *Otevřený dopis, odsuzující okupaci Československa. Evropou obchází strašidlo,*

20 Viz rozhovor s ním v knize *Za vaši a naši svobodu*, s. 167 – 185.

21 PAZDERKA J.: *Invaze 1968: Ruský pohled*, s. 203.

22 *Chronika tekušičich sobytij*. roč. 2, č. 1 <<http://www.memo.ru/history/diss/chr/chr6.htm>>

23 KOMAROV, V. V.: Otkrytoe pismo v svjazi s okkupaciej Čechoslovakii. In: *Sobranie dokumentov samizdata 1*, 1972, s. 1.

24 Ivan Jachymovič (nar. 1931) byl předsedou JZD v Lotyšsku. V roce 1968 napsal dopis na ÚV KSSS, byl odstráněn, neměl vůbec možnost pracovat, v roce 1969 ho vzali do vyšetřovací vazby, pak se „lččil“ na psychiatrii, roku 1972 byl osvobozen jako invalida 2. stupně.

*strašidlo katastrofy*²⁵, též napsaný v září 1968: „Od chvíle skončení Velké Vlastenecké války se náš národ nikdy nenacházel v natolik těžkých mravních podmínkách, ve které byl postaven událostmi 21. srpna 1968. Okupovat socialistickou svazovou krajinu v důsledku jen podezření z kontrarevoluce, okupovat krajinu, kde vedoucí úloha patří komunistické straně, bez souhlasu té poslední, navzdory její vůli – to nejde zařadit do mravních představ sovětských lidí, mírumilovných, nezištných a schopných si vážít přátelství a důvěru národů. Stará nemoc – strach, strnulost, jako paralýza dolehla na duše milionů lidí, jako říhnutí ponižujícího otrockého strachu krvavé stalinské noci! Celé toto bratrství, kterému říkají „stalinisté“, které nemělo a nemá nic společného s marxismem-leninismem, naopak, sklouzlo cestou k fašismu, jehož metody stále využívalo, které ještě nedávno rozehnal Chruščov do politických podkroví a do průjezdů, zařvala: Odveta! Jak je to podobné na fašistické nohsledy v Západním Německu. I ti se maskují cizími hesly, i ti touží po odvetě. [...] OPAKUJEME: VZPOMEŇTE SE! OPAKUJEME: RUCE PRYČ OD ČSSR! OPAKUJEME: SVOBODU POLITICKÝM VĚZŇŮM! OPAKUJEME: LENINISMUS – ANO! STALINISMUS – NE!”

Reakci Ivana Jachymoviče a Pjotra Grigorenka vyvolalo i sebeupálení Jana Palacha. Napsali dopis *Občanům Sovětského svazu* – podle všeho, už neviděli smyslu v tom, aby adresovat dopisy někam na československou vládu nebo ÚV KSČ. Podle mých informací, tento dopis se v češtině nepublikoval; uvádím ho v Příloze 5 jako celek.

Obsah prvních samizdatových protestů sovětských autorů proti invazi se shrnuje v *Kronice současných událostí*: „Všechny tyto texty napsané v různém stylu a žánrech mají několik společných vlastností: a) intervence do Československa je výsledkem obnovení stalinismu; b) pravým důvodem je záměr potlačit demokratizaci, právo, svobody, zlikvidovat nebezpečný příklad spojení socialismu a demokracie; c) mravní porážka okupantů; d) kolektivní vina našeho národa, naše inteligence za to, co se stalo, a nutnost konsolidace všech čestných a myslících lidí naší země.²⁶“

František Janouch ve vzpomínkách na svou cestu do Ruska v roce 1970 uvádí, že ze 67 lidí, se kterými během té cesty o 21. srpnu mluvil, intervenci

25 JACHYMOVIČ, I.: Otkrytoe pismo, osuždajuščee okkupaciju Čechoslovakii. Prizrak brodit po Evrope, prizrak katastrofy. In: *Sobranie dokumentov samizdata 1*, 1972, s. 1.

26 *Chronika těkušičich sobytij*. roč. 1, č. 5. <<http://www.memo.ru/history/diss/chr/chr5.htm>>

schvalovali jen tři, včetně celníka a stranického sekretáře.²⁷ Jak tvrdí jeden z bývalých disidentů, „*vždycky jsem myslel, že v naší generaci se touha po změně začala z Pražského jara. S jejím potlačením přišlo rozčarování*“.²⁸ Po letech se lidé vraceli v myšlenkách k srpnu 1968, ptali se sami sebe, jestli mohli udělat víc, jestli byli dost upřímní sami se sebou (vzpomínky Igora Pomeranceva²⁹, Raisy Lert³⁰ v exilovém časopise *Syntax*). Jsou známé i početné literární reakce na invazi. Nejslavnější je samozřejmě Jevtušenkova báseň Tanky se valí Prahou:

[...] Tanky jdou taky po snech
o světě bez diktátu.

Tanky jdou po tankistech
sedících uvnitř tanků...

Já (ještě dřív než pojedu,
naději v sobě zmarním)
k potomkům svého rodu
promluvím zbožným přáním.

Ať nade mnou jen srdcem
napíší stroze, naze:

Byl ruský básník. Zdrčen
ruskými tanky v Praze.³¹

Chci připomenout také méně známou báseň Josefa Brodského *List generálovi Z*, která nebyla zahrnutá do jeho básnických sbírek.³²

27 JANOUCH, F.: *Ne, nestěžuji si... Malá normalizační mozaika*. Praha 1990, s. 55.

28 Archiv autorky, email od Kirilla Popova (nar. 1949) autorce, 19. 12. 2011.

29 POMERANCEV, I.: Oko i sleza. In: *Sintaksis*, 1979, č. 4, s. 18.

30 LERT, R.: Pozdnij opyt. In: *Sintaksis*, 1980, č. 6, s. 6.

31 Překlad je citován v PAZDERKA J.: *Invaze 1968: Ruský pohled*, s. 206.

32 BRODSKIJ I.: *Pismo generalu Z*. Cit. podle webové stránky <http://lib.ru/BRODSKIJ/brodsky_poetry.txt>

...Генерал! Мы так долго сидим в грязи,
что король червей загодя ликует,
и кукушка безмолвствует. Упаси,
впрочем, нас услышать, как она кукует.
Я считаю, надо сказать мерси,
что противник не атакует.
... Генерал! Только душам нужны тела.

[...] Generále! Tak dlouho sedíme v bahně,
že král červů předem jása
a kukačka mlčí. Ale nedej Bůh,
abychom slyšeli, jak kuká.

Myslím, že musíme říct merci,
že nepřítel neútočí.

Generále! Jen duše potřebují těla.

Duše nejsou přece škodolibé,
myslím, že sem nás přivedla
dokonce ne strategie, ale touha po bratrství:
radší se budeme plést do cizích záležitostí,
když si nedokážeme poradit s vlastními.

Generále! Bojím se, že jsme v slepé uličce.

Je to pomsta nekonečného prostoru.

Naše oštěpy rezaví. Přítomnost oštěpů

ještě negarantuje přítomnost terče.

Nehne se náš stín dál než jsme my
ani v čas, kdy zapadá slunce...

Dokonce vojáci někdy odmítali účast na tažení do Československa: toto byl případ Vladimira Malinkoviče, který v roce 1968 vykonával vojenskou povinnost pod Kyjevem jako armádní lékař. Když jeho vojenský oddíl vyslali do Československa, Vladimír odmítl poslušnost a byl zajištěn. Případ vyšetřovala Zvláštní správa KGB. Velitelé ale rozhodli tento případ umlčet, a skončilo to pro Malinkoviče jen brzkou demobilizací.³³

Души ж, известно, чужды злорадства,
и сюда нас, думаю, завела
не стратегия даже, но жажда братства:
лучше в чужие встречать дела,
коли в своих нам не разобраться.
...Генерал! Я боюсь, мы зашли в тупик.
Это -- месья пространства косой сажени.
Наши пики ржавеют. Наличье пик --
это еще не залог мишени.
И не двинется тень наша дальше нас
даже в закатный час...

33 POMERANCEV I.: Oko i sleza, s. 18.

Ale i další „osvoboditelé“ byli nuceni změnit svůj postoj k politice SSSR vůči Československu – vojáci, kteří okupovali Československo 21. srpna, museli být vyměněni: *“20. gardová armáda trvale sídlí v NDR v okrese Bernau, bezprostředně u Berlína. V naprosté izolaci, samozřejmě. V jejích divizích jsem měl mnoho spolužáků z Charkovské tankovní školy. Tato armáda je jedna z nejlepších v celé Skupině sovětských vojsk v Německu. Vstoupila do Prahy jako první. A teď jako první z Československa odcházela. Byl to podivný odchod. Vlajky, štáby a většina důstojníků se vrátila do NDR. Část vojenské techniky bylo taky odesláno tam. Hned z pobaltských států do 20. gardové armády vyslali desítky tisíc čerstvých vojáků a důstojníků. A všechno se vrátilo na svá místa, jakoby armáda nikam neodcházela. Ale většina z vojáků a mladých důstojníků této armády přímo z Československa se dostala do čínské hranice kvůli převýchově. A naháněli osvoboditele do vlaků jako vězně, a my jsme je hlídali. Ale ze Svazu přicházely nové vlaky s mladými vojáky, kteří měli stále pobývat v Československu. Tito od prvního dne byly umístěny za vysokými ploty. Smutnou zkušenost z “osvobození” vzali v úvahu. Všichni jsme si byli vědomi toho, že v příštím desetiletí, bez ohledu na to, co se na světě stane, nikdo se už neodváží poslat nás do země s vyšší životní úrovní“.*³⁴

Dá se říct, že určitá „normalizace“ po roku 1968 nastala i v sovětské společnosti. Alexandr Daniel tvrdí: *„Protesty proti invazi do Československa představovaly poslední výboj energie, která se ve společnosti v šedesátých letech nakumulovala. Ale už i u nich bylo zřejmé, že jsou odsouzeny k zániku. Vrátime-li se k manifestaci osmi sovětských občanů, vidíme, že tato akce, inspirovaná nikoli politickými, ale osobními a mravními motivy, se stala kvintesencí a základem protestního hnutí v SSSR pro celé období konsolidace (1965-1968), modelovým příkladem disidentských aktivit nadlouho dopředu a současně i tečkou za obdobím vzruchu společenských protestů“.*³⁵

I když vztah sovětských intelektuálů k Československu byl velmi emotivní, musíme konstatovat, že nové informace o tom, co se děje v této zemi, dostávali se do Sovětského svazu jen zřídka. Režim “normalizace” v Československu znamenal mj. skoro neprůhledné informační hranice, z někdy hlavního zdroje informací – oficiálního pražského tisku – se sovětsští občané nic zajímavého dozvědět nemohli. Do SSSR se dostávalo jen velmi málo informací, především prostřednictvím zahraničních rozhlasových stanic. Tímto způsobem se sovětsští disidenti dozvěděli o perzekucích

34 SUVOROV, V.: *Osvoboditel*. Moskva 1993.

35 DANIEL, A.: *Sovětský svaz a Pražské jaro*, s. 52.

v Československu na počátku 70. let. K 4. výročí invaze sepsali Otevřený dopis Národnímu shromáždění ČSSR (sic; místo Federálního shromáždění. – E. G.) s výzvou k osvobození nových politických vězňů, v němž mj. stálo: „*Se zvláštní hořkostí si uvědomujeme, že Sovětský svaz, který před 4 lety vyslal svá vojska do ČSSR, nese takto plnou tíhu zodpovědnosti za nynější situaci v této zemi, včetně probíhajících politických procesů. Vyzýváme Národní shromáždění ČSSR, vyšší zákonodárny orgán krajiny, se vši vážností se postavit k aktuální situaci a napomáhat osvobození a rehabilitaci občanů, kteří uplatňují svá ústavní práva*“.³⁶

Sovětský disent se rychle dozvěděl též o Prohlášení Charty 77 a sestavil vyhlášení na jeho podporu: „*Humanizace společnosti se stala nejdůležitějším a nejnaléhavějším úkolem v socialistických zemích. Tento nevyhnutelný, ale obtížný proces se brzdí setrvačností svévůle a nezodpovědnosti shora a strachem zdola. Proto přišla velice vhodně publikace dobře argumentované Charty 77. [...] Útoky vlády na Chartu 77 a perzekuce jejích signatářů jsou vlastně expozicí [pravé motivace] vlády samé. Pokládáme Chartu 77 za vynikající humanitární dokument, vyjadřujeme plný souhlas s ní a solidaritu s jejími autory a všemi jejími signatáři*“.³⁷

V dokumentu Moskevské helsinské skupiny *Deset let poté* je dobře vidět, že mezi sovětským disentem neexistovalo pochopení pro specifiku procesů, které probíhaly během různých období v Československu. Pro sovětské disidenty Pražské jaro a Charta 77 byly vlastně různými projevy stejného protestu, podobnými opozičními akty. Ludmila Alexejevová vzpomínala, jak tento postoj bývalých sovětských disidentů překvapoval Václava Havla, který navštívil Moskvu v roce 2007.³⁸ Dokument *Deset let poté* ve zkrácení uvádím v Příloze 7.

V samizdatu též kolovalo například Vyhlášení 9 moskevských obránců lidských práv za propuštění českých politických vězňů V. Havla, J. Lederera, F. Pavlíčka a O. Ornesta.³⁹

36 Otkrytoe pismo grupy sovětskych graždan v Nacionalnoe sobranie ČSSR s prizyvom osvobodit' politzaključennych, arestovannyh v 1971-72 gg v Čechoslovakii, 20 avgusta 1972 g. In: *Sobranie dokumentov samizdata*, D. 24, 1977, s. p. (AC 1288).

37 V podderžku „Chartii-77“ (12. února 1977). In: *Sobranie dokumentov samizdata*, D.30, 1978, s. 262 – 263, (AC 2966). Dokument má 62 podpisov.

38 Památný večer věnovaný Václavu Havlovi. Moskva, 23. 12. 2011.

39 Zajavlenie 9 moskovskich pravozaščitnikov s trebovaniem osvoboždenia češskich politzaključennych V. Gavela, I. Lederera, F. Pavlinčeka i O. Oresta (!). Moskva 1978. In: *Materialy Samizdata*, AC 3367. Sovmestnoe zajavlenie polských i sovětskych pravoza-

31. července 1979 se objevilo společné prohlášení KOS-KOR a sovětských disidentů (Moskevská helsinská skupina, Pracovní komise vyšetřující využívání psychiatrie v politických účelech atd, vcelku 21 lidí) s výzvou na obranu 10 signatářů Charty 77, zatknutých 29. května 1979.⁴⁰

V dokumentu č. 107 (30. října 1979) Moskevská helsinská skupina vyjádřila solidaritu s „odvážnými a ušlechtilými lidmi Havlem, Uhlem, Bendou, Dienstbierem, Bednařovou, Němcovou“, kteří byli v roce 1979 souzení. Autoři dokumentu konstatují: „Soud v Praze nad šesti účastníky hnutí Charta 77 a členy Výboru na obranu nespravedlivě stíhaných je zlověstnou fraškou a parodií na justici. Takoveto soudy dobře známe ze zkušeností soudních procesů nad sovětskými obránci lidských práv. Toto jsou soudy, kde chybí glasnost, kde obžalovaní jsou fakticky zbaveni práva na obhajobu a kde o rozsudku je rozhodnuto předem“.⁴¹

Podobnou situaci, jak se zdá, můžeme pozorovat i v českém občanském disentu. Nehledíc na komplikovanost vztahů Čechů a Slováků se sovětskými občany po srpnu 1968, ti, kteří se postavili proti režimu v Sovětském svazu, vyvolávali ovšem v českém disentu respekt. V samizdatu kolovaly texty Solženicyna, Šalamova, Bukovského a dalších.⁴² Ale pokud je mi známo, nedá se říct, že příběh sovětských disidentů měl nějaké významnější místo mezi tématy, kterým se věnovali čeští občanští disidenti – určité mj. též z důvodů nedostatečné informovanosti. Avšak Výbor na obranu nespravedlivě stíhaných vyjádřil podporu sovětským politickým vězňům – Juriju Orlovovi, Zviadovi Gamsachurdia, Alexandrovi Ginzburgovi, Anatolijovi Ščaranskému aj.⁴³

Několik dokumentů Charty 77 jsou věnované akademiku Sacharovovi. Mimo jiné proto, že byl to právě akademik Sacharov, který se pokusil prolomit hranice mezi hnutím odporu v Sovětském svazu a Českosloven-

ščitnikov. In: *Dokumenty Moskovskoj Helsinsksoj grupy*, 1976 – 1982. Moskva, 2006, s. 391 – 392.

40 Sovmestnoe zavajlenie poľskich i sovětskich pravozaščitnikov. In: *Dokumenty Moskovskoj Helsinsksoj grupy*, s. 391 – 392.

41 O sude nad šestju čechoslovackimi pravozaščitnikami. In: *Dokumenty Moskovskoj Helsinsksoj grupy*, s. 420.

42 1983, 14. 5., Praha. Dopis mezinárodnímu centru PEN-klubu v Paříži o zabavování a ničení děl umělecké a vědecké literatury (dokument 238 nebo 14/83), příloha 1: Rukopisy a strojopisy zabavené při domovních prohlídkách. In: CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, B. – PREČAN, V. (eds.): *Charta 77. Dokumenty 1977 – 1989. Díl 1: 1977 – 1983*. Praha 2007, s. 508 – 512.

43 Sdělení VONS č. 63 (4. 1. 1979). In: *Informace o Chartě 77*, č. 1, 1979, s. 7.

sku. Napsal dopis *Obhájčům lidských práv v Polsku a Československu*⁴⁴, podepsaný též Moskevskou helsinskou skupinou: „*Drazí přátelé, tento dopis Vám adresujeme s nadějí, že poslouží jako východisko pro pravidelnější kontakty a pro sjednocení našeho úsilí v zápase za lidská práva v Polsku, Československu a Sovětském svazu. Doufáme, že úplnější seznámení s našimi dopisy, prohlášeními, dokumenty a články nám navzájem umožní dospět k definitivnímu přesvědčení, že máme stejné obecné názory a že vycházíme z principů, které potvrzují nutnost dodržování lidských práv všude a vždy, bez ohledu na národní a státní hranice [...] Současně by zřejmě bylo vhodné učinit společné prohlášení obhájců lidských práv v Polsku, Československu a Sovětském svazu, v němž by se poukázalo na obecné zákonitosti ve vztahu k lidským právům v našich zemích. Uvědomující si specifické postavení Sovětského svazu vůči Československu a Polsku, považujeme za svůj úkol bojovat rovněž proti porušování lidských práv ve Vašich zemích. Přitom považujeme pro nás všechny za přirozené vystupovat na obranu obhájců lidských práv, ať už jsou pronásledováni v kterékoliv zemi*“.⁴⁵

Charta 77 předložila akademikovi a jeho kolegům následující odpověď: „*Děkujeme za Váš dopis i za morální podporu, jíž je nám Váš postoj v něm vyjádřený. S obdivem a sympatiemi sledujeme Vaši činnost směřující k důslednému dodržování zákonných ustanovení i mezinárodních závazků v oblasti lidských práv... Souhlasíme s názorem, že vzhledem ke společenské a politické struktuře našich zemí máme s Vámi i s polskými přáteli mnoho podobných či stejných problémů. Rádi se zúčastníme práce, která by vyjádřila tyto společné problémy i naznačila možnosti jejich řešení*“.⁴⁶

V roce 1980 Charta zaslala na sovětské velvyslanectví v Praze dopis na podporu akademika, který byl vykázán do města Gorkij (nyní Nižnij Novgorod).⁴⁷ V následujícím roce Charta gratulovala Sacharovovi k jeho 60. narozeninám a vysoko ocenila zásluhy této vynikající osobnosti: „*Pře-*

44 SACHAROV A.: Pravozaščitnikam Polši i Českoslovakii [1.srpna – 23.října 1979], datování podle: *Andrej Dmitrievič Sacharov. Bibliografičeskij spravodnik*, t. 1: Trudy Sacharova. Moskva 2006. URL <<http://www.sakharov-center.ru/sakharov/works/biblsprav.php>>

45 Překlad v poznámce č. 1 k citovanému níž dokumentu.

46 1979, 6. 11., Praha. Odpověď na dopis akademika Andreje Sacharova a dalších obhájců lidských práv v SSSR. In: CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, B. – PREČAN, V. (eds.): *Charta 77. Dokumenty 1977 – 1989. Díl 1*, s. 281 – 282.

47 1980, 28. 10., Praha (dokument č. 132). Dopis Velvyslanectví SSSR v Praze protestující proti perzekuci A. D. Sacharova. In: CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, B. – PREČAN, V. (eds.): *Charta 77. Dokumenty 1977 – 1989. Díl 1*, s. 302.

jeme Vám k Vašemu životnímu jubileu, aby... zaznělo pro ostatní jako výzva, která ukazuje cestu k smysluplnému životu a jejíž naplňování je jedinou nadějí pro skutečný pokrok“.⁴⁸ V roce 1987 Charta krátce poblahopřála akademikovi, který se právě vrátil z vyhnanství, k Novému roku.⁴⁹ V roce 1989 Charta poslala Jeleně Bonnerové kondolenci k úmrtí Sacharova.⁵⁰ Připomeňme, že od roku 1971 si s akademikem dopisoval zakladatel Nadace Charty 77 František Janouch.⁵¹

Jak je vidět, kontakty občanského disentu v Sovětském svazu a v Československu nebyly velké. Na konci 80. let se Chartě podařilo navázat jisté kontakty s moskevským disidentským klubem *Glasnost* a Společností *Memorial*. Pro mezinárodní konferenci, kterou uspořádal klub *Glasnost*, Charta připravila programový dokument o svém ponětí lidských a občanských práv.⁵²

V dokumentu mj. stálo: „*Píšeme tento dopis jako občané země, která před dvaceti lety přežila pokus o demokratizaci politického, hospodářského, sociálního a kulturního života. Tento čs. pokus, který měl plnou podporu většiny občanů, byl potlačen a posléze zmařen intervencí pěti armád Varšavského paktu v srpnu 1968. Myslíme si, že vojenská intervence v Československu nebo později v Afghánistánu, nevojenská intervence v Polsku i všechny jiné intervence cizích mocností do životů národů a občanů, at se dějí kdekoli na světě, nejsou jen věcí politiků, vojáků a diplomatů, ale musí se stát předmětem pozornosti a jednání humanitárních fór [...] Znovu opakujeme požadavek, že sovětská vojska by měla být z Československa stažena*“.⁵³

48 1981, 7. 5., Praha (dokument č. 175), Blahopřejný dopis Andreji Sacharovovi k 60. narozeninám, In: CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, B. – PREČAN, V. (eds.): *Charta 77. Dokumenty 1977 – 1989. Díl 1*, s. 381.

49 1987, 3. 1. Praha (dokument č. 360, nebo 4 / 87), Novoroční blahopřání Andreji D. Sacharovovi, In: CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, B. – PREČAN, V. (eds.): *Charta 77. Dokumenty 1977 – 1989. Díl 1*, s. 821.

50 Dopis Jeleně G. Bonnerové k úmrtí Andreje D. Sacharova (dokument 596 nebo 74/89), In: CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, B. – PREČAN, V. (eds.): *Charta 77. Dokumenty 1977 – 1989. Díl 1*, s. 1173.

51 JANOUCH, F.: *Ne, nestěžuji si*, s. 80.

52 1987, 6. 12., Praha. Dopis nezávislému semináři k otázkám lidských práv v Moskvě se stanoviskem Charty 77 k pojetí, obsahu a uplatňování lidských a občanských práv (dokument 434, nebo č. 76/87). In: CÍSAŘOVSKÁ, B. – PREČAN, V. (eds.): *Charta 77. Dokumenty 1977 – 1989, Díl 2: 1984 – 1989*. Praha 2007, s. 959 – 961.

53 Tamtéž, s. 960.

Mezi usneseními přijatými na semináři byla i výzva k přehodnocení událostí srpna 1968. V Moskvě Chartu 77 představoval Jan Urban (měl tam též být přítomen Věněk Šilhan, ale zadrželi ho na letišti).⁵⁴ Vztah k českému disentu v prostředí opozičně naladěných Rusů, ale i úroveň informovanosti o jeho aktivitách vyčerpávajícím způsobem charakterizuje jeho výpověď, citovaná v českých *Informacích o církvi*: “*Máme tam tolik přátel, že si to ani nedovedeme představit. Prestiž Charty, její morální váha je obrovská, i když o Chartě je známo jen málo. Většina nezná ani základní prohlášení, základní myšlenky, strukturu Charty a způsoby práce. Důsledek naší účasti na semináři je ten, že pokud by nás dnes letělo do Moskvy sto padesát, pak všechny sto padesát kamarádi ubytují, budou žít a budou čekat na každé naše slovo*“.⁵⁵

V dubnu 1989 Charta 77 zaslala v Rusku nově ustavené Společnosti Memorial návrh na uspořádání společného východoevropského semináře o stalinismu v Praze;⁵⁶ nepodařilo se mi zjistit, jestli se jí dostalo nějaké odpovědi.

Úplně jiný postoj a jiný stupeň zájmu o Rusko projevovaly skupiny katolického disentu v Československu. I v Praze samé existovali lidé, kteří pašovali do Sovětského svazu Bible ve velkém, pomocí letadel.⁵⁷ Na misijnářské cesty chodil do Ruska například Dušan Špiner, kterého vysvětil za biskupa Felix Maria Davídek – měl dobré kontakty s polským klérem, a když byl v roce 1981 v Polsku vyhlášen výjimečný stav a Poláci prakticky ztratili možnost cestování, právě jeho kardinál Wysziński požádal, aby podle možnosti převzal rozběhnuté záležitosti v Rusku.⁵⁸ Mimo jiné byl zapleten do příběhu, který KGB využilo ke svým účelům – vysvětil totiž v řeckokatolickém ritu Vladimíra Nikiforova, blízkého spolupracovníka O. Alexandra Meně (možná stojí za to poznamenat, že se to neuskutečnilo v Moskvě, ale na Slovensku, a i to proto, že se Nikiforovi nepodařilo setkat

54 Tamtéž, pozn. 3, s. 961.

55 Účast Charty 77 na moskevském semináři. In: *Informace o Chartě*, č. 17 (1987), s. 7 – 8.

56 1989, 17. 4., Praha. Dopis sovětské nezávislé společnosti Memorial s návrhem uspořádat v Praze společný východoevropský seminář o stalinismu (dokument 544 nebo 31/89). In: ČISAŘOVSKÁ, B. – PREČAN, V. (eds.): *Charta 77. Dokumenty 1977 – 1989. Díl 1*, s. 1111 – 1112.

57 Archiv autorky, rozhovor s Pavlem Hradílkem 1. 12. 2011, Trenčianske Teplice.

58 Archiv autorky, rozhovor s Dušanem Špinerem 31. 5. 2010, Olomouc.

s polským biskupem, který ho měl vysvětit).⁵⁹ Později v Moskvě (v roce 1982) vysvětil též na řeckokatolického kněze Sergeje Nikolenka, taky člověka původně blízkého Meňovi, ale uchváceného Vladimírem a duchovní svobodou, kterou našel v katolictví.⁶⁰ Ze strany KGB dost rychle začal tlak na tuto katolickou skupinu; konečně počátkem roku 1983 byl Nikiforov zajištěn a zůstal ve vězení skoro do konce tohoto roku. Pojmenoval hodně lidí, včetně těch, kteří s jeho skupinou neměli nic společného. Na základě tohoto svědectví mnozí lidé ztratili práci, někteří byli donuceni emigrovat. V roce 1988 emigroval i Nikiforov s manželkou; momentálně působí jako kněz v Londýně. Sergej Nikolenko působí v Moskvě; oba ale museli podstoupit svěcení pod podmínkou. KGB udělalo z toho vzorový příběh, který měl ilustrovat špionáž Vatikánu v Sovětském svazu.⁶¹ V propagační knížce *CIA proti SSSR* je osudu Nikiforova věnováno hodně místa⁶². Nicméně, podle mínění Sergeje Nikolenka, hlavním účelem operace s Nikiforovem bylo vyvinutí tlaku na Alexandra Meně, a tato operace se podařila.

Po roce 1990 hráli značnou roli v obnovení katolických struktur v Sovětském svazu slovenští kněží ze *Společenství Fatima*. Snažili se působit na Rusko v křesťanském duchu ještě během sovětského období. Jádro této komunity tvořili žáci Tomislava Kolakoviče, kterému je věnován jiný příspěvek v tomto sborníku. Tito žáci, Vladimír Jukl a Silvester Krčméry, svědčili později, že Kolakovič přišel na Slovensko právě proto, aby tu našel pomocníky pro evangelizaci Ruska.⁶³

Kněz Pavol Benko vzpomíná, že když v roce 1971 maturoval, tak Sovětský svaz spíš nenáviděl – nejen kvůli invazi z roku 1968, ale i proto, že jeho rodná vesnice během 2. světové války neměla dobrou zkušenost se sovětskými vojáky. Nicméně postupně svůj vztah změnil, a jeho modlitby začaly patřit obrácení Ruska. Dozvěděl se, že existuje komunita, která sdílí jeho zájem, a tak se dostal do okruhu Silvestra Krčméryho a Vladimíra

59 Svědectví Dušana Špinera a P. Vladimíra Nikiforova. Rozhlasový program „S christianskoj točky zrenia“ na Radio Svoboda, vedoucí P. Jakov Krotov. Vysílání 31. 12. 2011. URL <<http://www.svobodanews.ru/audio/broadcastprogram/478026.html>>

60 Archiv autorky. Tu a dál vycházím především z rozhovoru s P. Sergejem Nikolenko 23. 4. 2011 v Moskvě.

61 Archiv autorky. Okolnosti zpravodajské hry popisuje P. Alexandr Chmelnickij v rozhovoru s autorkou 30. 8. 2010 v Moskvě.

62 JAKOVLEV, N.: CRU proti SSSR: gospod' i bomba. In: *Oktabr*, 1987, č. 3. s. 154 – 157.

63 KRČMÉRY, S. – JUKL, V.: *V slapajach Kolakoviča: Spomienky na duchovné začiatky a stretnutia s pátrom Kolakovičom*. Bratislava 1996, s. 4.

Jukla – i když říká, že tato jeho cesta byla spíš výjimečná. Otec Pavol vzpomíná: „*Bol tu ten prístup Matky Božej z Fatimy – zasvätenie Ruska. V Československu sme veľmi silno pocitovali ten ateistický režim, ktorý bol v Sovietskom zväze. [...] Uvedomovali sme si jednu vec, že ak sa má udiat nejaká zmena v Československu, u nás, bude to možné len vtedy, keď sa udeje nejaká zmena v Sovietskom zväze. Z toho taký pragmatický moment – pomôcť evanjelizácii tam.*”⁶⁴ Pavol Benko se nikdy nedostal ani do Sovětského svazu, ani do Ruska: v roce 1985 byl už připraven vycestovat, ale zadrželi ho na hranici.⁶⁵

Patrónkou Společenství od počátku byla Panna Maria Fatimská. Druhé z třech Fatimských tajemství znělo takto: „*Přeji si zasvětit Rusko mému Neposkrvněnému Srdci [...] Jestliže má přání lidé vyplní, Rusko se obrátí a nastane tam mír; pokud ale ne, rozšíří se jeho bludy po celém světě a zapříčiní války a pronásledování Církve [...] Nakonec ale mé Neposkrvněné Srdce zvítězí. Svátý otec mi zasvětil Rusko a ono se obrátí, a po celém světě zavládne mír*“. Vladimír Jukl vzpomínal: „*Od návratu z väzenia sme so Silvom cítili, že evanjelizácia Ruska je naše poslanie*”.⁶⁶ „*Ten Silvo mi hovoril, že keď ho zavreli a keď ho odsúdili, že už vtedy počas vyšetrovačky on obetoval svoj život Pánu Bohu za obrátenie Ruska [...] Oni to žili. Oni nejakým spôsobom niesli tú Fatimu, lebo obrátenie Ruska bolo pre nich touto Fatimou [...] To je nejaká osudová afinita Slovenska k Rusku a ku kresťanstvu*”.⁶⁷

Kněz ze Společenství Fatima Peter Murdza (1954 – 2009) též vzpomíná: „*Naša komunita sa od svojho vzniku orientovala na pomoc kresťanom v Rusku [...] Išlo nám o to, aby každý z nás bol vo svojom svedomí zodpovedný za nejakú časť. Predovšetkým, aby sa modlil za ľudí na tomto území, a pokiaľ to bolo možné, aby sa našli kontakty na miestnych kresťanov*”.⁶⁸ Peter Murdza dostal příležitost vycestovat do Sovětského svazu v roce 1984, ale tyto návštěvy se nestaly pravidelnými.⁶⁹ Uzavřenost normalizačního Československa byla tak velká, že tajní kněží ani nemohli jet do Sovětského svazu, nebo jak většinou říkali Ruska, dost často. Mohli se tam dostat

64 Archiv autorky. Rozhovor s Pavlom Benkom, 18. 6. 2010, Trenčín.

65 Tamtéž.

66 JUKL, V.: Gabriel. In: ŠIMULČÍK, J. (ed.): *Zápas o nádej: Z kroniky tajných kňazov 1969 – 1989*. Prešov 2000, s. 57.

67 Archiv autorky. Rozhovor s Františkom Mikloškom, 22. 4. 2010, Bratislava.

68 MURDZA, P.: Vendelín. In: ŠIMULČÍK, J. (ed.): *Zápas o nádej*, s. 147.

69 Tamtéž, s. 147 – 148.

v rámci turistického zájezdu, pracovně nebo na soukromé pozvání, ale ve všech případech vycestování se zřídka obcházelo bez potíží. Během každé cesty členové společenství využívali všechny možnosti, aby navázali kontakty s křesťany v SSSR – ovšem bez rozdílu konfesí. Někdy takové cesty nepřinášeli své ovoce – Pavol Benko vzpomíná, jak někdo hledal v tehdejšímu Leningradě katolický kostel celý týden.⁷⁰ Nicméně na každou cestu členové komunity vozili s sebou Bible v ruštině.⁷¹

Tajně vysvěcený kněz Vladimír Jukl vzpomínal, že svou první veřejnou mši svatou sloužil v Tbilisi v roce 1976; pak sloužil též v Kyjevě, Moskvě, Leningradě; v Tallině vedl duchovní cvičení.⁷² Matematik a tajně vysvěcený kněz Rudolf Fiby pravidelně cestoval služebně do Novosibirsku; v letech 1985 – 1990 tam jezdil dvakrát do roka, se zastávkou v Moskvě.⁷³ Vícekrát cestoval do Ruska před rokem 1989 i František Novajovský; v roce 1988 dokonce dokázal tajně celebrovat mši svatou v Uspenském chrámě Moskevského Kremla⁷⁴, jak to udělal v roce 1984 biskup Pavol Hnilica.⁷⁵ Několikrát před rokem 1990 do Sovětského svazu vycestoval Jozef Gunčaga⁷⁶, o kterém jiní kněží *Společenství* říkají, že jim otevřel cestu do Ruska v nových poměrech; v letech 1984 – 1989 tam jezdil s dalšími členy *Společenství* Viktor Jakubov, který v té době ale ještě nebyl knězem.⁷⁷ V Rusku pobýval i Silvester Krčmery.⁷⁸ Počátkem 80. let na postgraduálních studiích v Moskvě pobýval mladý Dušan Krajčovič z téhož *Společenství* (nebyl ale určitě sám). Seznámil se s prostředím Meňe, dostal se do skupiny Vladimíra Nikiforova a odnesl důsledky, které patřily všem členům této skupiny.⁷⁹

Po roce 1990, když katolická církev dostala možnost působit v Rusku veřejně, pastorskou práci na tomto území vykonávali a vykonávají hodně

70 Archiv autorky. Rozhovor s Pavlom Benkom, 18. 6. 2010, Trenčín.

71 Archiv autorky. Rozhovor s Františkom Mikloškom 22. 4. 2010, Bratislava.

72 JUKL, V.: Gabriel, s. 57 – 58.

73 FIBY, R.: Hugo. In: ŠIMULČÍK, J. (ed.): *Zápas o nádej*, s. 88.

74 NOVAJOVSKÝ, F.: Cyril. In: ŠIMULČÍK, J. (ed.): *Zápas o nádej*, s. 138.

75 HNILICA, P. – VNUK, F.: *Rozhovory o ľuďoch, udalostiach a Božej доброте*. Bratislava 2001, s. 157 – 161.

76 GUNČAGA, J.: Karol. In: ŠIMULČÍK, J. (ed.): *Zápas o nádej*, s. 109.

77 Archiv autorky. Rozhovor s Viktorom Jakubovom, 26. 4. 2010, Bratislava.

78 Archiv autorky. Rozhovor s Alexandrom Chmalnickim, 30. 8. 2010, Moskva.

79 FIBY, R.: Hugo, s. 88 – 90.

kněží ze slovenského společenství. Působili tu například páter František Kapusňák, páter Viktor Jakubov; od roku 1990 tu působí páter Jozef Gunga; pracuje tu také páter Jozef Roman, nyní ale člen řehole verbistů.

Na závěr je nutné konstatovat, že události roku 1968 v Československu měly velký význam pro utváření názorů sovětských občanů na politiku vlastní země. Pražské jaro hodně lidí v Sovětském svazu vnímalo jako vzor pro vývoj sovětské společnosti, a jeho brutální potlačení je donutilo přemýšlet o otázkách zodpovědnosti a spoluviny. Skutečné kontakty mezi občanskými disidenty v těchto krajinách byly ale dost nepatrné. Zvláštní kapitolu v dějinách kontaktů mezi Československem a Sovětským svazem tvoří činnost křesťanských aktivistů; tento příběh ještě čeká na svoje zpracování.

Prílohy

Dokument č. 1

1968, 28. července, Moskva. Pjotr Grigorenko, Alexej Kosterin, V. Pavlinčuk, Sergej Pisarev, Ivan Jachymovič.

Otevřený dopis komunistům Československa a všemu československému národu.⁸⁰

K členům KSČ, ke všemu československému národu

Sovětské vedení, znepokojené rozvojem vnitřně politické situace v Československu, v poslední době učinilo taková prohlášení a přijalo taková opatření, která byla ohodnocena drtivou většinou světové veřejnosti, včetně komunistické, jako pokus vměšovat se do vnitřních československých záležitostí. Dokonce jsou vyjadřovány obavy, že vládnoucí vrstvy naší krajiny mají záměr v případě nepříznivého, z jejich pohledu, vývoje událostí použít ozbrojené složky. Vzniku podobných obav napomáhá tendenční a jednostranné osvětlení událostí v Československu v sovětském tisku, s čím nemůže souhlasit aktivně myslící část našeho národa.

My, sovětští komunisté, dobře poznáme charakter svého národa, jeho mírumilovnost a pocit upřímného přátelství k československému národu,

80 Překlad podle: GRIGORENKO, P. – KOSTERIN, A. – PAVLINČUK V. – PISAREV, S. – JACHYMOVIČ, I.: Otkrytoe pismo kommunistam Českoslovakii, ko vsemu čechoslovackomu narodu. In: *Sobranie dokumentov samizdata 1*, 1972, s. p. (AC 108), s. 1.

a proto pokládáme takovéto obavy za neodůvodněné. Stranické a státní vedení, které by rozvázalo válku v Evropě, tím víc proti přátelské národně socialistické zemi, rychle by zdiskreditovalo samo sebe a ztratilo by důvěru národa.

Dokument č. 2.

Výňatek ze vzpomínkové knihy GRIGORENKO, P.: *V podzemí potkáš jen krysy*. Moskva 1997, s. 476 – 478.⁸¹

V předvečer plánované cesty k Čechoslovákům (československému velvyslanectví, kde Grigorenko a Jachymovič chtěli odevzdat svůj dopis na podporu Pražského jara – EG.) jsem byl na návštěvě u Kosterina. Byli jsme sami. Zase jsme mluvili o možnosti intervence. Zase oba jsme vyjádřili přesvědčení, že není možná. Ale něco mě trápilo. A nakonec jsem neodolal: „Víš, Aljošo, nedává mi pokoj moje svědomí vojáka. Jako voják, jsem zvyklý myslet, že nic nemožné neexistuje. To nejnemožnější je nejpravděpodobnější. Když rozhodneš, že něco není možné a přestaneš si dávat pozor, právě odtud přijde útok. Na místě Čechoslováků, přece bych se připravil odrážet invazi. Když nebude, no dobře. Vrátime se na obvyklé pozice. A když bude, okupant dostane do huby. Navíc, obránit Československo je snadný úkol. Rakouská hranice je v bezpečí. Maďarská taktéž. Maďarsko má tak málo ozbrojených složek, že se ho dá prostě zastrašit. Takže jen hranice SSSR, Polska a NDR – méně než tucet silnic, a když se uzavřou, tak se dá zastavit pohyb tankových armád. Když k tomu dodáme obranu též nevelkého počtu letišť, náhlá invaze nebude možná. A když nebude možná náhlá, nebude možná žádná. To může dokonce vyústit v úplnou katastrofu pro útočníky. Já bych udělal nejen to, ale též varoval Brežněva, že v případě útoku se budu bránit, prohlásím, že vlast je v nebezpečí. I když Brežněv je dub, ale neodvážá se na válku. Jediná jeho naděje – překvapení. Válka je pro něj šílenstvím, zvláště když československá armáda je nejefektivnější ve východní Evropě, a lidé, jak jsme to viděli, jednomyslně podporují svoji vládu. Vojenské dobrodružství v těchto podmínkách může stát Brežněvovi a jeho vládě hlavu. Československý odboj může iniciovat protiříšské destruktivní síly v NDR, Polsku, ale i v Sovětském svazu.“

- Dej Bůh! - řekl Alexej. Pak dodal vážně.- No, napiš o tom Dubčekovi. Přímo takhle napiš: já, jakožto i moji přátelé, pokládám invazi za nemož-

81 GRIGORENKO, P.: *V podpoľje možno vstretit' tolko krys*. Moskva 1997.

nou, ale jako voják pokládám za nutné se připravit na to nejhorší. A předej tuto zprávu v zalepené obálce, s poznámkou “Osobně”.

Tak jsem to udělal. Ale napsal jsem to ne jako bezprostřední radu. Báť jsem se, či spíše nevyučoval jsem možnost, že moje zpráva se dostane do rukou KGB. Pokud by k tomu došlo, text by neměl dávat bezprostřední důvod pro obvinění z vlastizrady. Proto jsem nenapsal to jako radu, ale vyjádřil jsem svůj obdiv práci, kterou vykonává. Přál jsem mu hodně úspěchů a pevné zdraví, a na závěr dodal něco jako: “*Nemyslím si, že by skuteční komunisté bránili Vaši ušlechtilé práci, tím víc nevěřím v možnost sovětské intervence. Brežněv je komunista, a taky voják. Chápe, že Československo může velmi snadno zneškodnit sovětskou invazi. Stačí vzít pod kontrolu hlavní silnice z NDR, Polska a Sovětského svazu a organizovat obranu letišť. Maďarsko lze snadno zastavit jednoduchou hrozbou odvety. Brežněv chápe, že celé to by vyvolalo válku, která je v dnešních podmínkách nebezpečná pro Sovětský svaz stejně jako pro Československo.*”⁸²

Věřil jsem, že Dubček by mohl to vzít jako radu, a když se lístek dostane do KGB, řeknu, že jsem v soukromém dopise uvažoval o věcech všeobecně známých, a nedotýkal jsem se žádného státního nebo vojenského tajemství. O tomto dopise jsem neřekl ani svému kolegovi Ivanu Jachymoviči. Lístek jsem potajmu od Ivana dal do kapsy pracovníkovi velvyslanectví, který s námi mluvil. Velvyslanec v té době pobýval v Československu.

Dokument č. 3

1968, podzim, Sovětský svaz. Dva příklady protestních letáků, které se šířily r. 1968 v SSSR⁸³.

Kamarádi, přátelé!

Nedůvěřujte falešným výmyslům sovětského tisku a rozhlasu o událostech v Československu. Nikdo tam naše vojska nepozýval. Vpadly tam navzdory přáním československého lidu a vlády, vtrhly tam, aby zardousily

82 I když nejsem odborničkou na sovětské vojenské dějiny, chci podpořit úvahu Pjotra Grigorenka o nebezpečí války pro Sovětský svaz odkazem na výše citovanou knihu: SUVOROV, V.: *Osvoboditel*. Moskva 1993 (poprvé vydána v Londýně v r. 1981). Autor, sovětský exulant, vzpomíná, že armáda, která stála na hranicích Československa, nebyla bojeschopná, i když početná: počet měl zastrašit Američany, aby nešli případně Československu pomoci. Elektronická verze knihy je přístupná na URL <<http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov9/index.html>>

83 Překlad podle: NIKITIN, V. Čechoslovackaja tragedia: otkliki, uroki, vyvody (1971). In: *Sobranie dokumentov samizdata* 9, 1974, s.p. (AC 676; stránka dokumentu 6), s. 1.

svobodu, zase zavedly cenzuru tisku a vnutily národu režim bezpráví a zvůle. Intervence do Československa hanobí naši armádu, hanobí čest naší vlasti. Poslouchejte pravdu o událostech v Československu ve vysílání svobodného rozhlasu! Sdělujte informace, které uslyšíte v zprávách, vašim přátelům a známým! Posílejte osobní a kolektivní protesty proti sovětské agresi na ÚV KSČ, Nejvyšší radu, na sovětskou vládu, do OSN a na adresy velvyslanectví západních zemí! Zápas o svobodu v Československu je zápasem i za naši svobodu!

Kamarádi!

Napadení socialistického Československa vyvolalo rozhořčení mezi poctivými komunisty, demokraty a pokrokovou veřejností celého světa. Banda Brežněva-Kosygina pošlapala všechny normy mezinárodního práva. Informace TASS o kontrarevolučním převratu, který je jakoby připravován v Československu, jsou lež a provokace! Stejná lež a provokace je i publikované v našem tisku “pozvání” sovětských vojsk do Československa jménem... nějaké anonymní skupiny stranických a státních činitelů!

Účel pobytu sovětských vojsk v ČSSR není pomoc československému národu a komunistům (nikdo je neohrožoval), ale strach před uskutečňující se v SSSR demokratizací, strach před rozhodnutím československého lidu i jeho komunistické strany skončit ve své zemi se všemi přežitky stalinismu a zvůle.

Tajní stalinisté, kteří ovládli vedení naší strany a vlády, touží, aby vrhli naši krajinu zpět do “šťastných stalinských časů”, kdy celá naše země byla pokryta koncentračními tábory a kdy řídila ji Lubjanka. A proto válčí a nenávidí každé svobodné slovo! Vypořádali se s Československem, teď chtějí začít s „čistkou“ i v SSSR! Napadení ČSSR je přípravou na masové represe v naší vlasti!

Osudy komunismu, osudy naší země jsou v našich rukou, kamarádi! Organizujte podzemní skupiny komunistů-demokratů, leninistů! Rozšiřujte naše letáky! Povězte o nich svým přátelům! Dozvídejte se adresy vojáků okupační armády v ČSSR a pište jim dopisy-protesty! Buďte připraveni k boji!

Skupina komunistů-demokratů (leninistů)

Dokument č. 4

1968, 21. srpna, Moskva. Zpráva o vyjádřeních pracujících města Moskva v souvislosti se situací v Československu⁸⁴

Tajné

ÚV KSSS

[...]

V Ústavu automatizovaného zařízení kandidát technických věd, výzkumný pracovník Andronov, nečlen strany, prohlásil, že nechápe, kdo v Československu a ve jménu koho žádá o pomoc Sovětský svaz a další země, a navrhl hlasování na podporu rezoluci valné hromady pracovníků ústavu odložit do vyjasnění situace. Jeho projev byl odsouzen účastníky schůze.

[...]

Ředitel Centrálního studia televize Torstensen, nečlen strany, řekl: „*Naše činy nejsou v souladu s minulými prohlášeními o nevměšování do vnitřních záležitostí Československa*”.

Učitel 1. Moskevského státního pedagogického institutu cizích jazyků Korolkov věří, že „*naše vláda neměla žádné formální důvody pro vyslání vojsk na území Československa*”.

Pracovník filmového studia Gorkého Kazarjanc prohlásil: „*Sovětská vláda nekoná správně. Na bodácích naší armády se nedá vybudovat státní autorita. Jsem proti násilí*”.

Podobná tvrzení si dovolovali v rozhovorech inženýr Státního projektového a vědecko-výzkumného ústavu zemědělství (Giproniiselchoz) Petrov, chirurg nemocnice č.16 Sidorova, opalovač ve vědecko-výzkumném ústavu elektrovakuového skla (všichni jsou nečlenové strany).

[...]

Tajemník Moskevského MV KSSS

V. Grišin

84 Ruský státní archiv novějších dějin (ďalej iba RGANI), Moskva, fond (ďalej iba f.) 5, opis 60, svazek 1, listy 106 – 111.

Dokument č. 5

1968, 22. srpna, Moskva. Zpráva o organizační a politické práci Moskevské městské stranické organizace s cílem vysvětlit pracujícím Zprávu TASS z 22.srpna 1968 a materiálů zveřejněných v novinách *Pravda*.⁸⁵

Tajné

ÚV KSSS

[...]

Pracovník Ústřední dětské knihovny, člen skupinového výboru literátů při nakladatelství „Sovětský spisovatel“ Glocer, nečlen strany, prohlásil: *“To se zbláznili! Je to fašismus! Určitě bude válka, protože Američané nezradí ČSSR. Rusko bylo žandarmem Evropy a zůstává jím i nyní”*.

Ředitel laboratoře Ústředního ústavu leteckého inženýrství, člen KSSS Lebedev si myslí, že *„vyslání vojsk do Československa svědčí o naší porážce na ideologické frontě“*.

V Ústavu chemické fyziky AV SSSR proti rezoluci schůze o Prohlášení TASS hlasoval inženýr Samojlov, nečlen strany. Ve svém vystoupení vyjádřil názor, že každá země musí sama řešit své vnitřní správy.

[...]

Tajemník Moskevského MV KSSS
V. Grišin

Dokument č. 6

1968, 26. srpna, Kaluga. Zpráva⁸⁶

Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu

Okresní výbor města Kaluga

Tajné

ÚV KSSS

[...]

Vedoucí inženýr vědecko-výzkumného ústavu Lvovský V. M. v přítomnosti několika pracovníků ústavu vyjádřil politování nad vstupem našich vojsk do Československa a označil toto opatření jako předčasné. *“Češi sami mohli vyřešit svoje věci, prohlásil, teď jsme si udělali ostudu před celým*

85 Dokument je víckrát vydán, naposledy s německým překladem v: KARNER, S. – TOMILINA, N. – TSCHUBARJAN, A. (Eds.): *Prager Frühling. Das internationale Krisenjahr 1968*. Band 1: Dokumente. Köln; Weimar; Wien 2008, s. 1136.

86 RGANI, f. 5, opis 60, svazek 1, listy 97 – 99.

světem. Odpudili od sebe československý národ. Rumunům jsme dovolili stokrát horší chování, ale Češi jsou přece Slované, a my jsme tak krutě s nimi zacházeli”. Přítomní mu poskytli náležitá vysvětlení.

Tajemník Okresního výboru KSSS
A. Kandrenkov

Dokument č. 7

1968, 27. srpna, Moskva. Zpráva o reakcích a vyjádřeních pracujících města Moskva na materiály novin „Pravda“ v souvislosti se situací v Československu⁸⁷

Tajné
ÚV KSSS
[...]

Nicméně v posledních dnech v městě Moskva se objevily ojedinělé případy nežádoucích jevů, spojených se situací v Československu. V Dzeržinském, Oktijabrském, Leningradském obvodu 24. – 26. srpna t. r. bylo nalezeno několik letáků a napsů s politicky škodlivým obsahem, ve kterých se vyjadřoval nesouhlas s vysláním vojsk do ČSSR.

[...]

Tajemník Moskevského MV KSSS
V. Grišin

Dokument č. 8

1968, 29. srpna, Leningrad. [Zpráva]⁸⁸
ÚV KSSS

[...]

- Proč vyslali vojska do Československa, - řekl řezbář továrny na zpracování barevných kovů, nečlen strany I. A. Lajkov, - tam přece umírají naši vojáci. Je možné, že Československo nechce budovat socialismus. Proč nutíme je k tomu násilím?

Velitel oddělení 8. ozbrojené požární posádky okresu Dzeržinskij, nečlen strany V. P. Akimov: „Neměli jsme intervenovat do Československa. Sami si poradí. Máme víc dávat pozor na vlastní záležitosti. Hasiči mají velice nízké mzdy, proto nikdo nechce tu pracovat.“

87 RGANI, f. 5, opis 60, svazek 24, listy 139 – 143.

88 RGANI, f. 5, opis 60, svazek 1, listy 116 – 120.

[...]

Tajemník Leningradského Okresního výboru KSSS
Romanov**Dokument č. 9**

1968, 4. září, Moskva. O náladách duchovenstva ve spojení s československými událostmi⁸⁹

Tajné

ÚV KSSS

[...]

Spolu se správným hodnocením událostí v Československu vyskytují se mezi duchovenstvem negativní a pomlouvačná vyjádření. Například, někteří kněží prohlásili toto:

Kněz Gerasimovič (město Kalinin⁹⁰): Celý tento příběh s bratrskou pomocí je důkazem toho, že socialistický režim byl nastolen v Československu silou zbraní a teď se tam drží jen díky brutálnímu násilí.

Protoierej Medvědskij (město Leningrad): Musím se upřímně přiznat, že jsem neslyšel, aby někdo schvaloval intervenci vojsk Varšavské smlouvy do Československa. Velice málo víme o tom, co se stalo, ale překvapuje nás, jak to, že po dlouhých jednáních a konečných rozhodnutích v Bratislavě [...] všechno se tak nečekaně zvrátilo.

[...]

Děláme taky opatření k posílení práce s duchovenstvem, k přerušování pokusů jednotlivých kněží ve spojení s událostmi v Československu rozšiřovat mezi věřícími nezdravou náladu, zlostné výmysly buržoazní propagandy.

Předseda
Rady pro náboženské záležitosti v rámci Rady Ministrů SSSR
V. Kuroedov

89 RGANI, f. 5, opis 60, svazek 24, listy 151 – 156.

90 Nyní Tver'.

Dokument č. 10

1969, únor, Moskva. Petr Grigorenko, Ivan Jachymovič. Otevřený dopis občanům Sovětského svazu.⁹¹

K občanům Sovětského svazu!

Kampaň sebeupálení, kterou začal 16. ledna 1969 pražský student Jan Palach na znamení protestu proti zásahu do vnitřních záležitostí ČSSR, nekončí. Ještě jedna, doposud poslední živá pochodeň vzplála na Václavském (sic! – EG) náměstí v Praze 21. února.

Tento protest, který se oblekl do takové podivné formy, je adresován především nám, sovětským lidem. Tato nevíтанá, ničím neodůvodněná přítomnost našich vojsk vyvolává takový hněv a zoufalství v československém národě. Ne nadarmo smrt Jana Palacha rozvířila celé pracující Československo.

Všichni neseme část viny za jeho konec, jako i za smrt dalších ukončivších vlastní život československých bratrů. Svou podporou vstupu vojsk, jeho omluvou či jen mlčením napomáháme tomu, aby živé pochodně i nadál plály na náměstích Prahy a jiných měst. Češi a Slováci vždy nás pokládali za své bratry. Opravdu připustíme, aby slovo “sovětský” pro ně zůstalo synonymem slova “nepřítel”?!

Velikost země nespočívá v moci její armád, které obsadily nepočtený, svobodmilovný národ, ale v její mravní síle. Skutečně budeme i nadále mlčky nahlížet, jak umírají naši bratři?!

Teď už je všem jasné, že přítomnost našich vojsk na území ČSSR není vyvolána ani zájmy obrany naší krajiny, ani zájmy zemí socialistického sdružení.

Skutečně nenajdeme odvahu uznat, že je spáchaná tragická chyba, a udělat všechno, co je v našich silách, pro její nápravu? To je naše právo a naše povinnost!

Vyzýváme všechny sovětské lidi, aby nedopouštěli se bezohledných činů, ale pomocí všech legálních prostředků bojovali za vyvedení sovětských vojsk z Československa a rezignaci na vměšování do jejich vnitřních

91 Překlad podle: GRIGORENKO, P. – JACHYMOVIČ, I.: Otkrytoe pismo graždanam Sovetskogo Sojuza (únor 1969). In: *Sobranie dokumentov samizdata 1*, 1972, s.p. (AC 95), s. 1. Text byl zveřejněn v *Chronika tekusčich sobytij* (s. 177, roč. 2, č. 1) a přetištěn v knize Natalie Gorbaněvské *Poledne*, ale z důvodu, že tato kniha ještě v češtině nevyšla, uvádím dopis jako celek.

záležitostí! Jen touto cestou budeme moci obnovit přátelství mezi našimi národy.

Ať žije hrdinský československý národ!

Ať žije sovětsko-československé přátelství!

Pjotr Grigorenko.

Ivan Jachymovič.

Dokument č. 11

1969, 20. srpna, Moskva. Prohlášení v souvislosti s výročím invaze vojsk zemí Varšavské smlouvy do Československa.⁹²

21. srpna minulého roku se stala tragická událost: vojska zemí Varšavské smlouvy napadli přátelské Československo.

Tato akce měla za účel zabránit cestě demokratického rozvoje, kterou nastoupila tato krajina. Celý svět s nadějí pozoroval polednový vývoj Československa. Zdálo se, že myšlenka socialismu, zkompromitována během stalinského období, bude teď rehabilitována. Vojska zemí Varšavské smlouvy zničila tuto naději. V toto smutné výročí prohlašujeme, že stále nesouhlasíme s tímto rozhodnutím, které ohrožuje budoucnost socialismu.

Solidarizujeme se s národem Československa, který chtěl ukázat, že socialismus s lidskou tváří je možný.

Tyto řádky nám diktuje bolest za naši vlast, kterou chceme vidět skutečně velkou, svobodnou a šťastnou.

Jsmo pevně přesvědčení, že národ, který utlačuje jiné národy, nemůže být svobodný a šťastný.

T. Baeva, Ju. Višnevskaja, I. Gabaj, N. Gorbanevskaja,
Z. M. Grigorenko, M. Džemilev, N. Jemelkina, V. Krasin, S. Kovalev,
A. Levitin (Krasnov), L. Petrovskij, L. Plušč, G. Podjapolskij,
L. Ternovskij, I. Jakirová, P. Jakir, A. Jakobson.

92 Překlad podle: Zajavlenie po povodu godovščiny vtorženia vojsk stran Varšavskogo pakta v Čechoslovakiu (20. srpna 1969). In: *Sobranie dokumentov samizdata 4*, 1973, s. p. (AC 264), s. l. Tento text se též objevoval v exilovém časopisu *Posev* (prosinec 1969, s. 46).

Dokument č. 12

1978, 16. srpna, Moskva. Moskevská Helsinská skupina, dokument č. 58: Deset let poté.⁹³

Víc než před deseti lety mnozí sovětští občané se s překvapením a nadějí dozvěděli o Československém jaru.

Krátké zprávy v sovětských novinách nejprve nedovolovaly pochopit, co se tam děje. Mohli jsme se jen dohadovat, že události v této malé krajině s vysokou kulturou jsou proti srsti sovětskému vedení. Později jsme pochopili, že v Československu opravdu začala přestavba lidských vztahů na novém, liberálním základě. Jedno bylo nepochybné: žít tak, jak předtím, občané této země už nechtějí, probíhá aktivní a neomezené vládou hledání nových forem organizace společnosti sebe samou. Koná se duchovní obnova národa, který 20 let podléhal sovětizaci.

Vznikla naděje, že liberalizace Československa vyvolá k životu analogické procesy i v jiných zemích sovětského bloku, liberalizaci i v naší krajině.

Sovětská vojska, sovětské tanky, které napadly Československo 21. srpna 1968 roku, potlačily i oživující svobodu této země, i naši svobodu pod doprovod hlasitých prohlášení o „bratrské pomoci“, „internacionální povinnosti“ a pod.

Moskva silou zbraní zrušila liberalizaci ČSSR. Zdálo se, že všechny a všechno je beznadějně stlačeno, umlčeno. Ale odpor nepřestával. Charta 77 ukazuje, že národ Československa není zlomený, neztratil vůli k odporu, vůli zastávat svá práva a svobody. Jeden z tisíce podepsal Chartu. Je to velké procento za podmínek režimu, který trestá nejmenší ideologický nonkonformismus.

Přejeme hnutí na obranu lidských práv v Československu vydržet zkoušky a získat ještě větší podporu uvnitř své země a za jejími hranicemi.

Liberální hnutí v Československu a v Sovětském svazu má hodně společného. Není politické v úzkém slova smyslu. Nemá pevnou organizaci, nemá program. Neodpovídá zájmům nějaké konkrétní společenské vrstvy, ale v zásadě vyjadřuje zájmy každého, kdo chápe nutnost základních práv a svobod pro náležitý život člověka a národa.

Represivní charakter sovětského režimu se nezměnil po podpisu Helsinských dohod. Hnutí za obranu lidských práv, které si našlo oporu v humanitární části těchto Dohod – potlačuje se, vykořeňuje se zvláště tvrdě, okázale

93 O desát rokův neskôr. In: *Dokumenty Moskovskej Helsinskej skupiny*, s. 291 – 292.

a až vyzývavě. Přetrvávající snaha zatajit pravdu a zdiskreditovat toto hnutí, přičemž se neštítit nejspínavějších metod, odráží mravní úroveň obhájců sovětského „pořádku“ a jejich strach před rozšířením liberálních nálad.

Za vaši a naši svobodu!

Moskevská skupina na podporu plnění Helsinských dohod:

Jelena Bonner, Sofja Kallistratová, Naum Mejman, Malva Landa,
Viktor Nekipelov, Tatjana Osipova, Sergej Polikanov

Podporujeme: Vjačeslav Bachmin, Jurij Jarym-Agaev, Leonard
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Avgusta Romanova, Vera Serebrova, Sergej Chodorovič, Nadežda Šatu-
novskaja, Vadim Ščeglov, P. Gleb Jakunin, Viktor Kapitančuk, Ludmila
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Dmitrij Micheev, Grigorij Tokajuk, Nina Strokatova

Summary

Brief review of Soviet “dissident” reactions to the Prague Spring and to the invasion of Warsaw Pact armies into Czechoslovakia is delivered in the study. After that time, it was more problematic for Soviets to watch closely social life in Czechoslovakia; nevertheless, the emergence of Charter 77 became another event which called upon attention of Soviet dissidents. Charter 77’ documents make it clear that Czech civic dissent was not really aware of the activities of Soviet colleagues either – the main source of information remained Western broadcasting stations. However, in the late 80s mutual contacts got stronger. On the other hand, in the case of Catholic dissent in Czechoslovakia there was a great interest in the situation in the Soviet Union, and a lot of efforts was made to help Christians in this country; in some cases, these efforts continued until the present day. Article is based on the extensive source material and brings as an appendix also several Russian samizdat and archival documents which were translated neither in the Czech or the Slovak languages.

Hnutie za občiansku slobodu na Slovensku

Patrik DUBOVSKÝ

V druhej polovici 80. rokov sa v Československu zintenzívnili aktivity opozície proti komunistickému režimu. Tieto mali v Čechách svoj základ najmä v chartistickom hnutí a na Slovensku v práci tajnej cirkvi, laického apoštolátu a v menších zoskupeniach nekomunistických intelektuálov, tzv. „šesťdesiatosmičkárov“ a ochranárov.

Vyššia koordinácia a efektívnosť týchto akcií sa rozvinula po veleh-radskej púti z júla 1985, kde režim a ŠtB už fakticky nedokázali paralyzovať prejavy nespokojnosti a výzvy na náboženskú slobodu. Podobne v podpisovej akcii *31 požiadaviek veriacich občanov*¹ šlo o vysoký stupeň organizovanosti, cieľavedomosti a úprimného zaangažovania sa potláčaných kresťanov, ktorí svojím podpisom demonštrovali svoju prelomovú odvahu k neanonymnosti. Neskôr Sviečková demonštrácia z marca 1988 predstavovala ďalší vyšší stupeň nielen organizovaného, ale i spontánneho masového prejavu nespokojnosti a i nenásilného dovolávania sa prirodzených práv.² Jej priebeh ukázal ochotu nonkonformných občanov sa vystaviť možnému prenasledovaniu po manifestácii, ale i ochotu prijať násilie počas zásahu proti nej. Treba zdôrazniť, že ľudia demonštrovali aj

1 Podpisová akcia mala názov *Podnety katolíkov k riešeniu situácie veriacich občanov v Československu*, organizovala ju skupina moravských katolíkov, združená okolo Jaroslava Navrátila. Podpisová akcia získala viac ako pol milióna podpisov, z toho väčšinu zo Slovenska. Po zásahu proti Sviečkovej manifestácii pribudlo ďalších 200-tisíc podpisov.

2 Viac k tomuto manifestačnému zhromaždeniu pozri: TATRAN, V. (Korec, J.): *Bratislavský veľký piatok*. Viedeň 1988. Knihu vydalo neskôr v dvoch vydaniach vydavateľstvo Lúč; Pozri tiež: ŠIMULČÍK, J.: *Čas svitania*. Prešov 1998, 2003.

za dodržiavanie občianskych práv ako za jednu z požiadaviek manifestácie. To v dovtedy prevažne religióznom prostredí odporu predstavovalo významný prielom v charaktere požiadaviek voči režimu a prirodzene to zblížovalo kresťanskú a občiansku časť opozície.

V tomto období sa veľmi vhodnou bázou na protirežimové vystúpenia stali rôzne výročia a osobnosti, ktoré nemali konotáciu s režimom. Tak sa prirodzene naskytovala príležitosť jednak si pripomenúť rôzne udalosti, ktoré súviseli s vlastenectvom, odbojom a odporom a jednak dávali možnosť na zhromažďovanie sa občanov a prejavy odhodlania. Takýmito boli výročie vzniku ČSR, výročie invázie a okupácie ČSSR z augusta 1968 a odpor voči nim, výročie SNP, osobnosti Štefánika, veliacich generálov v SNP či obeť invázie z roku 1968 a následnej okupácie.

V druhej polovici roku 1988 takto dozrela situácia na sformovanie sa hnutia, ktoré v sebe spájalo viac-menej všetky vyššie spomenuté aspekty a mohlo mať aj celočeskoslovenský rozmer. Dnes v porovnaní s viacerými izolovanými či monotematickými aktivitami disentu možno povedať, že takýmto sa v októbri 1988 stalo Hnutie za občiansku slobodu.

HOS vzniklo v Prahe 15. októbra 1988 z iniciatívy Rudolfa Battěka. Z ďalších českých signatárov treba spomenúť Stanislava Devátého, Václava Havla, Václava Bendu, Jiřího Kantůrka, Jiřího Dienstbiera a ďalších. Svoje požiadavky sformulovalo v základnom dokumente s názvom *Demokracia pre všetkých*, ktorý bol symbolicky podpísaný v Prahe, Brne a Bratislave. Zakladajúcich členov Hnutia za občiansku slobodu bolo 130. Jeho prvou vážnou akciou bola demonstrácia na 70. výročie vzniku ČSR v Prahe na Škroupovom námestí, kde vystúpil napr. Václav Havel. Zúčastnili sa jej aj niektorí disidenti zo Slovenska. Reakcia Štátnej bezpečnosti bola promptná. Ešte pred 28. októbrom 1988 pozatýkali po celej republike väčšinu signatárov manifestu a držali ich 48 hodín vo väzení.

Správu o vzniku HOS a exemplár manifestu *Demokracia pre všetkých* priniesol na Slovensko katolícky disident, právny obhajca prenasledovaných a vydavateľov samizdatových periodík Ján Carnogurský a stal sa prirodzeným lídrom jeho slovenskej časti. Ďalšími členmi HOS na Slovensku boli spolupracovník Antona Hlinku a dopisovateľ *Rádia Slobodná Európa* Anton Selecký, evanjelická spisovateľka a hádam prvá dáma slovenského disentu Hana Ponická, kresťanský disident Ján Langoš, Ivan Hofmann, Milan Šimečka, bývalý marxista, filozof a novinár Miroslav Kusý, ktorého možno zaradiť medzi kritických marxistických mysliteľov, Jozef Jablonický a Vladimír Maňák. Neskôr sa pridali Tibor Novotka, signatár Charty 77 a organizátor protestných akcií najmä na Považí, Michal Svrček, Juraj

Kohutiar, manželia Lehockí a ďalší, dovedna vyše 25 osôb. Táto slovenská skupina v HOS-e takto predstavovala veľmi rozmanitú myšlienkovú škálu osôb. Stretnutia týchto ľudí prebiehali najmä u J. Čarnogurského v Bratislave, neskôr u Juraja Kohutiara. Viacerí z nich boli bývalí signatári Charty 77, čím zvýraznili význam HOS-u a istú kontinuitu chartistických cieľov.

Na niektorých členov HOS-u na Slovensku zaviedla ŠtB už v rokoch predtým zväzky preverovanej osoby s kryciami menami (napr. na Jána Čarnogurského zväzok ADVOKÁT v roku 1977, na Miroslava Kusého zväzok RENEGÁT v roku 1981 či na Antona Seleckého zväzok KANÁL v roku 1986).³

Základnými inšpiračnými zdrojmi členov HOS-u na Slovensku bola dezilúzia z vývoja po invázii a okupácii 1968 a po zakorenení sa brežnevovského socializmu. Veriaci aktivisti pociťovali fatálny rozpor medzi svojím svetonázorom a normalizačnými praktikami a prehlbujúcou sa sovietyzáciou spoločnosti. Svoju motiváciu hľadali v čítaní a distribúcii samizdatov alebo pašovanej literatúry, v počúvaní západných rozhlasových staníc a tiež v odpore proti kriminalizácii opozície alebo v neobjasnených vraždách napr. kňazov. Niektorí, napr. Anton Selecký, boli v kontakte s Antonom Hlinkom v *Rádiu Slobodná Európa* a posielali mu správy.⁴

Na druhej strane šlo o často živelné akcie, bez vedomia nejakej perspektívy a bez snahy o porážku režimu. Disidenti sa ich zúčastňovali, organizovali ich ako momentálne prejavy odporu voči režimu, no často nepoznali ich efekt. Chýbala aj prepojenosť a plánovanie odporu.

Napriek tomu sa postupne disidenti rôznych ideových skupín stretávali častejšie a dokázali sformulovať spoločné stanoviská alebo naplánovať myšlienkovu silné a efektívne akcie. Bolo dobré, že nešlo len o protirežimové aktivity, ale viaceré mali kladný akcent v pripomenutí si zaslúžených osobností či udalostí.

HOS bol nezávislou občianskou iniciatívou. Jej tvorcovia v manifeste *Demokracia pre všetkých* vyzvali občanov, aby akýmkoľvek spôsobom začali pracovať na odstránení krízy, v ktorej sa Československo koncom 80. rokov nachádzalo. HOS malo byť voľné združenie slobodne vznikajúcich a ničomu nepodriadených politických skupín a klubov, otvorených

3 Viac pozri na www.upn.gov.sk, registračné protokoly zväzkov – <http://www.upn.gov.sk/regpro/>

4 Archív autora. Rozhovor autora s členmi HOS-u Antonom Seleckým a Tiborom Novotkom z 11. októbra 2011.

k širokej diskusii. Manifest *Demokracia pre všetkých* načrtoval 12 základných okruhov, a to najmä: politický pluralizmus, demokratická ústava, obnovenie právneho poriadku, záchrana životného prostredia, sloboda duchovného života, národná svojbytnosť, Československo ako súčasť Európy a podobne.

Ján Čarnogurský a Ján Langoš vydávali v rokoch 1988 – 1989 ilegálne periodikum *Bratislavské listy*. HOS na Slovensku zasielalo rôzne protestné vyhlásenia štátnym orgánom a podpisové akcie na prepustenie prenasledovaných (napr. I. Polanského alebo rumunskej disidentky Doiny Corneiovej, ktoré organizoval Tibor Novotka). HOS na Slovensku sa snažilo o znovu prinavrátanie svojho miesta osobnosti M. R. Štefánika. Pred 4. májom 1989 vydali *Vyhlásenie k 70. výročiu smrti Štefánika*, uverejnené v *Bratislavských listoch* a v *Rádiu Slobodná Európa*.⁵ Vyzdvihli jeho presvedčenie, že za slobodu treba bojovať. Vyhlásenie pripomenulo význam púte mládeže na Bradlo z roku 1968 a z jej inšpirácie vyzvali na obnovenie tradície takýchto stretnutí na Štefánikovej mohyle na Bradle na 7. mája 1989.

Stretnutie sa uskutočnilo za asistencie a nakrúcania ŠtB a zúčastnilo sa na ňom okolo tisícky ľudí. Príhovor chorej, no prítomnej Hany Ponickéj prečítal Ján Čarnogurský. Ten navrhol, aby zhromaždenie odsúhlasilo výzvu na rehabilitáciu Štefánika, obnovenie jeho pamätníkov a názvov ulíc a námestí po ňom. Tiež navrhol, aby sa tradičný slovenský znak vrátil do československého, čo zhromaždenie tiež odsúhlasilo a poverilo Hanu Ponickú, aby tieto požiadavky adresovala vláde SSR. Pohotovosť ZNB a ŠtB trvala týždeň a pod Bradlom boli pripravené dve vodné delá a v zálohe bol pripravený pohotovostný oddiel VB. Na Bradle bol údajne prítomný i prokurátor so zatykačmi na členov HOS-u.⁶

Pokračovaním akcií v súvisе so Štefánikom bolo stretnutie v júli 1989 pri jeho soche v Predmieri, ktorá bola vtedy jedinou na Slovensku. Toto stretnutie zvolal Tibor Novotka, aktivista HOS-u na Považí. Prejav na ňom mal Čarnogurský, prítomná bola Hana Ponická.⁷

V súvisе s výročím augustovej invázie 1968 zorganizoval HOS stretnutie pri hrobe jednej z obetí tejto invázie, vtedy 18-ročného Jozefa Gavorníka

5 www.magnificat.sk, Iniciatíva protikomunistickej opozície. Hnutie za občiansku slobodu (A. Selecký).

6 Tamže, *HOS opäť v akcii* (A. Selecký).

7 Archív autora. Rozhovor autora s členom HOS-u Tiborom Novotkom zo 14. 9. 2011. Na niektorých miestach sa mylne uvádza, že oznamovateľom tejto akcie bol J. Čarnogurský.

na cintoríne v Ilave. Zvolávateľ bol Tibor Novotka. ŠtB obsadila železničnú stanicu a cintorín v Ilave a viacerých zaistila.⁸

Napriek tomu, že pražské HOS ústami Havla pri príležitosti výročia augusta 1968 vyzvalo k umiernenosti, aby neprišlo k zbytočným obeťiam, HOS na Slovensku si chcelo uctiť aj ďalšie obete invázie a oznámenie o tom zaslalo na Úrad vlády SSR. Dňa 14. augusta 1989 ŠtB pozatýkala piatich signatárov HOS-u. Túto skupinku neskôr nazvali Bratislavskou päťkou.⁹ Treba však zdôrazniť, že šlo o slovenských členov HOS-u – Jána Čarnogurského, Hanu Ponickú, Antona Seleckého, Vladimíra Maňáka a Miroslava Kusého, ktorí takto len pokračovali vo svojich nekonformných aktivitách. Čarnogurský a Kusý boli vzatí do väzby, ostatných vyšetrovali na slobode. Proces rozdelili na dva – proces s Čarnogurským a Kusým a spol. – kauza: poburovanie, rozvracanie republiky a spojenie s cudzou mocou (u J. Čarnogurského aj znaky podpory a propagácie fašizmu). Dňa 6. októbra však Kusého prepustili z vyšetrovacej väzby a Čarnogurského proces odročili. Proces s Kusým, Ponickou, Maňákom a Seleckým prebehol 14. a 15. novembra 1989.¹⁰ Pred procesom zaslali podporný list pre obvinených prezidentovi ČSSR G. Husákovi, ktorí o. i. podpísali M. Kňážko, A. Dubček, J. Jablonický či tajný biskup J. Korec.

V prvom procese odsúdili len Kusého, a to podmienene za poškodenie záujmov republiky v cudzine – poslal totiž oznámenie o uctení si obetí augustovej invázie do *Rádia Slobodná Európa*. Ostatných troch prepustili. Tí potom „slobodne“ pod dohľadom ZNB mohli položiť pôvodne plánované kytice Danke Košanovej a Petrovi Legnerovi, zastreleným v auguste 1968.

Proces s Čarnogurským bol naplánovaný na 6. novembra 1989. Na jeho podporu i na protest so zatknutými členmi HOS-u (Bratislavskej päťky) zaslali viacerí podporné stanoviská, napr. členovia HOS-u na Slovensku, ktorí neboli stíhaní, zaslali 20. septembra 1989 list predsedovi vlády SSR Pavlovi Hrivnákovovi na podporu Čarnogurského a zastavenie jeho trestného stíhania. List podpísali Juraj Kohutiar, Michal Lehocký a Tibor Novotka. Reakciou bolo pozatýkanie niektorých členov HOS-u štátnou bezpečnos-

8 Tamže. Pozri tiež: SELECKÝ, A.: *November 1989: Skutočnosť bez mýtu*, rukopis, s. 3.

9 SELECKÝ, A.: *November 1989*, s. 4.

10 Archív Ústavu pamäti národa Bratislava, fond Krajská správa Zboru národnej bezpečnosti Správa Štátnej bezpečnosti Bratislava, vyšetrovacie spisy, archívne číslo BA – V – 20516. Rozsudok Trestného senátu Mestského súdu Bratislava z 15. 11. 1989.

ťou 13. októbra, tlak na zastavenie aktivít HOS-u (výročie vzniku ČSR 28. októbra) a vydanie výstrahy členovi HOS-u Jurajovi Kohutiariovi.

Dňa 1. novembra 1989 slúžil Anton Srholec v Blumentálskom kostole omšu za väzneného J. Čarnogurského, na ktorej sa zúčastnilo okolo 5 000 ľudí. Srholec vyzval veriacich, aby sa 6. novembra zúčastnili procesu s Čarnogurským. V tom termíne prišlo k Justičnému palácu v Bratislave asi 300 ľudí, v súdnej sieni boli napr. veľvyslanci USA a Veľkej Británie, biskup J. Korec, F. Mikloško, A. Srholec či predstaviteľ HOS-u z Čiech R. Battěk. Keďže J. Čarnogurský vzniesol námietku zaujatosti dvoch členov senátu, pretože boli nomenklatúrnymi kádrami KSČ, možno povedať, že najmä z tohto dôvodu bol proces odročený na 22. novembra 1989. Dianie pred justičným palácom nahrávala na kameru ŠtB.

Medzitým už prebiehali mítingy hnutia Verejnosť proti násiliu na Námestí SNP v Bratislave proti režimu a na mítingu 21. novembra výtvarník Peter Horváth vyzval prítomných na podporný míting o deň neskôr pred Justičným palácom počas procesu s Čarnogurským. Zišlo sa tam približne 3 000 ľudí, ktorí pokojne čakali na rozsudok. J. Čarnogurský bol rozsudkom senátu zbavený obžaloby a uznaný nevinným. Pribeh novembrových udalostí mal pravdepodobne vplyv na oslobodenie J. Čarnogurského.

Na demonštrácii bol prítomný aj A. Dubček, ktorý sa prihlásil k požiadavkám VPN, no tiež napodiv vyzval ľudí, aby sa rozišli. Žiadosť, aby sa míting VPN z námestia SNP presunul pred Justičný palác bola zamietnutá a predstavitelia HOS-u neboli vpustení na tribúnu na námestí SNP, aby referovali o procese s Čarnogurským a demonštrácii na jeho prepustenie. Revolúcia v Bratislave tak mala zozáčiatku istú dvojkolajnosť. Dňa 23. novembra však nebol J. Čarnogurský ešte na slobode. HOS žiadal koordinačný výbor VPN o podporu prepustenia Čarnogurského, údajne bez efektu. O niekoľko dní ho prepustili v noci a následne odišiel do Prahy, kde sa stal podpredsedom federálnej vlády. Podľa niektorých zainteresovaných sa tým malo ovplyvniť, aby sa nestal lídrom revolúcie na Slovensku.

HOS plánovalo aj uctenie si veliачich generálov v SNP Jána Goliana a Rudolfa Viesta položením kytice pri pamätnej tabuli SNP na Zvolenskom zámku. Keďže lídri HOS-u boli pozatýkaní v súvislosti s augustovým výročím 1968, túto akciu sa ŠtB podarilo rozložiť.¹¹

11 Archív autora. Rozhovor autora s členmi HOS-u A. Seleckým a T. Novotkom z 11. 10. 2011.

Na pôde internátov Univerzity Komenského ešte pre novembrom 1989 vznikol samizdat s názvom 23:55, pri ktorom sa angažoval Tibor Novotka a prispievali doň napr. M. Kusý či H. Ponická. Po novembri 1989, keď sa M. Kusý stal rektorom Univerzity Komenského, údajne nedovolil viac vydávanie tohto periodika na pôde UK.¹²

HOS v Bratislave stihol ešte k 71. výročiu vzniku ČSR usporiadať stretnutie pri pamätníku vzniku ČSR pred Slovenským národným múzeom, kde predniesol príhovor T. Novotka. Výpočet akcií HOS-u možno uzavrieť decembrom 1989, kedy Anton Selecký a Michal Lehocký z HOS-u a novinár Peter Štrelinger boli monitorovať rumunskú revolúciu v Temešvári.

Počas novembrových dní navštívila delegácia HOS-u Koordinačné centrum VPN. V ňom už pracoval tiež člen HOS-u Ján Langoš, hoci ho tam explicitne za HOS nenominovali. Lídri VPN na žiadosť HOS-u, aby aj oni participovali na zmenách, odpovedali, že za HOS je vo vedení VPN už Ján Langoš, čím je HOS vo vedení VPN zastúpený.¹³ Pôvodná skupina HOS-u na Slovensku sa tak rozišla na viacero smerov, no natíska sa aj domnienka, že noví lídri revolúcie už nemali záujem ešte znásobovať či rozširovať vedenie Novembra. Slovenský HOS tak akosi nedôstojne zostal pred bránami svojho prirodzeného a zaslúženého pokračovania či cieľa protikomunistických aktivít – napomôcť demokracii pre všetkých, ako boli spomenuté vyššie. Dodnes zostáva otázkou, prečo?

HOS ako „skratka v zátvorke“ za názvom VPN, reprezentujúci ponovembrový HOS na Slovensku ešte figuroval na kandidátke VPN v prvých slobodných voľbách v júni 1990. Bola to však labutia pieseň skutočného HOS-u, pretože významné pozície okrem disidentov VPN obsadzovali bývalí komunisti, ktorých VPN v snahe zachrániť si značne klesajúce preferencie, umiestnilo na kandidátku a do vysokých štátnych funkcií.¹⁴ Takto zmenené hnutie VPN síce voľby vyhralo, no prinieslo to zákonite svoju daň a reformy na Slovensku po roku 1990 nadobudli nahorkastú príchuť. Zostáva sa preto hypoteticky pýtať, či by dlhoroční odporcovia komunizmu na kandidátke VPN či Kresťansko-demokratického hnutia dokázali viac osloviť neskúseného slovenského voliča alebo Nežná revolúcia si na svoj tanier „sebazožratia“ musela priložiť takúto bizarnú „oblohu

12 Archív autora. Rozhovor autora s členom HOS-u T. Novotkom zo 14. 9. 2011.

13 Archív autora. Podľa rozhovoru autora s Fedorom Gálom z roku 2009 si tento vtedajší predseda Koordinačného centra VPN na toto vysvetlenie nespomínal.

14 Viac pozri GÁL, F.: *Z prvej ruky*. Bratislava 2009.

v tvare kosáka a kladiva“. Hádám najznámejším dinosaurom z tohto obdobia je posledný prednovembrový minister spravodlivosti SSR Milan Čič, ktorý dnes, dvadsaťdva rokov po novembri 1989, je riaditeľom kancelárie prezidenta SR.

Zmenšený HOS sa stal ešte členom ponovembrového Národného frontu, no bol to hádam posledný pokus o zviditeľnenie kedysi tak odvážneho lídra zmiešanej kresťansko-občianskej antikomunistickej rezistencie v Československu.

Napriek takémuto zakončeniu snáh HOS-u minimálne na Slovensku znamenala jeho existencia a činnosť jedinečnú formu dokončeného organizovania sa protikomunistickej opozície, ktorá bola vytvorená z viacerých myšlienkových prúdov či osôb a dokázala konzistentne vykonávať politické aktivity a tlak, ktorý donútil režim reagovať. Napriek tomu, že ťažisko protirežimových aktivít na Slovensku bolo tradične v náboženskom disente, dokázal HOS prepojiť viaceré prúdy myšlienkového opozície, zblížiť i skupiny líšiace sa konfesiónálne, ba dokonca i svojím bazálnym postojom k marxizmu.

Takto „slovenské“ HOS ukázalo, že dokáže opozične jednotne poukazovať na krízu režimu a jeho represálie. Nestalo sa len diskusným klubom či „fackovacím panákom“, ale hnutím, ktoré napokon režim musel rešpektovať, hnutím, ktoré tak získalo na svoju stranu verejnosť. Preto sa prirodzene, hoci bez veľkej publicity stalo časťou základu hnutia Verejnosť proti násiliu, Kresťansko-demokratického hnutia i niektorých duchovných intelektuálnych zoskupení po novembri 1989.

Summary

In the second half of the 1980s the time was ready in Czechoslovakia to establish a compact nation-wide dissident grouping representing all ideological streams. It was the Movement for Civic Freedom (HOS = Hnutie za občiansku slobodu).

Its leading representatives were R. Battěk, V. Havel, S. Devátý, J. Dienstbier; in Slovakia first of all J. Čarnogurský, A. Selecký, H. Ponická and M. Kusý. HOS had 130 founding members, more than 25 of them from Slovakia.

HOS published its fundamental manifesto called Democracy for All. There were twelve points where they called for crises settlement in Czechoslovakia, political pluralism, democratic constitution, reintroduction of rule of law, freedom of spiritual life, etc.

HOS partially followed the activities of Charter 77; many of its signatories became members of HOS. The State Security opened files about number of HOS representatives and started to monitor them immediately.

The activities of HOS in Slovakia focused on protest actions, publishing samizdat periodicals (e.g. *Bratislavské listy* – J. Čarnogurský, J. Langoš), memorial meetings commemorating important historical events and personalities.

One of the first was a meeting at the burial mound of Gen. Štefánik in Bradlo on May 7, 1989 with about 1.000 participants. Ján Čarnogurský read the protest declaration written by Hana Ponická.

There were also other events, as the meeting at Štefánik's statue in Predmier in July 1989, or the meeting at a grave of one of the victims of the August 1968 invasion in Ilava that was smashed by the State Security.

The meeting memorializing the victims of the 1968 invasion, promoted also by foreign media, should have been the most important event. The State Security arrested five Slovak HOS signatories, later called the Bratislava Five (J. Čarnogurský, A. Selecký, H. Ponická, M. Kusý a V. Maňák). They were accused of the revolt and subverting the Republic. A group of intellectuals sent a letter supporting those arrested to the President Husák.

Ponická, Selecký and Maňák were released in the middle of November and Kusý was sentenced to a conditional punishment for damaging the interests of the Republic abroad.


During November 1989 events, the representatives of HOS tried to find their place in the structures of the Public against Violence (VPN) movement. They failed, as the leaders of VPN argued Ján Langoš was the one already representing HOS in their organisation. HOS appeared on VPN's list of candidates in the first free elections, but after that its activities were covered by new political parties where also people active in the previous regime appeared.



Súdny proces s aktivistom HOS Jánom Čarnogurským, 1989.



Akcia HOS na Bradle, 1989. Ján Čarnogurský a Anton Selecký sú na obrázku v strede vľavo.



Účastníci akcie HOS-u na Bradle pri Štefánikovej mohyle. Tibor Novotka vpravo.

The Independent Historical Memory of the Hungarian Democratic Opposition

András BOZÓKI

“Our generation, whose interest it is to forget, would like to abolish good memory by decree. I would also be glad to remove my early poems from every library and from the memory of the people. Pathetic people revise their past. [...] If they are angry with somebody, they prove that the given person had been a criminal from the cradle. Of course, this is no longer important.”¹

Introduction

The historical memory of the democratic oppositions was independent of the official ideology of the Communist regime. This independent memory was not the consequence but the cause of the establishment and the functioning of the opposition. Obviously, the identity of the democratic opposition was rooted in ideas that were in opposition with the official ideology: without an independent memory, there would have been no opposition. Despite the fact that Hungarian samizdat publications mostly dealt with current affairs rather than historical ones, these journals were inseparably linked to the desire for and the existence of, an independent memory. Thus, independent historical memory was a constitutive element of the democratic opposition.

1 EÖRSI, I.: Búcsú egy naiv embertől. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás (Beszélő Complete Edition)*, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 1, pp. 235 – 236.

The editors² resumed the publication of the most important samizdat journal, *Beszélő*, after the Polish self-limiting revolution³ at the end of 1981. This publication had close links to the democratic opposition and in particular to SZETA (The Fund for Supporting the Poor). SZETA saw helping the poor, whose existence the regime denied, as its main mission. At the end of the 1980s, the editors also had close ties to the Network of Free Initiatives,⁴ and later to the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ).⁵ In the beginning, *Beszélő* was duplicated illegally with the use of stencils (1981 – 1989); it then became a legal magazine, published weekly (1989 – 1996) and later monthly (from 1996 to the present).

The editors and authors of opposition publications took hypocritical statements of the regime about constitutionality and freedom of speech and of the press seriously as their starting point. They were outspoken about taboo subjects and always published the names and contact details of the editors. With this, the editors not only risked their jobs and their freedom but also obstacles including the revocation of their passports, the constant scrutiny of the secret police or the confiscation of their writings.

In 1981, the first issue of *Beszélő* defined the aim of the journal: “*We wish to assist the quietly clamouring masses in painting a better picture of themselves in a period when two tiny minorities – the country’s leadership and the opposition – are loudly arguing with each other.*”⁶ Since *Beszélő* was the primary forum of the democratic opposition, the need for a coherent political programme surfaced. This programme appeared in 1987 as a special section, entitled *Social Contract*, of the twentieth issue. It demanded constitutionalism, freedom of the speech, the protection of the interest of employees, social security, civil rights and above all, the resignation of the general secretary of the Communist party, János Kádár. It called attention to such unspoken demands as the distancing of relations with the

2 János Eörsi, Miklós Haraszti, Gábor F. Havas, Gábor Iványi, János Kis, Ferenc Kőszeg, Bálint Nagy, György Petri, Otília Solt and Sándor Szilágyi.

3 On 13 December 1981, Wojciech Jaruzelski introduced a state of emergency in Poland in order to break the opposition labour union movement, *Solidarity*, because it endangered the Communist monopoly of power.

4 The Network of Free Initiatives was founded on 1 May 1988.

5 The Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) came into being on 13 November 1988.

6 KIS, J.: Lapunk elé. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 1, p. 4.

Soviet Union, the resolution of the situation of Hungarians abroad and the restoration of the events of 1956 to the collective memory of the nation.

The contents of the programme show that *Beszélő* mostly dealt with current affairs. It focused on the changes that concerned Central and Eastern Europe and covered these events from a Hungarian point of view. The topics that the journal covered can be classified into four broad categories:

1. The examination of and debate over current political and economic issues.
2. The past, characteristics and role of the Hungarian democratic opposition.
3. Raising and examining issues that the regime treated as taboos.
4. Reviews and descriptions of books that were published either illegally or abroad and talked of political or moral questions; the introduction of legal and illegal democratic organizations, their documents and activities.

The focus in the examination of all these issues, aimed at serving present needs, was on issues that were relevant and problematic in the 1980s: (1) the crisis of the Hungarian economy and possible solutions to it; (2) censorship and the opposition press; (3) the situation of Hungarian minorities abroad (especially in Czechoslovakia and Romania); (4) the relationship of the churches and those in power, coercions and persecutions; (5) the seizure of power by the military in Poland in 1981 and the illegalization of Solidarity; (6) the situation of those living under the poverty line in Hungary; (7) the need and the lack of advocacy for the interests of workers; (8) the building of the dam at Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros and arguments against it; (9) the nuclear catastrophe in Chernobyl and its concealment by the press; (10) the reform of electoral law.

From this, it would appear that it is hard to glean the historical view of samizdat intellectuals: samizdat publications hardly ever published articles on history. However, in discussion of current events, they often offered historical reviews or blamed problems on certain historical processes. Nonetheless, it can be said, in general, that history was not among the focal issues of the publication. The only exception was the 1956 revolution in

Hungary. Not only did the opposition articulate its own interpretation of the revolution on the pages of *Beszélő*, but also portrayed it through the eyes of participants in the form of interviews, memoirs and documents. Therefore, they made 1956 an event open to research, which would not have been possible without the publication of information that had previously been unavailable to researchers. However, the contributions about the 1956 revolution did not look upon this event as history, because they thought that it was an unresolved, thus living, problem for society. They believed that the silence surrounding the memory of 1956 and the retaliations after the revolution were fundamental lies of the Kádár regime. Therefore, if the opposition could tell the truth about the revolution, then they could substantially contribute to the delegitimisation of the regime.

The description of the past and present of Hungarian minorities, the situation of the churches, the political and economic periodization of the years following 1956 and the descriptions of the characteristics of these periods were frequently discussed in *Beszélő*. Furthermore, it openly talked about issues that the Socialist regime treated as taboos: the 1947 coming to power of the Communists and the fate of the other parties, the situation of the Jews and Hungarian emigration after 1945. Besides questions directly concerning Hungarians, the contributors of *Beszélő* reflected on the social, political and economic processes of the neighbouring countries, including Romania and Czechoslovakia in particular. The Polish changes preceding the 1956 revolution by a few months, the Prague Spring of 1968 and the military coup in Poland in 1981 also played an important role in the analyses.

The 1956 Revolution, Retribution and the Dilemmas of the Intellectuals

*“Those who were born after 1956 do not have common memories. [...] They are also sufferers of the consequences of the defeat in 1956: the hang-dog culture of Kádárism.”*⁷

The dissident intellectuals who contributed to samizdat publications belong to the part of the intelligentsia that defined itself as the democratic opposition, stood in opposition to power and demanded political rights. Not all of the intelligentsia of the Kádár era belonged to the opposition.

7 EÖRSI, I.: Búcsú egy naív embertől, pp. 135 – 137.

Nonetheless, intellectuals suffered from the same problem as the opposition: all of them broke with the independent, critical and democratic tradition of intellectuals, which were so characteristic of the political thinker, István Bibó. The opposition often referred to the ‘Bibó forgetting’ phenomenon:⁸ the opposition discarded the 1956 demands for democracy and independence and also broke with the liberal tradition and the sober value judgments that Bibó represented.

For the opposition, 1956 was the starting point. Miklós Haraszti notes that: “*since ideals do not matter, but only tanks, everyone seeks his or her own recipe for getting on in life. Mine could only be a private recipe: we treat spinelessness with reading forbidden literature.*”⁹

The following section will compare the official position of the regime with the opinion of the opposition, i.e. the ideology of spinelessness with the forbidden literature. While the Communist regime referred to 1956 as a counterrevolution against people’s democracy that was incited by imperialists, the opposition talked about a revolution that was the result of social unity and that demanded democratic changes and political rights.

What was the 1956 revolution in reality? Was it a revolution, a national uprising, a counterrevolution, a war of independence, or a crushed rebellion? Did it demand independent, self-governed, democratic socialism instead of state socialism? Examining the issue from multiple points of view, the opposition offered several alternative interpretations. One of these claimed that the Hungarian revolution in 1956 was the first loud outcry of the people of Eastern Europe. It was a radical expression of demands that has not been repeated in any other countries of the region ever since: “[...] *it was the 1956 revolution that expressed the squelched will of the peoples of Eastern Europe, living under Soviet occupation and in Communist regimes for (1) national independence, (2) a multi-party system, (3) representation of the workers’ interest (through workers’ councils) and (4) freedoms of speech, assembly, religion and press.*”¹⁰

According to another interpretation, 1956 was a spontaneous joining together of the workers. Thus, it was not possible to talk about 1956 as

8 CSURKA, I.: Bibó-felejtés. In: RAINER, J. M.: *A monori tanácskozás jegyzőkönyve*. Budapest 2005, pp. 75 – 85.

9 HARASZTI, M.: Emlék és panasz 1956-ból In: *Beszélő* 1987, Vol.1. See in HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.), *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Budapest 1992, pp. 246 – 249.

10 SZILÁGYI, I.: ‘Legyünk az Emberi Jogok Őskeresztényei!’ Négy vélemény a forradalom örökségéről. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 19, p. 696.

the overthrowing of the power of the people. One of the famous workers' leaders in 1956, Sándor Rácz reports that: "*What I believe is the greatest shame is that the regime did not aim at increasing and deepening the self-awareness of the workers after 1948, but ruined workers' unity, on which the power of the workers should have been developed, by the institution of the informers' system. In 1956, the deceived workers clearly realized this and supported and defended the revolution as long as they could. They did so, because they understood that it was possible to build a society that was free of exploitation in Hungary. I myself find the obligation to fulfil their commitments the most important political-historical deed in the history of the Hungarian workers' movement, because it was on their own initiative without any manipulative attempts.*"¹¹

Thirdly, the interpretation of the revolution is also closely linked to the role the intelligentsia played after 1956. *Beszélő* claims that intellectuals played a decisive role in the revolution, which influenced their post-revolution behaviour. In his ironic introduction, János Kis, who was one of the leading figures of the democratic opposition, writes that: "*It is said that nothing is happening in Hungary. The people are happy that it is left alone and do not have to deal with politics, can built their houses in their free time, raise poultry and bungle. The intellectuals shut themselves off into the ivory tower of culture and leave politics to politicians. The churches collaborate with the state. Old-fashioned reactionaries and civil democrats died out and the revisionists of the Communist movement could never rebound again after their defeat in 1956. Power sometimes shows its steely fist, but seeing that nobody is out of line, it quickly puts its fist back into its pocket.*"¹²

Among other things, *Beszélő* wanted to disprove this and show that dissidents were, once again, present in national politics. They follow and criticize the steps taken by those in power and continue in the democratic tradition that appeared to be lost. By the early 1980s not even the country's leadership denied the existence of the democratic opposition. Speaking at the meeting of party activists in Borsod county, the general secretary of the Communist Party, János Kádár, described the situation thus: "*As for intellectuals, most of them have a positive attitude and support our*

11 "A Munkástanács mint egy pecsét hitelesítette a forradalmat. Interjú Rácz Sándorral, a Nagy-Budapesti Központi Munkástanács elnökével" In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.), *Beszélő Összkiadás (Beszélő Complete Edition)*, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 2, p. 353.

12 KIS, J.: Lapunk elé. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 2, p. 3.

socialist goals. A small minority, perhaps following fashionable trends, has a tendency for effusiveness and only sees the negative side of everything."¹³

For a long while after 1956, politics was characterized by the absence of or, at least, the silence of intellectuals. Therefore, it was a novelty that, at the end of the 1970s, the democratic opposition became organized. The writers of *Beszélő* had realised that Nonetheless, after 1956, the relationship of the leadership and the opposition changed fundamentally and, as a result, there was no visible opposition in the 1960s.

The Communist leadership redefined alliance politics, left space for various 'progressive ideas' and wanted to preserve the monopoly of Marxism by persuasion and not coercion.¹⁴ This was Kádár's 'Hungarian way'. The economic boom that followed the repression resulting from 1956 made a certain kind of compromise between the regime and the intelligentsia possible. The compromise meant that, in exchange for the political monopoly not being openly questioned, the Party made allowances with regard to culture, consumption habits and in everyday life. Of course, the leaders of the regime saw this as their own success.

The Kádárist compromise or capitulation – the deal – and the fear of forgetting was the fundamental point of reference for the democratic opposition. The deal, which was made after the 1956 revolution, was a symbolic agreement between Hungarian society and the leading political elite. It was interpreted differently in various samizdat publications.

The greatest fear of the opposition about 1956 was that the revolution would be forgotten; this contributed to the emergence of different interpretations of the revolution. To prevent the revolution falling into oblivion, the editors of *Beszélő* had a policy of mentioning 1956 in each issue. At the Monor meeting of different opposition groups, István Csurka described the situation that resulted from the 'deal': "*Hungarian society today is the result of a bad, one-sided, opportunistic, yet also efficient and useful compromise. This forced compromise was made after the crushed revolution and war of independence. We were forced into it but the deal was not entirely useless or ineffective. The nation also gained with it. The country gained the "happiest barrack" image as a result of the compromise. For sure, life in the 1960s and 1970s became more human and bearable. [...] The happy barrack life went on*

13 KÁDÁR, J.: *A békéért, népünk boldogulásáért. Beszédek és cikkek 1981 – 1985.* Budapest 1985, p. 5.

14 See HUSZÁR, T.: *Az MSZMP értelmiségpolitikájának néhány időszerű kérdése.* In: HUSZÁR, T. (ed.): *A magyar értelmiség a 80-as években.* Budapest 1986, pp. 7 – 55.

*above a huge barrel covered by a thick lid to hide its rotting contents. After 4 November 1956, blood, heroic death, workers' council, the beauties of the revolution, the ecstasy of one week's freedom and self-consciousness were thrown into the barrel. Later on the thousands who were hanged and the beatings and humiliation of the imprisoned were also thrown into the barrel only to be covered by the lid of forgetting. The main condition of the deal was to forget and be silent. 'Who is not against us is with us,' said János Kádár. But it was only possible not to be against them if one was able to forget.'*¹⁵

According to the democratic opposition's narrative of 1956, the decade after the revolution passed with silence from the Hungarian intelligentsia. This was the consequence of the crushing of the revolution and the imprisonment of the activist intellectuals. Those who had resisted emigrated, became mute or served those in power to secure a livelihood. In the 1980s, the old Communist and revolutionary intelligentsia no longer existed. The leaders of the opposition, including fifty-sixers, leftist of 1968, social democrats and radical democrats, moved closer to the strategic aim step by step through the chosen policy of radical reforms. They all agreed, more or less, that most people were disillusioned by the regime; however, some served the power elite while others tried to find a way out of the general economic and political crisis. As György Konrád comments, "*the vacuum that sucked in most official and opposition intellectuals alike, in both the East and the West, was block nationalism.*"¹⁶

Thus, the opposition's view of the compromise of the 1960s and 1970s was fundamentally different from the official interpretation. Given the circumstances, György Petri spoke for most of the opposition in suggesting that it was not possible to speak about a compromise: "*Since the social compromise no longer exists, it is time to call attention to the fact that it never existed. What we called a compromise – and many people called it so – was resignation to reality. A compromise necessitates partners of comparable standing. The post-retribution society in the 1960s was only able to acknowledge things rather than to agree to them. This is true despite the fact that the growth and the happier times in the barrack gave a rationally unreasonable, albeit psychologically understandable, euphoria and the childish belief in the limitless elasticity of the barriers. Hungarian society as*

15 CSURKA, I.: Új magyar önépítés. In: RAINER, J. M.: *A monori tanácskozás jegyzőkönyve*, 14-16 June 1985. Budapest 2005, pp. 45 – 61.

16 KONRÁD, G.: A blokkrekszsim halálos dramaturgiája. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 13-14, p. 225.

*a whole, including most of the intelligentsia, was susceptible to such naivety, simply because it always tended toward political infantilism since it had always been socialized that way.*¹⁷

Petri thought that opposition intellectuals took part in public life in the 1960s, not because they were persuaded that Kádárism was right, but because they were willing to silence their own consciences for certain concessions. István Eörsi represented a less radical point of view. He believed that the compromise did exist, but it was based on the fear of the events of the period before 1956 rather than on the success of Kádárist politics: *“Those whose fate was to be silenced or persecuted during the Rákosi era did not fare any better. Fear was written in their bones and now they serve in silence and with resignation those whom they despise. ‘It can only get worse’, they say with a whisk when they meet the desire for change. The mute compromise that the Kádárist state made with its citizens is based on the memory of Rákosi, Soviet intervention and the gallows.*”¹⁸

Both opposition writers – István Eörsi and György Petri – agreed that intellectuals subsided into silence in the 1960s. Yet, Petri saw this as a result of the regime’s concessions. According to Eörsi, a social compromise existed but it was based on the fear of the Rákosi regime rather than on the success of the Kádár regime.

It is important to note that, while official propaganda and the democratic opposition agreed that the 1960s was characterized by the lack of open opposition, the Communist leadership differed on this point privately. János Kádár’s speech at the MSZMP Politburo in 1982 testifies to this: *“many in this room referred to the fact that opposition has constantly existed since 1956. That is true. And the problem with it was that we tried to fight it in our own way. I am not sure how the hell to say this but, in the politically active part of society, the opposition was in majority around December 1956. I think I can say it this way. And how did it become a minority? Think of what methods we used and how we used them at the time. That leaves us with some experience for today. [...] But if you remember, we persecuted*

17 PETRI, G.: Az unalmas válság. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 3, 1992, No. 22, p. 122.

18 EÖRSI, I.: A Szovjet Emberről. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 13-14, p. 207.

the big fish: those who murdered an individual or masses of people. We did not care what people said on trams or anywhere else.”¹⁹

According to Kádár, the opposition was not mute after 1956: in reality, the situation was that the leadership did not use total retaliation against them. However, the democratic opposition found such an understanding of the post-revolutionary consolidation to be entirely false. Using documents available at the time, M. János Rainer M. tried to count the number of people who fell victim to the retribution and to see who these people were. His findings contradict the concept of limited retribution. He claimed that retribution targeted certain types, namely: *“people in their early twenties at best, workers who fought in arms, those who were around thirty and had some respect in their local communities and those who perhaps had lower-level leadership positions in firm-level workers’ councils or were elected to firm-level revolutionary committees. Of course, retribution did not spare the intellectuals who played a leading role in the more moderate, pre-revolutionary period and were unable to accept the defeat of the revolution and continued resistance together with workers’ councils. We estimate that 350-400 people were executed in Hungary between December 1956 and the end of 1961 and the vast majority – about 90% – of them were executed for their participation in the revolution. [...] Sixteen thousand people were imprisoned, several hundred executed and tens of thousands were sanctioned in other ways after the government promised impunity for participants.”²⁰*

The interpretation of retaliations was closely linked to the criminal trials of the post-revolutionary period. The opposition questioned the regime’s claim that retributions were fair and only the ‘traitors’ of the people were called to account. *“Post-revolutionary retribution did not initiate show trials, but did not bother to stop the free interpretation and constructive classification of facts. The investigating, prosecuting and judicial personnel hardly changed until the end of the retributions.”²¹*

19 “Az MSZMP PB 1982. március 30-i ülése: A PB 1980. december 9-ei – az ellenséges, ellenzéki, ellenzékieskedő csoportok tevékenységéről szóló – határozatának végrehajtása” See Magyar Országghos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives, further only MOL), sign. KS 288. f.5/850.

20 RAINER, J. M.: Adatok az 1956-os forradalmat követő megtorláshoz. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 19, pp. 656 and 661.

21 Ferenc KÖSZEG, F.: Huszonöt év után. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 8, pp. 420 – 421.

The opposition also called into question the claim of the representatives of power that even those people who committed major crimes were given the opportunity to defend themselves in a fair trial and that the people were adequately informed after trials. The opposition pointed out that this was not in harmony with the facts. *“On 17 June 1958, the announcement of trials and executions after they had taken place resulted in general shock.²² Although it did not evoke strong emotions in the lethargic and terrified public, most people acknowledged the announcement that the former prime minister Imre Nagy was tried and executed without the people’s knowledge with rage and bitterness.”²³*

According to one of the most important self-justificatory narratives of the Kádár regime, the regime broke with the political practice of Stalinism. The editors of samizdat publications saw it differently. They thought that there was a perceivable continuity between the Stalinist orthodox dictatorship of Rákosi and the Kádár regime. They justified this position with reference to the fact that the political prisoners of the Rákosi era were not rehabilitated even into the 1960s: *“The present political leadership has claimed since November 4, 1956 that it broke with the sins of the past. However, it did not compensate the victims of those sins (apart from a few rehabilitations) or the cruelly punished opponents of that regime in any way. What is more, the present regime only continued punishing them, because they were tried after the revolution again and since they count as recidivists, the amnesty of 1963 did not apply to them. Several hundreds of them remained in prison until the turn of the 1960s and 1970s on the basis of the verdicts made around 1950 and they still suffer from the consequences of the long punishment.”²⁴*

The other manifestation of continuity was the eagerness with which the Kádár regime used the skills and the desire of the police and judicial cadres for revenge in order to solidify its own power. The democratic opposition could be distinguished from the official policy makers by disclosing and turning against this continuity. The contributors of the Bibó Memorial Book, a samizdat book published on the birthday of István Bibó, could be characterised by this position. As Miklós Szabó, opposition historian,

22 Prime Minister Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs were executed the day before: on 16 June 1958.

23 Ami elvárható. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 8, p. 45.

24 KŐSZEG, F.: Huszonöt év után, p. 410.

points out “*the authors [of the Bibó Memorial Book] represent diverging points of view and their opinions differ from one another. What is the uniting point then? In what is that their diverging thinking is still united? I think it is that they do not accept the continuity with Stalinism and that they are committed to a future that should not incorporate this historical phenomenon.*”²⁵

The opposition thought that, while certain elements of the regime showed direct continuity, society had changed: it had become more fatigued, more resigned and more opportunistic. It resembled its old self less and less. It was deprived of its history; things were decided without them and above their heads. István Csurka notes that “*Since November 4, 1956, Hungarians do not live their own history. This did not happen after defeats in previous wars. It happened in the soul of the people. [...] Neither after 1945, which represented the greatest change in history, nor after the death of the thousand-year old state at the end of World War I, when the country lost the war and won its freedom did the awareness of continuity break in the soul of the people on either the winners’ or on the losers’ side.*”²⁶

The hope that still existed after 1945 was lost for good after 1956. The promise of and chance for freedom disappeared. It became clear that Communism was not a straitjacket forced on the country for a short time, but a permanent system in Central Europe because neither superpowers were interested in changing the geographic *status quo* of the Cold war. In 1956 the United States chose not to risk a third world war in order to liberate Hungary. Consequently, Soviet power was cemented in Central Europe for decades. People in the region lost their right to shape their own history.

In connection with 1956, *Beszélő* mentioned a lot of political personnel who were forgotten or disapproved by the regime and the younger generation could not hear about. Alongside was one of the most important reinterpreted people, Imre Nagy, various individuals had a place in the personal recollections of the contributors: Sándor Bali (the leading figure of the Workers’ Council of Greater Budapest), Géza Losonczy, Miklós Gimes, Pál Maléter, József Szilágyi, Miklós Vásárhelyi and such political thinkers as Sándor Haraszti and István Bibó. Survivors were interviewed

25 SZABÓ, M.: Bibó Emlékkönyv. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.), *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 1, p. 28.

26 CSURKA, I.: Új magyar önépítés, p. 31.

to provide an understanding of the role that these people played. Personal recollections of others, speeches and court reports were used to remember those who had died or were executed. For example, they wrote that Isván Bibó “*was the only remaining representative of the dissident tradition in Hungary. In the 1970s there was a Bibó renaissance: his writings were duplicated, published as samizdat literature and served as starting point for debate. The duplicates reached even those whom other critical thoughts rarely penetrated. The Memorial Book was meant to be the culmination of this renaissance. The group that accepted Bibó’s intellectual heritage wanted to express their admiration to Bibó on the occasion of his 70th birthday, but, in the end, could only salute his memory.*”²⁷

When *Beszélő* published the ‘minutes’ of the three meetings of the Workers’ Council of Greater Budapest (KMT), it had the effect of a great revelation. KMT was founded in 14 November 1956 and operated until 9 December 1956 when its offices were closed and their leaders arrested. No minutes were made during these meetings.²⁸ Therefore, the minutes of the meeting were put together from the notes jotted down by the participants of those meetings.

Anniversary Celebrations

Beszélő had a special column devoted to 1956. These were documents or obituaries rather than interviews or personal recollections.²⁹ As the opposition writers noted on the 25th anniversary of the revolution (23 October, 1981), there have always been people who remembered 23. October. “*On the first anniversary, a few college students walked through the streets that protesters took the year before. As a punishment, they were denied the opportunity to study thereafter. Commemorations had to be held in private homes and became intimate personal affairs. They also testify about the fact that some dozen or thousand people did not forget the revolution, gathering with their friends and fellow prisoners or lighting a candle for their dead: the unknown Hungarian rebels and the Russian privates who died. The police*

27 SZABÓ, M.: Bibó Emlékkönyv. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 1, p. 28.

28 Of course, it is possible that the archives of the Ministry of Interior have copies of the minutes that were recorded secretly through informers.

29 KIS, J.: Egy igaz emberrel kevesebb: Bali Sándor, 1923–1982. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 6, p.127.

were fearful of those October days. On the nights of 21-22 October, 1957, they arrested five hundred people as a precaution. Similar arrests were made for many years to come even if on a smaller scale.”³⁰ Police action was more visible in 1981 than in previous years: “For months, the official propaganda whispered that the Party was preparing for a more realistic evaluation of the sad events and wanted to raise the taboo concerning 1956. Then as an anti-climax there was even more intense press propaganda than before, using well-known slogans about the counterrevolution of factory-owners and landowners and the mistakes made by the Rákos-Gerő leadership. [...] Still, the twenty-fifth anniversary was different from the ones before. It was the first time that the secondary public commemorated the revolution.”³¹

In the years of the Kádár regime, the representative body, or general assembly, of the Hungarian Writers’ Association met in every five years, including 1981 and 1986. These meetings always had tense moments when the representatives of the power elite and the writers did not agree. But only in 1986 did disagreements end up in open confrontation. No confrontation happened during the 1981 general assembly, despite it taking place on 12 and 13 December, at a time when military government was introduced in Poland. Opposition writer György Dalos comments that: “We do not note it to blame anyone but the assembled Hungarian writers did not feel it necessary to express their concern over the fate of their Polish colleagues. They already knew what their Polish colleagues are only to learn now. They did not raise their voice and did not sacrifice the attainable for their principles. They politely clapped when György Aczél tells them that he prefers those who write literature to those who write their names on petitions.”³²

The democratic opposition organized a two-day conference at a private home in Budapest on 5-6 December 1986, on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the revolution. The approximately seventy participants of the conference made the first objective attempt to recall the events of the revolution. The authors, writers, participants of the revolution and young intellectuals tried to view events from the distance of history and treated it as a subject of scientific research. The debate was based on stud-

30 KÖSZEG, F.: Hozzászolás. In: *Beszélő*, 1982, p. 12.

31 Kőszeg referred to the 6th issue of *Magyar Figyelő*; the audience of the illegal Monday Free University, which was organized by the opposition; and the 9-10th double issue of *Magyar Füzetek*, which was published by Hungarian emigrants in Paris.

32 DALOS, G.: Írók egymás között. In: *Beszélő*, 1982.

ies written by Ferenc Donáth,³³ János Kis,³⁴ Imre Mécs,³⁵ Jenő Széll,³⁶ and Miklós Vársárhelyi.³⁷ Participants also used their personal memories and experience in order to supplement their analysis of the unclear issues concerning the revolution. Later, a shortened version of the minutes of the debate was published.³⁸

Sometimes the participants of the debate wanted to decide questions that were difficult to judge, even with possession of nuanced information. How did the revolution start? How much was it spontaneous or inevitable? How much was it naivety? How much was the revolution consciously planned? These questions had serious political significance for the opposition. A spontaneous movement aimed for both legitimization and acquittal. A pre-planned event could mean both deliberate manipulation and intellectual power; it would seek to put new social forces into action and change the regime.

1986 was a turning point in remembering 1956. Commemorative events right before transition treated the revolution as part of history. By 1988-89, the revolution had cemented its place in Hungarian history. The opposition conference in 1986 was the watershed: debates still offered the possibility of both the continuing and breaking with the past. That is why the evaluation of János Kis, which appeared in the 1987 thematic issue about the revolution, is so telling: *“The restoration of the regime after 1956 sent the demands of the revolution – neutrality, multi-party system and economic self-governance – into exile. Thus, the opportunities of Hungarian society remained at the level where they were in 1947, which made it impossible to catch up with the West. We start to pay the bill for this now – after thirty years. So what if we point at these connections? No matter how much the Soviet world order has changed since 1956, the fundamental demands of the revolution cannot be made into short-term goals even today. A neutral, self-governed Hungary with a multi-party system is still a distant ideal. The*

33 DONÁTH, F.: Töredék az 1956-os magyar forradalomról. In: *Magyar Fuzetek*.

34 KIS, J.: Az 1956-57-es restauráció. In: *Magyar Fuzetek*.

35 MÉCS, I.: Alulról jövő és spontán mozgalmak a forradalomban. In: *Magyar Fuzetek*.

36 SZÉLL, J.: Társadalmi és politikai erők az 1956-os forradalomban. In: *Magyar Fuzetek*.

37 VÁRSÁRHELYI, M.: Az első megghiúsított reformkísérlet. In: *Magyar Fuzetek*.

38 It also appeared abroad after one copy printed in Budapest was duplicated abroad: *A forradalom előzményei, alakulása és utóélete. Tanulmányok és kronológia. Adalékok az újabbbkori magyar történelemhez*. Paris; New Jersey 1987.

*crisis of the 1980s is related to the 1956 – 1957 in other ways, as well. It was then that the political style of the power elite took shape. János Kádár and his environment deduced life-long lessons from the political struggles before and after 4 November, 1956.*³⁹

Approximately a year later, on 5 June 1988, when the Committee on Historical Justice (TIB) was founded, the new democracy-oriented political activists went beyond merely commemorating events. The leaders of TIB made it clear that they found it important to assess the whole post-1945 era objectively, including the revolution in particular, with the help of historical documents.⁴⁰ This meant the radical acceleration of events. A distant ideal for the leaders of the democratic opposition at the end of 1986 and 1987 almost became reality in 1989. The roundtable negotiations between the power elite and the democratic opposition took place in 1989, with a new constitution ratified and the republic declared. As a result of the free elections in 1990, a democratic republic came into being, in which the people elected all representatives from the local to the national level and which had a multi-party system.

Of course, this did not mean that the problem of historical justice was forced into the background. Rather the function of this issue changed. The scientific rediscovery of the past gave way to the utilization of 1956 for political ends. The samizdat journal, *Demokrata*, paid special attention to the reports about the power elite and remembering their historical forgeries when it published its thematic issue about the revolution in June 1988: “Numerous debates and a lot of guessing are going on about the Rajk trial when the documents of this event, which already became the synonym of a show trial internationally, are protected as sensitive state secret, provided they had not disappeared for good. And the other show trials that preceded the Rajk trial are also covered by similar mist.”⁴¹ These include the imprisonment of Pál Demény and Aladár Weiss, Aladár, the trials of the Hungarian Community, the smallholder ‘conspirators’, Cardinal József Mindszenty, MAORT, Standard and the left and right wings of the Social Democratic Party.

It is important to ask whose reflections such historical reflections are meant to be? There was much comment about 1956 in 1989 both by the

39 KIS, J.: Vég és Kezdet. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 19, p. 617.

40 *Demokrata*, Special Edition about 1956, 1988, p. 6.

41 *Ibid*, p. 5.

democratic political elite and politically active intellectuals; many of them saw a direct link 1956 and 1989. However, this was mainly a theoretical construction. As Bill Lomax notes, “*revolutions start when ordinary people enter the public arena and, thus, actively shape historical events. However, after the revolution it is the political elite and intellectuals who harness the fruits of victory. This is all the more so, because the history of revolutions is not written by the masses who started them, but by their intellectual advocates, or the political leadership, that is, those with whom revolutions are identified with in the end.*”⁴²

Budapest – Prague – Warsaw

“*At the entrance of the Farkasréti Cemetery, candles are lit every November 1. Officially, they are said to be for those who disappeared, died far away, but the average person believes them to burn for the revolutionary dead. This year there were a surprisingly large number of young people around the small flowerbed near the cemetery gates. Did they really think of the revolution or the Polish priest, Father Popieluszko, who was murdered earlier, or their own dead? No one can tell. Be that as it may, policemen standing near the gates viewed them with unease and suspicion.*”⁴³

Publications of the opposition often compared the three violent turning points of the history of Soviet satellite states – the events of 1956 in Hungary, of 1968 in Czechoslovakia and of 1981 in Poland. Discussion tended to focus on the results brought about by these three bottom-up processes. According to *Beszélő*, the process of recognition for 1956 took a long time, because Eastern and Central European intellectuals originally defined it as a national uprising; only in 1981, in the wake of events in Poland, was it re-evaluated as a revolution: “*Between intervention in the Czech Republic in 1968 and the appearance of the democratic oppositions, the Marxist opposition figures saw 1956 as a national uprising at best. They did not think it was a social revolution and they believed that, as opposed to the Prague Spring, the Hungarian uprising did not bring a desire for more human socialism any closer. The weakening of the Marxist socialist utopia, the discovery of Bibó’s ideas about a self-limiting revolution and the*

42 LOMAX, B.: Recenzió Pongrátz Gergely könyvéről. In: *Hírmondó*, April 1984.

43 Spartacus: Suhancok forradalma. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 5.

*spreading of the hope from Poland were all necessary for opposition thinkers, including both the democratic opposition and the former Marxist reformers who joined forces, to see 1956 as a revolution and, as such, distinguish it from other red letter days because the anniversaries were the realization of an invisible process.*⁴⁴

István Eörsi, who was imprisoned for many years after 1956, went further and reasoned that it was only the Hungarian national uprising in 1956 that fought the Communist regime in the ideological dimension. Instead of state socialism, Hungarian revolutionaries demanded real socialism, representative democracy, workers' councils and the making of state property into public property. He thought that the following two confrontations (Czechoslovakia 1968 and Poland 1981) were dominated by material demands rather than ideals. The Communists in power promised material gains in exchange for consolidation: *“For the existing power structures only attainable or believably promised goods and allotments served as legitimization. This turn across Europe was brought not by 1956, but the beautiful and doomed 1968. It was then that it became clear that no Prague spring or student movement in Paris or West Berlin could transform the ‘already existing socialism’ into real socialism or abolish the adversities of capitalism. In the West, student movements as well as workers’ movements suffered a general defeat when workers abandoned their parties. It was this defeat that the Polish workers repeated on the Eastern part of the continent in different historical and organizational settings in December 1981, when their head was chopped off by Jaruzelski who loudly pronounced that “I am the least of two evils.”*⁴⁵

István Csurka, who could still legally publish as a writer but was getting closer and closer to the ‘népi’ opposition circles, described 1956 as a singular event: *“The fate of Hungary still differs from the fate of other Central European peoples in one respect. It is the consequences of the revolution that makes all the difference. Until today, this has been the first and largest*

44 ‘Egy icipicit igazítottak a világon’ A második nyilvánosság az októberi évforduló és a decemberi hatalomátvétel között. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 3, p. 274.

45 EÖRSI, I.: A másság ünnepén. In: HAVAS, F.: et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 18, p. 530.

*of explosions. This explosion by nature could not be self-limiting. What followed in Czechoslovakia and Poland were already self-limiting events.*⁴⁶

Csurka's use of the word 'self-limiting' is interesting not only because it refers to the wording of Jadwiga Staniszkis,⁴⁷ but also because a few years later the Hungarian negotiated transition was described in the same terms, which then referred to the formal rules of the roundtable negotiations and the equality of the participants.

János Kis also called attention to the differences between the three crises in Central Europe. However, he focused on the difference in the nature of political consolidation. He said that the holders of power used different methods to rule individual countries. Thus, changes that followed revolutions had no clear pattern: *"In Hungary after November 1956 and in Czechoslovakia after August 1968, the Soviet-type political regimes were restored in their entirety. Here the party was reorganized, there the party was tamed by mass cleansing and then its power was restored at every level. The illegal bodies of resistance (here the revolting groups; there the network of independent radios) were destroyed [...] Of course within the framework of restoration, political developments took divergent roads. In Hungary, the situation started to be consolidated between 1960 and 1963. As opposed to this, the repressive measures have not been lifted in Czechoslovakia. However, we should not forget that society in Hungary was just as unable to influence the process of consolidation as in Czechoslovakia. Half a year after the invasion, even the thought of organized social resistance was out of question. As its revolution, the counterrevolution in Poland also differs from earlier examples. Of course, Jaruzelski also declared a state of emergency in order to restore the previous equilibrium. The authority of the party and government apparatus was strengthened, independent social organizations were banned, most independent artists' associations were dissolved. However, three years after December 1981, this process is far from being completed and it is unlikely that it will ever be..."*⁴⁸

Although Kis spoke of Polish changes as an unfinished process, the contributors to *Beszélő* made it clear that they saw the 1956 revolution in similar terms. This remained so up until the very end of 1980.

46 CSURKA, I.: Az első áldozat nevében. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 3, 1992, No. 21, p. 29.

47 JADWIGA S.: *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution*. Princeton 1984.

48 KIS, J.: Lengyel fejlemények – magyar tanulságokkal. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.), *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 11, p. 13.

Hungary, Central-Europe, Europe

The opposition was in agreement that many social and political problems were rooted in the fact that the borders of the nation and the state were different. Beyond that, the opposition was divided over two contradictory interpretations of the situation. This disagreement was focused on the consequence of the different social traditions that resurfaced after 1956, i.e. the ‘népi’ (traditionalist and popular) and urban (Western-oriented) views.

In later samizdat issues, the deepening crisis and the maturing of the democratic opposition resulted in a more clearly defined division between the ‘népi’ and urban groups. *“The main goal of the ‘népi’ grouping was to achieve the appearance of popular democratic nationalism as the official policy. The ‘népi’ camp thought that the survival of Hungarian society as a political community and the protection of its independent political identity would be guaranteed by keeping the national consciousness alive and giving official rhetoric a patriotic tint. The patriotic rhetoric was a means to distance itself from what was official and thus was still acceptable. Contrary to this, the urban position held that if its representatives joined the official anti-nationalism and the rejection of patriotic rhetoric, which fitted well with the bourgeois radical and social democratic orientation, they could perhaps carefully hide a few thoughts in their articles about the ideals of the defeated revolution. The ‘népi’ side did not see this possible.”*⁴⁹

In *Beszélő*, the representatives of the urban view most often voiced their concern over the lack of legal rights for Hungarians outside Hungary. As opposed to this, the followers of the ‘népi’ position painted a dramatic picture of national extinction as a consequence of the existing situation. While the former believed that national question was primarily a political issue, the latter built their reasoning on the idea of a cultural nation. Miklós Duray, member of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia suggests that *“When it comes to [the question of national minorities, A.B.], we Hungarians are most interested in the fate of the Hungarians who found themselves outside the borders when historical Hungary was cut to pieces. Not only because this event was unjust and illegal, but because it plays a decisive role in the*

49 SZABÓ, M.: A magyar neobarokk új korszaka. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 3, 1992, No. 25, p. 503.

relationship of the Hungarian and neighbouring nations, that is, the politics of Central Europe."⁵⁰

According to the 'népi' radical, István Csurka, there are some who gloat over the decline of the Hungarian nation, whose actions only serve this deadly process. However, to be able to continue with the process of ethnic annihilation, they hide their gloating and blame nationalism on those who dare to raise their voice about national annihilation. It is not only the weakness of the Hungarian nation, but also the moral decline and the lack of self-consciousness that encourage the repression of Hungarians, radical nationalists and the tacticians and strategists of assimilation.

But not all contributors treated Hungarians as a homogeneous group. The philosopher Gáspár Miklós Tamás, who originates from Transylvania, used the derogative nickname used by Romanians for Hungarians, 'Bozgor', in order to describe his experience in Hungary: *"I thought I could be Hungarian without being a 'Bozgor'. I have had suspicions for some time that this is self-deception. At first, the only obtrusive sign was that the swag we carried over from Romania contained food for very few people. The Devil knows what is wrong with us 'Bozgors.'* Our intonation and body language are urban, yet we still count as rural in Hungary; our liberalism is Hungarian, but protestant; it is obvious from our tardiness that that we were left out of every Hungarian revolution and counterrevolution of the twentieth century. Undeniably, twentieth century modern Hungarians are fictional to us. We are all Hungarians, but we have lived under different dictatorships."⁵¹

All contributors agreed that the nation was struggling with problems that were the consequence of the new borders instituted by the Trianon peace treaty. They thought that Hungarians outside our borders, especially in Romania and Czechoslovakia, were deprived of their legal rights. Although everyone agreed with this, there was less agreement about the causes of the current state of affairs. The representative of the 'népi' view argued that the cause behind legal deprivation was the cultural and moral decline of Hungarians in Hungary, which prevented them from successfully lobbying for Hungarian minorities. The followers of the urban tradition attributed legal deprivation to the repressive nature of political

50 DURAY, M.: A magyar kisebbségek és az egyetemes magyarság közötti kapcsolatok problémái. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 3, 1992, No. 24, p. 370.

51 GÁSPÁR, M. T.: The 'Bozgor'. In: Fanny Havas et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 3, 1992, No. 23, p. 221.

regimes. State socialism did not ensure freedom of speech, which was the fundamental means of representing and furthering the cultural and legal interest of minorities. At the same time, they pointed out that dictatorships in the region that lacked legitimacy attempted to create it by using nationalist propaganda and victimizing Hungarians. The Kádárist leadership in Hungary was also held responsible for the situation, because it did not advance the interests of Hungarian minorities. Thus, while the 'népi' view saw the Hungarian issue as cultural, for the urbanists it was a political problem.

The problems concerning Hungarians and Hungarian minorities were closely linked to the issue of Central Europe, since the conflict among nations in the region affected their foreign policies. Many asked whether Central Europe existed and, if it did, where its borders were. *Beszélő's* answer was an unequivocal yes to the existence of Central Europe as a historical formation: "*Meetings and contacts are numerous in the past of Central Europe. We share a part of our history and our cultural traditions has common elements.*"⁵²

However, Central Europe came to be redefined and artificially sustained as a political-military unity. It was an area ruled by Socialist regimes and the Warsaw Pact. According to the writer, György Konrád, "*our life and thinking were depressively defined by the East-West schizophrenia. The ruling social-political reality of today is no longer that of the nation state but of bloc states. It is not social reality that determines political reality but on the reverse.*"⁵³ István Eörsi articulated this in the following way: "*The people of Eastern and Central Europe live in regimes labelled as "real-time socialism" – what an expression! It expresses perplexity, the beginning for forgiveness and the fact of forgiveness. East of Eden, it is called the 'socialism of we-cannot-do-better-than-this' and on the west of Eden it is called the 'socialism of "they-cannot-do-better-than-this."*"⁵⁴

For the opposition, Central Europe was also a cultural bloc. As opposition critic, Sándor Radnóti wrote, "*Wolfgang Mantl is right in saying that,*

52 RADNÓTI, S.: Grand Café Mitteleuropa. Erhard Busek és Emil Brix: Projekt Mitteleuropa (Közép-Európa terve), Ueberreuter, Bécs 1986. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 3, 1992, No. 21, p. 54.

53 KONRÁD, G.: A blokkkreszim halálos dramaturgiája. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 13 - 14, p. 223.

54 EÖRSI, I.: A Szovjet Emberről. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 13 - 14, p. 205.

in the Eastern bloc, Central Europe stands for the desire to belong to the West and for anti-Soviet feeling. The division of Europe – if we disregard the bleeding wound of Berlin – is best signified by the differences between Vienna and Budapest or between Vienna and Prague. We cannot pretend that this difference does not exist; it would be self-deception on our part. From the West, it would be offending tact. If any virtual unity – and Central Europe is one – serves the purpose of covering over these differences in the name of a beautiful dream, then understanding is negligent and will remain illusionary.”⁵⁵

In the view of the democratic opposition, Central Europe was not created in Yalta. It existed before that and is defined by common historical experience. However, socialism isolated it by forcing Socialism on it and inserted it into the bipolar world order as counterweight to the West. The people of Central Europe finally accepted this definition, because it corresponded to their experience. However, instead of the official propaganda about an ideal social order, they saw the region as being defined by lack of freedom and the unavailability of certain products: *“It must be seen that Europe is not our home. For forty years the party leadership had done everything to ensure that it would not be our home. We only have to read the newspapers of the past, which show how consistently we were shut off and made to turn our back on anything that comes from the West.”⁵⁶*

Western Europe accepted this isolation and even commented on it: *“what is East of the Elbe is no longer Europe even according to meteorological maps. It is only an animal farm.”⁵⁷* Thus, the division was not only the fault of Socialist regimes but also of Western Europe since it had accepted and internalized this.

55 RADNÓTI, S.: Grand Café Mitteleuropa, p. 54.

56 VASS, I.: Levél a Magyar Nemzet főszerkesztőjéhez. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 3, 1992, No. 24, p. 393.

57 BARNA, I.: Hála bölcs Vezérünknek, pompás a víz. G. Orwell, Állati gazdaság – AB Független Kiadó, 1984. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 13 - 14, p. 244.

The Taboos Fall: Hungarian Minorities, Jews in Hungary and Political Emigration

Hungarians Living in Minority

Hungarians living outside the borders were an unavoidable issue for every Hungarian government after 1918. After the Communists came to power, the Rákosi regime decided to make this issue taboo. For the regime, minorities simply did not exist. The Stalinist regime could ignore this subject for two reasons: firstly, Communism was an international ideology that did not think in terms of nations but social classes, which suggests that the common goals of the international proletariat was more important than the Hungarian national interest; secondly, the regime was anti-fascist, which also made it possible to ignore the minority issue. Since Communists contrasted themselves with fascism, the revisionist goals of the Horthy era, which were defined in unequivocally fascist terms, fell outside the possible courses of action in foreign affairs. Every policy that fought for the rights of Hungarian minorities or listed their grievances potentially seemed similar to the foreign policy that had led to Hungary's tragedy of in the World War II. Thus, as Kántor says, up until the end of the 1950s, "*we cannot speak of independent Hungarian foreign policy.*"⁵⁸

This only changed slightly in the 1960s when the Kádárist leadership rediscovered the minority question. In this period, the issue was dealt with within the framework of the so-called ideology of dual attachment: when national minorities have cultural ties with their mother nation, as citizens of another state. They are required to obey the laws of that state. The principle of "non-intervention" prevented the regime from making public attempts to improve the situation of ethnic minorities abroad, but behind closed doors, the regime negotiated aspects of culture and education with the Czechoslovak and Romanian leadership. Nonetheless, in order to preserve the unity of the bloc, Hungarian leaders never made public statements about the bad situation of Hungarian minorities or the discriminatory measures brought against them.

The members of the democratic opposition found this approach unacceptable. As early as the first two issues of *Beszélő*, the work of Tibor

58 KÁNTOR, Z.: Nemzetpolitika a rendszerváltás előtt és után. In: MAJTÉNYI, G. – SZABO, C. (eds.): *Távolodás és Közelítések. Rendszerváltás és Kádár-korszak.* Budapest 2008, p. 184.

Fényi about the history of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia after 1945 was published. According to Fényi's periodization, Hungarians in Czechoslovakia were entirely deprived of their rights between 1944 – 1948 and Stalinist consolidation did not bring any substantial improvement in 1948: deportation, forced relocation and the confiscation of property characterized the late 1940s. Slovak nationalists limited the activities of the Cultural Association of Hungarian Workers' of Czechoslovakia (CSEMADOK), which came into being in 1949. Fényi describes the period after 1965 as an era characterized by the strengthening of nationalism at the expense of minorities.

György Nagy, who analysed the situation of Hungarian intellectuals in Romania with the use of numerous statistics, paints a similarly dire picture: *“The data unequivocally proves that, since 1966, the role of minority intellectuals in social and cultural life has decreased both in comparison to the ratio of Hungarians within Romania and in comparison to the number of minority intellectuals in Romania. The number of people who belonged to the minorities and had a university or college degree decreased further and this process has hit the Hungarian minority especially hard.”*⁵⁹

Besides the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, the minority in Romania received the greatest publicity in the opposition press. In a radical article, Gáspár Miklós Tamás, who moved from Transylvania to Hungary, blamed the Kádár regime, because the guided and censored Hungarian public sphere was silent, especially with respect to Romania. *“They describe the famine there with cautious irony, they wink meaninglessly in the distance as they discuss Hungarian literature in Romania, but both poverty and the oppression of Hungarians go unmentioned. [...] The most important things – solidarity, compassion and indignation – are not voiced at all.”*⁶⁰

Miklós Duray and Kálmán Janics were among the most important advocates of the interests of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and often expressed their views in *Beszélő*, which also published their autobiographic novels and an interview with Duray. In connection with this, István Eörsi bitterly notes that *“only from [the autobiographical writing of Duray and Janics] did I learn about the fact that after 1945, the Czechoslovak state and its constitution was built on racist foundations. It declared its intention*

59 NAGY, G.: A romániai magyar értelmiség jelenéről – jövőjéért. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 10, p. 599.

60 GÁSPÁR, M. T.: Éhség és terror Romániában. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 3, p. 147.

to create a Slavic state and built it on the deprived rights of non-Slavic inhabitants. I am appalled that Hungarian peasants were not allowed to take part in the land reform and 97% of Hungarians had no voting rights, social security insurance or pension. I was even more surprised at reading that the Communist leaders were openly and proudly racist. Communism was so attractive in my adolescence, because it promised to abolish class, national and racial antagonisms that were built on birth right. In 1983, I had to learn that there had been a Communist Party in the year when Nazism was defeated that advocated a nationalistic and racist program.”⁶¹

According to the poet Sándor Csoóri, who was the accepted leader of the ‘népi’ movement, Trianon was the cause of the minority neurosis and the divided conscience of and the conflict between the peoples of Central Europe. Yet, Csoóri saw the post-1956 changes in Hungary in a positive light: “*finally we are believed*” in international politics. He believed that this was the consequence of both the revolution and the economic reforms that happened after the revolution. Therefore, he believed, it was time for Hungarian politicians and intellectuals to stand up for the rights of Hungarians outside Hungary.⁶²

Hungarian Jews

Somewhat related to the minority issue, but in a completely different way, *Beszélő* also discussed the other great taboo of the Kádár regime: the situation of Jews in Hungary. According to Marxist ideology, capitalism is the result of harmful processes whether they are cultural, religious or patriotic. Thus Marxists believed that the victory of Socialism would end antisemitism and the Jewish problem as well.⁶³ That is, Marxism did not break with the assimilationist paradigm of the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century.

Despite this theoretical position, in the Socialist countries of East-Central Europe neither Jews nor antisemitism disappeared, which created some tension between the theoretical principles and their realization in

61 EÖRSI, I.: Egy újságcikk és a ,realitások’. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 9, p. 563.

62 CSOÓRI, S.: Eltemetetlen gondok a Duna-tájon. In: RAINER, J. M.: *A monori tanácskozás jegyzőkönyve*. Budapest 2005, p. 17.

63 See MARX, K.: On the Jewish Question. In: MARX, K. – ENGELS, F.: *Collected Works*. London 1975.

practice. The Kádár regime resolved this tension by denying the existence of the Jewish problem. It claimed that the “*counterrevolution [of 1956] allowed for numerous expressions of antisemitism,*”⁶⁴ but the consolidation that followed did away with these anti-Jewish tendencies. Although the state accepted the existence of the Israelite church and under strict limits allowed its operation, it did not acknowledge the possibility of the existence of a religious Jewish identity and unequivocally denied the presence of antisemitism in Hungary.

This taboo was refuted by *Beszélő*. On the one hand, they called attention to the Jewish participants of the revolution who were punished more severely because of their origin or identity: “*It was the origin of Gábor Földes, the talented Communist director of the theatre in Győr, that caused his downfall. Even though famous colleagues spoke up for him and everyone knew that Földes did not encourage anyone to make public tribunals but tried to save the life of ÁVH agents who fired at crowds and many of whom were later lynched. The Presidential Council decided that it would not look good if of all those on death row it would be a Jew who was pardoned in Győr [...] Former Communist and clerics – leftists and rightists – were accused side by side. As we remember them, we wish to make no difference among them – they were all martyrs of a cause whether we agree with their political views or not. We see the Communist Zoltán Schönherz as much of a martyr of anti-fascism as we do the racist Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and the Zionist Hanna Szenes, who was executed in prison on Margit körút (though her name is missing from the official catalogue of martyrs) although we are neither Zionists nor racists.*”⁶⁵

When the peace movement, SALOM, wrote an open letter to the National Representatives of the Hungarian Israelites and demanded the redefinition of the relationship between Jews and Hungarians, *Beszélő* published the letter as well as reactions to it. In his critical analysis of the letter, János Kis claims that “*since the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, along the rising consciousness of Hungarians, albeit partially independently of it, the number among Jewish youth who want to openly accept their Judaism, feel togetherness with the Jewish Diaspora of the world and Israel and own the special Jewish traditions has increased. SALOM voices the claim of these young people when it breaks with the hundred-year old principle*

64 See *Ellenforradalmi erők a magyar októberi eseményekben*. Budapest 1957.

65 KŐSZÉG, F. Huszonöt év után. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 1, 1992, No. 8, pp. 421 – 422.

of assimilation. 'Although we acknowledge the right of the individual to assimilation, we believe that the Jews of Hungary should not assimilate, but integrate into the society of their homeland.' That is, instead of doing away with all the differences between Jews and non-Jews, the aim is that Jews preserve their traditions, become a minority and find their place in Hungarian society that way."⁶⁶

According to Kis, this did not mean total assimilation, at least not in the way that official propaganda claimed. This was different, because "Jews almost entirely live and behave like any Hungarians, its environment still singles them out. It is a vain attempt to try to assimilate. It only leads to a compulsion to prove ourselves, minority complexes and humiliating exposures."⁶⁷

Hungarian Political Emigration

The existence and activities of Hungarian emigrants abroad was another sensitive issue for the system. Right after 1956, the official Communist position classified the emigrants into two groups. Those, who emigrated between 1945 and 1947, were described as "the fascist supporters of the Horthy regime" and those who left in 1956 – 1957 were called "counter-revolutionaries". The opposition disapproved of the position of the regime and, further, identified the controversies hidden in it: "Since 1945, a million Hungarians have left the country as a result of the violent means that characterized the historical processes and social shocks that the realization of Socialism brought with it. The vast majority of them were forced into emigration, because the Socialist regime saw them as enemies. This attitude was accentuated by death threats, prison sentences, forbidding them to practice their profession and by strict sentences in their absence. The official opinion about the emigrants did not change until the end of the 1960s. Communist party propaganda described it as radical rightist, reactionary, fascist and counterrevolutionary. Following détente in the 1970s and the Helsinki agreement, the universal condemnation of emigrants was replaced with a less extreme view, which divided emigrants into good and bad ones. The 'good'

66 KIS, J.: A Salom nyílt levele a magyar társadalomhoz és a magyar zsidósághoz. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 11, p. 58.

67 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

emigrants were those who were ready to cooperate with official Hungarian organizations and the ‘bad’ ones were those who refused to do so.”⁶⁸

Samizdat publications treated works written in emigration as an integral part of Hungarian culture. However, almost without exception, these works were all ‘to be banned’ according to the Communist power elite.

Economic Policy in the Kádár Era

Finally, most of the Hungarian samizdat publications attentively followed the alternatives that were worked out in the area of economic policy. The history of the ‘new economic mechanism’ (NEM) that was introduced in 1968, were analysed in numerous comprehensive studies before transition.⁶⁹ The beginning of economic reforms in Hungary should be dated to 1963, when Rezső Nyers, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, created an informal economic advisory body to start the reforms. His suggestions became the basis for the comprehensive reform package. Changes were necessary because, by the mid-1960s, it became clear that economic growth had slowed in the Socialist bloc. This included the inadequacy of agricultural production, technological and scientific research and development and the imbalance of payments. These phenomena were confusing, because Socialist propaganda claimed that CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) countries would catch up with the level of economic and industrial development of the capitalist countries. The eighth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party in 1962 declared that “*national income between 1960 and 1980 will increase fourfold [...] industrial production will increase fivefold [...] and] industrial products will be made with high-level technology. By 1980, consumption per capita will be higher in Hungary than in capitalist countries.*”⁷⁰

68 OROSZ, I.: Az ‘idegenbe szakadt’ demokratikus hagyomány’ Könyvkritika Borbándi Gyula: A magyar emigráció életrajza 1945 – 1985 című könyvéhez. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 17, p. 501.

69 See BEREND, T. I.: *A magyar gazdasági reform útja*. Budapest 1988; LENGYEL, L.: *Végkifejlet*. Budapest 1989; PETŐ – SZAKÁCS, S.: *A hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története 1945 – 1985*. Budapest 1985; UNGVÁRSZKI, Á.: *Gazdaságpolitikai ciklusok Magyarországon (1948 – 1988)*. Budapest 1989; or a book that was published after the transition: KORNAI, J.: *A szocialista rendszer*. Budapest 1993.

70 *A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt VIII. Kongresszusának Jegyzőkönyve, 1962 november 20 – 24*. Budapest 1963, p. 579.

Economic reforms were introduced in East Germany in 1963, in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in 1965 and in Hungary in 1968 as answers to the unfavourable economic tendencies that were contrary to official expectations. Hungarian reforms started in agriculture when small-scale private farms were allowed. These production units based on private ownership did not replace but temporarily supplemented Socialist production.

However, after the democratization in Prague in 1968, repressive measures were made stricter and this did not favour the survival of Hungarian reforms. Despite the fact that Kádár expressed his official commitment to reforms after the intervention, Hungarian political leaders had to make a u-turn in the early 1970s. This, however, was never accepted as official policy. The leadership talked about “corrective measures” and “temporary difficulties”, but these did not correspond to the size of the real crisis. By the early 1970s, *“it became clear for Kádár that the reform policy of 1968 cannot be continued and that the leadership in Moscow demanded scapegoats.”*⁷¹ Kádár realized the threatening nature of the situation, utilized the division in the Politburo and in the end only Rezső Nyers and Jenő Fock had to resign, but he could stay in power. These dramatic events were did not miss the attention of the opposition, either. János Kis comments that *“the turn abroad, that is the occupation of Czechoslovakia, made the necessity of a decision imminent. From 1969 on, the natural adversaries of reforms – the leaders of state firms who were threatened by competition, the leaders of the regional party apparatuses, sectoral ministries and labour unions – went on the offensive after Brezhnev’s rhetoric gave them encouragement. The Kádárist leadership was not ready to fight: it constantly retreated and gave way to the anti-reform coalition, which was so weak that despite the backing received from Moscow, it could not work out a clear policy and fell apart as soon as it emerged victorious between 1972 and 1974. Kádár could again solidify his position and play a balancing act between various factions.”*⁷²

Economic depression was unavoidable and called the reform generation of the 1970s into being: *“Towards the end of the 1970s, it became clear that the reserves of the Kádárist policies were exhausted. The return of newer concessions constantly decreased. As the stress was moved over to the secondary economy, it became clearer by the day that progress would sooner or later will*

71 HUSZÁR, T. (ed.): *Kádár – A hatalom évei 1956-1989*. Budapest 2006, p. 197.

72 KIS, J.: Vég és Kezdet. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 19, p. 617.

clash with the biological limits of self-exploitation. It became obvious that, for certain groups, this was not the right direction: growing inequalities made their mark. The spreading of uncontrolled economic activities increased autonomy vis-à-vis the state, but the effects of valueless self-exploitation on lifestyle were frighteningly destructive. Cultural progress also achieved the limit where the organizations of various views and open debates that were free of tutelage became essential for survival. New generations appeared for whom the consolidation was not an unexpected gift, but a natural point of departure.”⁷³

That is, in the face of official propaganda, which said that the country was continuously moving forward on the “Leninist road of Socialism” and that difficulties were temporary, János Kis claimed that the difficulties were rooted in the nature of the regime. The Kádár regime ensured its legitimacy by showing newer and newer results, repeatedly making political concessions and increasing living standards. But the sources of growth – cheap Soviet raw material and Western credits – dwindled by the end of the 1970s. The regime could only silence the dissatisfied population with further concessions. However, this would have resulted in such a degree of democratization that the regime would be abolished.

The Perceptions of Normality

One of the main building blocks of the Kádár regime was the perception of normality, in which ‘normal’ life equalled the opportunity for an apolitical existence. The media of the time often used the “deceiving strategy of normalization”; they painted “heroic”, irrational deeds in unbelievable colours. Nationalization was described not as a process based on force and violence but as the result of the voluntary joining together of rational individuals. How could it be otherwise? Why would a rational person work alone? Why would he want to be just a needle in a haystack?

Political Activism as a Form of Mental Illness

After 1956 and in connection with resisting intellectuals, the media often tried to prove their irrationality and used the illusion of normality. The story of Tibor Pákh’s hunger strike exemplifies this well. “*Dr. Tibor Pákh, the 59-year old lawyer, was imprisoned for twelve years after 1956*

73 Ibid, p. 617.

because he wrote political essays. His imprisonment was not longer, because he was declared to be ‘mentally unfit’ for good in 1971 and the rest of his sentence was abolished after he received electroshock treatment and was put into insulin-induced coma on a regular basis. Tibor Pákh went on hunger strike in prison to protest for the human rights of the imprisoned. He did the same 15 years later when he joined Polish civil rights activists in the church of Podkowa Leszna in the spring of 1981. In October 1981, he protested when his passport was illegally revoked. It was then that he was taken to the National Mental Institute. He underwent forced treatment in the hospital: he was intravenously given drugs to modify his consciousness and was fed forcefully. At this point, the situation could no longer be kept secret, because 57 intellectuals and many international organizations spoke up against the inhuman and dangerous ‘treatment’. Finally, Tibor Pákh was released from the hospital at the end of October (but he did not get his passport back).⁷⁴

The authorities treated Pákh’s protests as mental illnesses, that is, paranoia based on false political ideals and schizophrenia, which resulted in an eating disorder. It did not occur to the authorities that his life could be saved by providing remedy for the legal offenses that were committed against him rather than by ‘treatments’ that endangered his life and destroyed his health. What is more, legal offenses continued, so Tibor Pákh went on hunger strike again in October 1982. As one samizdat journal reported, *“the procedure was the usual. He was taken to a mental institution by force, drugged, tied down and fed forcefully. It must have occurred to those who knew the antecedents or signed the petition in 1981 that the psychiatrist might be right. Or as it was posed in Beszélő, ‘Is it not too extreme to risk one’s life for a passport?’ Or another related question is whether it was reasonable and right to collect signatures and turn to the domestic and international public on behalf of Tibor Pákh?”⁷⁵*

To answer this question, Professor Charles Durand arrived in Budapest in 1982 and talked to Tibor Pákh on several occasions for three days. He came to the conclusion that *“Tibor Pákh is an example of how one can be declared mentally unfit for truthful protest. We psychiatrists have to fight the wrongful use of psychiatry. Tibor Pákh feels that he is being persecuted in Hungary. On the basis of my experience, I must tell that this is not a delusion*

74 KRASSÓ, G.: Dr. Pákh Tibor elmebetegsége. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*.

75 Pákh Tibor ügye, *Beszélő Összkiadás*, op. cit.

*but the reality. For three days, we were continuously followed by persons who, I assume, belong to the police.”*⁷⁶

Commemorative Acts

Acts of remembrance symbolically place taboos back into the world of normality. Such acts lose their character as direct political protests, becoming instead routine activities, which are often tied to anniversaries. Commemorative events that are frequently repeated lose their protesting character, become rituals and this can make unusual, forbidden or – as in Hungary – abnormal behaviour acceptable.

When it came to acts of remembrance, the samizdat press was not united. Mostly *Demokrata* and sometimes *Hírmondó*, paid attention to it. *Beszélő* only occasionally reported commemorative events, which had the purpose of keeping historical events fresh in the minds of civil society. *Demokrata* and *Hírmondó* found commemorative occasions in Hungary particularly important (for example Mayday in Poland had a similar function: workers demanded changes when they celebrated Labour Day.) “Remembering the commemorative events” was also a frequent phenomenon in Hungary, as several opposition reports indicate, including the reports of *Hírmondó* about the anniversary celebrations of 15 March, i.e. the 1848 revolution⁷⁷ and *Beszélő* reports about the celebrations of 1956 in private homes. These made a clear distinction between official and private red-letter days: the regime celebrated 4 April and 7 November while the opposition would have wished to commemorate 15 March and 23 October. The national holidays of the regime were linked to the 1917 Soviet revolution and the Soviet occupation of Hungary in 1945. The opposition celebrated the beginnings of two Hungarian revolutions: the one that started on 15 March 1848 and the other, which started on 23 October 1956.

The Role of the Semi-Opposition: The Circle of ‘Nepi’ Writers

Besides the democratic opposition, who published samizdat journals outside the official public sphere, there was a tradition and circle of ‘nepi’ (populist) writers. Their work, however, belonged to the ‘grey zone’ between government and opposition, garnering at least some official recognition.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Cf. the issues of *Hírmondó*, 1984.

These writers did not consciously make informal alliances across borders, expand samizdat or theorize about the potential of the opposition in the same (or similar) way as the democratic opposition. Nevertheless, they represented a very influential intellectual tradition in Hungary that dated back to the 1920s and 1930s.

In the interwar period, the peasantry was squeezed below society and for this reason it was unable to articulate its interests itself or to enter into political alliance. The populist writers of the time attempted to close this social gap with their activities, but they themselves proved to be of limited influence: they were not able to mobilise the political class of the Horthy regime, nor the national middle class, which had entered into a compromise with the regime, nor the isolated bourgeois strata nor even the targeted peasantry could. Thus the function of their writings remained primarily to keep social self-conscience alive.

The defeat suffered during World War II and the communist change of 1948 fundamentally transformed the structure of Hungarian society. The gentry elite was wiped out and a large part of the bourgeois middle class was destroyed by the war. In the 1940s, many people emigrated from both strata. Furthermore, under the 1945 land reform, more than one million peasants were given land, which was subsequently forced onto kolkhozes. A larger proportion of the rural poor was absorbed by forced industrialization. A 'soft dictatorship', based on the reformist politics of consolidation, was launched by János Kádár in the 1960s and was able to make society digest the shock of the 1940s and 1950s. The issues raised by populist writers (large estates, land, agrarian poverty) became obsolete.

Populist thought, however, survived in a cultural form, linked to literature and in the meantime it did good service to the opponents of reform with the criticism of Western modernization and consumer society. It played a role in the revival of national traditions from the seventies onwards and, as a new element, it put the problem of Hungarian minorities living on the other side of the border, in other countries on the agenda. Thus it tried to make populist cultural heritage a nationalist one and also to maintain the idea of "middle of the road", which had a different meaning earlier, equally turning against Western liberal capitalism and Eastern internationalist communism. Populists found internationalism common to both and, similarly to the New Left, they condemned the economic influence of Western multinational concerns as well as the power monopoly of the Soviet-type system. They regarded both as foreign oppression.

Communist cultural policy, associated with György Aczél, tried to use their reappearance of “népi” vs. “urbans” rift to divide the opposition: since both Western and populist criticism appeared in the late 1970s, it was suggested that they could not have a common platform, as the “urbanists” were Jewish and the ‘népi’ (populists) were not. Whispering propaganda, which was amplified by the populists at the rime of regime change, has again made antisemitism a political issue. This seemed like an anachronism from the past for younger generations that had grown up in the shadow of the Kádár-system and had heard about the populist vs. urbanist conflict only from history books.

The populist writers and their circles were not directly political in their actions, but their symbolic gestures were usually echoed more widely among certain groups of public opinion makers, especially countryside teachers, churchmen, poets, writers, journal editors, literary figures, etc., than the writings and actions of the marginalized democratic opposition. Their message was coloured with cultural and historical undertones and they were concerned with the ‘mental recovery’ of Hungarians living under Communism, inside and outside the borders of Hungary. They developed important intellectual trans-border cooperation with like-minded people of the Hungarian community in Transylvania, Vojvodina and the Slovakian part of Czechoslovakia. They visited them, provided Hungarian books for them and saw their historic mission in keeping the Hungarian ‘national spirit’ alive beyond the borders of the nation-state. They operated between officialdom and the direct opposition, were anti-communists but ready to compromise with them in order to get closer to their cultural and political goal and sometimes they caused trouble for communist officials, especially at the scandalous Writers’ Congresses in 1981 and 1986. In the 1960s and 1970s, their spiritual leader was the writer Gyula Illyes, who died in 1983.

By the second part of the 1980s, the cultural criticism of popular origins was replaced by the organisation of political movements with the pluralisation of the intelligentsia and the society and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The forum was established as a loose intellectual association in Lakitelek in September 1987 and was transformed into a political organization a year later. Some of its spokesmen, such as Istvan Csoori, Istvan Csurka and Sandor Lezsak, later cut their previous ties with the official cultural politics, represented by the communist Gyorgy Aczel moved closer to the opposition. These writers were instrumental in forming the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), first as an independent movement

(in September 1987), later as a political party (in 1988 – 1989). Not accepting “*either the tag of pro-government or of opposition and the pressure of choice,*”⁷⁸ initially the Forum did not function as a party; yet it was active as a party that collected groups from a wide range of professions. Populist thinking emerged from its purely cultural forms and reappeared on the political stage. The MDF won the first free elections in March 1990, under the leadership of the former high school teacher and historian, József Antall, who became the first democratically elected Prime Minister in Hungary.

In sum, populist writers, with their democratic *and* nationalist agenda did not belong to the circles of democratic opposition or independent society. They belonged for a long time to a grey zone, a ‘second society’, which can be characterized as a set of informal relationships within the first, official society. Its specific characteristic was that it did not fit into the framework of the official ideology. Since the Kádár regime paid far more attention to maintaining the political monopoly of the Communist Party and to keeping social stability under check than to punishing ideological differences, the regime tacitly acknowledged and tolerated the marginal presence of a nationalistic semi-opposition. As mentioned above, some Communist politicians, most notably György Aczel, sometimes even used them to keep the democratic opposition ‘counter-balanced’ and thus politically contained.

Conclusion

It is not easy to summarize the samizdat publications’ view of history, because the analysis of historical processes was not crucial for *Beszélő* or other samizdat journals. But, as they discussed current events, they often mentioned and provided new interpretations of certain historical occurrences. Thus the independent building blocks of the historical memory of the democratic opposition can be clearly distinguished.

One of the most important characteristics of this memory was that it was almost exclusively limited to the post-1945 period. Paradoxically, the representatives of the dictatorship and the opposition both agreed that history started in 1945. For example, of the twenty-seven issues of *Beszélő*, only two mentioned events before the Communist takeover in 1947-1948 and only in passing. One was an article that reflected on the speech made

78 Az MDF Alapítólevele. In: *Hitel*, November 1988, pp. 50 – 51.

by Sándor Csoóri at the Monor meeting in July 1985. The author, Pál Szalai provided information so as to analyse the behaviour of Miklós Horthy in 1944 with more clarity.⁷⁹ Undeniably, he described it as more complex than the simplistic officially fascist image of Horthy, but his comments made up only two short paragraphs. The other such reference to the pre-1945 period was when István Eörsi identified the post-1956 period with the oppression of the Bach-era that followed the crushed revolution and war of independence in 1848: *“If we want to sincerely approach the memory of 1956, we have to start out of an independent consciousness. Official political positions help us in this, since – unlike during the reign of Francis Joseph – it cannot even attempt to make the revolution a part of its traditions. This is so, because in our times the same people and institutions performed the tasks that were divided between Haynau, Bach and Deák. Thanks God, this makes it impossible to see our age as the disillusionary stylization that represented the achievements of the realistic demands of the revolution.”*⁸⁰

The most unbearable error of the Kádár regime for the opposition was that it erased 1956 from the nation’s memory. Ultimately, this came to help them since it served as a reminder that the demands of the revolution were not achieved, even in a limited form.

Beszélő’s treatment of the Communist takeover of 1947 and the role of other parties in it helped to extinguish with existing taboos. The official Communist narrative talked of the ‘voluntary’ union of the Hungarian Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party in 1948, which resulted in the creation of a united workers’ party, the Party of Hungarian Workers. However, the union was preceded by the salami tactics of the Communist party and the election frauds in 1947. *Beszélő* documented these and the opposition of the social democrats by publishing relevant contemporary documents. The publication of the memorandum of the social democratic Peyer group was also closely linked to the issue of emigration, since Károly Peyer left the country in 1947 and became a prominent member of the social democrats abroad. The position of the Peyer group *“was timely because of the parliamentary elections called in August 1947. The Social Democratic Party that fought for fair elections for decades approved an election law that made all kind of frauds possible in 1947. This way, the Social Democratic*

79 SZALAI, P.: Contribution. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 12, p. 189.

80 EÖRSI, I.: A másság ünnepén. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 18, p. 530.

Party diverged from its earlier principles for temporary gains and gave its approval to measures that it should have opposed on principle.”⁸¹

Beszélő published the full version of the last speech of the Christian Democratic politician, István Barankovics, which he made in December of 1948 and was “*the last great expression of opposition in the Hungarian parliament after 1945.*”⁸² In a speech that criticized the Communists, Barankovics focused on three issues: the relationship of state and church, the issue of small- and medium- sized private property and the question of human rights. It is clear that these issues were the ones raised by *Beszélő*. This was what made the publication of the document so timely in the 1980s. The opposition also wanted to prove that democratic opposition had a tradition in Hungary: “*no one should say – least of all János Kádár in his interview to Time Magazine – that Hungary has no democratic tradition and, consequently, the Communists must teach democracy to the people.*”⁸³

Beyond the examples above, there were no other references to earlier historical events or processes in *Beszélő*. What could explain this? The reason could be partially tactical: contributors thought that the facts of the distant past are not urgent enough to pressure the dictatorship for a reaction. On the other hand, samizdat publications focused on current – not historical – problems, especially on those that resulted from the repressive nature of the regime. The roots of repression could, in part, be found in the outside, i.e. in Soviet occupation, and they could have gone back no further in time than the old Socialism of the 19th century. Since criticism targeted the Kádár regime, it was obvious that the greatest attention should be paid to events and processes that could question the legitimacy of the regime.

From the point of view of historical memory, the 1956 revolution was the most important historical theme. There was no common point in the interpretation of 1956 between the regime and *Beszélő*. The journal already expressed protest by simply calling the 1956 a revolution and, further, by analysing it and refuting the silence that the regime forced on society, which the contributors called ‘national forgetting’.

81 A Peyer csoport irataiból. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 17, p. 467.

82 Szalai Pál bevezetője Barankovics István utolsó beszédéhez. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 13-14, p. 193.

83 KRASSÓ, G.: Két választás Magyarországon. In: HAVAS, F. et al. (eds.): *Beszélő Összkiadás*, Vol. 2, 1992, No. 19, p. 700.

Beyond this, opposition writers renounced official propaganda. They showed that

1. In 1956, revolution erupted, which was based on broad social unity
2. The revolution defined its goal as the democratization of the system
3. Imre Nagy's government was not made up of traitors
4. The retribution and trials following the revolution were not legal in any sense
5. The new apparatus in power, which was led by János a Kádár, did not entirely break with the customs of the Rákosi regime. What is more, at the beginning it used the same tactics to consolidate its power
6. Following retributions, Hungarian intelligentsia subsided into silence in the 1960s, but this was not a consequence of accepting the social compromise. Rather, it was based on the fear of Stalinist restoration and on resignation about what could not be changed.

The assessment about the role of intellectuals relates to this last point. While the early issues of *Beszélő* described 1960 as the era of silence, later issues partially reassessed this position and pointed out that among intellectuals the 'népi' and urban views started to appear again. In 1987, *Beszélő* openly identified these two opposition movements: the followers of the 'népi' position tried to add a patriotic flavour to their statements and the representatives of the urban position agreed to the anti-nationalism of the official policy line so that they could get their views published despite censorship. While the former viewed the problems of the nation from a cultural point of view, the latter treated it in terms of a political programme.

The national question was one of the problematic issues discussed by the democratic opposition and this was the division along which different opposition positions developed. The 'népi' position believed that the Hungarian nation was in a moral crisis. As opposed to this, the 'urban' position blamed the economic and political crisis on the regime and its

leadership. The differences between these two positions could be most clearly seen in their treatment of Hungarian minorities abroad.

Besides reinterpreting the meaning of the revolution, the samizdat press exposed taboo issues that the regime tried to shovel under the carpet. This way, *Beszélő* discussed poverty, the situation of Jews in Hungary and Hungarian emigrants and minorities abroad. These problems existed but were hardly new. Therefore, the journal was able to examine their causes and history. Consequently, the members of the democratic opposition pointed out that the situation of the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Czechoslovakia could not be considered to be solved despite the internationalist nature of Socialist ideology. They found similar faults in the traditional treatment of the 'Jewish question', which was based on religious and assimilationist policies. For the opposition, Hungarian emigrants were not a group of 'fascists', as the official propaganda claimed and could not be divided into good and bad types. Rather they were treated as an integral part and constituent community of the nation.

Official propaganda tried to divide Hungarian emigrants into a good/bad dichotomy and the East-West division appeared as a similar antagonism in its worldview. The samizdat movement also accepted the existence of a division between East and West but, unlike official propaganda, questioned that this could be described along Socialist values. The division of Europe was, for them, characterized by lack rather than by possession. Freedoms were lacking in Eastern Europe and it was obvious to the opposition that the Soviet bloc would never catch up with Western Europe economically. The dividing line in the Cold War resulted from World War II and the agreement in Yalta, becoming unquestionably clear with the building of the Berlin Wall; however, economic differences had their roots in an earlier era and were linked to earlier historical developments.

Dissident intellectuals of *Beszélő* saw Central Europe – and not Eastern Europe – as a geographic and historical unit. They identified the turning points of the recent past in the events of 1956, 1968 and 1981. *Beszélő* regularly let Polish and Czech and Slovak intellectuals voice their views, commemorated the anniversary of the Prague spring and followed the fate of Solidarity – the movement of independent Polish labor unions. Thus, the opposition mostly meant Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary by Central Europe, that is, Central Europe was the geographic area between Germany and the Soviet Union that had a common historical heritage, experienced both fascism and Communism and gave life to democratic opposition, critical publicity and independent civil society.

Finally, the democratic opposition refuted the official economic self-definition of the system, which was based on the Marxist evolutionary ideal. According to the opposition, the situation after 1956 was not only characterized by improving economic trends but also by inconsequential reforms that were followed by hangs in the process of execution. Furthermore, from the early 1970s, the accumulation of national debt accelerated and the country lagged behind Western capitalist nations.

Based on this, I conclude that the democratic opposition did not question the historical interpretation of the Kádár regime entirely. Only the self-definition of the regime and its historical determinants were called into question.

Appendix

Table 1. The Diverging Position of the democratic opposition and the Kádár regime

Theme	The interpretation of the democratic opposition	The official position of the regime
History	Limited view of history: the post-1945 period in a critical view	The blooming of history started after 1945
	1947-48 was not a positive turning point; it meant the dissolution of opposition and multi-party system	Socialism came as a victorious turning point in 1948.
	1956 was a democratic revolution	1956 was a counter-revolution
Kádár regime	Did not break with the fundamental customs of the Rákosi regime	Historical compromise
	Brutal retaliations after 1956	Strict, but just reactions
	Defeat rather than social compromise	Compromise

	Economy: no continuous progress – semi-reforms, hangs and crises	Linear and steady economic progress
	Society: Unresolved issues, chronic problems (e.g. poverty, the churches, anti-Semitism, Hungarian emigration, Hungarian minorities)	Such problems do not exist
Nation	Turns against the internationalist narrative of the regime	Internationalism of the proletariat
	The Hungarian nation does not equate with the size of the country, which generates acute political problems	These problems are the shadows of the past, which can be solved in the spirit of internationalism
	<i>„Népi“ view:</i> The issue of ethnic minorities is a cultural and moral problem <i>Urbanite view:</i> the problem is a consequence of the dictatorial political regime that does not respect human rights	These problems are remnants of the past, which can be solved in the spirit of internationalism
Europe	The East-West division is not void of a value judgment and existed before 1945	The socialist system stands above capitalism in its historical chances
Central-Europe	The defining anti-regime events are those of 1956, 1968, 1980-81 in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.	It is the community of socialist people's democracies, its geographical location is secondary.

Resumé

Autor vo svojej štúdiu analyzuje genézu a pôsobenie maďarskej demokratickej opozície v období pred zmenou režimu v Maďarsku koncom 80. rokov, a najmä postavenie intelektuálov v tejto opozícii. Genéza demokratickej opozície má dôležité východisko v samizdatovej maďarskej literatúre, predovšetkým v periodiku *Beszélő*, do ktorého písali autori rozličného politického zamerania. Práve v tomto periodiku sa v 80. rokoch otvorene hovorilo o tom, čo oficiálna propaganda nespomínala. Či už skutočnú ekonomickú situáciu Maďarska, postavenie maďarských menšín v susedných štátoch, vzťahy medzi cirkvou a štátom alebo udalosti

v stredoeurópskom regióne, ako bola poľská kríza v roku 1981. Z historických udalostí sa analyzovala predovšetkým revolúcia z roku 1956, ktorej oficiálne podanie bolo považované v prostredí opozície za jednu z najväčších lží kádarovského režimu. Osobitne sa to prejavovalo počas výročí tejto revolúcie, ktorej bola zakaždým venovaná osobitná pozornosť a často sa porovnávala s podobnými pokusmi v ďalších krajinách sovietskeho bloku, ako boli Československo v roku 1968 či Poľsko v roku 1981.

The Political Anti-Communist Opposition in East-Berlin between 1985 and 1990. Unified against the Regime?

Detlef W. STEIN

Communist ideology, which had an international dimension and which accomplished so much in Europe and worldwide, must be reappraised internationally and in an interdisciplinary way after the fall of communism as state doctrine in European countries. Governments and non-governmental institutions must find possibilities and ways in order to advance examination and enlightenment with regard to the subject of communism and its variations, not only in academic discourse, but also with regard to educational policy.

The political opposition in the former capital of the GDR during the 1980s was unbelievably diverse and worked under the control of the Protestant church.

Here, from my point of view, we must introduce three categories:

- The peace groups and thematically determined working groups, which were partially integrated into municipal life.
- The so-called tolerated groups (such as groups of the “Open Work”), who expected in some cases great difficulties in the church structures and communities.
- The independent groups, who did not want to work under the control of the Protestant church and who met exclusively in private accommodation, but the ecclesiastical structures had to be used for their work.

I want to make any remarks with regard to the Catholic Church. The freedom of action for opposing or anti-communist groups within the structures of the Catholic Church can be neglected in this place for East Berlin and, no less, for the GDR.

It is important to add that the absolute majority of the politically active persons followed the ideas of the so-called “Third Way” and did not want to cause the total fall of communism. They always wanted the fall of the state party of the former GDR, but they often adhered to the idea of “socialism with human face” (Alexander Dubček). The statements of former civil rights activists, who nowadays actively serve in different political parties and institutions, are not telling at this place the whole historical truth.

Nobody could predict at that time the destruction of the Berlin Wall some years later. Therefore they had to put up with this inhuman social system of socialism. They were to a certain extent in a temporary stage in terms of social policy, probably lasting decades, where the socialist social order could form only very slowly in the direction of pluralism and individual freedom.

The quantity as well as the quality of the work in the peace circles within the Protestant communities constantly increased after 1981. It is impossible to describe the general atmosphere at that time in East and West Germany. The stationing of nuclear missiles in Germany by order of the governments of the Soviet Union and the USA (SS-20; Pershing) had produced a general atmosphere of fear and depression among the majority of the populations. For this reason, many young people began to commit themselves to peace work outside the state facilities in the GDR. The so-called OPEN Work allowed the church authorities to make the most of different offers: In the church rooms the punks could celebrate the same as political circles, who occupied themselves with special topics.¹

The groups of political opponents were politically committed in all districts of Berlin during the 1980s. The communication was quite difficult, because almost nobody possessed a telephone connection and because the exchange took place only in a personal way. The routes in the separate parts of town were not always optimal. The consequences of this were that the exchange of information within a district took place as quickly as possible by means of private visits.

Some communities which played an important part in the opposing scenery were the Samaritan community of priest Eppelmann, the Zionist

1 CRÜGER, H.: *Die Rolle der Kirchen in der DDR. Eine erste Bilanz.* München 1993.

community, the community of Gethsemane church and that of Sophien church.

Below is a brief description of the most important and active opposition groups and organisations in East Berlin:

- The Protestant communities, which since 1978 had come into being in all the larger towns of the country and possessed a great basis. On account of their composition they possessed an innovative power until the mid-1980s.
- Peace groups, which were independent of the Protestant church and had developed since 1983. The Social Peace Service advertised an alternative to military service and building workers. The movement “Swords to ploughshares” was against the militarisation of society in the GDR and was directed against the new school subject of military knowledge. Both initiatives were able to establish themselves in all parts of the GDR.
- The groups of conscientious objectors had been active since 1983, and since 1986 the working groups of total conscientious objectors possessed their own structures and preferred going to prison to serving in the army.
- In 1985 the initiative for peace and human rights was founded. In the following years this initiative was able to establish itself as one of the most important opposition groups in Berlin with working groups in the opposition scenery of the GDR. In the revolutionary autumn this group grew into a civil rights movement and was also engaged in conversations among equals.
- So-called peace workshops, which since 1984 had irregularly invited all base and peace groups for a weekend under the control of the church, were important meetings of the whole opposition scene in the country. Meetings took place there not only of the politically opposed and socially committed deputies, but also musicians and artists met there along with deputies of other discriminated minorities.²

The refusal of the peace workshop in 1986 by the church administration under pressure from the German Socialist Unity Party led to the foundation of the “church from underneath”. In any case this group would not

2 GOECKEL, R.: *Die evangelische Kirche und die DDR. Konflikte, Gespräche, Vereinbarungen unter Ulbricht und Honecker*. Leipzig 1995.

accept the order, what to undertake. In many groups of the opposition basically anarchical attitudes were widespread, not only in Berlin.³

After 1983 in many of the Protestant communities there came into being the culture of a peace decade, which was performed every year in November and where religious, theological problems and those in terms of social policy could be discussed.

Under the closing documents of the Helsinki-Accords from 1975 there is, among others, the signature of the GDR government, which recognised with this document the GDR people's rights to freedom of movement, the respect for human rights and civil rights.

Since then, the oppositional groups within the country tried to make use of these accords, as well as those who wanted to leave the country as quickly as possible.

The discussion around these individual human and civil rights grew from 1985 onwards because then, 10 years after the signing of the Helsinki-Accords, there were official propagandistic battles being waged by the SED leadership against the "class enemy" (the "imperialistic states"), mainly to emphasise certain foreign relations issues, like the Soviet Union's offer of increased arms control.

The arguments of the political opposition, as well as those of individual citizens, against the SED regime of course remained largely unheard. Nonetheless, there was some movement in East Berlin after 1986, because there were increasingly more direct contacts between some Protestant parishes and the local state functionaries and their block parties – and with that there was at least willingness on both sides now to discuss minor local problems.⁴

The most widely-known motto about GDR society was propagated in 1971 by the federal synod of the Protestant church: "*We want to be a church not beside, not against, but within socialism.*" The relations between church and state in the GDR, after an agreement between the government and the church leadership, were formulated in 1978: "Church within socialism". What was meant by that on the side of the Communist Party was that the church was expected to fit into the socialist value system and more or less cooperate with the state in all matters.

3 VOLLNHALS, C.: *Die Kirchenpolitik von SED und Staatssicherheit. Eine Zwischenbilanz.* Berlin 1996.

4 WILKE, M.: *Der SED-Staat.* Köln 2006.

As a “reward” for accepting the prevailing “order of things”, the church was given permission to build new churches all of a sudden. There were a few short documentaries about church life aired late in the evenings, and the church was able to develop further its social-diaconal institutions. There was the possibility of more open contact with West German churches, etc. However, there was often little engagement on the side of the church leadership when it came to daily cooperation with the newly established groups, and conflicts were often adjourned and not resolved. And so those free groups often not only stood against the communist regime, but also against the church leadership, or its local representatives.

After 1981 in the GDR - and in East Berlin after 1985 - activists increasingly aimed for and achieved an inter-linking of the human rights, peace and environmental movements. Civil rights activists that had emigrated to West Germany on many occasions continually provided technical and journalistic support for the opposition groups – first and foremost in Berlin and Leipzig.⁵

The catastrophe of Chernobyl in 1986 in the Soviet Union was an essential factor with regard to the establishment of new working groups concerning themselves with environmental problems. This was in the end a factor in the foundation of the environmental library in the Zion community in the district of Prenzlauer Berg in Berlin. In the following months and years a centre was formed there of political and artistic opposition in the GDR. The greatest self-published magazine, “Environmental Papers”, was also published there until 1989 (edition: between 500 and 1,100 copies).

In 1978, after an agreement, the relations between the state and the church in the GDR were reduced to a simple formula: “Church in socialism”. This meant, according to the thoughts of the Communist Party, that the church adapted to the socialist community with shared values and that the church more or less worked together with the state. As a reward for the acceptance of the existing circumstances the church received building permission for new churches, and the church could further develop its social institutions and establish open contact with churches in West Germany.

Generally one can evaluate that the political engagement of the individual members in the opposing groups was limited to a few members. The discourse taken quite openly about everyday problems and such in

5 RÜDDENKLAU, W.: *Störenfried-DDR-Opposition 1986 – 1989*. Berlin 1992.

the society took the first place.⁶ The Stasi-strategy of the corruption of a person was in the individual case successful. Consequently, many informal employees of the Stasi could exert an influence on the decisions in some groups – and the actions of the critics of the regime could not have an effect. Since the mid-1980s there existed only one way for many people: the official departure for West Germany. After 1987 a nationwide operating working group came into being, “Right of Nationality of GDR”, which worked separately from the church and was composed of such persons who wanted to go to West Germany. There was an almost insurmountable situation of the so-called “Hierbleiber”, also men, who wanted to reform the political system of the GDR and abolish the political system of GDR. They had one aim: to arrive in the Federal Republic of Germany as quickly as possible.

The new general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, who as a politician wanted to set absolutely new trends with regard to domestic and foreign policy, gained many friends with Glasnost und Perestroika and sympathizers inside and outside the Soviet national borders. For many opponents in the GDR this was hopeful.

To the policy of “new thinking” of Gorbachev belonged disarmament appeals and a security partnership with the West – with this the Breshnev doctrine was rejected. In the GDR the old formula of class struggle existed furthermore for the Socialist Unity Party.⁷ After 1987 the “New Thinking” gradually gained acceptance also at domestic political questions and at the reflection and new interpretation of the own soviet history.

Here I might mention a personal objection: since 1986 I was once a month in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin and took always the actual publications in German and English in order to use the information for my own work and to pass on that information to friends.

One could summarise to say that the political opposition in East Berlin in the 1980s only worked together in a coherent way on a few occasions - this was caused by the multitude of groups with their own thematic priorities. There were personal reasons among the activists, but there was also a more general divide between civil rights activists on the one hand, who were fighting for a reformed state with more liberties, and those people, on

6 VEEN, H.-J. (Ed.): *Lexikon: Opposition und Widerstand in der SED-Diktatur*. Berlin 2000.

7 WEBER, J. (Ed.): *Der SED-Staat. Neues über eine vergangene Diktatur*. München 1995.

the other hand, who were more radical in that they saw the only possibility for a future perspective for themselves and their families in emigrating and leaving the GDR for good.

The only unifying and predominant idea of these groups was their common disapproval of the ruling SED-Regime and its various administrations – however, there were certainly varying ideas on how to overcome those social structures.

As these few short examples show, there was quite a heterogeneous scene of opposing political groups, though almost no united political action because of the widespread topic-specific orientation in all of these individual groups. This, and also the methods used by the STASI to break the political opposition through intimidation, isolation, torture and so forth, were the reasons they were unable to show a united front until the fall of 1989.⁸

The peaceful revolution in the GDR had many “mothers and fathers”, since of course it was not just the civil rights activists who were responsible for the downfall of the regime in those months of 1989. The tens of thousands of GDR citizens who came to freedom fleeing over Prague, Warsaw and Hungary have to be counted as well. Even today, we East Germans are especially thankful for the humanitarian acts that took place at the borders between Hungary and Austria. The people and political leaders of Hungary were responsible in a crucial way for the slow lifting of the Iron Curtain. The GDR’s disastrous economic situation, the political realignment of the USSR and the situation in the other so-called brother states were further cornerstones in the downfall of the GDR.

Resumé

Autor štúdie sa zameriava na problém protikomunistickej opozície v Nemeckej demokratickej republike krátko pred pádom režimu v roku 1989. Politická opozícia v bývalom hlavnom meste NDR bola v 80. rokoch minulého storočia neuveriteľne rôznorodá a riadila ju Evanjelická cirkev. Autor identifikoval tri kategórie: Mierové skupiny a tematicky zamerané pracovné skupiny, ktoré sa čiastočne zapájali do života mesta; takzvané tolerované skupiny (skupiny ako napríklad „Offene Arbeit“), ktoré v niektorých prípadoch očakávali veľké problémy v cirkevných štruktúrach

8 POLLACK, D. (Ed.): *Die Legitimität der Freiheit: Politisch alternative Gruppen unter dem Dach der Kirche*. Frankfurt am Main 1990.

a komunitách; a napokon nezávislé skupiny, ktoré nechceli pracovať pod vedením Evanjelickej cirkvi a ktoré sa stretávali výlučne v súkromí, ale pri svojej práci museli používať cirkevné štruktúry. Autor sleduje vývoj protikomunistickej opozície v kontexte vývoja spoločnosti. Na konci prichádza k záveru, že pokojná revolúcia v NDR má mnoho „matiek a otcov“, pretože za pád režimu v tých mesiacoch roku 1989 neboli zodpovední iba aktivisti za občianske práva.

**3. panel:
Opozičné aktivity v oficiálnych
a pololegálnych organizáciách**

**3rd Block:
Opposition Activities in an Official
and Semi-Official Organizations**

Ukrainian National Communist Opposition to Bolshevik Authoritarianism (1919 – 1925)

Olena PALKO

National inclination unforeseeably for its creators became the peculiar feature of the 20th century's Communism. In 1957, Yugoslavian Communist, Milovan Djilas, in his famous theoretical investigation on Soviet Communism, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* argued that today, national Communism appeared to be the common notion. To some extent all Communist movements during the whole of European contemporary history have been clutching at national ground.¹ Djilas, being one of the creators of the Yugoslavian Communist model, had the right to assert his claims and beliefs in the decisive role of national inclinations into the modern Communist ideology. Conventional ideas about national Communism are based on the year 1948 when a definite break in the East-European Communist Block caused the dissolution of Stalin-Tito ideological ties.²

National Communism in the mid-century was developed as the ideological opposition to the totality of Soviet omnipresence and sustained attempts to control public and private life of East-European countries. In this paper, I want to stress that the history of national Communism has deeper roots and for this to analyse the national Communist theory in Ukraine and its attempts to oppose Bolshevism during the early 1920s.

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- 1 DJILAS, M.: *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*. San Diego 1957, p. 181.
 - 2 FURET, F.: *Mynule odnizei il'uzii. Narys pro komunistychnu ideju u XX stolitti*. Kyjiv 2007.

Ukrainian national Communism is significant as one of the earliest attempts in European intellectual history to adapt world Marxist theory to local conditions and to make the national state an area for Socialist revolution.

Ukrainian Social-Democrats and Russian Bolsheviks: the preliminary history of the interaction (1917 – 1920)

Ukrainian national Communism emerged from the revolutionary process of 1917-1920, which can be considered the most intensive period in the history of Ukraine. After the February Revolution of 1917, the national inspirations and political separatist movements of the Russian Empire gained strength in the borderlands. Ukraine after being part of a great empire began to form its own way in state-building through a series of revolutionary movements of different political orientations. The process resulted from the formation of the independent Ukraine in 1918 to it finally becoming part of the USSR in late 1922.

The national revolution in Ukraine in 1917 began with the formation of a national legislative authority – the Ukrainian Central Council (*Central'na Rada*). Almost all of its members were of Socialist orientation³. The most significant voice in that Council belonged to the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Working Party (*Ukrainska Social-Demokratychna Robitnycha Partia, USDRP*) which was founded in 1905. That party upheld the Marxist ideology and represented the rights of the Ukrainian working class and peasantry in the Second International. The most important leaders of the Ukrainian republic were Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866 – 1934) and Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880 – 1951). They both played a significant role in the political and ideological life of the revolutionary process at that time.

Notwithstanding the fact that the political elite had such moderate demands concerning the sovereignty of Ukraine defending its autonomous status within the Empire, the period between February and October 1917 was one of unprecedented “*national enthusiasm among the masses of*

3 For the detailed statistic data on the national, social and ideological representation of *Central'na Rada* as well as on the national representation of Ukraine see: BORYS, J.: *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine: a Study in the Communist Doctrine of the Self-Determination of Nations*. Stockholm 1960, pp. 108 – 109.

Ukrainian peasants, soldiers and worker masses".⁴ Vital decisions for the newly proclaimed Ukrainian state were made at that time. Ukraine gained state authorities and governmental institutions; official national symbols were adopted; the Ukrainian army began to be formed; and first steps in the international arena were taken. It should be stressed once more that for several months after the beginning of the revolution, Ukrainian leaders stood only for the autonomy and loose cooperation with other democratic republics within the Russian Empire. Still being a part of the bigger political organization and acknowledging the Russian Provisional Government, the short-lived administrative body formed after the Tsar's abdication. The highest authority defined the external policy of the Ukrainian Republic as well as the frames for cooperation with other autonomous republics, starting with Russia.

The mainstream autonomous orientation was changed after the October Revolution, when Bolsheviks overtook their power in Russia. Inspired by the great success achieved and looking on Ukraine as a potential sequel area, the Bolsheviks on the 8 November 1917, headed the workers' uprising on the biggest Kyiv factory, "Arsenal". Rapidly defeated by the national Ukrainian Army and eliminated from Kyiv, Bolsheviks were forced to search for other ways to conquer Ukraine. The period of the establishment of Soviet authority in Ukraine began. It was a step-by-step process combining Soviet governance building, the insurance of Bolsheviks' party, and public system of enlightenment and propaganda, which were strengthened by enlargement of military power.

For all those purposes the regional fraction of RSDRP (b), which was already formed in December 1917, was legalized as a self-standing separate Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (CP(b)U) in the Russian city, Taganrog in April, 1918. From the beginning, headed by Mykola Skrypnyk (1872 – 1933), the political status of this party was gradually changed from the ordinary fractional organization to being the sole and the most influential party in Ukraine after 1920. The status of the sole left party was gained by the voluntary or forced merging with the other Socialist parties concerned in this paper.

4 From the introduction *Unknown revolution: Ukraine, 1917 – 1921* to MAJSTRENKO, I. V.: *Borot'bism: A chapter in the history of Ukrainian Communism*. New York 1954. See URL <<http://thecommu.co.uk/2010/02/23/the-unknown-revolution-ukraine-1917-21>>.

At the same time, the Ukrainian state tried to preserve the leftovers of this authority. On the 20 November 1917, the leaders of the Ukrainian People's Republic passed the Decree still defending autonomous status of Ukraine but with stricter regulations on co-operation with Russia. In autumn 1917, Ukrainian leaders were sure of their position and legitimacy on the state territory. Their support was proven by the new elections to legislative authority which took place in November of the same year with shameful results for the Bolsheviks, who gained only 10 percent of the votes.⁵

The political defeat in Kyiv forced Russian Bolshevik leaders to change their tactics. In mid-December, an unjustified ultimatum was issued demanding the legal right for Bolshevik military troops to be settled in the whole territory of Ukraine. The rejection of the ultimatum became the cause of action for the Russian army to start the first Ukrainian-Soviet war in 1918. It should be acknowledged that the Bolshevik tactic was granted not only by military force but also by the political means. At the end of January 1919, the rival government (*Radnarkom*) and General Secretariat was established in Kharkiv. This Eastern Ukrainian city became the headquarters for the Bolshevik penetration of the Ukrainian territory.⁶

The Bolshevik invasion on Kiev caused rapid actions from the Ukrainian side as well. The long-awaited proclamation of the independent and sovereign Ukraine occurred on the 25th of January 1918. Later in his memoirs, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the leader of the Ukrainian People's Republic, wrote about the Decree proclaiming the independence which was signed under Bolshevik fire.⁷ As a result of the massive Soviet attack,

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- 5 Jurij BORYS in his research on Ukrainian history of the early 20th century (See *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine: a Study in the Communist Doctrine of the Self-Determination of Nations* (Stockholm, 1960)) described the prehistory of Ukrainian-Russian political relations after the February Revolution of 1917 till the formation of USSR in 1922. He analysed the process of the sovietization of Ukraine by defining three consecutive attempts since late 1917. In his thorough research he proved the difficulties of the establishment of the Soviet regime in Ukraine finally set up mainly by military force after 1920.
 - 6 For the detailed reading on the history of Bolshevik party in Ukraine see: RAVICH-CHERKASSKIJ, M.: *Istorija Kommunisticheskoj partii (B-ov)*. Kharkov 1923. This book written shortly after the revolutionary events and not influenced by the official party ideology presents considerably objective view on the achievements and losses of the CP(b)U in its early history.
 - 7 In the latest edition of the collected articles written by Mykhailo Hrushevsky the idea of the crucial shift in the political orientation of the Ukrainian People's republic and the decisive decision to proclaim independent Ukraine can be found in different papers

Ukrainian authorities retreated from Kyiv, moving its forces farther and farther West. In the midst of Bolshevik hostility, *Central'na Rada* managed to pass some important but delayed laws in social and economical spheres as well as in the Constitution of Ukrainian National Republic, adopted at the very end of April 1918.

That Soviet offense could be a mortal one for the Ukrainian state if not the crucial change in the international situation. World War 1 had just ended and the Ukrainian National Republic as a sovereign state signed a notorious separate peace treaty in Brest-Litovsk that allied with former adversary Central Powers to fight against Bolshevik Russia.⁸ Foreign support caused the end of the first Ukrainian-Soviet war, but not the Soviet desire to spread the influence over Ukraine. Constant political struggle with changeable success continued in Ukraine till 1921, when the whole territory of Ukraine was totally concurred by the Bolsheviks.⁹

The military history of the Ukrainian national Republic is just the framework for the intellectual searching on that period. Without the understanding of the controversial events of 1917 – 1921 it's hard to explain the tactics of Bolsheviks in an ideological sphere. Their political compromises and concessions towards Ukraine were caused by the constant necessity to prove their legitimacy on the captured territories. The sovietization of the Ukraine was not a rapid process which is often forgotten in Russian historiography.

The period of the Ukrainian revolution 1917 – 1921 was a time not only for Ukrainians to adjust to the conditions of consecutive loss of power and legitimacy on the national territory, but also a challenge for

devoted to the notorious events on 1918. The third part of this volume was all about the independence of Ukraine. Thoughts and attitudes of Ukrainian leader are depicted in *Ukrains'ka samostijnist' ta ii itorychna neobhidnist, Ochyshchennia ognem ta in*. See: HRUSHEVSKY, M.: *Na porozhi novoji Ukrainy*. New York; Lviv; Kyjiv; Toronto; Munich 1992

- 8 There was a lot of research written on the treaty at Brest-Litovsk with different points of view on this event. One of the first was MAGNES, J.: *Russia and Germany at Brest-Litovsk: A Documentary History of the Peace Negotiations*. New York 1919; and WHEELER-BENNETT, J.: *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace*. London 1938; reprint 1966. See also HORAK, S.: *The First Treaty of World War I: Ukraine's Treaty with the Central Powers of February 9, 1918*. New York 1988. The most recent research is MIKHUTINA, I.: *Ukrainskij Brestskij mir*. Moscow 2007.
- 9 For more information about Ukrainian-Soviet war 1917 – 1921 see: UDOVYCHENKO, O.: *Ukraina u viini za derzhavnist'*. Winnipeg 1954; MIRCHUK, P.: *Ukrains'koskovs'ka viina 1917-1919*. Toronto 1957; DOTSENKO, O.: *Litopys ukrains'koi revoliutsii*, Vol. 2, books 4 – 5. Lviv 1923/4; reprint Philadelphia 1988.

the Bolsheviks to develop a new approach to national questions for the borderlands. It must be acknowledged that the war in Ukraine was not unique for Soviet Russia. The same events but with other consequences took place in Caucasus with the Georgian republic.¹⁰ It was a proven need for the Bolsheviks to develop and to implement a new nationality policy for the former Russian Empire known as a Lenin's slogan for "the right for people's self-determination".¹¹

"Right of peoples of Russia for a free self-determination" and Ukrainian realities

The Bolsheviks' policy introduced by Lenin made way for the illusion of national self-determination. After 1913, Lenin wrote a lot about national state building and the opportunities which Soviet authority could guarantee for oppressed nations. One of the first decrees passed by the new authority of Soviets in Russia was the *Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia* which proclaimed:

- Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia;

10 Richard Pipes depicted the events connected to the formation of the USSR in the borderlands. The period of 1917 – 1923 was the time not only for military resistance but also for the confrontation in the ideological sphere, mainly between nationalism of local elite and the Communist orientation of the Russian Bolsheviks; or to take it differently: between nationalism or chauvinism of Russian leaders and national Communist opposition in the borderlands. For the violent establishment of the Soviet rule on Caucasus, Muslim national Communism and the Soviet war in Georgia see the chapter *Soviet Conquest on the Caucasus*. In: PIPES, R.: *The formation of Soviet state: communism and nationalism 1917 – 1923*. Cambridge 1964, pp. 193 – 221.

11 National question for Lenin and his comrades became of great importance after the amplification of the concept of national autonomy based on the Austromarxist model after 1913. The contradictory views on the national question within the international socialist discussion at the beginning of 20th century were argued by Lenin in a range of his articles and notes in 1913 – 1916. Being the opponent of the existing approaches of Austrian social-democrats and Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin conceptualized his ideas in the slogan for "the right of peoples for self-determination" which was granted by the Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia in 1917. For general reading on this issue see: BOERSNER, D.: *The Bolsheviks and the national and colonial question (1917 – 1928)*. Geneve; Paris 1957; FORMAN, M.: *Nationalism and the international labor movement: the idea of the Nation in Socialist and Anarchist Theory*. Pennsylvania 1998; NIMNI, E.: *Great historical failure: Marxist theories of nationalism*. London 1985; NIMNI, E.: *Marxism and nationalism: theoretical origins of a political crisis*. London 1994.

- Right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, including secession and formation of a separate state;
- Abolition of all national and religious privileges and restrictions;
- Free development of national minorities and ethnographical groups populating the territory of Russia.¹²

Richard Pipes, a well-known American researcher on Soviet history, analysed the national politics of Bolsheviks in the early years of the formation of Soviet Union. He estimated Lenin's claims and declarations on national question as general documents which ensured many practical ways to gain the right of secession: "*Lenin sponsored the right to self-determination as a general democratic right, much as he favoured the right to divorce without actually advocating divorce*".¹³ It was a game in democracy and flirting with the national inspirations of non-Russian nationalities caused by the unstable Bolshevik position in the borderlands. The deceptive tactic of the Bolsheviks appeared to be a very successful one, particularly in Ukraine. The main slogan, "free federation of the democratic Socialist states" was the idea in which almost all Ukrainian Socialists had believed. The trust in the nationality policy, issued after 1917, was the reason for Ukrainian Social-Democrats to ally and seek cooperation with Lenin's party. The same belief in possible loose federation with friendly republics caused the defeat of the Ukrainian National Republic. This defeat was done partially by Ukrainians themselves and by those who agreed to co-opt with the Bolsheviks with a great belief in a future Socialist but independent Ukraine.

At that time there were also attempts to criticize Lenin's position in the national question. One of those attempts was undertaken by a member of Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party, Lev Jurkevych (1884 – 1917). His opinion of the political events at that time was influenced by the older generation of Ukrainian Social Democrats. Jurkevych mostly lived in emigration and in his numerous writings he disputed with Lenin and his comrades.

12 For English translation see URL <<http://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/1917/11/02.htm>>.

13 PIPES, R.: *The formation of Soviet state*, p. 45.

In 1915, he published the pamphlet *Jesuits' policy (Jesuits'ka polityka)* and in 1917 *Russian Social Democrats and national question (Rosijski sozial-demokraty ta nazionalne pytannia)*. In these pamphlets he explained what Lenin's thesis, "national right for self-determination" would imply for Ukraine. Jurkevych considered Russian centralization policy to be very dangerous for Ukrainian state-building. He depicted Russian Marxists as chauvinists in their attitude towards Ukrainian national aspirations. He claimed that the national policy in Russian variant was just a despotism and enslavement.¹⁴ He also interpreted Lenin's idea of national self-determination as an assimilative one.¹⁵ Based on those contentions he demanded the democratic federation of the Russian empire, in a separate Social-Democratic party, should represent the interests of the Ukrainian working class.

Lev Jurkevych foresaw the future of Ukraine and other republics in a loose federation ensured by the Bolsheviks. The first years after the October Revolution in Russia were marked by attempts aimed at working out the best way to build a strong centralized government. At the same time, the Bolsheviks tried to expand control of a newly formed state-power over the entire territory of the former Russian Empire by means of one-party system and membership in a newly created international organization – the Third Socialist International, or Comintern, which should unite all Socialist parties under single governance.

The Communist International was formed by force in 1919 and became a convenient instrument to secure the Bolsheviks' influence on the newly emerged Communist parties as well as movements on the former imperial territory. That international organization was to replace the Second International, which failed in 1914. The Second International was primarily accused of representing the reformist way to Socialism. That approach was called Social Democratic and was opposed by the Communist approach which prevailed in Bolshevik Russia. Newly formed Communist International was open for all Socialist parties representing all nations, which defended the future proletariat revolution. Lenin believed that a new organization of that kind would help spread the Russian revolution across

14 JURKEVYCH, L.: *Jesuits'ka polityka*. In: GUNCHAK, T. – SOLCHANYK, R. (eds.): *Tysiacha rokiv ukrains'koi suspil'no-politychnoi dumky*. Kyjiv 2001, Vol. 6, pp. 184 – 193, p. 187.

15 JURKEVYCH, L.: *Rosijski sozial-demokraty ta nazionalne pytannia*. In: GUNCHAK, T. – SOLCHANYK, R. (eds.): *Tysiacha rokiv ukrains'koi suspil'no-politychnoi dumky*. Kyjiv 2001, Vol. 6, pp. 220 – 238, p. 225.

Europe. The early 1920s proved the failure to such beliefs. Before 1921, that organization turned out to be just the tool that the Soviet authority needed to control all those parties. It was of the utmost importance that according to the 18th plank of the *Terms of Admission to the Communist International* [a]ny party seeking affiliation with it must have called itself the Communist Party of the country in question.¹⁶ By that definition the difference between the Communist parties and the Socialist parties, which “*have betrayed the banner of the working class*”,¹⁷ was finally set. After that time, the Russian Communist party became the leading force within that International and conducted the decision-making process for all its members.

The framework of Ukrainian national Communism

Ukrainian national Communism cannot be perceived as a fully-fledged ideology or a rigorously elaborated political theory. It is more likely to be an ideological standpoint or orientation within a powerful Socialist movement. It coincided with the mainstream Socialism in its purpose and strategy of political struggle, but not in tactics. The idea of national frames for Socialism, national vanguard party, and national proletariat as its basis were perhaps the most distinctive features of that type of Communism. The Communist movement of that kind became possible after a range of proclamations made by Bolshevik leaders and also by the establishment of the official frameworks for the cooperation of separate local Communist parties within Comintern.

What is called Ukrainian national Communism can be understood in two different ways. First, there was a certain political orientation, typical for Communist and left-Socialist parties in Ukraine before it became a part of the USSR in 1922. Those political parties were already in place after 1918 and competed with the Bolshevik Communist Party for the influence on the territory of Ukraine and the representation of its interest on the international forum. To a certain extent, such an orientation was shared by the members of the Bolshevik Party, but only in the early (“pluralistic”) years of its activity. Secondly, the national Communist orientation was a deviation within the Russian Communist party (later, the Communist

16 LENIN, V. I.: Drafts to the II. Congress of Communist International. In: LENIN, V.: *Collected Works*. Moscow 1961, vol. 41, p. 210. For English translation see URL <<http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/jul/x01.html>>.

17 Ibid.

Party of the Soviet Union) without any connection to views held by Socialist parties present in Ukraine before 1918. That orientation could be discerned during the whole history of the USSR. It was quite popular in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and was a significant political force, which defended Ukrainian independence in 1991.

James Mace, one of the most important Western researchers of this phenomenon, distinguished two periods in the development of Ukrainian national Communism: (1) until 1925, the main feature of which was the imaginary political pluralism, and (2) until 1933, when the remains of nationally oriented political representatives were physically or mentally swept away.¹⁸

This paper touches upon the problem of national Communism in its “genuinely” Ukrainian, not Bolshevik variant, i.e. the first of the two meanings described above. My research is limited to the period of 1919 – 1925, when that orientation was embodied in the programs and activities of several political parties. The year 1925, when the Soviet Communist Party seized total control over Ukraine, set an end to Ukrainian national Communist parties, political pluralism, as well as Ukraine’s sovereignty.

National Communist orientation within the Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks (CP(b)U)

The CP(b)U in the first years of its activity was quite open for discussion regarding the future Socialist order in Ukraine. This fact can easily be proved by the free discussion regarding future political order, economical development, role of the party and even nationality questions in the official level within the party. Lenin’s ardent idea to build a future state on the basis of free mutual benefit and a coexistence of independent states and national parties caused the most intense discussion in those probable state parts. In Ukraine, the main discussion was over the nationality questions and the measures of possible sovereignty and economical self-sufficiency within new supranational state formation.

The first Bolshevik to adopt a nationally orientated Communist position after the founding of CP(b)U was Vasyl Shakhrai (1888 – 1919). He was the Commissar of military affairs in the first Ukrainian Soviet government in 1918. Then he emigrated to Russia and there he completed a series of

18 MACE, J.: *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918 – 1933*. Cambridge 1983, p. 17.

articles in which he summarized his experience of Soviet state building in Ukraine. In the latter half of 1918, Shakhrai wrote a pamphlet *Revolution in Ukraine* (“*Revoliutsiia na Ukraini*”), in which he argued that the national question had to be solved together with the social one. He saw it as just a myth that Socialism would automatically solve the former problem. True to his beliefs, in 1918 he resigned from his post in the Soviet government. After that he was forbidden to hold any state posts, worked as a teacher in Ukraine and was executed in 1919.

Another party member who contributed to the definition of national Communism was Sergiy Mazlakh (1878 – 1937). He also was a party leader and held certain important posts in the Ukraine government. But after 1919 he was expelled from the party. In 1937, he was arrested and executed under the charge of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. Those were the representatives of the first Communist generation of Ukrainian politicians and party activists who turned into Communists after being Ukrainian Social-Democrats and taking part in guidance of the Ukrainian revolution. Both became the pioneers of Ukrainian Communism as well as the predecessors of the future significance of this orientation in the Ukrainian left movement.

In January 1919, Vasyl Shakhrai and Sergiy Mazlakh, at the time both in exile in Saratov, published the book called *Concerning the Moment: What Is Happening in and to Ukraine* (*Do khvyli: Shcho diiet'sia na Ukraini i z Ukrainoiu?*). That book soon after being published gained the status of the program document of Ukrainian national Communism. That pamphlet aimed to depict the contradictions between Lenin's claims and policy in national question towards Ukraine. It also drafted certain ideas regarding appropriate political and economical structure of the new Ukrainian state, which was considered only Socialist in its orientation. The authors spoke about the revolution in Ukraine, which in their opinion should be both national and social, leading to the foundation of a social order that could only be secured in the framework of a national state.

Vasyl Shakhrai and Sergiy Mazlakh suggested that the pro-Russian CP(b)U should be replaced by a self-standing Ukrainian Bolshevik party that would affirm the Ukrainian language, culture and independent statehood. In their opinion, there was no political force in place in Ukraine which could achieve those goals. While analyzing the political situation in Ukraine, they argued the vital necessity to synthesize all available political orientations in one party program and all different political organizations into one party defending the social interests in independent Ukraine.

The authors argued the common idea that Ukraine had no sufficient economic base for separate existence. Based on solid data analysis, which can be found in their book, the authors proved the economical capacity for Ukraine to be independent¹⁹. Ukraine, they believed, had everything which was necessary for its successful development and could cooperate with other countries on an equal basis in economic sphere. This was another reason for the Ukrainian communist party to become a member of Communist International in its own right and only through the latter to cooperate with others self-standing communist parties.

After analyzing the Bolshevik policy in Ukraine and its violent approach towards it, they made the following statements. After 1919 these statements became the main slogans for Ukrainian national Communism. All these statements were focussed on the future and were based on the most general demands for Ukraine:

- Ukraine and Ukrainian people had defined themselves as a nation and proclaimed their independence;
- Ukraine will fight for its independence till the end. Sooner or later, in a hard and bloody way by armed struggle, or in a democratic way by compromise with neighbouring countries, – but Ukraine will indeed be independent and sovereign;
- Ukrainian reunion with Russia is progressive only for Russian great-power. In practice, Ukrainian sovereignty benefits not only Ukraine. The fewer national struggles we have, the better it is for economic, political, social and cultural life of Ukraine; the bigger contribution it will be for world culture;
- Unless the independence of Ukraine is assured, unless the Ukrainian worker is nationally discriminated, to be “nationalist” and “chauvinist” for Ukrainians is not only the historical right, but the obligation. Our “chauvinism” depends on your “internationalism”, but you hide behind words and we don’t want to hide any more.²⁰

Vasyl Shakhrai and Sergiy Mazlakh defended an idea that the European Communist movement represented by the Comintern would result from the existence of totally separated national authorities and parties, not only Ukrainian ones. Their idea was then not to diverge from Lenin’s party but to cooperate with it for the reciprocal benefit for all sides. The

19 MAZLAKH, S. – SHAKHRAI, V.: *Do khvyli: Shcho diiet’sia na Ukraini i z Ukrainoiu?* New York 1967, p. 110

20 *Ibid.*, p. 105.

idea of the widest cooperation, the authors believed, was already granted by the Bolshevik Declaration in national question. The point was to make Bolsheviks understand that it would be better for international Communism if Ukraine became independent.²¹

In their appeal to Lenin, the authors referred to the Communist Party program of 1919, where the right for national self-determination had been proclaimed. The right to form a separate Communist party and to unite in a free federation with RSFSR and other Soviet republics was a logical conclusion. But the reality of Soviet policy implementation proved to be completely different. That is why the main question Lenin asked in that pamphlet was as to how the proclamation was supposed to be understood or where is the line between independence granted by the law and enslavement occurred in political practice.

Vasyl Shakhrai and Sergiy Mazlakh also pointed to the contradiction of being a member of the Russian Communist party (and its Ukrainian branch) and defeating the rights of Ukraine. They demanded the answer as to whether it was possible to be a Ukrainian and a Soviet Communist at the same time. The question soon became crucial for the whole generation of Ukrainian left-oriented leaders. The answer the Bolshevik leader revealed was the whole ambiguity of early-Soviet politics and its attitude towards national movements in the borderlands.

In late 1919, in his *Letter to Ukrainian workers and peasants after the defeating of Denikin*, Lenin indirectly addressed the questions put by Ukrainian politicians. He wrote that in Ukraine there was still no unified position about Ukrainian-Russian relationship. For Russian Communists, it was just the question of time. But Lenin claimed that there could be no contradictions in the question of Socialist future and proletariat struggle.²² In such an evasive way Lenin presumed that there could be different ideas of Ukrainian statehood which would be definitely determined only by the workers of Ukraine themselves. The answer of that kind made the variety of nationally oriented left parties possible in Ukraine in the early 1920s.

21 Ibid., p. 117.

22 LENIN, V.: *Stati i rechi ob Ukraine*. Kijv 1936, p. 344.

Ukrainian political parties of national Communist orientation (1919 – 1925)

Until the beginning of the 1920s, Russian Communists did not elaborate any common platform or single view on the role of Soviet parties in the borderlands or greeted the political pluralism then in place. Therefore, after 1918, a range of political parties with national Communist orientation came into existence in Ukraine. The members of those parties believed in the opportunity to build the Socialist state of their own and to become an equal party in the international fight for world Communism. The followers of that ideology or political program were the representatives of both sides – the adherents of the newly organized Soviet party and old Nationalists who believed in Lenin's slogan of national self-determination.

In the period of 1919 – 1925, several Communist parties besides CP(b)U could be found in Ukraine. The first period of the intellectual development of this doctrine was marked by the great popularity of Socialism among the newly formed political parties. Ivan Majstrenko, Ukrainian Diaspora researcher in Ukrainian Communism, claimed in his analysis of the Ukrainian left movement at the beginning of XXth century, that after the CP(b)U, the most powerful and influential party, was the Ukrainian Communist Party of *Borot'bysts* (*Ukrains'ka komunistychna partia borot'bystiv*, UKP(b)), founded in 1919.²³

At first, it was the left oriented fraction among the Ukrainian Socialist-revolutionary party and only after the union with the part of the Ukrainian Social-Democrats, the party renamed themselves the Ukrainian Communist Party of *Borot'bysts* (UKP(b)). The party was lead by Oleksandr Shumskyi (1890 – 1946) who left a significant trace in Ukrainian politics and culture. *Borot'byst* party became the important self-standing political force in Ukraine. To gain the same status and to be internationally recognized as the representatives of Ukrainian interests, this party had to become a member of the international community of left parties – Comintern.

Even though Ukraine was represented by other parties, for example CP(b)U, in 1919, the leaders of Ukrainian Communist Party of *Borot'bysts* appealed to Comintern to admit them as the only representatives of Ukrainian Communism. Their arguments were that Bolsheviks did not

23 MAJSTRENKO, I. V.: *Borot'bism: A chapter in the history of Ukrainian Communism*, p. 26.

represent the interest of Ukrainian peasantry and alien to all Ukrainian. According to the *Borot'bysts* leaders, the main mistake of Russian CP(b)U was not taking into account the social structure of Ukraine in the 1920s. The majority of Ukrainian society at that time was peasantry and not proletariat. Consequently, the politics of Bolsheviks got much influence only in urban areas, while *UKP(b)* gained popularity among the majority of the country. It was the main reason why the Bolshevik policy was perceived as hostile on the major part of Ukrainian territory.

The statute document of this political party, the Memorandum of *UKP(b)*, stated that the main reason for unpopularity and hardships in building Socialism was the fact that the process amounted to attempted Russification of Ukraine. The idea was that in Ukraine an antagonism existed between Russian city and workers and Ukrainian rural areas and peasantry. Therefore, for the fast sovietization of Ukraine it was vital for the opposition to cease, which in turn meant that the Bolsheviks would be well advised to support Ukrainian culture and language; that is to speak to Ukrainians in their own language. The main idea of the Memorandum of *UKP(b)* was to raise the cultural and educational level of Ukrainians, which would allow them to become equal partners in the social building of the state.

The main idea of the party program was that Ukraine was a self-standing social body with its own economic and political organization. Soviet Ukraine had to be replaced by an independent Ukrainian Socialist republic with its own party and army. Ukraine had to form a separate sovereign Soviet Republic, an independent member of the future federation of Soviet Republics.²⁴

Borot'bysts gained popularity among the majority of rural population. Lenin appreciated their influence in Ukraine and successfully forced the negotiations with the *Borot'bysts* regarding their merging with the CP(b)U in 1920. Not only did he neutralize a strong rival, but he also made its leaders the representatives of the Soviet state. According to the statistic data on the party membership in 1922 in the CP(b)U 4746²⁵ (about 30%) were newcomers from different parties who later joined the CP(b)U. The best example of further activity of national Communist leaders within CP(b)

24 *Memorandum Ukrains'koi Kommunistychnoi partii Borot'bystiv*. In: GUNCHAK, T – SOLCHANYK, R. (eds.): *Tysiacha rokiv ukrains'koi suspil'no-politychnoi dumky*. Kyjiv 2001, Vol. 7, p. 399.

25 BORYS, J.: *The Russian Communist Party*, p. 265.

U could be Oleksandr Shumskyi, who became a member of the Bolshevik party after 1920.

Even though he was a loyal Communist, Oleksandr Shumskyi represented the faction of the party, which opted for distancing from the Russian Communist party of Bolsheviks (RCP(b) and cooperation on the platform of the Third International. Oleksandr Shumskyi held many important posts in Soviet government but his work as a Minister of Education was the most significant. Eventually, Shumskyi came to be perhaps the most important role in the implementation of national policies within the Ukrainian Soviet Republic during the 1920s. His policies, were considered part of the mainstream during the early 1920s, and were subjected to scrutiny after 1926, when “shumskism” became a common denomination in references to allegedly nationalistic policies and national deviations. Shumskyi denied the accusations, but the year 1926 marked the beginning of his gradual decline that ended up with his death in 1946.

The further development of the national Communist idea was marked by the formation of the Ukrainian Communist Party (*Ukrains'ka Komunistychna Partia, UKP*) in 1920, which became the most consistent and theoretically grounded group of proponents of Ukrainian national Communism. That party united those members of the Ukrainian Communist party of *Borot'bysts* who after its unification with CP(b)U remained true to national Communist orientation. Summarizing the history of Ukraine, *UKP* called itself the heir of Ukrainian Social-Democracy and revolution and on that basis the only genuine and indigene Socialist party in Ukraine²⁶. The *UKP* aspired to gather all kinds of Communist orientation as the central Socialist force in Ukraine. This party stood for the national revolution under social slogans and for the conversion of Ukrainian national republic into the sovereign Ukrainian Soviet one. At the beginning of 1920, this party was the most consistent in its criticism of the economic exploitation of Soviet Ukraine by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

All those ideas were first represented in an article, “From democracy to Communism” (“*Vid demokratii do komunizmu*”) written by the party leader Andriy Richytsky (1893 – 1934). He began his reflections with the crises in the international Socialist movement in 1914, when the incapability of the

26 *Programa U.K.P., uhvalena Perwym ustanivchym Z'izdom U.K.P. 22-25 sichnia 1920 roku*. In: GUNCHAK, T. – SOLCHANYK R. (eds.): *Tysiacha rokov ukrains'koi suspil'no-politychnoi dumky*. Kyjiv 2001, Vol. 7, p. 405.

Second Social International to fight with national movements was proven. The importance of the national question within Socialism or Communism was the evidence for Richytsky. On that basis the author proceeded to the place and role of Ukrainian Communist parties and their relations with Russian Communism.²⁷

Standing on that point, he highly valued the attempt of Vasyl Shakhrai and Sergiy Mazlakh in their contribution to depict the difference between Ukraine and Russia and to distinguish main trends in Ukrainian Communism. Andriy Richytsky stated that in Ukraine the conflict between Russian external and Ukrainian internal Communism occurred. Based on orthodox Marxism, he believed that Communism cannot be forced by external influence. In his view the only way to solve that contradiction was to absorb those Russian elements and to create a national Communist party. The struggle of the Russian Communist party for the influence in Ukraine was harmful not only for Ukraine, but also for the world Socialist movement. The only possible way was to create a new independent party which would unite all left-winged elements in Ukraine – Ukrainian Communist Party, which had to gain its equal representation in Comintern.²⁸

All those ideas were transformed into the official party program adopted in 1920. That party document set forth some of the main ideas of Ukrainian Communism, which were proposed by previous representatives of the same orientation. It was proclaimed that both national and social emancipation was the key question for the party and proletarian revolution could be forced only by a state-organized nation. Such revolution, carried out only by a single nation, would touch upon the national and class consciousness. The main idea was that Ukrainian revolution had to be a national one at first, since Ukraine was economically exploited by imperialist Russia. And only after that the social revolution should follow, fighting for social equality within Ukraine. That was why the aim of UKP was to launch a revolution which would be national and Communist at the same time. The only possible way to achieve this goal was to build

27 RICHYTSKYI, A.: Vid democratii do komunizmu. In: *Chervonyi prapor*, December, 1919 – January, 1920, pp. 4–5. See also URL: <<http://vpered.wordpress.com/2010/09/06/richytsky-democracy-to-communism>>.

28 Ibid.

an economically and politically independent state – Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, maintaining close ties with other Soviet republics.²⁹

In spite of the fact that *UKP* was quite popular at the beginning of the 1920s, it was hard to conduct its policy with the Russian Communists constantly gaining importance. In 1923 within the *UKP* the “left wing” fraction was formed, who argued for the merger with CP(b)U. The *UKP* did their best to remain independent but, overcome by the great force of CP(b)U, they passed the appeal to Comintern concerning its possible dissolution on the condition that the independence for Ukraine would be granted. The deceptive promise was given and consequently the members of *UKP* were allowed to join the CP(b)U. After that its members belonged to those who helped carry out the national Soviet policy.

All the programs of the above-mentioned parties can be summarized by listing several distinctive postulates common to all of them:

1. Independence of Ukrainian Socialist republic;
2. Separation and independence of Ukrainian Communist party representing the interests of Ukrainian working class and peasantry;
3. Equal membership within Communist International;
4. Political and economic cooperation with other sovereign Socialist republics;
5. Free development of Ukrainian language and culture as the only possible base for a sovereign state.

Those were demands that were so crucial for Ukrainian national Communism. Bolsheviks reacted to them in their own peculiar way. They guaranteed the fulfillment of all those Ukrainian Communist ideas, but within the newly formed USSR. Ukraine obtained a status of a separate republic in free federation with other Soviet Republics. Certain visible political autonomy was given to Ukraine, especially in the form of a right to implement internal policy in its territory. Together with administrative

29 *Programa U.K.P., uhvalena Perwym ustanivchym Z'izdom U.K.P. 22-25 sichnia 1920 roku.* In: GUNCHAK, T. – SOLCHANYK R. (eds.): *Tysiacha rokov ukrains'koi suspil'no-politychnoi dumky.* Kyjiv 2001, Vol. 7, p. 405.

reform the Bolsheviks began to introduce a new national policy, called *Korenisacija*, one of the most successful projects of the Russian Communist party in the borderlands. Due to that policy, the idea of free national development and the insurance of national language and culture were proclaimed and patronized. The short periods of the affirmation politics of that kind lasted till 1929 or even to some extent until 1933, when all national interests fell victim to the great yearning to build the compatible mighty state.

Despite being such a “bloody experiment” Ukrainian national Communism became the historical proof that it was in fact possible to take up political fight against the Soviet Union. The main challenge for the research on national Communism is the question of how to estimate the attempt. On the one hand, all the parties were annihilated and merged with the CP(b)U, which could be considered as a failure of that kind of ideology. On the other hand, it was the representatives of the former national parties who introduced and enforced the nationality policy in USSR after 1923.

Of course from the current perspective the estimation of Ukrainian national Communism is much easier because of the outcomes of that kind of affirmative national policy after 1933. The introducers of the Soviet policy in Ukraine are very much responsible for further political terror and purges. *Korenisacija* exposed the national affiliation in all spheres of public life in the republic. The national aspirations which were greeted until the year 1929, after the ‘great break’ in the Soviet State became the common accusation for Ukrainian leaders.

The history of Ukrainian Communism from 1918 – 1925 can be viewed as an attempt to develop and to implement the Communist theory for a separate state and to accommodate Marxist ideas to local circumstances. It did not contradict Marx’s vision of building Communism, but in fact it did become the opposition against the Soviet model as a result of the impact of social, political and cultural factors briefly discussed above.

Ukrainian national Communism should be considered a separate approach within world Socialist movement. It was not a deviation from Marxism-Leninism but the search for an appropriate local model to implement Marxism. From this point of view, Ukrainian national Communism at the beginning of the 1920s must be considered not as a part of an ideological history of the USSR but as a distinct case to be examined in the light of the worldwide perception and development of Marxism. Ukrainian Communism was not only the political practice which, due to different facts failed after 1929, but a political theory. As a separate approach

attempting to find the way to build a genuine Socialist order limited by definite state borders, national Communism became a trend for the whole 20th century.

Resumé

Autorka sa vo svojom článku zamerala na problematiku Ukrajinskej národnej komunistickkej opozície voči boľševickému autoritárstvu v rokoch 1919 – 1925. Ukrajinský národný komunizmus by sa mal považovať za samostatný prístup v rámci svetového socialistického hnutia. Nešlo o odklon od marxizmu-leninizmu, ale o hľadanie vhodného lokálneho modelu na implementáciu marxizmu. Z tohto hľadiska nemôžeme ukrajinský národný komunizmus zo začiatku 20. rokov minulého storočia považovať za súčasť ideologických dejín ZSSR, ale za odlišný prípad, ktorý treba preštudovať vo svetle celosvetového vnímania a vývoja marxizmu. Ukrajinský komunizmus nebol iba politickou praxou, ktorá kvôli mnohým dôvodom po roku 1929 zlyhala, ale politickou teóriou. Ako samostatný prístup, ktorý sa pokúšal nájsť cestu, ako vybudovať pravý socialistický poriadok ohraničený pevnými štátnymi hranicami, sa národný komunizmus stal trendom pre celé 20. storočie.

The Unreliable Fellow-Traveller – Péter Veres, Chairman of the National Peasant Party and the Hungarian Political Police

István PAPP

I. Introduction

The establishment of communist dictatorships in Central European countries occurred between 1945 and 1948. In this period, parliamentary democracies – which were limited to various extents – were gradually replaced by Stalinist-type political systems. The pace of this process was different in Poland, Czechoslovakia or, for example, Hungary. The communist parties, which were striving to gain unlimited power, were forced to form coalition Governments in the region. The coalition partners were left-wing political formations too: social democrats, bourgeois radicals, leftist liberals or agrarian parties. The latter had significant traditions – let us just think of Yugoslavia or Poland.

After 1945, there were two agrarian parties in Hungary: the Independent Smallholders' Party¹ and the National Peasant Party (NPP). The former mainly represented the middle and richer strata of the peasantry, while the

1 The Independent Smallholders Party (ISP) was a traditional party in Hungary, its predecessor party was established in 1909. The ISP was the main political enemy in the eyes of the communist politicians. The chairman of the IPS and Prime Minister of the country was Ferenc Nagy. His political route and programme was common with Stanisław Mikołajczyk. Regarding the latter see WNUK, R.: Soviets supporters of the Polish Communist Security. The Role of NKVD in Fighting Against the Anti-Communist Underground in Poland (1944 – 1945). In: GRUNOVÁ, A. (ed.): *NKVD/KGB Activities and its Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe*. Bratislava 2008, pp. 54 – 72.

latter represented the poor peasantry and the agrarian proletariat, together with a significant group of intellectuals. The National Peasant Party,² and its chairman Péter Veres, proved to be a faithful ally of the Hungarian Communist Party (HCP). The NPP basically supported the economic and political measures of the HCP until 1948 without reservations. They thought that it was the communists who stood up most resolutely against the remnants and supporters of the pre-war political system, which had been extremely disadvantageous for the peasantry. Although many members of the NPP opposed the communists' efforts to establish a dictatorship and to liquidate their political adversaries, Veres always turned against the protesters either because of his principles or because of subservience. He thought that his bellicose past in the resistance predestined him for an important role as head of an independent peasant party. Nevertheless, he had to leave the world of politics in 1948, and devoted his life to literature afterwards. Why did it happen so? Why did one of the most faithful allies of the HCP have to leave the political arena? Péter Veres's dossier at the political police can help to find the answers to these questions.

II. The dossier³

The Hungarian state security, or the State Defence Authority as it was called at the time, opened a personal dossier on Péter Veres in 1951. This was justified by his close contacts with the so-called right wing and anti-democratic elements of the National Peasant Party – a party, which, in fact, now existed in theory only. Two writers and poets were mentioned by name: Gyula Illyés and István Sinka, who had attacked fiercely the Christian-Conservative political system before 1945. The first report in Dossier No. Sz-3656 was written in late March 1945.⁴ It summarised Péter Veres's political career so far, highlighting his arguments with social democratic intellectuals on the Jewish question between 1937 and 1940. When

2 The National Peasant Party was the child of the populist movement in Hungary. It was founded in 1939, and its character and ideology was similar to some American and Finnish parties. For the latter of these see SALOUTOS, T. – HICKS, J.: *Twentieth-century populism*. Lincoln 1951, pp. 342 – 371.; GRANBERG, L. – NIKULA, J. (eds.): *The Peasant State*. Rovaniemi 1995, pp. 7 – 19.

3 Péter Veres' personal dossier is in the Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára (hereafter only ÁBTTL) in Budapest. Its opening number is Sz-3656, its archival number is 2.1. VII/1.

4 ÁBTTL, Péter Veres' personal dossier, 2.1. VII/1, pp. 23 – 24.

the first report was written, hostilities were still continuing in Hungary, and the German forces were eventually driven out only two weeks later. The organisation of the political police was in its infancy, but they already began the observation of the politicians of the National Peasant Party, including Péter Veres.⁵ In the meantime, the National Peasant Party was a member of the Provisional National Government and, after the elections in the autumn of 1945, the coalition Government.⁶ Veres supported the communists on the questions of land reform, the nationalisation of banks and mines, the expulsion of the Germans and the measures against former civil servants. Moreover, the NPP, together with the social democrats and the communists, established the so-called “Left-Wing Bloc” in March 1946. Its purpose, which they hardly concealed, was to control and weaken the power of the Smallholders’ Party.

III. The first deviation

Although Péter Veres proved to be loyal to the HCP on every question, the personal dossier reveals that several agents in and around the party leadership reported to the political police on the internal affairs from April 1946 onwards. Moreover, informants were present at Péter Veres’s election rallies and carefully noted down his speeches. After the parliamentary elections of August 1947, which were loud with communist frauds, Péter Veres contemplated leaving the coalition, and the political police were aware of all his steps. In this period reports were written almost every other day, and they even tapped Péter Veres’s telephone conversations with Ferenc Erdei, Secretary-General of the Party. Thus, the leaders of the political police, and through them the members of the Politburo of the Communist Party, learned that Veres was seeking contact with the

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- 5 The first phases of the organisation of the political police in Poland and Czechoslovakia see DUDEK, A. – PACZKOWSKI, Poland. In: PERSAK, K. – KAMINSKI, L. (eds.): *A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe 1944 – 1989*. Warsaw 2005, pp. 221 – 225.; BLAŽEK, P. – ŽÁČEK, P.: Czechoslovakia. In: PERSAK, K – KAMINSKI, L. (eds.): *A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe 1944 – 1989*, pp. 87 – 89.
- 6 The Independent Smallholder Party was the absolute winner of the elections: it won 57% of the votes. The leaders of the National Peasant Party were dissatisfied, because the NPP won only 7%. Earlier they hoped that the mandates of the agrarian parties were in balance.

leaders of the other agrarian party, the Independent Smallholders' Party.⁷ Plans arose to establish a coalition without the communists, but these efforts were soon suppressed. The leaders of the HCP made an apparently generous offer: the Independent Smallholders' Party could continue to name the Prime Minister, and Péter Veres was offered the position of Minister of Defence. Veres, who was fuelled by personal ambitions, was deceived: in a country under Soviet occupation, an army, which was just being organised, could not be a serious factor. Moreover, the communist generals had much stronger influence than the Minister who had no military experience at all.

By that time it had become evident to the HCP that Péter Veres, no matter how loyal he had been to them, would like to pursue an independent policy. That is why they began to collect compromising information about him: they revealed that one of his sons-in-law had been a member of the extreme rightist Arrow Cross Party before 1945.⁸ They examined Veres's parliamentary and election speeches and all his references to the independence of the National Peasant Party; the historic mission of the peasantry and its national characteristics were condemned as nationalist and narodnik ideas. They even searched the newspaper articles he had written before 1945, and checked diligently Péter Veres's private and official correspondence. The state security officers underlined the so-called compromising sentences with red pencil, and Péter Veres's personal dossier became increasingly thicker.

The political police used documents about Veres, which had been prepared by the secret service before 1945. It is interesting as the Communist Party, officially, denied any continuity with the Christian-Conservative Horthy-system of the pre-war era. This, however, did not prevent the political police, who were controlled by the party, from using this material to discredit their political adversaries. They wanted to prove that Péter Veres had kept contact with extreme rightist and fascist persons and associations before 1945. They claimed that Veres, being a radical peasant leader, sought contact with the extreme right too because of its social demagogy. This argument, however, was never justified as Veres had been imprisoned on several occasions before 1945. He had been condemned because he had been regarded as a communist subverter.

7 ÁBTL, Péter Veres' personal dossier, 2.1. VII/1, pp. 51 – 56.

8 Ibid., pp. 95 – 100.

IV. The final conflict

In early 1948 it gradually became evident that the hours of the multi-party system were numbered. The Independent Smallholders' Party had been broken up, and reprisals against the opposition parties in Parliament became incessant. It looked more and more probable that the HCP would soon attack its allies too, and thus the political fate of the NPP, and Péter Veres himself, became precarious. The more so, as news began to spread that the HCP's plans for the future of the peasantry were actually different from what they had declared earlier. As a result of the land reform of 1945, hundreds of thousands of small estates were formed, which enjoyed the political support of the NPP. For tactical reasons the HCP accepted their existence, but, in fact, it wanted to follow the Soviet model and establish the system of *kolkhozes* and liquidate private farms.⁹ The National Peasant Party could not accept this, as it would have meant confronting the small-holder peasants who were the voting base of the party.

In the spring of 1948, communist politicians began to refer more and more often to Soviet-type cooperatives as an agricultural model to be followed. Péter Veres found it necessary to stand up against these resolutely. He decided to write a book summarising the ideology of the Peasant Party, which would then be sent to every party member. He finished the manuscript in early 1948. In his book, Veres laid down some principles, which the Peasant Party had to adhere to. Firstly, he advocated the independence of the party and argued that they must not merge with the Communist Party. He pointed out that the party must represent the Hungarian national interests both in domestic and foreign policy – this could easily be interpreted as anti-Sovietism. The most important point, however, was that he supported peasants' private ownership and refused the introduction of the Soviet *kolkhoz*-system. This was unacceptable to the HCP both on ideological¹⁰ and practical grounds. Independently farming peasantry could be a base of any opposition social movements, and therefore it had to be broken up and removed in the view of the dictatorship.

It was a serious mistake by Péter Veres to believe that he could negotiate this question with the communists as an equal partner and with the

9 For the catastrophic effects of the Soviet collectivisation see LYNNE, V.: *Peasant Rebels under Stalin*. New York; Oxford 1996.

10 For the Marxist view of the peasant question in general see GOODMAN, D. – REDC-LIFT, M.: *From Peasant to Proletarian*. New York 1982, pp. 1 – 15.

support of his party. The leadership of the party discussed the manuscript of his book on 4th February 1948 for the first time, and two agents of the political police who were present at the meeting reported about it to their superiors immediately.¹¹ In the course of the following weeks the text was discussed by various bodies of the NPP, and numerous supporting declarations arrived from the party organisations in the country. The political police collected these industriously in Péter Veres's dossier. When the leadership of the HCP heard about the book, they mobilised their faithful allies in the NPP, Secretary-General Ferenc Erdei and his followers. Their task was to obstruct the publication of the book partly by collecting information, and partly by using counter-propaganda. The success of their activities is marked by the fact that they managed to acquire the full text of Péter Veres's reply to Ferenc Erdei's criticism on his book.¹²

Eventually, the party leadership decided that only the shorter part of Péter Veres's book could be published, in which he discussed the cooperative question. This, however, gave an excellent opportunity to the leaders of the HCP, primarily Secretary-General Mátyás Rákosi, to attack Veres in public in the summer of 1948. The part of the book in which Veres wrote about the necessity of an independent peasant party and the protection of national interests only appeared 62 years later, in 2000. Then it could interest only historians. A report in the dossier reveals that Veres talked to Secretary-General Ferenc Erdei about retiring from politics three days after his defeat on the question of his book.¹³

It is noteworthy how swiftly the political police responded to the events. In July 1948, when Mátyás Rákosi had already denounced publicly Péter Veres's views on cooperatives, they prepared a new summary. It contained information that Veres was the head of the right wing of the National Peasant Party, and opposed the communist-friendly wing, which was led by Erdei. Veres was described as a nationalist politician of confused notions, whose ideas were based on racism. This wording sounds rather ominous as it could easily have been the base of a show trial. Péter Veres's influence continued to decline when he had to leave his post as Minister of Defence. In February 1948 the Popular Front was established in Hungary with the National Peasant Party as one of its members. This, in fact, meant

11 ÁBTL, Péter Veres' personal dossier, 2.1. VII/1, pp. 85 – 86.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid, pp. 102 – 103.

that all political forces disappeared from the public sphere except for the Communist Party.

After all this, it is a mystery why there was no serious reprisal against Péter Veres. In the Stalinist Soviet Union there were a large number of show trials against peasant politicians. Moreover, Veres's personal dossier was opened in 1951, which practically meant that all the scattered documents related to him were now organised in one folder. This step of the state security perfectly matched the logic of show trials. In my view, the leaders of the Hungarian Workers' Party¹⁴ played a double game. They offered Veres the chance to be a loyal ally of the system simply as a peasant writer, deprived of all his power. At the same time, they checked carefully whether he participated in any political conspiracies. Veres accepted the deal: from 1949 he devoted himself entirely to writing fiction. He was awarded the Kossuth Prize, the most prominent state award in Hungary in 1950 and 1952. He was elected president of the Writers' Association in 1954. His dossier was closed in the same year with the explanation that in spite of his previous hesitant behaviour he was now undeniably faithful to the prevailing political system.¹⁵

V. Summary

Péter Veres's story is an excellent example to help us understand the history of agrarian parties, which allied with the communists, but still wanted to follow an independent policy. Veres's life and principles placed him explicitly in opposition to the pre-1945 political system, which is why he could accept, the communist dictatorship in spite of his reservations. When it was deemed necessary, they could neutralise him with the effective support of the political police. He raised his voice on a crucial issue, the fate of the peasantry, which constituted half of the population of the country. He probably realised the unsustainability of his own situation, that he had no chance to challenge the HCP without potential allies. He himself was also responsible for the fact that Hungarian politics had reached this point by the first half of 1948, because he had not realised that the HCP had only been using him and his party as a tool during its march to power. Although it is understandable that he opted for survival after 1949, his decision cast

14 The new name of the Hungarian Communist Party after the merger with the Social Democratic Party in July 1948.

15 ÁBTL, Péter Veres' personal dossier, 2.1. VII/1, pp. 236 – 237.

a shadow on his party too. Péter Veres's fate raises the question of what role the political police played in the liquidation of the close allies of the communist parties in Eastern Europe in the years of transition. Further research is necessary to find the answers to this question.

Resumé

Príbeh Pétra Veresa je vynikajúcim príkladom, ktorý nám pomôže pochopiť dejiny agrárnych politických strán, ktoré sa spojili s komunistami, ale predsa chceli robiť nezávislú politiku. Veresov život a jeho zásady mu jasne dávajú miesto v opozícii voči politickému systému pred rokom 1945, práve preto dokázal, napriek výhradám, akceptovať komunistickú diktatúru. Keď to bolo potrebné, mohli ho neutralizovať s účinnou pomocou politickej polície. Svoj hlas zdvihol v zásadnej veci, a to osudu roľníkov, ktorí tvorili polovicu obyvateľstva krajiny. Pravdepodobne si uvedomoval neudržateľnosť svojej vlastnej situácie, toho, že nemal šancu vzdorovať Maďarskej komunistickej strane (MKS) bez možných spojencov. On sám bol zodpovedný za to, že sa maďarská politika v prvej polovici roku 1948 dostala do tohto bodu, pretože si neuvedomoval, že MKS jeho samotného a jeho stranu len využíva ako nástroj na svojej ceste k moci. Aj keď je pochopiteľné, že sa po roku 1949 rozhodol o prežitie, jeho rozhodnutie vrhá na jeho stranu tieň. Osud Pétra Veresa nastoľuje otázku, akú úlohu zohrávala politická polícia pri likvidácii blízkych spojencov komunistických strán vo východnej Európe v rokoch zmien. Aby sme dokázali nájsť odpovede, je potrebný ďalší výskum.

Agrarians versus Communists: The Short Existence of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union “Nikola Petkov”, 1945 – 1947

Vasil PARASKEVOV

The wolves descended on the rabbits, for their own good, and imprisoned them in a dark cave, for their own protection. When nothing was heard about the rabbits for some weeks, the other animals demanded to know what had happened to them. The wolves replied that the rabbits had been eaten and since they had been eaten the affair was a purely internal matter.
James Thurber: *The Rabbits Who Caused All the Trouble*

During the Cold War, Bulgaria did not have the reputation of a mischievous Soviet satellite because the country had neither its 1956, like Hungary nor its 1968, like Czechoslovakia. There was, however, a strong opposition movement during the first post-war years. This movement included the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, “Nikola Petkov” (BANU “N. Petkov”), the Bulgarian Workers Social Democratic Party (united) (BWSDP (u)), the Democratic Party, the Radical Party (united) and a group of intellectuals. Opposition parties were supported by the significant part of the population and presented their own socio-political program for the future of Bulgaria; published newspapers; organized public meetings and protests. The BANU “N. Petkov” was the main adversary of the Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Communists) (BWP(c)) and its policy – to direct Bulgaria to the road of Socialism and to stick the country to the Soviet orbit. Therefore authorities followed a firm policy against the agrarian opposition – they

interfered in its internal affairs, infiltrated State Security's agents in the union, disrupted opposition meetings, arrested agrarian opposition leaders and adherences, sentenced them and, eventually in 1947, dissolved their organization.

There are various interpretations of the agrarian opposition activity in the Bulgarian historiography. We could divide the existence research into two main groups – the first, which was published in the years before 1989 and the second, which embraces the historical research in the 1990s and later. The studies during the Socialist period were united by one leading idea – according to the Communist ideology the conflict between the BWP(c) and the opposition was put in the context of the “Socialist revolution” in which “the progressive powers” led by the Communist Party had to defeat “bourgeois forces” emanated by the opposition. The Communists' opponents were presented in these researches as a “centre of reactionary and fascist powers”. They acted under the “influence of Anglo-American imperialists” through “sabotage, demagogy and threats” in order to prevent “the implementation of Socialist revolution”.¹ This biased characteristic of the opposition was very typical in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s estimations regarding the opposition parties were softened in research works of Mito Isusov, Jordan Zarchev and Dimitar Tishev.² Their studies were based on a rich documentary foundation but being comparatively modest in their conclusions those historians presented archival evidences selectively. Thus, the large amount of inconvenient details concerning the ruling Communist Party remained secret. In general the negative and politically motivated points of view towards the opposition were preserved in historiography. Certain contributions, however, were made through the enlightening of central opposition ideas and activities without previous extreme ideological qualifications.

1989 is a sheer watershed in Bulgarian historiography. The new socio-political atmosphere enabled Bulgarian historians to reevaluate the essence

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- 1 VANKOV, V.: *Borbata na BRP (k) i BZNS za politicheskoto razoblichavane i razgromyavane na nikolapetkovistkata opozitsia 1945 – 1947 g.* In: *Trudove na BINS 'Dimitar Blagoev'*. Varna 1960; GENCHEV, N.: *Razgrom na Burjoaznata opozicia v Balgaria 1947 – 1948.* In: *Godishnik na Sofiiskiia universitet, Ideologicheski katedri*, T. 56, Sofia 1962, pp. 181 – 274; KUKOV, K.: *Razgrom na Burjoaznata opozicia v Balgaria (1944 – 1947)*. Sofia 1966; PEIKOV, I.: *Razgrom na svalenata ot vlast monarho-fashistka burjoazia v Balgaria 9. IX. 1944 – IX. 1947*. Sofia 1982.
 - 2 ISUSOV, M.: *Politicheskite partii v Balgaria 1944 – 1948*. Sofia 1978; ZARCHEV, I.: *BZNS i izgrajdaneto na socializma v Balgaria (1944 – 1962)* Sofia 1984; TISHEV, D.: *Satrudnichestvoto mejdu BRP (k) i BZNS (9. IX. 1944 – XII. 1947)*. Sofia 1988.

and significance of opposition protests. There is enormous diversity of opinions and theses these days – some authors put the accent on the repressive Communist policy towards the opposition and on the efforts of the ruling circles to suppress it using various approaches³; other historians analyze the foreign impact on the opposition – Mito Isusov, for example, revealed the decisive influence of the Kremlin on the emergence and the fate of the opposition as well as on the Bulgarian political life⁴ while the Western diplomacy did not have the same effect and was passive and ineffective when the American and British representatives had to support Communist rivalries⁵; another author found the reasons for the emergence of the opposition movement, particularly the BANU "N. Petkov", not only in Communist aspirations of a leading position in the ruling coalition and international factors but basically in agrarian past and ambitions of its leaders.⁶ As a whole, after 1989 the negative and partial estimations were replaced with more balanced points of view, which are more reliable and well-grounded.

On the basis of various archival documents, historical research and newspapers, this paper aims at outlining the most specific feature of the confrontation between Bulgarian authorities and the BANU "N. Petkov". The paper covers the emergence, development and prohibition of the agrarian opposition. It analyses the internal and external impact on the destiny of the union – its social background, ideology and anti-Communist activism, the attitude of the BWP(c) and the Soviet Union towards the Bulgarian opposition, the relations between the American and British representatives in the country and agrarian opposition leaders.

On this ground several main points are presented:

Firstly, the paper argues that the main reasons for the emergence of the BANU "N. Petkov" were the BWP(c)'s attitude to other political parties and economic measures of the government. Communists made persistent

3 TSVETKOV, Z.: *Sadat nad opozitsionnite lideri*. Sofia 1991; GUNEV, G.: *Kam brega na svobodata ili za Nikola Petkov i negovoto vreme*. Sofia 1992; SHARLANOV, D.: *Tiraniyata: zhertvi i palachi*. Sofia 1997.

4 ISUSOV, M.: *Stalin i Balgaria*. Sofia 1991.

5 PINTEV, S.: *Balgaria v Britanskata diplomatsia 1944–1947*. Sofia 1998; KALINOVA, E.: *Balgaria i pobeditelite (1939 – 1945)*. Sofia 2004.

6 REVYAKINA, L.: Kam vaprosa za vatreshnite borbi v BZNS (septemvri 1944 – septemvri 1947 g.). In: KALINOVA, E. – GRUEV, M. – ZIDAROVA, L. (eds.): *Prelomni vremena. Sbornik v chest na 65-godishninata na prof. d.i.n. Lubomir Ognyanov*. Sofia 2006, p. 444.

attempts to ensure their leading position in the government and in society. Moreover, they provoked friction in other parties and installed obedient leadership in them. At the same time, the agrarian opposition also gained momentum because of strong agrarian dissatisfaction with the economic policy of the government. Authorities showed preference to industry instead of agriculture and to state property instead of private initiative, along with the beginning of agricultural cooperation.

Secondly, the paper explains the development of the BANU “N. Petkov” in the light of the Communist Party’s repressive policy and the deteriorating socio-political conditions in Bulgaria. Parliamentary elections in 1945 and 1946 as well as negotiations for the implementation of the Moscow decision in early 1946 manifested irreconcilable differences between Communists and agrarians.

Thirdly, the paper claims that Bulgarian Communists and their Soviet mentors, particularly Stalin, used the BANU “N. Petkov” and other opposition parties as a convenient mask. It had to enable the BWP(c) to avoid civil war with a large scale of victims in the first postwar years and to deflect Western calls for the democratization of Bulgaria on the basis of Yalta declaration. In general, the multi-party system from 1944 to 1948 had to contribute to the smooth Communist march to absolute power.

Domestic and International Background

Clashes between agrarians and Communists in the period 1944 – 1947 were predetermined not only by the radicalization of Bulgarian politics before the war and the growing strength of local Communists but also from the great powers’ policy towards Bulgaria during the war. This paper does not oppose domestic policy to international diplomacy. Actually it shows how they were mutually influenced. Several reasons formed this approach.

Firstly, the interwar years and the World War II prepared the Bulgarian soil for political parties and leaders that had affinity with dictatorial methods of rule. Authoritarian tendencies, and in the late 1930s the authoritarian system, marked by the progress of the extreme left and right ideologies.⁷ Bulgaria saw

7 TSVETKOV, P. – POPPETROV, N.: Kam tipologiyata na politicheskoto razvitie na Balgaria prez 30-te godini. In: *Istoricheski pregled*, 1990, No. 2, pp. 63 – 78; MIGEV, V.: Fashizmat i formiraneto na avtoritarnia model na Balgarskata darjava prez vtorata polovine na 30-te godini na XX vek. In: *Dvadesetiyat vek. Opit za ravnosmetka*. Sofia 2003, pp. 26 – 37.

political instability, miscellaneous offence of the constitution and laws, the encroachment on basic rights and freedoms of the population, prohibition of political parties and several *coups d'état*. After the First World War the leftist parties were in upsurge while traditional right parties declined. The radicalization of the Communist Party far exceeded dictatorship tendencies in the BANU, which the union demonstrated during its rule in the period 1920 – 1923. The formation of the Military League in 1919 and the National Alliance in 1921 faced the agrarian government against very determined opponents who were willing to cease the BANU rule with power. On 9 June 1923, both the Military League and the National Alliance organized a successful *coup d'état* that took down Stamboliiski's government and marked the beginning of three years of terror. There were severe clashes between the Communists, agrarians and the ruling Democratic Alliance after the coup. Among others, the Communist Party was the primary object of the violent actions of authorities and a perpetrator of violent activities. On 16 April 1925 Communists organized an assault in the Sveta Nedelya cathedral and killed more than 150 people. That provoked new repressive measures and the police arrested thousands of people, which to a great extent decreased the illegal activity of the Communist Party in the late 1920s. Later in 1934, the regime of the Political Circle, "Zveno" (Section) and the Military League dissolved it again along with all political parties and the parliament. During the Second World War, Communists were once again the focus of the social attention. The party led the partisan movement that grew progressively with the approaching of the Soviet army towards the northern Bulgarian border.

Secondly, the policy of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union had a crucial impact on Bulgaria's postwar developments. The United States did not engage itself with Bulgaria. In the war years the Office of Strategic Services, led by William Donovan, began talks with Hungarians and Bulgarians in an unsuccessful attempt to detach them from Germany. The Americans were not ready to send troops to the Balkans. Logically, in September 1944 Donovan informed the President about Soviet intentions to dominate the region.⁸ The British Foreign Office also had no any precise idea how to oppose the Kremlin's policy in the Balkans.⁹ London

8 KOVRIG, B.: *Of Walls and Bridges: the United States and Eastern Europe*. New York 1991, p. 10.

9 STANKOVA, M.: Kakva shte bade sadbata na Balgaria na podsadimata skameika? Britanskite planove za sledvoenna Balgaria (1942 – 1943). In: GROZEV, K. – POPNEDELEV,

seemed satisfied with keeping British position in Greece and Turkey as key countries in the threshold to the Mediterranean. At the same time, the Soviets communicated actively with Bulgarian Communists.¹⁰ Bulgarian Communist leader Georgi Dimitrov spent many years in the Soviet Union and he was completely subordinated to Stalin. Under Stalin's guidelines, Dimitrov elaborated the idea of people's democracy in the mid 1930s. When he returned to Bulgaria, in November 1945, Dimitrov had the opportunity to implement in practice his theoretical endeavor. Prewar links that existed between Bulgarian and Soviet Communists were crucial for the party policy and for Dimitrov himself.

The turn in the Second World War demonstrated how Bulgarian Communists gained crucial advantage from their close contacts with the Soviet Union, while bourgeois democratic circles did not have the same support from the Western countries. In 1943 the successes of the Red Army led to an intensification of Communist resistance in Bulgaria. In 1943 the Communist party prepared an ambitious plan – Bulgaria was divided into 12 rising zones in which operated partisan groups named the National Liberate Revolutionary Army.¹¹ Meanwhile, Communists made an attempt to organize wide political movement of all democratic powers which did not participate in the government of that time. In 1942 the result was not satisfactory but in 1943 they continued contact with various political leaders such as Kimon Georgiev, Nikola Petkov, Konstantin Muraviev, Grigor Cheshmedjiev, etc.¹² As a result, on 10 August 1943 the National Committee of the Fatherland Front was formed. It included Kiril Dramaliev (Communist), Kimon Georgiev (Zveno), Nikola Petkov (agrarian), Grigor Cheshmedjiev (Social Democrat) and Dimo Kazasov (Independent).¹³ The

T. (eds.): *Moderniyat istorik*. Sofia 1999, pp. 297 – 312.

10 DALLIN, A. – FIRSOV, F. I. (eds.): *Dimitrov and Stalin 1934 – 1943: Letters from the Soviet Archives*. New Heaven 2000.

11 Its members reached 1,340 people in November 1943 and 5,244 people in July 1944. In the eve of the coup on September 9, 1944 there were around 6,900 partisans in Bulgaria. The total number of participants, partisans and their supporters, in illegal resistance movement was around 9,600 people. In 1943 – 1944 the authorities arrested and sent to the camps thousands of people; in various actions against partisans the regime killed 2 740 partisans and their associates. DASKALOV, D.: *Politicheski ubiistva v novata istoria na Bargaria*. Sofia 1999, pp. 196 – 201.

12 DIMITROV, I.: *Burjoaznata opozicia 1939 – 1944*. Sofia 1997, pp. 149 – 151.

13 The creation and activity of the Fatherland Front is described in details by SHARLAMOV, D.: *Sazdavane i deinost na Otechestvenia front iuli 1942 – septemvri 1944*. Sofia 1966.

coalition used the Soviet approach to Bulgaria to come into power. On 26 August 1944 Communists issued *Circular Letter No. 4* that called for the preparation of uprising and seizure of the power by the Fatherland Front. On 8 September the Red Army invaded Bulgaria which enabled the Fatherland Front to implement a *coup d'état* on 9 September. After the coup in Sofia a new government led by Kimon Georgiev was formed.

The international environment at the end of the war, and postwar period as well, was quite appropriate for the Bulgarian Communists. A day before the coup, the Soviet army entered the country and enabled the conspirators to realize their plot without any resistance from the government. Then, the Soviet representatives had leading positions in the Allied Control Commission (ACC), an institution which had to observe how the Bulgarian government implemented the clauses of the armistice, signed on 28 October 1944. Practically, the Soviet representatives governed the ACC, which resulted in almost full isolation of its Western members. Furthermore, in October 1944 Churchill recognized Stalin's predominant interests in Bulgaria by a notorious percentage agreement. These circumstances predestined the weak influence of American and British diplomacy; their unsuccessful demands for democratization of the country and, eventually, the imposition of the Soviet pattern in Bulgaria. Thus, the Western representatives in the ACC were rather more moral or spiritual supporters of the opposition than effective political advisors like Stalin for Bulgarian communists.

An Uneven Coalition

In the first postwar years the BWP gradually enhanced its role in society. Although the Prime Minister, Kimon Georgiev, was a member of 'Zveno' and Communists had an equal number of ministries with the Agrarian Union and 'Zveno' they had in their position the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice.¹⁴ Both ministries played a primary role in the efforts of the new regime to consolidate its power. At the same time, Parliament was dissolved and the previous Regent Council was replaced by a new one which included the Regents Prof. Venelin Ganev, Tsvyatko Boboshevski and Todor Pavlov.¹⁵

14 *Darjaven vestnik*, 9 September 1944 (Supplement)

15 *Ustanovyavane i ukrepvane na narodno demokratichnata vlast: IX. 1944 – V. 1945 g.* Sofia 1965, p. 49.

In the beginning of its rule the Fatherland Front had the potential to unite the main political forces, to create conditions for the resumption of regular political life and to recover the political rights and freedoms of the population, which had been violated in the past. As the Prime Minister Kimon Georgiev pointed out the program of the government is “*synthesis from programs of the parties that participated in the Fatherland Front and that had not emerged so far, and I believe, any dissensions, any disputes and any differences about its content and core will not emerge in the future*”.¹⁶ Political changes, however, could not stop the struggle for supremacy between Agrarians and Communists. Under the surface of the widely proclaimed democratization of the society, the Communists managed to enhance their power.

Formally, the unity of the Fatherland Front continued for almost a year. Communists' attempts to subordinate their ruling partners along with the militia's repressions and economic hardships worsened relations in the Fatherland Front. For instance, the aspirations of the BWP to be the leading political force were manifested in the *Circular Letter No. 5* issued on 12 September 1944. The party evidently underlined several tasks in this letter: the stabilization of the new government and realization of the Fatherland Front's program, establishment of the Fatherland Front's committees as a tower of strength in the country, establishment of the People's Militia and purge of the reactionary officers from the army. Simultaneously the local structures were warned that they were not to pose a question for the establishment of Soviet power since this would create difficulties in domestic and international relations.¹⁷ The last as it seems was a very

16 GEORGIEV, K.: *Izbrani proizvedenia*. Sofia 1982, p. 74. In the program of the Fatherland Front from 17 September 1944 were proclaimed various measures for reforms of the country and betterment of its international position: recovery of the Constitution, abrogation of all repressive laws, free elections, People's Court for 'perpetrators of violence against the fighters for people's freedoms', purge in the state administration against 'anti-national elements', abolishment of the private monopolies and their replacement with the states ones, state support for agricultural co-operations and restriction of big landowners, “*cordial friendship with the Soviet Union [...] Western democracies and the great American republic*”, “*friendship relations with Yugoslavia and the other Balkan peoples*”, etc. Usually Bulgarian historians estimate this program positively because it had democratic nature and responded to the feelings of wide social circles. ISUSOV, M.: *Politicheskiyat hzivot*, p. 21; OGNJANOV, L.: *Darhzhavno-politicheskata sistema*, p. 16; KALINOVA, E.: *Balgaria i pobeditelite*, p. 156.

17 *Ustanovyavane i ukrepvane*, pp. 100 – 101.

appropriate decision and the party used it in order to protect Bulgaria from severe political turmoil as well as to ease its march to power.

The BWP(c)'s interference in the internal affairs of the other ruling parties increased opposition feelings among the agrarians. Dr Georgi M. Dimitrov, the leader of the BANU, was removed from the agrarian organization by pressure from Soviet and Bulgarian Communists in January 1945. Then the BWP(c) supported the left wing in the Agrarian Union and inaugurated a propaganda campaign against Dr G. M. Dimitrov.¹⁸ He was put under home custody but escaped in May 1945. Dr Dimitrov found asylum in the villa of the American representative in the ACC with whose support he left the country in September 1945.¹⁹

Communists' partners in the cabinet, especially the Agrarians and the Social Democrats, disagreed with the repressions of the People's Militia – several thousands were the victims in the first months after the coup, over 3000 people were sent to the labor camps, etc. The Agrarian leader Nikola Petkov, who succeeded Dr G. M. Dimitrov, considered these actions as a deviation from the Fatherland Front's program.²⁰ Ironically, when Petkov and his adherents participated in the government they endorsed certain repressive laws, such as the Decree for People's Court, the Decree for Labor Communities (labor camps), the Decree for Protection of the People's Power, etc. Later some of these laws were used by the BWP(c) against opposition leaders and members.

Ineffective economic policy of the government had huge importance for the emergence of the opposition. The beginning of the co-operation of the land, although this process was not quite active as it would be in the following years, was another reason for Agrarian dissatisfaction. The

18 Centralen darjaven arhiv (Central State Archive, hereafter CDA) Sofia, f. 1 B, op. 7, a. e. 157, p. 2; The National Archives (hereafter TNA) London, War Office (hereafter WO) 204/10131, ACC Bulgaria US Delegation 24 April 1945; OREN, N.: *Revolution Administered. Agrarianism and Communism in Bulgaria*. Baltimor and London, 1973, p. 91; ROTSCCHILD, J.: *Return to Diversity. A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II*. New York; Oxford 1989, p. 116.

19 The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barns) to the Secretary of State, Sofia, May 24, 1945; The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barns) to the Secretary of State, Sofia, August 7, 1945; The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barns) to the Secretary of State, Sofia, August 28, 1945. In: *Foreign Relations of the United States*, (hereafter FRUS), 1945, vol. IV, Europe. Washington 1969.

20 Arhiv na Ministerstvoto na vatrešnite raboti (Archive of the Ministry of Interior, hereafter AMVR) Sofia, II court, 2649, vol. II, p. 207; *Nikola Petkov. Sled 42 godini – opit za portret. Proektat na BZNS za constitutsia*. Sofia 1990, pp. 14 – 15, 20 – 21.

government continued to implement the wartime requisition of some agricultural products as well as maintained low prices of agrarian goods and high for industrial ones. Some essential goods could be found only on the black market, which also provoked discontent among agrarian adherences.²¹

The BWP(c)'s aggressiveness towards its coalition partners and unsolved economic problems stimulated deviated tendencies in the BANU. In the summer of 1945 N. Petkov left the union and established a new political force – the BANU “N. Petkov”, which acted simultaneously with the BANU that had stayed in the Fatherland Front. Authorities legalized the opposition Agrarian Union on 7 September 1945, along with the BWSDP (u), the Democratic Party and Radical Party²². Stalin's opinion regarding the formation of opposition parties had enormous significance for Bulgarian Communists. He advised them that the existence of opposition was in their own interest as this would enable them to control discontented people easily and would make a good impression abroad as well.²³ This advice allowed the legalization of the opposition parties but did not ease internal tension. Opposition consecutively denounced and criticized Communists' intentions for a smooth transition to one party rule.

The Rise of Agrarian Opposition

The opposition parties had several tens of thousands of members and many more supporters. The BANU “N. Petkov”, followed by the BWSDP (u), was the most influential opposition party. On the one hand, the impact of the Agrarian Union was due to the fact that the Agrarians encompassed around 80 per cent of the population and among them the Agrarian Union's ideas were very popular. On the other hand, some traditional bourgeois parties, like the Democratic Party for example, had lost people's trust before the Second World War. After the war the BWP(c) inflicted a powerful strike against the former political elite through the

21 Darjaven arhiv – Varna (State Archive – Varna, hereafter DA-V), f. 19 K, op. 1, a. e. 14, p. 26; f. 30, op. 1, a.e. 3, pp. 12 – 81; DA – Burgas (hereafter DA-B), f. 35, op. 1, a.e. 8, p. 1; *Politica*, 23 February 1945; MIGEV, V.: *Kolektivizacijata na balgarskoto selo 1948 – 1958*. Sofia 1995, p. 24.

22 CDA, f. 1 B, op. 6, a.e. 72, pp. 4 – 6.

23 Stalin considered that emergence of opposition would not worry Bulgarian communist since this did not abolish the ultimate goal – the establishment of the Soviet pattern in Bulgaria. ISUSOV, M.: *Stalin i Balgaria*, pp. 33 – 34.

People's Court that sentenced a vast number of prominent politicians. The court had to punish these officials who were responsible for the Bulgarian alliance with the Nazi Germany and all repressions that took place in the country from 1 January 1941 to 9 September 1944. It was similar to the prosecution of war criminals in Nuremberg and at the Tokyo trials and its constitution on 30 September 1944 was supported not only by Communist members of the government but also by Agrarian and Social Democrat ministers. However, the Communist leadership played the main role in the prosecution. The verdicts against the regents, advisors of King Boris III, Prime-Ministers, ministers and Members of Parliament were discussed directly in the Politburo of the BWP(c).²⁴ The People's Court acted from December 1944 to April 1945 and prosecuted over 11 000 people. The court issued over 2,700 death sentences including sentences against 3 Prime-Ministers, 33 ministers, 67 Members of Parliament, regents, officers, etc.²⁵

The purge of the previous political elite opened a gap in the political scene which the opposition parties used. Their structures covered the entire country quickly and their activity attracted the social circles that were dissatisfied with the official policy. For instance, the opposition Agrarian Union had active local organizations in very typical agricultural areas such as Pleven, Plovdiv, Dobrich, etc. According to the archival data its members were approximately 70 – 80,000 people.²⁶ A remark in the State Security's report probably is more important than these figures since it reveals an important tendency – the biggest part of the opposition supporters did not participate in any parties, but during elections was inclined to vote for the opposition²⁷. This was partly owed to the fears of repression or psychological pressure by the regime but also the Bulgarian political parties did not have vast membership during the previous decades and it seems this gave its reflection in the postwar period. The Communist Party was an exception to this tendency as the number of party members impetuously rose from 14,000 in September 1944 to 250,000 for several months.

The social structure of the Agrarian opposition was miscellaneous – Agrarians, craftsmen and shopkeepers but also merchants and

24 OGNJANOV, L. – DIMOVA, M. – LALKOV, M.: *Narodna demokratsia ili diktatura*. Sofia 1992, pp. 24 – 29.

25 SHARLANOV, D.: *Istoria na komunizma v Balgaria. Tom I*, Sofia 2009, pp. 284 – 299.

26 CDA, f. 146 B, op. 5, a. e. 1125, p. 34.

27 AMVR, f. 13, op. 1, a. e. 69, p. 7.

industrialists, (because of the governmental policy for gradual restriction of the private property) intellectuals, etc.²⁸ Authority's deviation from the constitutional norms, encroachment of civil rights and freedoms and impending economic problems motivated protests from various social groups. Although petty landowners and petty bourgeois basically formed the social face of the opposition, a significant number of upper bourgeois supported the opposition as well. The regime tried to restrict upper bourgeois' participation in the social life but it still had some economic resources and the opposition movement attracted it.

The first serious clash between authorities and the opposition occurred in 1945 when N. Petkov began a campaign for postponement of the parliamentary election which had to be held in August. His expectations for tolerant relations among the political parties failed. The pressure against Agrarian members and adherents continued, giving bitter examples of the Fatherland Front's methods of governance. Therefore, on 26 July 1945 Petkov sent a letter to the Prime Minister, the Regent Council and the ACC. He considered that there were not appropriate conditions for free and fair elections in the country. For this reason the Agrarian leader suggested that the elections were postponed and held under international observation.²⁹ Actually, he had already presented his view in March and April 1945 when he met some Western and Soviet representatives in Bulgaria. He emphasized in these conversations that the vote would not be free because of unstoppable Communist provocations and propaganda and that the BANU was guilty for all domestic problems. Petkov also insisted on more significant Agrarian participation in the state administration as well as in the People's Militia.³⁰ The letter in July was the first public and clear expression of Agrarian discontent. The authorities, however, were backed up by the Soviets and rejected to accept Petkov's requests.

Simultaneously the United States and Great Britain reacted warily, avoiding open confrontation. Their representatives tried to persuade Bulgarian leaders that the postponement would have a positive effect on

28 AMVR, f. 13, op. 1, a. e. 537, p. 57, 72; a. e. 154, p. 4, 7, 9.

29 CDA, f. 28, op. 1, a. e. 589, pp. 4 – 5; AMVR, II court, 2649, vol. VII, pp. 41 – 42; PINTEV, S.: Otlaganeto na parvite sledvoenni izbori v Balgaria – 1945 g. (novi facti i argumenti). In: *Istoričeski pregled*, 1993, No. 6, p. 60.

30 TNA, WO 204/10131, ACC Bulgaria, 16 March 1945; TNA, WO 204/10131, ACC Bulgaria, 4 April 1945.

the international position of the government.³¹ Initially the authorities did not agree to postpone the elections because it had the Soviet backing that the resolution of this issue was in the competence of the local government. Opposition protest, however, did not stop while Western pressure increased. After several notes from the Western political representatives on 24 August firm Soviet support for the government was changed and the ACC decided to recommend that the Bulgarian government should postpone the elections.³² Then the cabinet accepted this recommendation in order to "*ease and accelerate the conclusion of the peace treaty*" and to avoid any doubts about the freedom of elections. Thus the opposition won its first, and actually last, success in its clash with the BWP(c). According to Stalin the postponement was only a tactical concession for the Communist opponents: "*the postponement of the elections was not an essential demand and therefore we agreed with it*".³³

In reality Stalin was right. The elections were held in November 1945 in a permanently deteriorating situation. Violence against the opposition escalated but the Soviet chairman of the ACC considered that the commission had no right to interfere in Bulgaria's internal affairs. On account of this the opposition boycotted the vote and the sole participant – the Fatherland Front coalition – won it convincingly.³⁴ On the one hand, the victory was favorable for the BWP(c) and dominated by the Fatherland Front since the elections confirmed its position as the major ruling party; on the other hand, the Communist superiority had a negative impact on the international relations of Bulgaria as the United States and Great Britain did not recognize the government and did not resume diplomatic relations with the country. Both Western powers considered that the Bulgarian cabinet did not have representative character because it did not include all democratic elements, i.e. the opposition parties, and rule with purely repressive measures.

Moscow supported the BWP(c) vigorously after the elections and rejected all Western attempts for the condemnation of the Bulgarian government. The Soviets stated that the results of the vote were completely

31 FRUS, 1945, vol. IV, Europe.

32 TNA, Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 371/48130, pp. 122, 137, 169 – 171; KALINOVA, E.: *Bulgaria i pobeditelite*, pp. 346 – 347, 351 – 352.

33 ISUSOV, M.: *Stalin i Balgaria*, p. 33.

34 OGNJANOV, L.: *Darzhavno-politicheskata sistema na Balgaria 1944 – 1948*. Sofia 2007, p. 84.

acceptable. Meanwhile Washington and London backed the opposition and insisted its representatives to be included into the government as a decisive step towards its recognition. An agreement in this sense was reached in December 1945 in Moscow when the Soviets, Americans and British decided that two opposition members should join the cabinet. The Soviets had to act as a mediator between the government and the opposition. Negotiations began in early January and continued until the end of March 1946. The main aim of the BWP(c) was that the opposition was to have limited and insignificant functions in the government. The Communist intentions did not satisfy Petkov and Lulchev who wanted a real change in the government which had to be clearly outlined through the retreat of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice to the other political organizations in order to gain the guaranteed freedom of Bulgarian citizens.³⁵ Until 30 March neither the opposition nor the rulers made any significant changes to their positions. Finally, the opposition suggested that the BWP(c) could continue to govern both problematic ministries but the opposition to receive two Deputy-Minister positions in them.³⁶ Communists, however, did not accept this offer and eventually the negotiations failed. Petkov argued that the Soviet interference in the country was the reason for this result,³⁷ while Stalin accused the opposition and Maynard Barnes, the American representative in the ACC, of this failure. The Soviet leader also advised G. Dimitrov, the leader of Bulgarian Communists, to ignore the opposition, to stop conversations with it and to think over some measures for its isolation.³⁸

The formation of the government that included only the Fatherland Front had a negative effect on Bulgaria. The United States and Great Britain did not recognize the government and the lack of recognition predestined arduous days for Bulgarian diplomacy in the Paris peace conference. The failure of the Moscow decision was not favorable for the opposition as well. The opposition could not join the government, whose policy was an object of its consecutive criticism, without radical transformations in the same

35 *Narodno zemedelsko zname*, 10 January 1946; TNA, Records of the Cabinet Office, 121/536, p. 1059; MILANOVA, S.: *Moskovskoto reshenie ot 1945 g. za predstavitelnosta na balgarskoto pravitelstvo – diplomaticheski izhod ili politicheski kamuflaj*. In: *Balgaria v sferata na savetskite interesi*. Sofia 1998.

36 CDA, f. 146 B, op. 5, a. e. 1125, p. 149.

37 SETON-WATSON, H.: *The East European Revolution*. London 1956, p. 215.

38 DIMITROV, G.: *Dnevnik 1933–1949*. Sofia 1998, pp. 523 – 524.

government. These changes, authorities, of course, had no intention to implement. Without access to the state power, in the international situation of permanently deteriorating contradictions between the Soviet Union and the West, the opposition parties were a comparatively easy target for the BWP(c)'s repressive actions.

The Intensification of Internal Struggle

The BWP(c), however, did not dare to dissolve the opposition before the conclusion of the peace treaty. The party was afraid of a negative international reaction before the end of the peace conference. Therefore Communist endeavors were directed towards further restriction of its opponents' activities. The Politburo of the party outlined two perspectives in front of the opposition in November 1946: "*either to return to the Fatherland Front*" or, if not, "*it would be without mercy denounced and defeated as a reactionary enemy fascist power*".³⁹ In 1946 the propaganda campaign against the opposition through the radio, newspapers and public meetings rose while the opposition protest against the government policy continued. In its meetings the opposition wanted immediate relief of captured people, return of Dr G. M. Dimitrov to Bulgaria, new parliamentary elections, normal condition for political activity of all parties, recovery of constitutional freedoms, investigations of all cases of political murders and violence, etc.⁴⁰

The economic policy of the government was another field for the opposition's criticism. The cabinet did not find an appropriate decision for Agrarians' problems such as low prices of agricultural goods, unemployment and various difficulties in the co-operation of the land.⁴¹ The opposition was not against the co-operation but it was dissatisfied with its compulsory realization and with the BWP(c)'s complete guidance of this process. The Agrarian Reform in 1946 was the following problem that increased the frictions between the BWP(c) and the opposition. The opposition Agrarian Union reacted very firmly since its leader considered the reform as an act which deprived the owners from their land and subjugated them to the state. In general the Agrarians were not against the reform, they even prepared the first project, but they protested against

39 TSVETKOV, Z.: *Sadat nad opozitsionnite lideri*, p. 15.

40 *Narodno zemedelsko zname*, 12 February 1946; 27 February 1946; 9 March 1946.

41 CDA, f. 165, op. 1, a. e. 24, pp. 68 – 77.

its implementation, the maximum size of the land (200 decares), the distraction of some well arranged and prosperous farms, the low rate of payment for the confiscated land, etc.⁴² As a whole, the ideas of the BANU “N. Petkov” prevailed on the opposition economic platform because the union was the most influential opponent of the BWP(c) and Bulgaria was predominantly an Agrarian country. Therefore, the main accent was put on Agrarian issues, especially in defense of small and middle owners’ interests, while the industry had a secondary role in the opposition views. This was one of the disadvantages of opposition activity – they relied to a great extent on the traditional economic structure that had not succeeded in solving the problems of Bulgaria in the past.

The opposition had to a certain extent a passive attitude towards the cultural policy of the government since its general attention was concentrated on the political development. The BANU “N. Petkov”, BWSDP (u) and other oppositionists disagreed with Communist political impact on literature, education and the arts.⁴³ Agrarians reasonably criticized the purges among the teachers and university professors, prohibition of books and gradual proclamation of Communist values in Bulgarian culture and education. On the other hand, the opposition did not mention the efforts of the cabinet to expand the admission of people to schools and universities, the building of new schools, decreasing of the fees. Probably as with each opposition in the world, the Bulgarian one tried to find the weak points in the governmental policy. This, however, could not hide the fact that the opposition was not very active in the cultural sphere and didn’t have prominent intellectuals among its supporters, perhaps, with the exception of Trifon Kunev (member of the BANU from 1920s, a former director of the National Theater and President of the Writer Union, editor-in-chief of the opposition Agrarian Union newspaper *Narodno zemedelsko zname*).

The opposition activity and criticism only increased the authorities’ intolerance towards the BANU “N. Petkov”. In 1946, the Politburo of the BWP(c) decided to implement the most serious political administrative and legal measures against its leaders and members. The Communist party’s leadership ordered that the Militia did not have to be passive but had to show ‘the firmness of the power’ since ‘we should not bear in the

42 *Narodno zemedelsko zname*, 6 February 1946.

43 *Narodno zemedelsko zname*, 28 September 1945; 10 October 1945; 16 September 1946; 21 January 1947; MIGEV, V.: *Balgarskite pisateli i politicheskiyat zhivot v Balgaria 1944 – 1970*. Sofia 2001, pp. 19 – 22.

future any arbitrariness and offence of the Fatherland Front lawfulness, which were harmful for the party's interests⁴⁴. As a result of the BWP(c)'s policy, the social tension in Bulgaria continued to rise. In the entire country incidents between adherents of opposition and the government were registered almost daily. There were even death cases. Certain prominent oppositionists such as K. Lulchev, Krastio Pastuhov, Dimitar Ivanov, Milan Drenchev, etc. were arrested⁴⁵. In spite of this, the opposition's protests against the violence and lawlessness of the authorities did not stop. The opposition parties demanded the implementation of constitutional rights and freedoms of the population.

Bulgarian foreign political issues were another very important part of opposition activity. Although Agrarians' contradictions with the ruling parties were enormous, they did not use Bulgarian foreign affairs as an instrument for pressure on the government. Therefore, in May 1946, the BANU "N. Petkov" reasonably backed the cabinet's efforts to achieve a just Peace Treaty. Certain days after the governmental memorandum to the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain the Agrarians prepared and sent their own memorandum.⁴⁶ The BANU "N. Petkov" tried to defend with historical, political, economic and ethnic arguments the Bulgarian claims for Western Trace and Macedonia. Moreover, Agrarians wanted Allies to recognize Bulgaria like a cobelligerent country. Opposition memorandum showed something significant – with regards to main foreign political issues there was coincidence between the opposition's and ruler's views. The difference was that the opposition believed that a just Peace Treaty could be signed only from a democratic government. According to Agrarians, the Fatherland Front government did not represent real people's will.

In the summer of 1946, preparation for the referendum for the fate of the Monarchy and elections for the Grand National Assembly aggravated severe political confrontation. The opposition's position towards the Monarchy was clear – it supported the abolition of the discredited Monarchy, i.e. the opposition's view was not different from the ruling coal-

44 TSVETKOV, Z.: *Sadat nad opozitsionnite lideri*, p. 19.

45 AMVR, f. 13, op. 1, a. e. 232, p. 12; *Otechestven front*, 13 January 1946; OGNJANOV, L.: *Darzhavno-politicheskata sistema na Balgaria*, pp. 100 – 101.

46 AMVR, II court, 2649, vol. X, p. 68; *Narodno zemedelsko zname*, 11 May 1946.

tion's view.⁴⁷ The public meetings of the opposition revealed that it considered the referendum as an act which should lead to a deep transformation in Bulgarian political development but not only as an automatic change in the form of the state governance. The repressive nature of the regime did not allow the opposition to hope that the abolition of the Monarchy would lead to any significant change. In spite of this doubt, the opposition appealed to its adherents to vote for the Republic. Thus the Monarchy did not receive any real support and on 8 September 1946 it was abolished by 95.63% of the people's votes.⁴⁸

Agrarian leader, N. Petkov believed, according to his experience from previous elections, that there was a need of international observers during the elections. He thought that foreign presence would enable his party to participate in fair competition with the BWP(c) and the Communists would not be able to suppress their opponents.⁴⁹ During the pre-election campaign Petkov acted very carefully without categorical demands as in 1945, since he did not have the firm support of the American and British representatives. The Agrarian leader knew from the Western diplomats in the ACC that the United States and Great Britain would sign the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria and would recognize the government at the first appropriate moment⁵⁰. This meant that the opposition lost its important foreign supporters which could exercise pressure on the BWP(c) for the betterment of the political condition in the country. Henceforward the BANU "N. Petkov" did not repeat the wish for new postponement. Agrarians concentrated their efforts on propagandizing its program and criticizing the authority's policy.

The main aims of the Agrarian opposition were presented during the pre-election campaign. The BANU "N. Petkov" tried to guarantee political and economic freedom in the society and to develop Bulgaria as a "*democratic, free, independent, social, people's and flourishing republic*". The opposition wanted friendly relations with countries in Europe and the world as well as with all Bulgarian neighbours.⁵¹ The situation in Bulgaria, however,

47 AMVR, II court, 2649, vol. II, pp. 177 – 178; *Narodno zemedelsko zname*, 6 August 1946.

48 ISUSOV, M.: *Politicheskiyat Zhivot v Balgaria 1944–1948*. Sofia 2000, p. 233.

49 CDA, f. 146 B, op. 5, a. e. 1124, pp. 39 – 40.

50 AMVR, f. 13, op. 1, a. e. 228, p. 2; II court, 2649, vol. X, p. 68; PINTEV, S.: *Balgaria v Britanskata diplomatsia*, p. 199.

51 CDA, f. 139, op. 1, a. e. 61, p. 5.

was quite different from its notions. On 26 September 1946 the Ministry of the Interior ordered the Militia to observe strictly the activity of the opposition parties. The Minister proclaimed that "*the opposition groups should be completely unmasked as antinational groups, as foreign agents, as reactionary groups*".⁵² The results of these orders soon became palpable. Bulgarian officials dissolved opposition meetings, tried to hamper opposition pre-election activity and arrested its adherences. Domestic affairs were completely worsened by Communists' threats against the opposition. There were also several death cases of Agrarian supporters.⁵³

Pressure on agrarians enabled the BWP(c) to win over 50% of the vote. The opposition received 28% or 99 seats in Parliament – among opposition parties the BANU "N. Petkov" had 90 deputies, BWSDP (u) had 8 and the Independent intellectuals just one. The Democratic Party and Radical Party (united) received a very small amount of the vote.⁵⁴ Significant cases of violence and offence against the law threw a shadow over the Communist victory. The opposition newspapers *Narodno zemedelsko zname i Svoboden narod* presented many cases of lawlessness. It was interesting that in a secret meeting of the BWP(c) leaders the opposition's information was confirmed. G. Dimitrov concluded that there was need for 'the lawless actions of our people' to be stopped.⁵⁵ In fact, the party never acknowledged that the election victory had been achieved by many infringements but the contrast between the tone in the inner party discussion and the noisy eulogy of the victory in its newspapers was very palpable. In general, the results created suitable conditions for the BWP(c)'s final attack against the BANU "N. Petkov".

The Last Clash

The incensement of the tension in international relations in 1946 – 1947 had also a negative impact on the fate of Bulgarian opposition. The contradictions between the Soviet Union and the West became more distinctive

52 CDA, f. 317 B, op. 1, a. e. 21, p. 2; DA – Shumen, f. 1605, op. 1, a. e. 3, p. 119.

53 CDA, f. 1 B, op. 5, a. e. 11, p. 26; AMVR, f. 13, op. 1, a. e. 537, p. 3; DA – Ruse, f. 82, op. 1, a. e. 5, p. 131; *Narodno Zemedelsko Zname*, 23 October 1946; 27 October 1946.

54 ISUSOV, M.: *Politicheskiyat Zhivot v Balgaria*, p. 247. According to Joseph Rothschild this was the biggest result of the opposition in the Eastern Europe. ROTSCHILD, J.: *Return to Diversity*, p. 118.

55 CDA, f. 1B, op. 5, a. e. 11, pp. 2 – 26.

and the United States and Great Britain gradually changed their attitude towards Sofia. Western countries felt a lack of real opportunity to influence the regime and wanted to see the Soviet army out of the Balkans. Bulgarian Communists used the growing international contradiction in two directions. Firstly, they benefited from the Soviet approval of their efforts to suppress the opposition parties with more determined measures. Secondly, the BWP(c) used the worsened relations between the former allies to accuse Western governments of interference in Bulgarian domestic affairs. On 2 November 1946 the BWP(c) accepted the policy for “complete denunciation” and “debacle of the opposition”⁵⁶. The Communists became more aggressive after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty on 10 February 1947. According to the Peace Treaty the Soviet army had to leave Bulgaria by the end of the year. Stalin and G. Dimitrov tried to ensure the stable position of the local Communists before this act. On 31 May 1947 Dimitrov expressed his desire that the BWP(c) should establish full control in Bulgaria before the Soviet withdrawal and Stalin agreed that the opposition should be liquidated.⁵⁷

Meanwhile the opposition concentrated its activity on the Grand National Assembly (GNA). Its deputies protested against the internal policy of the Fatherland Front – the suppression of the publishing of opposition newspapers, entire political conditions during the election campaign and then, the arrest of opposition Agrarian Deputy Petar Koev, etc. The other point of opposition criticism was the economic policy of the government – the BWP(c) tried to expand the significance of the state property while Agrarians supported the market economy. Therefore they voted against the Law for Buying up of the Large Farm Equipment, the Law for State Tobacco Monopoly, the Two Year Economic Plan. Opposition deputies protested in Parliament against the realization of the Agrarian Reform and unfair establishment of co-operative farms. The opposition also criticized the cabinet’s policy towards culture and education. It considered that the aim of this policy was to subjugate Bulgarian writers, artists, teachers and scholars to “the party line”. For that reason the opposition did not accept the Law for the Bulgarian Academy of Science and the Law for the High Education. Finally, the BANU “N. Petkov” prepared its own project

56 Ibid., pp. 22 and 56.

57 BOGDANOVA, R.: Zemedelskoto dvijenie sled Vtorata svetovna vojna (patyat na partii-noto obezlichavane). In: *Zemedelskoto dvijenie v Balgaria – istoria, razvitie, lichnosti*. Pazardjik 2004, p. 269.

for constitution which was completely different from the BWP(c)'s one. Agrarians defended "*the principles of private property, political freedom and independence of personality, political and economic democracy*". The project clearly expressed the people's rights and freedom in political, economic and cultural sphere. The foreign policy was the sole sphere in which the BANU "N. Petkov" backed the government. On 21 November 1946, it accepted the GNA's resolution with demands for fair and just Peace Treaty and in 1947 it joined the disappointment of all political parties from the ultimate Peace Treaty.⁵⁸ That was all to the opposition's credit that, in spite of its protests against the government's policy, it did not follow narrow party interests in the Bulgarian foreign political issues and took a position according to the national claims.

The BANU "N. Petkov" explained the severe dictatorship of the Fatherland Front through the completely different aim and ideology of the opposition and the BWP(c). For instance, certain opposition Agrarian deputies such as Mitio Sedev, Marin Lichev and Kiril Popov wrote that the aim of the Communist Party was the imposition of the Socialist pattern in Bulgaria. Therefore it tried to subjugate the other parties. The core of this policy was the Communist ideology that the Agrarians considered as the emanation of "hatred, malice and revenge". For this reason, according to their opinion, Communists used violence, threats, interference in the affairs of its partners and endorsed legislation that contradicted the Bulgarian traditions⁵⁹. It is curious that the Agrarians did not dare to mention the Soviet support for the BWP(c), probably, because they feared an even more repressive Communist response.

In June 1947, the BWP(c) and the State Security finished the preparation of the main blow against the opposition. It included public denunciation of the Agrarian leaders, infiltration of agents in their union and collection of "evidences" regarding illegal agrarian activity against the regime. Authorities had been preparing the social atmosphere for this for a long time. The opposition was presented as an agent of Bulgarian fascism and as a centre that prepared various plots against the government, nonetheless authorities knew very well from the State Security's reports that the Fascist circles had neither significant activity in previous years nor an influence on

58 *Stenografski dnevnitsi na VI Veliko narodno sabranie* [Stenographic Diaries of the 6th Grand National Assembly], part I, vol. I.–II; part II., vol. I.

59 *Narodno zemedelsko zname*, 14 February 1947; 28 February 1947; 29 March 1947; 2 April 1947.

the opposition parties.⁶⁰ However, according to the statement of Tr. Kostov in 1946, the BWP(c) “*had to beat and debacle the reactionary opposition*”.⁶¹ One of the means which Communists used for the realization of the aim was including agents in the opposition parties. For example, the State Security had around 30 agents in the BANU “N. Petkov” in 1946 – 1947. Some of them were even deputies but one was a member of the Agrarian leadership. The main task of the agents was to provoke friction in the union, to work for its separation and to report for the intentions of its leaders.⁶²

Public trials against prominent oppositionists were another important contrivance for the suppression of the opposition. Dr G. M. Dimitrov, Social Democrats Kr. Pastuhov and Tsveti Ivanov were convicted while Tr. Kunev and others were arrested. Then the regime used certain trials, such as the trials against organizations Military League, Neutral Officer, agrarian deputy Petar Koev, etc., to find ‘evidence’ for the illegal activities of N. Petkov and his party. These trials shaped the framework of the accusations which the authorities directed to Petkov – inspiration and preparation of *coup d’etat* against the Fatherland Front, sabotage activities and outrages.⁶³ In June 1947 Petkov was arrested and put on trial. On 16 August he received a death sentence and on 23 September he was executed, despite the attempts of the United States and Great Britain to save him. Meanwhile, on 26 August, the opposition Agrarian Union was dissolved. Henceforward the opposition activity in Bulgaria declined since the other opposition parties were weaker than the Agrarian one. Soon the regime banned the Democratic Party and Radical Party (united).

In 1948 the authorities isolated and liquidated the BWSDP (u), the last opposition party. The Social Democrats concentrated activities in the GNA since they didn’t have a newspaper or opportunities for public meetings – its party clubs were closed and its members were pursued. In the summer of 1948 K. Lulchev and other prominent Social Democrats were arrested. Later, in November 1948, the Social Democrat leader received 15 years’ sentence, Ivan Koprinkov – 12 years, Dr Petar Dertliev and Tsonio

60 AMVR, f. 13, op. 1, a. e. 154, pp. 8, 27, 36 – 40.

61 CDA, f. 265 B, op. 1, a. e. 29, p. 2.

62 AMVR, f. 13, op. 1, a. e. 230, p. 8; op. 4, a. e. 9, p. 1.

63 TSVETKOV, Z.: *Sadat nad opozitsionnite lideri*; SHARLANOV, D.: *Tiraniyata: zhertvi i palachi*; AMVR, II court, 2649, vol. X, pp. 183 – 199, 243 – 250.

Hristov – 10 years, etc. The BWSDP (u) was banned and in this way the end of the opposition in Bulgaria was achieved completely.

Simultaneously the persecution of former opposition representatives continued. Dimitar Gichev, an influential Agrarian politician, was sentenced to life imprisonment. The leaders of the Democratic Party had a comparatively easier fate – Nikola Mushanov, former minister and leader of the party, was interned in Tarnovo, Aleksandar Gerginov was interned in Razgrad and then in Dulovo, Stoicho Moshanov in Targovishte (in 1954 he was sentenced to 3 years and in 1955 to 12 years imprisonment).⁶⁴

The Communist partners in the Fatherland Front either lost their independence or were dissolved – the official BANU accepted Communist ideology and continued its existence in the following decades but without any political role, the official BWSDP merged with the BWP(c) in August 1948, but *Zveno* and the Radical Party disbanded themselves in early 1949.

Conclusion

Opposition parties emerged as an act of disagreement of wide social circles with the policy of the government, dominated by the BWP. Sometimes, bearing in mind the severe Communist repressions, we show inclination to estimate opposition protest highly because of its brave resistance against the Communist policy and the Soviet interference in the country. Probably that is correct especially in the political sphere where the deep encroachment on civil liberties was quite obvious. The opposition protest, however, had economic and cultural dimensions as well. In my opinion, the opposition economic platform, which was based mainly on small personal property, did not have the serious potential to solve the impending economic post-war issues and to modernize Bulgaria entirely since this platform repeated disadvantages of the pre-war economic structure with its recurrent crisis. With regards to Bulgarian culture the opposition reasonably directed its protest towards the gradual adoption of certain Soviet influence in this sphere. The opposition aimed the culture and education to preserve its traditional Bulgarian character.

The diplomacy of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain was not indifferent to the opposition protest. The Soviet diplomacy, particularly, made an enormous contribution to the determined efforts of the

64 SHARLANOV, D.: *Tiraniyata: zhertvi i palachi*, pp. 168–183; TSVETKOV, Z.: *Sadat nad opozitsionnite lideri*, pp. 174 – 191.

Communist party to suppress the opposition movement. The American and British diplomacies, on the other hand, tried to encourage opposition protest but, as a result of the new international conjuncture, they could not help it crucially. This situation enabled the Bulgarian Communists to liquidate the opposition movement in the late 1940s. Thus the end of the most important protest movement in Bulgaria during the Cold War came about and the Communist party, supported by the Soviet Union, became the undisputable master of the situation.

Resumé

Autor sa vo svojej štúdií zaoberá krátkym pôsobením Bulharskej agrárnej národnej únie Nikolaja Petkova, ktorá sa krátko po 2. svetovej vojne stala jednou z politických strán, stojacich proti komunistom v Bulharsku. Cieľom komunistov bolo uchopiť totálnu politickú moc, aj preto sa táto strana stala ich nepriateľom. Výhodou komunistov bola podpora, ktorú im poskytoval Sovietsky zväz. Komunisti začali svoj mocenský vzostup okamžite po vojne, keď sa im podarilo ovládnuť najdôležitejšie ministerstvá, predovšetkým ministerstvo vnútra. Ich najväčším oponentom sa zdala byť práve agrárna strana, presadzujúca inú politiku ako oni a otvorene poukazujúca na totalitné kroky vlády, v ktorej už po prvých zmanipulovaných voľbách dominovali komunisti. K rozhodujúcej porážke opozície a nastoleniu komunistickej totality prišlo v rokoch 1947 – 1948, keď bulharskí komunisti za pomoci Sovietskeho zväzu nastolili monopol moci. Likvidácia opozície sa začala v júni 1947, keď bola agrárna strana po dôkladnej infiltrácii agentmi štátnej bezpečnosti a propagandistickej príprave obvinená z rozvracania štátu a z „fašizmu“. V zmanipulovanom procese boli potom odsúdení lídri väčšiny opozičných strán.

Adaptation and Resistance of Female Congregations towards the Communist Authorities in Poland between 1945 – 1989

Agata MIREK

Introduction

From 1944 when Poland was under communist rule, two kinds of attitude existed in Polish society: adaptation and resistance. Adaptation is understood to be a social attitude that aims for relative peace and fulfils the desires of both individuals and whole groups, whereas resistance is a spontaneous, unordered and unmanaged protest against an existing political and ideological order, often connected with the defence of traditional values.¹ These attitudes – adaptation and resistance – spread in the People's Republic of Poland because of the stability of power of the Polish United Workers' Party, as well as common beliefs about the lack of alternatives to the existing order of Europe's division.² Krystyna Kersten, while analysing these social attitudes, noted that they were present in almost every aspect of life, including political decisions, election of intellectuals and the actions of millions of ordinary people. *Adaptation and resistance grew from the same stem: they were driven by the imperative of the nation's existence in biological and cultural aspects and the role of the Polish state in protecting the material and cultural lives of Poles.*

The coincidence of adaptation and resistance being together in different aspects – intellectual, emotional, moral – resulted in deep consequences.

1 FRISZKE, A.: *Opozycja polityczna w PRL 1945 – 1980*. Londyn 1994, p. 5.

2 FRISZKE, A.: *Przystosowanie i opór. Studia z dziejów PRL*. Warszawa 2007, p. 124.

*It guaranteed survival but for many it happened to be destructive and caused spiritual devastation, as well as depravation as a result of unlimited compromise.*³

1. The Catholic Church's situation in the People's Republic of Poland

Until 1948 (until the political opposition was crushed) the attitudes of communist authorities towards the Catholic Church and convents in Poland were pragmatic, whereas the Church had a very realistic approach towards the authorities. It tried to avoid direct involvement in existing political battles and concentrate on building organisational structures. From 1948 there was a fundamental change in attitude towards the Catholic Church. The authorities aimed to defiantly weaken the Church and keep it under control. They also undertook action that aimed to separate the Church from the State. This meant that faith became a private matter (especially after removing religion from schools). In the meantime, atheistic propaganda was proclaimed, especially among young people. Indescribable but constant war was taking place between the State and the Church. It had very different stages but only one goal: to isolate the Church and prevent it from having an impact on Polish opinion.⁴ In August 1949, a '*Decree of protection of freedom of conscience and denomination*' was issued. Technically this document, just like its title shows, was meant to create a lawful guarantee of freedom of denominations in Poland. In reality the different authorities used some of the regulations both to make the Church's life more difficult and to repress the clergy and secular people.⁵

The right person for the Church happened to be Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, the Primate of Poland. From the beginning of his service in Warsaw, he proved to have an excellent skill and ability to put out conflicts. Wanting to *gain time in order to increase the power to protect the Divine position*⁶, on 14 April 1950, Wyszyński and the Episcopate signed an

3 KERSTEN, K.: *Między wyzwoleciem a zniewoleniem. Polska 1944 – 1956*. Londyn 1993, p. 14.

4 KISIELEWSKI, S.: *Na czym polega socjalizm? Stosunki Kościół-państwo w PRL*. Poznań 1990, p. 86.

5 DUDEK, A. – GRYZ, R.: *Komuniści i Kościół w Polsce (1945-1989)*. Kraków 2003, p. 43.

6 WYSZYŃSKI, S.: *Zapiski więzienne*. Bydgoszcz 1990, p. 15.

agreement. For the authorities this act had a propaganda value and enabled them to engage in controversy with international public opinion about the persecution of the Church in Poland. The authorities were hoping to break psychological barriers (signing a document) with the Episcopate, which didn't have anything in common with reality. They were hoping that this would create more possibilities for the Church's hierarchy to take part in a propaganda campaign⁷. Thanks to the inflexible attitudes of Cardinal Wyszyński and his *non possumus*⁸, the authorities were unable to fulfil the programme of 'loyalty' in the Catholic Church in Poland. The first years of coexistence of the Catholic Church and communist authorities in Poland had a big impact on the situation and future relations between State and Church. For all post-Stalinist leaders of the Polish United Workers' Party this time was proof of the failure and political harmfulness of an extremely repressive model of politics towards different denominations. On the other hand, events from 1945 until 1955 made bishops and clergy realise that they had to prepare themselves for the permanent politics that, using different methods, aimed for secularisation and atheisation of society and breach of the Church's autonomy.⁹

2. Religious convents in the People's Republic of Poland

World War II had a big impact on religious orders and congregations in Poland; it thinned out the number of nuns. Due to the war devastation and arrangements made by the Big Three, convents lost their houses and possessions, especially on Kresy, but they gained the respect and trust of society instead. This was a result of their clear and uncompromising attitudes of coming to the aid of those who needed help in occupied country. When freedom was announced (May 1945), nuns struggling with difficult material situations started to live a normal life and reactivated different kinds of institution – charitable, educational, childcare and academic – depending on the congregation's character and local situation. They started to create day care centres, nurseries, orphanages (especially for post-war orphans), primary schools, high schools, dormitories and canteens, not

7 DUDEK, A. – GRYZ, R.: *Komuniści i Kościół w Polsce*, p. 57.

8 An Episcopal Memorial to Bolesław Bierut from 8th May 1953. In: RAINA, P.: *Kościół w PRL, Kościół katolicki a państwo w świetle dokumentów 1945 – 1989*. Poznań 1994, p. 426.

9 DUDEK, A. – GRYZ, R.: *Komuniści i Kościół w Polsce*, pp. 98 – 99.

to mention helping at hospitals, health centres, parishes and among the poor or those who were under moral threat. In the first period, authorities supported convents, however this was only a temporary kindness. Subsequently the communist government didn't plan for congregations to carry out free social activities but planned to gradually limit their work, create closed enclaves and completely liquidate nuns' work.¹⁰

The Primate of Poland, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, who had a great sense of the situation in which the Church of Poland found itself, was also aware that religious orders and congregations would have to play an important role in this battle "for God, Truth and Freedom". He was aware that this role could be significant, creative and effective as long as it was carried out by everyone. That is why he wanted to create in Poland, as he said, "*a uniform army of souls devoted to God, sacrificial souls living according to the evangelic spirit, spirit of their founders ready to face the atheism in order to save a faith among the nation especially among the young generation.*"¹¹ The Primate was looking at not only how to defend a congregation's assets and common attitudes towards the politics of the state authorities but also how to develop a spiritual and intellectual level. Moreover the role that convents played in Polish society in this extraordinary situation always changing and threatened both the nation's faith and education of the younger generation.

The Catholics in Poland were treated as second-rate citizens (limited in their ability to get promotion, even if they kept a loyal attitude). However nuns were treated even worse as third-rate citizens, being continuously pushed into the dregs of social life, not only without any chance of promotion but also without the fundamental rights and freedom guaranteed to every Pole by the Constitution.¹² "*A special politics of discrimination is used towards religious orders and congregations*" – Wyszyński pointed out to the authorities – "*to which our Nation in its history and society owe*

10 A protocol from a session of the Commission KC on Clergy Affairs in 26th of July 1961. In: *Tajne dokumenty Państwo-Kościół 1960 – 1980*. London 1996, pp. 17 – 28.

11 ŁACZKA, A. (ed.): *Wspomnienia o współpracy między zakonnej Zgromadzeń Zakonnych Żeńskich w Polsce po II wojnie światowej do 1960 r., Cz. II*. Warszawa 1986, p. 5.

12 "*A situation of the monastic clergy is very uncertain and dangerous. Religious orders are limited in their activities. Moreover they are prevent from doing all kind of work that they used to do everywhere and according to their vocation. By using unpleasant political methods of pressure the authorities are aiming to expropriate religious orders from existence funds and apostolic work*". In: An Episcopal Memorial to the government of People's Republic of Poland 15th of April 1959. In: RAINA, P.: *Kościół w PRL, t. 1*, p. 37.

a lot”.¹³ Nuns were systematically deprived of carrying out apostolic work as well as taking on any other work.¹⁴ They were refused the opportunity to get qualifications¹⁵, use social welfare benefits such as health care, social insurance or a retirement pension¹⁶, and tax regulations were also used very instrumentally.¹⁷ This planned atheisation affected all of the congregations’ activities.¹⁸ The process was institutional and lawful. Moreover this battle with the religious orders’ work was happening in the face of the law.¹⁹

“*The most painful and irritable, because it discriminates against clerics*” – wrote the Primate, Stefan Wyszyński, in his letter to Prime Minister Boleslaw Bierut about disobeying the rights by civil servants – “*is the politics of finished facts with methods insulting the democratic state power.*”

13 An Episcopal Memorial to the government of People’s Republic of Poland 15th of April 1959. In: RAINA, P.: *Kościół w PRL, t. 1*, p. 700.

14 “*Nuns from female congregations are removed from hospitals and charitable institutions, in which they worked for a long time with a big dedication and heroic time for the sick, orphans and lonely. With no regardless of their present and future situation they are deprived of their property support.*” In: An Episcopal Memorial, p. 34.

15 “*There wasn’t any place for nuns at schools. They were deprived of teaching secular subjects so there no need to educate nuns to become teachers. The only university that allowed religious people to study in socialism was The Catholic University of Lublin.*” KACZMAREK, E.: *Dlaczego przeszkadzały?* Warszawa 2007, p. 148.

16 Those solutions having a discrimination character are seen in regulations telling about the lack of ability to insure due to the fact of being a religious person and carrying out an apostolic work. STANISZ, P.: Rola przepisów regulujących ubezpieczenie społeczne duchownych w realizacji polityki wyznaniowej państwa w latach 1945-1989. In: MEZGLEWSKI, A. – STANISZ, P. – ORDON, M. (eds.): *Prawo i polityka wyznaniowa w Polsce Ludowej*. Lublin 2005, pp. 272 – 273; see BACH, T.: Ubezpieczenie społeczne osób duchownych i zakonnych w PRL (1945 – 1989). In: *Kościół i prawo*, t. 13, Lublin 1998.

17 A legal person of the Catholic Church including convents weren’t treated by the authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland as social organizations within the meaning of tax law, they were treated as institutions focusing on profit only. STANISŁAWSKI, T.: Wykorzystanie opodatkowania Kościoła w polityce wyznaniowej PRL. In: *Prawo i polityka wyznaniowa w Polsce Ludowej*. In: MEZGLEWSKI, A. – STANISZ, P. – ORDON, M. (eds.): *Prawo i polityka wyznaniowa w Polsce Ludowej*, p. 265.

18 It is worth to show some figures to illustrate this process. Between 1949 – 1967 80 monastic schools, 263 orphanages, 680 nurseries, 73 community centres and 46 day-care centres were liquidated. Out of 276 hospitals, only 93 remained. Monastic hospitals were nationalized. DEBOWSKA, K.: Kardynał Stefan Wyszyński i zakony żeńskie. Co zgromadzenia żeńskie zawdzięczają Prymasowi Tysiąclecia? In: *Instytuty życia konsekrowanego i stowarzyszeń życia apostołskiego w hołdzie Prymasowi Tysiąclecia*. Warszawa 2001.

19 ZUBER, B. W. – BACH, T. M.: Ograniczenia w realizacji własnego charyzmatu przez instytuty zakonne w okresie rządów totalitarnych w Polsce. In: *Roczniki Nauk Prawnych*, 1994, t. 4, p. 87.

*Those methods, based on some civil servants' ruthlessness and zeal, aimed straight to a law and order because they determined and ruined the chance to defend and recall. They were the reason why the State Council and Ministry Council Resolution from 14th of December 1950, in a case of considering and arranging recall and grievance, is becoming a dead letter for those categories of wronged [...] Clergies are not considered to be citizens with full rights".*²⁰ The Episcopate was protecting monastic life. It was aware that a battle with religious orders was part of the main repertoire among most of the regime, which could undertake a battle with the Church at any time.²¹ *"Monasteries' situation" – wrote bishops in a memorial to Boleslaw Bierut – "is one of the most alarming matters in the current Church's situation. Without any rights to do charity work, without any of their own properties, suffering from persecution, custody and numerous commissions, monasteries in Poland are in an extremely difficult situation".*²²

The authorities, free from the uncomfortable bonds of the Concordat, which was terminated in September 1945, gradually introduced legal provisions that aimed to eliminate all kinds of religious order activities. The People's Republic of Poland Constitution enacted in 1952 guaranteed freedom of conscience and denomination in article 82. However atheisation depeopled because constitutional rules about religious law being under the influence of atheism were interpreted very freely. As a result, the regulations of the religious legislation in relation to the religious orders were broken instead of guaranteeing rights and freedom based on the Constitution.²³

One can ask: Where does the kind of law exist that gives the main factors (the authorities) the right to make an instant accusation against the religious hierarchy, clergy and peaceful people? Why is a person who works peacefully considered to be a worse citizen and punished with impunity and publicly admonished only because he believes in God, trusts Him and wants to remain under the religion and moral guidance of the Catholic Church?²⁴

20 The Primate S. Wyszyński's letter from 22nd of May 1953 to the Prime Minister B. Bierut about disobeying the law by the civil servants. In: RAINA, P.: *Kościół w PRL*, p. 429.

21 *A memory about an inter-religious orders cooperation*, p. 31.

22 A letter from 12th of September 1950 referred to B. Bierut about the harm caused to the Church. In: RAINA, P.: *Kościół w PRL*, t. 1, p. 253.

23 PIETRZAK, M.: *Prawo wyznaniowe*. Warszawa 1993, p. 157.

24 *An Episcopal Memorial to the government of People's Republic of Poland*, p. 692.

3. Inter-religious orders' cooperation as an example of effective resistance

In November 1945 representatives of monastic communities turned to the Polish Primate, Cardinal August Hlond and showed him the importance of making an agreement between religious orders in order to create uniform attitudes toward the communist state authorities. The Primate called a congress in Cracow (24-25 January 1946) for all superior and provincial generals. This congress took place at Ursulines of the Roman Union, where 124 nuns from 53 convents gathered together. It became very significant because it started, according to the Primate's recommendation, a united front and uniform attitudes towards the state authorities. As a result, a special commission (Committee on Inter-religious Orders Agreement) was created which was based in Warsaw.²⁵ Between 1946 and 1949 informal groups of inter-religious orders cooperation, which didn't have any organisational form, were created in individual dioceses. The most active were religious orders in the Diocese of Cracow under Cardinal Adamo Stefano Sapieha's supervision. At the beginning, meetings took place at Ursulines Sisters but due to increasing danger from the state authorities, the location was changed every three months.²⁶ The existence and future of congregations were more and more uncertain every year.

After 1948 when authority regulations started to threaten the existence of congregations, it was clear that convents would have to resist the attack coming from 'ours'. At that time there was a need for joint action and common agreement. It was believed that being under one church's leadership in close connection with the Church's hierarchy is the only way to face up to enemies fighting with God, Church and religion in their own country. Trusting the Church's hierarchy absolutely guaranteed, without any doubts, survival and victory. There was a need for unity and a big effort was made by the inter-religious orders cooperation to achieve this unity.²⁷ On 9 March 1950, in the church of the Visitation Order in

25 The congress was very significant. It started, according to the Primate's recommendation a joint front and made an action towards the state authorities uniform. The congress made clear where the authorities are aiming, what type of methods they use to achieve this goal and how to prevent this. In: *Wspomnienia o współpracy między zakonnej Zgromadzeń Zakonnych Żeńskich w Polsce po II wojnie światowej do 1960 r.*

26 KACZMAREK, E.: *Dlaczego przeszkadzały?*, p. 132.

27 *Wspomnienia o współpracy między zakonnej Zgromadzeń Zakonnych Żeńskich w Polsce po II wojnie światowej do 1960 r.*

Warsaw near Krakowskie Przedmieście, behind the a closed and guarded door, superior generals met with the secretary of the Episcopate, Bishop Zygmunt Choromański, who pointed out the dangers to monastic life (as a consequence of the politics of the state authorities) and gave some useful instructions. The next nationwide meeting with superior generals present took place in Warsaw in August 1950. Then the idea of an inter-religious orders agreement was specified and became the Department of Monastic Affairs at the Secretariat of the Polish Primate, which was directed by priest Bronisław Dąbrowski, later archbishop and long-term general secretary of the Polish Episcopate, followed by Alojzy Żuchowski (the Pallottines). In order to make all religious classes in Poland more dynamic, Cardinal Wyszyński, established an unknown institution: dioceses referents²⁸ which firstly appointed himself. Due to the diocese referents' work, all the inspiration and indications of Cardinal Wyszyński reached every convent in Poland. Commissions were the bodies which supported the Department of Monastic Affairs were. At first they were called departments and were founded by the Superior Generals Consul of Higher Female Religious Orders.²⁹ These commissions were: educational³⁰, parish³¹, Marian³², nurs-

28 A Department of Monastic Affairs realized that it wasn't able to support all of the congregations spread all over different dioceses as well as it wasn't able to communicate them quickly about important matters. In order to coordinate a work and give a better course in dealing with different matters The Primate established dioceses referents which had a varied work. They had to passed all the official instructions made by the Department of Monastic Affairs and made sure they were fulfilled. They also had to carry out both educational action for nuns and concentration in order to deepen a spiritual and monastic life. The first meeting for dioceses referents took place in 11th of March 1953. *Wspomnienia o współpracy między zakonnej Zgromadzeń Zakonnych Żeńskich w Polsce po II wojnie światowej do 1960 r.*, p. 22.

29 BAR, J.: Konferencje Wyższych Przełożonych zakonów w Polsce. In: *Prawo Kanoniczne*, Vol. 23, 1980, No. 3-4, p. 145.

30 An educational commission was founded in 1950, a few headteachers of monastic schools were members of this commission. The main goal was to communicate in order to create uniform attitudes towards a state authorities' order as well as share experiences, discuss problems connecting with work at school, work on programs and organize a day of concentration for headteachers, teachers and children.

31 A parish commission was founded in 1951 as an answers to different problems happening among nuns who worked in parishes. The main goal was to organize trainings as well as helping nuns who started their work at parishes.

32 A Marian commission was established by the Polish Primate in 10 February 1959. the main goal was to coordinate all of the activities, spiritual and apostolic connecting with spreading a Marian cult. *Wspomnienia o współpracy między zakonnej Zgromadzeń Zakonnych Żeńskich w Polsce po II wojnie światowej do 1960 r.*, p. 222 – 232.

ing³³ and a separate commission of congregations with no religious habits (clothing).³⁴

Due to the huge commitment of its director, priest Bronisław Dąbrowski, and the competent and devoted work of nuns (directed to this work by Cardinal Wyszyński), the Department of Monastic Affairs soon became an information point³⁵, a centre for discussion and sharing experiences and what's more an important organ representing convents to the secular authorities.³⁶ It is worth mentioning that accustoming congregations to inter-religious orders cooperation wasn't easy. Some people thought that this cooperation, recommended by Cardinal Wyszyński, was an attack on the internal autonomy of convents. The more the state authorities threatened convents, the more they realised the importance of joint action which enabled convents to exchange experiences and support each other in different situations. "*We all work*" – said the Primate – "*in order to unite our monastic attitudes so we can fulfil a task appropriate to every monastic family and so we can protect the right of monastic life in Poland always threatened, always uncertain*".³⁷

An initiative of inter-religious orders cooperation happened to be very useful for the whole of monastic life in Poland under communism. Due to the considerable help and recommendation of the Department of Monastic

33 A nursing commission started its work in February 1960.

34 A commission of congregations with no religious habit was founded by the Polish Primate to replace a current Consul of congregations with no religious habit founded by Honorat. The main reason for this reorganization was to make a closer connection between congregations with no religious habit and Superiors Generals Conferees of Female Religious Orders in Poland. The legal character of section is based on principles regulating inter-religious orders work of Female State of Perfection in Poland approved by the Polish Primate in 12th of May 1960. Members of this section were appointed by the Polish Primate with a decree of 10th of September 1965 among candidates chosen by the Higher Superior Generals of Female Congregations with no religious habit founded by Honorat in 12th of May 1965. In: Archive of Congregation of Daughters of Mary Immaculate (further only ACDMI), Commission of Congregations with no religious habit, signature (further only sign.) B. XVIII, I. 2, documents about appointing the commission of nuns from congregations with no religious habit by the Council of Higher Superior Generals of Female Monastic Congregations in Poland.

35 ACDMI, f. the State Authorities, sign. B. XV, I. 1-3, A legal instruction based on regulations as at the date of 10th of November 1952.

36 *Wspomnienia o współpracy między zakonnej Zgromadzeń Zakonnych Żeńskich w Polsce po II wojnie światowej do 1960 r.*, p. 22.

37 The Primate speech in 2 August 1958 during the meeting with higher superior generals and a protonotary apostolic B. Filipiakiem, the auditor of the Secret Roman Rota.

Affairs, which was obeyed by Polish nuns, they were able to resist the destructive activities of the authorities. Instructions about how to complete a statistical questionnaire³⁸, run a housing register³⁹, carry on a conversation with administrative authorities in offices⁴⁰ or welcome an officer of the Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs into monastic houses were sent by diocese referents to every convent in Poland. These instructions were very successful in forming resistance attitudes. A different kind of resistance towards an order of communist authorities was to refuse to keep the accounting and inventory records of religious orders.

During an Episcopal meeting on 7 May 1951, bishops raised an issue about danger for convents from state authorities. Firm resistance was recommended, such as an energetic protest or a written appeal to a higher institution demanding an answer based on the law guaranteed by the Constitution. Wyszyński was convinced that convents shouldn't give any pretexts for the authorities to think that they were afraid because this may lead to more attacks.⁴¹

In this situation, the Primate was forced to make a new action plan due to the intensive attack on monastic life in Poland. General principles about monastic houses were included in three points. First, they should resist as long as possible. Second, they should leave the state institutions but defend their own. Finally, every congregation should decide which house they could give up first and which they could lease in whole or in part. It was recommended that nuns who were removed from state institutions should be given a chance to work in different monastic families. Congregations with small communities were encouraged not to give up their institutions but to undertake work instead. A second part of the analysis was related to methods and conditions while undertaking a job. The general rule in this case was to resist a common monastic life. In cases where state factors forced nuns to work, they suggested undertaking work at home and signing an agreement explaining all the norms which enable nuns to carry on

38 ACDMI, the State Authorities, sign. B. XV, I. 1-3,

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., How nuns should behave in case of a personally summon to appear before the office.

41 Archive of Institute of National Remembrance (further only A IPN) BU, signature (further only sign.) 01283/902, An information number 1/119 from the provincial conference from 31 July 1952.

their monastic exercises⁴². The last problem under discussion was religious habits (clothing). It was said that complete renouncement of religious habits was unacceptable. One shouldn't change the habit itself but only minimise the material.⁴³

4. In defence of religious orders' possessions

In January 1950, the authorities decided to nationalise the diocese institutions 'Caritas' and take over all of their possessions. The act about filling ecclesiastical positions was substituted with different options, prepared and accepted during a meeting on 23 February 1950: as we can read in the protocol it should be taking over church possessions by the state and creating a Church Fund.⁴⁴ Lack of any notice of competence and a way of appointing the Church Fund become the next instrument of pressure when dealing with the Church⁴⁵. An act about 'goods of death hand' introduced legal status and congregations were losing their own properties and households which maintained a lot of religious orders, especially novitiates and formation houses. Monastic houses were allowed to have only five hectares of land. The nuns fought back – they demanded respect for their right to keep possessions. By using economical instruments the authorities wanted to penetrate the Church's internal structures, especially religious orders, and become their legislator.

When the act was issued it began to be enforced. Small commissions started to appear in convents in order to sign a protocol about taking over properties.⁴⁶ Civil servants had the text of a protocol about taking over

42 KACZMAREK, E.: *Dlaczego przeszkadzały?*, p. 135.

43 An Archive of Polish Episcopal Secretary, sign. 23/I, Issues about monastic houses, pp. 5 – 6.

44 An Archive of New Act (further only AAN) Warszaw, f. KC PZPR (Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party), sign. 1639, A Protocol from the meeting of KC PZPR 23. 2. 1950.

45 WINIARCZYK-KOSSAKOWSKA, M.: *Przejęcie przez państwo „dóbr martwej ręki”*, p. 58.

46 In a general house of Congregation of Daughters of Mary Immaculate a commission in the presence of sister L. Kamińską tried to take possessions to the benefit of the state in Nowym Mieście n. Pilicą by Rawskiej and Rawskiej 22 street. (...) at the end of a protocol an officer wrote: "Possessions belong to the Congregation of Daughters of Mary Immaculate "Caritas" in Nowe Miasto n. Pilica, according to the situation mentioned above, are being transferred to the management board of state. A member of the congregation who was present during the protocol was signing refused to sign it." In: AAN, f. UdSW, sign.

properties written on a typewriter and they had to fill it with specific data. They made a list of houses, living and dead goods, supplies of root crops and fodder. There were a lot of irregularities and misuse in the action of taking over monastic properties. Commissions that visited convents very often took over everything that belonged to them, interpreting the act as they pleased.⁴⁷

The Episcopate undertook action in order to protect possessions belonging to congregations. As a result, monastic houses were able to keep land of five hectares. However, the realisation of a promise was based on a political assessment of particular houses, superior generals or the whole congregation. All the decisions that were made by the authorities showed a negative attitude towards convents. According to the list of appeals directed to state offices by congregations, fulfilling a decree on taking over a church's possessions became an instrument of state politics conducted towards congregations. The main goal was to set a limit on the financial base of religious orders and its enforcement was supposed to persuade nuns to have a positive attitude towards all the changes happening in Poland.⁴⁸

Cardinal Wyszyński encouraged nuns to be brave and assume a firm attitude to defending their possessions. He said calmly to them: *bear suffering and harm with peace, ready to forgive, but remember do not eat Polish bread for free because it is properly earned by You. You have the right to keep your houses and to protect within members of your congregation devastated by social work.*⁴⁹

5. "There is no place for nuns in schools"

According to the authorities, allowing nuns to work in schools was dangerous for education. There was the burden of the liability not only for spreading a convent's atmosphere in schools but also for bringing up children in the clerical spirit. They were accused of a lack of ideological attitudes and a hostile attitude towards political changes happening in Poland.

5c/3, A protocol of taking over possessions belong to the Congregation of Daughters of Mary Immaculate in Nowe Miasto n. Pilica to the benefit of the state.

47 KACZMAREK, E.: *Dlaczego przeszkadzały?*, p. 99.

48 *Ibid.*, p. 102.

49 *Memories about an inter-religious orders cooperation of Female Congregations in Poland after World War II till 1960*, p. 31.

One of the ways to restore schools in Poland was to take away from the Church and its institutions (including religious orders) the right to teach. This action against monastic schools was planned during a meeting of the Politburo of the Polish United Workers' Party and carried out by the Ministry of Education. In the first stage of an action against monastic schools the Ministry of Education dealt with primary schools. Based on the information gathered, the Political Office made a concrete decision. It was decided that until 1 September 1949, all nuns teaching secular subjects and performing an educational function should be removed. Even if the negative attitude of nuns towards the People's Republic of Poland was never found, they were suspected of having one.⁵⁰

Secularisation covered every area of education, beginning with nurseries and ending with universities as well as every institution of emergency care and education such as dormitories and orphanages. Secularisation was always linked to a question about the influence that nuns had on children and young people. An issue about young people was always raised in reports about the hostile activities of nuns submitted to the Ministry of Public Security. Those reports underlined that "*convents by their intense activities are aiming to subordinate young people to convents' ideology and distort their character, convents make difficult to raise young people with a materialistic world-view*".⁵¹ School authorities, trying to pretend that decisions made by them were legal carried out tendentious visits to monastic schools. The main goal was to decide whether a school met all the standards required to obtain state rights. Usually reports had a positive opinion about the level of education and administration of the schools and a negative opinion about the ideological upbringing. The Primate issued an instruction saying that the headteachers of monastic schools mustn't allow the state inspectors to come in without the church authorities' consent.⁵²

The process of closing down schools was carried out in two stages. The first happened with immediate effect. The school authorities were informed about the closing down of institutions and asked to explain all the accusations that were made. Next, the answer was recognised to be unsatisfactory and the last step was to issue a decision about closing down the school. The second, gradual stage was based on the fact that schools

50 AAN, Office of Denominations' Affairs, sign. 5c/6, Catholic high schools.

51 A IPN BU, sign. 01283/1061, Hostile activities of convents and a work of second section for 1955.

52 KACZMAREK, A.: *Dlaczego przeszkadzały*, p. 150.

were allowed to have new children in the first grade but they couldn't have new children in different classes. As a consequence, the number of children in the upper grades was reduced until the expiration of school.⁵³ The Episcopate supported nuns in the battle about schools' and institutions' abilities to carry out emergency care and education as well as their abilities to fulfil their teaching mission.

6. Looking for new alternatives to the authorities' decision – a convent's response to a ban on educating nuns

At the same time, nuns were unable to attend higher education, vocational, high school or any other courses. Those who had been studying already weren't allowed to take a general education exam and very often the condition of taking off the religious habit was set. Nuns who were removed from schools and crossed out from a list of pupils or listeners protested by writing to authorities but usually the complaint was left with no answer. In June 1954, a superior general of the Sisters of Mercy from Warsaw was expelled from a nursing school. She lodged a complaint to the chairman of the Bierut Ministry Council and was told that sisters were expelled not because they were nuns but because they had hidden this fact.

Convents were looking for a way to enable nuns who weren't allowed to study in state institutions to receive a general education certificate. At that time, the Diocesan Institute of Catechesis, led by the Ursulines of the Roman Union, played an important role.⁵⁴ It was supposed to prepare nuns to teach religion in schools but due to the situation that had arisen, nuns were excluded from education in state schools and two classes of a develop-

53 MEZGLEWSKI, A.: *Szkolnictwo wyznaniowe*, p. 224.

54 A Higher Catechetical Institute in Cracow, Based on the Prince Cardinal Adam Sapiecha's cornerstone establishing the Diocesan Institute of Catechesis by the convents of by the Ursulines of the Roman Union in Cracow, in 15th of September 1951 the Inter-religious orders Higher Institute of Catechesis started its activities. KNAPCZYK, A. S.: *Międzszakonny Wyższy Instytut Katechetyczny w Krakowie*. In: MAJKA, J. (ed.): *Wyższe Szkolnictwo Kościelne w Polsce. Wizja kardynała Karola Wojtyły i jej realizacja*. Kraków 2002, pp. 423 – 450; SONDEJ, C. M.: *Intelektualna i duchowa formacja osobowości katechety w Międzszakonnym Wyższym Instytucie Katechetycznym w Krakowie. Studium z zakresu katechetyki*. Kraków 1998; DYDUCH, J.: *Geneza, rozwój i aktualny stan prawny Międzszakonnego Wyższego Instytutu Katechetycznego*. In: KLICH, A. E. (ed.): *Kontemplacja Oblicza Chrystusa i ewangelizacja*. Kraków 2003, pp. 31 – 44; KRZYWDA, J. – SONDEJ, C. M.: *Międzszakonny Wyższy Instytut Katechetyczny w służbie Kościoła*. In: KOPEREK, S. – SZCZUR, S. – LEŚNIAK, M. (eds.): *Archidiecezja Krakowska na przełomie tysiącleci*. Kraków 2004, pp. 499 – 509.

ing four-year course for nuns who finished primary school were opened. This course was based on a high school programme, with theological and pedagogical subjects. The graduates prepared to take a state secondary school examination.⁵⁵ The next step was to establish a Higher Catechetical Institute, which prepared nuns, by studying theology, philosophy and monastic life, not only for catechetical work but also for the Christian Ministry and Formation.⁵⁶

7. *Catechesis in parishes*

A ban on religious people teaching religion constituted an administrative obstacle and aimed to cause more organisational problems for the church authorities, which were already struggling to find enough religious teachers to teach religion at schools. It was aimed directly at a group of over 2,000 priests and nuns who taught religion. It also affected a large group of children and young people who were left without the experience of religious teaching⁵⁷. Bishops protested against the regulations from 4 August, saying that: *“removing, by the Ministry of Education, religious people and stopping them from teaching religion is against the Constitution and the Agreement because it discriminates against people, it decreases hours of religion at school and it disappoints a lot of Catholic families.”*⁵⁸ The Episcopal School Commission was aware of having a weak point in this clash with the school authorities, which was the pedagogical preparation of teachers.

The removal of religion from schools was undoubtedly the Church's failure but the state authorities' success was doubtful. Although the secularisation of education was conducted without a big disturbance, it is difficult to hide the fact that this action was carried out by using hidden political, economical and police pressure. The removal of religion from public schools deprived the authorities of supervising the subject, as well as the Church's educational influence, for at least two generations of young Poles. An attempt to liquidate this inconvenience, with the August 1961 regulation issued by the Ministry of Education, met with failure. Moreover

55 KNAPCZYK, A. S.: *Międzyzakonny Wyższy Instytut Katechetyczny w Krakowie*, p. 427.

56 Ibid.

57 KONOPKA, H.: *Religia w szkołach Polski Ludowej*, p. 225.

58 Ibid., p. 228.

it caused more difficulties connected with registration and supervision issues over the catechetical point, which lasted until the end of Gomułka's government.⁵⁹

By 1962, nuns' official and team work among children and young people in church institutions and social organisations was over. A lot of nuns lost their jobs. Some of them tried in vain to return to state educational institutions. The authorities thought that: nuns should be fired and no one should care about their situation because this problem should be solved by convents, which should look after those nuns.⁶⁰ The authorities were afraid of having nuns in schools and educational institutions because they were believed to be leaders who will be carrying out clergies' work.⁶¹ They decided to stop educating nuns and splitting them up around the country.⁶² Despite all the difficulties, the nuns' educational influence didn't weaken but due to their huge involvement in catechetical work, the number of children and young people among whom they worked increased instead.⁶³

A battle with after-school catechesis, especially with those nuns who were involved in catechesis, was prepared very carefully and covered all aspects of life. It is worth pointing out an issue about the social insurance of people teaching religion. In October 1971, the Union on Denominational Politics decided that the authorities wouldn't allow religious people to teach in schools; as a result they weren't allowed to use their social insurance. The Church discussed this matter with the Social Insurance Institution, which wasn't allowed to sign any agreement. The Office on Denominational Affairs postponed the problem. In 1975, a minister of work, wages and social affairs announced that only people who were employed by an employer (parishes included) had the right to insure themselves. Religious education was classified as a fulfilment of spiritual or monastic vocation,

59 DUDEK, A.: *Państwo a Kościół w Polsce 1945-1979*. Warszawa 1995, p. 93.

60 Protokół z posiedzenia Komisji KC ds. Kleru w dn. 26 lipca 1961 r. In: *Tajne dokumenty*, p. 19.

61 *Ibid.*, p. 18.

62 *Ibid.*

63 MIREK, A.: Zaangażowanie sióstr zakonnych w pracę katechetyczną wśród dzieci i młodzieży w okresie PRL jako jedno z priorytetowych zadań wspólnot zakonnych na przykładzie Zgromadzenia Córek Maryi Niepokalanej. In: J. SZCZEPANIAK, J. (ed.): *Materiały i studia do dziejów nauczania i wychowania religijnego*, t. 4. Kraków 2004, p. 138.

that's why it was beyond the employer-employee relationship. The issue about insurance remained a convenient measure of pressure. During a conversation on 3 December 1976 with Bishop Bronisław Dąbrowski, Stanisław Kania, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, announced that nuns who taught religion couldn't have any insurance because: "*We believe that nuns who are praying or teaching religion are not allowed to have insurance because they don't do useful social work.*"⁶⁴ Religious education remained, according to the authorities, useless for state citizens. However, over 90 percent of members of the Polish United Workers' Party believed that children should learn religion because it guaranteed the best moral education.

The fact is that Communism didn't destroyed religious lessons taught by people properly prepared and delegated by the Church. Nuns who were discriminated against by the communist authorities constituted 20 percent of all religious teachers, teaching outside schools. Millions of Poles received basic knowledge and a Christian formation thanks to them.

Conclusion

Knowing that both the dissolution of a one-off system and regaining independence in Poland (after the Yalta Conference) was unreal, the part of society that didn't accept the new communist system decided to work with great effort, planting the embryo of independent thinking and resistance in the name of law and the defence of values, as well as stirring up others who were less brave. Anti-communist resistance in the People's Republic of Poland applied to every class and group of society. It was undertaken, not only by the armed Underground, but also by Polish society, which felt the need to join the resistance in whatever form. The Great Primate didn't expect the People's Republic of Poland to weaken (in the near future) and was afraid of any violent shock that might result in Soviet intervention. He was strictly against profuse in with Polish blood. Instead he saw an opportunity for a gradual evolution of the system and extension of freedom of religion and civil rights. His strategy was a combination of both adjustment and resistance and was different from other strategies held

64 Sprawozdanie z rozmowy ks. bp. B. Dąbrowskiego z S. Kanią sekretarzem KC PZPR z dnia 3 grudnia 1976 r. In: RAINA, P.: *Rozmowy z władzami PRL. Arcybiskup Dąbrowski w służbie Kościoła i narodu*, t. 1, Warszawa 1995, p. 275.

by the other great hierarch of Eastern Europe – the Primate of Hungary, Józef Mindszenty.

The described symptoms of adjustment were accompanied by keeping an internal sovereignty and an ability to make resistance at least against some of the system features or government acts. The resistance was directed at issues limiting freedom of denomination, breaching the values of national traditions or limiting freedom of speech and beliefs.

Real Christian life shown by Polish nuns in their dull everyday routine was the most effective picture of anti-communist action. This was the reason why the authorities were afraid of the nuns' presence in society and tried, with perseverance and firmness, to push them into the dregs of society.

Affirmation, adjustment, resistance and opposition – these attitudes appeared at the same time and were related to each other. Nuns, as well as the whole of society, were forced to remain silent and follow the rules. They got used to it but at the same time they tried to keep autonomy in certain areas and to extend it. These activities were effective. Discrepancies between guidelines from different instances and real life might be the proof. The history of the People's Republic of Poland might be described as a process of struggle between the authorities and society where both sides were changing under the influence of this struggle.

Resumé

Protikomunistický odboj v Poľskej ľudovej republike sa spájal s každou skupinou a triedou spoločnosti. Odboj sa netýkal iba ozbrojeného ilegálneho hnutia, ale takmer väčšiny spoločnosti, ktorá cítila potrebu kolektívneho odporu, i keď z hľadiska formy tu boli rozdiely. Spomedzi spoločenských skupín, ktoré vykonávali protikomunistickú činnosť zohrala Katolícka cirkev, ako aj ženské rehole fungujúce v rámci cirkvi, dôležitú úlohu. Svojou účasťou na vzdelávaní a starostlivosti o deti, ktoré im boli zverené do opatery, vytvorili u detí a mládeže protikomunistické povedomie. Legislatíva komunistických orgánov mala za cieľ vytlačiť činnosť reholí zo spoločenského života a viedla k úplnej likvidácii ženských kláštorov v Poľsku. Navzdory vytláčaniu oficiálnej činnosti ženských reholí zatváraním inštitúcií, kde učili a ošetrovali mníšky, ony použili rôzne formy apoštolátu a odboja proti komunistickému režimu.

Prostredníctvom svojej tichej a skrytej práce učili poľské mníšky mladých ľudí hodnotám, ktoré boli v opozícii voči materialistickému

obrazu sveta, ktorý budoval a vyučoval oficiálny vzdelávací systém. Pravý kresťanský život, ktorým mníšky žili, bol tým najúčinnnejším obrazom protikomunistickej činnosti. Preto sa úrady obávali prítomnosti mníšok v spoločenskom živote a vytrvalo a tvrdo sa pokúšali vytlačiť ich na okraj spoločnosti.

Třetí odboj v ČSR a rok 1956

Václav VEBER

Rok 1956 byl kritickým rokem střední a východní Evropy. Třináct dnů maďarské revoluce (od 23. října do 10. listopadu 1956) bylo posledním radikálním masovým vystoupením občanské společnosti se zbraní v ruce proti totalitnímu komunistickému režimu.¹ Jen upozorním, že se obvykle uvádějí jen dva předcházející pokusy o protikomunistické povstání ve střední a východní Evropě, a to východoněmecké povstání koncem června 1953 a polské v červnu 1956, ale jistě k nim náleží i červnový pokus o povstání v Plzni a jiných československých městech 1953 v souvislosti s peněžní reformou – právě tato skutečnost (povstali dělníci, místní mocenské mechanismy se ukázaly jako neschopné zasáhnout, přijít musela vojska pohraniční stráže a pražské lidové milice) poučila komunistické vedení a donutila ho k chování v duchu sovětské metody, že tyto pokusy musí komunistům ukázat jejich slabá místa v systému vlády. Asi to je nejzávažnější argument vysvětlující odlišný, méně aktivní postoj československé veřejnosti na přelomu října a listopadu 1956.

Je téměř jisté, že komunistický režim v ČSR v roce 1956 nebyl v krizi a Tigridovo tvrzení, které skoro zdomácnělo, že místo podpory maďarských vlastenců dala československá veřejnost přednost sledování nevýznamného ligového zápasu v kopané, je přinejmenším nepřesné.² Komunistický režim

1 Stručný popis událostí viz sborník Centra pro ekonomiku a politiku (dál pouze CEP) Kol. autorů: *Maďarské povstání 1956 – padesát let poté*. Praha 2007; nejpodrobnější (včetně odkazů na další literaturu) NÁLEVKVA, V.: *Sovětský svaz a maďarská revoluce 1956*, s. 19 – 36.

2 Tigrid je první, kdo přišel s obdobnou argumentací (Češi a Slováci zůstali v klidu a promarnili velkou šanci na změnu). In: TIGRID, P.: *Marx na Hradčanech – pokus*

v ČSR razantně potlačil pokus o povstání v červnu 1953, ve státech střední a východní Evropy byl nejpoptatnější sovětskému komunismu, vždyť jenom vlastních komunistů popravil více než všechny ostatní východoevropské satelitní státy dohromady. Vytvořil si obratným řešením, které možná ani nepředpokládal, prostor pro zvyšování životního standardu (dokonale ožebračil společnost s pomocí peněžní reformy), propagandisticky umně útočil proti maďarské revoluci (psal nepřetržitě o „výstřednostech“ maďarských fašistů – tak nazýval všechny Maďary bojující za svobodu, o živých pochodních – pověšených komunistech na pouličních kandelábrech, politých benzinem a zapálených či o zohavených tělech nevinných obětí). Našel i obětní beránky ohledně komunistických zločinů v ČSR, Gottwaldova zetě Alexeje Čepičku a již tři roky mrtvého Slánského, označovaného za československého Beriju.

Karel Kaplan v jedné ze svých posledních prací o Antonínu Novotném píše, že v roce 1956 – hlavně v době maďarské revoluce při první zprávě o ozbrojených konfliktech dal Novotný jako první tajemník okamžitě podnět *„k vyhlášení pohotovosti bezpečnosti, poté vojenských jednotek, nařídil pohotovost Lidových milicí a stranického aparátu. Patřil mezi úzký okruh vedoucích, kteří rozhodovali o přesunu vojenských a bezpečnostních útvarů k ochraně hranic s Maďarskem, o materiální, včetně zbraní, pomoci maďarským komunistům.“* V ústředí byly shromažďovány zprávy o jednání československých delegací s maďarskými komunisty, o činnosti československých Maďarů, kteří byli vysíláni do Maďarska se zvláštními úkoly, o žádostech maďarských komunistů o pomoc (zbraněmi, vozidly, jídlem aj.) a jak jim pomoci. Pohotovost znamenala každodenní schůze s informacemi i závěry, co bude v krátké době učiněno k zajištění klidu. Kaplan pokračuje: *„Bezpečnostní orgány, které 'zaktivizovaly' svoje agenturní síť a sledovaly nálady a názory občanů, zvýšily pozornost vůči tzv. podezřelým osobám, hlásily a předávaly prokurátorům a do vazby ty, kteří vyslovili souhlas s maďarským bojem proti režimu a sovětské armádě a u kterých pozorovala náznaky k přípravě akce. Značně se rozrostla tajná prověrka korespondence [...] Prokurátoři byli povinni denně hlásit případy o zatčených a na svobodě vyšetřovaných osobách.“*³

o pohled na československou otázku deset let po únoru. In: *Svědectví*, č. 3, 1958 – 1959, s. 311n. Pak už jen pokračovali Karel Kaplan až Muriel Blaive.

3 KAPLAN, K.: *Antonín Novotný – vzestup a pád „lidového“ aparátčíka*. Brno 2011, s. 90.

Ovládnutí občanské společnosti je složitý proces s mnoha jemnými zákrutami a metodami moci. Na základě ruských zkušeností, podmíněných tradicemi ruského carismu a tomu odpovídající ruské společnosti, byl v sovětském Rusku vyvinut systém permanentního tlaku na společnost v takové míře, že postupně prakticky nebyla schopna občanského života, Solženicyn píše o postupném podbýjení stropu nad občanskou společností. S terorem, i jeho nejtvrděšími formami v SSSR včetně státem řízeného hladomoru, se pravidelně střídala fáze uvolnění, na kterou perzekuovaná společnost odpovídala přizpůsobením se režimu ve smyslu přežití, což považovala obecně za výjimečný pokrok – neodvažovala se totiž o aktivní protest pro hrozbu perzekuce. Tím chci uvést, že každá společnost v jednotlivých satelitních státech prošla různými fázemi odporu, jenž – ve smyslu občanského odporu i odboje – byl omezován až do nicoty a neexistence. Konečné vítězství však totalitnímu komunismu dopřáno nebylo. Jakmile došlo k situaci, kdy občanský odpor skomíral, přelil se dovnitř do komunistického hnutí, kde se ve straně i jiných složkách moci rodila stále silnější opozice, která převzala prapor odporu⁴ – revoluce se zbraní v ruce se ovšem vyčerpala a vpřed postoupily fáze vnitřního převratu, jež se orientovaly na vnitřní oslabování systému a na jeho vnitřní změnu sametovým způsobem. Komunismus v Evropě padl (podle Lecha Walesy⁵) otevřením dveří komunistické Bastilly dohodou. To je zkušenost východoevropského komunismu, i když rozprostřená do časového horizontu života jedné generace, tedy do poněkud neobvykle dlouhé doby.

Diktátoři i diktátorské režimy totalitní povahy se chovají prakticky stejně, ocitují jen pro zajímavost a příklad krátký úryvek z Chateaubriandovy kritiky chování Napoleona Bonaparta, když se ujímal moci, hodí se

4 Pěkně je tento proces popsán jedním z aktérů doby spisovatelem Pavlem Kohoutem v jeho bilančním životopise KOHOUT, P.: *To byl můj život??? Díl I.* Praha; Litomyšl 2005, s. 126n. Výklad začíná větou: „V Československu se naopak jevilo neefektivnějším využití trvalího ochromení domácích dogmatiků a změnit chod věcí tam, kde byl pokažen, tedy přímo v lůně strany.“ Podle Kohouta se právě v roce 1956 komunisté rozdělili do třech skupin: na „bratrstvo viníků“ (dále je nazývá zločinci), kteří uzavřeli pakt, že budou držet moc, na „klub cyniků“, kteří žili dle zásady: Je li pověst jednou v čudu, dá se žít už beze studu! a třetí, kam počítá i sebe, „osudové společenství“ těch, „kteří to nadšeně umožnili a dokonce opěvovali a zoufale se radili a přeli, jak z té krvavé kaše ven“. (Tamtéž, s. 125 – 126). Nemohli prý přenechat stranu zločincům a cynikům, soudí, že se možnosti občanského odboje vyčerpaly – letní povstání u příležitosti poznaňského průmyslového veletrhu bylo potlačeno polskou armádou maršála Rokossovského a „po odklizení šedesáti mrtvých a tří stovek raněných pokračoval veletrh jakoby nic.“ (Tamtéž, s. 126.)

5 WALESA, L.: *Cesta k pravdě – vlastní životopis.* Praha 2011, s. 170, 222 aj.

na moderní diktátory všech následných období, mj. psal: „*Celá Francie se stává říší lží; noviny, pamflety, próza i verše, vše maskuje pravdu. Prší-li, jsme ujišťováni, že svítí slunce; jestliže tyran prošel středem němeého lidu, říká se, že se procházel uprostřed hlučného a klamajícího davu; jediným cílem je kníže: morálka spočívá v podřízení se jeho kapricím, v povinnosti ho chválit. Je zvláště třeba křičet obdivem, provede-li chybu nebo spáchá-li zločin [...] Nejohrožnější revoluce jsou lepší podobného stavu*“.⁶

Poučení pro držitele moci z plzeňské revolty, což byly přibližně dvou-denní protikomunistické aktivity masového charakteru s vyrabováním údajných sloupů komunistické moci, městského magistrátu a soudních instancí včetně likvidace tzv. krepového socialismu (hesel, nástěnek, bust i obrazů s představiteli komunismu, Gottwaldů, Stalinů aj. plakátů apod.), vedlo k tomu, že

- a.) zesílily už tak značné perzekuce (kampaň zatýkání a procesů s pravicovými sociálními demokraty a dalšími bývalými lidmi, vyhodnocenými jako možní potenciální odpůrci a vůdci odporu) a
- b.) byla zahájena kampaň údajného systematického zvyšování životní úrovně cestou pravidelného snižování cen (první bylo v prosinci 1953, Jiří Pernes jich v krátké době včetně roku 1956 napočítal šest⁷, nutno však dodat, že peněžní reforma byla takovým zásahem do životního standardu obyvatel, že rázem – škrtem pera – došlo ke snížení reálné životní úrovně přibližně o 9 – 12 %⁸, bylo tedy možné propagandisticky využívat cestu vzhůru).

To je právě doba, kdy se společnost snaží vyrovnat s režimem, jenž nemůže být svržen, přizpůsobením a odklonem od společenských aktivit, což samozřejmě vládní režim podporuje.

Československý komunistický režim v kritickém roce 1956 se snažil jednak zvyšovat životní standard a propagandisticky tuto skutečnost

6 Cituji dle SFORZA, C.: *Evropa a Evropané – evropská synthesa*. Praha 1937, s. 19 (kapitola Duchovní ponižení Evropy).

7 PERNES, J.: Československý rok 1956 – k dějinám destalinizace v Československu. In: *Soudobé dějiny*, roč. 7, 2000, č. 4, s. 612.

8 Viz kapitolu Sociálně demokratická strana a dělnická otázka v připravované knize autora tohoto příspěvku *Třetí odboj – ČSR v první polovině 50. let 20. století*, která vyjde na jaře 2012 v nakl. Vyšehrad.

využívat a jednak upevňoval nad obvyklou mírou dohled nad čs. občanskou společností. V mezinárodním měřítku pak podporoval mocenské zásahy proti jakémukoli ohrožení komunistické moci (českoslovenští komunisté – hlavními mluvčími byli tentokrát Novotný a Široký – nabízeli ochotně účast na intervenci v Maďarsku a silně ji podporovali).⁹ V Archivu bezpečnostních složek je nepřehledné množství tzv. monitoringu chování, ať už ve fázi přípravy či provedení, odpovědnost za dohled nad společností mělo Barákovo ministerstvo vnitra.

Plány ministerstva vnitra na opatření k „mimořádným událostem“ jsou výmluvné.¹⁰ Předpokládají agenturně operativní opatření, čímž se rozumí každodenní styk s agenturou (a její maximální aktivizace) přímý i telefonický a zorganizování sledování možných nebezpečných lidí podle připraveného projektu, včetně západních ambasad, hotelových hostů a hlavně západních novinářů apod. A za druhé pohotovostní opatření, pod nimiž se skrýval požadavek neustálého přehledu situace na vybraných místech (v Praze na Václavském náměstí), utvoření bojůvek v civilu, které budou pomáhat uniformovaným příslušníkům v případě potřeby (KSC v Praze dodala koncem října 1 000 komunistů k výpomoci bezpečnostním orgánům a přes 1 000 začátkem listopadu) a samozřejmě doplnění střeliva a především samopalů jako nejhodnějších zbraní v pouličním boji (v Praze každá místní správa Veřejné bezpečnosti dostala k dispozici navíc jeden kulomet, městská správa pak osm), stálé služby u agenturních telefonů apod. 27. října 1956 pak zvláštním tajným rozkazem byla vyhlášena úplná pohotovost orgánů ministerstva vnitra (výslovně: včetně žen a řidičů), např. operativní plán obsazení hlavního města Prahy předpokládal: „*Obsazení důležitých objektů a úseků a to zejména sekretariátů KSC, budov ONV a ministerstev, zastupitelských úřadů, rozhlasů, telefonických spojů, pošt, elektráren a transformačních stanic, nádraží, skladišť Svazarmu, důležitá zásobovací centra, studentské koleje, mosty, nemocnice, divadla, kina, musea, významné pomníky apod. Úkolem je zajišťování jejich vnější bezpečnosti a sledování situace s cílem likvidace pokusů provokací,*

9 Na poradě zástupců komunistických stran v Moskvě v noci z 1. na 2. 11. 1956 Široký patřil k radikálům, navrhol uskutečnit intervenci neodkladně a koordinovaně „ze všech stran a ještě dnes“. MARUŠIAK, J.: Maďarská revolúcia 1956 a Slovensko. In: KMEŤ, N. (ed.): „Spoznal som svetlo a už viac nechcem tmu...“. Pocta Jozefovi Jablonickému. Bratislava 2005, s. 192. Viz také KAPLAN, K.: Antonín Novotný – vzestup a pád „lidového“ aparátčíka, s. 91.

10 Jsou soustředěny v Archivu bezpečnostních složek (dál pouze ABS), fond (dál pouze f.) H – 669, svazek 3.

shromažďování a paniky.“ Vedle běžných příslušníků byly navíc vytvořeny speciální pohotovostní jednotky. Ještě 3. listopadu 1956 byl vydán tajný rozkaz ministra vnitra pro boj s „případnými“ provokacemi, který vyžadoval: a) včas zjistit a hlásit všechny náznaky „provokací“, b) zesílit agenturní činnost na všech úrovních a c) zajistit zachycování signálů nepřátelské činnosti. Příkladově se v něm dále, aby operativní pracovníci byli přítomni v civilu mezi manifestujícími i mezi diváky a vystupovali jako „pochtiví občané“.

V dosavadních studiích Jiřího Pernese, Karla Kaplana, Jána Peška i Juraje Marušiaka a dalších jsou již zcela vytěženy materiály StB, uložené v archivu, zbývá snad jenom kontrola dopisů a jejich analýza pro ministra Baráka.¹¹ Jeho pracovníci uvedli, že ve zmíněném období bylo v poštovním styku realizováno přibližně 290 000 dopisů, z nichž 26 493 bylo zkontrolováno, tj. tajně otevřeno, přečteno a vyhodnoceno, bohužel ve zprávě se nic nedozvíme o metodice výběru, zdá se, že zaměření bylo směřováno na studenty a vojáky v základní službě, tj. na mladou generaci. Pracovníci StB zjistili, že ve 451 z nich se pisatelé vyjadřovali k maďarské revoluci, podle analytiků 176 v duchu komunistické rétoriky a 90 dopisů bylo vysloveně antikomunistických (u 185 nebyl rozeznán převažující trend postoje pisatele). Pro příklad jen: přítelkyně sděluje Jiřímu Hoskovcovi, t. č. ve vojenské zotavovně Klínovec na Božím Daru mj.: „*Možná, že tě budou zajímat poměry a nálada posledních dnů v Praze [...] Plně ulice vojska, milice a SNB mají pohotovost. Ohniska nepokojů jsou pryč Pardubice, Brno a Bratislava. Mluví se něco o 7. listopadu. První půjdu do průvodu. Nenechám si nic ujít. Nenávidím Rusáky.*“ (zpráva z 1. listopadu 1956, s. 12). Ze série dopisů z 28. října 1956 můžeme pro příklad uvést, aspirant Olda Harazin sděluje Světle Studené do Brna mj.: „*Já mám hroznou radost z těch událostí, neboť čím dál dojdou v osvobozování naši sousedé, tím dříve padnou naše idoly na Hradě. A věřte, že v Praze panuje nálada na bourání pomníku a snad i na políčkování.*“ Nebo manžel psal Aničce Fundové, ředitelce školy na Sušicku mj.: „*Ať se člověku něco líbí nebo ne, musí v nynější době mlčet a to moderní otroctví nějak vydržet. Zde v Praze je situace podivná. Všude je plno fízlů [...] dávám si pozor, ale přesto mně na Václavském náměstí StB chtěl zatknout. Díky lidem, kteří stáli kolem, se mu to nepovedlo a byl rád, že utekl živ.*“

Ještě větší je množství agenturních zpráv, uložených ve stejném fondu. Podle zprávy z 6. listopadu 1956 někteří zaměstnanci pražského

11 ABS, f. H – 669, svazek 2, zpráva pro ministra Baráka z 28. 10. 1956.

Potravinoprojektu oslavovali vítězství maďarské revoluce ve veřejné restauraci, v jiné pražské vinárně zaměstnanec Státní pojišťovny Jiří Šimek při obdobné příležitosti údajně vykřikoval: „*Témato rukama je budu škrtit. Mám doma zbraně, já jim ukážu.*“ Autor udání se rozhořčoval, že ve vinárně bylo plno hostů a všichni jeho řeči slyšeli, ale nikdo to neohlásil, ačkoliv u vstupních dveří stál příslušník SNB. Zpráva z 2. listopadu zase hlásí, že zaměstnanec n. p. Potrubí Tiefenbach veřejně prohlašoval, že převrat u nás by byl jednoduchou záležitostí, kdyby Češi nebyli zbabělci, stačilo by prý 300 odhodlaných „chlapů“, ale nač se namáhat, „*když to stejně musí přijít samo*“. Nebo Voříšková (křestní jméno chybí) z ministerstva těžkého strojírenství se netajila svým názorem a údajně prohlašovala: „*Líbí se mi, že Maďaři jsou rozumní a vyhnali komunisty z vlády.*“ Jako u většiny podobných zpráv, je i u paní Voříškové uvedeno: „*S Voříškovou byl okamžitě rozvázán pracovní poměr a po výsledku bude zajištěna pro pobuřování.*“

Samozřejmě, že zvláštní pozornost byla věnována dělníkům jako opoře režimu. Dílčích zpráv je dost, jako např. z 2. listopadu týkající se tesařů v pražské Jeseniově ulici, kteří odmítli pracovat a údajně prohlásili: „*Že se na to 'vykašlou' a že jdou zapít svobodné Maďarsko. Pak odešli do hospody*“, hlásil informátor. Celou záležitost dostal na starost vedoucí tajemník OV KSČ Prahy 11. Souborná zpráva je ale jen jedna, týká se Severočeského uhelného revíru a píše se v ní o pravděpodobné sabotáži velkého rozsahu; je z 2. listopadu a uvádí, že předcházející den bylo nutné na pěti dolech zastavit těžbu pro nedostatek vagonů, také na 2. listopadu bylo údajně objednáno 1 130 vagonů, ale dopoledne jich revír měl k dispozici pouze 421. Neodjelo prý 12 regulačních vlaků, ale – zdá se – veřejné řešení bylo zamítnuto a celá událost zůstala skryta v archivu (komunisté uměli vyrábět pramennou nouzi a ještě dnes bohužel platí, že to, co není v archivu, neexistuje).

Mezi politickými protivníky byla jako nejnebezpečnější vyhodnocena aktivita Křesťansko demokratického hnutí, které prý sjednocovalo nábožensky založenou mládež, pracovalo na programu hnutí a čekalo jen na pokyn ze Západu, jenž měl odstartovat jejich veřejné vystoupení. V archivu je uložen záznam anonymního informátora o zasedání ústecké oblastní rady, na němž se zúčastnili jednání zástupci ústředního vedení, organizátorem byl Ladislav Krejsa (v listopadu 1957 ho soud odsoudil na 16 let do vězení). Referovala pro informátora neznámá osoba a o Maďarsku mj. údajně řekla: „*Nemohu hovořit o cizině, abych nevzpomněl i nejbližších našich sousedů, jejichž osud nám všem tane naléhavě na mysli. Víte*

*všichni, koho míním: statečné Maďarsko, bojující Maďarsko, kde v prvých sledech vojáků svobody byli naši ideoví bratři, křesťanští demokraté maďarští. Je mi těžko hovořit o tom, co je ještě žhnoucí ranou ve svědomí světa. Je mi těžko hovořit o maďarské revoltě, přehlušené a umlčené detonacemi sovětských granátů. Mnozí světoví politikové zklamali oprávněně a spravedlivé očekávání národů. Ve svém Vánočním poselství hovořil o tom i římský Pontifik Pius XII. Mnozí z nás slyšeli, jak příkře odsoudil slabost OSN. Není k tomu co říci, snad jen toto: politikové zklamali, národy však ne! Svět nikdy nezapomene na krvavé orgie, páchané v Maďarsku pomatenými despoty. Nikdy, pravím, nebude zapomenuto bezpříkladného hrdinství maďarského lidu. Události posledních měsíců jsou hrůznou obžalobou stalinistických politických dobrodruhů.*¹²

Největší události československého roku 1956 jsou známy a z velké části popsány. Jde o Majáles 1956 (v Praze 19. – 21. května za účasti přibližně 100 tisíce lidí s ústředním heslem: *Nebojte se Pražáci, jsou tu ještě študáci!*)¹³ a pak i ve všech městech s vysokými školami včetně Bratislavy, někde i středními) a druhý sjezd Svazu československých spisovatelů v dubnu 1956 (především projevy Františka Hrubína a Jaroslava Seiferta, patří k nim ale také Dominik Tatarka, Ladislav Mňačko a Katarína Lazarová). V archivu ABS však nalezneme i zprávu ministra vnitra Baráka pro Politické byro ÚV KSČ, která vypočítává „trestnou činnost“, především pobuřování a přípravu i ochotu k veřejnému vystoupení několika studentských skupin, detailní popis jejich činnosti nám zatím chybí, ani nevíme, zda je výčet úplný, nebo uvádí jen příklady bez snahy o úplnost.¹⁴ Jen je vypočítám:

12 ABS, f. H – 602, sv. 8, s. 6.

13 Soupis požadavků podle zpravodajských služeb: 1. Větší a „pravdomluvnější“ informovanost v tisku, rozhlase a filmu, 2. Zákaz rušení cizích vysílaček, 3. Povolení dovozu zahraničních novin a literatury, 4. Úpravu formálního postavení politických stran, 5. Revizi nezákonných politických procesů, 6. Potrestání zodpovědných viníků, 7. Všeobecnou amnestii politických vězňů. Patřil k nim i požadavek nehrát hymnu SSSR při každé příležitosti a sovětskou vlajku vyvěšovat jen 7. 11. a 9. 5. In: SVATOŠ, M.: *Pražské studentské majálesy let 1956 – 1968*.

14 ABS, f. A 2/1, inventární číslo 1064 (zpráva je z 22. 12. 1956). V téže složce je také Barákova informace z 6. 12. 1956 o Memorandu o přípravě čl. dobrovolnického sboru v zahraničí, které připravil a akci údajně organizoval Čsl. zahraniční ústav v exilu, o němž ovšem dnes víme, že byl expoziturou KSČ v exilu. Píše se, že tento sbor shromažďuje dobrovolníky a zbraně k vojenskému zásahu v Maďarsku a eventuálně i v ČSR a Barák žádal propagandistické využití této informace. Nevíme přesně, proč z toho sešlo.

- c.) studenti Vysoké školy chemické v Praze v čele s Miroslavem Příklopem (nar. 1929), kteří údajně chtěli vystoupit 7. listopadu, vyvolat zmatek a přepadat příslušníky bezpečnosti, naznačuje se, že hodlali nastartovat veřejné nepokoje.
- d.) Studenti Vysokého učení technického – zeměměřičská fakulta, kteří organizovali hromadný poslech zahraničního vysílání a následně diskuse, v nichž se jen čekalo na impuls k akci.
- e.) Studenti Libuše Albrechtová a Jan Rejnoha, kteří se pokusili uletět letadlem ČSA do exilu – všichni jejich kolegové to věděli a nikdo to neoznámil.
- f.) Středoškoláci v Nymburce – 18letý Bohuslav Zlatník, 16letí Petr Adámek a Oldřich Hejl a další – v noci na 1. listopadu ve všech vyšších třídách své školy vyvěsili hesla: „*Studenti! Jste avantgardou revoluce. Nechceme socialismus, ale demokracii. Sympatizujeme s bojem lidu Maďarska za svobodu. S USA na věčné časy. Smrt SSSR. Pryč s komunismem. Chceme svobodu.*“
- g.) Sedmičlenná studentská skupina na Vysoké škole chemicko-technologické v Pardubicích v čele s Pavlem Levým, která „pobuřovala“ své okolí.¹⁵
- h.) Studenti lékařské fakulty v Plzni v čele s Jiřím Musílkem.
- i.) Středoškoláci z Nitry, z průmyslovky a jedenáctiletky, kteří vstoupili do ilegální organizace Slovenský orol (vydávala protistátní časopis).

15 Podle vzpomínek Pavla Levého z konce 90. let dvacátého století, které má autor k dispozici ve vlastním archivu (LEVÝ, P.: *Vzpomínky na dobu temna na pardubické Alma mater*, napsal je pro Zpravodaj Univerzity Pardubice, ale jeho článek nebyl otištěn), byla slavnost Majáles v Pardubicích ozvěnou pražských Majáles s různou formou recesí v podobě hesel a transparentů. Organizátoři dostali zadání z vyšších míst: oslavit SSSR, sovětskou a ruskou vědu s dodatkem: přece budete chtít majálesovat i příští rok. Celá skupina hlavních organizátorů byla zatčena až 4. 11. 1956, v době již plně probíhající maďarské revoluce. Ukazuje velmi podrobně, v jak velkém rozsahu byla celá aktivita studentů agenturně zachycována (objektový svazek VŠCHT zmizel až v průběhu roku 1991), mnozí z agentů ani o sobě nevěděli a udávali se navzájem, povedlo se jim ovšem své chytrější a nadanější kolegy dostat z fakulty a na dlouho si rozdělit funkce i tituly.

pisí Táborák a Bystrina), velmi ostře vystupovali především proti SSSR.

- j.) Studenti lékařské fakulty v Brně v čele s Jiřím Šteflem (nar. 1932), kteří hodlali vytvořit ilegální skupinu a vést aktivní boj s režimem.

Zbývá tedy dost práce, protirežimní aktivity v roce 1956 rozhodně nejsou běžně známy badatelům ani veřejnosti, jisté ale je, že existovaly.

Summary

The 1956 year was crucial for Middle and Eastern Europe. One phase of the anti-Communist movement culminated in Hungary and Poland (it was the last stage of post-war armed acts of revolutionary resistance in Hungary), while the situation in the other states of the region was relatively calm. Of course, the situation was influenced by the previous attempts at a revolt in Czechoslovakia and the GDR in June 1953. The experience of their suppression and the level of repression and persecution predetermined the behaviour of the civil society of the said states in 1956. Despite there were several attempts at anti-regime actions in Czechoslovakia, albeit they remain to be less known to date.

Resistance in Polish Music after 1945

Anna G. PIOTROWSKA

Introduction

Music has always been considered an integral part of cultural life. It has also been actively exploited in social, political and religious dimensions regardless of the type of the society and notwithstanding the historical period. In fact under the general and rather uninformatively used notion that 'music' is not only the actual sounds but also a complex web of variety of interactive actions. These involve, among others, the support of rich patrons, the production of music, musical composition, performances and the audience reception. Specified by their own aesthetics and carrying their own history they also play an important role in the processes taking place outside purely musical reality. In this understanding of music the structures of the sound alone do not stand for the multitude of meanings attributed to music – the significance of music is related to a number of factors including (but not confined to) financial constraints, aesthetic values, social interest and finally, political regulations.

Politics can greatly influence music by promoting certain styles and fostering new musical events and at the same time by censoring and repressing others it can serve as a discouraging factor. In the broadly defined sphere of music, politics may exercise power of motivating composers and performers and on the other hand it may stimulate the musicians to undertake certain types of politicised expressions, such as boycott or even silencing. The relationship between the world of politics and the world of music can be characterised in a number of ways – two approaches, however, seem to prevail. As J. M. Barbalet said, "*power relations imply*

acceptance on the part of those subject to them. They also imply resistance".¹ Acceptance means no resistance at all, collaborating with the system and supporting its directives, although J. M. Barbalet suggests that even "*an acceptance of power does not preclude resistance*".² On the other hand, the opposite of an acceptance, i.e. resistance, may be defined in a number of ways. In fact the very term resistance has been used by various scholars in a variety of contexts in order to describe "*actions and behaviours at all levels of human social life [...] and in a number of different settings, including political systems, entertainment and literature and the workplace*".³ As the authors J. Hollander and R. Einwoher point out, "*there is little consensus on the definition of resistance*"⁴ let alone resistance in music which in itself is a rather difficult to defend concept. In order not to follow in the footsteps of those authors who refer to the notion of resistance in the titles of their works and yet fail to provide the readers with – at least a provisional – definition of it or their own understanding of the concept, I would like to start with the typology suggested in 2004 by Hollander and Einwoher. The authors suggested the following types of resistance⁵:

1. Overt resistance – characterised by visible actions easily identified as of resistant nature by targets and observers.
2. Covert resistance – intentional acts of resistance that go unnoticed by their targets, although classified as resistance by the observers.
3. Unwitting resistance – refers to unintended resistance that is recognised by both the target and observers.
4. Target-defined resistance – is a type of resistance identified solely by the target, without even realizing the resistant character of the action on the side of the actor and the observers.

1 BARBALET, J. M.: Power and resistance. In: *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 36, 1985, No. 4, p. 531.

2 Ibid.

3 HOLLANDER, J. A. – EINWOHER, R. L.: Conceptualizing Resistance. In: *Sociological Forum*, vol. 19, 2004, No. 4., p. 534.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

5. Externally-defined resistance – actions described as resistance only by the onlookers.
6. Missed resistance – intended acts of resistance that go unnoticed by the observers.
7. Attempted resistance – neither the target nor the third party seem to interpret these actions as resistance.

This detailed typology of acts labelled as resistance illustrates to the best extent the diversity of phenomena that can be described as resistance. They can be interpreted according to the above-mentioned typology at various levels: collective or individualist, referring to constant actions and permanent behaviours, or can be applied to one-off acts. The richness of musical life that is about to be analysed in this article presents several possibilities to further investigate the phenomenon of resistance, especially in the context of such a complicated situation as the one in post-1945 Poland. And yet before proceeding further it should be stressed that the diversity among what is hailed as resistance stems from three factors identified by Hollander and Einwoher as mode of resistance (understood literally as an act of physical resistance or as a type of, usually protesting, behaviour with symbolic meaning), the scale of resistance and directions or goals.⁶ Furthermore, the inevitable element of resistance is action, broadly defined, targeted against certain goals. The opposition requires at least two parties: the opposing one and the one being opposed. In the situation of post-1945 Polish music, the opposing group I intend to discuss in this paper is that of composers protesting against the Communistic rules as embodied in the directives imposed on them by the organizational bodies, especially the Polish Composers' Union. However, in the case of the performance art such as music, apart from the two indispensable actors (opposing creators and opposed addressees) there is still room for the third factor – the element of recognition by the public, critics and musicologists. Although some theoreticians of resistance, like J. Scott, claim that there is no need for recognition in the case of resistance⁷, there is a general consensus among

6 Ibid., p. 536.

7 SCOTT, J. C.: *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Heaven 1985.

other authors to the fact that in order to call an opposing behaviour an act of resistance it should be recognized as such by others.⁸

Another important question that rises from these theoretical divagations is whether or not the intentions of the resisting composers are to be included in the examination as well as the problem of the consciousness of the resistant character of the actions among opposing composers. The complex character of resistance – as illustrated in the proposed above typology – circumstanced by several additional conditions results from the far more sophisticated nature of resistance than it seems at first sight. In the scope of this article I would like to draw attention to the subversive nature of the resistance of Polish musical circles after 1945 – escaping the typologies and crossing the boundaries of the types suggested by Hollander and Einwoher. Concentrating on the period starting in the mid-1940s and ending about ten years later, I intend to illustrate two examples of the different shades of resistance and very tangled paths the relationships between the resisting composers and the Communistic powers followed. My intention is to point to the fact that in order to realize the complexity of the resistance phenomenon in post-war musical Poland over-simplifying statements ought to be omitted in favour of carefully planned and very detailed investigations. I chose two contrasting case studies of Andrzej Panufnik's immigration to Great Britain in 1953 and the establishing of the festival named "Warsaw Autumn" by a group of composers in 1956. These examples differ in a variety of ways: one being individual and the other collective, one being a symbolic act, the other involving years of undertaking different actions and finally the first one being negated by the political powers and the other – surprisingly – supported. What is common in both cases, however, is their ambiguous character.

Polish situation

Communistic Poland generously supported artistic activities, including musical ones. In post-war Poland, musical life was quickly recovering and normalizing. With a view to supporting it, musical life in Poland went through a phase of some, generally positive, organizational changes. In Krakow – comparatively little was damaged during WWII – the Philharmonic Hall was opened in February 1945 and in March, Andrzej Panufnik – one of the most respected Polish conductors – became its

8 HOLLANDER, J. A. – EINWOHER, R. L.: *Conceptualizing Resistance*, p. 541.

director. The same year, also in the city of Krakow, the **Polish Composers' Union** was founded during a National Assembly of Composers. According to the official web page of the PCU, the union was established as a continuation of the pre-war Polish Composers' Association in operation since 1925. The composer Piotr Perkowski was elected the first President of the PCU, Roman Palester became the 1st Vice-President and Stanislaw Wiechowicz the 2nd. Witold Lutosławski served as the First Secretary and Treasurer of the PCU. From the very beginning, the statutory aim of the PCU was to support Polish composers and to promote Polish musical culture through the organisation of concerts, festivals, conferences, courses, exhibitions and competitions, as well as publishing activities. As in the whole Socialist bloc also in Poland achievements of the Soviet Union were treated as road – sings regulating the development of music. In 1948, Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov, who had been in charge of the Soviet Union's cultural policy since 1946, proclaimed his simplified doctrines about music development during a Conference of Composers. Struggling against so-called *formalism* Zhdanov condemned the individualistic tendencies in music as well as any forms of subjectivity in art. According to Zhdanov, music of the past had been cherished by a snobbish clique catering only to themselves and remaining few, whereas for Zhdanov real music had to be made for people and consequently, composers were supposed to write music for the people, music for everybody. The broad name applied to this type of music was "music for the masses". Vocal forms rather than purely instrumental were preferred as songs and cantatas could carry the appropriate message. In cantatas and operas grand political themes were supposed to appear. As far as musical language was concerned the main postulate was the simplicity understood as comprehensibility and clarity. The emphasis was put on the propaganda effect that music was prone to having rather than on its other qualities. Hence M. Juzl described the impact of the Zhdanov policy as "numbing" the development of music in both the Soviet Union and its satellite countries⁹ since the doctrine promoted artistic mediocrity as long as it conformed to the rules.

The principles of Socialist realism, suggested by Zhdanov, were in fact first applied to literature when initially they were agreed upon back in 1934 at the first All Union Literary Congress. However, despite the widespread repercussions Socialist realism dogmas evoked, no binding definition of it was ever proposed. Neither its opposite: formalism was clearly defined

9 JŪZL, M.: Music and the Totalitarian Regime. In: *IRASM*, Vol. 27, 1996, No. 1, p. 37.

and the whole ideology hinged on the fact that bourgeois art was criticised and Communist patterns were hailed as healthy and beautiful.¹⁰

In Poland the omnipresent orders to follow social ideas in art, including music, became overt for everyone after the conference which took place in Lagow Lubuski between 5-8 August 1949. Ideologically, active music was meant to serve as a tool of official propaganda. Proclaimed in Lagow, the new means of musical expression were not received too well, although it was made clear that the straightforward support of the authorities would be directed towards the composers whose works were bound up with Communist ideology. Music was supposed to promote the vision of a happy Communist future, in which some composers never believed or simply stopped believing. A growing number of Polish composers gradually became to realize that the situation in the country was deteriorating and were deciding – sooner or later – to emigrate from Poland. Those who stayed often remained bitter or even scared. A number of composers also decided to follow the path of resistance – active and passive.

Andrzej Panufnik and the “bad presence” syndrome

The Central Committee of the Communist party would pass a resolution banning the performance of certain composers in order to protest against their artistic endeavours resulting in departing from the aesthetic doctrines and ideologies of the Social realism so explicitly expressed during the Lagow meeting. Composers who, in the opinion of Communist authorities became undesirable consequently were either silenced or their works were completely absent from Polish concert halls. These composers symbolise the so-called “bad presence” syndrome in post-war Polish music. Among them were, to name a few, Zygmunt Mycielski (1907 – 1987), Stefan Kisielewski (1911 – 1981), Roman Palester (1907 – 1989) and Andrzej Panufnik (1914 – 1991). The public activity of Mycielski and Kisielewski resulted in their works being sentenced by Communist authorities to absence from musical life and as a contemporary Polish musicologist Andrzej Chlopecki says, “*the composers themselves were forced to a type*

10 ARBATSKY, Y.: The Soviet Attitude towards Music: An Analysis Based in Part on Secret Archives. In: *The Musical Quarterly*, Vol. 43, 1957, No. 3, p. 299.

of “inward” emigration”.¹¹ The real emigration was yet another solution, a visible act of demonstrating the resistance against the power.

In Poland for over 200 years the successive waves of emigration among aristocrats, artists and the intellectual elite regularly marked the tragic events of Polish history. As the result of political situation imposed on the countries in proximity to the USSR a number of Poles choosing to live outside Poland increased. These émigrés left Poland for a variety of reasons, sometimes quite complicated and not always directly linked with the political situation of the country. Some Polish composers – especially those of Jewish origin like Karol Rathaus or Alexandre Tansman – decided to immigrate before the outbreak of the WWII in the light of the growing anti-Semitic feelings, other Polish composers (e.g. Michał Spisak or Antoni Szałowski) were already residing abroad and the war caught them there – in this situation they often decided to stay in their new, adopted homelands not sure what they might be expecting after coming back to Socialistic Poland.¹²

Andrzej Panufnik decided to emigrate from Poland as a sign of his disagreement to the situation imposed on the composers in his Socialistic homeland. This statement, although it holds true, needs to be clarified as Panufnik left Poland as late as 1953. Before that, however, he cherished a comparatively high status and was considered as one of the best Polish composers and directors by the public, critics and Communist authorities alike. In March 1945 he became the director of the newly-opened Philharmonic Hall in Krakow, and his newly composed works (everything he wrote before the war was destroyed) were often performed and praised by music critics writing highly positive reviews, furthermore his music became also respected by other composers. The public opinion was so unanimous that Panufnik gradually became one of the leading Polish composers. Because of Panufnik’s growing position in Poland (in 1946 he became the music director of the Philharmonic Orchestra in the capital city of Poland – Warsaw) and in the light of his international successes, more and more political pressure was put on him. The composer, who had had radical opinions before the war, initially did not mind co-working

11 CHLOPECKI, A.: *Contemporary Polish Music* at URL: <http://www.culture.pl/en/culture/artykuly/es_muzyka_wspolczesna>.

12 HELMAN, Z.: *Muzyka na obczyźnie (Music in Exile)*. In: FIK, M (ed.): *Między Polską a światem. Kultura emigracyjna po 1939 (Poland and the World. Immigration culture after 1939)*. Warszawa 1992, pp. 209 – 210.

with the authorities. On one hand, the material advantages (like obtaining a flat, which in Poland, that was haunted by their shortage, was considered a miracle) and on the other hand the green light to his travels abroad were regarded as a kind of reward for the sacrifices that Panufnik was prepared to make. As British musicologist Adrian Thomas suggests, the price Panufnik paid for his, for example, numerous foreign trips was writing press coverage in line with the political directives.¹³

The high status Panufnik achieved as a conductor in the late 1940s was followed by his promotion in the hierarchy of Polish composers: after Roman Palester's immigration to France, Panufnik overtook his place as 'the first composer'¹⁴. At that time Panufnik actively worked in the Polish Composers' Union and in 1948 he was appointed the Vice-President of this – more and more politically dependent – organization. The fact that Panufnik was in this way at the authorities' disposal as well as the very high position he occupied in the musical environment enabled him to help many of his fellow composers. And in that light Panufnik's co-operation with the official powers was remembered and evaluated by his colleagues. Jan Krenz defended Panufnik's behavior: "*I know that some grudge Panufnik's involvement in the politics at that time. Personally I look on it with tolerance [...] Any artist is entitled to protect himself. That is what Panufnik did. Living in Stalinist times he felt endangered as an artist, maybe he even got scared that he will be ignored, forgotten, so he decided on the compromise. But it does not mean he did it for his career, for having such a huge talent as he did he never made compromises for his career [...]*"¹⁵

Panufnik composed – as the majority of Polish composers of that era – occasional works, e.g. mass songs. *Song of the United Party* was written for a competition announced to mark the union of two left wing parties forming the Polish United Worker's Party was highly praised by the authorities. Much as he wanted to, Panufnik could not escape entering the competition itself, but he deliberately produced the banal piece of music,

13 THOMAS, A.: In the Public Eye: Panufnik and his Music, 1945 – 1954. In: PAJA-STACH, J. (ed.): *Andrzej Panufnik's Music and its Reception*. Kraków 2003, p. 211.

14 GWIZDALANKA, D.: Trzy postawy wobec totalitaryzmu: Roman Palester – Andrzej Panufnik – Witold Lutosławski. In: JABŁOŃSKI, M. – TATARSKA, J. (eds.): *Muzyka i Totalitaryzm*. Poznań 1996, p. 170.

15 KACZYŃSKI, T.: Rozmowa z Janem Krenzem. In: KACZYŃSKI, T.: *Andrzej Panufnik i jego muzyka*. Warszawa 1994, p. 53.

which surprisingly won the competition.¹⁶ Panufnik's attitude towards the government was critical and his cooperation with the authorities was not blindly obedient. He never composed *Revolution Symphony* discussed in 1950 and most of Panufnik's works from that period bear the marks of his escape from socio-realistic art cannons towards the old Polish music patterns as evident in *Old Polish Suite* or *Concerto in modo antico*. Panufnik's situation – despite his apparent successes – was gradually becoming more and more difficult. The contact with the authorities, although almost inevitable for any composer living in a totalitarian state¹⁷, were more often at odds with Panufnik's nature, as for the composer the only dream and aim was to devote his entire life to composing rather than being honoured and privileged.

Panufnik seriously started considering leaving Poland. In his autobiography, *Composing Myself* he names reasons for his decision to emigrate. Acknowledging the importance of such memoirs, it must be stressed that – as Adrian Thomas says – “*the historian must treat such reminiscences with due caution*” in the light of “*errors and selective memory*”¹⁸ especially evident in the section devoted to the post-war decade. The main reasons for Panufnik's leaving Poland – complicated as they were – mainly concerned the problem of political pressures – as the composer would often stress – although his personal situation must have played some role too. Panufnik was profoundly tired of the impasse of the whole musical environment and especially felt sorry for those composers continually accused of formalism (the accusation Panufnik did not avoid himself). That feeling was strengthened by Panufnik's personal bitterness connected with the expectations imposed on him by the authorities to play the role of a model Socialist composer. D. Gwizdalanka sums up the reasons of Panufnik's decision: “*no privacy or concentration resulting from the involvement in political life [...]. Censoring the artistic output, total isolation from western music, [...], shrinking of the repertoire, and [...] depression, hypocrisy and frustration as the feelings dominating in musical environment*”.¹⁹ The emotional character of Panufnik's relations with Polish Communist authorities suggests that the composer wanted to believe that while sacrificing himself for other

16 Ibid., pp.196 – 197.

17 GWIZDALANKA, D.: Trzy postawy wobec totalitaryzmu, p. 178.

18 THOMAS, A.: In the Public Eye: Panufnik and his Music, p. 207.

19 GWIZDALANKA, D.: Trzy postawy wobec totalitaryzmu, p. 173.

fellow composers' causes and the endangered music,²⁰ he was naïve in his evaluation of the current situation. And yet *“the act of making up my mind was very difficult, because no-one could then immigrate officially and my secret departure entailed the loss of all – in my case not too many – belongings in Poland”*.²¹ In his native country Panufnik was banned from performance for over 20 years and even his name was censored – with no information available about the international premieres of his works his achievements were excluded from Polish musicological publications. Leaving Poland by Panufnik – the composer the authorities happily saw as an incarnation of their ideals – was understood by the public in Poland as a symbolic act of resistance. Although the intentions of the composer were rightly deciphered by the audience, also the Communists fathomed the situation and their politics of excluding the name of Panufnik and his like from Polish musical life resulted in the consequent lack of recognition, or – in the best situation – this type of resistance gained little recognition among the audience. Immigrating as an act of resistance had consequently little power of influence. Soon, however, a new form of resistance of Polish musical circles emerged, inside the country. Paradoxically, the new resistance – although recognized not only by the public, but also by the authorities – was tolerated and to some extent even promoted as a sign of the new approach observed within the Communists enabling them, at the same time, to control the resistance they could not prevent.

“Warsaw Autumn” as an example of controlled resistance

As a result of the political *détente* after Stalin's death in 1953 some Polish composers made spectacular debuts with very innovative suggestions and fresh ideas. They rebelled against the omnipresent rules of social realism and set the search for new qualities in music, associated with the sound itself rather than the qualities outside music (for example political). The hunt for newness was a common feature for a group of young composers, who – in the history of music – are considered as the representatives of a “Polish composers' school”. Especially in the early 1960s the term “Polish composers' school” became widely used mainly by German music critics who applied this description to indicate the specific Polish style exposing

20 Ibid., p. 182.

21 KACZYŃSKI, T.: *Andrzej Panufnik i jego muzyka, (Andrzej Panufnik and his Music)*. Warszawa 1994, p. 64.

tones of sounds as the fundamental element of a musical structure. A contemporary Polish musicologist Andrzej Chlopecki claims however that “the term “Polish composers’ school” should be treated metaphorically rather than literally. Composers considered representatives of this school have a lot in common (mainly the prevalence of tone colour over other components). However, the individual detailed aesthetic and technical solutions they propose are different”.²²

A political crisis of 1956 encouraged some radical attitudes among composers. So far unthinkable reactions as rejection of the personality cult in the sphere of politics and abandoning dogmas of social realism in the area of culture came to the fore for a short time. In fact the government quickly left the democratization course, but during the encouraging climate of the political thaw that followed the years of Stalinist dictatorship the festival of contemporary music, named “Warsaw Autumn” inaugurated in October 1956.

Back in 1949 a Polish composer Tadeusz Baird (1928 – 1981) together with Kazimierz Serocki and Jan Krenz founded a so called “Group 49”. Their goal was to create music that would be at the same time communicative and expressive. In fact the main directives of the group went along with the social–realistic ideology of the state. The founders of the group were consequently honoured by the state – Baird received a few state awards and the Polish Composers’ Union Award. Also Serocki was well-acknowledged as a recipient of a number of Polish and foreign awards, he was a laureate of several State Prizes including the one from 1952 for his music to the film “Young Chopin”. Furthermore, in the years 1954 – 1955 he served as a Vice-President of the central administration of the – already heavily politicised – Polish Composers’ Union.

The very same group of the composers who initiated “Group 49” also came up with an idea of organizing a new festival dedicated solely to the contemporary music. In 1956 under an umbrella of the Polish Composers’ Union, Baird and Serocki created in the capital of Poland the festival called the “Warsaw Autumn”. It was the first festival in Poland on an international scale and soon gained a very high status. “Warsaw Autumn” became a forum of overt manifestation of resistance towards Socialist realism. Their preferred experimental forms were – to use R. Ingarden’s association – *individual cases*, individual processes revealing individual feelings

22 CHLOPECKI, A.: *Contemporary Polish Music*. URL: <http://www.culture.pl/en/culture/artykuly/es_muzyka_wspolczesna>.

and thus negating the postulated collectivism. Moreover, the avant-garde musicians presenting works were creating new rules and abolishing old ones – the metaphor of which hardly ever escaped the listeners. The preference for instrumental works meant the resistance towards officially supported and looked for mass songs with propaganda heavy texts. Furthermore, the introduction of new, Western musical technical solutions was aimed against the all-covering accusation of formalism. And finally performing works by Western composers such as Boulez, Nono, Dallapiccola etc. meant opening to the West rather than to the East.

Indeed, the festival, “Warsaw Autumn” immediately established its positions as a window for Western music. It was the site of the first Polish performances of many compositions considered canonical in contemporary music and yet unknown so far to Polish public and composers. After a long period of imposed isolation from musical currents and the phenomena of Western European Polish audiences and especially musicians themselves were eager to hear works by such renowned composers as Schönberg, Berg, Webern, Varese. Surprisingly Bartok or Stravinski’s works appeared also new to them. The festival’s formula enabled the performance of experimental compositions. The current, most update avant-garde experimenters of those years, namely Boulez, Nono, Dallapiccola, Maderna and Cage had their works performed at “Warsaw Autumn”. Two factors met at the festival – the Polish cultural circles were acting like a sponge, absorbing novelty and overtly demonstrating the interest in the Western, ‘formalist’ music and at the same time the Western composers were curious to see and hear what was happening on the other side of the “Iron Curtain” and seized through the festival the only opportunity to find out about it. Soon, the festival gained a worldwide reputation

During the festival, Polish composers had an opportunity to present their original compositions conceived in a new way, often rebellious towards the prevailing social-realistic dogmas. These premiers became manifestations of new aesthetic tendencies in Polish music. The very term ‘new tendencies’ sounds rather sarcastic in the Polish context of the late 1950s as Polish composers were initially fascinated with the technique of dodecaphonism, which thrived in Western Europe a few decades ago. Polish composers, however, quickly made up for lost time and soon crossed the gap dividing them from their Western contemporaries. Moreover, they offered their own input into the development of modern music by means of an introduced technique called sonorism. The word sonorism became used with reference to musical compositions where the priority of the tone

of sound is given over all other parameters of composition. This technical solution of drawing the public's attention to the feature of the sound timbre allowed composers to avoid accusations of sophisticated formalism.

As T. Wielecki says, the festival “constituted an evident crack in the Iron Curtain, it was an island of creative freedom. Socialist realism was not obligatory here: the most varied forms of artistic invention were possible. These created a sense of freedom of expression in general, and were viewed as a form of political protest. The government tolerated this situation, wanting to present itself as a liberal patron of the arts”.²³ The historical paradox of the “Warsaw Autumn” festival hinges on the fact that the resistance proposed there was not only tolerated by the authorities, but also to some extent even encouraged, as long as it remained controlled. As the current Director of the festival bitterly noticed, “paradoxically, the Communist era was a period in which the “Warsaw Autumn” thrived”.²⁴ Oddly enough, or perhaps in line with this inner logic, even the finances of the festival were secured by the state. Partly due to this fact as well as to its high status and the Polish composers' constant resistance against political power and their determinacy to struggle in defence of their right to be a part of an international community of musicians, the festival was the only event of this kind in Central and Eastern Europe. In this respect it can be rightly called a witness to the history of Polish resistance through music.

Concluding remarks

Both Panufnik's situation and the case of the “Warsaw Autumn” festival prove the interactional nature of resistance with the central role assigned to the powers-to-be. The involvement of many factors in often unexpected constellations, create the complex nature of resistance. As a Polish musicologist M. Tomaszewski once observed, Polish composers after 1945 had limited options to follow: to accept the situation totally, to be flexible, not to refuse the commissions coming from the authorities or to reject the pressure and to make up their mind to emigrate (literally as Panufnik or Palester did or ‘inwardly’ like Malawski or Lutoslawski).²⁵ In

23 WIELECKI, T.: *History of the festival*. At URL <<http://warsaw-autumn.art.pl/03/about-the-festival.html>>.

24 Ibid.

25 TOMASZEWSKI, M.: O twórczości zaangażowanej. In: JABŁOŃSKI, M. – TATARSKA, J. (eds.): *Muzyka i Totalitaryzm (Music and Totalitarianism)*. Poznań 1996, pp. 143 – 144.

the general opinion of musicologists and critics, Polish composers living and working after 1945, due to their solidarity and constant resistance – sometimes open, covert, externally-defined, missed or only attempted (to use Hollander and Einwoher terminology) were able to sustain their high artistic position and managed to survive the time when totalitarianism ruled the state with their heads high up. The same can be said about the majority of Polish musicians of that time as well as Polish musical institutions (e. g. Polish musical publishing houses) – that consequently, although perhaps not very spectacularly, resisted the regime.

Resumé

Tak situácia Panufnika, ako i prípad „Varšavskej jesene“ dokazujú interakčný charakter odboja s hlavnou úlohou pridelenou schopnostiam – byť. Prítomnosť mnohých faktorov, často v nečakaných konšteláciách, vytvára komplexnú povahu odboja. Ako pozoroval poľský muzikológ M. Tomaszewski poľských skladateľov po roku 1945, nemali na výber z mnohých možností: buď situáciu úplne akceptovať, byť flexibilní, neodmietajú objednávky prichádzajúce od úradov, alebo odmietnuť tlak a rozhodnúť sa pre emigráciu (doslovnú, ako to urobil Panufnik alebo Palester, alebo „vnútornú“ emigráciu ako Malawski či Lutoslawski). Podľa všeobecného názoru muzikológov a kritikov boli poľskí skladatelia, ktorí žili a pracovali po roku 1945, vďaka svojej solidarite a neustálemu odporu – niekedy otvorenému, skrytému, externe definovanému, nezdarenému alebo iba skúšanému (aby sme použili terminológiu Hollandera a Einwohera) – schopní udržať si svoje vysoké umelecké postavenie a dokázali so zdvihnutou hlavou prežiť obdobie, keď totalita vládla štátu. To isté možno povedať o väčšine poľských hudobných inštitúcií (napr. Poľskom hudobnom vydavateľstve) – že dôsledne, i keď asi nie veľmi okázalo, režimu odporovali.

Reakcia ukrajinskej verejnosti na udalosti Pražskej jari 1968

Igor ŠNICER

„Pražská jar“ roku 1968 má v dejinách svetového socializmu špeciálne miesto. Jej myšlienky akoby boli zničené tankami vojsk štátov Varšavskej zmluvy a odsúdené k zabudnutiu, ale ako sa ukázalo, mali veľký vplyv na vznik myšlienky protitotalitných masových hnutí a revolúcie, ktoré na konci roku 1989 privedli k pokojnej zmene spoločenského systému v bývalých socialistických krajinách. Na základe toho možno tvrdiť, že idey „Pražskej jari“ mali veľký vplyv na socialistické krajiny vrátane republík Sovietskeho zväzu. V tomto kontexte je veľmi zaujímavé sledovať reakciu ukrajinskej vlády a verejnosti na udalosti „Pražskej jari“ roku 1968.

Na Ukrajine v čase vlády Piotra Šelesta dominovala „ukrajinofilska skupina“, ktorá sa snažila o zachovanie autonómie vnútornej politiky republiky. Prvý tajomník Komunistickej strany Ukrajiny (ďalej iba KPU), ktorý rozprával po ukrajinsky, vyzýval, aby „*chránili ukrajinský jazyk ako najdrahší poklad*“. Aj napriek obrovskému tlaku moskovských ideológov, ktorí tvorili „novú historickú spoločnosť – sovietsky národ“, Šelestovi sa podarilo zdržiavať proces rusifikácie ukrajinských škôl. V podmienkach vtedajšieho Sovietskeho zväzu takáto jazyková politika v jednej z jeho väzových republík bola priamo „odchýlkou“ k nacionalizmu a vzbudzovala podozrenie neostalinistov v Moskve. Kremľu sa nepáčilo ani úsilie Šelesta týkajúce sa rozvoja ekonomiky Ukrajiny. Šelest totiž až príliš vážne vzal do úvahy ústavou deklarovaný princíp rovnoprávnosti všetkých národov a vôbec nechcel uznať úlohu Rusov ako „staršieho brata“. Naopak, vždy zdôrazňoval, že Sovietsky zväz je federálnym zriadením autonómnych

republik a bol zástancom princípu parity v ekonomických vzťahoch. Preto vzťahy medzi Moskvou a vedením KPU neboli jednoduché.

Avšak, mali by sme spomenúť aj fakt, že ukrainofilstvo Piotra Šelesta malo zvláštny, sovietsky charakter týkajúci sa národného komunizmu. Budúcnosť Ukrajiny videl v sovietskom systéme, preto nie je divné, že ľudia, ktorí boli proti sovietskej moci, vyvolávali v ňom zúrivosť. Prave v čase jeho vladnutia sa obnovuje „poľovačka na bosorky“ v podobe tzv. ukrajinských buržoáznych nacionalistov. V rokoch 1965 – 1966 sa Ukrajinou prehnala prvá vlna zatýkania disidentov. Šelest bol poznačený krutosťou zachovania „čistoty straníckej línie“. Nie je preto prekvapujúce, že bol horlivým odporcom Západu, poznačený obranou „výdobytkov socializmu v socialistickej tábore“. Zároveň viedol konzervatívne krídlo sovietskeho politbyra a zohral významnú úlohu v organizácii vojenskej agresie do Československa. Všetko, čo sa stalo v Československu na jar 1968, prvý tajomník Komunistickej strany Ukrajiny považoval za otázku „*politických extrémistov, drobných politikov, ktorí túžia po moci na úkor pracovitých ľudí*“.¹ O negatívnom postoji Šelesta k demokratickým reformám v Československu svedčí aj jeho list Ústrednému výboru Komunistickej strany Sovietskeho zväzu 30. mája 1968. V ňom vyjadril obavy týkajúce sa situácie v Československu, a najmä výsledkov „*neobmedzenej demokratizácie*“.²

Šelest bol horlivým stúpencom a aktívnym plniteľom tvrdej línie Kremľa k dramatickým udalostiam v Československu v roku 1968. Zúčastňujúc sa moskovského stretnutia „bratských strán“ 14. júla 1968, Šelest otvorene obvinil KSČ z odchýlenia od socialistickej cesty a hrozil, že sa s Československom bude zaobchádzať „*jednoducho, proletársky*“. Okrem toho si dovoľil nazvať člena československej delegácie Františka Kriegela „Židom z Haliče“, čím podľa svedectiev prítomných vyviedol z miery Alexandra Dubčeka.³ Ten protestujúc proti tomu opustil miestnosť, v ktorej sa konalo stretnutie.

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- 1 Spohady i sčodenni sapysy Petra Šelesta. In: ŠELEST, P.: „*Spravžnij sud istoriji sče poperedu*“. *Spohady, sčodennyky, dokumenty, materialy*. Kyjiv 2004, s. 257.
 - 2 Lyst do CK KPRS pro situaciju v Čechoslovačny vid 30 travnia 1968 r. In: ŠELEST, P.: „*Spravžnij sud istoriji sče poperedu*“. *Spohady, sčodennyky, dokumenty, materialy*, s. 512 – 516.
 - 3 HOHOL, J.: Ukrajina v period «Pražskoj vesny»: vlast' i obsčestvo. In: „*Pražskaja vesna' 1968 goda i sovetskije respubliky. Reakcia vlasti i obsčestva*. Moskva; Grac; Vena; Stavropol'; Rostov-na-Donu 2009, s. 95.

Po ukončení moskovského stretnutia „bratských strán“ zostal postoj Šelesta týkajúci sa udalostí v Československu nezmenený. Vo svojom prejave na pléne ÚV KSSZ 17. júla 1968 vyhlásil, že Sovietsky zväz nemá žiadne „právo bezstarostne sa zachovať k tomu, čo sa odohráva blízko našej západnej hranice – v socialistickom Československu. Aj keď československí vodcovia nechcú mobilizovať stranu a ľudí v boji proti kontrarevolúcií, aby ju neutralizovali, a potom priniesli rozhodujúci úder, musíme im otvorene povedať, že my sa nachádzame na rôznych cestách, a preto sa môžeme ocitnúť na rôznych stranách barikády.“⁴ Zároveň Šelest povedal, že nepriatelia socializmu „musia vedieť, že Sovietsky zväz a jeho priatelia na základe Varšavskej zmluvy nedovolia kontrarevolúcii zničiť komunistickú stranu a národ Československa, a preto musí dokonca splniť povinnosť a brániť socialistické zriadenie československého ľudu“.⁵ Vodca ukrajinských komunistov mal najväčší strach z toho, že „negatívne postoje“ z Československa sa môžu preniesť aj na Ukrajinu. Podľa archívnych materiálov môžeme rekonštruovať, že každý druhý deň podával do Moskvy správu o situácii na hranici.

Negatívny postoj Šelesta k demokratickým zmenám v Československu bol rozhodujúcim pre rozhodnutie politbyra ÚV KSSZ poslať práve jeho na dôverné stretnutie so slovenským komunistom a členom predsedníctva ÚV KSČ Vasilom Biľakom, ktorý plánoval stráviť časť svojej dovolenky v Maďarsku pri Balatone. Toto stretnutie sa konalo 21. júla 1968 a umožnilo Moskve vyriešiť dôležitú otázku, týkajúcu sa žiadosti popredných konzervatívnych funkcionárov KSČ adresovanej Sovietskemu zväzu s prosbou o vojenskú pomoc „bratskému Československu“. Vo svojich pamätiach Šelest napísal, že sa mu podarilo dohodnúť na tom s Vasilom Biľakom.⁶ Nie je preto divné, že vďaka Šelestovi poslal Biľak počas stretnutia najvyšších predstaviteľov šiestich socialistických krajín v Bratislave 3. augusta 1968 list – pozvánku sovietskym súdruhom na vojenskú intervenciu jeho krajiny.

Dôležité je spomenúť, že Šelest si veľmi cenil Biľaka, a preto sa postaral o ochranu jeho rodiny, ktorá okamžite vycestovala na Ukrajinu. Dcéru

4 Promova Petra Šelesta na Plenumi CK KPRS vid 17 lypnja 1968 r.. In: ŠELEST, P.: *“Spravžnij sud istoriji sče poperedu“*. Spohady, sčodennyky, dokumenty, materialy, s. 524.

5 Tamže.

6 ŠELEST, P.: *“Spravžnij sud istoriji sče poperedu“*. Spohady, sčodennyky, dokumenty, materialy, s. 269 – 270.

Bilaka, ktorá sa počas prvých dní okupácie Československa nachádzala v Londýne, sovietska tajná polícia poslala do Kyjeva.

Neskôr sa prvý tajomník Komunistickej strany Ukrajiny zúčastnil aj na dôležitých rokovaníach medzi československým a sovietskym vedením, ktoré sa uskutočnili 29. júla – 1. augusta 1968 v Čiernej nad Tisou. Práve vtedy Šelest otvorene vystúpil a obvinil KSČ zo zrady. Svoj prejav skončil oslovením Dubčeka: „*Nebudte zamilovaní sami do seba, lebo to môže priviesť k prasknutiu bublinky, čiže koniec politickej kariéry, a hlavne môže mať veľké politické a ekonomické následky pre vašu krajinu a pre KSČ.*“⁷ Drsný tón svojej reči vysvetlil tým, že „*chcel verejne vyjadriť to, čo vedel o nich, čo si myslel, čo zodpovedalo skutočným podmienkam v KSČ a krajine.*“⁸ Výsledky rokovaní v Čiernej nad Tisou Šelest hodnotil negatívne. Myslel si, že „*z tohto stretnutia sme nezískali nič, ale iba stratili.*“⁹ Na základe výsledkov rokovaní prvý tajomník Komunistickej strany Ukrajiny zostal zástancom ozbrojeného ukončenia „Pražskej jari“.

Pri tom však nie je potrebné preháňať úlohu Šelesta pri vytváraní a realizácii opatrení na potlačenie „Pražskej jari“. Dokonca aj keď vezmeme do úvahy, že bol naozaj vplyvným politikom, všetky zásadné rozhodnutia boli prijaté najvyšším stranícko-štátnym vedením v Moskve a prvý tajomník ÚV KCU bol len ich aktívnym vykonávateľom.

Je dôležité, že postoj prvého tajomníka Komunistickej strany Ukrajiny nezdieľali všetci komunisti. Dňa 29. júla skupina ukrajinských komunistov pod vedením generála Grigorenka poslala na vyslanectvo Československa list, v ktorom odsudzovali zasahovanie Sovietskeho zväzu do vnútorných záležitostí Československa.¹⁰ To bola výzva vedeniu Komunistickej strany Ukrajiny, pretože odklon od oficiálnej politiky strany mohol ešte viac skomplikovať vzťahy s Moskvou. V snahe vyhnúť sa tomu v budúcnosti, komunistická strana v auguste 1968 začala „celonárodnú“ informačnú kampaň na základe správ Telegrafnej agentúry Sovietskeho zväzu (TASS), v ktorej vojenskú inváziu maskovala ako „bratskú pomoc“ vojsk Varšavskej zmluvy Československu. Táto kampaň sa stala pokračovaním predchádzajúcej informačnej kampane, počas ktorej na stránkach novín a časopisov, v televízii a rozhlasovom vysielaní pripravení agitátori presvedčovali

7 Tamže, s. 275.

8 Tamže.

9 Tamže.

10 ALEXEJEVA, L.: *Istorija inakomyšlja v SSSR. Novejšij period.* Viľnjus; Moskva 1992, s. 214.

obyvateľstvo Ukrajiny o tom, že socialistické Československo sa stalo predmetom „útoku vnútornej reakcie a vonkajších imperialistických síl“ a zároveň že je „ohrozený socializmus v Československu“. ¹¹ Zároveň, podľa žiadosti straníckej elity západnej Ukrajiny sa oddelenie propagandy a agitácie ÚV KPU ešte v máji 1968 obrátilo na oddelenie propagandy ÚV KSSZ s návrhom preskúmať otázku týkajúcu sa obmedzenia prichádzajúcej československej periodickej tlače na územie Sovietskeho zväzu. Toto bolo urobené s jediným cieľom: zastaviť prenikanie informácií o politickej situácii v Československu na Ukrajinu.

Dôležitú pozornosť agitátori venovali zakarpatskej oblasti Ukrajiny, ktorá priamo susedila s Československom. Miestne médiá takmer denne produkovali materiály podporujúce oficiálnu líniu strany, týkajúcu sa udalostí v Československu. V júni 1968 v novinách *Zakarpatská pravda* bol publikovaný otvorený list profesorov, učiteľov a študentov Užhorodskej štátnej univerzity, v ktorom bolo „*odhodlanie podporovať revolučné vymoženosti československého ľudu, stáť na strážni nespochybniteľného zväzku so ZSSR a ďalšími krajinami socialistického spoločenstva, byť verní ideálom marxizmu-leninizmu v otázkach výstavby socializmu a komunizmu*“. ¹² Po pléne ÚV KSSZ v júli a stretnutí delegácií komunistických a robotníckych strán socialistických krajín vo Varšave sa v médiách začala pestovať idea plnej podpory občanov Ukrajiny rozhodnutiu poskytnúť „bratskú pomoc“ vojsk Varšavskej zmluvy Československu. Na pokyn republikánskeho centra boli zorganizované stretnutia regionálnych a mestských straníckych skupín v Záporoží, Lucku, Mykolajove, Poltave, Rivne, Simferopole, Černigove, Chersone, Ternopile ¹³, Ivano-Frankivsku, Kirovohrade, Lvove, Odese a Lugaňsku. ¹⁴ V Užhorode členovia regionálnej a mestskej strany schválili rozhodnutie pléna ÚV KSSZ a vyjadrili presvedčenie, že „*všetky útoky imperializmu budú odrazené a pracovitý ľud Československa obráni dobytie socializmu*“. ¹⁵

Verejná mienka sa aktívne formovala predovšetkým v médiách. Na stránkach republikánskych a regionálnych novín sa zverejňovali listy občanov a pracovných kolektívov, v ktorých sa vyjadrovala podpora

11 Smicnjuvaty posyciji socializmu i myru. In: *Zakarpatska pravda*, 20. 7. 1968, s. 1.

12 Naše partnerstvo neporuše. In: *Zakarpatska pravda*, 26. 7. 1968, s. 1.

13 Odnostajne schvalennja. In: *Zakarpatska pravda*, 21. 6. 1968, s. 1.

14 V obstanovci odnostajnosti i shurtovanosri. In: *Zakarpatska pravda*, 23. 6. 1968, s. 1.

15 Odnostajniš i shurtovanisť. In: *Zakarpatska pravda*, 20. 8. 1968, s. 1.

oficiálnej politike sovietskej moci, odôvodňovala sa účelnosť a aktuálnosť „internacionálnej pomoci“ československému ľudu. V mestách sa začali konať demonštrácie na podporu „bratskej pomoci“ Československu. Na základe údajov v časopise *Zakarpatská pravda*, na Zakarpatsku sa také demonštrácie konali, napr. v Užhorodskej elektrárni¹⁶, Užhorodskej mechanickej továrni, v továrni „Bolševik“, v továrni na výrobu topánok a ďalších podnikoch.¹⁷

Avšak veľká propagandistická kampaň nepriniesla očakávané výsledky. Bezpečnostná služba zaznamenala mnoho názorov ľudí o vojenskej invázii, ktorá by mohla prerásť do novej svetovej vojny. Napríklad vedúca materskej škôlky č. 5 v meste Užhorod v súkromnom rozhovore povedala: „*Dnes je situácia komplikovanejšia než v roku 1956, všetci sú rozhorčení. Počas jednej noci mobilizovali 300 vojakov, 70 zdravotných sestier, veľa lekárov. To je mobilizácia. V roku 1956 konala však len armáda. Bojím sa o manžela. Zobrali ho do armády. Čo keď ho náhodou pošlú do Československa? Tam môže dôjsť ku zrážke.*“¹⁸ Majster perečinskej továrne na nábytok Paško povedal: „*Mnoho ľudí má strach a ide preč zo Zakarpattia. Moja žena má o mňa tiež strach. Musíme čakať horšie udalosti, aké boli v roku 1956 v Maďarsku.*“¹⁹

To znamená, že väčší počet obyvateľov v Zakarpatsku vnímal inváziu vojsk do Československa nie ako obmedzenú vojenskú operáciu, ktorá by mohla neutralizovať konflikt, ale ako rozsiahlu vojenskú akciu s dlhými negatívnymi dôsledkami na politiku a ekonomiku. V konečnom dôsledku sa medzi obyvateľmi krajiny začala šíriť panika. Ako dôkaz svedčí list študentky Užhorodskej štátnej univerzity L. Borovikovej venovaný rodičom, ktorí bývali v meste Kamenec Podolský. V liste je takto charakterizovaná situácia na Zakarpatsku: „*Som v poriadku, keď neberiem do úvahy medzinárodnú situáciu všeobecne a naše vzťahy s Československom zvlášť. Nepreháňam, ale panika je tu hrozná. V obchodoch prázdnota, čiže nie je*

16 Slovo energetykiv. In: *Zakarpatska pravda*, 23. 8. 1968, s. 1.

17 Dopomoha svoječiasna, potrebná. In: *Zakarpatska pravda*, 24. 8. 1968, s. 1.

18 Dopovidna zapyska zastupnyka holovy KDB pry RM URSR B. Šulženka CK KPU pro reakciu naselennja na navčannja vijsk Prykarpatskoho vijskovoho okruhu ta častkovu mobilijaciju oficerskoho, seržantskoho ta rjadovoho skladu vid 29. 7. 1968 r. In: *Z archyiv VUČK–HPU–NKVD–KHB*, roč. 30/31, 2008, č. ½, s. 70 – 71.

19 Tamže, s. 71.

*ani soľ či klobásy.*²⁰ Navyše, pod vplyvom „Pražskej jari“ v Zakarpatskej oblasti medzi maďarskými obyvateľmi sa začalo posilňovať autonomistické hnutie. Ako uvádzal druhý tajomník ústredného výboru Komunistickej strany Ivan Lutak, hlavným cieľom tohto hnutia bolo vytvoriť tzv. „maďarský národný okres“. Je príznačné, že autonomistické myšlienky podporovali nielen zástupcovia maďarskej vedeckej a tvorivej inteligencie, ale aj obyvatelia dedín Zakarpatskej oblasti. Šesť informujúc o tom ÚV KSSZ písal: *„Kolchozníci z dediny Perechrestia z Vinogradovského okresu Zakarpatskej oblasti Komlovci B. A., Sentmyklovši J. S., kandidát na člena KSSZ, a niektorí ďalší kolchozníci, Maďari podľa národnosti, so schválením reagovali na to, že v Československu na programe rokovania je aj národný problém. Podľa ich názoru, bolo by treba upozorniť na problém, týkajúci sa autonómie pre Maďarov aj v Sovietskom zväze.*²¹ Neskôr autonomistické hnutie medzi maďarskými obyvateľmi Zakarpatska kleslo vďaka úsiliu vlády, ktorá sa nezaujímalá o podnecovanie národnostnej otázky v republike.

Nespokojnosť s politikou Kremľa v československej otázke predviedlo aj obyvateľstvo iných území Ukrajiny. Zdravotná sestra infekčnej nemocnice mesta Chmeľnisk Gromová povedala: *„My by sme nemali zasahovať do záležitostí Československa. To by mohlo viesť k vojne. Môže byť hoci čo, ale nie vojna.*²² Jednotliví občania mali antisovietske vyhlásenia a obvinenia proti sovietskej vláde a tiež podporovali udalosti, ktoré sa konali v Československu. Obyvateľ mesta Kolomyja Ivano-Frankovského regiónu Vrubel povedal: *„Ak by naša vláda nezasahovala do vnútorných záležitostí Československa, možno by potom podobnej situácie nebolo.*²³

Charakterizujúc protestné nálady občanov Ukrajiny treba poznamenať, že verejné vystúpenia proti zásahom Moskvy do vnútorných záležitostí Československa na území Ukrajiny neboli. V neposlednom rade to bolo kvôli tomu, že ukrajinské hnutie za ľudské práva sa v tej dobe iba formovalo. Avšak niektorí jednotlivci si dovoľovali vyjadriť nesúhlas s invá-

20 DMYTRUK, V.: Vozrastanije protestnych nastrojenij sredi naselenija Ukrajiny v svjazii s sobytijami 1968 goda v Čechoslovakiji. In: *„Pražskaja vesna“ 1968 goda i sovietskije respubliky. Reakcia vlasti i obsčestva.* Moskva; Grac; Vena; Stavropol'; Rostov-na-Donu 2009, s. 64.

21 DMYTRUK, V.: Prazka vesna i Ukrajina. In: *Z archiviv VUČK–HPU–NKVD–KHB*, roč. 30/31, 2008, č. 1-2, s. 13 – 14.

22 Dopovidna zapyska zastupnyka holovy KDB pry RM URSR B. Šulženka CK KPU, s. 71.

23 Tamže.

ziou vojsk do Československa, ba niekedy ju priamo odsudzovali. Vedúci výskumného oddelenia archívnej správy pri Štátnom archíve v Kyjeve, kandidát historických vied I. Butyč v súkromnom rozhovore povedal: „*To je veľmi zlé pre politickú autoritu našej krajiny vo svete. Ešte nevieme, čím sa to všetko skončí. Neboli sme povinní poslať do Československa ozbrojenú silu. Čo sa tam deje, nevieme. Vieme len to, čo dnes povedali v rozhlase.*“²⁴

Inžinier bezpečnosti Černoveckej továrne Kutin povedal: „*Sovietska vláda urobila politickú chybu, že poslala vojská do Československa. To povedie k tomu, že komunistické hnutie v celom svete bude porazené. Je to rok 1968, nie 1956 a nikto to nechce pochopiť.*“²⁵

Na východnej Ukrajine bezpečnostná služba taktiež zaznamenala nespokojnosť občanov týkajúcu sa invázie vojsk Varšavskej zmluvy do Československa. Lekár Lugaňskej nemocnice na liečbu tuberkulózy Švarcman povedal: „*Odohrala sa skutočná agresia proti Československu, čiže stalo sa to, čo kedysi urobil Hitler.*“²⁶ Učiteľ jednej zo škôl v meste Lugaňsk Cejtlin, Žid, člen komunistickej strany, charakterizoval vojenskú inváziu ako „*skutočnú okupáciu Československa*“.²⁷

Udalosti 1968 v Československu prispeli k aktivizácii národného vedomia občanov Ukrajiny, čo spôsobilo značné obavy ukrajinskej vlády. V informačnom oznámení predsedu KGB pri Rade ministrov Sovietskeho zväzu Nikitčenka sa poukazovalo na to, že „*niektoré nacionalistické elementy v udalostiach v Československu vidia nádej na možnosť získania národnej nezávislosti Ukrajiny v prípade rozdelenia socialistického tábora*“.²⁸ Fakt, že to boli čiastočne opodstatnené obavy, dokladá aj vyjadrenie jedného z obyvateľov mesta Ľvov, inžiniera Baluka, ktorý pri pamätníku

24 Z informácii zastupníka holovy KDB pry RM URSS B.Šulženka CK KPU pro reakciu naselennja respubliky na Zajavu TARS vid 21 serpnja 1968 roku pro vvíd vjisk socialističnych krajín na terytoriju ČSSR vid 22 serpnja 1968 r. In: *Z archiviv VUČK-HPU-NKVD-KHB*, roč. 30/31, 2008, č. ½, s. 83 – 84.

25 Tamže, s. 84.

26 Informacija holovy KDB pry RM URSS V. Nikitčenka CK KPU pro vidguky naselennja respubliky na uvedennja vjisk krajín Varšavskoho dohovoru u Česoslovačynu vid 23 serpnja 1968 r. In: *Z archiviv VUČK-HPU-NKVD-KHB*, roč. 30/31, 2008, č. 1-2, s. 88.

27 Tamže.

28 Informacijne povidomlennja holovy KDB pry RM URSS V. Nikitčenka CK KPU pro aktyvizaciju «nacionalističnych elementiv» v Ukrajinu i zvjasku s podijamy u Česoslovačynu vid 24 serpnja 1968 r. In: *Z archiviv VUČK-HPU-NKVD-KHB*, roč. 30/31, 2008, č. 1-2, s. 90.

sovietskych vojakov povedal: „*Česi sa oslobodzujú od komunistického jarma. Je načase aj nám, Ukrajincom, urobiť to isté. Tu sú pochovaní nie hrdinovia, ale banditi. Skutoční hrdinovia sú v lese, zabíjajú Sovietmi.*“²⁹

Obyvateľ dediny Repužency Zastavnického regiónu Černovického okresu Šmuk v rozhovore povedal, že „*naši kričia o oslobodení iných národov, ale svojich neoslobodzujú. Prečo ukrajinský ľud už päťdesiat rokov prebýva pod jarmom? Pretrvá však rok alebo dva a ukrajinský národ bude slobodný.*“³⁰ Ďalej uviedol, že keby nebolo Rusov, Ukrajinci by žili lepšie.

Bezpečnostná služba počas leta 1968 zaznamenala aktivizáciu činnosti občanov, ktorí boli kedysi odsúdení za protisovietsku činnosť. Otec bývalých členov OUN Baranjuk, obyvateľ Bučačského okresu, región Ternopol, povedal: „*Už to nebude trvať dlho. Keď dožijem zmeny vlády, nemilosrdne sa pomstím.*“³¹ Bývalý člen OUN Zastavnyj, obyvateľ mesta Lvov, uviedol: „*Nad Československom visí strašné nešťastie. Rusi bez upozornenia československej vlády obsadzujú Československo. Česi sa správali veľmi slušne a vyzývali svoj národ nebrániť sa útočníkom, aby sa zabránilo krviprelievaniu.*“³²

Zvláštnu nespokojnosť vo vyššom vedení republiky a bezpečnostnej služby vyvolali nálady medzi ukrajinskými študentmi. Niektorí študenti otvorene vyjadrili podporu svojim vrstovníkom v Čechách a na Slovensku, ktorí stáli na barikádach a obhajovali myšlienky „Pražskej jari“. V podrobnom zápise KGB pri Rade ministrov ZSSR sa uvádzalo, že iba malá skupina študentov „*vyžaduje rozhodné kroky a použitie vojenskej sily*“, zatiaľ čo iní študenti „*pozerajú na to, čo sa deje v Československu s dobročinným záujmom. Oni si ani neuvedomujú, k čomu to môže viesť. Páčia sa im českí študenti, ktorí sa stali veľkou spoločenskou silou. Niektorí dokonca považujú (pravda, hypoteticky) možnosť zopakovať české skúsenosti u nás.*“³³

29 Tamže.

30 Tamže.

31 Dopovidna zapyska zastupnyka holovy KDB pry RM URSR B.Šulženka CK KPU pro reakciu naselennja na navčanja vijsk Prykarpatskoho vijskovoho okruhu ta častkovu mobilijaciju oficerskoho, seržantskoho ta rjadovoho skladu vid 29 lypnja 1968 r. In: *Z archiviv VUČK-HPU-NKVD-KHB*, roč. 30/31, 2008, č. 1-2, s. 72.

32 Z informaciji zastupnyka holovy KDB pry RM URSR B.Šulženka CK KPU pro reakciu naselennja respubliky na Zajavu TARS vid 21 serpnja 1968 roku pro vvid vijsk socialistyčnych krajín na terytoriu ČSSR vid 22 serpnja 1968 r. In: *Z archiviv VUČK-HPU-NKVD-KHB*, roč. 30/31, 2008, č. 1-2, s. 85.

33 DMYTRUK, V.: Vozrastanije protestnych nastrojienij sredi naselennija Ukrajiny v svjazi s sobytijami 1968 goda v Čechoslovakiji, s. 80 – 81.

Štátna propaganda robila všetko možné, aby zmenila postoj ukrajinských študentov na udalosti v Československu. Prvý tajomník Komunistickej strany Ukrajiny Šelest vo svojom prejave na stretnutí študentov a učiteľov Kyjevskej štátnej univerzity, venovanom začiatku školského roka, uviedol rozhodnutie o „vojenskej pomoci československému národu“ ako „extrémny krok“, ktorý bola sovietska vláda donútená podstúpiť, aby zabránila „prechodu Československa do tábora kapitalizmu“. ³⁴ Tento prechod by podľa Šelesta vytvoril skutočnú hrozbu bezpečnosti ostatných socialistických krajín a bezprostredne aj hraniciam Ukrajiny. Vodca ukrajinských komunistov povedal študentom, že „*existenciu kontrarevolučného prúdu v Československu potvrdzuje nielen agresívna antikomunistická propaganda, odsudzujúca všetko, čo dosiahol bratský československý národ počas 20 rokov, ale faktom je aj existencia konšpiračného podzemia, ktoré si chcelo vynútiť antisocialistický prevrat*“. ³⁵ Šelest vyzýval študentov, aby nepodľahli „imperialistickej propagande“, ktorá sa snaží dezorientovať spoločenské aktivity a naopak podporovali oficiálnu líniu strany. Do svojho denníka si hlavný komunista Ukrajiny zaznamenal, že stretnutie so študentmi „*prešlo dobre a bolo absolútne nevyhnutné*“. ³⁶ Avšak, neprijemným prekvapením pre neho bolo, že na druhý deň po stretnutí dostal urážlivý list, v ktorom ho anonymní autori obviňovali, že o Československu klamal. Tón listu, podľa vodcu komunistickej strany, bol nielen hrubý, ale aj obviňujúci jeho osobne, ba aj sovietsky systém všeobecne. ³⁷

Značný záujem vyššieho politického vedenia Ukrajiny spôsobili početné prípady šírenia pohľadníc a proklamácie v súvislosti s vojenskou operáciou na území Československa po celej Ukrajine. Dňa 25. augusta 1968 na hlavnej pošte v Odeze pri triedení pošty bola nájdená pohľadnica, v ktorej bolo: „*Hanba sovietskym agresorom! Ruky preč od Československa! Nech žije národ Československa, ktorý bráni svoju samostatnosť od sovietskych útočníkov! Hanba politickým zlodejom, ktorí vytvárajú čierne diela na území*

34 Promova P. J. Šelesta na zborach studentiv i vykladačiv Kyjivskoho deržavnogo universytetu, prysvjačenych počatku navčalnogo roku vid 3 veresnja 1968 r. In: ŠELEST, P.: „*Spravžnij sud istoriji sčepopeređu*“. *Spohady, sčodennyky, dokumenty, materialy*. Kyjiv 2004, s. 536.

35 Tamže.

36 Spohady i sčodenni sapysy Petra Šelesta In: ŠELEST, P.: „*Spravžnij sud istoriji sčepopeređu*“. *Spohady, sčodennyky, dokumenty, materialy*. Kyjiv 2004, s. 291.

37 Tamže.

suverénneho štátu Československa!³⁸ Aj v dedine Zeliske, Talnovský región, okres Čerkasy, bola 5. septembra 1968 nájdená antisovietska pohľadnica, v ktorej sa odsudzovali akcie KSSZ „na pomoc“ Československu. Písalo sa v nej: „*Ruky preč od československého národa! Občania! Československý národ, ako viete, búril sa proti tyranii a útlaku ľudí, ktorí sa nazývajú komunisti.*“³⁹ Hnev autorov pohľadníc spôsobilo to, že sovietski komunisti „*poslali našich synov vraždiť bratov – Slovanov – Čechoslovákov.*“⁴⁰ Listy proti invázii sovietskych vojsk do Československa sa objavili aj v ďalších okresoch Ukrajiny.⁴¹

Bezpečnostná služba robila monitoring verejnej mienky, týkajúci sa rozhodnutia sovietskej vlády o invázii sovietskych vojsk do Československa. Už počas obdobia 21. – 25. augusta 1968 zaznamenala 681 prípadov negatívnej informácie. Pričom 173 prípadov z nich (25,4 %) bolo priamymi vyjadreniami občanov proti vojenskej invázii a za nezasahovanie do vnútorných záležitostí Československa.⁴² V nasledujúcich dňoch došlo k nárastu počtu kritických poznámok. V období od 21. augusta do 7. septembra 1968 bolo zaznamenaných 1 182 takýchto prípadov. Z toho 303 prípadov (25,8 %) – sú vyjadrenia proti invázii vojakov a zasahovaniu do vnútorných záležitostí Československa. Ak vezmeme do úvahy tieto prípady cez prizmu sociálneho pôvodu, najviac kritický postoj k politike Kremľa bol medzi zamestnancami (168 prípadov) a robotníkmi (105 prípadov).⁴³ Nie je to prekvapujúce, lebo práve sami zástupcovia vedeckej

38 Z informacijného povidomlennja holovy KDB pry RM URSS V. Nikitčenka CK KPU pro vyjavlennja lystivky u m. Odesi vid 27 serpnja 1968 r. In: *Z archiviv VUČK-HPU-NKVD-KHB*, roč. 30/31, 2008, č. 1-2, s. 103 – 104.

39 Z informacijného povidomlennja KDB pry RM URSS CK KPU pro vyjavlennja u s. Zaliske Talnivskoho rajonu Čerkaskoji oblasti lystivky iz sazudžennjam vijskovoho vtorgnennja do ČSSR vid 7–8 veresnja 1968 r. In: *Z archiviv VUČK-HPU-NKVD-KHB*, roč. 30/31, 2008, č. 1-2, s. 110.

40 Tamže.

41 Z informacijného povidomlennja holovy KDB pry RM URSS V. Nikitčenka CK KPU pro rospovsjudžennja lystivok u m. Černivci z protestom proty vtorgnennja radjanskyh vijsk u ČSSR vid 12 veresnja 1968 r. In: *Z archiviv VUČK-HPU-NKVD-KHB*, roč. 30/31, 2008, č. 1-2, s. 116 – 117.

42 Informacijne povidomlennja holovy KDB pry RM URSS V. Nikitčenka CK KPU pro rezultaty monitorynhu hromadskoji dumky sčodo rišennja Uriadu SRSS s pryvodu uvedennja radjanskyh vijsk do ČSSR vid 26 serpnja 1968 r. In: *Z archiviv VUČK-HPU-NKVD-KHB*, roč. 30/31, 2008, č. 1-2, s. 100 – 103.

43 Informacijne povidomlennja holovy KDB pry RM URSS V. Nikitčenka CK KPU s analizom krytyčnych vyslovjuvaň risnych verstv naselennja respubliky ta inozemciv

a tvorivej inteligencie, ktorí patrili do kategórie zamestnancov, najviac vítali reformný kurz československej politiky, vidiac v ňom cestu vývoja demokratických procesov na Ukrajine. Ako uvádza historik Vladimír Dmitruk, vysvetľujúci nálady charakteristické pre ukrajinskú inteligenciu, nemali by sa v tejto súvislosti používať len v spoločnosti známe mená významných osobností na poli vedy a kultúry. Naozaj, v rôznych odvetviach ukrajinskej inteligencie – medzi učiteľmi, lekármi či inžiniermi – bolo veľa nezávisle zmýšľajúcich ľudí, ktorí nielen analyzovali udalosti „Pražskej jari“, ale sa aj snažili zdieľať svoje myšlienky a úvahy s ostatnými.⁴⁴ To bolo impulzom pre rozvoj ukrajinského opozičného hnutia. Prave na základe „Pražskej jari“ sa v ukrajinskej spoločnosti postupne presadzovala idea možnosti skutočných zmien v totalitnom sovietskom systéme. Táto idea našla svoj obraz v rôznych formách prejavu nespokojnosti: od otvoreného odsúdenia zasahovania do vnútorných záležitostí Československa až po šírenie pohľadníc. Po udalostiach „Pražskej jari“ 1968 sa ukrajinské opozičné hnutie preorientovalo politickým smerom na ochranu a dodržiavanie ľudských práv.

Ukrajinská moc, podľa Kremľa, udalosti v Československu roku 1968 vnímala ako „*kontrarevolučnú vzburu bloku pravicových revizionistických a antisocialistických síl*“. Uvedenie vojsk do Československa považovali ukrajinské komunistické orgány za „bratskú pomoc“ československému národu pri ochrane socializmu. Napriek všetkým úsiliam úradov, odôvodnenie invázie vojsk do Československa vzbudilo v ukrajinskej spoločnosti pochybnosti. Časť spoločnosti videla v tomto násilnom akte tlak na Československo a rozchod s princípmi demokracie, zaistenia ľudských práv a slobôd. Nesúhlas s oficiálnou politikou Kremľa ukázalo veľa obyvateľov Ukrajiny. Prejavy nesúhlasu boli rôzne, pričom tie najvýznamnejšie sa zamerali na otvorené odsúdenie zasahovania do vnútorných záležitostí Československa.

u zvjasku z podijamy u Čechoslovačny vid 12 veresnja 1968 r. In: *Z archiviv VUČK–H–PU–NKVD–KHB*, roč. 30/31, 2008, č. 1-2, s. 111 – 116.

44 DMYTRUK, V.: *Vozrastanije protestnych nastrojenij sredi naselenija Ukrajiny v svjazi s sobytijami 1968 goda v Čechoslovakiji*, s. 79 – 80.

Summary

Ukrainian government headed by the first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Petr Shelest saw “the counterrevolutionary mutiny of the right revisionist block and anti-socialist forces” in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Thus, the bringing of the WTO troops to Czechoslovakia was interpreted by the communists as the brotherly assistance to the Czechoslovakian people in the defence of the socialism gains. However, despite all the efforts of the authorities, the arguments for the troops bringing to Czechoslovakia arouse doubts in Ukrainian society, whose leading representatives considered the pressure on Czechoslovakia to be a departure from the democracy principles, human rights and freedoms. As a result, the general public of Ukraine expressed disagreement with the official Kremlin line. There were different dissent displays, mostly, the direct condemnation of the interference into the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, distribution of leaflets and proclamations with the relevant content.

Underground Independent Students' Association (NZS) at Warsaw University (1982 – 1989)

Patryk PLESKOT

Several years after martial law had been imposed, Warsaw University (Uniwersytet Warszawski: UW) became one of the most vibrant and important milieus of the underground Independent Students' Association (*Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów*, NZS). Over the years it became evident that the student opposition in the 1980s was a true springboard for political and media careers. This is where Katarzyna Piekarska, Paweł Piskorski, Joanna Kluzik-Rostkowska, Paweł Lisicki and Mariusz Kamiński took their first steps. Moreover, by 1989 it was the NZS – as it seems – that was more active and more determined in the fight against the drab reality of the 1980s than the “adult” opposition of “Solidarity”.

It should be stressed that many members of the movement dismiss any talk of the so-called “second NZS” (i.e. the underground period of its activity). In Warsaw (and in many other academic centres), by the spring of 1989 this “second NZS” was rather a conglomerate of mutually independent, unconnected student groups that simply referred to the flag, the myth or the symbols of NZS. Initially, these were small groups of enthusiasts who on their own established underground cells and called them NZS.¹

At Warsaw University we can discern several groups, “generation” waves, of which each regarded itself as the true “second NZS”. We should bear in mind that any “periodization” is even more difficult as we speak of

1 PLESKOT, P. – SPĄLEK, R.: Wstęp. In: *Pokolenie 82/90. Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim we wspomnieniach (1982–1990)*. Warsaw 2011, p. 9.

an amorphous organization, which until March 1988 was not formalized and did not even have a list of members. By that time, practically anyone could have been an NZS activist, anyone who felt so and who established contact with a group or set it up themselves.²

During martial law the institutional activity of student opposition at the University virtually dropped to zero. Until the mid-1980s there were individual activists that came from the original NZS (e.g. Wojciech Świdnicki) or those who entered University during 1982 – 1984. Some of them worked non-institutionally (e.g. Krzysztof Czuma, Andrzej Szozda), others created “resting” structures of the Association (e.g. Jan Szczerba, Paweł Porucznik) – primarily the clandestine NZS board of Józef Piłsudski Warsaw University (in late 1983). At that time the most active milieu of the University was the Department of Law.³

An event that galvanized the Warsaw students who were determined to actively oppose the system and that made possible the establishment of broader contacts was the death on 14 May 1983 of a secondary school student, Grzegorz Przemyski, who had been beaten up by militiamen two days before. His funeral on 19 May was attended by around 13,000 people and became a formative moment of the NZS generation in Warsaw.⁴ Six months later, most likely in December, a group consisting of several people was formed at the Department of Law and it set up the underground, clandestine board of the Independent Students’ Association of Józef Piłsudski Warsaw University (thus referring to the pre-war name of the University). The board members were: Radosław Świtkiewicz, Witek Przytocki, Wojtek Świdnicki, Paweł Porucznik and Janek Szczerba, as well as Michał Bichniewicz from the Warsaw University of Technology. The first three had already been active in the legal NZS before 13 December 1981, with the others representing the younger students.⁵

In the following months two separate events significantly influenced the activity of the students’ opposition at the University. The first, the kidnapping (and, later, murder) of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko on 19 October 1984 by the Security Service (*Służba Bezpieczeństwa*, SB) stimulated

2 Authorized account of Wojciech Świdnicki, 13 March 2009.

3 PLESKOT, P. – SPAŁEK, R.: Wstęp, p. 9, pp. 13 – 14.

4 WIERZBICKI, M.: *Niezależne ugrupowania młodzieżowe w Polsce lat osiemdziesiątych*. In: KAMINSKI, Ł. – WALIGÓRA, G. (eds.): *NSZZ Solidarność 1980 – 1989. Vol. 7: Wokół Solidarności*. Warsaw 2010, p. 365.

5 Authorized account of Jan Szczerba, 4 March 2009.

the organization by students of vigil groups. After the Father's funeral, on 3 November, they became guards at his grave.⁶ Just like Przemysk's death, the experience can be considered another formative element of the generation. Several months later, on 24 July 1985, the Sejm of the People's Republic of Poland adopted a restrictive law on higher education, which politicized the election of university authorities, radically narrowed the scope competence of students' self-government bodies, and closed inter-departmental study groups.⁷ These restrictions facilitated the development of illegal areas of activity, including that of the Independent Students' Association.

The mid-1980s brought increased activity in student opposition and its radicalization. This development was connected with the influx of new generations, most of them from the Department of History (primarily Mariusz Kamiński, Andrzej Papierz and Piotr Ciompa). The link between the “young” and the “old” was the legal student Tomasz Ziemiński – an informal leader of the University NZS during 1986–1988 – who took over the helm of the J[ózef] P[iłsudski] UW NZS clandestine board.⁸

The radicalization brought the first results: on 1 July 1986, the first “kadrówka” (“cadre demo”) was organized in the Old Town. It was a short, spectacular street demonstration that consisted of a swift march by several people who carried banners and shouted anti-communist slogans. Having covered a short distance, the group dispersed. Such brief and rapid actions made it difficult for the militia and the Security Service to intervene.⁹ Also at that time, there developed other kinds of street actions, such as throwing leaflets or doing graffiti. The role of the underground student press also grew. Among the most important titles were: *Kurier Akademicki*, *Międzyuczelniany Informator Środowiskowy (MIŚ)*, *Nurt Przegląd Wiadomości Agencyjnych – PWA*, and *Serwis Informacyjny – Centrum Informacji Akademickiej (CIA)*.¹⁰

6 PLESKOT, P. – SPAŁEK, R.: Wstęp, p. 14; cf. KINDZIUK, M.: *Książd Jerzy Popiełuszko*. Warsaw 2009.

7 PLESKOT, P. – RUTKOWSKI, T. P.: Wstęp. In: *Spętana Akademia. Polska Akademia Nauk w dokumentach władz PRL, Vol. 2: Materiały partyjne (1950 – 1986)*. Warsaw 2011, p. 14.

8 Authorized account of Jan Szczerba, 4 March 2009.

9 PLESKOT, P. – SPAŁEK, R.: Wstęp, p. 14.

10 ANUSZ, A.: *NZS 1980–2000. Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów, czyli nie ma sukcesu bez NZS-u*. Warsaw 2000, pp. 57 – 58.

Alongside the increased activity characteristic of NZS cells all over Poland, the first attempts were made permanently to coordinate the activities of student opposition in different cities. Initially, the most important illegal opposition structure at the Warsaw University – the NZS UW im. JP – remained isolated from these tendencies. On 10 January 1987, in the dormitory of Warsaw University of Technology in Narutowicza Square, a meeting of representatives of NZS organizations from Wrocław, Cracow, Łódź, Katowice and Radom was held. Warsaw was represented only by the Warsaw University of Technology. The meeting, later called *The Second Congress of the Independent Students' Association* (the reference was to the first legal Congress of April 1981), approved the election of members of the NZS National Commission (the so-called “krajówka”) previously carried out at 21 higher education institutions.¹¹

The University NZS decided not to be passive. As part of a counter-offensive, over a month later, on 17 February 1987, it established the so-called “NZS Union”, that is, a forum of NZS milieus of Warsaw-based higher education institutions: Warsaw University, the University of Physical Education, the Warsaw University of Life Sciences, and the Main School of Planning and Statistics. The first violin of this otherwise loose structure was NZS UW im. JP (at that time the term “im. JP” was being dropped as a result of the generational changes in the clandestine board).¹²

Meanwhile, on 4 April 1987, the first session of the newly appointed NZS National Commission was held in Cracow, which decided that the basis of the Association’s activity would be its statute adopted in 1981. Therefore, the National Commission re-adopted its original name National Coordinating Commission.¹³ The student opposition milieus at the UW were contemplating with increasing determination domination over the Commission organ.

John Paul II’s third pilgrimage to Poland during 8–14 June 1987 was probably the turning point in the consolidation and the “headcount” of student opposition milieus. Unlike the pilgrimage of 1983, student groups were visible and very active. Practically in every place visited by the Holy

11 Ibid., pp. 27 – 29.

12 Authorized account of Tomasz Ziemiński, 4 February 2009.

13 ANUSZ, A.: NZS 1980 – 2000. *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów*, p. 2.

Father, one could see NZS and “Solidarity” banners, which was documented in photographs published in the foreign and underground press.¹⁴

Another generation of the illegal Association's activists, the youngest, entered universities during 1987–1989 (among them Paweł Piskorski and Marcin Meller); this was at a time of more intense activity (chiefly in the form of demonstrations, happenings and rallies), but also of more marked ideological rifts. The University began to be associated with the left. Some conservative leaders of NZS structures in the country (e.g. Ryszard Czarnecki of Wrocław and Jerzy Bogaczyk of Lublin) became involved in a sharp ideological controversy with the NZS UW.¹⁵ But one should bear in mind that the latter was far more ideologically diverse than its opponents would have wished. Some “freelance” activists from the University, such as Andrzej Szozda or Krzysztof Czuma, did collaborate with Czarnecki and his circle.¹⁶

It was then that the national structures of the Association became more stable, and three fundamental events took place: the “coming out” of some members of the NZS UW leaders (in March 1988) and the two student strikes of May and August 1988. Earlier on, in late November 1987, there was probably the first anti-system demonstration, carried out by the NZS in connection with the state referendum. In the same month, some chairs of student study groups at Warsaw University, dominated by people associated with the NZS, published the appeal “Save the BUW [i.e. Warsaw University Library]” in the underground press. It was the beginning of a broad action to save the university library (by collecting funds, organizing street happenings, etc.).¹⁷ These initiatives were carried out before 1989. They were an example of the “organic work” of the Warsaw NZS.

These ideological arguments and the rivalry of different student opposition groups led to a rift within the NZS at the national level. Between 15 November 1987 and 28 March 1988 there were two presidia of the NZS National Coordinating Commission that issued separate and contradictory

14 DUDEK, A – GRYZ, K.: *Komuniści i Kościół w Polsce (1945–1989)*. Kraków 2006, p. 430; Jan Paweł II na Zamku Królewskim. In: *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, 1987, No. 215, p. 1; Archive of Institute of National Remembrance (further only A IPN), 1585/3899, *Meldunek dotyczący wstępnych watykańskich ocen wizyty Jana Pawła II w Polsce*, 15 June 1987, pp. 31 – 32.

15 Authorized account of Robert Pastryk, 15 December 2008.

16 Authorized account of Krzysztof Czuma, 25 November 2008.

17 PLESKOT, P. – SPAŁEK, R.: *Wstęp*, p. 15.

communiqués. Finally, several months later, agreement was reached and the decision to appoint the chairman (Wojciech Bogaczyk of Lublin) and the spokesman of the NZS Commission (Ryszard Czarnecki of Wrocław) was nullified as it was not accepted by all milieus.¹⁸

The controversies and conflicts did not hinder increasingly mass and open activity, related to the progressive liberalization of the system and in the wake of the “adult” opposition that launched more and more semi-open initiatives. On 19 February 1988 the NZS UW organized a rally in the University yard (the so-called “trial rally”) in protest against price rises. The student opposition wanted to test its mobilization potential before its planned “coming out” (following “Solidarity’s” example), which had been the subject matter of discussion for several months. The rally turned out to be a success, as it gathered around 1,500 people.¹⁹ It was the first NZS action on a mass scale since martial law was introduced.

On 8 March 1988, the University authorities declared “rector’s day”. At the rally to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the protests of March 1968, over 2,000 people turned up. The catchword of the day was: “NZS is back”. It was then that – in accordance with the resolution of the clandestine NZS UW board – a ten-person group came out; it later called itself the Warsaw University NZS Founding Committee, soon referred to as “the ten”. The Committee members were: Andrzej Anusz, Anna Gosiewska, Mariusz Kamiński, Wojciech Lewicki, Paweł Lisicki, Andrzej Papierz, Robert Pastryk, Cezary Sobieszczak, Aleksander Wolicki and Lech Zakrzewski.²⁰ At the same time, there was still a clandestine NZS UW board, then made up of Piotr Ciompa, Marek Gessel, Mariusz Kamiński and Tomasz Ziemiński, with Piotr Skwieciński joining them two months later.²¹ Therefore, in practice there were two bodies that aspired to the leadership of the Warsaw organization.

At the strike rally, the NZS programmatic declaration was read out, as well as the application to register the Association, which was to be filed

18 KOZŁOWSKI, T.: *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów 1980–1989*. In: KAMINSKI, Ł. – WALIGÓRA, G. (eds.): *NSZZ Solidarność 1980–1989. Vol. 7: Wokół Solidarności*. Warsaw 2010, pp. 279 – 280; ANUSZ, A.: *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów w latach 1980 – 1989*, pp. 63 – 65.

19 Kalendarium walki. In: *Kurier Akademicki*, October–November 1989, p. 2.

20 KOZŁOWSKI, T.: *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów w latach 1980 – 1989*, pp. 73 – 74; ANUSZ, A.: *NZS 1980–2000*, pp. 30 – 31.

21 Authorized account of Tomasz Ziemiński, 4 February 2009.

with the Warsaw-Center District Office. That day 899 people joined the Association (soon the number rose to as many as 2,000). At night, after a mass in St Ann's Church, students formed a procession that marched towards Adam Mickiewicz's monument. The demonstration was brutally quashed by the militia and the riot police (the ZOMO), with many protesters severely beaten up. Two weeks later, on 21 March, the district office rejected the application to register NZS UW.²²

Despite that, since their coming out, the Association's activists were involved in semi-open activity. It manifested itself in sales of underground publications (newspapers, books, badges) on Warsaw University premises from March 1988 onwards. Several weeks later, the tables that displayed underground publications were moved to the University gate.²³

May 1988 was a turning point in the activity of the University's NZS. It was then that it held an occupation strike (the first one in seven years) to express solidarity with the protesting workers of Nowa Huta and the Gdańsk Shipyard. Thus on 4 May at 1.00 p.m. a rally began, which turned into a strike several hours later. Controversy regarding the ending or continuation of the strike soon led to rifts within the Strike Committee itself, established specially within the Founding Committee (the open "ten"), and between "the ten" and the clandestine board. Ultimately, the strike was extended for one night and ended on 5 May. According to the underground NZS newspaper, *Kurier Akademicki*, between 3,000 and 5,000 students took part.²⁴

Between 17 August and 1 September the NZS UW, despite internal quarrels and the summer holidays, organized another solidarity strike to support the workers. This time it was not an occupation strike. At the same time many street happenings and demonstrations (virtually every day from 22 to 31 August) were organized. On 25 August, armed military patrols appeared in front of the University gate.²⁵ With the new academic year, street actions, pickets and rallies were organized, as well as happenings inspired by the Wrocław Orange Alternative or sittings modelled after the Freedom and Peace movement. At the same time, NZS – at least in Warsaw – was more agile than "Solidarity" and other factions of the

22 KOZŁOWSKI, T.: *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów*, pp. 283 – 284; ANUSZ, A.: *NZS 1980 – 2000*, pp. 31 – 32.

23 Authorized account of Krzysztof Czuma, 25 November 2008.

24 *Kalendarium walki*, p. 2.

25 PLESKOT, P. – SPAŁEK, R.: *Wstęp*, p. 16.

“adult” opposition, closely collaborating with various milieus such as KPN (Confederation of the Independent Poland) or PPS (Polish Socialist Party). Among the most important initiatives was the boycott of the compulsory student military training. On 4 October, in the small yard of the University, NZS UW organized a rally that called for a boycott, with 600 people participating.²⁶

Parallel to these events, there was a fight for influence in the Association’s national structures. During 9–11 September 1988, at the Gdańsk St. Bridget’s Church, the III NZS Congress was held. It elected the open National Coordinating Commission, but given the deadlock that arose between the key strands in the organization, the decision was made not to appoint the NZS chairman. Nevertheless, the Congress revealed the growing influence of the NZS UW, which began to play a key role in the Commission (chiefly in the person of Tomasz Ziemiński). Present were 33 activists from Gdańsk, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Szczecin, Toruń, Warsaw and Wrocław.²⁷ As a result, at the beginning of the 1988–1989 academic year, at most Polish higher education institutions, open NZS organization committees began to operate, often combined with the coming out of the so-called clandestine boards of the Association. The National Coordinating Commission began activity that was marked with some bad luck: as early as 24 September, in Tomasz Ziemiński’s flat, the SB arrested Commission members who were in a meeting. However, those arrested were not subjected to any major repression.²⁸

Soon afterwards, on 11 October 1988, the clandestine NZS UW board decided to make itself open. That day the Academic Intervention Bureau was established, whose task was to transfer information to families and independent media about repressive activities against students and high-school students, as well as to organize collections for fines and secure legal aid. The head of the Bureau was Paweł Piskorski, a sophomore history student.²⁹

Even more open NZS activities were accompanied by attempts to legalize the Association. Three days after the coming out of the clandestine board of the UW, the National Coordinating Commission (formally

26 KOZŁOWSKI, T.: *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów*, p. 289; *Kalendarium walki*, p. 4.

27 KOZŁOWSKI, T.: *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów*, pp. 286 – 287; ANUSZ, A.: *NZS 1980 – 2000, Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów*, pp. 85 – 88.

28 PLESKOT, P. – SPAŁEK, R.: *Wstęp*, pp. 16 – 17.

29 Authorized account of Paweł Piskorski, 15 May 2000 and 2 June 2009.

appearing as the National NZS Organization Committee) filed another application at the Warsaw Municipal Office to register the Independent Students' Association. On 8 November it was rejected. Despite the appeal filed with the Minister of the Interior, Gen. Czesław Kiszczak, the decision was upheld. On 31 December 1988, Gen. Kiszczak again categorically refused to legalize the Association.³⁰ The decisions of the authorities did not halt preparations for elections to the Departmental NZS Commissions, and later to the NZS UW Commission scheduled for the autumn and winter of 1988. Similar efforts were also undertaken in other higher education institutions all over the country.³¹

Arguably, 1989 turned out to be the most tumultuous year in the history of NZS underground structures. On the one hand, it brought a renewed legalization of the Association (in September) and a rapid rise in membership, and on the other, it was a time of protests (notably the May strike) and of the growing marginalization of student opposition, as NZS was largely excluded from the “round table” negotiations.

Initially, there were not many omens that events would take such a turn. On 18 December 1988, Tomasz Ziemiński, the leader of the Warsaw (and in fact national) NZS, became one of the founders of the Citizens' Committee initiated by the chairman of “Solidarity” in Gdańsk. Lech Wałęsa assured students that NZS was the “third leg” of the opposition, next to “Solidarity” and the farmers. During 3–27 January 1989, the first democratic elections (since 13 December 1981) within the NZS at Warsaw University were held. Several weeks later, the inter-university Coordinating Commission of the NZS was established, which brought together eight Warsaw-based higher education institutions (including two rivals, the University of Technology and Warsaw University).³² The organization seemed to be moving ahead.

The first sign of the Association's diminishing role was the preparations for the round table talks. Since January, there had been heated debates within the student opposition in Warsaw (and beyond) as to whether the NZS should take part in the planned negotiations. Some activists believed that the Association should not become involved in any kind of talks with the communists, while others were afraid of being instrumentally

30 ANUSZ, A.: NZS 1980 – 2000, *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów*, p. 99.

31 PLESKOT, P. – SPAŁEK, R.: *Wstęp*, p. 17.

32 *Kalendarium walki*, p. 4.

treated by the authorities and the opposition.³³ Ultimately, NZS received no mandate to take part in the plenary “round table” talks but only to have informal participation in several so-called “subtables”. Only on the last day of the talks (5 April) was the Association invited to sign the agreement between a part of the opposition and the authorities. Having no real influence on the course of the talks, the proposal was turned down by the NZS “krajówka”.³⁴

The round table talks deeply affected politically active students. The general sentiment was that NZS had been sidetracked. Activists wavered between manifesting their discontent and becoming involved in the election campaign on the side of “Solidarity”, despite their disenchantment and grievances. This attitude was highlighted by two demonstrations that began their march from Warsaw University and the Warsaw University of Technology on 20 April 1989, and which combined in a joint demonstration under the Palace of Culture and Sciences, leading to a national day of protest organized at the request of the NZS National Coordinating Commission.³⁵ It was a symbolic end of antagonisms between the two Warsaw universities.

In a heated atmosphere of disenchantment combined with excitement to do with the forthcoming election, on 22 April and 6 May in Warsaw and Sopot, respectively, two rounds of the IV Extraordinary NZS Congress were held. It was the first meeting (since the I Congress of 1981) in which all the country’s academic centres were represented. A total of 124 delegates from 76 higher education institutions (from 22 cities) took part. During the April session the Congress adopted a resolution that left the decision to vote in the June Sejm and Senate election up to the “conscience of the members”. At the same time, the Congress members appealed for organizational help in the opposition’s election campaign. During the second round of the Congress (in Sopot), the type of legal personality of NZS was decided – the registration application was to be filed only by the National Coordinating Commission, not individual university organizations. About a quarter of the delegates filed their *votum separatum*.³⁶ Heated debates

33 ANUSZ, A.: *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów w latach 1980 – 1989*, pp. 100 – 106.

34 PLESKOT, P. – SPAŁEK, R.: Wstęp, pp. 17 – 18.

35 Kalendarium walki, p. 6.

36 *Ibid.*; ANUSZ, A.: *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów w latach 1980 – 1989*, pp. 107 – 111.

were a clear symptom of controversy, anxiety and discord as to the role and organization of the Association in a rapidly changing political reality.

Meanwhile, on 23 May 1989, the Provincial Court in Warsaw again rejected the Association's application to register, although a month before "Solidarity" had been legalized. On the same day, NZS members from Warsaw University and Warsaw University of Technology proclaimed, in their institutions, occupation strikes in protest against the refusal to register the Association. The following day, the Medical Academy and the Warsaw University of Life Sciences joined in, and the Academy of Music, the Academy of Fine Arts and the Theater Academy proclaimed warning strikes. On 26 May the Warsaw University Białystok Branch joined the strike. Such a broad mobilization marked the difference from the strikes of 1988. This time, however, fewer students took part, and NZS had evident problems mobilizing its members. The same was the case in other cities. Soon the lack of backup structures became clear, and the fate of the strike itself was uncertain. In order to get out of this embarrassing situation, on 30 May the NZS National Strike Committee suspended strikes all over Poland, claiming that the protests could be used by [government] propaganda against "Solidarity" candidates in the coming parliamentary election.³⁷

The Independent Students' Association was not registered until 22 September 1989, ten days after the formation and swearing in of Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government. During 24–26 November V NZS Congress was held, which elected the first formal chairman of the Association since 1981. The chairman was Paweł Piskorski.³⁸ At that time it was becoming increasingly evident that NZS would play no significant role on the Polish political scene.

To sum up, one could discern the following NZS groups at Warsaw University and the periods of their most intense activity:

- I. The underground NZS of Józef Piłsudski Warsaw University (1983–1986/1987) – the so-called "clandestine board" (several friends and acquaintances); in the early years it was actually almost the entire NZS "organization" at the University (dominated by legal students).

37 Kalendarium walki, p. 6; KOZŁOWSKI, T.: *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów*, p. 295.

38 ANUSZ, A.: *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów w latach 1980 – 1989*, p. 130.

- II. The underground and open NZS UW (1986 – 1988/1989) – the clandestine board and later the “organizational committee” and the open board of the “organization” were dominated by historians.
- III. The “young” NZS UW (since 1989/1990) – an openly operating organization, with its head taken over by Paweł Piskorski, who in 1990 became chairman of the national NZS (there was no chairman during 1982 – 1990).

In practice, there was only a weak link of “institutional” continuity between the underground NZS and its second “generation” at Warsaw University, although both milieus increasingly intermingled. One could venture to say that those were “different NZSs” at the same University. On the other hand the transition from the second to the third NZS “generation” was quite smooth. But we should bear in mind that it was accompanied by animated controversies and rifts within the university milieu.³⁹

Following the systemic transformation, NZS became increasingly marginal. It failed to take the route of the Hungarian FIDESZ, a student organization that was able to transform into one of the most important political parties in Hungary, and held on to power for many years.⁴⁰ In the Polish case, the attractiveness of newly formed “adult” political formations was stronger than the desire to transform NZS into a political power. Today, NZS is merely one of many – and not the most important – student organizations. Why it happened this way remains an open question. It is beyond any doubt that the structural student opposition of the 1980s was one of the most important anti-communist movements in Poland. It was also in NZS that many of today’s prominent politicians started their public (but clandestine!) activity. However, after 1989 they did not act under the auspices of NZS.

Resumé

Autor v článku popisuje aktivity študentskej organizácie Nezávislé združenie študentov, ktoré na platforme antikomunizmu pôsobilo v Poľsku v 80. rokoch. Jadro hnutia pôsobilo na Varšavskej univerzite, malo však

39 PLESKOT, P. – SPAŁEK, R.: Wstęp, p. 17.

40 This difference was pointed out by Paweł Piskorski. See authorized account of Paweł Piskorski, 2 June 2009.

svoje pobočky po celom Poľsku. Viditeľnou aktivitou boli rôzne demonštrácie, ktoré organizovali študenti v druhej polovici 80. rokov v poľských mestách. Združenie prešlo počas svojho pôsobenia viacerými fázami, od podzemnej činnosti cez polooficiálnu až po faktickú legalizáciu na konci 80. rokov. Počas prechodu na demokraciu však toto hnutie zostalo na okraji diania. Na činnosti združenia sa aktívne podieľali mnohí budúci poľskí politici.

On the Path to Freedom. Underground “Solidarity” Structures in the Capital of Poland during Martial Law (1981 – 1983). Genesis, Activity and its Consequences

Tadeusz RUZIKOWSKI

The consent of the authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland (*Polska Rzeczypospolita Ludowa*, PRL) to the formation of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” (*Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy “Solidarność,” NSZZ “Solidarność”*) in August 1980, and the union’s activity, were unique for a communist bloc country.¹ The prospect of building a new independent trade union occasioned great social organizational enthusiasm in that direction. It was realized through various undertakings, not only those directly associated with the tasks of a trade union (e.g. it was due to censorship that independent meetings with artists and factory libraries of non-censored books were also organized under

1 Almost from the moment of its establishment, “Solidarity” became an object of interest, not only to historians. The first monograph of the trade union had already been published in 1983 in the second publication circulation (HOLZER, J., “*Solidarność*” 1980 – 1981. *Geneza i historia*. Warsaw, 1983). Soon, Western researchers also took up the topic of Solidarity in their publications. DE WEYDENTHAL, J. B. – PORTER, B. D. – DEVLIN, K.: *The Polish Drama 1980–1982*. Lexington 1983; ASH, T. G.: *The Polish Revolution: “Solidarity”*. Stoughton 1985. The publication was also published in Poland in the second publication circulation (ASH, T. G.: *Polska rewolucja. Solidarność* (1987)). The books recently published in Poland include: the concise study by Ryszard Terlecki (TERLECKI, R.: „*Solidarność*”. *Dekada nadziei 1980 – 1989*. Warsaw 2010) and a multi-volume study on Solidarity’s history entitled *NSZZ „Solidarność” 1980 – 1989* (See e.g. KAMINSKI, Ł. – WALIGÓRA, G. (eds.): *NSZZ „Solidarność” 1980 – 1989, vol. 2. Ruch Społeczny*. Warsaw 2010). In this article, I use full names of organizations and then refer to their acronyms.

the aegis of “Solidarity”). “Solidarity” brought together various milieus: workers, farmers and intellectuals. It was also a social movement. In the late 1980s its membership reached about 9 million, which made up for approximately 54% of the total number of people employed in the so-called socialized, i.e. nationalized economy.² The number of “Solidarity” members was a few times bigger than that of the ruling United Polish Workers’ Party (*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*, PZPR), which had about 3 million members. The “Solidarity” Mazowsze Region (part of the countrywide trade union structure), which included Warsaw, covered the largest area (it comprised a few provinces) and had the second highest number of members (almost 1 million). Figure 1 shows the “Solidarity” Mazowsze Region.

Figure 1

“Solidarity” Mazowsze Region in 1981. (Source: Author’s own material)



2 PACZKOWSKI, A.: *Pół wieku dziejów Polski 1939–1989*. Warsaw 2000, p. 479.

The period of the trade union's legal activity (the so-called "carnival of Solidarity") was brutally interrupted by the Citizens' Militia and the army, which took part in the PRL authorities' imposition of martial law on 13 December 1981. In fact, the operation had already begun on the night of 12th to 13th December (Saturday to Sunday) after several months of preparation.³ From the beginning of "Solidarity", the PRL authorities regarded the trade union as a threat to the regime. Consequently, they consistently tried to destroy it. Martial law was the ultimate realization of that intention, as it helped destroy its legal structures. At first, in December 1981 the PRL Authorities formally "suspended" the trade union, only to de-legalize it later on. As a result of the action of the so-called internments ("Jodła" action), many "Solidarity" leaders were in fact illegally detained under the pretext of merely the potential danger the authorities thought they posed to the PRL regime. About 10,000 people were interned in Poland at various periods during martial law, some on several occasions. They were placed in special facilities, usually located in penitentiaries and jails (e.g. in Warsaw-Białołęka). Despite the draconian punishments – including the death penalty – introduced in the martial law decree, many trade union members decided to fight for "Solidarity", as that trade union was identified with real freedom. It was the beginning of illegal, so-called underground "Solidarity". The adjective "underground" was actually a reference to the various forms of organized social resistance practised by the Poles during the German and Soviet occupation during World War II.⁴ The war generation's experience at conspiracy proved useful in many cases. The younger generation of "Solidarity" learned from it.

To protect "Solidarity" and to protest against martial law, the trade union members from Warsaw and other places initially resorted to a familiar and available weapon - strikes and protests - as they had often been practised. Most of them started on 14th December (Monday), but in some places the organizational activity had already commenced on

3 PACZKOWSKI, A.: *Wojna polsko-jaruzelska. Stan wojenny w Polsce 13 XII 1981 – 22 VII 1983*. Warsaw 2006, p. 55. It features a concise, as of then, literature overview concerning Solidarity and the martial law. See also: DUDEK, A. (ed.): *Stan wojenny w Polsce 1981–1983*. Warsaw 2003.

4 There are many studies on the activity of the underground Solidarity (HOLZER, J. – LESKI, K.: *Solidarność w podziemiu*. Łódź 1990; and DUDEK, A. (ed.): *Stan wojenny w Polsce 1981–1983*. Warsaw 2003). See also: RUZIKOWSKI, T.: *Stan wojenny w Warszawie i województwie stołecznym 1981 – 1983*. Warsaw 2009.

the previous day (e.g. in the Warsaw Steelworks). The ardour of many protesters was to be damped by the publically announced draconian punishments introduced by the martial law decree and by the numerous detachments of armed soldiers and Citizens' Militia functionaries with their equipment displaying force near the factories on strike. In a number of cases, the pressure proved successful, as many protesters gave up as a result. Strikes and protests in the capital generally had a passive character. Active resistance was desisted, which was in accord with "Solidarity's" spirit, as its methods of action excluded violence. The authorities soon managed to quash even the biggest protests in the largest Warsaw factories using the army (which only displayed force outside the factories) and the Citizens' Militia (which did enter the factories and arrest the strikers). Already on 16 December, the documents of the Ministry of the Interior noted (perhaps with satisfaction) that the strikes in Warsaw had been quashed.⁵

The Warsaw "Solidarity" structures were generally unprepared for such a decisive blow from the authorities. Underground "Solidarity" conducted spontaneous independent organizational activity in many parts of Warsaw during the first days and weeks of martial law. Those undertakings resulted from individual trade union members' zeal rather than from a top-down order of the regional trade union authorities who had not been arrested (led by the chairman, Zbigniew Bujak). The authorities, despite their plans, also failed to arrest his deputy, Wiktor Kulerski. Those who avoided interment (arrest) and the regional leaders of "Solidarity" in hiding spoke publically, for example by means of proclamations printed in leaflets and distributed as widely as possible. They usually advocated restraint of emotions and passive resistance. It seems that, thanks to those appeals, no blood was shed in Warsaw during the December protests. By contrast, the pacification of the strike at the "Wujek" Hard Coal Mine in Silesia on 16 December 1981 had tragic consequences, as nine miners died of gunshot wounds in a Citizens' Militia assault.⁶

The major common demands of trade union milieus included the following main goals: The lifting of martial law, the release of the interned (arrested) and "Solidarity's" legalization. Even under the new


5 RUZIKOWSKI, T.: *Stan wojenny w Warszawie*, p. 297.

6 FRISZKE, A.: *Polska. Losy państwa i narodu 1939 – 1989*. Warsaw 2003, p. 406.

circumstances, both the individual members and the groups of members associated, among others, in factory, inter-factory and regional structures supported those postulates.

Just like before martial law, major Warsaw factories (e.g. Warsaw Steelworks, Passenger Car Factory and “Ursus” Machine Factory) became the main activity centres of “Solidarity”, although this time it was illegal. Though obviously limited, its underground activity proved that the trade union had survived the massive attack and was still active. It was symbolically manifested by “Solidarity” members’ wearing illegal badges with the organization’s logo. In the new situation of martial law, those who managed to avoid internment (*de facto* arrest) and the most active trade union activists began to form Underground Factory Commissions (TKZ) composed of “Solidarity” members.⁷ The commissions were, first and foremost, to collect membership fees, provide various forms of support to the repressed and help achieve the enumerated major goals of “Solidarity” (the ideas were spread, for example, by means of leaflets and independent press published by some TKZs). The most visible manifestations of their activity included publication of local trade union factory periodicals (e.g. *Hutnicy 82* at Warsaw Steelworks, *Wolny Głos Ursusa* at the “Ursus” Machine Factory and many others). They spread uncensored information, for example concerning the real problems of factories and their workers, the repressions against the trade union members and stigmatization of the workers particularly dangerous to “Solidarity”. The trade union periodicals helped establish a network of contacts, such as between editors-in-chief, printers and distributors as well as the final audience, the readers. They were used to collect funds both for the publication of periodicals and trade union activity, such as leaflet distribution or the provision of help to the repressed. Factory staff members contacted each other in the course of various organizational activities, which helped create the underground “Solidarity” inter-factory (supra-factory) structures. Figure 2 illustrates a simplified diagram of inter-factory agreement formation.

7 RUZIKOWSKI, T.: *Stan wojenny w Warszawie*, p. 188.

**Figure 2**

Simplified inter-factory agreement formation diagram. (Source: Author’s own material)

In fact, quite soon the grassroots organizational movement of underground “Solidarity” moved onto the inter-factory level. It seems that it could have been at least partly a simple necessity, as it is estimated that only a small percentage of legal “Solidarity’s” members became involved in the underground trade union structures. Inter-factory agreements simply broadened the spectrum of activity. This might have been the reason why they had been created already during the first weeks of martial law. Until 1983 (martial law was lifted in July that year), at least a few were formed in Warsaw: “Solidarity” Inter-factory Coordinating Committee (MKK), Inter-factory Workers’ “Solidarity” Committee (MRKS), “Solidarity” Inter-factory Cooperation Committee (MKWS), “Solidarity” Inter-factory Agreement Committee (KPMS), “Solidarity” Mazowsze Confederacy (MKS), “Unia” “Solidarity” Inter-factory Agreement (MPS), Victory and “Solidarity” (VIS), Inter-factory “Solidarity” Structure (MSS). By the way, the Inter-factory Workers’ “Solidarity” Committee was created in April 1982 by way of merger of two inter-factory structures (“Solidarity” Workers’ Social Self-Help Inter-factory Committee (*Międzyzakładowy Robotniczy Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej “Solidarność”*) associated with

the Warsaw Steelworks and the CDN agreement).⁸ Simultaneously, the two periodicals that were connected with them also merged into one. *Głos Wolnego Robotnika* merged with *CDN* to form a new title *CDN-Głos Wolnego Robotnika*.⁹ It is an example of an organizational change to consolidate the activities on the level of inter-factory structures.

Certain structures covered the same factories. The inflow of membership fees from a given area (factory) was considered the essential measure of a given structure's range of influence. In fact, sometimes workers of one big factory supported more than one inter-factory structure. In such cases, the factory could be counted as an element of all those structures. Tensions in the inter-factory structures sometimes resulted in rifts, which was the case with the Mazowsze "Solidarity" Confederacy (*Mazowiecka Konfederacja „Solidarności”*) established by some from the KPMS.¹⁰

The underground "Solidarity" structures had some common as well as specific characteristics. In principle, all structures on the inter-factory level acknowledged the authority of the surviving Mazowsze Region authorities, which in May 1982 became part of the underground Regional Executive Commission (*Regionalna Komisja Wykonawcza*). The statements and proclamations of their members were announced in the associated periodicals such as *Wola* (associated with MKK), *CDN-Głos Wolnego Robotnika* (MRKS) and *Verbum* (MKS). Such enunciations in the underground press were a basic proof of a given structure's existence and activity. It was characteristic of certain inter-factory initiatives undertaken in 1983 (the final year of martial law) to actually sell their publications. The publishing market had already been fairly saturated with independent periodicals (in 1983 almost 150 of them were published at various intervals in Warsaw). Consequently, paid distribution was a basic chance for a new periodical's survival.¹¹ Some initiatives failed, like the publication of *Structure* – an organ of the Inter-factory "Solidarity" Structure

8 KALISKI, B.: Meandry radykalizmu. "Międzyzakładowy Robotniczy Komitet 'Solidarności'". In: FRIZSKE, A. (ed.): *Solidarność podziemna 1981 – 1989*. Warsaw 2006. We should remember that the acronym CDN stood for [C]iąg [D]alszy [N]astąpi (To Be Continued) which was a manifestation of the hope for Solidarity's ultimate victory.

9 Ibid., pp. 490 and 492.

10 RUZIKOWSKI, T.: *Stan wojenny w Warszawie*, p. 198.

11 Author's analysis in RUZIKOWSKI, T.: *Stan wojenny w Warszawie*, 542 ff.

(*Międzyzakładowa Struktura „Solidarności”*). It was discontinued after just a few issues, perhaps due to the lack of buyers.¹²

Some structures were unique in certain ways. The MKK structure was made up of smaller territorial units – the so-called micro-regions – which corresponded to districts (e.g. Mokotów in Warsaw) or even smaller city parts (e.g. Pyry). In turn, MRKS stood out due to the radicalism of its ideas and actions.

It was the first organization, from a group of a few structures readying themselves for such an undertaking, to conduct a spectacular release action of "Solidarity" activist Jan Naroźniak. Shot by a Citizens' Militia functionary, he was hospitalized in Warsaw. In June 1982, he was secretly removed from the hospital where he was being watched by the SB.

MRKS was also one of the major organizers of the demonstration which was an alternative to the official 1982 Warsaw Labour Day parade organized by the PRL authorities.¹³ Less than a month later, its members put up a commemorative plaque to honour the dead miners of the "Wujek" Coal Mine. The action took place in broad daylight on what was then Victory Square – one of the major squares in the capital. Those actions were truly spectacular compared to other undertakings of the underground "Solidarity". They became something of a showcase for the first months of MRKS' activity, and they also gave birth to the myth of it being an efficient and enterprising inter-factory structure.¹⁴

The initiative to create Radio "Solidarity" was undertaken to achieve a special goal. It was to be another channel through which uncensored information was to reach the members of suspended "Solidarity". The broadcasts began in Warsaw on 12 April 1982. Its creators used a transmitter constructed before martial law by talented engineer Ryszard Kołyszko. The appliance was built within the framework of the preparations to establish a communications channel – as an alternative to the state one – which was to be used by legal "Solidarity" structures to contact one another.¹⁵ The

12 Ibid., p. 202.

13 For more on the street demonstrations in Warsaw see: DUDEK, A. – MARSZAŁKOWSKI, T.: *Walki uliczne w PRL 1956 – 1989*. Cracow 1999; and SPAŁEK, R.: *Warszawska ulica w stanie wojennym. Demonstracje, protesty, zamieszki, pochody w oczach opozycji i władzy 1981 – 1983*. Warsaw 2008.

14 Cf. KALISKI, B.: *Meandry radykalizmu*, 489 ff.

15 ŁOPINSKI, M. – MOSKIT, M. [GACH, Z.] – WILK, M.: *Konspira, czyli Rzecz o podziemnej Solidarności*. Gdańsk; Warsaw 1989, p. 91.

Radio Solidarity initiative was organized by a group of people connected with Mazowsze Region Presidium member Zbigniew Romaszewski and his wife Zofia Romaszewska; before 13 December 1981, they and their co-workers had been active in the trade union intervention committee. By the way, in the literature the radio is referred to as the First Channel of Radio “Solidarity” to differentiate that first initiative from the later ones.¹⁶ Due to security considerations, its broadcasts usually lasted just a few minutes. It was to prevent the Citizens’ Militia from detecting the broadcasting staff and the transmitters, as it used beeping-finders to detect transmitting apparatus. The broadcasts informed people about the repressions against “Solidarity” and opponents of martial law. Listeners were also encouraged to participate in underground “Solidarity” initiatives, such as the already mentioned alternative Labour Day parade on 1 May 1982). During the following months and years, the programs were broadcast at different intervals, often at an interval of 7 days and usually in the evenings (e.g. at 9 p.m.). The broadcasts were announced in advance in various ways. Initially, it was done by means of leaflets, but that allowed the authorities to regularly jam the broadcasts of Radio “Solidarity”. To check the range of the broadcasts, the radio employees asked the listeners, for example, to switch the lights on and off in their apartments. Whole housing estates and districts of Warsaw flashed, which was quite impressive after dark.¹⁷ The programs were recorded in a studio improvised in a Warsaw apartment. With its clear aim and spectacular dimension, Radio “Solidarity” considerably enriched the Warsaw trade union underground structures. It also showed the illegal trade union’s technical and mobilizing capability. The initiative to create Radio “Solidarity” in Warsaw was then emulated both in the capital and other parts of the country.¹⁸

16 It should be stressed that in the 1980s there was only one *Radio Solidarity* for a wide spectrum of listeners, and it did not matter which group of the underground “Solidarity” activists actually organized it. What counted was the sign of “Solidarity” as an identification sign of various initiatives.

17 MAJCHRZAK, G. – RUZIKOWSKI, T.: *Radio Solidarność w eterze na przykładzie Warszawy*. In: KRAJEWSKI, K. – PIETRZAK-MERTA, M. (eds.): *Warszawa miasto w opresji*. Warsaw 2010, p. 600.

18 Cf. BAKUŁA, B. (ed.): *Radio Solidarność: Podziemne rozgłoszenie oraz audycje radiowe i telewizyjne w Polsce 1982 – 1990. Materiały z konferencji w Wyższej Szkole Zawodowej „Kadry dla Europy” w dniach 26–27 maja 2007 roku*. Poznań 2008.

The Regional Executive Commission (RKW) was unique and it differed from other discussed structures.¹⁹ This regional executive body of underground "Solidarity" was active, among others, in Warsaw and in other parts of the "Solidarity" Mazowsze Region [see: Figure 1]. It was officially formed just a few months after the imposition of martial law, on 8 May 1982. Its members included "Solidarity" Mazowsze Region chairman Zbigniew Bujak (who was in hiding), his deputy Wiktor Kulerski, Zbigniew Janas (president of the "Solidarity" Factory Commission at the Ursus Machine Factory) and Zbigniew Romaszewski (region presidium member, Radio "Solidarity" organizer). In practice, however, even before the RKW's formation, the above mentioned persons contacted one another in various ways. Earlier, the region leaders simply had not intended to form such a body, as from the very beginning of martial law the Mazowsze Region authorities had opted for the decentralization of trade union resistance or, more broadly speaking, social resistance. The formation of RKW was actually forced, among others, by the earlier formation (22 April) of a country-wide executive body of underground "Solidarity" – the Provisional Coordinating Commission (TKK) which included Zbigniew Bujak, the "Solidarity" Mazowsze Region representative. Most Mazowsze Region leaders (who had not been arrested) supported the concept of decentralized resistance, organized under the banner of an "underground society" (comprehensive and decentralized social resistance encompassing various milieus). The RKW declared that its goal was to "coordinate the efforts aimed at martial law lift, release of the interned and convicted, reinstatement of civil rights and resumption of 'Solidarity's activity'".²⁰ That was in accord with the widespread expectations of "Solidarity" activists and its sympathizers. RKW used its funds to organize and support various forms of resistance in a spirit of "underground society" and non-violent resistance preferred by most members of that milieu. The aid was both financial (funds) and material (e.g. printing equipment).

In the eyes of its rank and file members, RKW's formation and activity were, first and foremost, a symbol of Solidarity's durability, as they gave hope for its rebirth despite the numerous repressions and persecutions. The "Solidarity" Mazowsze Region chairman Zbigniew Bujak, was another

19 For more on its activity Cf. FRISZKE, A.: *Regionalny Komitet Wykonawczy Mazowsze. Powstanie, struktura, działalność (1981 – 1986) in Solidarność podziemna*, 405 ff; and RUZIKOWSKI, T.: *Stan wojenny w Warszawie*, 214 ff.

20 *Komunikat. Tygodnik Mazowsze*, Vol. 13, 12 May 1982.

symbol of the trade union's survival. Not only in Poland but also abroad „[h]e was [thought] the symbolic leader of 'Solidarity's' resistance and living proof that 'Solidarity' had survived.”²¹

The RKW was a country-wide organizational phenomenon. Its complex executive structure consisted of specialized departments, by whose agency the organization supported social resistance initiatives of various milieus, mostly those whose activities fitted the concept of decentralized non-violent resistance.

The most vital element of its structure was the so-called bureau, managed by Ewa Kulik. It helped the regional leaders (Zbigniew Bujak and Wiktor Kulerski) to stay in hiding for many months and continue their underground activity. RKW's infrastructure included many other teams and groups performing various duties connected with the commission's activity or, more broadly speaking, organization of resistance.²² The housing team was one of the most important ones, as it provided secret rooms and apartments necessary for RKW's operation. Another cell dealt with communications with, for example, underground "Solidarity" structures in other parts of the country. Cassettes with radio broadcasts were recorded in a special studio improvised in a Warsaw apartment. The control team checked the credibility of information and people. There was also a legalization department which provided necessary documents, not only to people in hiding, such as preparing fake IDs. Some of the RKW teams made up the so-called "Armenia" structure of an executive character combined with a technical background. It was subordinated directly to RKW and it comprised certain teams, including the one code-named "Kwadrat". Its members formed a few groups of specialists whose task was to prepare materials and objects needed for RKW-supported undertakings. The teams comprised, for example, technicians, electricians and chemists. The latter group prepared items such as invisible ink, marker pens to write on glass or smelly chemical agents (isobutyric acid). They could be used, for example, to make the lives suspected collaborators unbearable. The RKW electricians participated in the construction of the Radio "Solidarity" transmitting apparatus. Team "Nil", which was responsible for its servicing, became part of the underground structures of "Armenia" in 1983. Its organizational background was incorporated within

21 HAYDEN, J.: *Poles Apart: Solidarity and the New Poland*. Dublin; London 1994, p. 78.

22 For more on the topic see: ŁOPINSKI, M. – MOSKIT, M. [GACH, Z.] – WILK, M.: *Konspira, czyli Rzecz o podziemnej Solidarności*, p. 90.

the "Armenia" structure in the autumn of that year, after the arrests in the underground Radio "Solidarity" milieu and the trial of some workers at the illegal radio station.

The Special Groups – "Solidarity" Resistance Groups (*Grupy Specjalne: Grupy Oporu "Solidarni"*) run by Teodor Klincewicz – cooperated closely with RKW. Their members distributed leaflets, painted slogans on the walls and put up banners with slogans. They also organized radio broadcast actions using special cassette recorder transmitters (the so-called "chatterbox" – *gadala*). They also ran resources and printing machines across the border to be used by underground "Solidarity".

The effect of RKW's operation that was the most visible for the society was the proclamations and statements it published. They commented on current issues that related to the authorities' policy, trade union protest actions or the broadly-understood situation of "Solidarity". RKW public announcements were discussed by the commission of several members until it adopted a joint stance. It was crucial, as all RKW members signed the organization's statements. The organization discussed the current situation, considered what actions to undertake, what to call for and what issues should be addressed publicly.²³

Similarly to many other structures, RKW had a press forum. Though unofficial, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* was considered its organ; it published, for example, RKW documents and its members' texts. Earlier, at the beginning of 1982, the weekly became a forum for a programmatic discussion on how to meet the basic aims widely supported by the underground "Solidarity" milieus.²⁴

The authorities responded to underground Solidarity's activity using various forms of repression; these included arrests, searches, confiscations and political trials – particularly of the organizers of the most spectacular actions. It could be easily understood why the most infamous political trials during martial law were those of people connected with Radio "Solidarity" and the Inter-factory Worker's "Solidarity" Committee – the two organizations had the most impact on the society in terms of propaganda.

In 1983, the PRL authorities organized a show trial of *Radio Solidarity* organizers. It began on 24 January 1983 at the Warsaw Military District

23 RUZIKOWSKI, T.: *Stan wojenny w Warszawie*, p. 220.

24 See DUDEK, A.: *Solidarność w poszukiwaniu metody walki w stanie wojennym*. In: *Solidarność a wychodzenie Polski z komunizmu. Studia i artykuły z okazji XV rocznicy NSZZ Solidarność*. Gdańsk 1995.

Court (*Sąd Warszawskiego Okręgu Wojskowego*).²⁵ Both the Security Service representatives and the collaborators of the *Radio* carefully followed its course. By the way, on that very day the latter broadcast another program, thus proving that the authorities had not managed to totally destroy the radio station. Nine people were accused: these were Jacek Bąk, Danuta Jadczyk, Anna Owczarska, Zbigniew Pietrzak, Irena Rasińska, Marek Rasiński, Zofia Romaszewska, Zbigniew Romaszewski and Dariusz Rutkowski. The sentence was announced on 17 February. Zbigniew Romaszewski was sentenced to 4.5 years, while the remaining accused got sentences from 7 months' to 3 years' imprisonment.²⁶ Another infamous political trial – that of the Inter-factory Workers' "Solidarity" Committee – began in the same court on 21 March 1983. Nine people were accused: Roman Bielański, Jerzy Bogumił, Adam Borowski, Grzegorz Gampel, Bogumił Gołębiowski, Andrzej Machalski, Mieczysław Nowak, Waclaw Skudniewski and Elżbieta Stobbe. The sentence was announced on 19 May 1983. The most severe sentence was that of Adam Borowski, who was sentenced to 3 and half years' imprisonment; the least severe was that of Elżbieta Stobbe, sentenced to two years' imprisonment suspended for three years.²⁷ By the way, the funeral of Grzegorz Przemyski, who died after being brutally beaten up on 12 May at a Militia station in Warsaw Old Town, was organized on the same day,²⁸ which might not have been a coincidence.

The authorities also tried to destroy the trade unions' structures from the inside using networks of secret collaborators of the Security Service. For example, the Warsaw SB greatly benefited from the activity of a secret collaborator, code name "Piegus." He regularly handed over to SB the copies of *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, which he acquired from underground "Solidarity" for distribution. The SB intended not only to control individual distribution channels but also to eliminate from them all persons not connected with SB.²⁹

25 According to martial law regulations, during that period the courts martial took over some of the cases from the civil courts.

26 M. ŁĄTKOWSKA, M. (ed.): *Solidarność. XX lat historii*. Warsaw 2000, pp. 299 – 300.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 302.

28 PERNAL, M. – SKÓRZYŃSKI, J.: *Kalendarium Solidarności 1980–1989*. Warsaw 1990, p. 80.

29 RUZIKOWSKI, T.: *Kontrolować czy/i rozbijać? Przyczynek do działań warszawskiej SB przeciwko 'Solidarności' w związku ze stanem wojennym*. In: POLAK,

Despite the repressions of martial law, underground "Solidarity" structures in Warsaw were diversified and carried out various tasks. Some of the undertakings realized by the Warsaw underground "Solidarity" structures were spectacular (e.g. street demonstrations, the release action of a trade union activist watched by SB in the hospital and the Radio "Solidarity" broadcasts). Equally important was the less spectacular sphere of its activity, namely its efforts to educate society. They included the publication of independent press and books, leaflet distribution and painting slogans on walls. Many of them entered the cannon of anti-system undertakings practised during the years to come by the Warsaw underground "Solidarity" structures (e.g. street demonstrations, publications and uncensored broadcasts).

Those efforts of the Warsaw underground "Solidarity" structures were among the factors which cleared the way for the beginning of the political transformation in Poland in 1989. It had been preceded by the Round Table talks between the PRL authorities' representatives and major members of the opposition, some of whom recruited from the Warsaw underground "Solidarity". The major Round Table accords included the organization of free elections to the Sejm and to the Senate (which was to be restored), for the first time with the participation of "Solidarity" candidates. The vote took place on 4 June. It was the beginning of a new chapter, not only for the members of the Warsaw underground "Solidarity" structures active during the martial law but also, as it turned out, for Europe as well. This is why the preparation of this article was possible before the 30th anniversary of the imposition of martial law (13 December 2011).

Resumé

Stanné právo vyhlásené 13. decembra 1981 znamenalo koniec legálnej činnosti „Solidarity“. Napriek drakonickým trestom (vrátane trestu smrti), ktoré zaviedol dekrét o stannom práve, sa mnohí členovia odborov rozhodli bojovať za „Solidaritu“, keďže odbory sa identifikovali so skutočnou slobodou.

Ilegálne štruktúry „Solidarity“ sa organizovali na úrovni jednotlivých fabriek, priemyselných odvetví a na regionálnej úrovni (Rádio „Solidarita“, Regionálna výkonná komisia). Medzi ich ciele patrilo obnovenie možnosti

legálneho fungovania „Solidarity“. Niektoré akcie varšavských ilegálnych štruktúr boli podobné (tlač letákov a tlačovín), zatiaľ čo iné mali svoje špecifické črty (napr. veľkolepé akcie alebo špecifické funkcie). Úrady na ilegálnu činnosť „Solidarity“ odpovedali používaním rôznych represíí, napr. zatýkaním, prehliadkami, konfiškáciami, politickými procesmi (najmä s organizátormi najväčších akcií). Úrady sa tiež pokúšali zničiť odborárske štruktúry zvnútra používaním siete tajných spolupracovníkov Bezpečnostnej služby (*Śłużba Bezpieczeństwa*, SB). Napriek tomu pod vlajkou solidarity rozkvitali rôzne opozičné aktivity. Neboli to len aktivity odborárov. Ilegálna „Solidarita“ sa tešila aj podpore z prostredia, ktoré s ňou formálne nebolo prepojené.

Niektoré úlohy, ktoré zrealizovali štruktúry varšavskej ilegálnej „Solidarity“ boli spektakulárne (napr. pouličné demonštrácie, zverejnenie odborárskeho aktivistu, ktorého v nemocnici sledovala Bezpečnostná služba, a vysielanie Rádia „Solidarita“). Rovnako dôležitá bola aj tzv. „základná práca“, t. j. vydávanie ilegálnej tlače alebo kníh. Tieto snahy varšavských ilegálnych štruktúr „Solidarity“ patrili medzi faktory, ktoré pripravili cestu počiatku politickej transformácie v Poľsku v roku 1989.

The Phenomenon of the Youth Political Opposition in Poland in the Years 1980 – 1990 and its Initial Interpretations

Marek WIERZBICKI

Introduction

This paper aims to show the little-recognized social and political phenomenon of the rise and dynamic development of youth opposition organizations, movements and environments and then how they took part in the political and structural transformation in Poland in 1980 – 1990. The paper will introduce both the active participants of the “youth opposition”, as well as a broader context of their activity and thus the situation of the Polish youth in the 1980s, its views, aspirations, needs, goals and their approach towards political life in the People’s Republic of Poland. As the research of the subject is in its early stages, the paper will only attempt to point out the most important aspects of the discussed phenomenon, pose

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- 1 By this term I understand the activity of anti-systemic and transformative organizations, movements and environments which aim at a fundamental overhaul of the political system of the People’s Republic of Poland through its dismantling, e.g. changing the role of the basic political institutions of a Communist country, which was to restrict the Communist Party’s political power monopoly and restore social subjectivity. Opposition activity thus understood was bound to be repressed by the authorities. Relying on the definitions proposed by Michał Kubat, the „youth opposition“ should be considered opposition in the strict sense and thus institutional opposition, i.e. one represented by various „institutions“ (groupings) with a clear objective (overthrowing the system) and structures that enable its accomplishment. See KUBAT, M.: *Teoria opozycji politycznej*. Kraków 2010, pp. 21 – 58; ANTOSZEWSKI, A. – HERBUT, R. (eds.): *Leksykon politologii*. Wrocław 2004, pp. 275 – 276; FRISZKE, A.: *Opozycja polityczna w PRL 1945 – 1980*. Londyn 1994, p. 5.

questions and formulate research hypotheses. It should therefore be treated as an outline of those issues.

The genesis and social context of “youth political opposition”

The events of the early 1980s, most notably the rise of the National Commission of the Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” (NSZZ “Solidarność”), had a strong influence on the awareness and attitudes of the young generation. At that time, dozens of youth organizations appeared in secondary schools – although not secret, they were still illegal and in 1981 they were joined to form the School-Age Youth Federation (Federacja Młodzieży Szkolnej). The Federation constituted something of a pupils “Solidarity” which was supposed to represent the interests of the school-age youth within a totalitarian regime. There were also other, strictly conspiratorial, anti-Communist organizations. 67 of them were created between 1980 and 1981, whilst another 10 comprised of youth members but were conducted by adults.²

The declaration of Martial Law and the brutal destruction of the 1980 – 1981 liberation endeavours led to a strong resistance among the society as a whole, and among its younger members in particular. In large and medium-sized cities many young people were underground activists or took part in street demonstrations. In 1982 alone the officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) dispatched 185 conspiratorial youth organizations (67 in 1983); comprised mostly of school-age youth (pupils of high schools and technical high schools).³ During the Martial Law period most of the young Poles viewed the reality of “real Socialism” critically and openly expressed their support for “Solidarity’s” endeavours. Part of them took part in the conspiratorial movement within their own organizations and groups as well as street demonstrations aimed against the Communist regime.⁴

2 WIERZBICKI, M.: Niezależne organizacje młodzieżowe w Polsce w latach osiemdziesiątych XX wieku. In: KAMIŃSKI, Ł. – WALIGÓRA, G. (eds.): *NSZZ „Solidarność” 1980 – 1989, tom 7, Wokół „Solidarności”*. Warszawa 2010, pp. 359 – 362.

3 The Archives of The Institute of National Remembrance (further only A IPN), zespół MSW, 01305/244, *Nielegalne organizacje i grupy młodzieży szkolnej w Polsce w latach 1980 – 1982*, k. 1–52.

4 KOSIŃSKI, K.: Młodzież lat osiemdziesiątych w świetle badań CBOS oraz wybranych analiz IBPM, MAW i KC PZPR. In: *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 2009, No. 2, p. 120.

A significant change in social attitude took place in the mid 1980's. The resistance against the Communist reign subsided and the will to fight the commonly hated system became weaker as apathy, resignation and passive acceptance of the reality settled in. Without broad support and unable to introduce new methods of political fight, the Solidarity movement was facing a serious crisis. At the same time, the majority of youth withdrew from active politics preferring literal or "inner" emigration. About 750 thousand citizens, mostly under the age of 30, left Poland between 1981 – 1988 (c. 1 million according to some estimates).⁵ The years 1984 – 1985 witnessed an increase in people supporting the authorities' policy (the so called "normalization"), which consisted of effectively restricting citizens' rights, removing political opposition and attempting to end a deep economic crisis by introducing socially painful economic reforms. Eventually, however, the government did not win the support of the majority of the youth. Similarly to the older part of the society, they preferred to focus on their private lives and simultaneously distance themselves from the public sphere and from politics in particular.⁶

Youth subcultures, especially those connected with various kinds of youth music, enjoyed great popularity at that time. The fans of punk music stood out with one thousand punk bands created in 1984 alone. The enthusiasts and members of other music subcultures such as metal and Depeche Mode fans were also becoming more common. The youth music of the time, the so-called young 'generation music', became a language through which the youth could describe and express the reality they lived in; it became the matter from which they shaped their worldview. There were other music subcultures, some of which went beyond the sphere of youth music, e.g. hippies, rastafarians, poppers, skinheads, hooligans and anarchists.⁷

Apart from that, groups which promoted helping others were also flourishing; they included the Light-Life Movement (Ruch Światło Życie) i.e. the "oases" gathering around particular churches, independent scout groups, "Monar" activists and ecological movements. Groups promoting their own code of values through the self-development of the individual,

5 HABIELSKI, R.: *Emigracja*. Warszawa 1995, p. 61.

6 WIERZBICKI, M.: *Młodzież w PRL*. Warszawa 2009, p. 76.

7 KOSIŃSKI, K.: *Oficjalne i prywatne życie młodzieży*, pp. 349 – 360.

such as Zen Buddhists, the Hare Krishna Movement members, the Yogis and even theatrical communities.⁸

The development of the youth opposition groupings

In this context the development and activity of the youth opposition organizations became evident. In the second half of the 1980's their organizational development was related to the youth's dissatisfaction with the socio-political system. The public opinion polls show that respondents were increasingly critical about the "achievements of Socialism" mainly due to the inefficiency of the economy, the incapability of the government to fight the escalating socio-political crisis, the discrepancies between what the ruling regime declared it would do and what it was in fact doing ("theory and practice" discrepancy). The party was losing support especially among the most opinion-forming youth environments, the youth from the large and mid-sized cities, coming from intellectual families, well-educated, who were to become the foundation of the humanist and technology-oriented intelligentsia.⁹

In the mid-1980s the polls proved that most of the youth preferred a democratic system based on political pluralism and market economy. Although they did not express the will to involve themselves in political activities against the ruling government, they declared a progressively stronger consent for such initiatives. The general atmosphere soon transformed into one of great political agitation in youth environments from large and mid-sized cities. There was a rapid development of youth opposition organizations and movements, which instantly gained popularity among the pupils, students and young workers.¹⁰

8 ZIELIŃSKI, M.: Młodzieżowe ruchy alternatywne – próba oceny, wnioski i prognozy, Warszawa 20 września 1988 r. In: CERANKA, P. – STĘPIEŃ, S. (eds.): „*Jesteście naszą wielką szansą...*”. *Młodzież na rozstajach komunizmu 1944 – 1989*. Warszawa 2009, pp. 444 – 461; KOSIŃSKI, K.: *Młodzież lat osiemdziesiątych*, pp. 127 – 129. Zob. także BARAN, A.: *Walka o kształt harcerstwa w Polsce (1980–1990). Niepokorni i niezależni*. Warszawa 2007.

9 KOSIŃSKI, K.: *Młodzież lat osiemdziesiątych*, p. 122; MACHCEWICZ, P.: „*Monachijska menażeria*”. *Walka z Radiem Wolna Europa 1950 – 1989*. Warszawa 2007, p. 407.

10 MACHCEWICZ, P.: „*Monachijska menażeria*”, pp. 123 – 126.

The most prominent opposition organizations and movements

The Federation of Fighting Youth (FMW), which in a couple of years grew to encompass pupils' groups and environments in more than 50 cities in Poland, was formed in Warsaw in June 1984. The common goal of the ideologically divergent environments of the Federation was to overthrow the system and ultimately to make Poland "free and democratic", i. e. independent. The Federation of Fighting Youth organized leafleting events, demonstrations, actions of painting slogans on the walls, radio broadcastings, self education initiatives, or published uncensored documents (they have been publishing more than one hundred underground periodicals).¹¹

In 1985 the "Freedom and Peace" Movement was established (Ruch "Wolność i Pokój"), a nationwide, non-violent movement whose purpose was to fight the totalitarian regime through sittings, happenings, by sending military service books back to the Ministry of Defense, or printing independent publications. Its ideology consisted of a combination of pacifist, Christian, liberal and ecological values. It was an elite movement dominated by individual motivations which were a response to the powerlessness of the underground "Solidarity", the violence of the apparatus of power, the lack of perspective for the future and the malaise of the second half of the eighties. The originality of its ideology, programme and forms of action made the "Freedom and Peace" Movement popular amongst the youth.¹²

Delegalised in 1982, the Independent Students' Association (NZS) was able to rise again in 1986 – 1987 and rebuilt its units in most of the Polish universities, especially those in larger cities.¹³

All those organizations and movements were consolidated thanks to several key events of a generational character, the events responsible for the emergence of the identity of the young opposition. First of those events was the Third Pilgrimage of John Paul II to Poland in June 1987, during which

11 WIERZBICKI, M.: *Niezależne ugrupowania młodzieżowe*, pp. 369 – 374.

12 LITWIŃSKA, M. – WALIGÓRA, G.: Ruch „Wolność i Pokój” 1985 – 1989. In: NSZZ „Solidarność”, pp. 299 – 330.

13 KOZŁOWSKI, T.: *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów 1980 – 1989*. In: NSZZ „Solidarność”, pp. 237 – 298; WIERZBICKI, M.: *Niezależne ugrupowania młodzieżowe*, pp. 369 – 374.

the members of the discussed groupings could gather in large numbers, meet their fellow members from other cities and live through the experience of communion and authority and remain “unpunished”.¹⁴

The breakthrough of 1988

Even more important events took place in 1988. The celebration of the 20th anniversary of the protests of students and youth, in general, that took place in academic environments in 1968. The Independent Students' Association units organised rallies, demonstrations, night parties, leafletting events and happenings in more than ten universities. The magnitude of those events surprised both the authorities and society. They realised that after several years of malaise students were again engaging in politics and they were doing so unaided, i.e. under the banner of an independent students' organization.¹⁵

A series of strikes was organized in April and May of 1988. The oppositional youth environment responded to the strike initiative with energy. Many universities organised solidarity rallies, sittings and leafletting events. Some of them organised student strikes. The ‘Students-Support-Strikers’ Committee (Studencki Komitet Pomocy Strajkującym) was established in Cracow and it collected c. 500.000 PLN later given to the Church to secure the needs of those who were prosecuted for political reasons.¹⁶

The members of the Federation of Fighting Youth, the Independent Students' Association and the “Freedom and Peace” Movement took an active part in the August strikes in Gdansk; they handled the printing, collected the money, handled the communication and transportation issues, organised lectures for the strikers and solidarity events, similarly as they did in May. This time the members of the Federation of Fighting Youth proved to be the most active group.¹⁷

14 GACH, Z.: *Drugie podejście. Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów w Uniwersytecie Gdańskim 1985-1989 na tle swoich czasów*. Gdańsk 2009, s. 97 – 121.

15 A IPN, 1585/16090, *Informacja Dzienna [Gabinetu Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych] Nr 57/2257 z 8 marca 1988 r.*, k. 168 – 169; A IPN, 1585/16090, *Informacja Dzienna [Gabinetu Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych] Nr 58/2257 z 9 marca 1988 r.*, k. 205 – 209.

16 KASPRZYCKI, R.: *Opozycja polityczna w Krakowie w latach 1988 – 1989*. Kraków 2003, pp. 45 – 54; GACH, Z.: *Drugie podejście*, pp. 197– 245.

17 A IPN, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, sygn. IPN BU 0248/191, *Informacja dot. [ycząca] działalności Federacji Młodzieży walczącej*, Warszawa 26.10.1988 r., k. 49 – 61; LICBARSKI, B.: *Federacja Młodzieży Walczącej w latach 1984-1990*. In: SUDZIŃSKI,

The May and August strikes of 1988 brought about a reactivation of the young generation's initiative, which manifested as their increased interest in political matters. The ferment in the universities made both the authorities and the Solidarity movement realise that the extremist youth was a difficult and independent political partner.¹⁸

Breaking from the "adults' opposition"

The key matter that the young oppositionists had to face was their attitude towards the Communist authorities and the possibility of finding a compromise between them and the government. The ending of the strike in Gdańsk Shipyard on 1 September 1988 by Lech Wałęsa's arbitrary decision caused protests among young workers, students and pupils engaged in opposition activities. It became clear that the moderate side of the opposition is leaning towards an agreement with the authorities. Towards the end of 1988, the Solidarity Citizens' Committee (appointed on 18 December) supporting the Chairman of the National Commission of the Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity", Lech Wałęsa, spoke in favor of a compromise solution to the differences between the government and the opposition. At the same time the Federation of Fighting Youth (FMW) as well as other youth organizations spoke clearly in favour of a completely independent Poland, rejecting the possibility of any compromise with the Communists in power. It became transparent during the proceedings of the Round Table (6 February – 5 April 1989) and directly after its closure. Unlike the main-stream opposition, numerous environments of the Federation of Fighting Youth and other anti-Communist youth groupings condemned the idea of cooperation with the authorities and expressed

R. (ed.): *Niezależny ruch młodzieżowy w Polsce po drugiej wojnie światowej (1945 – 2001)*. Toruń 2005, pp. 129 – 171; CECUDA, D.: *Leksykon opozycji politycznej 1976 – 1989*. Warszawa; Toruń 1989, p. 7; WĄSOWICZ, J.: *Federacja Młodzieży Walczącej w Gdańsku w latach 1984 – 1990*. In: *Niezależny ruch młodzieżowy*, pp. 173 – 204; Relacja Mariusza Wilczyńskiego see URL <<http://www.fmw.org.pl/index.php>>; *Szkoła. Niezależna Unia Młodzieży Szkolnej*. *Miesięcznik Uczniowski*, No. 5(7)/65, bdw, (prawdopodobnie II połowa 1989 roku), p. 8; *Monit. Pismo Federacji Młodzieży Walczącej*, No. 5/59, Gdańsk 30. 8. 1988, pp. 1 – 2.

18 KASPRZYCKI, R.: *Opozycja polityczna w Krakowie*, pp. 87 – 92; GACH, Z.: *Drugie podejście*, pp. 294 – 295; A IPN, 1585/16090, *Informacja Dzienna [Gabinetu Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych] Nr 252/2552 z 21 października 1988 r.*, k. 5 – 6; A IPN, 1585/16090, *Informacja Dzienna [Gabinetu Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych] Nr 255/2555 z 25 października 1988 r.*, k. 100 – 101.

their disagreement through a set of demonstrations and rallies. On 17 and 24 February in Cracow, for instance, there was a clash between the youth from students' organizations (Akcja Studencka WiP, Organizacja Studencka KPN, NZS, FMW) and the local militia.¹⁹

Some of the young oppositionists consistently refused to accept the new political reality based on the compromise with the Communists and, consequently, on the policy of making concessions to them. The youth did not see the benefits of such a policy, which aggravated their frustration. The differences in the matter of the settlement with the authorities deepened the disintegration of particular organizations and movements, such as the Federation of Fighting Youth. Another reason for the split within the Federation of Fighting Youth was the exhaustion of their acting procedures, which were adapted to fighting against the Communist system in conspiratorial circumstances. The new socio-political reality demanded a change of goals, operation forms and methods, which apparently surpassed the capabilities of the Federation members and caused considerable controversies among them. "Freedom and Peace" (WiP) broke up as well in the beginning of 1989. The organization split into the supporters of the Round Table initiative and evolutionary changes in the system, and the anarchistic radicals who rejected any compromise with the Communist authorities.²⁰

Despite the generally held belief that the opposition-oriented youth refused to accept the political reality of the time, not all of them dismissed the possibility of reaching an agreement with the Communists, which may remain unnoticed in the context of the more pronounced attitude of resistance. In each of the previously listed organizations there were activists and members who involved themselves in the political and systemic transformation.²¹

However, the leaders of most of these organizations would not accept the agreement with the Communist regime. The second half of 1989 saw them become more radical and gradually decrease in importance. In Autumn 1989 some of them joined the initiative organised by the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), whose goal was to occupy buildings belonging to the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), Polish Socialist Youth Union (ZSMP), Polish Scouting and Guiding Association (ZHP), and Patriotic

19 KASPRZYCKI, R.: *Opozycja polityczna w Krakowie*, pp. 105 – 114.

20 WIERZBICKI, M.: *Niezależne organizacje młodzieżowe*, pp. 378 – 379.

21 GACH, Z.: *Drugie podejście*, pp. 299 – 303.

Movement for National Rebirth (PRON). Some environments and regions of the Federation of Fighting Youth (FMW) emphasized their strong connection with the Polish independence tradition; especially the one inspired by Piłsudski and proclaimed the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile as the only rightful authority. These organisations strongly condemned the election of General Wojciech Jaruzelski as the President of the People's Republic of Poland/Polish Rzeczpospolita. The marginalisation of the radical students' environments was furthered by the registration of the Independent Students' Association (NZS, 22 October 1989), which, as a legal organization, was no longer interested in the most radical political protests.²²

The change was not accidental, since the attitudes among the youth of the second half of 1989 and first half of 1990 evolved from negating the Communist system to supporting the new one, directed at the democratisation of political life. Against the background of such tendencies, the stance of radical rejection of the new system seemed to most young people as unpopular as it was anachronistic. This may explain the decreasing significance of the opposition youth groupings.²³

At the turn of 1989 and 1990 in many Polish cities the members of the Federation of Fighting Youth, Youth Organization and the Round Table Students, Confederation of Independent Poland, "Freedom and Peace", SW and the Anarchist Federation symbolically settled accounts with Communism; they picketed at the Consulate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Cracow), taking down signs from the buildings of the Polish United Workers' Party, Polish Socialist Youth Union or the Polish Scouting and Guiding Association, often occupying the buildings. Those

22 *Szkoła. Miesięcznik Uczniów Dolnego Śląska. Ruch Młodzieży Niezależnej*, No. 11/58, Wrocław, czerwiec 1989 r., p. 1; IPN BUiAD, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, sygn. IPN BU 0248/191, *Bez tytułu [pismo naczelnika wydziału Ochrony Konstytucyjnego Porządku Państwa Wojewódzkiego Urzędu Spraw Wewnętrznych we Wrocławiu do naczelnika Wydziału III Departamentu OKPP MSW w Warszawie]*, Wrocław, 19. XII. 1989 r., k. 239; Relacja Mariusza Wilczyńskiego (Internet, strona); *Szkoła. Niezależna Unia Młodzieży Szkolnej. Miesięcznik Uczniowski*, No. 5(7)/65, bdw, prawdopodobnie II połowa 1989 roku, p. 2; CENCKIEWICZ, S.: „Dość paktów z czerwonymi”. Federacja Młodzieży Walczącej Region Pomorze Wschodnie przeciwko porozumieniom Okrągłego Stołu. In: CENCKIEWICZ, S. (ed.): *Oczami bezpieki. Szkice i materiały z dziejów aparatu bezpieczeństwa*. Kraków 2004, pp. 527 – 531, 535 – 542.

23 ALBERSKI, R. – CEBULSKI, L.: Polski przełom polityczny w opinii studentów Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. In: JABŁOŃSKI, A. – ANTOSZEWSKI, A. (eds.): *Polski przełom polityczny 1989. Między totalitaryzmem a demokracją. Materiały sympozjum politologicznego*. Wrocław 1990, pp. 246 – 247.

were, however, the last of such radical actions performed by those groupings. In 1990 most of them fell apart, lost their power or changed the form of their political activity.²⁴

Interpretations of the phenomenon of youth opposition

While analyzing the phenomenon of “youth opposition”, one inevitably must pose a question about its nature – identity, uniqueness – especially when juxtaposed with the whole youth population and the political opposition in the People’s Republic of Poland.

It seems that what the groups, organizations, movements and environments of “youth opposition” consisted of may be examined in terms of a social movement. In sociology a social movement is defined as a mass, spontaneous activity of individuals targeted at carrying out a common goal (goals), and among its characteristic features one may list the symbolic identification of its members with the movement’s goals, the sense of community and the small specificity of roles. According to Jan Szczepański, social movements may be divided into reform, revolutionary and expressive. From the point of view of this essay’s theme, the most accurate seems the category of a revolutionary movement. It is established when a large part of society (i.e. a social, generation, or working group) feels that one of its crucial needs cannot be fulfilled, which leads to frustration and finally to social unrest. At the next step informal circles and groups led by natural leaders emerged. At that point the ideology and the group’s manifesto is being formulated by the intellectuals. Then, the movement is institutionalized – various organizations, associations and parties are formed, their aim to achieve the movement’s goals. Thanks to either the fulfillment of the movement’s goals, or the goals becoming outdated, the movement undergoes ossification. Interestingly, while reform movements aim at reshaping social reality from within the social and political system,

24 LICBARSKI, R.: *Federacja Młodzieży Walczącej*, p. 168; IPN BUiAD, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, sygn. IPN BU 0248/191, *Meldunek nr 138 OKPP Szczecin z 22.01.1990 r.*, k. 244; IPN BUiAD, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, sygn. IPN BU 0248/191, *Meldunek nr 111 OKPP Gorzów Wlkp. z 28.01.1990 r.*, k. 245; IPN BUiAD, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, sygn. IPN BU 0248/191, *Meldunek nr 451 OKPP Kraków z 19.03.1990 r.*, k. 247; IPN BUiAD, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, sygn. IPN BU 0248/191, *Meldunek nr 273 OKPP Częstochowa z 22.03.1990 r.*, k. 248; CENCKIEWICZ, S.: „Dość paktów z czerwonymi”, pp. 542 – 547.

revolutionary movements share the same goal but try to achieve it through dismantling a given social order.²⁵

The youth opposition groups from the 1980s may be categorized as revolutionary movements. The aim of their revolution was to overthrow the Communist regime and win Poland full independence. This goal was pursued through the bloodless revolution initiated by the Solidarity movement in 1980, in which young oppositionists soon gained a unique position independent of other, both legal and illegal, political actors. University students and the most intelligent from the high school pupils took the role of intellectuals. The revolutionary youth movement rejected armed combat and physical terror, even though it is not a necessary feature of such a social formation.²⁶

Youth opposition groups participated in the fight against the Communist dictatorship and became especially significant in the second half of the 1980s due to the weakening or even partial disappearance of the “grown-up” underground (and especially of the underground organizations of the Solidarity movement). It is difficult to establish the extent of their influence on the weakening and the subsequent overthrowing of the Communist government, yet their role in that matter is undeniable. In the 1980s, through the development of illegal press, they contributed to the erosion of the authorities’ monopoly on information. They also made a major contribution to the creation of an alternative, independent of the authorities, civil society, which had been destroyed during the Stalinist regime in the early 1950s.²⁷

Youth opposition groups also contributed to the agreement reached between the authorities and the opposition (even if, paradoxically, they were against it), which made gradual, and at the same time bloodless, transformation of the political system possible (from para-totalitarian, autocratic and bureaucratic, to parliamentary democracy). From this point of view they may be seen as a form of socio-political movement which, aiming at the creation of a political subject out of youth groups and the

25 SZCZEPAŃSKI, J.: *Elementarne pojęcia socjologii*. Warszawa 1970, pp. 521 – 533; DELLA PORTA, D. – DIANI, M.: *Ruchy społeczne. Wprowadzenie*. Kraków 2009, pp. 23 – 31.

26 *Leksykon politologii*, pp. 393 – 394; SZTOMPKA, P. (ed.): *Ruchy społeczno-strukturalne w procesie stawania się*. Warszawa 1988.

27 ANTOSZEWSKI, A.: *Zabudowa przestrzeni politycznej*, pp. 77 – 91.

accomplishment of important social goals, from time to time took a more formalized organizational structure.²⁸

How did the movement present itself when juxtaposed with the whole youth population of Poland? First of all, it was elitist. The reason for that was a small number of active oppositionists in comparison to the total number of young people – both studying (university students and high school pupils) and working (workers and peasants). The oppositionists' circles (activists, ordinary members, and active supporters) may be estimated as consisting of around 20-30,000 members, compared to about 5 million young people in the age from 14 to 25.²⁹ Moreover, the elitist nature of youth organizations may be ascribed to the exceptional interest their members expressed in social and political issues, spiritual values, their greater political and national awareness, knowledge about social life and recent Polish history and their active participation in both private and public life. One must remember that except for the period of the Solidarity movement's legal activity, when young people expressed their interest in socio-political issues, in the early 1980s the young generation did not take an active part in political life, focusing mostly on their own private affairs. Thus the activists and members of independent groups were not "standard" teenagers.³⁰

The illegal opposition groups of the second half of the 1980s had a few other distinctive features. First of all, they were anti-Communist, which means that they were determined to weaken or even overthrow the Communist regime. It may be even stated that the Communists served as a factor integrating various groups, factions and youth circles, often of different ideological world views. For many of them anti-Communism served as a substitute ideology. Its intensity was definitely higher among youth organizations' members than among "normal" teenagers. Another important aspect of youth organizations was their radicalism – their members rejected compromise and the evolutionary road to independence.³¹

28 Na temat teorii i praktyki ruchów społecznego zob. SZCZEPAŃSKI, J. (ed.): *Elementarne pojęcia socjologii*, pp. 521 – 533.

29 Zob. WIERZBICKI, M.: *Młodzież w PRL*, p. 82.

30 KOSIŃSKI, K.: *Młodzież lat osiemdziesiątych*, pp. 26 – 30.

31 ZIELIŃSKI, M.: *Młodzieżowe ruchy alternatywne*, pp. 448 – 451.

Conclusion

To conclude, I would like to pose a couple of questions that could help in future studies on the history and role of “youth opposition”. Therefore, can its activity be really summarized as (last) rebellion? Undoubtedly there is an element of revolt in their actions, a fierce protest against the socio-political reality of the People’s Republic of Poland whose decline at that time was clearly visible. But at the bottom of the protest lie such phenomena as political demoralization and the fact that the ruling elites blocked access to the majority of political activities.³²

As a result, the frustration caused by the inability to fulfill personal needs deepened. To some extent the youth revolt of the second half of the 1980s may be explained by the theories of social psychologists: Theodore M. Newcombe, Ralph H. Turner and Peter Converse. According to them, the key factor in the creation of groups contesting a given social order are socio-economic conditions that determine both an individual’s and a group’s position in a broader social context. Group members become frustrated by injustice, difficult economic conditions and lack of prospects for the future. These factors contribute to group members’ marginalization, which causes protests and negation. Even though the theory has been used to explain the mechanism of youth subculture and gang formation in Western countries, it seems applicable to the interpretation of “youth opposition” in non-democratic countries as well.³³

Next to political factors, as the source of youth revolt one may list the lack of prospects for the future, caused by the disastrous economic condition of the country and the fossilization of social structures, which made an actual social advance impossible. Sociological studies conducted at the end of the 1980s prove that thesis. Since 1987 (and even since 1985) young Poles had become increasingly critical about Socialist ideology, which they perceived through the prism of economy (people were becoming poorer, the country’s debt grew, and one economic crisis followed another), the way the country was managed (lack of democracy, violation

32 ANTOSZEWSKI, A.: *Zabudowa przestrzeni politycznej*, p. 98.

33 FRANKOWSKI, M. T.: *Socjologia. Mikrostruktury społeczne. Wybrane zagadnienia*. Warszawa 2004, pp. 132 – 133.

of human rights, demoralization, bureaucracy) and political system (chaos and exploitation).³⁴

While assessing the part “youth opposition” played in the events that took place in 1980s, one must notice new values and rules it contributed to political life. Firstly, it rejected the old doctrine of the Solidarity movement from 1980-1981, according to which one should restrict one’s goals and political manifesto because of the geopolitics of Poland and the power of the Communist country. Young oppositionists offered a new point of view, both for the authorities and the Solidarity movement, forcing them to take a stand on this new conception. Their radicalism made them unpredictable and, therefore, dangerous for the political system³⁵.

At first, until the end of 1988, they were merely “foot soldiers” of the Solidarity movement, which was especially visible against a background of small in size and rather stagnant both underground and official structures of the Solidarity movement. For example, in May 1988, during the strike in Gdansk’s shipyard, 90% of its participants were at the age of 20, sometimes a little older. What is more, most of them opted for fight until total freedom was won, showing remarkable courage and determination. The case during the strikes in August was similar. It seems that the then management of the Solidarity movement served as the “command headquarters” and the young oppositionists and its supporters were the “army”.³⁶

As the political situation changed and the authorities began the negotiations with the opposition, young oppositionists became a pressure group, a tool used by the circles rejecting the idea of compromise with the government (i.e. Confederation of Independent Poland, Fighting Solidarity, Work Group of the National Commission of the Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity”). One must ask: which of those forces gained more from the actions undertaken by teenage activists – the Solidarity movement or Confederation of Independent Poland? The latter shaped its image of a patriotic force that followed Polish *raison d’état* by participating both in youth protests and the official political game (i.e. taking part in parliamentary election). Maybe because of that it gained the most votes during the first free parliamentary election in 1991. Or maybe the main beneficiary

34 SMOLSKI, R. – STADTMILLER-WYBORSKA, E.: Ewolucja poglądów młodzieży w latach 1987 – 1989. Raport z badań. In: *Polski przełom polityczny*, p. 180; KOSIŃSKI, K.: *Młodzież lat osiemdziesiątych*, pp. 119 and 130 – 131.

35 KASPRZYCKI, R.: *Opozycja polityczna w Krakowie*, p. 150.

36 GACH, Z.: *Drugie podejście*, pp. 259 – 260, 271 – 276.

of the youth opposition's activity was, in fact the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), using it as an enemy necessary to "close ranks" – to mobilize its members and sympathizers, and to legitimize its firm position on such issues as organizational pluralism in youth circles?

Should we, then, recognize youth opposition as a factor facilitating or hindering the necessary transformation of the political system?

It is not easy to give an unequivocal answer to the above question. Although "youth opposition" was an important party when it comes to fighting the Communist regime, its program was based mostly on the rebelliousness against the political system of the time. The lack of a positive program that would offer ways of transforming a non-democratic system into democracy was the major drawback of that formation, testifying to its political immaturity. Therefore "youth opposition" could play a positive part only in the context of an authoritarian regime, where the authorities rejected the very possibility of power division, becoming a destructive factor in the reality of political transformation, where society started to regain its subjectivity. "Grown-up" opposition offered a much more flexible, consistent program, which turned out to be a decisive factor in the power struggle. Thus a hypothesis may be put forward: the growth of significance of "youth opposition" that took place after 1986 may be to a large extent attributed to the methods and program of the Solidarity movement it adopted. Among them was the acceptance and continuation of the peaceful character of the "Polish revolution" of 1980, the acceptance of the Solidarity movement's postulates and the Roman Catholic Church's – and especially John Paul II's – authority. Young conspirators, then, were successful as long as they continued the legacy of the "grown-up" opposition. But the moment they started to radically dispute that legacy, rejecting the authority of "old" leaders and trying to follow their own path, they were marginalized and rendered politically insignificant.

The relations between these two segments of the opposition were complicated and tended to change during the last decade of the People's Republic of Poland. When the Solidarity movement was still legal, "youth opposition" had minor importance due to the size of the conflict between the Communist authorities and new movement, which dominated the political life of the country. At that time young people were of marginal significance to the opposition, supported and at the same time controlled

by the older generation. These relations looked similar during the Martial Law period. In 1985-1989 the leaders of the Solidarity movement looked favourably on young oppositionists (they were, after all, useful), but at the same time were indulgent towards them, considering them inexperienced in life and matters of politics. It was then, however, that “youth opposition” began to gain a central role in the opposition’s activities, setting their tone. Its growing importance was noticed in 1987, during John Paul II’s pilgrimage to Poland. It was no accident that shortly after the pilgrimage Lech Wałęsa met with the leaders of student movements (KKK NZS). As a result, an announcement was issued, signed by the two parties. In 1988 “youth opposition” was still Solidarity’s “pet”, which seems understandable if one takes into consideration its services to the organization of May and August strikes. Since 1989, however, young oppositionists had been criticized by moderate activists, who believed their stand to be too radical and, consequently, harmful to the country.³⁷

Each side of the conflict stood its ground. When “youth opposition” tried to carry on its uncompromising fight against the Communist regime, aiming at its complete overthrowing, the older generation, taking into consideration the reality of the time and the consequences of previous Polish uprisings, accepted compromise with the authorities as the only way Polish society could regain its freedom and national sovereignty. What is more, the older generation accused the youth of being too radical. Therefore it seems justifiable to look closer at the phenomenon of organized, political opposition of young people in the context of generation conflict and young people’s attempt to contribute “youthful”, original spirit to the political transformation of the People’s Republic of Poland during the last decade of its existence. What is more, the “young generation’s” protest was organized and strong enough to become, for most of its participants, a generation-forming experience.

One must ask, then, whether “youth opposition” is not the loser of the transformation, who, in spite of its huge commitment and great services, was left out, lost the political gambit and was forced to retire while

37 GIEŁŻYŃSKI, W.: Kości zostały rzucone. In: *Kontakt*, No. 3, 1989, p. 19, /za:/ KASPRZYCKI, R.: *Opozycja polityczna w Krakowie*, p. 146; GŁĘBOCKI, H.: „Ojcowie i dzieci” „Solidarności”. Ostatnie pokolenie młodzieży studenckiej w PRL jako czynnik polityczny w epoce „wielkiej transformacji” systemu komunistycznego 1988 – 1989. In: BERNACKI, W. – NAWROCKI, Z. – PASIER, W. – WÓJCIK, Z. (eds.): *Nie ma wolności bez Pamięci. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Ryszardowi Terleckiemu*. Kraków 2009, pp. 479 – 484.

still in its prime. Is it safe to claim that such an outcome of the political gambit of 1988-1989 resulted in the young generation's unfulfilled ambitions, causing it to get entangled in the fight with Polish Third Republic's authorities only to "settle a score"? As an example in support of such an interpretation of the reasons "youth opposition" got engaged in politics after 1990 one may give the Republican League's (Liga Republikańska, 1993 – 1999) achievements, program and rhetoric, a party established in December 1993, after Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland took over the power, its members mostly the representatives of "Generation'89". Nevertheless, is such an interpretation not an oversimplification of the genesis of the organization, one that does not take into account other, both social and political, factors? It is impossible to answer these questions now; therefore the issue of "youth opposition" and its role during 1989 and the events that followed still awaits further, detailed research and an in-depth analytical study.³⁸

Resumé

Autor si v príspevku kladie za cieľ ukázať málo známy spoločenský fenomén vzostupu a dynamiky hnutí mládežníckej opozície v Poľsku v 80. rokoch. Zameriava sa na predstavenie a genézu vzniku mládežníckych študentských organizácií, ktoré úzko súviseli s pôsobením *Solidarity* a vyhlásením stanného práva v roku 1981. Autor kladie otázky a určuje tézy, na ktoré sa jeho výskum v problematike mládežníckeho hnutia zameriava. Študentských spolkov pritom bolo viacero, pričom zároveň mali aj rozličné zameranie. Ich spoločnou platformou bol odpor proti komunizmu, ktorý ich zjednocoval. Študenti z rôznych spolkov sa podieľali na väčšine protikomunistických vystúpení v Poľsku v druhej polovici 80. rokov.

38 Zob. np. M. KAMIŃSKI, M. et. al. (eds.): *Dekomunizacja*. Warszawa 1999.

**4. panel:
Povstania a vzbury proti
komunistickým režimom**

**4th Block:
Insurrections and Rebellions
against the Communist Regimes**

Anti-Communist Armed Resistance in Romania, 1949 – 1962: An Overview

Alexandra GEROTA

The Romanian Communist Party (RCP), more than any other communist party in Eastern Europe, relied on military and technical help from Moscow. The real force that maintained communists in power was the Soviet army.¹ For this reason, the anti-communist resistance movement in Romania may be split into two periods. Before 1946 – 1947, resistance and protests were directed against crimes and abuses committed by the Red Army, which was, together with the RCP, seen by the population as an occupation army of a foreign power. Former parties were still allowed, so resistance came mainly from their members and followers, who organised demonstrations and, sometimes, acts of sabotage. This was the period of public open resistance. In 1946, the coalition led by the RCP officially won the elections, in reality through fraud, violence and intimidation. In late 1947, the King was forced to abdicate due to threats and blackmail.

Starting with this date, the Romanian state, melted into the RCP, took over responsibility for the repression. In 1949, the ‘Securitate’ political police was created, with NKVD officers at its head, and a period of raging terror began.

Allied sources (the United States Ambassador in Moscow, 1952; the United Kingdom Legation in Bucharest, 1953) explained this rigorous application of Marxist doctrine, among other reasons by: Romania’s geostrategic position being access to the south of the Balkan Peninsula (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary); the historical hostility between Russians

1 FEJTÖ, F.: *Histoire des démocraties populaires*. Paris 1952, p. 289.

and Romanians and the issue of World War II, Romania being a ‘liberated’ country before having signed the armistice with the USSR; and also by the way local communist leaders – the most cruel in Eastern Europe – were treating their fellow citizens².

Before the end of 1947, anti-communist resistance came from civil society: political parties and their youth organisations, and other types of organisation composed mainly of intellectuals, students and some of clergymen. These organisations were very active during the rigged elections in 1946 and, until 30 December 1947 when the King was forced to abdicate and the Socialist Republic was proclaimed, this date meant the end of democracy, civil and political freedom in Romania.

It is also important to stress the anti-communist resistance that came from the workers during the first years of the regime, through acts of sabotage for example. It was their way of reacting to the ‘working class’ communist propaganda, by trying to reappropriate their social identity.³

The tragic episode of collectivisation, which affected 80% of the country’s population, aimed to destroy the social category of landowning peasants; it led to the creation of partisan armed groups, who organised anti-communist guerillas in the mountains. The idea of an armed resistance started to propagate in 1949, when the expropriation of the peasants started, in order to create state-owned collective farms on the kolkhoz model.

Between 1948 and 1962, ten main centres of resistance were identified in the entire territory, each of them formed by several groups. A 1969 report from the ‘Securitate’ political police shows that about 1,200 subversive groups had been discovered and neutralised to date.⁴

These groups were formed by 30 to 40 people at most – underground, or rather guerilla combatants, who lived permanently in the mountains. The inhabitants of the nearby villages backed them, which could mean that the number of people actively involved in the resistance activity went

2 Quote by CIUPEA, I. – STANCUTA, T.: Represiune, sistem si regim penitenciar in Romania. 1945 – 1964. In: CESEREANU, R. (ed.): *Comunism si represiune in Romania*. Iasi 2006, p. 39.

3 RADOSAV, D.: Rezistenta anticomunista armata din Romania intre istorie si memorie. In: CESEREANU, R. (ed.): *Comunism si represiune in Romania*. Iasi 2006, p. 89.

4 Ibid.

up to 200. Their armament was made out of light weapons, such as rifles and submachine guns.⁵

The social composition of these groups was very mixed; all social categories were represented in anti-communist combat. However, the core command was generally assured by former Royal Army officers in 60% of the cases. Other social categories very present within resistance groups were schoolteachers, professors, peasants, priests and students.⁶

People were pushed to join mountain guerilla groups for political, economical or cultural-ethical reasons. Members of political parties declared illegal in 1947, and who were being persecuted or imprisoned, peasants oppressed during the collectivisation process who saw their land taken away from them and soldiers who had been in contact with Soviet realities during the Russia campaign were hostile to the communist regime since the very beginning.

Moreover, people started to experience a reversal of the values system, one of the pillars of communist totalitarianism. The way local communist leaders and activists were recruited was by shaking up the references of collective identity, as these went against a leadership system naturally focused on competition, goodwill, dignity, role models and social prestige. Thus, people could note that among the active communists were former offenders, individuals with no social status or the poorest, who used communist party membership as a means to escalate social levels.

Another element that led to the appearance of anti-communist attitudes was the intention of the authorities to destroy Christian values which had been, for centuries, deeply rooted in the collective identity.⁷

Among the actions organised by anti-communist guerillas were acts of sabotage like destroying railway tracks, transport routes and other communication means, mainly in the oil-producing areas, as well as ambushes and instigating peasant uprisings against collectivisation. Spontaneous acts of punishment for abuses committed by communist authorities and manifestations of hostility against collectivisation agents also took place. Direct attacks against townhalls or the headquarters of the 'militia', for example, were not systematic, they were organised generally as a reaction to a given situation.

5 Ibid., p. 93.

6 Ibid., p. 92.

7 Ibid., pp. 90 – 91.

Armed resistance combatants regularly sent messages to the US, French and British embassies in Bucharest in order to inform Western powers about their existence, in case an open conflict with the Soviets led to a national outburst, as they expected. Counter-propaganda actions took the form of leaflets, destroying communist symbols and slogans displayed in public places, destroying records in the rural areas attesting collectivisation and collection of production quotas – actions of anti-communist direct communication and persuasion within the local population.

Logistic activities were the third dimension of the resistance armed groups; they were ensured by the inhabitants of villages who supplied the resisters with food and guns.⁸

All these hostile acts coming from the population scared the communist authorities, but they also made them more determined in their repression strategy.

To that, we have to add that, unfortunately, resistance did not become a mass phenomenon. From the beginning, the number of people who decided to engage in a guerilla movement was rather limited, and the number of resisters, as well as their resources, grew smaller as they were caught or killed. For this reason, offensive actions became, in time, less frequent, and gave way to a defensive type of existence, as resisters were only struggling to escape the ‘Securitate’.

Political police employed several methods to take over armed resistance groups. Firstly, people who assisted these groups were arrested and tortured to make them give information; the families of combatants were persecuted and so used as a means of pressure. A method that was often used was the infiltration of agents within the resistance groups; sometimes, rewards were offered in exchange for denouncements, or informers were recruited among family members. Executions of resisters as a deterrent for the local population who might have been tempted to assist them were frequent, as their dead bodies were abandoned near the towns or villages of the region where the group was active⁹. If they got arrested, resisters were, in most cases, executed; the others were condemned to hard labour, or sentenced to long prison terms. Many of them died during gunfights with the Securitate troops.

The ‘Arsenescu-Arnautoiu’ group, active in the Fagarash Mountains between 1949 and 1958, is a relevant case study. The most known and

8 Ibid., pp. 95 – 96.

9 Ibid., p. 95.

representative group of the armed resistance was the one that was activated in the Fagarash Massif, the southern part of the Carpathians with the highest altitude. Actually known under the name of its two leaders (Arsenescu-Arnautoiu), the group initially took the name ‘The Haïdouks from Muscel’ (a town situated on the mountain side). Here we can find an element of Romanian social history revisited, as the ‘Haïdouks’ were peasants who fled exploitation to live in the woods as free men; no doubt this historical phenomenon was in the memory of the group members.

Colonel Arsenescu, a former division commander, and the two Arnautoiu brothers, former officers in the Royal Guard, together with a land-owning peasant and member of the National Peasants Party (Christian-Democratic) were the founders of the group. They decided to lead a resistance movement that would fight and punish all those who ‘sold themselves to the Russians’, destroyed Romania’s fundamental institutions and oppressed their own people. They intended to fight using the weapons and ammunition that the Colonel had hidden in the mountains.¹⁰

The composition of this group illustrates the social categories implied in the resistance movements. Fifteen people made up the heart of the movement, all of them from one village. There was a peasant family that would eventually die during gunfight; another family that came from the Bassarabia region; the village school teacher and his two sons, a student and a pupil; the village Orthodox priest and his son. During their first reunion, the priest invoked God’s help for their cause, while members took oath to fight against communism in arms.¹¹

Starting in 1952, Colonel Arsenescu gave up armed combat, but continued to hide in the mountains; he was arrested in 1960 with the other members that had survived, following a denunciation; they were all sentenced to death and executed in 1961. The Arnautoiu brothers, as well as Toma Arnautoiu’s wife, with another 16 resistants, had been captured and executed in 1958.¹² The peasant family that assisted the group with supplies was condemned to years in prison. They survived the particularly difficult conditions of detention; after 1989, they witnessed this unknown episode of national history. So did Toma Arnautoiu’s daughter, who, aged two in 1958, had been entrusted to an orphanage and only discovered who her parents were after 1989.

10 ARNAUTOIU, V. – RALUCA, I.: *Luptatorii din Munti*. Bucuresti 1997, p. 12.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 10.

Some of the Romanian armed resisters managed to survive and carry on their fight against the forces of the 'Securitate' until 1962, when the last of them were arrested, unlike armed resistance movements in other Central and Eastern European countries, which generally disappeared after four or five years of existence, after the coming to power of the communist parties.

In regard to this, anti-communist armed combat in Romania had several specificities that makes it different when compared to other resistance movements in Eastern Europe (for example, the Polish Armja Krajowa). These were led by organisations structured on a military model, with one central and unique command. The Romanian movement appeared spontaneously, without a central organisation; even if at the beginning one group, commanded by a former Royal Army general, called itself 'National Resistance Movement' and tried to take the head of the resistance, it didn't manage to extend its influence to the many other resistance groups. These groups had reduced dimensions, were isolated and maintained only random relations between them, and so information wasn't centralised. Such groups, or even individual resisters, were thus able to survive and counter the Securitate attempts to exterminate them.

In other countries from the communist bloc, the intention to lead a national insurrection that would overthrow the regime justified the hierarchical, military-like organisation, with a central command. Romanian pockets of resistance were scattered all over the territory (mainly on the mountain side), they were independent and mobile, never aimed to unite and survived with the aid of the local population.¹³

It is thus evident that they did not follow the strategy of a national insurrection, as they did not seem to consider that this could be achieved with the national population's own forces. However, these multiple armed resistance groups did not completely lack strategy or political thinking.

Their main purpose was to keep alive the resistance spirit among the population, and so to prepare the ground for the possibility of a national insurrection in case of an international conflict between the West and the USSR, and more precisely, at the moment when American troops would enter the country.

Most of the population was persuaded that American intervention was imminent. As one tends to interpret the facts according to one's own

13 HENEGARIU, N.: Introduction. In: ARNAUTOIU, V. – RALUCA, I.: *Luptatorii din Munti*, p. 6.

desires and needs, this mechanism gave birth to the myth of the arrival of the Americans, of the provident force coming from abroad¹⁴. However, this expectation had grounds in the historical reality of the time. It was fostered by the fact that people remembered the aid that Anglo-Americans allowed to democratic parties between 1945 and 1947, and also by the image of the ‘freedom-bringing American Army’, made popular by the Free Europe and Voice of America radio stations.

At the international level, a series of events encouraged the resisters in their expectations – mainly Tito’s dissident attitude towards Moscow, which created a possible conflict zone at the border with Romania. Tito refused to support Greek communists during the civil war, which led to them losing it. At the same time, the American intervention in the Korean civil war and the idea that the conflict might become global created the illusion that Western forces were ready to intervene against the communist camp. Finally, radio shows in Romanian broadcast from London, Paris or Madrid encouraged the combat of the resistant groups.¹⁵

In countries like the Czechoslovak Republic where a Communist Party existed before World War II, the communist economical and political project had a certain legitimacy; even in Poland, some intellectual elites shared Marxist thinking, even if it was clear that communism was a system imposed by force by an occupying power. However, after the hard suffering inflicted on the Poles during the war, peace and reconstruction were a priority for them, albeit under communist rule. Very soon, in most countries people faced communist realities and this weak legitimacy disappeared, which led to uprisings. None of this is true for Romania; communist or even socialist theories had absolutely no legitimacy or visibility before the end of World War II, as the Communist Party was declared illegal in 1923 for anti-national activities. Thus, opponents to communism found it hard to imagine that the regime would survive; and if it did, it wasn’t because of people’s adherence to communist ideas or trust in successive governments, but because of harsh Soviet intervention and repression and internal collaboration with it.

The year 1956 and the crushing of the Hungarian insurrection clearly showed that the world was divided into two influence zones, and was to remain divided for a long time, as Americans had no intention to organise

14 RADOSAV, D.: *Rezistența anticomunistă armată din România între istorie și memorie*, p. 93.

15 HENEGARIU, N.: *Introduction*, pp. 6 – 7.

a military intervention in order to support the anti-communist struggle in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite this withdrawal, which became obvious after 1956, despite the consolidation of the communist regime in Romania and the merciless terror against the whole population, and especially against those who supported the resistance, the last Romanian armed resisters managed to continue their hopeless fight for another four or five years.¹⁶

Resumé

Autorka sa vo svojej štúdií venuje problematike ozbrojeného protikomunistického odboja v Rumunsku v období po 2. svetovej vojne až do začiatku 60. rokov. Protikomunistický odpor súvisel už s príchodom Červenej armády, ktorá bola vo väčšine Rumunsku vnímaná ako okupačná armáda. V tomto období sa však väčšinou zameral na verejné protesty a demonštrácie. Až po tom, ako sa moci v štáte zmocnili rumunskí komunisti a začali realizovať politiku kolektivizácie, prerástol odpor do ozbrojenej formy a vytvárali sa partizánske skupiny. Neskoršie správy hovorili o existencii asi 1 200 protikomunistických skupín. Ich hlavnou činnosťou boli sabotáže a nabádanie k vzburám.

16 Ibid., p. 7.

Anti-Communist Guerilla in Croatia 1945 – 1951

Aleksandar JAKIR

New research on anti-communist guerilla in Croatia after World War II, as well as material on this subject from the U.S. Embassy Belgrade and Consulate Zagreb records in the National Archives in Washington DC, indicates a more appropriate picture of the levels of anti-communist resistance in Croatia than the Ustasha emigre organisation had promoted after the war.¹ Croatian guerrilla was called various names: Crusaders (*križari*), Cavers (*špiljari*), *Škripari*, *Kamišari* (cavers), *Jamari* (cavers), *Šumnjaci* (forest people), even White Partisans (*bijeli partizani*). However, only the name “Crusaders“ broke regional nicknames while other names were used only in some regions. There were literally hundreds of small „Križari“ (crusaders) groups scattered throughout Croatia proper and Bosnia and Herzegovina² in the immediate post-war years, but practically none ever presented any kind of serious military or political challenge to Tito’s government.³ Attempts to organise Ustasha guerillas in the areas

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- 1 See the second, enlarged edition of RADELIČ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 – 1950*. Split 2011. The author has based his study on a wide range of published and unpublished sources (see the impressive list of documents and literature on pp. 603 – 616). He uses material from various fonds in the Croatian state archive in Zagreb (Hrvatski državni arhiv), among them records from secret service (OZNA and Služba državne sigurnosti SRH) and the Public Prosecutor in Croatia. This short overview of the Križari movement after World War II is entirely indebted to and based on his findings.
 - 2 LUČIČ, I.: Hrvatska protukomunistička gerila u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1945 do 1951. In: *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, 2010, No. 3, pp. 631 – 670.
 - 3 For an account on political developments after 1945 see BILANDŽIČ, D.: *Hrvatska moderna povijest*. Zagreb 1999; GOLDSTEIN, I.: *Croatia: A History*. London 2001. GOLDSTEIN, I.: *Hrvatska povijest*. Zagreb 2008; GOLDSTEIN, I.: *Povijest Hrvatske*

held by the Yugoslav partisans began already in late 1944, before the end of World War II. Still, the majority of the guerilla groups were formed by former members of the military units of the so-called Independent State of Croatia after the end of the war. Crusaders were especially active in 1945 and 1946. Groups of *križari* (crusaders) and *škripari* resisted the communist authorities until the beginning of the 1950s, and both sides had losses in these showdowns.⁴

As Zdenko Radelić has concluded in his important study on the topic, the majority of „crusaders“ in Croatia were soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers of the defeated Armed Forces of the Independent State of Croatia.⁵ Most of them served in the Ustasha militia, and some served in the regular army (Domobranstvo) and in the Croatian legion units of the German army. Some were also members of the political branch of the Ustasha movement.

After the war ended in May 1945 with the collapse of the so-called Independent State of Croatia (NDH)⁶, different guerilla groups were organised. The Crusaders were not numerous, they were poorly organized, and not particularly well armed. There was no central command and control, poor or no contact between the various groups, no worked out plan for a continued guerrilla war against Communist forces, and no plan or way to start a general rebellion in Croatia against Communist rule. Working in almost total isolation, with little or no external support, and without the possibility of gaining any serious internal support, the Crusader groups were eliminated by the OZNA or later UDBA (Odjelenje za zaštitu naroda/ Department for Peoples Protection later Unutrašnja Državna Bezbednost

1945 – 2011. 1. Svezak 1945 – 1968. Zagreb 2011; RADELIĆ, Z.: *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945 – 1991. Od zajedništva do razlaza*. Zagreb 2006.

- 4 See JONJIĆ, T.: Organised Resistance to the Yugoslav Communist Regime in Croatia in 1945 – 1953. In: *Review of Croatian History*, 2007, No. 3, pp. 109 – 145. The author notes on p. 113, that Crusader Antun Tuna Butorac was arrested on the mountain of Dilj on 15 January 1955, and Radelić (p. 230) mentions that some Crusaders remained in hiding even until mid 1960's.
- 5 On the Independent State of Croatia see MATKOVIĆ, H.: *Povijest Nezavisne Države Hrvatske*. Zagreb 1994 and 2002, and the collection of works in RAMET, S. P. (ed.): *Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941 – 1945. Zbornik radova*. Zagreb 2008.
- 6 See PAVLOWITCH, K. S.: *Hitler's new disorder: the Second World War in Yugoslavia*. Columbia University Press 2008; TOMASEVICH, J.: *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941 – 1945: Occupation and Collaboration*. Stanford University Press 2001.

/ Interior State Security - the Yugoslav secret service/police).⁷ Most groups were destroyed or penetrated by UDBA agents within the first months after World War II. But despite draconian measures and punishments, it took the regime some years to eliminate the Croat armed resistance, and several more to exterminate the last remnants of the Crusader Movement.⁸

There were several reasons for the establishment of the Crusader guerilla movement. Besides the obvious ideological reasons which motivated those who were not willing to accept communist rule, in general living conditions and the economic situation after 1945 in a war exhausted country like Croatia were such that its not hard to imagine that some members of former military groups did not see any perspective for them than to continue fighting. The economic situation was in general very difficult. Villages and towns had been destroyed and damaged, the decimated population faced rationed supplies, and despite the regime's promises to redistribute goods and establish a socially just order, nationalisation and agrarian reform in the eyes of some Croats only worsened Croatia's war ravaged economy and provoked resistance. Tomislav Jonjić notes that generally in the first post-war years, the basic note in the political activities of those who showed active and passive resistance to the communist Yugoslav regime, was the hope that the armed Crusader Movement would result in overthrowing the communist regime and establishing an independent Croatian state.⁹ After the collapse of the NDH and defeat of Nazi-Germany, the political views of the Crusaders became pro-Western. They considered the United States of America and Great Britain their allies, although these democratic countries were at war with the former NDH. Crusaders counted on their support should a war with the Soviet Union ever break out. The behaviour of members of Crusader groups – and opponents of the new regime – was often conditioned by the expectations and rumours that the West would attack the Yugoslav communist regime.¹⁰ Obviously this hope quickly came to nothing.

7 See RADELIČ, Z.: OZNA u Hrvatskoj 1944 – 1946: Skica temeljnih značajki. In: IVE-LJIČ, I. – MATKOVIČ, S. – LAZAREVIČ, Ž. (eds): *Iz hrvatske povijesti 20. stoljeća – Iz hrvaške zgodovine 20. stoletja*. Ljubljana 2012, pp. 59 – 77.

8 See JONJIČ, T.: Organised Resistance to the Yugoslav Communist Regime in Croatia, pp. 117 – 136.

9 Ibid., pp. 111 – 112.

10 Ibid., pp. 114 – 117, who cites the record of an interview of a Crusaders' harbourer, Jago Tomac, made on 21 April 1947 at the office of the district UDB department for the district of Bjelovar, that the Crusaders in the area around Bjelovar were trying to

However, there can be no doubt that the Crusaders wanted to re-establish the Independent State of Croatia. Commonly the Crusader Movement was considered to be a form of „Ustasha guerilla“.¹¹ Especially in areas like Lika, Dalmatinska Zagora, and Herzegovina most of the Crusaders were former members of the armed forces of the Ustasha-state. Generally, the Crusaders viewed, as Zdenko Radelić puts it, the new Yugoslav communist state as enslavement of Croatia by Serbia, Serbs and “Croat traitors” (Croats who joined the communist partisans).¹² Crusaders strongly opposed communism and Yugoslavia and these were the main motives behind their struggle. Many of them also feared communist repression or revenge for the Ustasha crimes committed during the war. For this reason many members of the Ustasha militia or the political branch of the Ustasha movement, but also members of other military units of the former Ustasha state, refused to surrender and instead formed guerilla groups to fight for survival. They feared lawful punishment for the crimes they had previously committed, but sometimes they were simply victims of unjustified revenge. Struggle for survival and bare existence in the face of communist persecution forced many individuals not only to escape from punishment or revenge, but also to join the armed resistance. As shown, motivation for the continuation of struggle, as the Crusaders themselves believed, grew out of a wish for national liberation and was also an answer to the communist repression.

Despite the name, the Crusaders were not a religious movement. Religion was just a banner that they used to distinguish themselves from atheist communists. Most supporters of the Crusaders were Catholic but there were also Muslim members.¹³ Catholicism was but one element with

convince people „*that the whole world is fighting against communists and that they are supported by England and America, because the situation like this cannot last*“.

- 11 See JONJIĆ, T.: Organised Resistance to the Yugoslav Communist Regime in Croatia, p. 116, who also supports Radelić's assessment that it is not only that many among the Crusaders actually were Ustashas, but namely „*the main reason is that the basic tone to Crusaders, their military and political orientation, was given by members of the Ustasha movement and army*“; „*Undoubtedly among Crusaders the most numerous were members of the armed forces of NDH who immediately withdrew into the woods. They were followed by those who escaped out of fear of arrest, but also fugitives from camps and deserters from the Yugoslav Army*“ . See RADELIĆ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 – 1950*, p. 197).
- 12 RADELIĆ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 – 1950*, p. 573; Summary, p. 593.
- 13 According to a report from November 1946, there was only one percent of Muslims among Crusaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina. See JONJIĆ, T.: Organised Resistance to

which they could urge others to join the fight against the “godless communists“, but the regime used the fight with the Crusaders as an opportunity to fight another, in its eyes even more dangerous enemy: the Catholic church.¹⁴ In the rare sources connected with Crusader groups it can be seen that they often presented Catholicism as an important and valuable element of the Croatian nation, and acted in the name of Catholicism, although this was not approved by the Catholic church officially. However, it seems quite sure that in fact some members of the clergy were probably sympathetic toward crusaders.¹⁵ Priests appeared among the accused at the first „Crusader“ trails in 1945.¹⁶ Crusaders adopted the Ustasha view that partisans were a movement dominated by Serbs and communists, therefore an atheistic movement hostile toward Croatia. They spread propaganda that Yugoslav partisans were a Serbian, anti-Croat, movement. Even the fact that many Croats also joined the partisans did nothing to change this view. As mentioned, Crusaders were former members of the NDH military units, therefore elements of the formerly regular army transformed into

the Yugoslav Communist Regime in Croatia, p. 117; RADELIČ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 – 1950*, p. 104.

- 14 According to the incomplete data, the number of priests and monks killed by Yugoslav communists during and after the war reached 287 priests, 201 monks, 20 nuns, and 54 seminary students of theology and lay people – all together 601 victims. On the subject of persecution of the Catholic Church after 1945 see: AKMADŽA, M.: *Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj i komunistički režim 1945 – 1966*. Rijeka 2004; AKMADŽA, M.: The Position of the Catholic Church in Croatia 1945 – 1990. In: *Review of Croatian History*, 2006, No. 2, pp. 89 – 115; KOŽUL, S.: *Martirologij Crkve Zagrebačke*. Zagreb 1998; NIKIĆ, A.: *Lučonoše naše vjere i uljudbe – mrtvoslovnik hercegovačkih fratara*. Mostar 2004; BAKOVIĆ, A.: *Svećenici žrtve rata i poraća 1941 – 1945*. Zagreb 1994; BEZINA, P.: *Franjevci provincije Presvetoga otkupitelja – žrtve rata 1942 – 1948*. Split 1995; BEZINA, P.: *Progoni biskupa, svećenika i redovnika Splitske metropolije i Zadarske nadbiskupije 1941 – 1992*. Split 2000; FRANIĆ, A.: *Svećenici, mučenici – svjedoci komunističkog progona*. Dubrovnik 1996; KRIŠTO, J.: Postupak komunista prema vjerskim službenicima, osobito pripadnicima Katoličke crkve nakon rata. In: *1945 – razdjelnica hrvatske povijesti*. Zagreb 2006, pp. 231 – 255.
- 15 See the chapter „Križari i Katolička crkva“ (The Crusaders and the Catholic church). In: RADELIČ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 – 1950*, pp. 155 – 203.
- 16 For instance, Father Ivo Bjelokosić, together with Jakov Andrijuci, was convicted on 18 June 1945 for distributing leaflets with contents against the state and providing assistance to Crusaders. See JONJIĆ, T.: Organised Resistance to the Yugoslav Communist Regime in Croatia, p. 137.

a guerilla organisation.¹⁷ This is, as Radelić also notes, exactly the opposite to the Yugoslav army which was formed from partisans who were themselves a guerilla movement.

The cause for formation of Crusaders was in elimination of communism, destruction of Yugoslavia and re-establishment of independent Croatia.¹⁸ The former leadership of the NDH stated in all its documents that their main goal was re-establishment of the Independent State of Croatia, and they tried to denounce any previous or current ties with fascism or national-socialism, what, of course, was not very convincing.¹⁹ The re-established Croatian state, so they said, would be based on principles of popular sovereignty and multiparty democracy. Croatia would establish close ties with European and the United Nations. In the plans for the re-establishment of the independent Croatian state, the former Ustasha leadership of the NDH in exile first planned to achieve victory by means of an armed uprising. Representatives of the Ustasha leadership in exile occasionally contacted American and British intelligence services. Allied intelligence agents were mostly interested in gathering information about the military situation in Yugoslavia and Croatia. Western secret services can be assumed were also interested in the possibilities and future plans of the Crusaders. Although Western governments never backed the exiled Ustasha leadership, its agents used contacts with the Ustasha to gain valuable information. War between the Western allies and Soviet bloc never broke out, and for this reason Western intelligence services were never interested in achieving closer cooperation with the Crusaders.²⁰

The exiled Ustasha leadership overestimated the strength of the guerilla movement. The appearance of the Crusaders seemed like a positive and dramatic change of fortunes after the disastrous collapse of the NDH in May 1945. The events around mid-May 1945 and the withdrawal of the troops of the so-called Independent State of Croatia and of numerous civilians, who became the victims of mass executions after they became

17 See MUNOZ, S. J.: *For Croatia and Christ: The Croatian Army in World War II 1941 – 1945*. Bayside NY, 1996.

18 See the chapter „Križari: nastanak, razvoj i nestanak“ (The Crusaders: Fornation, Development and Vanishing). In: RADELIĆ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 – 1950*, p. 205 – 258.

19 See the cited documents in the chapter „Prisege i leci kao programski dokumenti“. In: RADELIĆ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 – 1950*, pp. 91 – 103.

20 See RADELIĆ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 – 1950*, pp. 71 – 75, „Križari i obaveštajne službe SAD-a i Velike Britanije“.

prisoners of the communist-led Yugoslav army in May 1945, in my opinion can also be named as a sound reason that provoked resistance.

These killings are associated with the name of *Bleiburg* and the *Way of the Cross*, a matter which is treated very differently in Croatian historiography.²¹ However, there is no longer any controversy about the basic facts, even though historiography emphasizes that there are still sources that continue to be unavailable and that “not all historical facts have as yet been accurately confirmed”²². The total losses connected to Bleiburg, according to established estimates and allegations cited in more recent literature, could amount to between 70,000 to 80,000 victims of which Croatian losses are estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 victims.²³ In May 1945, members of the Armed Forces of the Independent State of Croatia, remnants of the German, Slovenian and Chetnik military formations and the vast columns of civilians retreated towards the Austrian border, with the intention of surrendering to the British forces. One part of the column of refugees fell into the hands of the Yugoslav Army already on Slovenian territory, while the other one managed to reach the Bleiburg Field and to surrender to the British Army. However, the British handed them over to the Yugoslav Army, which subsequently started squaring accounts with the prisoners. The communist propaganda spoke of “settling accounts with the people’s enemy”. Today, there can be no doubt that this was a massive crime against the prisoners that was systematically carried out by the Yugoslav authorities. The terms *Bleiburg Tragedy* and *Way of the Cross*, refer to the Austrian town of Bleiburg in Carinthia, close to where the tragedy of the prisoners (Croatian and others) started, and the fate that awaited them afterwards on the numerous mass execution grounds and lengthy marches throughout former Yugoslavia. Already in the early post-war years, the pro-Ustasha political emigration began to build a mythological and emotional symbol of the collective tragedy around the Bleiburg and Way of the Cross events.

21 See PAVLAKOVIĆ, V.: Red Stars, Black Shirts: Symbols, Commemorations, and Contested Histories of World War Two in Croatia. In: NCEEER Working Paper. See URL <http://www.nceeer.org/Papers/papers.php> or “*The Commemorative Culture of Bleiburg, 1990 – 2009.*” In: BOSTO, Š. – CIPEK, T. (eds.): *Kultura sjećanja: 1945 – Povijesni lomovi i svladavanje prošlosti.* Zagreb 2009, pp. 167 – 194.

22 See GRAHEK, M.: Bleiburg i Križni put u hrvatskim udžbenicima povijesti. In: FLECK, H.-G. – GRAOVAC, I. (eds.): *Dijalog povjesničara – istoričara 9,* Zagreb 2005, p. 641; GRAHEK, M.: *Bleiburg i Križni put.* Zagreb 2009.

23 See GRAHEK, M.: *Bleiburg i Križni put.*

This symbol was interpreted as the focal point that gathered and united the politically divided émigrés.²⁴

Actually, in some of the émigré circles, it was said that the number of the Bleiburg Tragedy victims was in the hundreds of thousands, from about 200,000 to as many as 500,000. There is no doubt that such numbers are exaggerated. It is obvious that the followers of the Ustasha movement systematically inflated the number of the Bleiburg and the Way of the Cross victims, just as the followers of the Communist ideologies minimized this number or kept silent about the actual number of victims. As a relevant source on the number of victims, most historians cite the research conducted by the demographers Vladimir Žerjavić and Bogoljub Kočović. In his work entitled *Obsession and megalomania surrounding Jasenovac and Bleiburg*, Vladimir Žerjavić came to the conclusion that “the losses linked to Bleiburg could amount to about fifty thousand”, after scrupulously weighing and evaluating the veracity of available data.²⁵ This is the figure most widely accepted among historians that have dealt with this topic, in spite of the fact that it is, of course, difficult to speak of “the overall number”.²⁶ If we take a look at the majority of the writings published on this topic over the last decades, it becomes clear that each side that drew politically motivated conclusions certainly had its motives to do so.²⁷ The mass crime that occurred in May 1945 is still a stumbling block for historiographers. Considering the still present emotions that are tied to

24 See GOLDSTEIN, I.: *Hrvatska 1918–2008*. Zagreb 2008, p. 368. GOLDSTEIN, I.: *Povijest Hrvatske 1945 – 2011, 1. Svezak 1945–1968*. Zagreb 2011.

25 ŽERJAVIČ, S.: *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga*. Zagreb 1992, p. 77. ŽERJAVIČ, S.: *Demografski i ratni gubitci Hrvatske u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraću, Bleiburg 1945 – 1995*. Zagreb 2000.

26 GOLDSTEIN, I.: *Povijest Hrvatske 1945 – 2011, 1. Svezak 1945 – 1968*, p. 88.

27 Sadly, we are witnesses to the fact that the number of victims is still being used for manipulation, politicization and ideologization. Their number is either reduced or increased, either way a truly reprehensible act. The notion of collective guilt is not acceptable, since there were specific individuals that gave the orders and others that executed them, as well as the victims of such decisions. It therefore still has to be determined who was responsible and to what extent anyone influenced events. Already back then in May 1945 the Ustasha and Croatian Home Guardsmen (domobrani) commanders, by citing a large number of victims, attempted to convince the Americans and the English that the issue concerned the exodus of a nation fleeing from the communists, and that the Croatian nation was subjected to genocide. The communist authorities, on the other hand, later on tried to diminish their own guilt and to justify the crimes by downplaying the number of actual victims. Attempts at manipulation should be condemned, whether for political, economic, personal or other purposes.

this issue, the question continues to remain open, in spite of numerous historical and journalistic publications devoted to this topic.²⁸ Alas, the anti-communist resistance movement, in my opinion, can not be fully understood without taking into account this background.

As already mentioned, after their defeat, the Ustasha leadership in exile hoped they would return and re-establish Croatia as an independent state with the help of new allies. Several Ustasha officers and officials of high rank secretly returned to Croatia during 1945 and 1946 to establish contacts with the Crusaders. The most elaborate plan of the Ustasha leadership which aimed to unite all the guerilla groups was set in motion in 1947. This plan was known under the code name „April, 10th“ (the Independent State of Croatia, NDH, was proclaimed on 10 April, 1941) and it ended in total failure after the Yugoslav political police organised „Operation Gvardijan“ and, during 1947 and 1948, successfully captured large numbers of Ustasha representatives who infiltrated Croatia. Nevertheless, Operation 10th April can be seen as one of the most important episodes of the Croatian resistance against Communist Yugoslavia.²⁹

By the beginning of 1947, elements of anti-Communist Croats, mostly former Ustasha officers or high ranking Domobrans during the NDH years considered an attempt at armed resistance within Communist controlled Croatia. Most of them knew that armed groups of “Križari” (Crusaders) had been haphazardly organized in the last days of the NDH, but there was no direct contact between the émigré Croats and the units left behind to offer resistance to the Communists. A so-called “Croatian National Committee” had been formed in 1946, in order to facilitate aid to anti-

28 In his numerous historiographic works, Vladimir Geiger thoroughly covered the question of Croatian losses during World War II and in the post-war period caused by the National Liberation Army and the Partisan Yugoslav forces, or the later Yugoslav Army and communist government. See GEIGER, V.: Bleiburg. In: DESPOT, Z.: *Tito. Tajne vladara. Najnoviji prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza*. Zagreb 2009, p. 319. GEIGER, V.: Osvrt na važnije žrtvoslove u Drugom svjetskom ratu i poraču objavljene u Republici Hrvatskoj 1991 – 2004. godine. In: FLECK, H.-G. – GRAOVAC, I. (eds.): *Dijalog povjesničara – istoričara* 9, pp. 621 – 639 or GEIGER, V.: Tito i likvidacija hrvatskih zarobljenika u Blajburgu 1945. In: *Istorija 20. veka*, Vol. 28, 2010, No. 2, pp. 29 – 52 or GEIGER, V.: Ljudski gubici Hrvatske u Drugome svjetskom ratu i u poraču koje su prouzročili Narodnooslobodilačka vojska i Partizanski odredi Jugoslavije/Jugoslavenska armija i komunistička vlast Brojdbeni pokazatelji (procjene, izračuni, popisi). In: *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, Vol. 42, 2010, No. 3, pp. 693 – 722.

29 See JONJIČ, T.: Organised Resistance to the Yugoslav Communist Regime in Croatia, p. 115; and the chapter „Akcija 10. Travnja i Operacija Gvardijan“. In: RADELIČ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 – 1950*, pp. 143 – 153.

Communist rebels in Croatia. In late 1947, based on the reports coming from Croatia, the “Committee” received orders to send into Croatia a group of trained men equipped with radios, in order to establish contact with the Križari, and in turn organize communications between the rebels in country and the political/military leadership abroad. Unfortunately for the “Committee”, the “rebellion” in the country was completely false intelligence, and the presumption that there were massive anti-Communist forces just waiting to go in action against Communist rule in Croatia was a falsehood perpetrated by the Yugoslav UDBA counter-intelligence (this particular operation by the UDBA was headed by Ivan Krajačić, a Croatian Communist and Partisan officer during WW2). The goal of the Communist operation was to lure high-ranking anti-Communists into Yugoslavia, under the premise that a rebellion was about to start in Croatia, and that experienced commanders were needed to take these anti-Communist forces into combat. Completely falling for the communist deception, the “Croatian National Committee” dispatched former high-ranking Ustasha officers into Croatia, equipped with a radio and a code book, and orders to make contact with a “Križari” group on the Papuk Mountain (near Slavenska Požega). Upon successful contact with the “Križari”, the group was to advise the “Committee”, and an armed group of high-ranking and experienced Ustashe would enter Yugoslavia and take over command of the upcoming uprising in Croatia. Miloš’ group successfully entered Yugoslavia through Hungary, and made its way to Papuk. However, the “Križari” - that they met up with in July 1947 - were in fact UDBA agents in disguise. Miloš and Vrban were arrested, while Grgić was killed while offering resistance. Using the code-book found on Miloš, the UDBA made contact with the “Committee”, and lured several more of the command groups of Ustashe into Yugoslavia. By the end of August 1948, when “Operation Gvardijan” came to an end, a total of 96 Croatian anti-communists had been arrested. Some of the groups even came before the agreed time, but were captured nevertheless. In the trial held in 1948 in Zagreb 43 were sentenced to death, 20 by hanging, and 23 by shooting, 2 were sentenced to lifelong prison, 9 were sentenced to between 15 and 20 years in prison.³⁰

30 Unfortunately there is no comprehensive study giving an exact number of political prisoners in the prisons of Stara Gradiška, Srijemska Mitrovica, Lepoglava, Zenica, Foča, and Mostar, and the camps in Sisak, Velika Pisanica, Gospić, and elsewhere. Tomislav Jonjić gives the number, in the Penitentiary and Correctional Home in Lepoglava alone, of some 12,500 political prisoners who served their sentences there (JONJIĆ, T.: Organised

Some members of Crusader groups denounced the symbol used by the Ustasha movement during the existence of the NDH. Most of them wore a cross and called themselves crusaders to emphasise their animosity toward the communists. Many retained the U (for Ustasha) badge on their caps and uniforms with the addition of the cross. The exiled Ustasha leadership explicitly forbade the use of the fascist arm salute. There is no information about the crusaders really using this salute, although it is highly likely that this discredited symbol of the Ustasha dictatorship was abandoned by the Crusaders. According to the Ustasha ideology, Bosnian Muslims were also part of the Croat nation. For this reason the Ustasha leadership considered abolishing the name „Crusaders“ altogether. But these plans were never implemented; the term „Crusader“ was retained and for that reason few, if any, Bosnian Muslims ever joined this guerilla movement.

Crusaders were active in all parts of Croatia, except in Istria, coastal parts of Dalmatia and on the islands. Still, some crusaders were active in the area of the northern Croatian Adriatic coast and on the islands of Pag and Rab. Crusaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina had similar military and political plans, but they never formed firm ties with Crusaders in Croatia. The activities of the Crusaders in the province of Vojvodina were negligible and the Crusaders in Slovenia were anti-communists but not anti-Yugoslav.³¹

During the winter of 1946 – 1947 most guerilla groups broke down, and this continued until the end of 1947; after that, the few remaining groups were forced to fight for survival. The Crusaders were not able to organise a long-lasting resistance. The last guerilla actions were recorded in 1951 when the last Crusader group was formed. Zdenko Radelić estimates the approximate number of crusaders in Croatia in the period between 1945 and 1950 between 3500 and 4000 crusaders. Documents of the Yugoslav secret police estimated the number of crusaders in Croatia at 2500 in 1945,

Resistance to the Yugoslav Communist Regime in Croatia, p. 126). According to some sources, by late 1947 around 5,000 prisoners were confined in Lepoglava. The majority of them were political prisoners, and most of these were members of the Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP).

31 See „Prikaz križarskih skupina po područjima“. In: RADELIČ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 – 1950*, pp. 259 – 495.

540 in 1946, 510 in 1947 and 243 in 1948. The number of crusaders in 1949 and 1950 can be estimated at several dozens of men.³²

The level of guerilla activities depended on the season of the year. The Crusaders were more active in the spring-autumn period. During winter they tried to find suitable shelter. In the spring-autumn period crusaders sheltered in caves and huts deep in the woods. During winter they mostly hid in the homes of relatives or other supporters, often in bunkers constructed near the houses. Many guerilla groups paid a great deal of attention to political activities especially by distributing political leaflets.³³

On the basis of evidence Zdenko Radelić comes to the conclusion that the Crusaders were divided into more than 200 separate groups without organised chains of command and without unified political leadership, and he estimates their number between 1945 and 1950 to less than 4000 for the whole period.³⁴

One of the main features of these groups was the fact that they operated in their native areas. Crusader groups were usually small and numbered between five and ten members. Smaller groups usually kept their activities at a low level. Bigger groups were rare and existed only in 1945 and 1946. During that period smaller groups sometimes united for joint actions, after which every group returned to independent activity. Almost without exception the crusaders never attempted to increase their strength by mobilising the civilian population. Most of the crusader groups never had an organised chain of command and rarely respected any kind of military discipline. Low discipline, drunkenness and internal disputes characterised most of the guerilla groups. Cooperative enterprises were often attacked by crusaders because they symbolised communism. Besides that, cooperative enterprises and their stores were often attacked to supply the crusaders with the goods they needed. Large parts of the civilian population lived in poverty, and in order to win their hearts and minds

32 See RADELIĆ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 - 1950*, pp. 543 - 558.

33 Crusaders never attempted to re-establish administrative bodies of the former NDH, but they did organise Crusaders councils in some villages despite the fact that they never had firm military control over any wider area. These councils secured supplies, gave shelter to and informed crusaders about the movements of the Yugoslav army and police. Many individuals secretly supported and sheltered the Crusaders, but they were never part of any organisation. Larger-scale public support of the population for crusaders was possible only in some areas immediately after the collapse of the NDH.

34 See „Brojčani podaci“ (Figures). In: RADELIĆ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 - 1950*, pp. 543 - 558.

Crusaders mostly avoided taking away their private property. Of course, there were exceptions to this rule, especially later when Yugoslav security forces became more efficient in fighting the crusaders. Gradually, the support of the population for crusaders dwindled because of increasing government pressure and growing conformity to the new regime. For this reason Crusaders increasingly took what they needed by force and were not able to share much-needed supplies with their supporters. For some crusader groups plunder became the most important activity and banditry became inseparable from guerilla warfare. Some guerilla groups transformed into bandit groups, and some groups were formed for the sole purpose of plundering. The Crusaders often attacked communist officials. This was also a way of securing supplies. Military-style actions occurred only occasionally. Several times Yugoslav army motor vehicles were ambushed and many soldiers died in such attacks. There were also many attacks on smaller police patrols. The crusaders never captured any village or town and never placed any larger area under their control. They often entered villages where there were no representatives of state authorities. Contrary to the military logic of any guerilla organisation, which considers constant military activity more important than the number of available men or weapons, the crusaders mostly kept their military actions at a low level. They never conducted any larger action of military importance. They never captured or besieged any larger territory, town or village, nor did they ever capture any military barracks, destroy any military or police unit or cause large-scale disruption of communications. They never damaged or put out of production facilities of great economic importance. Still, their attacks on individuals, occasional attacks on communications and on cooperatives prevented the complete transition of society from war to peace. Crusaders stirred up strong feelings of insecurity among the civilian population and especially among communist officials and supporters.

Radelić states that, although the Crusaders were fierce enemies of Yugoslavia and the Serbs, they never attacked villages inhabited by Serbs.³⁵ The crusaders attacked soldiers, policemen, communist party or state officials as such, not because, or not solely because they were Serbs. Crusaders produced a very small amount of propaganda material, and their propaganda activities were mainly restricted to oral communication. What little is left of their propaganda material does not contain messages

35 RADELIĆ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 – 1950*, p. 598.

against Serbs. It is highly probable that communist party or Yugoslav secret Police would have registered in their documents any sign of crusader actions or propaganda aimed specifically at the Serbs. Crusader groups were only active in rural areas which provided them with supplies and shelter. Crusader activities in towns were limited to low-profile actions (writing of anti-communist slogans, destruction of communist posters and other communist propaganda material, collection of weapons). „Terrorist organisations“, as Yugoslav secret police called these groups, were mostly discovered and their members arrested immediately after they were found. Most of these groups were made of secondary school and university students. Crusader actions in towns were negligible and for this reason they should be considered primarily a rural guerilla organisation. Although they used every opportunity to appear in any village where there were no policemen or soldiers, the crusaders never succeeded in taking control of larger territory. For this reason they were never secure against continuous Yugoslav police and army actions which forced them to be constantly on the move. For this reason many crusaders who preferred hiding and their supporters were forced to leave their shelters and homes and flee. Others chose to hide from the search parties.

The communist regime used its secret police apparatus for a merciless fight against the crusaders but also against the remaining Serb Chetniks.³⁶ Communists used political and propaganda measures to persuade the crusaders to surrender, but the main emphasis was placed on military and police actions (search parties, ambushes and round-ups of suspects). Relatives of the crusaders were threatened and physically abused and their families resettled to other distant areas. The most effective method was the infiltration of Yugoslav secret police agents into crusader groups. These agents were often former Ustasha or captured crusaders who were promised freedom in exchange for their help in capturing or killing other crusaders. After the capture of crusaders Yugoslav police often executed them on the spot or after interrogation. At other times captured crusaders were freed by the authorities and not put on trial. Yugoslav courts sentenced crusaders, especially their leaders, to death or long-term prison sentences. The repressive methods of the communist regime dissuaded many individuals who wanted to join the crusaders but at the same time many were left with no other option except to struggle for their lives.

36 See „Udba: predvodnik protukrižarske borbe“. In: RADELIČ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 - 1950*, pp. 559 - 571.

Yugoslav authorities proclaimed several amnesties and some crusaders were freed immediately after their capture. Such actions increased the popularity of the communist regime and helped to pacify the situation in the country. Communists often tried to slander their political enemies by accusing them of cooperation with the Ustasha and the crusaders. Such accusations were the most effective means of struggle against potential political opponents who presented an obstacle in the creation of complete communist dictatorship. The main political enemies were the Croatian Peasant Party and the Catholic church whose independence threatened the communist ideological monopoly. Many accusations against the Peasant Party and the Catholic church, including those which suggested their connection with the crusaders, were fabricated by the communist authorities and the Yugoslav secret police. Generally, armed resistance against the regime was covered up in order to diminish its importance and possible influence on all parts of the population dissatisfied with the communist regime.

In fact, Crusaders were never politically organised, although this is an important element of any guerilla movement. The Ustasha leadership in exile formed a body called the Croatian National Resistance (*Hrvatski Narodni Otpor*), but this body never achieved real control over the crusader groups which operated in Croatia. Many crusaders wanted to enlist the cooperation of the Croatian Peasant Party, which was the most important Croatian political party before World War II, and also wanted to establish closer ties with the Catholic church.

The Yugoslav regime depicted crusaders as a symbol of backwardness, hatred and bigotry who, according to the communists, tried to prevent the creation of a rich, just and free socialist society for all national groups within Yugoslavia. In accordance with the changed historical circumstances the Crusaders tried to modify the exclusive racist policy of the Ustasha, but they were incapable of countering communist advantage achieved through their military and political victory in World War II. Radical communist policy toward the defeated enemies with elements of Serb revenge against Croats was being justified as punishment for the Ustasha crimes committed during the war. The crusaders had no foreign assistance and also for this reason they vanished quite soon.³⁷

37 See Summary in RADELIČ, Z.: *Križari - gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945 – 1950*, pp. 593 – 601.

Resumé

Autor sa venuje otázke protikomunistických partizánskych oddielov, ktoré vznikli v Chorvátsku krátko po 2. svetovej vojne. Autor svoju štúdiu postavil na materiáloch z Veľvyslanectva USA v Belehrade a konzulátu v Záhrebe, pochádzajúcich z Národného archívu vo Washingtone, D. C. Poukázal na to, že tieto materiály poskytujú presnejší obraz o stupni odboja „Križarov“ v Chorvátsku, aký šírila ustašovská emigrantská organizácia po vojne. Po skončení vojny v máji 1945 a páde Nezávislého štátu Chorvátsko sa organizovali rôzne partizánske skupiny. Vytvorenie križiackeho partizánskeho hnutia malo niekoľko dôvodov. Križiaci chceli obnoviť Nezávislý štát Chorvátsko. Na novú komunistickú Juhosláviu pozerali ako na zotročenie Chorvátska Srbom, Srbmi a „chorvátskymi zradcami“ (Chorvátmi, ktorí sa pridali ku komunistickým partizánom). Križiaci boli veľmi proti komunizmu a proti Juhoslávii a toto boli hlavné motívy ich boja za nezávislý chorvátsky štát. Mnohí z nich sa taktiež obávali komunistickej represie alebo pomsty za zločiny, ktoré Ustašovci spáchali počas vojny. Križiaci neboli nikdy politicky organizovaní, i keď toto je dôležitý prvok akéhokoľvek partizánskeho hnutia. Križiaci boli aktívni vo všetkých oblastiach Chorvátska okrem Istrie, pobrežných častí Dalmácie a ostrovov. Autor analyzuje všetky aspekty križiackych aktivít, ako boli útoky na vojakov, policajtov, predstaviteľov komunistickej strany či štátu, výroba propagačných materiálov a pod. Ich odboj mal všetky znaky občianskej vojny a rebélie voči komunistickým úradom.

The Unknown Resistance Movement

Valery KATZOUNOV

It is acknowledged that the Bulgarians, unlike Germans, Hungarians, Czechs and Poles did not have a revolution against the Soviet regime and the communist Government. But the truth is quite different. The Bulgarians not only resisted, but actually they were the first in Eastern Europe to rebel against the new regime.

This resistance is known as the Goryani Movement or Goryanstvo – an armed resistance against the communist regime established after the 9 September in 1944 in Bulgaria. It occurred as a reaction against the communist terror and continued to exist until 1956. The participants in this movement were called Goryani because of the fact that they were hiding in the forests.

For understandable reasons, this hard and prolonged struggle of the Bulgarians against the establishment of a communist dictatorship in Bulgaria remained almost unknown until recently. The deep analysis and promotion of the Goryani Movement would destroy the myth that only Bulgarians had not rebelled against the regime imposed by Moscow. During the first months after 9 September 1944 the new Government of the Fatherland Front put the country to the so-called “red terror”. Thirty thousand people were killed or announced “missing without a trace”.¹ In response to this repression, hundreds of people, sometimes entire families, tried to escape and hide from this repression. It is believed that at that time the Goryani and their helpers were around 10,000. The Goryani themselves were probably about 2,000, and their illegal organizations,

1 See: Шарланов, Д. История на комунизма в България. Т. 1, С., 2009, pp. 261 – 263.

600. Many people from different social strata in Bulgaria joined the movement. According to a report prepared by State Security in 1951 they were hundreds of farmers, nationalists, ex-communists, former policemen, Trotskyites and anarchists, former officers and members of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization.²

In response to the resistance movement against the pro-Soviet Government in Bulgaria in May 1947 there was established a special department, the First Directorate of the State Security to combat the “counterrevolution”.³ The main task of that department was to identify and liquidate the illegal organizations and the Goryani groups and bands, called “the bandits” by the communist Government.⁴ For this purpose, immediately after the formation of the First Department on May 4 1948 it developed a special *Instruction to organize the agents in the fight against political banditry*.

The legal political resistance and the illegal armed form of resistance occurred simultaneously. But until the beginning of 1947 only the legal form had a priority and they prepared the sociopolitical base for the illegal one, developing and promoting its programme goals among the population. Today it is difficult to establish from the records and reports of the State Security, of the Internal and Border forces as well as those of the Military Intelligence what was the exact number of the illegal organizations. In various State Security reports you can find fairly convincing evidence. In 1945 according to reports of the Military Intelligence and State Security, the Goryani were 173 people while the illegal organizations had over 490 members.⁵ The Goryani Movement grew rapidly in 1947 and 1948.⁶ According to information for the whole of the country, as well as on the districts (Sofia, Plovdiv, Stara Zagora, Vratsa, Varna, Bourgas, Gorna Djoumayya and Shumen) it was reported that new Goryani bands and illegal organizations were formed. At the end of 1948, the Goryani were already 780 people in number while those who were members of illegal organizations numbered 2960 persons.⁷

2 Ibid., T. 2, pp. 133 – 141.

3 Архив на МВР, ф. 1, оп. 11, а. е. 2, pp. 1 – 2.

4 Ibid., ф. 13, оп. 3, а. е. 809, pp. 7 – 8.

5 Шарланов, Д. История на комунизма в България. Т. 2, С., 2009, с. 132.

6 Архив на МВР, ф. 13, оп. 1, а. е. 418, л. 1 – 3.

7 Ibid. ф. 13, оп. 1, а. е. 372, л. 23; а. е. 418, л. 1-2; а. е. 420, pp. 1 – 2.

During the subsequent years (1949 – 1951), the Goryani Movement acquired a mass character. A report of the State Security states that: “*Throughout the whole of 1950, the illegal organizations and groups were growing like mushrooms ...*”.⁸ However, it was very difficult to separate “the Goryani” from the other political opponents of the communist regime. In 1951 there were 176 groups and 1,196 participants while 1,511 resistance members were arrested.

However, 68% of them were followers of the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union “N. Petkov” and the Agrarian Youth Union banned in August 1947. This ratio changed considerably in 1953. From the established 127 illegal organizations and the people arrested by the State Security, only 4.7% of these were from the Union of N. Petkov, while the others were “*enemies from the other lines*”.⁹

Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain the exact social composition of the Goryani Movement. These were hostile groups against the regime that had been formed for different reasons: kinship, a former political affiliation, people deprived of property, those under political pressure, and others.

By the summer of 1955, when the Goryani Movement gradually subsided, 28 new bands were created. State Security had also detected about 160 single gunmen, called by the departments “the vagrants”. Most of them initiated the formation of illegal organizations on the ground, while others managed to organize bands with their own participation. At the same time, from Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia 52 armed groups of political immigrants crossed the border with Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia and entered into Bulgaria.¹⁰ With their arrival in the country, some of them initiated the establishment of illegal organizations and Goryani bands. They had the task of organizing a mass armed struggle against the communist rule. Others, however, merely performed assignments of foreign intelligence, and therefore could not be attributed to the Goryani Movement.

The information about the Goryani Movement is scattered in different documents created at different times. According to the sources, by the end of 1948 the Goryani were about 780 people in number.¹¹ Another report

8 Шарланов, Д. История на комунизма в България. Т. 2, С., 2009, р. 132.

9 Архив на МВР, ф. 13, оп. 1, а. е. 1822, pp. 21 – 22.

10 Ibid., а. е. 1311, л. 8; а. е. 811, pp. 5 – 6; а. е. 796, р. 7; а. е. 638, р. 38.

11 Шарланов, Д. История на комунизма в България. Т. 2, С., 2009, р. 134.

states that by 30 July 1951 many Goryani and 1,000 other persons were captured and liquidated.¹² In a report of 8 March 1952 it was stated that there had been investigated 2,560 out of 3,165 illegal political parties, most probably Goryani were investigated. It was recognized that there were quite a number of illegal armed groups, which were not yet included in the reports of the intelligence services.¹³

From the second half of 1953, the armed struggle began to recede.¹⁴ State Security noted in their records and reports that “*since 1953 there were no attempts to create rogue groups while the number of illegal organizations was steadily decreasing*”. The main reason for this was the change in international relations. The issues between the US and the USSR entered a new stage. The armed conflict between them became less likely.

Only a few people of the Goryani Movement survived. They had been sentenced to death or killed without a trial and their families and relatives were persecuted and oppressed for decades.

Resumé

Autor sa venuj otázke Gorjanského protikomunistického hnutia, ozbrojeného odboja voči komunistickému režimu, ktoré vzniklo v Bulharsku po 9. septembri 1944. Bola to reakcia na komunistický teror a toto hnutie existovalo až do roku 1956. Účastníci tohto hnutia sa nazývali Gorjani, pretože sa skrývali v horách. Donedávna bol tento ťažký a dlhý boj Bulharov proti nastoleniu komunistickej diktatúry v ich krajine takmer neznámy. Z hnutia Gorjanov prežilo iba niekoľko ľudí. Odsúdili ich na smrť alebo ich zabili bez súdu a ich rodiny a príbuzných po desaťročia prenasledovali a utláčali. Táto štúdia osvetľuje operácie a činnosť členov tohto hnutia.

12 Архив на МВР, ф. 13, оп. 1, а. е. 891, р. 6.

13 Ibid., оп. 3, а. е. 943, л. 9, 12; а. е. 892, р. 20.

14 Ibid., оп. 1, а. е. 1311, р. 5.

Protikomunistické a antisovietske aspekty pôsobnosti oddielov Ukrajinskej povstaleckej armády na území Slovenska v rokoch 1945 – 1947¹

Michal ŠMIGEL'

Propagandistické a únikové vpády niekoľkých oddielov Ukrajinskej povstaleckej armády (UPA; tzv. banderovci) na Slovensko, respektíve do Československa v prvých rokoch po skončení II. svetovej vojny spôsobili nielen uskutočnenie po desaťročia najväčšej vojenskej akcie československej armády po skončení vojny, ale mali aj svoj významný politický a spoločenský vplyv. Už len samotný cieľ a realizácia prvých prienikov – tzv. rejdov UPA na východnom Slovensku na jeseň 1945 a na jar 1946 mali jednoznačne politické zameranie a čisto propagandistický charakter. Až tretí prienik jednotiek UPA na územie Československa v roku 1947, aj keď mal svoj primárny politický podtext, bol predovšetkým vojenskou záležitosťou, hoci sa neskôr k nemu pridávali postupne sa vzťahujúci politický vplyv tejto problematiky na vnútropolitický vývoj krajiny a silnejúci medzinárodný ohlas.

Ako je známe Ukrajinská povstalecká armáda, pôsobiaca na západnej Ukrajine a v juhovýchodnom Poľsku v čase vojny – od roku 1942, pokračovala vo svojich akciách v povojnovom období, ale čiastočne zmenila svoje poslanie. Vedenie Organizácie ukrajinských nacionalistov (OUN), respektíve Ukrajinská hlavná oslobodzovacia rada (UHVR) predpokladala, že krátko po vojne dôjde k politickej roztržke medzi hlavnými členmi

1 Štúdia je výstupom z grantového projektu UGA *Bezpečnostná a vnútropolitická situácia regiónov Slovenska v rokoch 1945 – 1948*.

antihitlerovskej koalície a vypukne ďalší vojenský konflikt medzi USA/Britániou a Sovietskym zväzom, ktorý dopomôže k nezávislosti Ukrajiny. Ukrajinská podzemná armáda mala preto pretrvávať a aj naďalej viesť gerilovú vojnu proti sovietskemu zriadeniu na etnických územiach Ukrajiny. Za tejto situácie UHVR zároveň vyzývala sovietske zväzové republiky a tiež krajiny strednej a juhovýchodnej Európy k spoločnému boju proti bolševizmu prenikajúcemu do tohto priestoru v povojnových rokoch, a to v tzv. Fronte podrobených a ohrozených národov strednej a východnej Európy. Podľa novej koncepcie UHVR – „*K frontu podrobených národov ZSSR pripojuje sa nový front ohrozených národov strednej a južnej Európy, ktoré boli ‚oslobodené‘ Červenou armádou spod nemeckej okupácie. Pred týmito národmi v celej dôležitosti stojí otázka revolučnej obrany proti snahám Stalina pripojiť ich k ZSSR. Zo spojenia týchto dvoch frontov sa vytvorí blok podrobených a ohrozených národov, čo v dôsledku svojich revolučných úsilí povedie k zvrúteniu zväzovej väznice národov a nastoleniu slobodného života na zručaninách stalinskej tyranie.*“²

Podľa UHVR národy strednej a juhovýchodnej Európy, ktoré sa ocitli v „*bolševickom jarme ZSSR*“, sa mali stať strategickými partnermi v boji ukrajinských povstalcov za obrodienie ukrajinskej štátnosti. Práve v spojení s oslobodeneckými hnutiami týchto národov mal byť zničený existujúci bolševický „*imperialistický stav*“ a vybudovaný nový medzinárodno-právny systém opierajúci sa o princíp národného sebaurčenia. V procese boja proti sovietskemu systému v regióne sa preto vedenie OUN a UPA od roku 1945 uchýľuje k taktike propagandistických ťažení – rejdov, keď na územia susedných štátov boli vysielané špeciálne pripravené oddiely ukrajinských povstalcov, ktoré na spôsob rejdov organizovali medzi miestnym obyvateľstvom (spravidla susednej krajiny) rôzne formy politicko-propagandistickej práce.³ Ako uviedol jeden z popredných ideológov ukrajinského osloboditeľského hnutia Osyp Djakiv: „*Touto cestou UPA informuje o oslobodeneckom boji ukrajinského národa, o živote v ZSSR (hlavne tie národy, ktoré ešte nezažili krutosť bolševického režimu), aktivizuje revolučné protibolševické sily týchto národov a stupňuje protibolše-*

2 Vojenský historický archív (ďalej iba VHA) Bratislava, fond (ďalej iba f.) Operace „Banderovci“ 1945 – 1948, inventárne číslo (ďalej iba i. č.) 371, škatuľa (ďalej iba šk.) 78. *Deklarácia vedenia OUN po ukončení druhej svetovej vojny v Európe (odpis).*

3 SZCZEŚNIAK, A. – SZOTA, W.: *Droga do nikad. Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i jej likwidacja w Polsce.* Warszawa 1973, s. 320.

*vické nálady národných mäs, vytvára praktické predpoklady na konkrétnu spoluprácu týchto národov v jednotnom protibolševickom fronte.*⁴

Praktickými krokmi na ceste realizácie vyššie uvedeného cieľa boli v priebehu rokov 1945 – 1950 uskutočnené rejdy ukrajinských povstaleckých oddielov na územie Bieloruska, Poľska, Československa, Rumunska a do Pobaltia (Litvy).⁵ Treba však zdôrazniť, že rejdy ako nová forma činnosti a boja jednotiek UPA v povojnovom období sa v najväčšej miere realizovala práve na území Československa (zvlášť v jeho východnej časti – na Slovensku), ktoré ešte z medzivojnového obdobia malo vysoký kredit ako demokratický, liberálny a tolerantný štát a po vojne sa tešilo určitej autorite na západe a v strednej a juhovýchodnej Európe.⁶ Navyše pomerne slabším tempom sa v krajine uskutočňoval proces bolševizácie (sovietizácie), teda na začiatku sa prejavovala zdanlivo nevýrazná závislosť krajiny od Kremľa⁷ a komunisti sa zdali byť so slabšími pozíciami. To predstavovalo istú záruku predstáv, že akcie UPA nebudú celkom dezinterpretované a získa sa mediálny priestor a ohlas v medzinárodnom meradle.⁸ Zároveň – v prípade Slovenska – práve Slováci boli považovaní vedením ukrajinských nacionalistov za potenciálnych spojencov antibolševickej rezistencie, keďže medzi ukrajinským a slovenským národom nikdy nedošlo k ostrým antagonickým prejavom či sporom a dôležitú úlohu taktiež zohrávali osobitosti vnútropolitického vývoja krajiny, kde časť slovenskej

4 В'ЯТРОВИЧ, В.: Рейд українських повстанців у Прибалтику. In: *Український визвольний рух*. Зошит № 1. Львів 2003, s. 144.

5 В'ЯТРОВИЧ, В. et al.: *Українська Повстанська Армія. Історія нескорених*. Львів 2008, s. 231.

6 KONEČNÝ, S.: Protikomunistické aspekty v činnosti jednotek UPA na Slovensku po druhé svetové válce. In: *Odboj a odpor proti komunistickému režimu v Československu a ve střední Evropě*. Praha 2010, s. 253.

7 Situácia v československých oblastiach susediacich s ukrajinskými bola systematicky spomínaná v ukrajinských povstaleckých periodikách a vyhodnocovaná vojenskými stratégmi a analytikmi ukrajinského nacionalistického podzemia. V procese snáh o sovietizáciu krajiny konštatovali nasledujúce: „Československo je naďalej vysunutým bolševickým „forpostom“ na západ, bolševici, vzhľadom na ostražitosť Západu, uskutočňujú v krajine obmedzenú „revolúciu“, ktorá skutočne neprerastá do takých foriem ako v Rumunsku či Bulharsku. Kým v Rumunsku alebo v Bulharsku bolševické Rusko vystupuje ako zverský imperialista, v Československu sa tvári, akoby sa bolševizácia uskutočňovala z iniciatívy samého československého národa...“ В'ЯТРОВИЧ, В.: *Рейди УПА теренами Чехословащини*. Торонто – Львів 2001, s. 62.

8 KONEČNÝ, S.: Protikomunistické aspekty v činnosti jednotek UPA na Slovensku po druhé svetové válce, s. 253.

spoločnosti bola nespokojná s likvidáciou slovenského štátu a obnovením Československa.⁹

Celkovo sa na území Československa realizovali tri rejdy, a to v auguste – septembri 1945, v apríli 1946 (obidva na východnom Slovensku) a tzv. *veľký rejd* cez územie republiky do americkej zóny v Nemecku v júni – októbri/novembri 1947.

Bezpochyby v prvej etape (t. j. v rokoch 1945 – 1946) hlavným dôvodom akcií UPA na území Slovenska bola prieskumná činnosť, propagácia vlastného hnutia i objasňovanie jeho cieľov a najmä aktívna antisovietska i antikomunistická propaganda. Jednoznačne vedenie ukrajinského odboja malo záujem o šírenie svojich názorov, predstáv a programu v susednom štáte, do ktorého navyše presahovalo ukrajinské etnické osídlenie (na východnom Slovensku), a zároveň sa ukazovala reálna potreba strategického zázemia nielen z logistických dôvodov, ale najmä kvôli získaniu spojencov a sympatizantov.¹⁰

Prvý propagandistický rejd bol organizovaný vedením OUN (v réžii zástupcu krajského vedúceho a krajského referenta propagandy OUN Vasiľa Halasu – „Orlana“) a veliteľstvom UPA v juhovýchodnom Poľsku. Dňa 22. augusta 1945 tri špeciálne pripravené oddiely UPA („Zmiji“, „Zavediji“ a „Bulava“) spolu s príslušníkmi civilnej siete OUN (celkom okolo 400 osôb) vstúpili na územie Slovenska. Vzhľadom na absolútnu nepripravenosť československej strany na takúto prekvapivo veľkú ozbrojenú aktivitu z územia juhovýchodného Poľska sa banderovci na jeseň 1945 pohybovali na východnom Slovensku viac-menej nerušene.¹¹ V snahe zasiahnuť čo najväčšie územie sa rozdelili a v malých skupinách sa pohybovali spočiatku v okresoch Medzilaborce, Stropkov a Giraltovec, kde navštevovali jednotlivé obce,¹² uskutočňovali propagandistickú činnosť

9 В'ЯТРОВИЧ, В.: Чехословацчина очима українських повстанців 1945 – 1948. In: *Acta historica Neosoliensia*, tomus (ďalej iba t.) 9. Banská Bystrica 2006, s. 167.

10 КМЕЇ, М.: Vecná a umelecká literatúra o problematike Ukrajinskej povstaleckej armády v Československu pred rokom 1990. In: *Acta historica Neosoliensia*, t. 8, Banská Bystrica 2005, s. 163.

11 Blížšie pozri ŠMIGEL, M.: *Banderovci na Slovensku (1945 – 1947)*. Banská Bystrica 2007, s. 89 – 90.

12 Postupovali spravidla podľa rovnakého scenára. Do obce (predtým obklúčenej a zaisnenej ozbrojenými hliadkami) vstupovali navečer. Ešte pred stretnutím s obyvateľmi vysielal veliteľ sotne, respektíve veliteľ oddielu miestneho občana za náčelníkom stanice Národnej bezpečnosti (NB), ak sa taká nachádzala v obci, s odkazom, že UPA nemieni použiť násilie, a to isté očakáva aj z druhej strany. Následne navštívil veliteľ oddielu v sprievode troch alebo štyroch mužov stanicu NB, kde sa zaviazal, že príslušníci

a mapovali pomery, politickú klímu i prostredie. Neskôr svoju činnosť rozšírili aj do ďalších okresov východného Slovenska.

Keďže išlo o propagandistický vpád, a nie o represívnu akciu proti politickým odporcom a už vôbec nie o drancovanie krajiny a obyvateľstva (ako na to poukazovala prednovembrová historiografia), už od začiatkov príprav akcie sa kládol prioritný význam na vytvorenie čo možno najpozitívnejšieho obrazu ukrajinského nacionalistického hnutia v slovenskej spoločnosti. Napríklad Oblastné veliteľstvo NB v Humennom za svoju oblasť pôsobenia neskôr konštatovalo: „*Banderovské tlupy pri príchode do tej-ktorej obce medzi obyvateľstvo, ako aj do ich obytných bytov sa chovajú veľmi disciplinované, obyvateľstvu prehlasujú v mnohých prípadoch, aby sa ich nebáli, že oni bojujú za demokraciu a za slobodnú Ukrajinu.*“¹³ Podobné stanovisko zaujala aj Oblastná správa Obranného spravodajstva (OBZ) 4. vojenskej oblasti: „*Tieto bandy, pomerne inak disciplinované, prevádzajú značnú propagandu proti Rusku. Ich ideovým cieľom je boj proti komunizmu a proti Rusku. Robia tiež propagandu, že čakajú na vojnu medzi Amerikou a Ruskom a tak si chcú vydobyť samostatnú Ukrajinu. Voči civilnému obyvateľstvu sú bandy inak slušné a prehlasujú, že dajú tomu pokoj, pokiaľ nebudú prenasledované.*“¹⁴

Zároveň s tým sa oddiely UPA nestretli s otvoreným odporom slovenských bezpečnostných zložiek (priamemu vojenskému stretu sa doslova vyhýbali), rozdali pripravený propagandistický materiál, vykonali desiatky prednášok v obciach a besied v domácnostiach, v niektorých prípadoch dokonca navštívili aj miestne tanečné zábavy či omše v kostoloch, čím si nepochybne u výraznejšie religiózne založeného miestneho obyvateľstva

oddielu nebudú používať násilie a majú prísny zákaz lúpenia a obťažovania miestneho obyvateľstva. Na stanici NB zrealizovali aj propagačnú prednášku, kde ozrejmili svoje ciele a dôvody, pre ktoré bojujú. Krátko pred súmrakom, keď sa obyvatelia vracali z poľnohospodárskych prác, bolo v obci vyhlásené alebo vybuchované verejné zhromaždenie, na ktorom politický pracovník UPA propagoval činnosť ukrajinských partizánov. Ostatní príslušníci oddielu chodili po domoch a uskutočňovali individuálne besedy. Zároveň hľadali ubytovanie s možnosťou prípravy vareného jedla. Osobitné postavenie malo v dedine stretnutie s miestnou inteligenciou (farár, učiteľ, obvodný notár). V neskorých nočných alebo ranných hodinách banderovci obec opúšťali a po rýchлом presune navštevovali ďalšie (často aj vzdialené) obce, čím u obyvateľstva vzbudzovali dojem obrovského počtu partizánov pohybujúcich sa v regióne. Archiv bezpečnostných zložiek (ďalej iba ABS) Praha, f. 302-142-6. Komisia pre vyšetrovanie banderovských tlúp na území ČSR. Banská Bystrica, 27. novembra 1947.

13 Slovenský národný archív (ďalej iba SNA) Bratislava, f. PV – bezp., šk. 1, č. 637/1945. Situačná správa z oblasti – predloženie.

14 ABS, f. 307-99-1. Oblastná správa OBZ Veliteľstva 4. oblasti z 11. septembra 1945.

vytvorili celkom prijateľný obraz. Tento relatívne pozitívny dojem (aj napriek zjavnej záťaži, ktorú akákoľvek partizánska činnosť prináša pre civilné obyvateľstvo) bol zachovaný aj krátko po ukončení akcie a stiahnutí sa oddielov UPA do bázového územia v juhovýchodnom Poľsku (postupne do 24. septembra 1945).¹⁵

Aj nasledujúci (druhý) propagačný rejď UPA, uskutočnený v apríli 1946, mal zhruba podobné zameranie a priebeh ako prvý. K jeho uskutočneniu primälo vedenie ukrajinských nacionalistov tak úspešnosť (bezproblémovosť) prvého rejdu, ako aj výhodnejšia medzinárodná (otvorene začínajúca roztržka medzi Východom a Západom a črtajúca sa možnosť vojnového stretu dvoch ideologicky znepríatelených blokov) a predovšetkým vnútropolitická situácia v Československu pred májovými voľbami do Ústavného národného zhromaždenia. A tak do predvolebného boja medzi komunistickými a demokratickými silami o budúce smerovanie krajiny vstúpila na jar roku 1946 so svojimi aktivitami v oblasti východného Slovenska aj UPA.¹⁶

Prípravy na druhý rejď sa začali čiastočne už začiatkom roka 1946. Jeho organizovanie mal na starosti opäť zástupca krajského vedúceho a krajský referent propagandy OUN V. Halasa – „Orlan“ v spolupráci s ďalšími čelnými predstaviteľmi hnutia a velenia UPA v juhovýchodnom Poľsku. K realizácii druhého propagačného rejdu UPA boli rovnako vyčlenené tri

15 Zlom nastal paradoxne až po skončení prvého rejdu UPA na Slovensku, keď v nasledujúcich mesiacoch a priori takmer všetky výraznejšie kriminálne prečiny v tejto oblasti boli zvalované na účet banderovcov, ktorých sa v skutočnosti dopustili presne neidentifikované ozbrojené kriminálne skupiny (či už domáce alebo z poľského pohraničia). Vo vtedajších bezpečnostných hláseniach sa to však často stávalo, a hoci si racionálnejšie bezpečnostné zložky neskôr uvedomovali zneužívanie kriminálnej činnosti iných ozbrojených skupín na úkor banderovcov, všeobecne bol však už oficiálne vytvorený obraz „rabujúcich a terorizujúcich“ banderovcov. Paušálne obviňovanie banderovcov z mnohých kriminálnych činov vykonaných na severovýchodnom Slovensku v októbri až decembri 1945 vrcholil ich obviňovaním z rasovo-politických vražd v Novej Sedlici, Uliči a Kolbasove (okres Snina), kde došlo k zavraždeniu 18 obyvateľov – komunistov a Židov. Ako však ukazujú najnovšie výskumy, autorstvo banderovcov pri týchto vraždách je prinajmenšom sporné, diskutabilné a existuje viacero možných alternatív, i keď ani podieľanie sa niektorej nedisciplinovanej skupiny UPA (pôsobiacej na vlastnú päsť, t. j. bez vedomia velenia UPA na Zakerzoní) na týchto vraždách nemožno úplne vylúčiť a takisto ani potvrdiť. Pozri: ŠMIGEL, M.: Vraždy židov a komunistov na severovýchodnom Slovensku v roku 1945: Kolbasovská tragédia. In: *Acta historica Neosoliensia*, t. 10, Banská Bystrica 2007, s. 217 – 231.

16 SYRNÝ, M.: Ukrajinská povstalecká armáda a parlamentné voľby v máji 1946 na Slovensku. Referát prednesený na vedeckom seminári *Ukrajinská povstalecká armáda (UPA) na Slovensku v rokoch 1945 – 1947*. Banská Bystrica, 16. apríla 2006. Rukopis, s. 2.

oddiele UPA – „Bir“, „Didyk“ a „Karmeljuk“ (opäť takmer 400 osôb), ktoré prekročili poľsko-slovenské hranice v noci 6. apríla 1946.

Príslušníci rejdujúcich oddielov boli oproti prvému rejdu oveľa lepšie pripravení a pre výraznejší úspech propagandy bolo do slovenského a českého jazyka preložené väčšie množstvo propagandistických letákov a brožúr adresovaných prioritne obyvateľstvu a tiež československým vojakom a miestnym orgánom vlády¹⁷ (ba aj list samotnému prezidentovi ČSR E. Benešovi¹⁸). Pred uskutočnením rejdu vypracoval „Orlan“ inštrukcie k úspešnej realizácii pochodu. Jeho základom malo byť slušné, nekonzfliktné a nenásilné správanie všetkých účastníkov operujúcich oddielov. Osobitný zreteľ sa kládol na personálny výber účastníkov rejdu, najmä tých, ktorí mali propagandisticky presvedčať miestne obyvateľstvo v osobnom kontakte v jednotlivých slovenských obciach. Ako uviedol „Orlan“: „*Cieľom rejdu bolo uskutočniť antibolševickú propagandu nielen na teritóriu, kde sa pohybovali oddiely, ale taktiež využiť slovenské obyvateľstvo a poštu na celom území krajiny. Chceli sme demonštrovať pred svetom, že Ukrajina nepodľahla sovietskemu okupantovi a pokračuje v boji za svoju štátnosť. Povstalci niesli varovanie iným národom pred hroziacim nebezpečenstvom zo strany agresívneho ruského bolševizmu.*“¹⁹

Hneď po prekročení hranice príslušníci všetkých troch oddielov UPA rozbehli na území severovýchodného Slovenska aktívnu propagandistickú činnosť. Používali taktiku odskúšanú už v priebehu prvého rejdu – opäť sa rozdelili, čím vyvolávali dojem veľkého počtu pohybujúcich sa ukrajinských partizánov v regióne a snažili sa svojou činnosťou obsiahnuť čo najväčšie teritórium. Propaganda druhého rejdu sa opäť sústredila

17 Podľa V. Vjatrovyča išlo o nasledovný propagandistický materiál: *Vyhľadška v slovenskom a ukrajinskom jazyku* (s vysvetlením cieľa príchodu) – 500 ks; letáky *Česi! Slováci! Vojaci!* v českom, slovenskom a ukrajinskom jazyku – 135 ks; *Deklarácia Vedenia OUN po ukončení druhej svetovej vojny z mája 1945* – 135 ks; podzemné periodiká *Ideja i čin* (tlačový orgán vedenia OUN) č. 9, *Informátor* (tlačovina Tlačovej služby UPA); brožúra *Riešenie Tretieho mimoriadneho Veľkého Zboru OUN* (vo všetkých slovanských jazykoch); brožúra člena vedenia OUN Dmytra Majivs'koho – *Dumy, Bolševická demokratizácia Európy*; brožúra *Platforma UHVĽR*; vyhlásenie *Do celého kultúrneho sveta! Otvorený list Ukrajincov, žijúcich za líniou Curzona* (protest proti poľskému teror a nútenému vysídleniu Ukrajincov z juhovýchodného Poľska do ZSSR); letáky pre Poliakov (*Prezidentenci, Poliaki! Odvekí západní susedia, Poliakom atď.*). В'ЯТРОВИЧ, В.: *Рейду УПА теренами Чехословащини*, s. 80 – 81. Tiež: *Літопис Української Повстанської Армії*. Т. 33. Ред. П. Й. Потічний, І. Лико. Торонто – Львів 2001, s. 614.

18 Pozri Prílohu č. 1.

19 ГАЛАСА, В.: *Наше життя і боротьба. Спогади*. Львів 2005, s. 85.

na vysvetľovanie dvoch základných problémov ich ideológie a činnosti. Najskôr sa snažili obyvateľstvu predstaviť svoje nacionalistické hnutie, informovať a podať o ňom pozitívny obraz. V druhej časti propagandy sa príslušníci UPA snažili v maximálne možnej miere znechutiť obyvateľstvu Sovietsky zväz a komunizmus. Poukazovali na situáciu na Ukrajine a v celom ZSSR, kde vládli komunisti. Slovenskému obyvateľstvu rozprávali o stalinských zločinoch, hladomoroch, Gulagu a bezprávnom postavení národov v Sovietskom zväze. Upozorňovali na sovietsky imperializmus, skrytú a pomalú, ale o to zákernejšiu boľševizáciu Československa a jej isté dôsledky.²⁰ Varovali pred nastolením moci boľševikov i „diktatúry proletariátu“ a odporúčali v nadchádzajúcich voľbách voliť slovenských demokratov.

V jednom z letákov (tzv. Vyhláška) svoje poslanie UPA vysvetľovala nasledujúcim spôsobom: *„Utlačené národy spojte sa do boja proti boľševickým imperialistom! Sloboda národom! Sloboda jednotlivcovi! Upozorňujeme Vás, že my, ukrajinskí povstalci, prišli sme k Vám aby rieknúť Vám slovo pravdy pre hrobárov národov a jednotlivcov – boľševických imperialistov. Prišli sme k Vám ako hostia a nie ako vrahovia. My bojujeme proti tomu vrahovi, ktorý aj nad Vašou Vlasťou chystá okupantské zotročenie. Preto nevystupujte proti nám a presvedčujte k tomu všetkých Vašich priateľov. Neuposlúchnite príkazov stalinských komisárov, ktorí chcú Vás pošvať proti ukrajinským povstalcom. Sabotujte náказы boľševických komisárov a ich agentov. Tým sa pričinite do suverenity Vašej Vlasti. Pomáhajte, čím môžete ukrajinským povstalcom – ktorí bojujú proti okupácii boľševickej. Smrť boľševickým tyranom! Ukrajinskí povstalci.“*²¹

Počas druhého rejdú prichádzali oddiely UPA častejšie do styku už aj s československými jednotkami nasadenými do boja proti nim. Na šírenie protikomunistickej, resp. protisovietskej propagandy medzi československými vojakmi využívali pripravené letáky, ale aj programové listy odosielané poštou alebo doručované niektorým vojenským veliteľom cez miestnych obyvateľov. Prostredníctvom letákov československých vojakov varovali: *„[...] Také brutálne násilie, ako masové vraždy pokojného obyvateľstva, uväzňovania, odstrelovania, vyvážanie na Sibír a na ostrovy*

20 Pozri propagandistické letáky UPA a správy oddielov UPA z druhého rejdú po Slovensku v apríli 1946: *Літопис Української Повстанської Армії*. Т. 48. Ред. Michal Šmigel'. Торонто – Львів 2010, s. 525 – 606; *Літопис Української Повстанської Армії*. Т. 33, s. 592 – 627.

21 SNA, f. PV – sekr., šk. 74, inv. č. 99. Leták *Vyhláška*.

Severného ľadového oceánu, vyhnanstvo do koncentračných táborov, drancovanie a teror deje sa dnes v celej Ukrajine! Nech to bude výstrahou všetkým národom, ktorí ešte nepoznajú bolševickú praktiku zblízka. Pamätajte, že taký istý osud čaká v budúcnosti i Vaše národy, len čo sa bolševické jarmo nad Vami upevní. Moskovskí bolševickí imperialisti taký osud pripravujú celej Európe. Preto dnes prvou povinnosťou všetkých slobodýmilovných skutočne demokratických národov je: postaviť sa spoločne do obrany a boja proti nebezpečenstvu nového červeno-fašistického totalitného tyranstva, aké nesie celému svetu moskovský imperializmus. [...] Keď ste čestní ľudia, keď ste demokrati, nepočúvajte bolševickej lživej propagandy, nepočúvajte tých, ktorí vychvaľujú červenú diktatúru a kážu Vám bojovať proti Ukrajincom. [...] Dobre si pripomeňte tie dni, keď bolševická armáda drancovala Vaše dediny, vykrádala Vaše domy, znásilňovala Vaše ženy, sestry, zneuctovala Vaše náboženské a kultúrne svätyne. Pripomeňte si tie smutné dni, keď zdivočení Stalinovi odchovanci NKVD bez toho najmenšieho súcitu hnali Vašich bratov do ďalekej Sibíri... Robili to vtedy, keď Vás prišli ‚oslobodiť‘! A čo by sa s Vami stalo, keby červená bolševická saranča obsadila Vašu krásnu zem? Spravili by to, čo robia s našimi a všetkými národmi, ktorí nechtiac dostali sa do ‚kráľovstva satana Stalina‘! [...] Preto nebojujte proti ukrajinským povstalcem, nestrielajte na nás – ale spoľúťte sa s nami a pomáhajte nám. Tým urobíte veľkú službu aj svojej Vlasti, ktorá je dnes tiež ohrozená nebezpečenstvom bolševického imperializmu [...]“²²

V priebehu druhého rejdru oddiely UPA navštívili okolo 106 obcí v desiatich východoslovenských okresoch, v ktorých uskutočnili plánované aktivity.²³ Cieľ, vytýčený vedením OUN, v podstate naplnili (v tom užšom ponímaní problematiky).²⁴ Pôvodným zámerom bolo zdržať sa na území

22 SNA, f. PV – sekr., šk. 74, inv. č. 99. Leták Česko-slovenským vojakom.

23 В'ЯТРОВИЧ, В.: *Рейди УПА теренами Чехословащини*, s. 82 – 83.

24 Pri svojich rejdoch po Slovensku sa velenie UPA, vzhľadom na nacionalistické, protisovietske a protikomunistické zameranie svojho hnutia, čiastočne spoliehalo na aktívnu pomoc zvyškov radikálnych nacionalistických prívržencov bývalej Slovenskej republiky (1939 – 1945), prívržencov Demokratickej strany, ako aj ukrajinského a rusínskeho obyvateľstva obývajúceho severovýchodné okresy krajiny. Tieto predpoklady politického vedenia UPA sa však naplnili iba v minimálnom až zanedbateľnom rozsahu. Radikálne nacionalistické hnutie na Slovensku bolo slabé a nebolo schopné poskytnúť ukrajinským partizánom účinnú pomoc, aj keď k tomu bolo vyzývané exilovými ľudáckymi skupinami či osobnosťami. Od začiatku sa od aktivít UPA dištancovali aj slovenskí demokrati. Vo svojich interných obežníkoch určených funkcionárom strany vedenie DS vystríhalo pred akýmikoľvek kontaktmi s prípadnými predstaviteľmi banderovcov a každého, kto by sa bol o to v mene demokratov pokúsil, mali ihneď

východného Slovenska 10, maximálne 14 dní, aj to za podmienky, že nebudú rušení československými jednotkami. V skutočnosti druhý slovenský rejd trval fakticky do 24. apríla 1946, teda 18 dní. V jeho priebehu sa oddiely UPA nestretli s intenzívnym odporom československých armádnych a bezpečnostných zložiek, z celej akcie vyšli bez vážnejších ľudských strát (traja zranení a niekoľko nezvestných) a bez väčších prekážok vrátili sa do svojich základní v juhovýchodnom Poľsku. Svoje zamýšľané propagandistické ťaženie aj tentokrát úspešne zrealizovali.²⁵

Rok 1947 sa napokon stal posledným výrazným a najvýznamnejším obdobím pôsobenia UPA v Československu, keď v jeho druhej polovici došlo k prechodu niekoľkých oddielov UPA územím krajiny na Západ. Tento prienik bol spôsobený realizovaním akcie „Visla“ v juhovýchodnom Poľsku, zameranej na vysídlenie ukrajinskej menšiny do západných a severných území (niekdajších nemeckých) a definitívnu likvidáciu ukrajinského hnutia odporu v regióne.²⁶ Na základe straty civilného zázemia – informačnej, personálnej a materiálnej bázy, pod neustále sa vzťahajúcimi útokmi poľských divízií, oddielov sovietskeho NKVD a s pribúdajúcimi stratami sa velenie UPA rozhodlo ukončiť svoju činnosť v juhovýchodnom

udať československým bezpečnostným orgánom. Objektívne však spoluprácu medzi UPA a demokratmi na tej najnižšej úrovni nie je možné vylúčiť. Išlo však o mizivú spoluprácu predovšetkým na úrovni obecných organizácií – o poskytnutie materiálnych potrieb, informácií atď. (Podrobnejšie pozri SYRNÝ, M.: „Banderovci“ a slovenská spoločnosť v rokoch 1945 – 1947. In: *Acta historica Neosoliensia*, t. 8. Banská Bystrica 2005, s. 160 – 161.) Očakávanú podporu nenadobudla UPA ani v radoch slovenských Ukrajincov a Rusínov, pre ktorých to bol cudzí boj, ktorému ani nerozumeli a ktorý sa ich v podstate ani netýkal. Príslušníci týchto menšín boli tradične naladení rusofilsky až sovietofilsky, komunizmu boli naklonení a naň náchylní oveľa viac ako Slováci (pre ktorých antikomunistická a antisovietska propaganda UPA rozširovaná v regióne bola predsa prijateľnejšia). Isté sympatie tu samozrejme boli a nie je ich možné poprieť, ale väčšina minoritného obyvateľstva si predovšetkým zvažovala svoje postavenie v štáte (uvedomujúc si zložitosť situácie menšín v povojnovom Československu) a rovnako sa obávala istých represívnych následkov za akúkoľvek podporu UPA. ŠMIGEL, M.: Pôsobenie banderovcov na severovýchodnom Slovensku a ich vplyv na situáciu a identifikáciu rusínsko-ukrajinskej menšiny v povojnových rokoch In: *Vedecký zborník Múzea ukrajinskej kultúry vo Svidníku 26. Ukrajinci v prihraničných oblastiach Karpát: problémy akulturácie, asimilácie, identifikácie*. Svidník 2011, s. 154 – 157.

25 Podrobnejšie: ŠMIGEL, M.: *Banderovci na Slovensku (1945 – 1947)*, s. 145 – 176.

26 HALCZAK, B. – ŠMIGEL, M.: K problematike postavenia Lemkov v Poľsku v prvej polovici 20. storočia a ich presídlenie do Sovietskeho zväzu. Akcia „Visla“. In: *Acta historica Neosoliensia*, t. 7. Banská Bystrica 2004, s. 196 – 198.

Poľsku,²⁷ a to tým spôsobom, že časť oddielov UPA sa mala z taktických dôvodov prebiť na územie Ukrajiny a pokračovať v boji so sovietskym zriadením a druhá časť mala demonštratívne prejsť územím Československa do americkej zóny v Nemecku (pričom išlo o presne určené jednotky – sotňa „Hromenko“, zoskupenie sotní „Burlaka“ – „Krylač“ – „Lastivka“ a neskôr sotňa „Brodyč“ i niekoľko menších skupín).²⁸

Prechod oddielov UPA Československom na Západ bol diametrálne odlišnou akciou v odlišnej situácii, aká bola v priebehu predošlých propagandistických vpádov v rokoch 1945 a 1946.²⁹ Propaganda a zachovanie svojho kladného obrazu u československého obyvateľstva boli síce stále dôležité, avšak už druhoradé. Prioritne sa oddiely UPA mali prebiť do americkej okupačnej zóny v Nemecku a s touto akciou sa očakával medzinárodný ohlas, aktivizácia miestnych antikomunistických hnutí východného tábora a napokon zviditeľnenie boja Ukrajincov so stalinským totalitarizmom na Západe, čo sa aj sčasti naplnilo. Táto udalosť sa doslova stáva mediálnou senzáciou a o prebíjaní sa oddielov UPA na Západ písali viaceré noviny ako v sovietskom bloku – v Československu, Maďarsku, Poľsku a ZSSR, tak aj v krajinách demokratickej Európy – vo Švédsku, Francúzsku, Rakúsku, západnom Nemecku, Holandsku, Belgicku, Veľkej Británii, Španielsku a tiež v USA, Kanade atď. Západná tlač, aj napriek istým nepresnostiam a prekrúteným informáciám, pomerne dobre vysvetľovala problematiku UPA, jej ciele a aktivitu.³⁰

Predstava UHVR a UPA o vytvorení spoločného antisovietskeho frontu podrobených a ohrozených národov sa napokon nenaplnila a zahraničné rejdry ukrajinských povstalcov nevedli k rozmachu protibolševickej rezistencie v krajinách strednej, východnej a juhovýchodnej Európy. Vo vtedajšej geopolitickej situácii a rozložení mocenských štruktúr v Európe to ani nebolo možné a izolovaný zápas UPA sa ukázal odsúdeným na neúspech. Pozoruhodnou je však ostrá kritiku komunizmu, socialistického systému,

27 HALCZAK, B.: Próby przebicia się oddziałów UPA z Polski przez terytorium Czechosłowacji do Niemiec w 1947 r. In: *Acta historica Neosoliensia*, t. 9. Banská Bystrica 2006, s. 158 a 161.

28 ABS, f. 305-143-1. Vyšetrovanie banderovcov – záverečná správa. Komisia pre vyšetrovanie banderovských tlúp na území ČSR. Košice, 12. februára 1948.

29 Podrobnejšie: ŠMIGEL, M.: *Banderovci na Slovensku (1945 – 1947)*, s. 195 – 223. Porovnaj: ŠTAIGL, J.: Spolupráca vojenských jednotiek ČSR, Poľska a ZSSR v akciách proti UPA na východnom Slovensku v rokoch 1945 – 1947. In: *Vojenská história*, roč. 15, 2011, č. 2, s. 72 – 101.

30 Podrobnejšie: В'ЯТРОВИЧ, В.: *Рейди УПА теренами Чехословащини*, s. 126 – 141.

politiky ZSSR a ľavicových režimov vo formujúcom sa sovietskom bloku z hľadiska konštruktívnosti.

Aktivity UPA v Československu boli svojším upozornením na situáciu v ZSSR, existenciu protisovietskeho odboja, ale aj postavenie obyvateľstva v totalitnej spoločnosti, či význam národnostnej otázky v sovietskej zóne. Zároveň aj výstrahou pred politickou dôverčivosťou nekomunistických strán a naivnou vierou veľkej časti obyvateľstva v úprimnosť komunistických kormidelníkov a v akúsi dokonalosť sovietskeho systému, ktorý sa chystali zaviesť. Ako to veľmi výstižne pomenoval historik S. Konečný: „*Banderovci mu nastavili krivé zrkadlo, ktoré síce deformovalo obraz, no súčasne zobrazovalo realitu. Bolo však príliš skoro, aby sa to dalo rozoznať, a príliš neskoro, aby sa tomu dalo zabrániť.*“³¹

Príloha č. 1:

**Vysoce váženému
panu prezidentu Dr. E. Benešovi**

Uviedomujeme Vás, pane presidente, že my, ukrajinští povstalci jsme přišli na Vaše území. Přišli jsme ne jako nepřátelé, ale jako hosté. Přinášíme Vašemu národu a obyvateľstvu Vašeho státu slova pravdy o útisku národů a lidstva moskevsko-bolševickými imperialisty.

Vás, pane presidente, již určitě uvědomili o našem příchodu, avšak toto uvědomení nebylo jistě pravdivé. Víte, že nás bolševičtí emisaři a agenti líčili v nejtemnějších barvách. Toto je už stará a všem známá metoda bolševických utiskovatelů ve vyjadřování se o osvobozovacím hnutí jimi utiskovaných národů. Bolševici na příklad nešetřili sympatiemi pro indonéské nacionalisty jenom proto, že jejich boj je namířen proti Anglii. Naproti tomu nejdemokratičtější revolučně-osvobozovací hnutí těch národů, které jsou utiskovány, nazývají bolševici fašismem, reakcí, kontrarevolucí atd. Střízlivě uvažující člověk však lehce pozná, kde je vlastně kořen pravdy. Zdravý člověk ví, že ne sám název osvobozenického hnutí, ale jeho ideová náplň, za kterou jest bojováno, jest podstatou jeho vedení. My, s celým naším národem bojujeme za nic jiného, jak za osvobození z bolševického jarma. Přitom nemáme žádných nároků na cizí území. Všelidské morální

31 KONEČNÝ, S.: Aktivity jednotiek UPA na Slovensku po druhej svetovej vojne. In: HARBUĽOVÁ, E. (ed.): *Migrácia obyvateľstva východnej Európy na územie Slovenska a Čiech (prvá polovica 20. storočia)*. Prešov 2009, s. 278.

zásady učí, že každý národ, ktorý bojuje za své osvobození z cizího jarma postupuje čestně, šlechtně a shodně s právem. Historie neodsuzuje a nehaní tyto národy, které bojovali za své osvobození, ale naopak jim dává za tyto šlechtně činy nejlepšívysvědčení.

Bolševici se snaží představit nás světu jako ukrajinsko-německé nacionalisty, fašisty, nepřátele národa a na to, že jsme vedli neúprosný boj proti německým okupantům, plnili německá vězení a koncentrační tábory, hynuli pod německými koulemi, oni říkají, že to bylo v dorozumění s Němci, že jsme se dali dobrovolně věznit Němci atd. Podle bolševických tvrzení by se zdálo, že jsme šli dobrovolně do německých vězení a koncentráků, dobrovolně jsme tam hynuli dobrovolně šli na německé šibenice, dobrovolně se podrobovali středověkým mučením v gestapáckých katovnách, dobrovolně se stavěli na okraje hromadných hrobů, abychom se dali odstřelit atd.

Je možno uvěřit takové lži? Čemu to nasvědčuje?

Nasvědčuje to bezmezně bolševické nečestnosti, lži a jejich bezradnosti vůči naším svatým pravdám. Konečně, kdo zná bolševiky, ten také ví, že bolševickým termínům nutno rozumět opačně. Když mluví o osvobození, znamená to utiskování, když slibují ráj, přinesou peklo, když nazývají někoho nepřitelem národa, znamená to, že se jedná o nejlepšívho a národu nejvíce oddaného syna.

Člověk, věřící bolševické lži, řekne: „Co chcete, když máte ukrajinskou sovětskou socialistickou republiku v čele s Chruščovem, máte ukrajinskou delegaci v OSN na čele s Manuilem, máte právo chodit do škol, mluvit dvojí rodnou řečí, máte čest být ve svazku se starším bratrem slovanských národů Rusy atd. ?“

Na to my odpovídáme: všechny tyto falešné řeči nezmění nic na skutečnosti, že ukrajinský národ je utiskován, ubíjen a mořen hladem a NKVD-istickými koulemi a přímo ničen moskevskými bolševiky a jejich agenty ukrajinského původu. Zatím co Manuilem a jiní zrádcové ukrajinského národa sedí v měkkých hotelích, náš národ nese těžké bolševické jarmo.

SSSR není žádný svaz republik. Je moskevským Impériem – strašným vězením národů, totalitním, despotickým, teroristickým, rudofašistickým režimem, který se skládá z utiskovatelů a utiskovaných, exploatátorů a exploatovaných, sytých a hladových, těch, kteří mají neomezená práva a privilegia a těch, kteří nesou bezprávi a těžké závazky. K prvním patří Stalin a NKVD, NKHD a jiní bolševičtí velmoži a krvežíznivci a ke druhým utlačené národy a hlavně pracující lid.

Mezi všemi, bolševiky podmaněnými národy, trpí nejvíce Ukrajina, kterou změnili bolševici z krajiny oplývající mlékem a medem v krajinu zalitou krví a slzami. Ukrajinský národ nejen že nemá v SSSR politickou a kulturní svobodu, ale nemá práva ani možnosti k nejprimitivnějšímu životu, nemá zkrátka, jako národ, práva k fyzické existenci.

Hospodářství zaměnili kolchozním jařmem a lid moří hladem a nadlidskou prací. Dělníka přikovali k šachtě a vystávají jeho síly. Inteligenta zterorizovali a nechali ho pod hrozbou smrti nebo vyhnanství oslavovat Stalina, jeho stranu a její utlačovatelský režim. Jak řekl náš básník Taras Ševčenko, charakterizující moskevské impérium: „Od Moldavy až po Finsko všechno mlčí.“ A skutečně, všechno mlčelo. Ale je jasné, že to, co má počátek, musí mít i konec. Dochází trpělivost terorizovanému a hladovějícímu sovětskému obyvateli. Ke ztracení již nic nemá, neboť již všechno ztratil a jeho nevolnický život mu mohou dnes nebo zítra vzít NKVD-isté hladem nebo kulí. Národ povstal do boje.

Na Ukrajině již dva roky je veden těžký, neutichající boj a sice boj nebývalých rozměrů. Na jedné straně stojí bolševičtí utiskovatelé s množstvím divizí vojsk NKVD /RA se bolševici nepokoušejí použití proti nám, neboť u nich se rovněž vzrůstá revoluční duch/, ozbrojených všemi druhy zbraní, tanky a letadly a na druhé straně stojí ukrajinský národ, jeho branná síla – Ukrajinská Povstalecká Armáda /UPA/ i povstalecké skupiny jiných, bolševiky utiskovaných národů. Boj je neúprosný, ale tím více zarputilý. Bolševická zvěrstva páchaná na ukrajinské zemi nabyla tak strašného rozsahu a charakteru, jakého dějiny ještě nezaznamenaly. Masové exekuce, popravy, věšení lidí na náhrobních křížích, které tito postavili svým padlým bojovníkům, věznění, strašná mučení vězňů, vyvážení na Sibiř, vojenské akce, loupení, znásilňování žen, vypalování vesnic, házení ještě nedobitých, položivých lidí do ohně, nevyjímajíc ženy a děti, k tomu ještě všelijaké provokace a orgie NKVD a NKHD – to jest každodenní obraz ukrajinské vesnice a města. Současně vzrůstá veliká nenávisť a zloba proti utiskovatelům a lidojedům, jakož i odhodlání k revolučně-osvobozovacímu boji. Ukrajinská povstalecká armáda, která se vytvořila v době vzrůstu německého protiukrajinského teroru, utvrdila se v boji proti německým okupantům a pokryla svými těly celou zemi Ukrajinu, svádí dnes každodenní boje s bolševickými nájezdníky. UPA chrání ukrajinské obyvatelstvo před napadením NKVD-istů. Bije nepřítel i v jeho střediscích, oblastech a rajonech.

UPA je dnes nejen největší partizánská armáda v Evropě, ale v první řadě je revolučně-osvobozovací armáda protibolševické fronty, která bojuje nejen za svobodu ukrajinského národa, ale i za svobodu všech národů a všeho

lidstva, utiskovaného a ohrozeného bolševizmom. UPA je armáda, ktorá pripravuje všenárodnú osvobodzovaciu revolúciu vo všetkých vrstvách a to politicky, psychologicky, propagačne a prakticky. UPA je armáda, ktorá sa stáva praporem osvobodzovacieho boja všetkých bolševizmom utiskovaných národov.

Nás, ukrajinské povstalec a celý náš národ, nezastaví ani tá skutočnosť, že vojna na svetovej fronte bola ukončená a nepriateľ vrhl všetky svoje sily proti nám. My budeme bojovať za svoju svätú právu a pravdu do posledného dychu a nevzdáme boj i keby proti nám stál celý svet. Dnes sa dívame so súcitom na národy, ktoré sú omámené narkosou bolševizmu a vrhli sa do náručia rudých „osvoboditeľov“ a nepochybujeme, že tieto obeť bolševizmu prídu zakrátko k sebe a povstanú spolu s nami do boja proti kremelskej tyranii, pretože iné cesty ke slobode a ke životu tieto národy nemajú. Táto skutočnosť posiluje v nás vieru, že naše ideály sú sväté a naše cesta i metódy nášho boja sú jedinú správne a dávajú nám záruku ke víťazstvu a životu.

Bolševici sa s posmechem pripravujú ke novým bojom a nové kořistnické války, nehládíc na to, že v zemi panuje strašný hlad, ekonomický rozvrat a chaos. Na to neberou bolševičtí imperialisté zreteľ, ale dajú si svoje. Táto skutočnosť mobilizuje progresívne sily sveta proti bolševizmu a uvnitř SSSR uspisuje proces vnitřní revolúcie.

Bolševici píšu o každom boji, na pr. tých národov, ktoré vystupujú proti anglickému impériu, ale zamlčujú fakta o rozměrech boja národov a v prvú radú ukrajinského, ktorý je veden uvnitř vëzení národov, t.j. v SSSR. Ale ani terorem, ani lži, ani zamlčováním faktov o boji proti nim, nezničí bolševici ten oheň, ktorý sa rozeplál ve všetkých částech bolševického impéria. Tento oheň sa mení ve všenárodne-osvobodzovaci požár a v tomto požáru vystane nový, spravodlivý, skutočne demokratický porádek na východe i juhu a ve celú Evropu. Teprve tehdy budú volné národy i lidstvo.

Víte, pane presidente, že i kdysi a do určité míry i dnes sa dívá Váš národ na Rusko jako na spasitele a ochránce všetkých slovanských národov pred germánskou agresi. Dnes mnoho Vašich obyvateľ bolo rozčarováno po svých snech. A zůstane-li tak i dále, bude určité proklínat falešného Mesiáša, ktorý záměnou za německé jařme přivodil jařme bolševické, které užívá ideje panslavizmu, pravoslavi a demokracie ke zastření svých imperialistických plánů a politiky. Slovanské národy nemajú vůbec chuti měnit německé jařme za bolševické a přijímají ho jen proto, že je od staršího bratra. Ruští bolševici se ve ničem neliší od německých zvěřstev. Stalinští NKVD-isté vraždí masově lidi zrovna tak, jako hitlerovští gestapáci, plynové komory Hitlera nahrazují Sibiř, Solowky a jiné továrny smrti.

Viděl jste, pane presidente, sovětské obyvatele ve vašich vesnicích a městech. Viděl jste jejich vzhled a chování, ale to není ještě celý obraz sovětského člověka. Třeba vidět miliony těch chudáků a mučedníků v jejich domovech, při práci v kolchozech a na šachtách a tehdy vyvstává v hloubi srdce otázka, proč bolševičtí tyrané zaměnili hezký lidský život v takové mučednické živoření a kde jim dal práva tak mučit a vraždit lid. Třeba uznat v zájmu pravdy, že tito sovětští obyvatelé, které jsme viděli v RA nejsou vinni za to, že tak strašně vypadají a mají tak politováníhodnou kulturu. K tomu je přivedla sovětská vláda svými nesmyslnými experimenty. Bolševici přivedli své obyvatele nejen do tohoto stavu, ale i k tomu, že matky jedí svoje děti, jak tomu bylo již v době velkého hladu na Ukrajině v letech 1922-33. Taková strašná perspektiva vyvstává před každým, bolševiky „osvobozeným“ národem. I když bolševici v nově okupovaných nebo osvobozených zemích používají vzhledné taktiky, tedy je to jen první stupeň bolševické akce. Kdyby se však situace nezměnila, mělo by to dále strašné následky.

Ukrajinský národ a jeho politické vedení zastává dnes takové stanovisko, že bolševiky utiskované a ohrožené národy musejí povstat do boje na společné, antibolševické osvobozovací frontě, do boje za svůj život, jestliže nechtějí zahynouti.

My věříme, že dnes nebo zítra poznají všechny národy a všechny státy, co to znamená bolševismus a co kremelská tyranie připravuje světu. Věříme, že tyto se však vzpamatují a zasadí protiúder. Toto musí uspíšit i náš boj a to boj všech, bolševiky utiskovaných národů.

Věříme, že Vy, pane presidente, náležitě mezi ta politická individua v Evropě, která náležitě oceňují současnou politickou situaci v Evropě a bolševické nebezpečí pro všechny národy, v prvé řadě národy slovanské. Myslíme, že Vy, pane presidente i Váš národ máte náležitý poměr k antibolševické osvobozovací frontě.

Dovolte, pane presidente, abychom vám tlumočili náš pozdrav.
Znamenáme se v hluboké úctě

UKRAJINŠTÍ POVSTALCI.³²

32 ABS, f. 302-142-6. List UPA Dr. E. Benešovi.

Summary

Anti-Communist and anti-Soviet aspects of the operation of the Ukrainian insurgent army in Slovakia during the years 1945 – 1947

The Ukrainian insurgent army, which operated in western Ukraine and south-eastern Poland during the II. World war – from 1942 onwards, continued in its actions during the post-war years but it slightly altered its mission. The leaders of the Ukrainian underground movement expected that a political conflict would start between the actors of the anti-Hitler coalition and that a new armed conflict would start between the West and the Soviet Union. This, they thought, would mark the end of the Soviet totalitarian regime in Eastern Europe. In this situation the Ukrainian underground encouraged the Soviet Union republics and countries of middle and south-eastern Europe, to a united armed conflict against Bolshevism. This was to be done in the so called: Front of subjugated and endangered nations of middle and Eastern Europe. To practically realize these aims the Ukrainian insurgent units undertook several propaganda raids during 1945-1950 into White Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and into the Baltic states (Lithuania). These raids were a new form of anti-Soviet activities and struggle of the Ukrainian insurgent army during the post-war years. Czechoslovakia was one of the main targets for these raids, which took place in three phases: August – September 1945, April 1946 (both in eastern Slovakia) and the so called: Great raid through the republic into the American zone in Germany during June – October/November 1947, which also had a profound international response.

Protikomunistické hnutí v českých zemích v roce 1953

Pavel MAREK

Cílem našeho příspěvku¹ je evokace a komparace dvou nejvýznamnějších protirežimních protikomunistických akcí v Československu v roce 1953, kterými byly lidové demonstrace v dubnu na Hané, v moravském Prostějově, a hned vzápětí nato v květnu v západočeské Plzni. Odborné veřejnosti nejsou sice neznámé, jsme však přesvědčeni o tom, že se jedná více o povědomí o nich, než o skutečnou znalost. Studie se opírá o prameny celostátní a místní provenience, o dokumenty vzniklé v souvislosti s prodáváním těchto kauz ústředními, krajskými a okresními stranickými a státními orgány, a o nečetnou sekundární literaturu vzniklou po roce 1990 v obou regionech. Nejde nám o podání vyčerpávajícího pohledu na události se všemi detaily, neboť jsme přece jen omezeni rozsahem pojednání, spíše se chceme soustředit na postižení příčin, průběhu a důsledků demonstrací a jejich zhodnocení na základě komparativního přístupu k materiálu.

Rok 1953 reprezentuje v dějinách evropského komunismu po 2. světové válce nepochybně mezník. O této věci není v historiografii sporu a dokazuje to mj. také početná literatura věnovaná zmapování a zhodnocení událostí spojovaných hlavně se Stalinovou smrtí.² Zdá se tedy, jakoby

1 Studie vznikla v rámci plnění grantového úkolu GAČR č. 409/08/0009.

2 Srov. např. LAQUEUR, W.: *Europa auf dem Weg zur Weltmacht 1945 – 1992*. München 1992, s. 203 – 219; BENZ, W. – GRAML, H. (eds.): *Das zwanzigste Jahrhundert, 2. Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*. Frankfurt a. M. 1983, s. 351 – 373; BENEŠ, J.: *Čas voněl dnem. Stručný přehled dějin VKS(b)*. Praha 2004, s. 265 – 297; REIMAN, M.: Obrat roku 1953 a Chruščov. In: *Slovanský přehled*, roč. 83, 1997, č. 4, s. 403 – 413.

návrat k tématu první velké krize v dějinách budování socialistického bloku³ (pokud pomineme sovětsko-jugoslávskou roztržku z roku 1948⁴) byl zbytečný, neboť zřejmě nelze přinést už nic podstatně nového. Domníváme se, že tato skepse není plně opodstatněná.

Historiografie zabývající se problematikou budování základů socialismu v českých zemích připomíná, že reakce obyvatel na únorový puč komunistů v roce 1948⁵ byla pozitivní i negativní. Nicméně odpor proti převzetí správy státu komunisty se projevoval převážně dílčími a izolovanými akcemi, jsou zaznamenány stávkové akce, akce odporu proti kolektivizaci, proti vládní církevní politice atd.⁶ Za akce masovějšího rázu jsou pak označovány pražské protesty při červnovém sokolském sletu a při pohřbu prezidenta Edvarda Beneše (1884 – 1948)⁷ v září roku 1948 a potom předvánoční protesty dělnictva v Brně v roce 1951.⁸ Teprve v roce 1953, kdy zakladatelské období vyústilo do hlubší krize režimu postihující všechny oblasti života společnosti a kdy v důsledku realizace vize Československa jako strojírenské velmoci a militarizace ekonomiky země⁹ ztratila schopnost uspokojovat potřeby svého obyvatelstva a kdy došlo k citelnému

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- 3 LAQUEUR, W.: *Europe in our time: a history 1945 – 1992*. New York 1992, s. 144 – 150; WEGS, R. J. – LADRÉCH, R.: *Evropa po roce 1945*. Praha 2002, s. 53.
 - 4 PELIKÁN, J. – TEJCHMAN, M.: *Dějiny Jugoslávie*. Praha 1984, s. 39 – 44; RIDLEY, J.: *Tito*. Praha 1995, s. 247 – 256; PELIKÁN, J.: *Jugoslávie a východní blok 1953 – 1958*. Praha 2001; SERVICE, R.: *Soudruzi. Světové dějiny komunismu*. Praha 2009, s. 222 – 229; WEITHMANN, M. W.: *Balkán. 2000 let mezi Východem a Západem*. Praha 1996, s. 345 – 349.
 - 5 RUPNIK, J.: *Dějiny Komunistické strany Československa*. Praha 2002, s. 236 – 246; NÁLEVKA, V.: *Světová politika ve 20. století. Díl 2*. Praha 2000, s. 21 – 22; KAPLAN, K.: *Kronika komunistického Československa*. Brno 2005, s. 7 – 16.
 - 6 KAPLAN, K.: *Kronika komunistického Československa*, s. 55 – 61.
 - 7 KAPLAN, K.: *Nebezpečná bezpečnost. Státní bezpečnost 1948 – 1956*. Brno 1999, s. 55; LIŠKA, V.: *Causa Edvard Beneš*. Praha 2005, s. 244.
 - 8 PERNES, J.: *Brno 1951. Příspěvek k dějinám protikomunistického odporu na Moravě*. Praha 1997; PERNES, J. Dělnické demonstrace v Brně v roce 1951. In: *Soudobé dějiny*, roč. 3, 1996, č. 1, s. 23 – 41.
 - 9 RENNER, H. – SAMSON, I.: *Dejiny Československa po roku 1945*. Bratislava 1993, s. 33; RATAJ, J.: *KŠČ a Československo (1945 – 1960)*. Praha 2003, s. 127 – 140; VYKOUKAL, J. – LITERA, B. – TEJCHMAN, M.: *Východ. Vznik, vývoj a rozpad sovětského bloku 1944 – 1989*. Praha 2000, s. 294 – 298; KŘEN, J.: *Dvě století střední Evropy*. Praha 2006, s. 647 – 685; JUDT, T.: *Poválečná Evropa. Dějiny od roku 1945*. Praha 2008, s. 179; KAPLAN, K.: *Československo v letech 1948 – 1953. Díl 2*. Praha 1991, s. 93 – 96.

poklesu životní úrovně,¹⁰ můžeme registrovat novou sérii velkých protivládních demonstrací, na nichž je otevřeně kritizován celý komunisty vedený režim.

Je známo, že vlna protirežimních protestů v Československu byla vyvolána a souvisela s měnovou reformou roku 1953. Forma nesouhlasu s touto „loupeží století“,¹¹ kterou českým komunistům poradili sovětsí soudruzi, zahrnuje celou škálu akcí od verbálních projevů jednotlivců, protestní schůze a shromáždění na závodech, literatura připomíná konání 129 stávek v rozsahu jednoho až tří dnů, až po veřejné protesty na náměstích a v ulicích měst, kde došlo ke střetu demonstujícího obyvatelstva s ozbrojenou mocí. Jako příklady slouží akce v řadě menších lokalit na Ostravsku, dále v Třinci, Bohumíně, Orlové, ve Vimperku, Strakoncích a v Praze, ale proběhly např. i v Blovicích, Klatovech, Horažďovicích aj. Na Slovensku v Košicích-Lubeníku, v Mokradi, Ružomberku, Vlaškách, Liptovském Mikuláši aj.¹² Za vrchol protestů je českými historiky v čele s Karlem Kaplanem označováno povstání obyvatelstva vedeného dělníky tamní Škodovky v Plzni 1. června 1953.¹³

Dříve, než se budeme věnovat této kauze, zaměříme pozornost na protikomunistické demonstrace roku 1953 v Prostějově,¹⁴ které proběhly z časového hlediska před akcemi proti měnové reformě, už 10. dubna 1953. Při srovnání s Plzní nelze prostějovské demonstrace označit za dělnické, jejich účastníci pocházeli ze všech sociálních vrstev, přičemž převládala

10 KAPLAN, K.: *Sociální souvislosti krizí komunistického režimu 1953 – 1957 a 1968 – 1975*. Praha 1993, s. 7 – 23.

11 JIRÁSEK, Z. – ŠŮLA, J.: *Velká peněžní loupež v Československu 1953, aneb 50:1*. Praha 1992; LOUŽEK, M. (ed.): *Fenomén Stalin: náhoda, nebo nevyhnutelnost? Padesát let od měnové reformy*. Praha 2003; MUSILOVÁ, D.: *Měnová reforma 1953 a její sociální důsledky*. Praha 1994; PETRÁŠ, J.: Peněžní reforma 1953. In: *Sborník Archivu ministerstva vnitra*, č. 3, 2005, s. 141 – 171.

12 KAPLAN, K. – VÁCHOVÁ, J.: *Perzekuce po měnové reformě v Československu v roce 1953. Dokumenty*. Praha 1993; JIRÁSEK, Z.: Problémy měnové reformy na Slovensku roku 1953. In: *V tieni totality. Perzekúcia na Slovensku v začiatkoch komunistickej totality (1948 – 1953)*. Zborník materiálův z vedeckej konferencie v Bratislave 10. 5. 1996. Bratislava 1996, s. 90 – 97.

13 PERNES, J.: *Krize komunistického režimu v Československu v 50. letech 20. století*. Brno 2008, s. 91.

14 K prostějovským demonstracím srov. TRAPL, M.: *Prostějovský „černý pátek“ 10. dubna 1953*. Prostějov 1998; TRAPL, M.: Svržení Masarykova pomníku a demonstrace v Prostějově v dubnu 1953. In: *Štafeta*, roč. 24, 1993, s. 2 – 7; LŽIČAŘOVÁ, J.: *Vývoj regionálních struktur komunistického režimu v 50. letech 20. století na Prostějovsku*. Olomouc 2010, s. 36 – 38. Rkp. magisterské diplomové práce na katedře historie FF UP v Olomouci.

mládež, a také neměly tak masový charakter – Prostějov byl přece jen menším, čtyřicetitisícovým okresním městem; počet účastníků je odhadován na 1 500 – 2 000 lidí. Také jejich motivace byla jiná, nebyly (přímým) protestem proti snižování životní úrovně a ožebračování, ale vyvolalo je stržení Masarykova pomníku. V tomto smyslu byly akcí s politickým podtextem, byly namířeny proti komunistům považovaným 1) za iniciátory tohoto násilného a nekulturního činu a 2) nositele totalitního režimu odmítajícího Masarykův odkaz demokratického politika a vytvářejícího v něm obraz třídního nepřítelů lidových mas. Do jisté míry by se dalo také kalkulovat s celkovou atmosférou města, s jeho historickými tradicemi,¹⁵ se vždy (až dodneška) výrazným postavením sociálních demokratů a také s pozitivním vztahem vůči osobnosti T. G. Masaryka (1850 – 1937), který se projevil např. už v roce 1921,¹⁶ tedy ještě za prezidentova života, návrhem na postavení jeho pomníku. Po řadě peripetií se tento záměr podařil realizovat až 27. října 1946¹⁷ a ne náhodou byl slavnostním řečníkem tehdejší předseda sociálně demokratické strany Zdeněk Fierlinger (1891– 1976).¹⁸ V prvních poválečných volbách v roce 1946 KSČ v Prostějově skončila dokonce až na třetím místě za socialistickými stranami,¹⁹ což lze v rámci českých zemí označit za výjimku.

Tato úcta k Masarykovi se objevovala i po roce 1948, lidé k jeho soše na náměstí pokládali květiny, zapalovali svíčky, v tichu rozjímali. To se dělo i v roce 1953 – 25. února v den „vítězství pracujícího lidu“ a 7. března, v den Masarykových narozenin, ale současně dva dny po Stalinově smrti. Je přirozené, že tyto tiché demonstrační akty komunistická moc viděla nerada. Vlastně už koncem roku 1952 rada městského národního výboru řešila návrh na odstranění pomníku.²⁰

15 K novodobým tradicím města srov. *Prostějov. Dějiny města. Díl 2.* Prostějov 1999, s. 8 – 104; Národní archiv (dál pouze NA) Praha, fond (dál pouze f.) ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951-1954, archivní jednotka (dál pouze a. j.) 151/23, svazek (dál pouze sv.) 56, Zpráva o odstranění pomníku T. G. Masaryka v Prostějově.

16 TRAPL, M.: *Prostějovský „černý pátek“ 10. dubna 1953.* Prostějov 1998, s. 4.

17 TRAPL, M.: *Osudy sochy.* Prostějov 1999.

18 KAPLAN, K.: *Kronika komunistického Československa*, s. 186 – 211.

19 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, a. j. 156/5, sv. 58 – Zpráva o průzkumu situace v městě Prostějov; URBAN, J.: *Parlamentní volby v roce 1946 v Prostějově.* Brno 2008, s. 51. Rkp. magisterské diplomové práce na HÚ FF MU v Brně.

20 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, a. j. 151/23, sv. 56, Zpráva o odstranění pomníku T. G. Masaryka v Prostějově.

Pokud jde o místní komunistické elity a jejich postoj k odstranění Masarykovu pomníku, byly v podstatě rozštěpené. 1) Většina komunistů, můžeme je označit za radikály, byla pro jeho stržení, tím více, že v nedávných celostátních kampaních byla „odhalena“ jeho „pravá tvář“.²¹ 2) Menšina (umírnění) reprezentovaná okresním stranickým a státním vedením sice nebyla proti, ale chtěla vyčkat na „příhodnější dobu“. Obdobné stanovisko zastávaly špičky i na KV KSČ v Olomouci.

Zdá se, že tichá demonstrace u Masarykova pomníku počátkem března 1953, v době, kdy národ „truchlil“ nad smrtí „milovaného vůdce“ světového proletariátu, byla poslední kapkou do číše vína skupiny místních komunistických radikálů, která přetekla. Ve dnech 7. a 8. dubna se v prostorách místního leteckého učiliště sešlo několik letců-vojáků a vůdčích postav StB a kontrarozvědky (Josef Děrda, Pavel Bernát, Slavomil Sobotka),²² kteří přizvali ke spolupráci předsedu ONV Františka Jána jako jediného představitele místní komunistické stranické a státní moci. Dohodli se na nic nečekat a Masarykův pomník odstranit. O svém úmyslu nikoho neinformovali, jednalo se o ilegální akci provedenou na vlastní pěst.²³

postupovala velmi rychle a v pátek 10. dubna 1953 ve dvě hodiny ráno Masarykovu sochu z náměstí odstranila²⁴ za pomoci vojenského autojeřábu a odvezla ji do nedaleké obce Žarovice u Plumlova na vojenskou střelnici. Podle vyjádření F. Jána za zasedání byra (předsednictva) OV KSČ 11. dubna byla socha rozdracena pod koly autojeřábu a zahrabána do připravené jámy; při pozdějším ověřování toto místo nebylo nalezeno a dodnes je skulptura přes pátrání mnoha lidí v různé době a na odlišných

21 Jedním z vrcholů kampaně bylo vydání prací Jana Pachty (1906 – 1977), Františka Nečáaska (1913 – 1968) a Věry Raisové manipulujících s politickou činností, daty a událostmi ze života T. G. Masaryka. Srov. NEČÁSEK, F. – PACHTA, J. – RAISOVÁ, V. (eds.): *Doklady o protilidové a protistátní politice T. G. Masaryka. Sborník dokumentů*. Praha 1953; PACHTA, J.: *Pravda o T. G. Masarykovi*. Praha 1953; NEČÁSEK, F. – PACHTA, J. (eds.): *Dokumenty o protisovětských piklech československé reakce. Z archivních materiálů o kontrarevoluční činnosti Masaryka a Beneše*. Praha 1954.

22 TRAPL, M.: *Prostějovský „černý pátek“ 10. dubna 1953*, s. 5.

23 Státní okresní archiv (dál pouze SOKA) Prostějov, f. Okresní výbor KSČ (dál pouze OV KSČ) 1948 – 1960, *Závady při odstraňování soch v kraji olomouckém – zpráva z 13. 4. 1953*.

24 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, a. j. 151/23, sv. 56 – Zpráva o odstranění pomníku T. G. Masaryka v Prostějově.

místech nezvěstná. Pachatelé se domnívali, že akce nevyvolá větší rozruch, počítali maximálně s nějakou „kytičkou na podstavci“.²⁵

Velmi rychle se však ukázalo, že své kroky nedomyslela. V krajním případě podcenila konzultaci se svými nadřízenými, neinformovala stranické ani státní orgány města a okresu, bagatelizovala názory obyvatelstva. Proto se na počátku ocitla v defenzivě a izolaci. Od rána se na náměstí scházeli konsternovaní občané, většinou ženy a mládež, diskutovali o události a hledali viníka.²⁶ Byli přesvědčeni, že se jedná o dílo komunistů a vojáků navedených místním národním výborem. Shromáždění nikdo neorganizoval, jednalo se o spontánní akci. Paradoxem dopoledního shromáždění byla skutečnost, že v téže době, kdy občané v podstatě tiše demonstrovali, městem projížděl autem (vzdušnou čarou asi sto metrů od náměstí) inkognito nedávno zvolený prezident republiky Antonín Zápotocký (1884–1957). Vracel se do Prahy z léčebného pobytu v lázních Teplice nad Bečvou. Neměl o akci nejmenší tušení. Kolem poledne se dav lidí na náměstí zvětšil s tím, jak se zpráva o nočních událostech šířila. K ženám, studentům a žákům se přidávali živnostníci, řemeslníci a obchodníci, kteří řešili formu demonstrace, a ze shromáždění se začaly ozývat první protikomunistické výkřiky reagující také na nedostatky v zásobování a problémy hospodářského rázu. Když se lidé ani v poledne nerozešli, začal situaci řešit OV KSČ a vyslal mezi demonstranty 60 – 80 aktivistů, mezi nimiž byly dvě skupiny milicionářů v civilu,²⁷ jejichž úkolem bylo diskutovat s občany a vysvětlovat jim důvody odstranění sochy. Agitátoři argumentovali poukazy na protilidový charakter politiky T. G. Masaryka, což vyvolalo první fyzické

25 Svou roli zde sehrálo jako inspirace odstranění Masarykova pomníku v Olomouci, které proběhlo v noci z 3. na 4. dubna 1953 v Olomouci. Akci provedli členové vojenské kontrarozvědky, kteří sochu odpálili náloží. Tento čin v Olomouci nevzbudil žádnou pozornost. Dne 10. dubna byl odstraněn Masarykův pomník také v Uničově. Kromě toho se „ztratily“ také Masarykovy busty v Brodsku u Přerova a v Čelčicích. Vyšetřování ukazovala na ilegální akce příslušníků StB, kteří vyšetřovatelům následně lhali a svou účast popírali. Nadřízené orgány odstranění připomínek osobností T. G. Masaryka a E. Beneše (např. přejmenování názvů ulic a náměstí) schvalovaly, vadilo jim pouze, že akce probíhaly v noci. Disponovaly představou o schválení postup ze strany ÚV KSČ, resp. očekávaly vydání akční směrnice, která naváže na protimasarykovskou kampaň. NA, f. ÚV KSČ-02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, a. j. 151/23, sv. 56 – Zpráva o odstranění pomníku T. G. Masaryka v Prostějově; SOkA Prostějov, f. OV KSČ 1948 – 1960, Závady při odstraňování soch v kraji olomouckém – zpráva z 13. 4. 1953.

26 NA, f. ÚV KSČ-02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, a. j. 151/23, sv. 56 – Zpráva o odstranění pomníku T. G. Masaryka v Prostějově.

27 Tamtéž.

srážky a šarvátky.²⁸ Útoky směřovaly proti příslušníkům Lidových milicí a těm, kteří stržení sochy hájili. Jeden z přítomných vojáků-důstojníků se pokusil vystoupit na podstavec pomníku, dav jej však po prvním slovním útoku na bývalého prezidenta strhl, zbil a degradoval. V odpoledních hodinách OV KSČ vyslal mezi demonstrující druhou skupinu aktivistů, kteří se však z obav o své zdraví omezovali spíše na pozorování lidí, jejich fotografování a předávání informací o účastnících StB. Údajně však mezi nimi byli i takoví, kteří se nechali strhnout a volali s davem.

V podvečer protesty přerostly v protikomunistickou demonstraci za účasti 2 000 – 5 000 lidí, kteří skandovali hesla a volali po svobodě, demokracii a proti místním funkcionářům, v nichž dav viděl hlavní iniciátory odstranění sochy. Objektem zájmu se stal zejména předseda MNV Vilém Pobuda patřící mezi radikály, který se ani na veřejnosti netajil s názorem, že pokud by on sám mohl rozhodnout, tak by socha na náměstí, pod okny jeho kanceláře na radnici, už dávno nestála. Vedle averze svou roli nepochybně sehrálo i jeho jméno, které se ve skandovaném volání dobře rýmovalo: „Dejte nám Pobudu, dáme mu na hubu!“²⁹ Ale ozývala se i další hesla jako: „Hrouť se nám republika, chceme zpátky Masaryka“, nebo „Masaryka máme rádi, Tonda (případně Gottwald) nám ho nenahradí“. V zájmu spravedlnosti nutno konstatovat, že V. Pobudu demonstranti považovali za hlavního „hybatele“ neprávem, neboť o akci opravdu nevěděl. Skuteční viníci se zřejmě obávali jeho „přílišné hovornosti“. Tato vlastnost mu zůstala až do smrti, což může autor tohoto článku dosvědčit na základě vlastní zkušenosti staré už téměř 40 let... Když se v roce 1968 tato kauza rozvířila, sebevědomý Pobuda, následně pak jeden z „normalizátorů“, dával popsanou epizodu k dobrému a holedbal se, že by mezi bořiteli určitě nechyběl.

Kolem 19. hodiny večer došlo k prvnímu útoku na budovu radnice.³⁰ Demonstranti vnikli přes nedostatečně zajištěné vchodové dveře do přízemí monumentální budovy, postavené v roce 1913 podle projektu architekta Karla Hugo Kepky (1869 – 1924), vyzdobené originálními secesními malbami a štukami a budované současně do podoby jakési obrazárny s mnoha vystavenými uměleckými díly významných, převážně

28 Tamtéž.

29 Tamtéž.

30 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, a. j. 156/5, sv. 58 – Zpráva o průzkumu situace v městě Prostějov; TRAPL, M.: *Prostějovský „černý pátek“ 10. dubna 1953*, s. 9.

moravských tvůrců, a úředníky vytlačili do prvního patra.³¹ Mezitím OV KSČ vyslal na pomoc radnici asi 30 příslušníků Lidových milicí, kterým se podařilo dostat do budovy jednotlivě zadním vchodem. Na radnici se spojili, vchod zabarikádovali a demonstranty uvnitř budovy izolovali a zatkli.³² Elektrárna dostala pokyn vypnout v celém městě proud, což však vyvolalo ostré reakce nejen na náměstí, ale tlaky přicházely i z ostatních částí města, takže zanedlouho byla dodávka obnovena. Kolem 21. hodiny se útok na radnici opakoval. Vyvolala jej fáma, že v budově jsou drženy děti, které se připletly mezi demonstranty při první akci. Jeho razance předčila první útok.³³ Z nedaleké stavby byly doneseny trámy, z parku lavičky a jedna žena přinesla sekeru. Lidé se pokoušeli prorazit vrata, do poměrně vysoko situovaných oken létalo kamení a kusy železa.³⁴ Část davu se pokusila využít pro obsazení budovy zadní vchod, tam však narazila na členy SNB, kteří na demonstranty mířili zbraně a zastrašili je. Když před budovu přijela záchranná zdravotní služba pro dva zraněné milicionáře, došlo ke střetu davu se sanitkou, která odjela s prořezanými pneumatikami. Asi půlhodinový zápas o radnici byl úspěšný, budova byla podruhé obsazena, demonstrantům se tentokrát podařilo proniknout i do kanceláří v horních poschodích. Zlikvidovali však pouze obrazy státníků a nástěnky s komunistickými symboly, jinak interiéry zůstaly nepoškozeny.

Ve stejné době došlo k pokusu demonstrantů navázat kontakt s průmyslovými závody, kde pracovala „druhá směna“, vyslaní poslové však byli cestou zatčeni příslušníky SNB nebo členy LM. Snaha OV KSČ zorganizovat mítinky ve výrobních podnicích a vysvětlit na nich počínání „provokatérů“ a „reakcionářů“ skončila fiaskem. Bouřlivý průběh měla schůze v n. p. Železářny Prostějov, část dělníků ředitele závodu

31 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, a. j. 151/23, sv. 56 – Zpráva o odstranění pomníku T. G. Masaryka v Prostějově.

32 Důvody, proč se nepodařilo radnici zcela ovládnout, uvádí vyšetřovací zpráva StB. Velitelé ozbrojených (uniformovaných) složek měli strach dát pokyn k zásahu proti demonstrantům, avšak příslušníci bezpečnostních složek vysílali do akce v civilu. Obsadili i radnici a zasahovali, proto méně zaslíbeným se zdálo, že budovu ubránili úředníci a milicionáři. Rozhodující podíl však měli členové StB v civilu. SOKA Prostějov, f. OV KSČ 1948 – 1960, Závady při odstraňování soch v kraji olomouckém – zpráva z 13. 4. 1953.

33 Zpráva vyšetřovací komise ÚV KSČ situaci v tento moment charakterizuje jako „vzbourění“. NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, a. j. 151/23, sv. 56 – Zpráva o odstranění pomníku T. G. Masaryka v Prostějově.

34 TRAPL, M.: Svržení Masarykova pomníku a demonstrace v Prostějově v dubnu 1953. In: *Štafeta*, roč. 24, 1993, s. 3.

vypískala a ukřičela.³⁵ Proto také po skončení směny byli zaměstnanci naloženi do autobusů a rozvezeni do domovů, aby se nemohli demonstrace na náměstí zúčastnit.

Po „dobytí“ radnice aktivita demonstrantů upadala a represivní síly začaly přebírat iniciativu. Milicionáři a vojáci začali z davu „vytahovat“ neaktivnější jedince, „organizátory“, autory hesel a plánů dalších akcí. Místní rozhlas, který se demonstrantům nepodařilo ovládnout, vysílal výzvy k rozchodu a varoval před „pácháním protistátních činů“. Kolem 22.30 hod. dal náčelník Krajské správy SNB v Olomouci souhlas k přesunu pohotovostního oddílu asi 150 milicionářů z Olomouce do Prostějova, kteří se po příjezdu přidali asi k 400 členům SNB, StB, důstojníkům letectvého pluku, funkcionářům KSČ a milicionářům z Prostějova a společně začali demonstranty vytlačovat z náměstí. V záloze zůstaly další „posily“ z Olomouce, Brna a Gottwaldova, ale ty už nemusely zasahovat, neboť akce skončila kolem 23.50 hod. úspěšně, prostora byla „čistá“ a poslední zatčení putovali do internace. Zatýkáni pak pokračovalo ještě v následujících dnech, stejně jako ostraha náměstí hlídkami SNB a LM. V sobotu 11. dubna dopoledne došlo opět k pokusu o shromáždění lidí u podstavce Masarykova pomníku, lidé nerespektovali výzvu zvolit jinou trasu pochůzky, když ovšem zpozorovali nástup uniformovaných jednotek, prostoru opustili a byl zajištěn klid.³⁶

Teprve po potlačení páteční demonstrace začaly situaci ve městě řešit místní stranické orgány.³⁷ Byro OV KSČ se sešlo poprvé v sobotu 11. dubna ve 2 hodiny ráno na popud vedoucího tajemníka OV KSČ Ludvíka Zvonička, který pozval na schůzi také předsedu KV KSČ v Olomouci Václava Uhlíře. Zvoniček jako odpůrce radikálních praktik³⁸ na zasedání odstranění pomníku označil za neuváženou akci významně poškozující komunistickou stranu a pro její iniciátory navrhl stranický trest vyloučení

35 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951-1954, aj. 151/23, sv. 56 – Zpráva o odstranění pomníku T. G. Masaryka v Prostějově.

36 Tamtéž; TRAPL, M.: Svržení Masarykova pomníku a demonstrace v Prostějově v dubnu 1953, s. 4.

37 Už 10. dubna dopoledne jednali o kauze Zlatníček s Jánem, který asi po 9. hodině přišel na OV KSČ informovat, co se v noci událo. Jejich výpovědi zřejmě před vyšetřovací komisí ÚV KSČ však vyznívají tak, jakoby se nic moc přes den nestalo a nedělo, v akcích byly hloučky lidí a po 22. hodině nastal ve městě klid. Srov. SOkA Prostějov, f. OV KSČ 1948 – 1960, rkp. psaný tužkou, datovaný 27. 4. 1953 (s. Zlatníček, s. Ján).

38 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, aj. 151/23, sv. 56 – Zpráva o odstranění pomníku T. G. Masaryka v Prostějově.

z KSČ. V obdobném duchu se neslo i vystoupení krajského tajemníka, kterého nejvíce trápilo, že se o událostech ví i v Praze, přitom nešlo o nějaké zanedbatelné srocení lidí, ale „byla to úplná vzpoura“, kdy na budovu státní správy lidé útočili sochory, a celá řada účastníků si odnesla krvavé šrámy. Zdá se, že tomuto tlaku nakonec podlehl i přítomný předseda ONV F. Ján, který zaujal sebekritický postoj a přiznal, že akci nedocenil a nedomyslel, vůbec nečekal, že by mohla vyvolat masové protesty. Dokonce přiznal, že si zaslouží potrestání, neboť se měl se soudruhy poradit, ovšem vyloučení ze strany se mu zdálo jako příliš přísné. Když o této záležitosti následně hlasovalo plénum OV KSČ, svolané na 4 hodiny ráno, ukázalo se, že zdaleka ne všichni jeho členové se s názorem vedení OV a KV KSČ ztotožňovali.³⁹ Muselo se hlasovat dokonce dvakrát, než byl návrh na vyloučení iniciátorů odstranění pomníku schválen, přičemž prý „soudruzi táhli ruce nahoru těžko – jako slimáci“. Zato přijatá rezoluce nesoucí Zvoničkův rukopis, byla ostrá a „s odporem a opovržením“ odsoudila jak „nezodpovědné osoby“, které nedůstojným způsobem zacházely se skulpturou, tak „iniciátory provokační akce z řad buržoazních a maloměšťáckých a oportunistických živlů“, neboť „zhanobili revoluční tradice města Prostějova“. Podobná prohlášení pak přijal i ONV a MNV v Prostějově a texty byly ve formě letáků rozšiřovány do města obyvatelstvu a na závody.⁴⁰

Dne 14. dubna prostějovský případ projednalo byro ÚV KSČ⁴¹ za účasti tehdejších špiček Antonína Zápotockého, Viliama Širokého (1902 – 1971), Karola Bacílka (1896 – 1974), Alexeje Čepičky (1910 – 1990), Václava Kopeckého (1897 – 1961) a Antonína Novotného (1904 – 1975).⁴² Informaci dostalo z úst přítomného tajemníka KV KSČ v Olomouci V. Uhlíře. Zprávu vzalo víceméně pouze na vědomí a ustavilo vyšetřovací komisi ÚV v čele s Bacílkiem a Čepičkou, která byla pověřena provést šetření případu po vlastní linii⁴³ a své závěry předložit byru, aby mohlo rozhodnout. Zdá se, že členové byli nespokojeni s tím, že za viníka událostí byli označeni

39 Tamtéž.

40 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, aj. 151/23, sv. 56 – Prohlášení.

41 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, aj. 156/5, sv. 58 – Zpráva o událostech dne 10. dubna 1953 v Prostějově – návrh na opatření.

42 KAPLAN, K. – KOSATÍK, P.: *Gottwaldovi muži*. Praha; Litomyšl 2004.

43 Vlastní šetření v Prostějově ve dnech 21. – 24. 4. prováděli Jaroslav Pastyřík, Adolf Škarka a Jaroslav Trojan, pracovníci I. a II. oddělení ÚV KSČ. NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, aj. 156/5, sv. 58 – Zpráva o událostech dne 10. dubna 1953 v Prostějově – návrh na opatření.

také komunisté. Potvrzuje to skutečnost, že byro dalo pokyn ke zrušení stranických trestů těm vyloučeným členům, kteří likvidaci Masarykova pomníku připravili. Vedení KSČ současně pověřilo ministra národní bezpečnosti Bacílka zpracováním směrnic pro krajské a okresní velitele SNB, jak se v obdobných případech pobouření obyvatelstva chovat. Zda k tomu došlo, nebo ne, nevíme, ovšem chování bezpečnostních orgánů v případě plzeňského povstání sugeruje dojem, že poučení se nedostavilo. Krajské výbory strany měly obdržet informaci o událostech v Prostějově a vyvodit z nich pro sebe závěry.

Přestože byro ÚV KSČ zaujalo z formálního hlediska ke kauze víceméně vyčkávací postoj, úkoly jím stanovené naznačovaly, že se s hodnocením špiček OV a KV KSČ v Prostějově a Olomouci nezotožnil. Tak situaci vnímalo i množství příslušníků strany na Prostějovsku a existují záznamy o tom, že se šířila nespokojenost se zmíněným usnesením OV KSČ z 11. dubna, které bylo označováno za ukvapené a kapitulantské. Užší vedení strany však svůj postoj nechtělo změnit, což dokazují výsledky zasedání OV KSČ 16. dubna i okresní stranické konference konané ve dnech 18. a 19. dubna. Přizvaná trojice iniciátorů musela vyslechnout další kritické hlasy, kála se ze svých činů, současně se však hájila tím, byla vyprovokována pietními akcemi u Masarykova pomníku v době, kdy celý národ už jasně věděl, kdo to Masaryk ve skutečnosti byl. Nemohli ovládnout své emoce, a proto připravili odstranění sochy, aby se obdobné akce už neopakovaly. Celkově mezi komunisty převládal souhlas se svržením pomníku, výhrady měli spíše k formě a „partyzánskému“ postupu.

Komise ÚV KSČ předložila politbyru výsledky svého šetření prostějovských bouří 19. května 1953.⁴⁴ Její zpráva evokuje dojem historicko-politologické úvahy, neboť je jednak analýzou ekonomické, politické, sociální, kulturní a náboženské situace na Prostějovsku v retrospektivním pohledu, ale současně se opírá o informace získané „výslechy“ svědků událostí, pocházejících ze všech sociálních vrstev. Její závěry byly v tom základním zásadně odlišné od stanovisek vedení OV a KV KSČ v Prostějově a Olomouci.⁴⁵ Prostějovské události celkově označila za projev „činnosti reakce“ a doporučila všechny zajištěné účastníky demonstrací tvrdě potrestat.

44 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, aj. 151/23, sv. 56 – Zpráva o odstranění pomníku T. G. Masaryka v Prostějově.

45 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, aj. 156/5, sv. 58 – Zpráva o průzkumu situace v městě Prostějov; TRAPL, M.: Svržení Masarykova pomníku a demonstrace v Prostějově v dubnu 1953, s. 5.

Požadovala však diferencovat mezi nimi a oddělit iniciátory od svedených. Doporučovala zohlednit při stanovení trestů třídní původ, přičemž chtěla „*studenty buržoazního a kulackého původu vyloučit ze škol*“. Současně však zpráva obsahuje ostrou kritiku OV KSČ v Prostějově, který krizovou situací nezvládl, počínal si pasivně, bál se rázně zasáhnout.⁴⁶ Toto selhání však nebylo podle autorů materiálu náhodné, neboť okresní stranické vedení dlouhodobě podceňovalo a nezvládalo masově-politickou a ideologickou práci. Velké chyby se dopustilo tím, že už v listopadu 1952 se postavilo proti snahám MNV v Prostějově Masarykův pomník odstranit. Komise ÚV KSČ podpořila trojici iniciátorů, navrhla definitivně jim zrušit stranický trest a povolal je z nucené dovolené opět na jejich původní pracovní místa.⁴⁷

Politbyro toto hodnocení prostějovských událostí 10. dubna 1953 v podstatě schválilo a tento pohled akceptovalo s tím rozdílem, že ve svém usnesení kritiku OV KSČ v Prostějově ještě prohloubilo a zostřílo. Demonstrace označilo za „*projev kapitalistických živlů*“, za vystoupení reakce, které bylo umožněno tím, že stranické orgány v Prostějově prokázaly svou bezradnost a chovaly se kapitulantsky. Politbyro ÚV KSČ tak nepřímou schválilo zbourání Masarykova pomníku v Prostějově, postavilo se za iniciátory akce a dalo popud k rozpoutání represí.

Soudní proces s „*kapitalistickými živly*“ prokurátor původně plánoval jako veřejný, žaloba měla znít pro velezradu,⁴⁸ a bylo do něj vybráno 17 účastníků demonstrací,⁴⁹ z nichž 13 pracovalo v dělnických profesích!

46 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, aj. 156/5, sv. 58 – Zpráva o průzkumu situace v městě Prostějov.

47 V prvé řadě se to týkalo předsedy ONV Jána, jemuž hodně pomohla sebekritika, prý si uvědomil chybu. NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, aj. 156/5, sv. 58 – Zpráva o událostech dne 10. dubna 1953 v Prostějově – návrh na opatření; NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951-1954, aj. 156/5, sv. 58 – Zpráva o průzkumu situace v městě Prostějov.

48 SOKA Prostějov, f. OV KSČ 1948-1960, Závady při odstraňování soch v kraji olomouckém – zpráva z 13. 4. 1953. – Zpráva doslova uvádí: „*Mínění krajských činitelů je, že je nutné vynést tresty při horní hranici sazby.*“

49 Ve zprávě náčelníka Krajské správy VB kpt. Švehlák a náčelníka Krajské správy StB kpt. Radoně je uvedeno zatčení 78 „nejaktivnějších“ účastníků demonstrací, z nichž oba velitelé doporučovali zařadit do procesu 13 – 15 lidí. Zpráva je uvádí jmenovitě a ke každému z nich autoři materiálu připojují asi desetiřádkovou charakteristiku obsahující výčet trestné činnosti. Jednalo se o tyto osoby: Jaroslav Vyrubal, Alois Halala, Jiřina Drvotová, Jiří Kysela, Jiří Altman, Josef Hájek, Hynek Svoboda, Josef Franěk, Josef Martan, Stanislav Studený, Bedřich Vitásek, Václav Hrubý, Karel Hel, Danuše Chlupová, Alois Procházka, Milan Matečný a Josef Kypěna. Jednalo se většinou

Nakonec v srpnu 1953 stanulo před Okresním soudem v Prostějově 46 lidí žalovaných pro trestný čin „útoku proti veřejné osobě“. Nad 43 z nich byl vynesena rozsudek věznění v rozmezí od několika měsíců do čtyř let. Mnohem rozsáhlejší se jeví mimosoudní postihy v zaměstnání jako propuštění, snížení platu, přeřazení na nekvalifikovanou práci apod. Největší represivní zásah však mířil do školství,⁵⁰ kdy byli postiženi studenti středních škol a profesori. Žáci označení za „podněcovatele“⁵¹ byli ze škol vyloučeni, množství z nich obdrželo sníženou známku z chování nebo důtky ředitele. Exemplární potrestání se týkalo jedné z maturitních tříd prostějovského gymnázia.⁵² Pocházeli z ní totiž studenti, kteří 7. března 1953 položili kytičku k Masarykovu pomníku a tím se vlastně stali hlavními inspirátory celé kauzy. Navíc se ukázalo, že v tentýž den třída při společném hrabání listů podpalovala hromádky novinami, v nichž byl otištěn portrét J. V. Stalina, a při práci si zpívali „masarykovské písně“. Třída jako celek byla označena za skupinu s protistátním smýšlením, rozpuštěna a nikdo nebyl připuštěn k maturitě na žádné škole v ČSR. Tyto detaily se podařilo zjistit z výpovědi-přiznání Milana Králíka, jednoho ze studentů inkriminované třídy; za odměnu mohl v Olomouci složit maturitu. Třídní učitel prof. Bohumil Svozil, spolužák básníka Jiřího Wolкера (1900 – 1924), musel opustit školství, ředitele gymnázia prof. Jaroslava Porta zbavili funkce a katecheta Josef Životek ztratil státní souhlas k výuce náboženství.⁵³

Události v Prostějově v dubnu roku 1953 byly před veřejností důsledně utajovány, lidé se o nich mohli dovědět pouze z vysílání zahraničního rozhlasu nebo ze styku s obyvateli města. Všechny spisy týkající se kauzy byly přísně utajovány. Širší veřejnost se k informacím dostala poprvé až v roce 1968. Okresní výbor Národní fronty ustavil komisi s názvem „M 53“, jejíž úkol směřoval k objasnění událostí z roku 1953 a měla nalézt Masarykovu sochu. Městský národní výbor konstituoval komisi, která měla připra-

o jedince zadržené při útoku na radnici nebo přistižené při volání výzev a hesel. NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, aj. 151/23, sv. 56.

50 NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, aj. 151/23, sv. 56 – Zpráva o odstranění pomníku T. G. Masaryka v Prostějově.

51 Ve skutečnosti byl uplatněn třídní pohled. Pokud byl žák z dělnické rodiny, byl proveden jen pohovor za účasti rodičů, zatímco studenti „buržoazního“ původu byli okamžitě vylučováni. NA, f. ÚV KSČ, 02/5, politický sekretariát 1951 – 1954, aj. 156/5, sv. 58 – Zpráva o událostech dne 10. dubna 1953 v Prostějově – návrh na opatření.

52 TRAPL, M.: *Prostějovský „černý pátek“ 10. dubna 1953*, s. 16.

53 TRAPL, M.: *Svržení Masarykova pomníku a demonstrace v Prostějově v dubnu 1953*, s. 6.

vit obnovu pomníku. Invaze vojsk Varšavské smlouvy 21. srpna 1968, která v Prostějově vyvolala další lidskou tragédii způsobenou střelbou intervenčních vojsk do obyvatelstva, vše zastavila. Masarykův pomník v Prostějově se podařilo obnovit v roce 1998.

Nyní svou pozornost zaměříme na protikomunistické povstání v Plzni. Jednalo se o živelnou akci za účasti několika tisíc občanů, která je v některých parametrech srovnatelná s největším protestem v zemích východního bloku, s živelným povstáním ze 17. června 1953 v Německé demokratické republice.⁵⁴ Na rozdíl od východního Německa, kde se stávkové hnutí a nepokoje rozšířily z Berlína fakticky do celé země, akce v Plzni zůstaly lokálně zcela izolovány a nakonec i před ostatní veřejností v Československu utajeny (proto nejvýznamnější práce o událostech nese název *Utajené povstání*). Na rozdíl od Německa byly likvidovány vlastními režimními silami, bez účasti SSSR, za pomoci vojska, Lidových milic a bezpečnosti, povolány z oblasti západních Čech. Obešly se bez mrtvých na obou stranách.⁵⁵ Historikové, politologové i lokální patrioti diskutují o charakteru protestní akce v Plzni, zejména v komparaci s událostmi v NDR. Otázka tedy zní, zda se jednalo o protistátní puč, demonstrace, protistátní vystoupení nebo povstání?⁵⁶ Po vyhodnocení detailů a srovnání se příkláním k názoru, že šlo o masové demonstrace. Specifikem charakterizujícím plzeňských událostí je konfrontace komunistické moci s dělnickou třídou, která byla nejvýraznějším představitelem protivládních sil a současně sociální vrstvou, o níž se komunisté v teorii i praxi opírali. Náš výzkum potvrdil, že v případě Plzně se jednalo o nejmasovější veřejný protest proti režimu a jeho politice v Československu v roce 1953.

Povstání v Plzni začalo v pondělí 1. června 1953 jako protestní akce proti měnové reformě, primárně tedy mělo ekonomické pozadí, nicméně tento rozměr rychle ztratilo a přerostlo v politickou akci s „prvky mocenského střetu“.⁵⁷ Už jsme naznačili, že reakce na nečekanou měnovou reformu byla v celém Československu bouřlivá. Rozhořčení obyvatelstva souviselo na jedné straně s pocitem oklamání, neboť nejvyšší představitelé strany a státu do posledních chvil národ ujišťovali, že občas probleskující zprávy o chystané měnové reformě jsou jen fámy reakčních sil, ve skutečnosti je

54 NÁLEVKA, V.: *Kapitoly z dějin studené války. Díl 1*. Praha 1997, s. 105 – 106; BRADLEY, J. F. N. *Válka a mír po roce 1945*. Praha 1994, s. 92.

55 BLAIVE, M.: *Promarněná příležitost. Československo a rok 1956*. Praha 2001, s. 183.

56 ŠTĚPÁNEK, Z.: *Utajené povstání 1953*. Praha 1993, s. 68 – 70.

57 Tamtéž, s. 7.

hospodářská situace stabilní, a k žádným změnám ve finanční politice nedojde, na druhé straně sociální dopady měnové reformy byly opravdu tvrdé a postihly všechno obyvatelstvo, nejvíce však rodiny s dětmi, dělníky v těžkém průmyslu a důchodce. Kurs nastavený pro výměnu peněz lze označit přímo za hanebně nevýhodný pro obyvatelstvo, přičemž z něj těžil stát, který později zisku využil pro své politické cíle. Došlo k naprostému a záměrnému znehodnocení všech úspor, neboť režim potřeboval zlikvidovat přebytek peněz na trhu, který kontrastoval s naprostým nedostatkem spotřebního zboží. Životní úroveň obyvatelstva poklesla zhruba o čtvrtinu, u rodin s více dětmi a důchodců se rovnala životnímu minimu. Z politického hlediska bylo závažné, že opatření dopadla i na dosud privilegované skupiny dělníků pracujících v těžkém a zbrojním průmyslu, takže stranické a státní elity se de facto ocitaly v izolaci. Někteří příslušníci elit si tohoto negativa stranické politiky byli vědomi a odpor veřejnosti očekávali, na druhé straně v regionech, na úrovni míst, okresů a krajů, byli funkcionáři reakcí lidí zaskočení a dezorientováni, nebyli připraveni a také se báli proti dělníkům mocensky zakročít.

Situace v pondělní ráno po měnové reformě v Závodech V. I. Lenina (bývalé Škodovce) v Plzni signalizovala nespokojenost a neklid mezi dělníky. Cestou do práce a v šatnách kriticky reagovali na měnu, cítili se podvedeni zmíněnými sliby nejvyšších funkcionářů (zejména A. Zápotockého), kromě toho se jejich hněv obracel i proti vedení závodu, které nechalo vyplatit zálohy na mzdy předčasně ve staré měně, takže i ony byly měnou znehodnoceny, a do nové výplaty bylo daleko. Celozávodní výbor KSČ na situaci reagoval poměrně pružně a hned ráno dal pokyn ke svolání dílenských výborů, které měly dělníky přesvědčovat o výhodách reformy a čelit kritice, kterou vydávali za nepřátelskou propagandu.⁵⁸ Směnu zahájil v 6 hodin ráno projev generálního ředitele v závodním rozhlase, ale když diskuse neustávaly, před sedmou hodinou do rozhlasu promluvil technický ředitel. Toho však nikdo neposlouchal a projev byl doprovázen pískotem a výkřiky. Schůze strany zahájené po 7. hodině měly bouřlivý průběh, mluvčí dělníků odmítali, že by kritika stranické politiky byla dílem provokatérů a dávali průchod názoru, že byli měnovou reformou okradeni.

Kolem 9. hodiny ráno začala situace v podniku eskalovat, jednotlivé závody začaly svolávat na nádvoří protestní shromáždění a osazenstvo vyhlášovalo stávkou. Došlo k zformování několika průvodů, které opustily závod a směřovaly do centra města, na Náměstí republiky, před radnici.

58 Tamtéž, s. 11.

Některé z nich si udělaly zastávku na Masarykově náměstí u sochy T. G. Masaryka a u základů památníku osvoboditelů města od fašismu, jimiž byla americká armáda. Demonstrující postupovali za zpěvu písní a provolávání hesel namířených proti měnové reformě.⁵⁹ Mezitím KV KSČ v Plzni, který byl dosud v klidu a pouze sbíral informace, začal vydávat pokyny směřující k uklidnění situace. Do bývalé Škodovky vyslal agitátory a mobilizoval ozbrojené složky, které obsadily vyústění některých ulic směřujících na plzeňské hlavní náměstí a obsadily brány důležitých závodů ve městě a bránily dělníkům opouštět pracoviště. Lidové milice nebyly nasazeny na náměstí, ale měly sřežit průmyslové podniky. Hlavní tíhu obrany režimu nesly jednotky bezpečnosti, neboť armáda byla do velké míry demoralizovaná – když vojáky dovezli na náměstí, odmítli slézt z vozů a zasahovat, návrh na použití zbraní nepřicházel v úvahu. Obecně se dá říci, že nikdo neměl odvalu vydat pokyn k zahájení akce o své újmě, protože ani pokyny z Prahy k tomu nevybízely. Předseda KNV údajně obdržel od předsedy vlády V. Širokého doporučení soustředit se na agitaci, vysvětlování, rozhodně situaci neřešit násilnými prostředky.

Kolem 10. hodiny dopoledne se Náměstí republiky ve své severní části před radnicí zaplnilo 3 – 5 000 lidí z bývalé Škodovky, pivovaru, přišli železničáři, zdravotníci a studenti, kteří skandovali hesla jako „*chceme nové volby*“, „*chceme novou vládu*“, „*chceme naše peníze*“, „*máme hlad*“, „*smrt komunistům*“. Jednalo se většinou o mladší lidi a dělníky. Situaci se pokusil uklidnit předseda MNV, který se odvážil vyjít mezi dav a mluvit z korby nákladního auta. Po prvních slovech však byl vypískán. Proto se vrátil na radnici a svůj projev dokončil prostřednictvím místního rozhlasu. Chtěl vysvětlit smysl měnové reformy, jeho slova však zanikala v křiku lidí. Po tomto incidentu demonstranti zahájili útok na budovu radnice.⁶⁰ Nejprve začali do oken házet kameny, kusy dřeva a ruličky znehodnocených peněz, pak vzali vchod útokem, prorazili obranu tvořenou příslušníky SNB, a asi 150 lidí budovu obsadilo a demolovalo kanceláře, z jejichž oken k velké radosti přihlížejících létaly busty a obrazy Lenina, Stalina a Gottwalda.⁶¹ Zaměstnanci prchli zadním vchodem a zavolali na pomoc jednotku hasičů, příslušníky LM, SNB a StB. V budově radnice i před ní tak došlo k řadě fyzických srážek, padaly nadávky, lidé noži rozřezávali hadice, aby zastavili proudy vody namířené do davu. Během krátké doby

59 Tamtéž, s. 14 – 17.

60 Tamtéž, s. 22 – 28.

61 BLAIVE, M.: *Promarněná příležitost*, s. 185.

se do bitvy zapojilo asi sto příslušníků pohraniční stráže dislokované v Poběžovicích. Demonstranti sice bránili jejich příjezdu na náměstí, ale auta najížděla do lidí a prorazila si cestu k radnici. Za tento manévr však zaplatila demolicí, ocitla se bez pneumatik i spojovacích kabelů v motorech. Vojáci byli odzbrojováni a jejich zbraně znehodnoceny ohýbáním hlavní. Teprve kolem 14. hodiny ozbrojené síly situaci na náměstí zvládly a prostoru vyklidily.

Vytláčení demonstranti se z části rozešli, ale dav asi tisíce lidí se rozhodl v akcích pokračovat. Jako cíl svého pochodu zvolil budovy Krajského soudu, krajského vysílání Československého rozhlasu a pošty.⁶² Nevěděli však, že KV KSČ vydal preventivní pokyn k ochraně důležitých objektů ve městě, takže se nedalo čekat, že se podaří naplnit záměry spojené s tímto rozhodnutím: osvobodit demonstranty zatčené v dopoledních hodinách, soustředěné v soudní budově, a informovat o plzeňských událostech celou republiku. V praxi se pak ukázalo, že nejjednodušším úkolem bylo dobytí budovy soudu. Dveře byly vyraženy pomocí trámů a budova zdemolována, z oken vyházeny stovky spisů a zapáleny. Prokurátor Heger razii přečkal zamčený na dámské toaletě, soudkyně Synková v převleku za kuchařku v závodní kuchyni. Incident uzavřel zásah Lidových milic. Naopak pochod k budově Československého rozhlasu je označován za nejdramatičtější událost protikomunistické vzpoury v Plzni, neboť komunistické elity si byly velmi dobře vědomy strategického významu této instituce. Proto na tříkilometrové trase z náměstí k budově rozhlasu vybraly strategický bod, železniční most situovaný do terénního zářezu, ten opevnily a obsadily armádou a milicemi tak důkladně, že demonstranti jej nepřekonali. Nepodařilo se přivolat posily ze Škodovky, dělníkům v odchodu zabránily jednotky LM a hasičů, k zastrašení byla použita i střelba do vzduchu.

V odpoledních hodinách začala druhá fáze plzeňských protikomunistických demonstrací, když se kolem 14.30 hodiny na hlavním náměstí sešli lidé vracející se z první pracovní směny. Prostora se plnila průvody až 7 000 lidí, kteří museli překonávat zátarasy a hlídky bránící přístup na náměstí, což se neobešlo bez fyzických srážek s posílenou ochranou povolanou z Prahy a Kladna (jednotky SNB), Aše a Českých Budějovic (Pohraniční stráž), milicionáři, hasiči a stovkami příslušníků StB většinou v civilu. Rozhořčený dav jako dopoledne opět zaútočil na radnici, vzduchem létaly kameny, demonstranti se pokoušeli rozrazit železná vrata,

62 ŠTĚPÁNEK, Z.: *Utajené povstání 1953*, s. 29 – 32.

hasiči do lidí provolávajících různá hesla pouštěli proudy vody a obránci radnice pilně fotografovali a zatýkali útočníky. Obranu budovy řídil osobně náměstek ministra národní bezpečnosti pplk. Košťál,⁶³ který nechal pro zastrašení kolem budovy rozmístit nákladní auta, na jejich korbách byly připraveny kulometry. Šarvátky probíhaly téměř dvě hodiny, ovšem dobře hlídanou radnici se dobýt nepodařilo. V 17 hodin byly nasazeny zálohy a o hodinu později už bylo náměstí opět bez demonstrujících lidí.

Po téměř 10 hodinách nepokojů se podařilo povstání obyvatelstva utlumit, avšak klid ve městě zatím obnoven nebyl, neboť KSČ ve večerních hodinách zorganizovala jako odvetu komunistickou protidemonstraci. Její zárodky v pozdních odpoledních hodinách před budovou KV KSČ, kdy zorganizovali demonstrační průvod vysokoškoláků městem, skončila fiaskem, neboť studenti se během cesty rozprchli. Po 18. hodině se shromáždilo před budovou stranického sekretariátu několik stovek komunistů, kteří se pak vydali průvodem na hlavní plzeňské náměstí před radnici. Zde někdo vydal pokyn „Na Masaryka“ a komunisté se vydali na Masarykovo náměstí s cílem likvidovat pomník prvního čs. prezidenta. Cestou vykřikovali hesla „Ať žije soudruh Zápotocký“, nebo „Ať žije armáda“, a v čele byly nesené obrazy A. Zápotockého a Georgije M. Malenkova (1902 – 1988), československá a sovětská vlajka. Jádru průvodu hlídaného na ulicích příslušníky StB tvořili zaměstnanci státních úřadů a místních divadel. Když průvod dorazil k Masarykovu pomníku,⁶⁴ narazil na skupinu jeho obránců, jež však milicionáři rychle vytlačili. Zatímco se čekalo na příjezd autojeřábu, účastníci provolávali protimasarykovská hesla typu „Pro tu holotu – půjdeš do šrotu“, nebo „Tebe i tvou holotu – odvezeme do šrotu“. Když přijelo auto s jeřábem řízené muži v černých uniformách, náměstí ztichlo v očekávání, co se bude dít dál.

Přesný popis toho, co se na náměstí dělo, není dodnes k dispozici, resp. existuje několik verzí.⁶⁵ Jedna z nich líčí pokus strhnout sochu pomocí lana, přičemž hlavní roli měl přitom sehrát známý komunistický herec Josef Větrovec (1922 – 2002), plzeňský rodák, bývalý dělník Škodovky, v níž se vyučil modelářem a zámečnickem, a pozdější národní umělec. Pravděpodobnější je verze o odvozu skulptury hasiči vyslanými ředitelem Škodovky Václavem Kláilem; v noci měla být rozbíta a roztavena. Další

63 Tamtéž, s. 43.

64 KAPLAN, K. – PALEČEK, P.: *Komunistický režim a politické procesy v Československu*. Brno 2001, s. 19.

65 ŠTĚPÁNEK, Z.: *Utajené povstání 1953*, s. 47 – 51.

sochy z pomníku Národního osvobození byly odstraněny dodatečně, v následujících dnech, jejich další osud není znám. Je přirozené, že celou událost provázely emoce souhlasu i nesouhlasu.

Po tomto aktu se komunisté v průvodu odebrali zpět před sekretariát KV KSČ, kde na ně už čekali řečníci v čele s ministrem národní bezpečnosti Karolem Bacílkem,⁶⁶ členem ÚV KSČ Ladislavem Kopřivou a vedoucím tajemníkem krajského výboru strany Hlinou. Po projevech se všichni rozešli, plzeňský rozhlas vyhlásil zákaz nočního vycházení od půlnoci do čtyř hodin ráno a ve městě hlídkovali příslušníci ozbrojených složek. Občas nad městem přelétávala pozorovací letadla. Přestože panoval klid, vojska MNB zůstala v Plzni dva týdny a hlídala všechny strategické budovy, u budovy věznice na Borech stály dokonce tanky.

Po 1. červnu 1953 nastala fáze zatýkání, vyšetřování a trestání účastníků protikomunistického povstání.⁶⁷ Ke slovu se dostali udavači, na závodech a na pracovištích probíhaly pohovory se zaměstnanci, které měly odhalit jak účastníky, tak zejména smýšlení lidí. Na některých místech (např. ve Škodovce nebo v Městských divadlech) zasedaly „dělnické soudy“, které obviňovaly i ty, kteří se akcí nezúčastnili, ze styků „s imperialistickými živly“. Uvěznění lidé museli očekávat násilí, mlácení, byli „ozdobeni“ podlitinami, mnozí přišli o zuby. Cely byly přeplněné a dozorcí se vyžívali v neustálém buzení spících zadržených. Dne 19. června 1953 ministerstvo vnitra vydalo pokyn, jakým způsobem „viníky“ potrestat. S těmi, kteří nesouhlasili s měnovou reformou, měl být rozvázán pracovní poměr. Ve Škodovce přišly o místo tisíce lidí, další byli přeloženi na nekvalifikovanou práci, množství rodin přišlo o podnikové byty. Vystěhování z bytů se netýkalo jen Škodováků, ale i několika (100 – 250) rodin žijících v pěkných bytech; mnohé s demonstracemi neměly nic společného. Večer obdržely příkaz a v 5 hodin ráno už čekal stěhovací vůz, který je vyvezl do devastovaného pohraničí. Většinou šlo o rodiny živnostníků, nebo ty, o nichž bylo známo, že jejich poměr k režimu není pozitivní („reakční rodiny“). Zakrátko samotná prokuratura uznala, že se jednalo o nezákonný postup, ovšem odvolání většinou neuspěla, neboť byt už byl obsazen „zasloužilými“, takže lidé se vraceli domů až po letech.

66 KAPLAN, K.: *Kronika komunistického Československa*, s. 74 – 88.

67 ŠTĚPÁNEK, Z.: *Utajené povstání 1953*, s. 57 – 61.

Příprava monstrprocesu zabrala zainteresovaným šest týdnů.⁶⁸ Skládal se z 15 dílčích soudních procesů, v nichž bylo obžalováno 298 lidí a před lidový soud postaveno 256 osob. Celkem 250 z nich muselo vyslechnout rozsudek. Obžalovaní byli rozděleni do čtyř skupin: 1) iniciátoři a zvláště aktivní (56), 2) aktivní účastníci (152), 3) účastníci a přihlížející (66) a 4) osoby, jimž nebyla prokázána účast (24). Jednání probíhalo tajně a poměrně rychle, neobjevily se komplikace, neboť obvinění tresty v tichosti přijímali, byli zřejmě „zpracováni“. Nejvyšší trest dostal P. Kotera 14 roků vězení pro přípravu ozbrojené revoluce, což byl samozřejmě nesmysl, neboť povstání vzniklo živelně. Obvinění padala pro nepolitické kriminální činy, přičemž vyšší tresty dostávali „ideoví nepřátelé“ – bývalý živnostník, syn ukrajinského emigranta, bývalý důstojník, pracivý sociální demokrat atd.

Vyšetřování především zjišťovalo, kdo za protistátním pučem stál. Tři čtvrtiny souzených byli dělníci a bezpečnost je označovala za fašistické živly s cílem dokázat, že se jednalo o spiknutí řízené ze zahraničí. Krajská prokuratura viděla záležitost „třídně“. Demonstranty podle ní byli „výtržníci v modrých halenách, kteří se vydávali za dělníky“. Podařilo se jim pro akci získat deklasované živly, zahaleče, kolísavce a vícekrát trestané lidi. Samotní pracující přijali měnovou reformu kladně a nedůvěru mezi ně vnesli třídní nepřátelé. Když v červnu 1953 události řešil sekretariát ÚV KSČ, došel k závěru, že vše zavinila „reakce“. Část viny však padala i na hlavu místních a krajských stranických orgánů, které tyto živly podcenily. Chyby byly nalezeny i v chování ozbrojených složek v průběhu povstání, ukázalo se prý, že někteří utíkali od rozhodnutí a převzetí odpovědnosti, komunisté obecně prokázali malou aktivitu, proto demonstranti mohli vzdorovat až do večera a musely zasáhnout síly dislokované mimo Plzeň.

Plzeňské události se podařilo před širší veřejností utajit. Krajský deník Pravda referoval pouze o demonstraci komunistů, přičemž o stržení Masarykova pomníku se ani nezmínil a líčil, jak lidé měli z měnové reformy radost. Tím se otevřel prostor pro fámy kolující zejména v západních Čechách, z nichž mnohé byly přehnané a šířily informace o krveprolití, střelbě, mrtvých a raněných. Podrobnější informace rozhlasová stanice BBC vysílala až za rok, takže dodnes není tato kauza příliš známá. Byla otevřena v roce 1968 a hlavně až v období po roce 1989.

68 Tamtéž, s. 62 – 67.

Bouřlivé protikomunistické demonstrace v roce 1953, mezi nimiž zaujmají události v Prostějově a Plzni mimořádně významné postavení, vyslaly reprezentantům moci jasný signál, že jejich praktiky řízení společnosti jsou neúspěšné a neúnosné a vedou k devastaci země. Pod vnějšími i vnitřními tlaky sice elity přijaly „nový kurs“ nápravy chyb a korekce trendů, avšak jejich arogance způsobila, že se příliš nepoučily a téměř vše zůstalo při starém, pouze na papíře.⁶⁹ Toto podcenění situace se komunistům nesporně vymstilo v 60. letech.

Summary

The aim of the paper in hand is to provide an evocation and a comparison of the two most important anti-regime actions in former Czechoslovakia in 1953, namely mass demonstrations in the Moravian town of Prostějov (April) and in the West Bohemian town of Pilsen (May). The events serve as evidence of a crisis which came as a result of the founding period of socialism in the country. To get the global picture the demonstrations fit the first general crisis of the socialist camp brought about by establishing the Stalinist model of society in respective countries. The protests in Prostějov were a spontaneous reaction of the population to a covert removal of the Masaryk monument in the centre, conducted by a group of the State Security Service officers, aviation schools officers and radical Communists. The demonstration on 10 April 1953 resulted in the storming of the town hall and the crowds of protesters were broken up in the late hours before an intervention of the Armed Forces. The events in Pilsen were a reaction to the currency reform in Czechoslovakia. The organizers of the protests were mainly workers from the local Škoda factory, who charged the town hall and the court building twice. After the anti-Communist demonstrations on 1 June 1953 were suppressed, the Communists organized a march across the town and a manifestation to support the totalitarian regime. As a result the statue of T. G. Masaryk, a part of the Freedom Memorial, was pulled down. In both cases, the security forces managed to suppress the protests by using the force. They also succeeded in concealing the incidents from the public and prevented it from spreading further.

69 Srov. PERNES, J.: *Snahy o překonání politicko-hospodářské krize v Československu v roce 1953*. Brno 2000.

Selected demonstrators were judicially punished, negatively affected in their workplaces and in private lives. The wide public learned about these events in the 1968 year only and then later on in 1989.

1956, 1968, 1980–81: Three Uprisings against State Socialist Regimes. Similarities and Differences – a Comparative Study

Miklós MITROVITS

During the existence of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe three uprisings took place which influenced the entire region. The first was the Hungarian revolution of 1956; the second, the Prague Spring of 1968; and the third was the Polish Solidarity movement of 1980 – 1981. There is a general consensus in the literature that the uprisings, which occurred roughly at twelve-year intervals, were a continuation of each other, just like waves upon the sea's surface, dealing consecutive blows against the communist system which finally collapsed in 1989.

In my paper I examine whether these revolutions and riots did indeed arise from each other and what kind of connections we may detect among them. It is an accepted fact today that the direction in which the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the Czechoslovakian events of 1968 were pointing, had the Soviet tanks not forestalled further development, was that of a democratic state system. The transition of 1989, in which the Solidarity movement played an invaluable part, also proves that Polish events in 1980 – 1981 were also heading in the same direction. Naturally, the mass movements which unfolded during the three uprisings differed in terms of volume, character, social base, the kind of agendas which became public and the degree to which they were embedded in the international context. We must also bear in mind the fact that the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian events started amongst the reform circles of the Communist Party itself, and gained mass support, until eventually the governing parties lost control over the events and certain of their leaders even took sides with the

masses. By contrast, in Poland, the mass movement which came to be called Solidarity evolved fully from bottom up, from the ranks of society itself, independently of the party. The measures taken by the Soviet leadership were determined by these facts, no less than by the economic and international political position of the Soviet Union. There were several other differences as well, as regards the emergence and course of events. Each of the revolutions in question was also powerfully marked by the diverging traditions arising from the different national histories and political cultures of these countries. In my paper, I offer a detailed discussion of these differences.

A common trait among the events in question was the active participation of intellectuals (particularly writers) and workers, as well as the fact that, in each of the three cases, they adopted and further developed the tradition of the self-government of workers. There is sufficient evidence that, in both 1968 and particularly in 1980 – 1981, the experiences of the 1956 revolution were studied systematically. Leaders of the Polish “Solidarity” movement consciously avoided any such demands as threatened Soviet hegemony and the foundations of the international socialist system, but they did build most powerfully on the traditional practice of workers’ self-government.

The latest archive documents also allow me to make it quite clear in my paper that, besides the revolutionaries, the leaders of the regimes also learnt their lessons from these cases and subsequently tried to apply different, less harsh methods against their opponents. I base my research work on Hungarian (the National Archives of Hungary), Polish (the Central Archives of Modern Records), Czech (the *National Archives*) and Russian (the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History) archives as sources. The present piece of research forms part of a larger project comparing different communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe, conducted by the Institute of Political History.

1. Tools and methods of the resistances

Eastern Europe saw a number of attempts to change the state socialist system which existed between 1947 and 1989. By change, I mean a broad range of possible adjustments, such as raising living standards, improving working conditions, ensuring respect for social and human rights; indeed, there were even attempts to liberalise the system of centrally controlled economy inherited from Stalinism and adapt a different model in its stead.

From time to time attempts were also made to reform the political system: to break the Communist Party's monopoly on power, to create a pluralistic political arena or to increase the role of trade unions in political and economic decision-making.

Different groups of society had access to different means to pursue these goals. The broader strata were forced to limit their hopes to only modest goals in this period (improving living standards and working conditions, broadening social rights) and had a limited set of means for attaining them (strikes, street demonstrations, samizdat publications). Changing the entire system would have required a far more profound intellectual enterprise, more potent means and methods, and an adequate apparatus, even if by this we mean merely the introduction of a new economic model or the decentralisation of economic and political decision-making, instead of a full political transition, the replacement of state socialism by capitalism, abolishing the leading role of the Communist Party or the acceptance of a pluralistic political life. Obviously, such requisites were unavailable to any except the ruling parties and their nomenclature. Within the framework of the political, economic and social system which emerged during the Stalinist era and persisted even after Stalin's death, change was actually unimaginable through any other channel than the party apparatus, even if there were some attempts at change coming from the outside. The broad masses of society (workers, peasants, intellectuals and university students) lacked information, adequate tools and the necessary capital for reforming the dictatorial system by their own resources.

After the revolutions in October 1956, and after the initial hopes were dispersed, it became clear that the system wasn't heading for decentralisation and democratisation, as the party bureaucracy was unwilling to hand over controlling posts of economic and political power to the society, but were making efforts to concentrate these even more in their own hands. This was the experience which motivated, from the mid-1960s onwards, the intellectuals to elaborate and articulate their objectives.

- a.) The '*Open Letter to the party*' (to the PUWB, in 1964), by Jacek Kuroń and Karol Modzelewski, called for a 'workers' democracy' based on the self-government of the workers to replace the existing system. Thus their main aim was to change the conditions of production by destroying the rule of the bureaucratic class. As long as this system existed, no decentralisation was possible. The workers would have an increased influence on dividing the profits. Kuroń and Modzelewski would have ensured higher objectives (a wider

social safety net) with the help of social control, which was prevented precisely by the existence of the bureaucracy.

- b.) After Stalin's death it was a characteristic of the times that social movements grew stronger at times when the party's leading role weakened so much that the public could sense it. But even in these cases, societies could only achieve any success when conditions were favourable both in the international arena and the socialist camp. This is the kind of opportunity which Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski recognised when, in 1971, he published his essay, *Theses on hope and hopelessness*. He drew the conclusion that rigidity of system depends on how far its inhabitants are convinced about this very rigidity. Because of its internal contradictions, the system was constantly working to weaken itself. This weakness was what society should take advantage of.
- c.) Eventually, it was Adam Michnik who articulated the mission of the intelligentsia. It was published in his famous essay, *New evolutionism*. Continuing Kołakowski's line of thought, he stressed that opposition politics should be addressed to society. It is for the people, not the party, that you need to create a programme. The best guide for the party should be the pressure coming from below. The essence of 'new evolutionism' which he proclaimed was that the intelligentsia, with the help of the workers, would force central administration to allow change.

2. The origin and social base of the events

The social explosion which took place in Poland, and particularly in Hungary, in 1956 was preceded, and indeed provoked, by a power crisis within the Communist Party and direct intervention by the Soviet leaders. The Hungarian revolution did not start on October 23rd 1956 – it had begun as far back as the summer of 1953 when, after Stalin's death, Khrushchev and Beria directly interfered with the replacement of leaders within the Hungarian party and put Imre Nagy in the place of Mátyás Rákosi. Prime Minister Imre Nagy's programme meant the end of Stalinism in the classic sense in Hungary and this détente brought about the 'awakening' of a broad layer of intellectuals consisting mostly of economists and writers. This effervescent intellectual life contributed considerably to the defeat of the Stalinists after the internal power struggle which became exacerbated once more after the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The

demonstrations of October 23rd turned into a bloody revolution because the Hungarian Stalinists were willing to put up an armed struggle against a society clamouring for change, and lend armed assistance to the old leadership despite the de-Stalinisation programme that had been proclaimed. With this, an anti-Stalinist uprising turned into an anti-Soviet freedom fight.

The Polish events were also heavily influenced by the 20th Congress and the power crisis that emerged after the death of that country's Stalinist leader, Bolesław Bierut. The uprising which broke out in Poznań (June 28th) mainly focused on economic and social demands. It was not sufficiently broad or well-organised to aim at radically transforming the regime or at least the existing political model. The fact that the central power once more responded with armed retaliation was due to internal power struggles. Even so, the Stalinists failed to retain their positions and, on 19 October, Władysław Gomułka, who had plainly rejected the existing regime in his speech held at the 8th plenary session of the Central Committee, was able to return to power. The 'de-Stalinisation' processes were highly popular with the societies of both Poland and Hungary. In Warsaw, these sentiments were so powerful that the Soviet leadership decided to refrain from direct interference with the replacement of the leadership. In Hungary, although the freedom fight was stifled with military assistance, János Kádár did indeed fulfil the original objective of the anti-Stalinist rebellion of preventing the return of the previous regime.

The Prague Spring of 1968 also finds its origin in the de-Stalinisation processes. In Czechoslovakia, the eradication of the Stalinist regime was delayed by a certain set of reasons and took place more slowly and without a social explosion. From the early 1960s onwards (after 1962 – 1963), the Communist Party leadership showed an increasingly strong determination to reform the system. This mainly meant market liberalisation and the decentralisation of a redistribution mechanism working through a powerfully centralised planned economy governed in a top-down fashion. Similarly to the Hungarian processes of 1953 – 1956, these circumstances made it possible for an effervescent intellectual life to develop within the intelligentsia which significantly contributed to genuine reform plans being discussed by the decision-making bodies after leaders were replaced in early 1968. Similarly to 1956, the initiating role was played by economists and writers.

The Polish events of 1980 – 1981 go back to a very different origin. While in the previous case it was clearly visible that processes starting in

the leadership of the Communist Party generated a political and social situation which mobilised first the intelligentsia and then the broader strata of society, the events in Poland in 1980 took a different course. Within the Polish United Workers' Party there were practically no reform initiatives; indeed, the congress held in February 1980 was dominated by an air of satisfaction and self-confidence. Nevertheless, change had profound roots in Poland. Between 1956 and 1980, the misguided economic and social policy of the party and the overt use of power to stifle signs of social discontent led to the emergence of opposition forces amongst those ranks of the intelligentsia which were independent of political parties, as well as among industrial workers and the peasantry. The various social strata only gradually joined forces after 1976. The strikes which broke out in the summer of 1980 in response to yet another in a line of price rises led, in a way unprecedented in history, to the emergence of a mass movement amounting to some ten million people within a few months. This movement was an entirely independently organised social initiative, unrelated in any way to the party or the old trade unions associated with it. It was essentially based on workers of heavy industry but also had close ties with the intelligentsia, the peasantry and the Catholic Church which played an integrating role. The movement, which soon received the name of 'Solidarity', developed into a phenomenon unique within the history of Central and Eastern Europe.

3. Objectives and results

The goals of these three revolutionary attempts were in many ways similar but they also diverged in a number of important aspects. In Poznań, workers were clamouring for their overdue wages, overwork payments and bonuses. They were outraged by the fact that the city was treated with negative discrimination by central headquarters. They also wanted a payrise. Naturally, as events progressed, demands affecting Polish–Soviet relations also emerged. The buildings of the local party headquarters and the state security organisation were attacked as symbols of the regime. Thus the initiative was clearly directed against the regime but time was too short for them to formulate a progressive programme. The Hungarian revolution had more time for this. The majority of people who flooded the streets on October 23rd 1956 were motivated by more than mere discontentment with economic and social relations. They were at least as keen to get rid of the Stalinist heritage, to cleanse themselves morally of a recent past

laden with a sense of guilt, and to tie in socialism with genuine democracy. They demanded that Soviet troops be removed from the country, Soviet–Hungarian business agreements be revised, Stalinist leaders be removed and the establishment of a ‘national government’. At the same time, the majority were appreciative of the fundamental traits of the existing socialist economic and social system – the dominance of collective ownership, economic planning, full employment and social security. Hungarian society did not wish to give up on the idea and requirement of social justice and equality for the future. In other words, the Hungarian revolution was an anti-Stalinist uprising which was aimed, not at a restoration of the capitalist social and economic model, but at transforming the Stalinist-type state socialist system through a revolutionary process and developing a socialist system based on genuine social control, which might go so far as to permit the emergence of a multi-party system and a coalition government.

The Polish October formulated similar objectives. Workers were powerfully driven by an ideal of self-government which was to operate as an effective interest protection mechanism and a decision-making forum. Workers’ councils were recognised, temporarily, in both countries.

The Hungarian revolution and freedom fight was stifled by Khrushchev with the help of the Soviet Army, while the Polish revolution failed due to the intervention of Gomulka’s armed forces in autumn 1957. The question is whether all that had been achieved was eventually lost or was it possible to salvage some of the results of the uprisings? Did the reforms become incorporated with the politics of the Communist Party? Were these uprisings in any sense successful?

The answer is clearly yes. The period between October 1956 and October 1957 played a more powerful catalytic role than anything beforehand in the dissemination and development of opposition ideas. Władysław Gomułka came into power relying on a strong social base, particularly the working classes but, in return for this legitimacy, the party was forced to take into account what were thought of as ‘Polish characteristics’. Thus, the predominance of peasant farmsteads was allowed to survive, the relative freedom of the Church also prevailed, while the cultural sphere (music, film, theatre) came upon an unforeseen degree of freedom in Poland. One of the results of the Polish revolution was that the regime, previously aiming at a Stalinist-type totalitarian rule, was now replaced by a post-totalitarian system in which the central power no longer used its previous

methods and society experienced a general air of relative freedom in which it was able to organise its later actions against the regime.

After the Hungarian revolution, János Kádár – appointed by the Soviets as the new leader – restored law and order using harsh retaliations and terror. Executions, mass-scale emigration, the reorganisation and restriction of the press, and the establishment of the workers' militia were reminiscent of the Stalinist period. Eventually, however, this was not the path that Kádár chose to take. It soon transpired that the de-Stalinisation process in Hungary was being resumed, even if strictly controlled by the party. The Soviet party leadership did not interfere directly with Hungarian domestic politics and Kádár interpreted his own position as one which gave him a relatively free hand in the country as long as he first restored order.

As a result, from 1957 onwards, meeting the needs of the general population and continually improving living standards became a strong priority. At first, the state financed its growth using loans from the Soviet Union but soon the policy regarding living standards came to be at the centre of economic policy. In January 1957 a process was launched, with the help of economists of a 'bourgeois' hue, of radically transforming the control mechanism of the economy and allowing the mechanisms of the market economy to play their part. At the head of the project was István Varga, an economist formerly associated with the Smallholders' Party but, in April 1957, the government called off the efforts of economic reform. After the 1962 congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, however, the plan for radically altering the system of economic management inherited from the Stalinist period was put on the agenda once more. As a result, after a great deal of debate and long elaboration, on 1 January 1968 the new economic mechanism came into force.

Around the turn of the 1950s and 1960s the country's agriculture was reorganised on an industrial and cooperative basis, but without the use of Stalinist methods. The aim was not to withdraw resources but to modernise agricultural production. Later on, a private form of farming was also permitted in the form of what was called home farmsteads. The country became open to Western visitors, and foreign travel was also made easier for Hungarians. The central power no longer strove to interfere with people's lives; political agitation and propaganda was withdrawn from everyday life. However, the latest achievements of the arts and sciences did not find their ways as easily into Hungary as they did into Gomulka's Poland.

The processes of 1968 affected each of these three countries but with varying intensity and on different levels. After all, it was not only in Czechoslovakia that serious objectives were set out to change the existing regime, but in Hungary and Poland also. It is a fact that the new leadership of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, headed by Alexander *Dubček*, came to champion reforms of a degree unparalleled in the entire region. Hungary's new economic mechanism, however, was not only similar to the Czechoslovakian ideas but survived longest in practical operation. By contrast, in Poland, the student demonstrations held in March against the dogmatic Conservative Party leadership also voiced some slogans demanding major adjustments to the regime. Foremost of these was the demand for workers and university students to be granted self-government – however, this did not come to play a serious role until later. In Prague, the 1968 *Action Programme* of the Czech Communist Party openly strove to do away with the former, Stalinist-type economic structure and centralised, command-governed planning and redistribution. 'The former methods and orientation of the control of the national economy are outdated and instantly call for a new system of economic control which offer the option of change in the direction of intense development.' However, authors of the *Action Programme* aimed to change, besides the system of economic control, the entire political superstructure.

The Hungarian party leadership had a keen and sympathetic eye on the changes that took place in Czechoslovakia from early 1967 onwards. In October that year, *Antonín Novotný* gave a detailed account to János Kádár of the results they had achieved up to that time. Kádár assured him that the Czechoslovakian initiatives had his wholehearted support. Later, in May 1968, *Dubček* and Kádár pointed out in Budapest that the reforms taking place in the two countries showed great similarities. However, in the event, the Czechoslovakian processes took a different course, primarily because their 'de-Stalinisation' was delayed. One might say that the process which took place in Poland and Hungary in 1956 – 1957, although among very different external and domestic conditions, did not come about here until 1967 – 1968. In Hungary in 1968, the majority of the population was very much in favour of the reforms but powerful mass movements, comparable to those in Czechoslovakia, were unable to emerge because of the memory of the 1956 retaliations. Thus, while Hungarian society watched the developments of the Prague Spring quietly and with secret joy, it exercised no pressure on the party leadership in Budapest to tie in economic reform with the transformation of the political system.

After the defeat of the Prague Spring, contrary to the revolutions of 1956, there was barely anything that the reformers were able to retain from the achievements they had attained before the military intervention. What is worse, this intervention scarred the unity of the socialist world profoundly. Despite the fall of the uprising, it was this historical experience which confirmed Leszek Kołakowski's already-quoted theses and this is also what Adam Michnik drew on in his famous essay, *New Evolutionism*. The latter came to the conclusion that a social resistance movement can form a counterweight and may be able to limit and further weaken the regime. Michnik emphasised that it was not the party but the people that had to be given a programme. For the party, the best guidance is the pressure that comes from below. The essence of new evolutionism is that it is by leaning on the working class that the central power can be forced to bring about gradual changes. Ultimately, this was nothing other than applying Polish historical experiences to the existing conditions. Not insignificantly, Pope John Paul II, a Pole by birth, proclaimed a social policy within the Church which entailed openness toward non-believers, emphasising the uniting force of Christian culture which served in Central and Eastern European countries, but particularly in Catholic Poland, to organise society and render it capable of exerting influence over the central power.

When the Solidarity movement emerged in 1980, those dictating its programme made sure they did not make the kind of mistakes they had made before. The social movement itself was organised as a trade union, and its demands did not affect the deep foundations of the existing regime. It did not openly question Poland's external alliances, either. This is precisely why Jadwiga Staniszkis aptly termed the Solidarity movement a '*self-limiting revolution*'.

Naturally, the question of reforming the political system was also discussed as a prerequisite for economic reform. It was believed that economic change could not be attained without breaking down the limitations of the existing political regime. However, it was not determined just what kind of reform was necessary. At this time, most people still believed in a system in which workers' self-governments could play a significant role in company management and redistribution. Objectives included developing a two-chamber system in which the upper house would exercise genuine social control over the decisions of the lower house. At the same time, as early as 1981 a programme was proclaimed, associated with the work team headed by Leszek Balcerowicz, which would lend far more room to market processes and contain fewer restrictions. According to this concept,

the free market could help the country survive the crisis. This liberal idea was counter to the concept of workers' self-government supported by the majority.

Although the state of war, introduced on 13 December 1981, prevented further debate and the full unfolding of reform ideas, in the final balance it contributed to the victory of those demanding the liberalisation of the economy. This coincided with what the Western capitalist world expected in exchange for economic assistance.

To sum up, we may declare that the revolutionary movements of Central and Eastern Europe were aimed at changing the Stalinist and post-Stalinist systems of economic and social management. The primary objective was always to decentralise and democratise the decision-making procedure. Over a 25-year period (1956 – 1981), means and methods changed considerably, and conditions of external and internal politics were also altered. However, we may also point out that, due to several of the experiments carried out by reform groups and opposition movements, some of these objectives, despite temporary failures, became incorporated in the system; foremost among them, the demands for liberalising the society. By 1989 there were political and economic systems active in the region which were suited to adapting themselves easily to the capitalist world economy. It is also a fact that communist leaderships of any of the affected countries were more willing to concede to liberal demands than to the full scale unfolding of workers' self-governments. This is where the events discussed above played a considerable role.

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Resumé

V snahe o zhrnutie môžeme vyhlásiť, že cieľom revolučných hnutí v strednej a východnej Európe bola zmena stalinských a poststalinských systémov ekonomického a spoločenského riadenia. Primárnym cieľom bolo vždy decentralizovať a demokratizovať rozhodovacie procesy. Počas obdobia 25 rokov (1956 – 1981) sa nástroje a metódy značne zmenili, aj podmienky vonkajšej a vnútornej politiky prešli zmenami. Môžeme však zdôrazniť, že vďaka niekoľkým experimentom, ktoré uskutočnili reformné skupiny a opozičné hnutia, sa niektoré ciele, napriek dočasným neúspechom, stali súčasťou systému, predovšetkým požiadavky na liberalizáciu spoločnosti. V roku 1989 jestvovali v regióne politické a ekonomické systémy, ktoré sa ľahko dokázali prispôbiť svetovej kapitalistickej ekonomike. Je tiež faktom, že komunistickí vodcovia v každej z daných krajinách si skôr želali pripustiť liberálne požiadavky, ako dovoliť robotníckym samovládam, aby sa naplno rozvíjali. Tam zohrali vyššie diskutované udalosti pozoruhodnú úlohu.

5. panel:
Formy súdnej a mimosúdnej perzekúcie
aktivistov protikomunistického odboja

5th Block:
The Forms of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Persecutions of Anti-Communist
Resistance Activists

Právní a mimoprávní postih účastníků protikomunistického odboje v ČSR

Kamil NEDVĚDICKÝ

I. Úvod

Po převzetí neomezené moci v únoru 1948 stál československý komunistický režim před otázkou, jak postupovat při likvidaci svých odpůrců. Protiústavní uzurpace veškerých státních struktur a používání teroru proti všem nepohodlným občanům, vyvolávaly nesouhlas značné části veřejnosti a bylo zřejmé, že vytvoření totalitního systému sovětského typu narazí na odpor. Sami komunisté s touto skutečností počítali a byli připraveni rozšířit základnu odboje proti své vládě pomocí provokačních metod. Důvod pro takový postup lze nalézt v samé podstatě komunistické věrouky, jež vychází z **nutnosti odstranění nepřátelských vrstev společnosti a jejich bezpodmínečné likvidace**.¹ Tento postulát byl v době po únoru 1948 doplněn stalinskou tezí o „**zostřujícím se třídním boji**“. V této souvislosti je nutno zdůraznit fakt, že KSČ v Československu neaplikovala teoretické poučky marxismu – leninismu, ale vycházela ze zkušeností Sovětského svazu, přičemž se snažila o napodobení vývoje v Rusku po bolševickém převratu a mnohdy mechanicky přebírala pravidla, vzniklá v diametrálně odlišných podmínkách. Po vzoru SSSR očekávali představitelé nového komunistického zřízení aktivní odpor „svržených tříd“, v rámci kopírování sovětské reality hodlali i sami konstruovat „protistátní skupiny“

1 LENIN, V. I.: *Stát a revoluce. Učení marxismu o státu a úkoly proletariátu v revoluci*. Praha 1949, s. 90.

a chybět nemohlo ani hledání nepřítele uvnitř strany, tj. „odhalování“ loajálních komunistů jako zrádců a utužování disciplíny prostřednictvím permanentních čistek. S tím je spojeno šíření atmosféry ohrožení vnitřními a vnějšími „škůdci“, a to hned v době po únorovém převratu v ČSR. Dokonce již před rokem 1948 vůdcové KSČ vyzývali k „rozdrčení reakce“, „odstranění agentů reakcionářů“ či „očištění veřejného života od protistátních živlů“.³

Protiústavní a vpravdě pučistické nastolení totalitní vlády komunistů v únoru 1948⁴, zákonitě muselo způsobit nespokojenost celé řady lidí, zvláště za situace, kdy mnoho občanů ČSR očekávalo blížící se volby, v nichž předpokládali porážku KSČ a větší vliv ostatních stran na směřování společnosti. Těmto nadějím učinil únor přítrž. Vzednutí vlny spontánních protirežimních aktivit, kdy řada odbojářů nesplňovala očekávání komunistických představitelů, neboť se rekrutovala ze všech sociálních vrstev společnosti, včetně dělnictva, přimělo státní aparát, řízený KSČ, k předvídatelné represivní reakci. Sovětský příklad poskytoval návod pro použití práva jako příhodného instrumentu, sloužícího k odstranění všech nepohodlných osob, aktivních odpůrců na prvním místě.⁵ Právo ale nově nemělo být vnímáno jako souhrn pravidel upravujících různé ve společnosti existující jevy a platících pro všechny, naopak úlohou právního řádu se stalo utužení „diktatury proletariátu“, systému výkonu moci, založeného na násilí.⁶ Ideologové a právní teoretikové se nemuseli zabývat

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- 2 Viz projev Rudolfa Slánského v Ústavodárném Národním shromáždění. Stenoprotokol z 95. schůze ÚNS RČS 1946 – 1948. Dne 11. 3. 1948. Část 2/7. Dostupné na URL: <<http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1946uns/stenprot/095schuz/s095002.htm>>; MAŇKOVSKIJ, B. S.: Sovětská socialistická zákonost a její zásady. In: *Právník*, 1949, s. 387.
 - 3 Srov. RUPNIK, J.: *Dějiny Komunistické strany Československa. Od počátků do převzetí moci*. Praha 2002, s. 235.
 - 4 K ústavněprávním souvislostem únorové vládní krize více NEDVĚDICKÝ, K.: Únor 1948 jako počátek nelegitimního režimu. In: *Securitas Imperii*, roč. 17, 2010, č. 2, s. 70 a násl.
 - 5 Vzhledem ke snaze všech zemí východního bloku napodobit sovětský vzor by nepochybně stálo za to provést komparaci jednotlivých právních systémů, prozkoumat, do jaké míry se jednalo o automatické přebírání zákonů SSSR a zda lze shledat i místní odlišnosti hlubšího významu. Srovnání by mělo být provedeno nejenom ve vztahu jednotlivých právních řádů k „normativnímu ohnisku“, tj. sovětskému právu, ale i s přihlédnutím ke spolupráci mezi lidově demokratickými státy. Za příklad takové součinnosti lze považovat např. společnou československo-polskou tvorbu rodinného kodexu (zákon č. 265/1949 Sb. o právu rodinném).
 - 6 STALIN, J. V.: *K otázkám leninismu*. Praha 1949, s. 22.

marxistickými tezemi o zániku právního systému společně se státem, neboť sovětská stalinská „právní věda“ jasně deklarovala úlohu práva. Jeho primárním úkolem je ochrana socialistického státu proti vnitřním a vnějším nepřátelům. V souvislosti s tím dochází k významovému spojení pojmů „protistátní“, „protirežimní“ a „protistranické“. Právo může být pojímáno jako požadavkům strany se přizpůsobující normativní systém, používaný k výkonu represe a naplnění plánů likvidace účastníků odboje a odporu, stejně jako příslušníků tříd, určených k odstranění, bez ohledu na jejich poměr ke komunistickému režimu. Jinými slovy: „*Normativismus splývá s volním pojetím práva*“.⁷ Právní doktrína Československa 50. let potvrdila charakter práva jako zbraně, určené proti aktivním odpůrcům nového zřízení i všem nepohodlným osobám, když popisovala roli právních norem v boji proti těm, kteří se staví na odpor, jako zásadní a dominantní. Navíc právě prostřednictvím takto instrumentálně pojatého souboru zákonů mohly být státní orgány vybaveny: „*všemi prostředky, nezbytnými k účinnému a důslednému boji a to nejen proti třídnímu nepříteli, nýbrž i proti kapitalistickým přežitkům v myšlení a morálce lidí*“.⁸ Pod pojmem právo pak neměla být vnímána jen hierarchicky pojatá soustava počínaje ústavou a konče podzákonnými předpisy. Naopak, za pramen práva jsou uznávány ideologické podklady typu spisů stalinské a marxisticko-leninské politické a právní teorie, v pozici silnější než zákony se nachází projevy Klementa Gottwalda⁹, a dokonce jsou soudci vyzýváni, aby se řídili články Rudého práva, neboť v nich je zakotvena linie strany.¹⁰ Takto vytvořené právo může v rámci boje proti třídním nepřátelům dobře posloužit díky své elasticitě a naprostému monopolu vedení komunistické strany na výklad jednotlivých právních norem.

7 PŘIBÁŇ, J.: Komunistická teorie státu a práva: kritický nástin strukturních znaků a vývoje československé právní teorie v období let 1948 – 1989. In: MALÝ, K. – SOUKUP, L. (eds.): *Vývoj práva v Československu v letech 1945-1989*. Praha 2004, s. 65.

8 Kolektiv autorů: *Československé státní právo*. Díl I., část I. až III. Praha 1956, s. 74.

9 Srov. KNAPP, V.: Některé poznámky k zemědělsko-družstevnímu právu. In: *Právník*, 1954, č. 5, s. 320.

10 KOKEŠ, J.: Za lepší rozhodování našich soudů. In: *Socialistická zákonnost*. Sv. 1, 1953, č. 1, s. 12.

II. Trestní právo jako nástroj represe

Československý právní řád zůstal po únoru 1948 nadále v platnosti. Zpočátku se představitelé KSČ snažili vzbudit zdání, že bude pokračovat vývoj, započatý v roce 1945.¹¹ Diskontinuitní měla být reálná praxe aplikace existujících norem. Formální převzetí „buržoazního“ práva v první etapě budování totalitního režimu má svou oporu v teoretických spisech¹², důležitá je ovšem obsahová stránka, kdy bylo zřejmé, že nebude použito nic, co by zabraňovalo v udržení a upevnění pozice vládnoucí státostrany. Právo psané a právo faktické tak byly dva úplně rozdílné světy. Do ústavy (ústavní zákon č. 150/1948 Sb.) si navíc poúnoroví vládcí zakomponovali několik široce koncipovaných ustanovení, jejichž pomocí mohli obhájit jakékoliv porušení ústavy a zákonů.¹³ Při trestání protikomunistických odbojářů se v počátečních stádiích poúnorového zřízení používalo dosud platné právo. Ale ani trestní zákon, ani zákon č. 50/1923 Sb. na ochranu republiky, nemohly dostačovat, neboť se jednalo o předpisy, vyhovující demokratickému státu v jeho úsilí o zabránění protiprávní činnosti extremistů, nikoliv tyranické vládní moci. Navíc trestní sazby, vymezené např. zmiňovaným zákonem č. 50/1923 Sb., pokládali komunisté za příliš mírné. Tyto zákony a dostatečně neovládnutá justice vedly k tomu, že v některých případech v roce 1948 nedošlo k okamžitému a přísnému odsouzení odpůrců režimu dle přání KSČ, což byla skutečnost, již komunistický státní aparát nehodlal tolerovat.¹⁴ Ani varianta likvidace oponentů prostřednictvím tzv. druhé retribuice¹⁵, tedy obnovením retribučního soudnictví, nemohla vést k úspěchu a stala se jen typickou ukázkou snahy o primitivní skandalizaci známých protivníků komunistů, a to včetně čelných osobností protinacistického odboje typu Vladimíra Krajiny. Vedení totalitního Československa proto rozhodlo o opuštění dosavadního právního systému („dost dlouho jsme nalávali nové víno do starých měchů“)¹⁶ a vytvoření

11 Viz projev Klementa Gottwalda ze dne 25. 2. 1948. In: *Rudé právo*, 26. 2. 1948.

12 Srov. LENIN, V. I.: *Stát a revoluce*, s. 95 a násl.

13 § 171 odst. 2 či § 173 odst. 2 Ústavy.

14 Srov. VAŠKO, V.: *Neumlčená. Kronika katolické církve v Československu po druhé světové válce. Díl II*. Praha 1990, s. 34.

15 Zákon č. 33/1948 Sb. jímž se obnovuje účinnost retribučního dekretu a nařízení o lido-
vém soudnictví a mění některá jejich ustanovení.

16 Stenoprotokol z 9. schůze NS RČS 1948 – 1954, ze dne 19. 7. 1948. URL <<http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1948ns/steprot/009schuz/s0090008.htm>>.

nového, pro teror vůči odboji a pro odstranění určitých vrstev společnosti vhodnějšího, práva, jako nejdůležitějšího nástroje v boji za socialismus, při zdůraznění cesty třídního boje.¹⁷ V rámci právnícké dvouletky se právní systém proměnil tak, aby byl plně v souladu s generální linií KSČ, přičemž **základním vzorem a napodobovaným příkladem**, k němuž se chtěli tvůrci komunistického práva co nejvíce přiblížit, je jim **sovětské právo**.¹⁸ Trestní právo začíná hrát roli hlavního nástroje režimu, využívaného vůči každému, kdo nevyhovuje československým vládcům. Největší pozornost je pochopitelně věnována aktivním účastníkům protikomunistického odboje a obětem provokací bezpečnostních složek. **Zákony č. 231/1948 Sb. na ochranu lidově demokratické republiky, č. 232/1948 Sb. o státním soudu či č. 247/1948 Sb. o táborech nucené práce, poskytují justici, zaple- velené pseudoprávníky z řad „právnícké školy pracujících“, platformu pro výkon státního teroru. Zvýraznění vlivu prokurátorů a degradace postavení obhajoby posilují kapacity systému ve směru urychleného a splehlivého odsuzování pestré škály jedinců, kteří se dostali do soukolí třídní justice a bezpečnostního aparátu, což byly instituce, jimž nešlo primárně o odhalení pravdy, ale o naplnění ideologických pouček.**

Přes přijetí zákonných norem a posléze i kodexů, mezi nimi na prvním místě zákona **č. 86/1950 Sb. trestní zákon**, (dále jen trestní zákon), zůstává **role práva sekundární**, neboť rozhodující slovo mají vedoucí orgány komunistické strany, které přímo řídí soudní sféru a kontrolují obsah rozsudků. Není proto náhodná podobnost právní kvalifikace jednotlivých případů či odůvodnění, vycházející z totožných argumentů.¹⁹ Protiústavní stranické orgány, vystupující jako rozhodující činitel, dokáží v rámci **kabinetní justice** usměrňovat realizaci právních norem dle předem připravených plánů. Oddělení justice, prokuratury a bezpečnostních složek, které tvoří elementární součást demokratických právních systémů, je potlačeno ve prospěch společného zájmu represivního aparátu – likvidovat veškerý aktuální či potenciální odpor. Předporady, na nichž je projednáván průběh procesu, dopředu stanovená právní kvalifikace i výměra trestu, stejně jako

17 DOLEŽAL, M.: *Dějiny státu a práva v Československu 1938 – 1960. Skripta pro posluchače právnícké fakulty*. Praha 1984, s. 80.

18 Viz *Justiční dvouletka – nástiny osnov provádění změn právního řádu*. 28. 10. 1948. Citováno dle VOREL, J. – ŠIMÁNKOVÁ, A. – BABKA, L.: *Československá justice v letech 1948 – 1953 v dokumentech. Díl II*. Praha 2004, s. 247 – 248.

19 Podrobněji k tomu srov. NEDVĚDICKÝ, K.: *Komunistické právo proti třetímu odboji*. In: VEBER, V. – BUREŠ, J. (eds.): *Třetí odboj. Kapitoly z dějin protikomunistické rezistence v Československu v padesátých letech 20. století*. Plzeň 2010, s. 259 a násl.

zpětná kontrola dodržování dohodnutého postupu a monitorování, zda se soud neodchýlil od rozhodnutí, přijatého bezpečnostní pětkou či jinou nezákonnou institucí, vylučují jakoukoliv možnost dovolat se spravedlivého posouzení jednotlivých případů.²⁰ Při bližším pohledu na jednotlivá ustanovení aplikovaných zákonů je zřejmé, že i v případě neexistence stranického řízení soudní sféry a z ní vyplývající kabinetní justice, by se nejednalo o právo v tom slova smyslu, jak je mu rozuměno v demokratických státech stejné doby. Vágnost použitých formulací, umožňující široký výklad, zdůrazňování třídního charakteru a vytvoření dostatečného prostoru pro účelovost trestních norem, dokládá oprávněnost označení komunistického práva za legalizované bezpráví. Když pohlédneme na první a tudíž uvozující ustanovení trestního zákona, shledáme, že za účel tohoto kodexu je určena ochrana lidově demokratické republiky a její socialistické výstavby (§ 1). Účel trestu vymezil zákonodárce pokynem: „zneškodnit nepřátele pracujícího lidu“ (§ 17 odst. 1 písm. a). Za přitěžující okolnost se zejména pokládá, pokud pachatel: „projevil trestným činem nepřátelství k lidově demokratickému řádu“, či: „ohrozil trestným činem politické, vojenské nebo hospodářské zájmy republiky“ (§ 20 písm. a) a b) cit. zákona). **Hlavním cílem komunistického právního řádu** je ochrana totalitního systému, potlačení odboje a odporu a destrukce společenských vrstev, nepatřících do „nového světa“. Při postihu odpůrců samovlády KSČ tudíž není důležitá objektivní pravda, ale splnění požadavků strany. Odbojáři jsou nuceni přiznávat nikoliv svou reálnou či plánovanou činnost proti režimu, neboť ta se mnohdy nehodí do schémat odporu vůči diktatuře proletariátu, vymyšlených stranickými ideology v Sovětském svazu a kopírovaných československými komunisty. Toto **schematické posuzování** je viditelné například při pohledu na postih účastníků vzpoury, vyvolané peněžní reformou v roce 1953, kdy především v Plzni přerostly demonstrace do otevřeného povstání neozbrojených občanů. Režim, vystupující jako „diktatura dělnické třídy“, se musel vypořádat s faktem, že drtivou většinu protestujících tvořili dělníci. Řešení bylo prosté. Dělníky, stavící se na odpor, označili představitelé vládnoucí strany za imperialistické agenty.²¹

20 Např. *Archiv bezpečnostních složek* (dál pouze ABS), fond (dál pouze f.) 310 – Velitelství Státní bezpečnosti, signatura (dál pouze sign.) 310-23-2, Usnesení komise pro bezpečnost ze dne 11. 5. 1950; VOREL, J. – ŠIMÁNKOVÁ, A. – BABKA, L.: *Československá justice v letech 1948 – 1953 v dokumentech, Díl II.*, s. 209.

21 KAPLAN, K.: *Československo v letech 1953 – 1966. 3. část.* Praha 1992, s. 5.

Doznání jako koruna všech důkazů a cíl usilování orgánů činných v trestním řízení, stojí na vrcholu trestněprávní teorie i praxe, bez ohledu na skutečný stav věci. Proto i v Československu probíhají procesy, osvědčené již v Sovětském svazu. Jde o absurdní krvavá divadla, kde předem zpracovaní obžalovaní plně přiznávají vinu a žádají o nejpřísnější trest. S tím je spojeno běžné používání mučení, fyzický i psychický nátlak a rafinované metody zlomení osobnosti. Ze sovětského systému vyšetřování jsou převzaty **tzv. otázkové protokoly**. Ty se staly základem **tzv. režijní knihy procesu**.²² Jednalo se o výkon naprosté svévole a nespravedlnosti a v neposlední řadě rovněž o neobhajitelné porušení ústavních zásad, zaručených § 3 Ústavy. V totalitní společnosti ale nebylo možno se dovolat nejenom nezadatelných práv lidské bytosti ve smyslu Všeobecné deklarace lidských práv, dokonce i upozornění obětí „nezákonností“ na porušování platných ústavních a zákonných ustanovení ze strany vyšetřovatelů, příslušníků StB, bachařů a dalších vykonavatelů režimní represe, s sebou neslo další trestněprávní útlak.²³ Zneužití **tzv. notorií**, tedy skutečností, které není nutno dokazovat, proti stíhaným osobám (např. „*každý katolický kněz je špion Vatikánu*“), zapadá do koncepce komunistického trestního práva a zbavuje některé obžalované možnosti prokázat svoji nevinu. Je samozřejmé, že rovněž v procesech, kde byla připuštěna alespoň nějaká forma skutečné obhajoby, docházelo jen k naplnění předem schválených rozsudků, případně obsah soudního rozhodnutí přímým zásahem do průběhu procesu ovlivnily mocenské orgány. O nezávislosti soudců se tudíž v žádném případě nedá hovořit. Kromě prověrek a přísných kontrol justičního aparátu, obsazování důležitých postů absolventy právnických škol pracujících či přímo stranickými funkcionáři, zavazují k poslušnosti také zákonná ustanovení. Soudci jsou povinni přísahat, že se budou řídit nejenom zákony, ale i: „*zásadami lidově demokratického zřízení*“ (§ 2 odst. 1 zákona č. 270/1948 Sb. o přísaze soudců). Dle zákona č. 319/1948 Sb. o zlidovění soudnictví, získávají v soudních senátech nad profesionálními soudci početní převahu soudci z lidu (§ 2 odst. 1), přičemž tyto laiky, prověřené stoupenky komunistického světonázoru, povolávají do funkcí správní orgány (§ 10). Typickým příkladem politického řízení trestní justice a důkazem zneužití soudnictví k likvidaci protikomunistického odboje, jsou pečlivě připravované a kontrolované procesy, s dopředu jasným výsledkem a navíc

22 KAPLAN, K.: *StB o sobě. Výpověď vyšetřovatele Bohumila Doubka*. Praha 2002, s. 65.

23 VOREL, J. – ŠIMÁNKOVÁ, A. – BABKA, L.: *Československá justice v letech 1948 – 1953 v dokumentech. Díl. I.*, s. 80.

stanoveným úkolem propagandistického charakteru: „*Hlavní úkol soudu a prokurátorů bylo odhalit vesnického boháče jako úhlavního nepřitele poctivých drobných a středních rolníků, ukázat, proč vesnický boháč brzdí rozvoj JZD a snaží se mařit socializaci vesnice, s kým se vesnický boháč spojuje k zločinům proti státu*“.²⁴ Oporu pro ideologicky vedené soudní jednání lze nalézt v ustanovení § 1 odst. 2 zákona č. 87/1950 Sb. o trestním řízení soudním (trestní řád), v němž komunistický zákonodárce zavázal orgány a osoby, podílející se na výkonu trestního práva, následujícím úkolem: „*Projednávání věcí se má dít tak, aby vychovávalo občany k ostrážitosti vůči nepřátelům pracujícího lidu a jiným rušitelům jeho budovatelského úsilí a k plnění občanských povinností*“. Postupem času se díky obsahu právních norem dala omezit kabinetní justice, neboť všechny orgány a osoby, podílející se na represích odbojářů a obětí režimu, byly vybírány, školeny a kontrolovány stranickými institucemi a měly pro svoji činnost dostatečný podklad v novém platném právu totalitního státu.

III. Role vězeňství v procesu likvidace odpůrců režimu

Odsouzením ale postih protikomunistických odbojářů nekončí. Speciální předpisy jim vyhradí nejhorší vězeňská zařízení – TNP (např. vyhláška ministerstva národní bezpečnosti č. 492/1950 Ú. l., kterou se vydávají bližší předpisy o výkonu trestu v táborech nucené práce a ve správních věznicích, § 1 odst. 1). Potřeba otročké práce v lágrech při uranových dolech a dalších táborech, vede k vytváření seznamů potenciálních vězňů. Využívání kvót a směrných čísel staví bezpečnostní a justiční sféru do pozice stroje, určeného k splnění dopředu vytvořeného plánu počtu odsouzených.²⁵ Atmosféra nenávisti vůči „nepřátelům“ je podporována z nejvyšších míst: „*Nutno si uvědomit, že uvnitř ústavů jsou největší reakční krysy, které narušují oddíly a podrývají autoritu [...] Velitelé budou v budoucnu posuzováni podle toho, jak dokážou udělovat tresty. Vězeň nesmí mít dojem, že má na něco nárok. Není na místě žádná sentimentalita, teď když jsou ve vězení*

24 Národní archiv (dál pouze NA), f. Státní prokuratura Praha, nezpracováno, spisová značka (dál pouze sp. zn.) 7SPt I 75/52. Hodnotící zpráva Státní prokuratury v Praze Generální prokuraturě o hlavním přelíčení se skupinou Vladimír Cerman a spol., ze dne 14. 6. 1952.

25 ABS, f. 310, sign. 310-22-6, Návrh úpravy a doplnění pro akci T-43.

největší gauneři“.²⁶ Vytvořené podmínky jsou pro politické odpůrce samovlády KSČ katastrofální. V rámci koncentračních táborů a věznic zažívají nejenom mučení, ponižující jednání a nucení k otrocké práci, ale neustává ani na ně zaměřená **plánovitá represe**, která se prostřednictvím různých rozkazů, instrukcí či přednášek, stává součástí útlaku politických vězňů.²⁷ Ve srovnání s realitou vyznívá jako toliko fiktivní zákonná úprava, především § 17 odst. 2 trestního zákona, stanovící, že: „*Výkonem trestu nesmí být ponížena lidská důstojnost*“. Proti odbojářům používá vězeňská správa odsouzené za násilnou kriminální činnost.²⁸ Cílem je napodobení situace celé společnosti, v níž zuřil třídní boj a diferencování mezi vězni, přičemž odbojáři mají mít to nejméně příznivé prostředí k přežívání v prostředí táborů. Nechybí ani provokování k útekům, snaha o verbování spolupracovníků StB²⁹, a bezpečnostní složky dokonce konstruuují akty odporu s tragickými následky. Ukázkovým příkladem je proces a následná justiční vražda bývalého poslance Stanislava Broje, majora gšt. Reného Černého a dozorce stržm. Čenka Petelíka, vedená úmyslem zlikvidovat respekt budící politické vězně a odstrašit bachaře od jakýkoliv sympatií k odsouzeným odbojářům.³⁰ Přestože právní normy zakotvily a doktrína potvrzovala **výchovný charakter trestního práva**³¹, z čehož vyplývalo, že cílem výkonu trestu odnětí svobody má být **převýchova**, u odbojářů tato premisa neplatila. Pomocí těžké manuální práce, násilí a otrěsných životních podmínek, mají být nepřátelé režimu zlikvidováni, a to běžně i ve fyzickém slova smyslu. V roce 1951 došlo v jednom z jáchymovských táborů k pokusu o útek. Dozorci doslova rozstříleli pět účastníků této nezdařené akce a ostatní vězni museli pochodovat kolem jejich těl. Kdo

26 Zápis z porady na ministerstvu spravedlnosti konané dne 6. 4. 1950. In: NAVARA, L.: KSČ podporovala teror v lágrech. In: *Zpravodaj, časopis KPV ČR*, roč. 10, 2003, č. 1, s. 7.

27 ABS, sign. H-787-7, Přednáška o věznicích StB, školní materiál, 1950; ABS, f. A 6/3, Tajný rozkaz ministra vnitra č. 37/1956 o nedostatcích v agenturně operativní práci mezi vězni ve věznicích a nápravně pracovních táborech MV.

28 BAŠTA, J.: „Boj proti reakci“ v NPT Nikolaj. In: *Securitas Imperii*, č. 12, 2005, s. 282 a násl.

29 Srov. BURSÍK, T.: *Přišli jsme na svět proto, aby nás pronásledovali. Trestanecké pracovní tábory při uranových dolech v letech 1949 – 1961*. Praha 2009, s. 54.

30 RADOSTA, P.: *Protikomunistický odboj. Historický nástin*. 1993, s. 91 – 93.

31 § 1, § 17 písm. b) a c) trestního zákona; DOLEŽAL, M.: *Dějiny státu a práva v Československu 1938 – 1960*, s. 85.

smekl čepici, byl potrestán korekcí.³² Vzpomínky očitých svědků – politických vězňů, ale i některých dozorců, schopných přiznat hrůznost reality, poskytují plastickou představu o poměrech v trestních zařízeních komunistického Československa. Není divu, že ztráta života a zdraví hrozí každodenně a řada odbojářů se již domů nevrátí.³³ Ostatní byli vystaveni stálému tlaku na zlomení svých osobností, snaze učinit z nich spolupracovníky represivních složek režimu a vlastní zkušenost jim jasně ukazovala, že nemohou čekat slitování, neboť nenávisť komunistické moci k odbojářům neznala mezí a ani usmrcení odpůrců mnohdy nebylo poslední represí.³⁴

IV. Právní řád a odbojáři po výkonu trestu

Propuštění „na svobodu“ zdaleka neznamenal změnu náhledu režimu na osoby, jež se aktivně postavily na odpor poučným poměrům nebo byli k takové činnosti vyprovokováni, případně je systém potrestal za příslušnost k určitým sociálním skupinám. Po opuštění vězeňských zařízení se občané, postižení z politických důvodů, nevyhnuli intenzivní pozornosti StB a jejich kádrové materiály si předávaly všechny stranické a státní instituce. Navíc političtí vězni, kterým soud vyslovil **zákaz pobytu**, a to některým i navždy³⁵, se nemohli vrátit do míst, v nichž žili před svým odsouzením. Zvykání na mimo vězeňské prostředí totalitní společnosti tím bylo dosti ztíženo. Komunistické instituce jednotně a komplexně přistupovaly k bývalým „muklům“ a vnímaly je jako potenciální nebezpečí. Proto zapojují právní systém, s cílem nastolit přísnou kontrolu a vykonávat represi jinými formami. Nejen trestní právo, ale taktéž **právo pracovní** a **právo sociálního zabezpečení** mají vymezenou úlohu spolupracovat při postihu odbojářů. **Diskriminační třídní pojetí** ale funguje ve všech sférách, včetně zdánlivě apolitických oblastí občanského či rodinného práva.³⁶ Ministerstvo spravedlnosti vydalo v roce 1951 *Výnos o zařazo-*

32 *Zpravodaj, časopis KPV ČR*, roč. 13, 2006, č. 5, s. 29.

33 TICHÝ, M.: Náhlá úmrtí ve vězeňských zařízeních. Několik otázek k problému na příkladu úmrtí Josefa Honse. In: *Paměť a dějiny*. roč. 4, 2010, č. 1, s. 93 a násl.

34 Srov. ABS, Č. j. S-2592/10-taj-52, Tajný rozkaz ministra národní bezpečnosti č. 164/1952 ze dne 18. 11. 1952: Pohřeb agentů a teroristů usmrcených v boji s bezpečnostními orgány.

35 Srov. např. Rozsudek Lidového soudu v Třebíči, č. j. T 7/56-155.

36 Srov. ULČ, O.: Malá doznání okresního soudce I. In: *Bestseller*, č. 2, Praha 1990, s. 11 a násl.

vání osob propuštěných z vězeňských ústavů a TNP do práce.³⁷ Uvedeným podzákoným předpisem stanovilo čtyři skupiny propuštěných vězňů. V první, nejhorší, skupině byli zařazeni ti, kdo zůstali zjevně nepřáteli lidově demokratického zřízení a do čtvrté, z hlediska režimu nejlepší, osoby, u nichž se dalo předpokládat, že povedou „řádny život pracujícího člověka“. K potrestání „nenapravitelných“ odpůrců sloužilo jejich umístování do zaměstnání, které se mělo dít s ohledem na chování ve vězení, pracovní úsilí za doby trvání trestu, pochopení škodlivosti protistátní činnosti, postoj ke školení a výchově, zřetel měl být brán na charakter spáchaného činu a, vzhledem k panujícímu „třídnímu rasismu“, nesměl být opomenut ani původ a rodinné prostředí. V zemi, kde je zavedena pracovní povinnost a vyhýbání se „pochtivé práci“ spadá pod trestný čin příživnictví (§ 203 zákona č. 140/1961 Sb., trestní zákon), představuje diskriminace při hledání zaměstnání závažnou represi již jednou potrestaných občanů. Pro bližší ilustraci poslouží několik příkladů, které jsou typickou ukázkou, jak režim používal pracovní zařazení jako formu útlaku protikomunistických odbojářů a obecně všech politických vězňů. Významný národohospodář a podnikatel, doktor práv, hovořící čtyřmi jazyky, Jiří Hejda, odsouzený v procesu s dr. Horákovou na doživotí, musel pracovat jako figurant u geometrů.³⁸ Generál Karel Kutlvašr, vojenský velitel Pražského povstání z roku 1945, odsouzený na doživotí v rámci skupiny „Pravda zvíťezí“, byl vrátným v Nuselském pivovaru.³⁹ Mistři světa v ledním hokeji nemohou po opuštění lágrů dělat nic jiného než manuální práci a sport je jim zapovězen.⁴⁰ Podobné případy se počítají na statisíce.

Vládní nařízení č. 52/1953 Sb., o opatřeních proti fluktuaci a absenci, zaměřené na pracovní právní represi odpůrců komunistického státu, stanovilo tvrdé podmínky rozvázání pracovního poměru. V § 2 odst. 1 nalezneme povinnost souhlasu vedoucího zaměstnance s výpovědí podanou zaměstnancem. Znění § 5 odst. 1 pak vypovídá o vytvoření jakéhosi „nevolnického“ systému, neboť výpověď zaměstnance bez souhlasu vedoucího zaměstnance je označena za svévolný odchod, který musí vedoucí zaměstnanec nahlásit prokurátorovi (§ 5 odst. 2). Za nedodržení výše uvedených podmínek jsou

37 VOREL, J. – ŠIMÁNKOVÁ, A. – BABKA, L.: *Československá justice v letech 1948 – 1953 v dokumentech. Díl. I.*, s. 380 – 383.

38 HEJDA, J.: *Žil jsem zbytečně*. Praha 1991, s. 392.

39 SLANINA, J. – VALIŠ, Z.: *Generál Karel Kutlvašr*. Praha 1993, s. 114.

40 MACKŮ, J.: *Zapřené generace. Vyškrtnuti z kroniky, vymazání z paměti*. Praha 2004, s. 288.

oba dva trestně odpovědní, a to podle § 135 trestního zákona (ohrožení jednotného hospodářského plánu). Sami komunisté ale v souvislosti s protesty po měnové reformě shledali toto nařízení neúnosně represivním, a proto ho vládním nařízením č. 59/1953 Sb., se zpětnou platností (!) ke dni 1. 7. 1953 zrušili, s odůvodněním, že: „Československý pracující lid prokázal v těchto dnech, že pochopil význam boje proti absenci a fluktuaci a že dovede sám zajistit, opíraje se o svou Komunistickou stranu, Revoluční odborové hnutí a Československý svaz mládeže, vytvoření uvědomělé pracovní kázně (§ 1)“. Vrcholem neuznávání rovnoprávnosti obětí komunistického právního systému je pak „Rozkaz ministra vnitra č. 1/1959 ze dne 3. ledna 1959 – Rozpracování, pozorování a evidování „bývalých lidí“. Vychází ze zásady, že kdo se jednou postavil proti komunistům, je nepřitelem pořádku. Stejně tak funkcionáři předúnorových státních struktur, průmyslníci, „kulaci“, představitelé církví, jedinci s nesprávným třídním původem, atd. Dle instrukce o evidenci bývalých lidí a jiných osob nebezpečných lidově demokratickému zřízení, která byla vydána formou přílohy k výše citovanému rozkazu, se pod dehonestující pojem „bývalí lidé“ měli zařadit i občané, odsouzení za protistátní trestné činy (čl. 2 odst. 15). Cílem bezpečnostních orgánů je sledovat bývalé politické vězně, aktivně je rozpracovávat a bojovat proti těmto „živlům“ (čl. 1).

Zcela šikanózní charakter má právo, upravující sociální zabezpečení. Mimozákonnou formou, vládním nařízením č. 22/1953 Sb., o úpravě důchodů z důchodového zabezpečení osob nepřátelských lidově demokratickému zřízení, provedeným předpisem č. 119/1953 Sb., se zastavovala výplata důchodů osobám, jež byly odsouzeny ke ztrátě čestných práv občanských proto, že svým činem projevily nepřátelství k lidově demokratickému řádu. Rada okresního národního výboru dále mohla významným představitelům předchozího režimu a jejich vdovám snížit důchody či jim je dokonce zcela odejmout, pokud se na tom rada KNV usnesla a o výživu těchto osob bylo jinak postaráno. Samozřejmostí je nemožnost soudního přezkumu uvedených rozhodnutí. Ovšem ani dovolání se ochrany soudu by nepomohlo. Nejvyšší soud ve svém judikátu sp. zn. Cz 56/53 ze dne 17. července 1953 konstatoval: „Odpovídá ústavním zásadám našeho lidově demokratického státu a jeho společenskému zájmu, aby osoby odsouzené pro zločiny tak výjimečně těžké byly postiženy ve svých sociálních právech a nárocích, které jsou jim jinak ústavně zajištěny“. Na protikomunistické odbojáře dopadal zákon č. 40/1958 Sb. o úpravě důchodů některých odsouzených osob. Ustanovení § 1 odst. 1 cit. zákona upravilo možnost odejmutí či snížení důchodu ze sociálního zabezpečení pravomocně odsouzeným

odpůrcům režimu. Dle **odst. 2** zmíněného paragrafu se daly důchody odebrat i pozůstalým po politických vězňích. Po celou dobu trvání komunistického režimu přežívali odbojáři v pozici sociálně diskriminovaných občanů. Již zmiňovaný generál Kutlvašr požádal v roce 1960 ve věku 65 let o přiznání starobního důchodu. Komise sociálního zabezpečení přiznání důchodu odmítla s odvoláním na rozsah jeho trestného činu a jím projeveného nepřátelství vůči státu, pracovní schopnost manželky a dobré sociální poměry.⁴¹ Být protikomunistickým odbojářem a obecně politickým vězněm komunistického režimu, přináší s sebou až do roku 1989 nutnost strpět řadu diskriminačních opatření.

V důsledku kontinuity práva muselo být po pádu komunismu postupováno tak, že v souladu s ustanovením § 8 zákona č. 198/1993 Sb. o protiprávnosti komunistického režimu a o odporu proti němu, vydala vláda několik předpisů, jimiž stanovila příplatky k důchodům, mající za cíl kompenzovat křivdy, spáchané komunistickým režimem na protikomunistických odbojářích v sociální oblasti (např. nařízení vlády č. 51/1994 Sb., č. 165/1997 Sb., č. 145/2004 Sb., č. 622/2004 Sb., č. 405/2005 Sb.). Na vyrovnání důchodů a odstranění diskriminace odbojářů pamatuje i § 8 zákona č. 262/2011 Sb. o účastnících odboje a odporu proti komunismu, který spolu s celým zákonem nabyl účinnosti dne 17. listopadu 2011. Snaha ČR ocenit hrdinství účastníků protikomunistického odboje a vyrovnat se s faktem jejich postihu v oblasti pracovněprávní a sociálně právní vyplývá rovněž z ustanovení § 6 **odst. 7** cit. zákona, v němž je zakotven jednorázový finanční příspěvek účastníkům odboje a odporu proti komunismu a jejich manželům či manželkám. Tímto způsobem se demokratický právní stát distancuje od zneužívání práva totalitním režimem v Československu a v mezích možností napravuje diskriminaci v sociální sféře, jež byla účinným nástrojem komunistického usilování o likvidaci nepřátelských osob.

V. Mimoprávní metody perzekuce odpůrců komunistického zřízení

Ve srovnání s fatálními následky aplikace především, ale nejenom, trestního práva, možná poněkud méně tragickou, ale přesto důležitou součástí postihu účastníků protikomunistického odboje, byly faktické zásahy do jejich životů, které často neměly žádnou oporu v „zákonech“ a pokud vycházely z nějaké právní normy, šlo o právo toliko formální,

41 SLANINA, J. – VALIŠ, Z.: *Generál Karel Kutlvašr*, s. 113 – 114.

přičemž obsah těchto předpisů lze označit za legalizovanou nespravedlnost. Mimoprávní způsoby represe není možno označit za nahodilé a neorganizované, byly totiž pevně **zakotveny v rámci systému** a jednotlivé orgány státního mechanismu totalitního režimu je uplatňovaly a na jejich účinné aplikaci vzájemně kooperovaly. Osoby, odsouzené z politických důvodů, se, po odpykání trestu, zařazovaly v rámci povinné vojenské služby k **tzv. Pomocným technickým praporům**, kde často bez ohledu na svůj věk a zdravotní stav těžce pracovaly, v podmínkách, připomínajících vězeňská zařízení.⁴² Výrazné dopady do života odbojářů mělo **vyučování ze studia**, které se vyskytovalo jak v úřední, tj. písemné, tak i faktické rovině.⁴³ **Ztráta vojenské hodnosti** u elity československé armády, **suspendování akademických titulů**, dosažených v souladu s příslušnými regulemi, **odebírání státního občanství** a podobné akty pronásledování již jednou odsouzených „nepřátel“, vytvářejí úplnou mozaiku perzekuce politicky nepohodlných občanů ČSR ze strany totalitního státu, s dopady do současnosti.⁴⁴ Samostatnou kapitolou je **vystěhovávaní z domů a bytů**. Jde o akci „B – byty“ a podobné akty bezprávného zbavování domova. Cílem byl nejen trest za odpor vůči režimu, stejnou váhu přikládali vykonavatelé těchto akcí také uvolnění bytových jednotek pro loajální stoupence KSČ, často přímé účastníky likvidace III. odboje.⁴⁵

Sedlákům, sociální skupině, odmítající krádež svého vlastnictví prostřednictvím kolektivizace, věnovali komunisté velkou pozornost a kombinovali celou řadu metod, jak zlomit jejich odpor. Zničení „kulaků“ se stalo nezastíraným cílem a součástí režimní propagandy.⁴⁶ Uplatňování teroru pomocí trestního řízení doprovázela přísně stanovená **dotávková**

42 Blíže viz BÍLEK, J.: *Technické prapory. O jedné z forem zneužití armády k politické perzekuci*. Praha 2002.

43 Srov. MALÝ, R.: *Není vhodný pro studium*. In: ONYSKOWOVÁ, Z. (ed.): *Vysokoškoláci za svobodu. Almanach*. Praha 1998, s. 112.

44 Mám na mysli například absolutní vyloučení možnosti odebrat státní občanství ČR (čl. 12 odst. 2 ústavního zákona č. 1/1993 Sb., Ústava České republiky, v platném znění), což je skutečnost, reagující na odebírání občanství odpůrcům komunistické totalitní vlády, přičemž ale nemožnost zrušit podvodně nabyté státní občanství způsobuje v aplikační praxi velké obtíže. Podobná situace vyšla najevo při snaze o odebírání sporně získaných akademických titulů.

45 ABS, f. 310, sign. 310-22-6, Pracovní plán bezpečnostního odboru.

46 Podrobněji MACOURKOVÁ, A. – URBAN, J.: *Nástin cesty československé komunistické zemědělské politiky v 50. a 60. letech 20. století s důrazem na násilný charakter kolektivizace*. In: VEBER, V. – BUREŠ, J. (eds.): *Třetí odboj. Kapitoly z dějin protikomunistické rezistence*, s. 251.

povinnost, k jejímuž plnění měl být dle politických směrnic „kulak“ bezohledně donucen.⁴⁷ Dále se používaly zákonnými normami blíže neupravené postupy. Vyhlášky, instrukce, návody, pokyny, vydávané různými institucemi komunistické moci, případně příkazy místních funkcionářů KSČ, postavily selský stav do bezvýchodné situace. Přestože komunisté ustavičně tvrdili, jak zlepšili dostupnost zdravotní péče, vyhláška č. 66/1951 Ú. I. 1. znevýhodnila soukromě hospodařící zemědělce při přístupu k lékařské péči oproti členům JZD vyššího typu. „Kulakům“ bylo zakázáno poskytovat úvěr a půjčku a dokonce šatenky, lístky na cukr či mýdlo. Vyloučili je ze šlechtitelských a množících programů, navýšili jim ceny za použití mechanizace ze strojních traktorových stanic, museli hradit účty za boj proti „americkému broukovi“, atd.⁴⁸

Další metodou represe, používanou vůči aktivním odpůrcům, je **vyloučení ze státních odborů**, což znamená značné sociální dopady – krácení dovolené, snížení sociálních příplatků...⁴⁹ Odbory působily jako převodní páka režimu a spolupracovaly na útlaku „nepřátel“ diktatury proletariátu. Zakotvení dominance jednotné odborové organizace a její role v rámci systematického ovládnutí společnosti a odstraňování ohnisek nespokojenosti získalo své zákonné vyjádření. Zákon č. 37/1959 Sb. o postavení závodních výborů základních organizací Revolučního odborového hnutí a Příloha, jež je jeho součástí, jsou ukázkou, jak silnou pozici mělo ROH v plánech KSČ na udržení totalitní vlády. Svou úlohu sehrávaly taktéž různé **soudružské komise**, rozhodující o propuštění protirežimních aktivistů z práce, vystěhování z bytu, a podobně.⁵⁰ Stejně jako nacisté, i komunisté teror neaplikovali pouze na své odpůrce, ale **postihovali rovněž jejich rodiny**. Nemělo to žádnou oporu v platném právu, KSČ však i zde vycházela ze sovětských zkušeností, neboť právo SSSR znalo kolektivní odpovědnost rodinných příslušníků.⁵¹ Šlo o drtivé porušení zásady

47 ROKOSOVÁ, Š.: Administrativní opatření – jedna z forem perzekuce sedláků komunistickým režimem. In: *Securitas Imperii*, č. 10, 2003, s. 184.

48 Tamtéž, s. 158 a násl.

49 Srov. potrestání účastníků demonstrací proti peněžní reformě. KAPLAN, K.: *Československo v letech 1953 – 1966*, s. 6.

50 PETRÁŠ, J.: Peněžní reforma 1953. In: *Sborník Archivu ministerstva vnitra*, 2005, č. 3, s. 155 a násl.

51 PELIKÁN, D.: Ruské právo v sovětské epoše a jeho historická podmíněnost. In: SCHROEDER, F. Ch. – PELIKÁN, D. – MALÝ, K. V.: *Tři studie z novodobých dějin ruského práva*. Praha 1994, s. 162, 164 a násl.

individualizace viny a trestání pouze pachatelů, ovšem za komunistické vlády se jednalo o státní politiku. Celé rodiny odsouzcenců z politických důvodů vystěhovali z domovů, bez rozsudku a jakéhokoliv zákonného důvodu, jen na základě směrnic represivního aparátu. Příkladem může být **Směrnice ministrů národní bezpečnosti, vnitra a spravedlnosti** ze dne 22. října 1951 **o úpravě poměrů rodinných příslušníků odsouzených vesnických boháčů**.⁵² Kromě sedláka, kterého potrestal soud či národní výbor (sic!), musí přijmout sankci ve formě příkázání místa pobytu a pracovního místa i jeho blízcí, vymezení v čl. 2 citovaného rozkazu společnou domácností a široce pojatými příbuzenskými vazbami. Zvrhlost vykonavatelů komunistického teroru dokládá vystěhování rodinných příslušníků obžalovaných v kauze „Babice“, o němž rozhodl politický sekretariát ÚV KSČ ještě před začátkem procesu.⁵³ Děti politických vězňů se staly obětí **diskriminace v zaměstnání**, režim jim bránil **v přístupu ke vzdělání, vylučoval je ze škol a trestal za jejich rodiče**. To všechno přes výslovné znění § 11 odst. 2 tehdy platné ústavy: „*Původ dítěte nesmí být jeho právům na újmu*“. Důležitý je i § 12 ústavy, v jehož **odst. 1** nalezneme zakotvení práva všech občanů na vzdělání a v **odst. 2** pak má stát stanovenou povinnost pečovat o to, aby se každému dostalo vzdělání podle jeho schopností. Postihování dětí za rodiče dopadalo na občany, kteří nespáchali žádný protiprávní čin, stavělo je do těžké osobní situace, a to bez ohledu na jejich vlastní názory a chování.⁵⁴ Až do roku 1989 přežívali rodinní příslušníci účastníků protikomunistického odboje v postavení „lidí nižší kategorie“ a stávali se terčem čistek. Z plejády příkladů zmíním Přílohu k usnesení vlády č. 256 ze dne 14. března 1958 (*Zásady pro hodnocení třídní a politické spolehlivosti pracovníků státního a hospodářského aparátu*), kde dle bodů 6 a 7 jsou k propuštění ze zaměstnání určeni rodinní příslušníci aktivních exulantů a osob, potrestaných za protistátní činnost.

Napravování zločinů komunistické totality v této mimoprávní oblasti je samozřejmě daleko složitější než rehabilitace a částečné zadostiučinění za trestněprávní postih. Při odstraňování křivd, způsobených oponentům totální vlády KSČ, se musí odpovědné instituce držet pravidel, vnímajících reálnou situaci v době před rokem 1989 a reflektujících širokou paletu

52 ABS, Tajný rozkaz ministra národní bezpečnosti č. 27/1951 o úpravě poměrů rodinných příslušníků odsouzených vesnických boháčů ze dne 22. 10. 1951.

53 RÁZEK, A.: *StB + justice, nástroje třídního boje v akci Babice*. Praha 2002, s. 31.

54 VOREL, J. – ŠIMÁNKOVÁ, A. – BABKA, L.: *Československá justice v letech 1948 – 1953 v dokumentech. Díl. I.*, s. 330.

způsobů potlačování protirežimních vrstev společnosti ze strany dobových mocenských orgánů. Lze proto vycházet z návodu, který poskytl Ústavní soud ČR v nálezu **sp. zn. I. ÚS 246/98** ze dne 17. 3. 1999, když konstatoval povinnost soudů přezkoumávat, zda: „*Rozhodnutí vydané v době nesvobody bylo či nebylo důsledkem politické perzekuce nebo postupu porušujícího obecně uznávaná lidská práva a svobody*“. Právě takové vnímání je schopno reflektovat souvislosti a kontext taktéž některých majetkových kauz, a to i na nadnárodní úrovni, jak je tomu například v rozsudku senátu páte sekce Evropského soudu pro lidská práva ze dne 9. června 2011 ve věci **č. 37400/06** – Tesař a ostatní proti České republice, kde uvedený soud potvrdil oprávněnost nápravy křivd spáchaných v minulosti protiprávními postupy a uvedl, že osoby, které využily svého privilegovaného postavení v totalitním režimu k nabytí majetku, nemohou očekávat ochranu svého vlastnictví ze strany demokratické společnosti, která oprávněně sleduje legitimní zájem na ochraně práv původního vlastníka. S oporou v této argumentaci je možno prostřednictvím právního řádu alespoň částečně nahradit účastníkům protikomunistického odboje a jejich blízkým příkoří, jimž byli po dobu trvání komunistické totality vystaveni.

VI. Závěr

Komunistický režim využíval mnoho právních a mimoprávních metod postihu účastníků protikomunistického odboje. Přes rozdílné nástroje, zakotvené v tzv. zákonech, případně obsažené v různých vyhláškách, pokynech, instrukcích a směrnicích, byl účel jediný – likvidace všech skutečných, domnělých, nebo potenciálních protivníků totalitní vlády KSČ. Komunisté vnímali právo jako dobře použitelnou zbraň a nehleděli na protiústavnost či rozpor s „obecnými zásadami právními, uznávanými civilisovanými národy“, tedy na mezinárodní právo, upravující lidská práva a svobody, jež se po druhé světové válce stalo v rámci mezinárodního společenství měřítkem spravedlnosti. Právo mělo služebnou roli a podléhalo komunistické ideologii a aktuálním potřebám státustrany. Zločiny, spáchané na protikomunistických odbojářích a jejich rodinách, nenávistná propaganda, plná lží a polopravd, množství drobných každodenních ústrků vůči bývalým politickým vězňům, to všechno mělo za cíl vymazat vzpomínky na všechny, kdo se vzepřeli rudé tyranii, ze společenského vědomí českého a slovenského národa. Rok 1989 přinesl, přes všechny problémy, spojené s kontinuitou práva a dalšími souvislostmi, naději na pravdivé a spravedlivé popsání role protikomunistického odboje v Československu.

Důkazem faktu, že úsilí komunistů o likvidaci fenoménu třetího odboje bylo neúspěšné, je i tato konference.

Summary

The author examines the persecution methods used against the anti-communist resistance participants in Czechoslovakia. He deals with the law that became the most important tool used against all who opposed the regime, and members of social groups determined to be liquidated. He underlines the Soviet model, used by the Czechoslovak Communists as an example that had to be followed. Therefore also the legislation of the Soviet Union was transposed and the Eastern Block countries cooperated in creating their national legislations. The author presents the theoretical basis of the Communist system and the need to liquidate the enemies derived thereof, as a condition to implement Socialism. The ruling Communist Party perceived the members of the resistance in purely schematic and unrealistic ways, that was clearly demonstrated in case of the persecution of people taking part in a rebellion against the monetary reform in Pilsen in 1953.

More detailed explanation is dedicated to the criminal law used as a main tool in executing the state terror, and the basic principles applying that part of the law in practice. Apart from the direct management of the judicial system by the Party and the implementation of the so-called 'cabinet justice', there are some examples of new legal regulations wording presented, the purpose of which was to serve the new regime in its plan of the repression against first of all the inconvenient persons and resistance members. The prison system and its role in the process of resistance members liquidation is also mentioned, as the worst possible conditions were made for those people in the forced labour camps and prisons through derivative regulations as directives, orders or instructions. The author deals also with the situation of the political prisoners after their release. He presents some methods of further victimisation of the citizens that had already been punished. He emphasises the position of the labour law and social care law, misused to discriminate the participants of the anticommunist resistance.

The author pays his attention also to a wide range of out-of-law methods of persecuting the resistance members, as posting them in military working units, releasing them from their jobs, from schools, depriving them of the citizenship, their academic degrees and military ranks. Similar methods

were used for example when the given persons were prohibited to stay in the place of their permanent residence, were moved from their houses or flats, or excluded from national trade unions. Although the regime claimed the aim of the imprisonment was to correct the Communist government opponents, the former political prisoners were still perceived as enemies and were subjects of slighting and suffering wrong. Repressing the family members of those sentenced resistance members also cannot be omitted. Although they did not commit any crime, they were moved from their homes, excluded from schools, expelled from their jobs under different directives and instructions adopted by the authorities, being often in conflict even with the constitution and laws valid in those days, and their family origin represented a significant handicap for them in their everyday lives.

Concluding this study, the author states that the aim of all both legal and out-of-law persecution methods applied with the resistance members, was to liquidate the opponents of the regime and the consciousness about their actual activities. The situation after 1989 and the current research of the phenomenon of the so-called Third Resistance show that the efforts of the Communists failed and the issue of the anticommunist resistance has still been in the centre of our attention.

The Opposition in Poland versus Communist Camp Propaganda after the Jewish Massacre in Kielce (4 July 1946)

Ryszard GRYZ

The article aims at presenting different forms and contents of the answers from the anticommunist opposition circles to the attempt of their propagandist discredit after the Jewish massacre in Kielce on 4 July 1946. Thirty-seven Jews were put to death at that time and several dozens sustained numerous injuries. On that day they were celebrating the Independence Day in the USA, and in Nuremberg the International Tribunal commenced the hearing of the barristers making their final speeches during the evidence trial over the Katyn massacre. Having received the information from Kielce, the Katyn issue got pushed into the background. Since 1946 there were no investigations into the motives and circumstances of the Kielce massacre carried out as the authorities of the communist Poland had brought down the curtain on the problem. Independent historians and publicists decided to draw it up after the Solidarity had been born, however, the elaborations of theirs are of different character. There are scientific works based on the solid archive query and thorough analysis of the sources¹, but one can also encounter the works which do not meet any of the scientific criteria.² Both historians and investigating officers of

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- 1 KAMIŃSKI, Ł. – ŻARYN, J. (eds.): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*. Vol. 1, Warszawa 2006; BUKOWSKI, L. – JANKOWSKI, A. – ŻARYN, J. (eds): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, Vol. 2. Warszawa 2008.
 - 2 GROSS, J. T.: *Strach. Antysemityzm w Polsce tuż po wojnie. Historia moralnej zapaści*. Kraków 2008.

the Institute of National Remembrance are still not able to answer many inquiry questions. Such a situation results from the fact that quite a considerable number of the documents has been damaged and there has been no access to the sources stored by the Russian Federation archives.

Jews started to settle down in Kielce in the middle of the 19th century. In the period between the wars their number rose up to about 21 thousand (30%).³ Before 4 July 1946 there were only two hundred and fifty Jews out of fifty thousand native inhabitants of Kielce. The majority of them came from the former Soviet Union and resided in a building in Planty Street 7. They planned to go to Palestine.⁴ The next day after the massacre the communist party and its satellites started the propaganda action which was meant to blame the post-Holocaust tragedy on the anti-system opposition.⁵ In the view of the West, the legitimism of power was regarded to be the most important thing in Poland. Major attacks were launched towards the legal opposition – Polish Peasant Party (known as PSL), illegal opposition- independence armed organizations as well as towards the Roman-Catholic Church hierarchs. This human tragedy gave rise to the attack against political opponents. To do this, they took advantage of the whole potential of propaganda state institutions such as Ministry of Propaganda and Information, the General Office of the Press, Publication and Event Control as well as the Press and Propaganda Department of Polish Peasant Party.⁶

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- 3 GULDON, Z. – MASSALSKI, A.: *Historia Kielc do roku 1945*. Kielce 2000, pp. 219 and 329; URBAŃSKI, K.: *Żydzi w Kielcach w latach 1939 – 1945*. In: BUKOWSKI, L. – JANKOWSKI, A. – ŻARYN, J. (eds): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, Vol. 2, p. 11.
 - 4 After the end of World War II Polish and other countries' authorities, which were within the Soviet zone of influence, supported Jewish emigration. They helped both Zionist organizations and those institutions that supported Jewish emigrants. After the massacre on 4 July the emigration of the Jews increased dramatically. During the first three months about 70 thousand (30%) Jewish citizens left Poland. KUGLER, P.: *Československo a poválečná židovská emigrace z Polska*. In: *Almanach Historyczny*, 2012, Vol. 13, pp. 145 – 159; STOLA, D.: *Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949 – 1989*. Warszawa 2010, pp. 49 – 51.
 - 5 KUŚNIERZ, R.: *Pogrom kielecki na łamach prasy w Polsce*. In: BUKOWSKI, L. – JANKOWSKI, A. – ŻARYN, J. (eds): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, Vol. 2, pp. 132 – 150; ŚMIETANKA-KRUSZELNICKI, R.: *Pogrom w Kielcach – podziemie w roli oskarżonego*. In: KAMIŃSKI, Ł. – ŻARYN, J. (eds.): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, vol. 1, pp. 28 – 33.
 - 6 KRAWCZYK, A.: *Pierwsza próba indoktrynacji. Działalność Ministerstwa Informacji i Propagandy w latach 1944 – 1947*. Warszawa 1994; KRAWCZYK, A.: *Czarna księga cenzury PRL*. Vol. 1 – 2, Londyn 1977; WOJŚLAW, J.: *Obraz teraźniejszości w propagandzie*

The attitude of legal opposition

Stanisław Mikołajczyk, the PSL leader, was fighting for the real referendum results from 30 June 1946 to be revealed. The referendum was to constitute the plebiscite on the popularity of either the political power or the opposition. He was also against diverting attention of the world opinion away from the electoral fraud during the referendum. Having been a vice prime minister of the coalition Temporary Government of the National Unity already for a year (yet the government was dominated by the communists), Mikołajczyk demanded that the special enquiry commission should be established urgently. Communist Home Secretary, Stanisław Radkiewicz, rejected that demand. Also, the Country National Council (the parliament) turned down the stipulation made by Franciszek Kaminski, the PSL member of parliament. The censorship deleted the whole text on the Jewish massacre in Kielce, which was meant to be published by the leader of the legal opposition in his journal *Gazeta Ludowa* (*The People's Gazette*). Therefore, it was impossible to deny and contradict all the lies as well as to launch an independent investigation. At that time one could read in the newspapers: “*some reactionaries, infuriated with their own defeat during the referendum, began to kill Jews*”. The leader of the communist Polish Labour Party (PPR), Władysław Gomułka, accused Polish Peasant Party of the manslaughter in Kielce. Mikołajczyk writes about this in his memories *The rape of Poland*.⁷

The PSL leader together with the representatives of the Church hierarchy were forced to search for the way of how to condemn the massacre and oppose the communists' plans to use it against the opposition. As for Poland, the results were severely limited in there.⁸ Having emigrated from the country, the political activists, clustered around the former prime minister, kept saying that the communists organized the massacre in order

komunistycznej Polski lat 1949 – 1954. Zarys problematyki. Gdańsk 2009, pp. 43 – 44, 54 – 59.

- 7 MIKOŁAJCZYK, S.: *Polska zgwałcona*. No year and place of publication have been given, pp. 202 – 203; BUCZEK, R.: *Na przełomie dziejów. Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe w latach 1945 – 1947*. Wrocław 1989, p. 207; MEDUCKI, S. (ed.): *Antyżydowskie wydarzenia kieleckie 4 lipca 1946 roku. Dokumenty i materiały*. Vol. 2. Kielce 1994, pp. 120 – 122; TURKOWSKI, R.: *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe w obronie demokracji*. Warszawa 1992, p. 160.
- 8 KUŚNIERZ, R.: *Pogrom kielecki*, pp. 152 – 153.

to divert the attention of the world away from the referendum fraud.⁹ The communist propaganda did not have any influence on the vies of Polish emigration in the West. The situation in Poland was interpreted by the RP Emigration government (Emigration government of the Republic of Poland) independently. The circle of its Foreign Office experts produced a document on a close relationship between the Warsaw government policy on the Jewish issue and the policy of the government of the Soviet Union. Polish emigration believed that anti-Semitism in Poland resulted from an excessive number of Jews having a seat in the country and security forces apparatus. The policy of the Warsaw government was meant to convince the Jews to leave Poland. Therefore, there was no legislation which could enable Jewish owners to regain their possessions and the pogroms were organized.¹⁰ The official propaganda was trying to accuse scouts and general Wladyslaw Anders's soldiers, who stayed in Italy with his II Corps, of taking part in the massacre. They widely suggested that the crowd got manipulated by so called 'reactionary murderers' and by the armed soldiers of General Anders's. The words expressing that Polish army were not responsible for the massacre but Anders's soldiers' were spoken by Adolf Berman, the chairman of the Central Committee of Polish Jews, who came to Kielce to take part in the meeting with Jews from Kielce on 6 July. Also Albert Grynbaum, a deputy head of the chairman of the District Public Security Office in Kielce, said before the meeting with American journalists "*it was being done by Anders's people*".¹¹ Such a thesis was presented in the bill of indictment during the trial of the 12 alleged perpetrators of the massacre. The regime press stated that the massacre had been arranged by the underground organizations related to the emigration government in London. Numerous lengthy political comments juxtaposed democracy camp with clergy and fascism.¹² The willingness of bringing

9 BUCZEK, R.: *Na przełomie dziejów*, p. 195; KAMIŃSKI, Ł. – ŻARYN, J. (eds.): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, Vol. 1, Doc. No. 44, pp. 261 – 262.

10 WOLSZA, T.: *Rząd RP na obczyźnie wobec wydarzeń w kraju 1945 – 1950*. Warszawa 1998, pp. 239 – 246. Zob.: ŚLEDZIANOWSKI, J.: *Pytania nad pogromem kieleckim*. Kielce 1998, pp. 146 – 148.

11 WRONA, Z.: Kościół wobec pogromu Żydów w Kielcach w 1946 roku. In: KACZANOWSKI, L. – MASSALSKI, A. – OLSZEWSKI, D. – SZCZEPAŃSKI, J. (eds.): *Studia z dziejów kultury chrześcijańskiej*. Kielce 1991, p. 290; ŚMIETANKA-KRUSZELNICKI, R.: *Pogrom w Kielcach*, pp. 42 – 45.

12 BUCZEK, R.: *Na przełomie dziejów*, pp. 195 – 196; ŚMIETANKA-KRUSZELNICKI, R.: *Pogrom w Kielcach*, pp. 42 – 45.

disgrace on Anders's army was so strong that they explored the topic for several weeks.¹³

Reaction of the independence underground

Armed organizations, which carried on fighting for an independent Poland even after the end of the war, were severely attacked by the propaganda. They performed lots of daring actions in the Świętokrzyski region, which at that time included such cities as Częstochowa, Radom and Sandomierz. The biggest and the most famous action was to capture the prison in Kielce during the night on 4 July and release 350 prisoners. The strongest armed resistance groups had connections with all-Polish Freedom and Independence organization (WiN) as well as with Polish Armed Forces. As regards WiN, it originated from an already dissolved Home Army. In the Świętokrzyski region, the Armed Underground Association (known as ZZK) was regarded to be the biggest organization and it was commanded by lieutenant Franciszek Jaskulski nicknamed 'Zagończyk'.¹⁴

In reply to the regime propaganda lies, ZZK revealed the information concerning the communist provocation in Kielce. In the fourth issue of *Fighting Poland* magazine from 15 July the organization published an article entitled *About anti-Jewish incidents in Kielce*. Its author remains unknown. According to the article it was impossible to decide about important causes of the Kielce massacre. It was also added farther in the article that "*first to blame for the pogrom were the Jews, who provoked the army with their shootings. However, on the other hand, there were so called security organs¹⁵ who were considered to be primary participants of the anti-Jewish actions*". One of the leaflets entitled *Radkiewicz, the bandit, prepared the provocation*

13 Nieznane źródło do dziejów pogromu kieleckiego w 1946 roku. In: MEDUCKI, S. – WRONA, Z. (eds.): *Kieleckie Studia Historyczne*, 1992, vol. 10, pp. 191 – 192. Vide: CHODAKIEWICZ, M. J.: *Po zagładzie. Stosunki polsko-żydowskie 1944 – 1947*. Warszawa 2008, p. 173; ŚLEDZIANOWSKI, J.: *Pytania nad pogromem*, p. 123.

14 *Atlas polskiego podziemia niepodległościowego 1944 – 1956*. Warszawa; Lublin 2008, pp. 268 – 286; ŚMIETANKA-KRUSZELNICKI, R.: *Komendant „Zagończyk”*. Z dziejów zbrojnego podziemia antykomunistycznego. Warszawa 2000.

15 Cyt.: ŚMIETANKA-KRUSZELNICKI, R.: *Podziemie antykomunistyczne wobec Żydów po 1945 roku (na przykładzie województwa kieleckiego)*. In: WIJACZKA, J. – MIERNIK, G. (eds.): *Z przeszłości Żydów polskich. Polityka – gospodarka – kultura – społeczeństwo*. Kraków 2005, p. 267. See: KAMIŃSKI, Ł. – ŻARYN, J. (eds.): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, Vol. 1, Doc. No. 21, pp. 181 – 184.

in Kielce was published in hundreds of copies. Its content was written after receiving the information on primate August Hlond's statement (read below) that appeared in *Polish Journal and Soldier Journal* published in London on 18 July 1946 and then got into ZKK leader's hands.¹⁶ Its first part portrayed the role of the communist security apparatus in anti-Jewish incidents. The officers did not prevent the incidents and were declared to be the perpetrators of the manslaughter. Its second part, however, presented the very purpose of the anti-Jewish provocation. The authorities considered it extremely significant to develop and escalate the terror¹⁷ which was meant to overpower the society and defeat the opponent before the parliament referendum took place. In the leaflet they wrote about searching for a pretext "to denigrate the Catholic clergy just because the primate, the representative of theirs, dared to condemn those who took part in the Kielce massacre as well as any other manslaughter acts performed not only on Jews but also on thousands of Polish best citizens. In the view of reigning communists, the Catholic clergy is bound by the Christian duty to defend and stand for Jewish community. However, the willingness of theirs to rescue thousands of Poles tormented, tortured and murdered by Stalin's people does not account for the Church Christian duty and is considered as the act of transgression against the country and "democracy"."¹⁸

As one can notice, the independence organizations cared a lot about the Catholic Church hierarchy support. The clergy, appealing to Catholics' conscience, raised more possibilities to prolong the activity of active resistant organizations against a still strengthening regime. Nevertheless, they did not manage to propagate the very statement. Quite a considerable part of the leaflet circulation was confiscated by the security force at the very moment of Jaskulski's arrest (26 July 1946).¹⁹

There were seven open or secret trials after the massacre. None of them confirmed the participation of the anticommunist underground.²⁰ This

16 Nieznany dokument do dziejów „pogromu kieleckiego”. In: ŚMIETANKA-KRUSZELNICKI, R. (ed.): *Zeszyty Historyczne WiN-u*, 1993, No. 4, pp. 126 – 127; ŚMIETANKA-KRUSZELNICKI, R.: *Podziemie poakowskie na Kielecczyźnie w latach 1945 – 1948*. Kraków 2002, p. 206.

17 ŚMIETANKA-KRUSZELNICKI, R.: *Podziemie poakowskie*, pp. 80 – 84, 137 – 140 and 245 – 253.

18 Nieznany dokument, pp. 127 – 129.

19 ŚMIETANKA-KRUSZELNICKI, R.: *Komendant „Zagończyk”*, p. 81.

20 ŚMIETANKA-KRUSZELNICKI, R.: *Pogrom w Kielcach*, p. 45.

way the communists' thesis got disgraced. However, it couldn't be revealed to the public. And the underground opinion about the communists' arrangement of the massacre was based on circumstantial evidence. The majority of murdered Jews got fatally wounded with bayonets and bullets. Twenty-seven repression apparatus officers were taken to court (Public Security Office, Military Police, Public Security Corps and Polish Army). They did not receive any harsh punishments and some of the officers even got promoted. Instead nine out of twenty-one civil citizens were condemned to death penalty which was carried out. The sentence was based on false accusations made by the secret political police officers. It is worth adding that the firing squad had arrived in Kielce before the sentence was pronounced and the envelopes containing the records from the execution bore seals in the Russian language.²¹

Even though 20 years of intensive research have already passed, it cannot be proved that they were communists who arranged the pogrom and it is still unknown who gave the order. We should remember that definite residents of Kielce also took part in the Jewish massacre. You could also come across some activists from the independence underground or people who had connections with the armed underground organizations. Marek Chodakiewicz stated that there is no proof that patriots and nationalists belonging to anticommunist organizations arranged the pogroms.²² It is progress in research that determines the answer to the question about different forms and contents of polemics with anticommunist propaganda (gossip, rumours, wall writing). According to the statistics published by Łukasz Kamiński, references to the political context of the Jewish issue in the first years after the end of the war in Poland oscillated around 2 up to 3 per cent. However, the rate of Jewish people in authority reached 6.9 per cent. All the statements and corresponding expressions were mostly of an anticommunist character.²³ It is advisable to continue study on various

21 WRONA, Z.: *Kościół*, pp. 283 – 284; ŚLEDZIANOWSKI, J.: *Pytania nad pogromem*, pp. 115 – 116; KAMIŃSKI, Ł. – ŻARYN, J. (eds.): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, Doc. no. 45, p. 264; ŻUREK, J.: *Ofiary „pogromu kieleckiego”*. In: BUKOWSKI, L. – JANKOWSKI, A. – ŻARYN, J. (eds): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, Vol. 2, p. 170.

22 CHODAKIEWICZ, M. J.: *Po zagładzie*, pp. 172 – 173.

23 KAMIŃSKI, Ł.: *Polacy – Żydzi – komunizm 1945 – 1948. Próba nowego spojrzenia*. In: BERENDT, G. (ed.): *Spółeczność żydowska w PRL przed kampanią antysemicką lat 1967 – 1968 i po niej*. Warszawa 2009, pp. 192 – 194.

underground trends as the extremely anti-Semitic leaflets might have been prepared by sham groups of Polish and Soviet secret service members.²⁴

Reaction of the Church

When the referendum preparations were taking place, the Catholic clergy sided with anticommunist opposition. Therefore, after the massacre, there was the propaganda attack on the Church. The whole action was started on 6 July by Józef Cyrankiewicz, who was joined by Edward Osóbka-Morawski, the prime minister of the government, the very next day. They were the leaders of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) which allied with communists. PPR and PPS parties accused Polish primate, August Hlond, and the Diocese Curia in Kielce together with its ordinary, Czesław Kaczmarek, of joint responsibility for the massacre. One of the journalists posed a question “*Was the ordinary in Kielce, as an active Christian, able to rescue people being murdered from death and dissuade his congregation people from committing Cain’s crime?*”. The editor Franciszek Gil answered this question saying “*Bishop Kaczmarek would have had to act also against the army and military police*”.²⁵ Bishop Kaczmarek was not present in Kielce when the manslaughter was taking place. He was taking treatment for his heart disease in Polanica Zdrój in Lower Silesia²⁶ from 4 June till 23 July. He did not come to the funeral of the victims as his doctor forbade him to break the course of the aforementioned treatment. Having returned from there, he established a special commission to investigate the circumstances and the course of the massacre. The commission was led by Mieczysław Żywczyński, who was a historian at the Catholic Lublin University. Their eighteen-page report on the agitators and perpetrators of the massacre was submitted to Arthur Bliss-Lane, the Ambassador of the United States,

24 The answer concerning the issue of such an anti-Semitic leaflet, published by an unidentified ‘organization’ which was very active in the Kielece region in the second part of 1946 as regards their propaganda activity and not the armed one, might appear only then. An aggressive and extremely radical content of the leaflet entitled ‘PPR Russian Servants’ published at night on July 4th in one of the Kielce district is hard to verify. It says about the Jewish pogrom in Kielce and reviles the phenomenon of ‘Jewish communism. ŚMIETANKA-KRUSZELNICKI, R.: *Podziemie antykomunistyczne*, pp. 250 and 268 – 269; ŚMIETANKA-KRUSZELNICKI, R.: *Pogrom w Kielcach*, pp. 45 – 50, 72 – 73.

25 Cyt.: WRONA, Z.: *Kościół*, p. 285.

26 Ibid.

who forwarded it to the US State Department²⁷, where the document got encrypted and locked in the archive. Nevertheless, the communist propaganda was doing their best to get Bishop Kaczmarek involved in the issue. One can notice here the propaganda activists' method of 'vector reversing'. The bishop who was trying to uncover the truth on the Jewish massacre got accused of causing it. In the Stalin era, bishop Kaczmarek got condemned to 12 years of prison for the espionage for the Vatican City and the USA. It might have been the form of revenge for the report. No one knows, however, why they resigned from discussing the issue of the pogrom during the fabricated trial in September 1953 while it was being raised at the next inquiry.²⁸ Only *The Jewish Chronicle* in London wrote about a Jewish lawyer who was defending the bishop allegedly responsible for the massacre of the Jews.²⁹ Being familiar with Stalin's judiciary system and the defenders' role in the exemplary trials, one may leave this issue without a comment (The barristers plays roles which should do public prosecutors). Diocese Curia employees acted very responsibly at the moment of the tragedy. Delegated priests were not admitted to Planty street by the army and the police. On the very same day the Curia authorities in Kielce got accused of idleness. The Curia representatives protested against the lie in a letter forwarded to Eugeniusz Wiślicz-Iwańczyk, the provincial governor of Kielce³⁰. The very next day there was a meeting held in the governor's place in which the Church representative took part. Working on a joint speech to the public, he contradicted the statement "*The manslaughter was carried out by the hirelings of Polish gentry.*" Clergymen protested against those opinions and tendentious expressions included in the speeches to people. They demanded that the objective investigation should be recorded and the perpetrators punished regardless of their racial background and

27 KAMIŃSKI, Ł. – ŻARYN, J. (eds.): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, Vol. 1, Doc. No. 22, pp. 185 – 201; See KAMIŃSKI, Ł. – ŻARYN, J. (eds.): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, Vol. 1, doc. no. 9 – 19, 23 – 24., pp. 162 – 176 and 202 – 204.

28 ŚLEDZIANOWSKI, J.: *Pytania*, p. 180 – 181; KAMIŃSKI, Ł. – ŻARYN, J. (eds.): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, Doc. No. 43, p. 259.

29 ŚLEDZIANOWSKI, J.: *Ksiądz Czesław Kaczmarek. Biskup kielecki 1895 – 1963*, Kielce 2008; PAUL, M.: *The Catholic Church and the Kielce Tragedy*. In: *A Collective Work: Kielce – July 4, 1946. Background, Context and Events*, Toronto; Chicago 1996, pp. 108 – 110.

30 WRONA, Z.: *Kościół*, pp. 288 – 289; ŚLEDZIANOWSKI, J.: *Pytania*, pp. 152 – 156.

religion.³¹ That appeal was not published and its false version was signed with the name of Kaczmarczyk who was not a bishop but an officer of the Security Office Department in Kielce.³² They also forged an appeal of six other political parties that did not get signed by Kazimierz Kasterski, the chairman of the Labour Party, an opposition party of both Christian and democratic character. He insisted on deleting his name from the false text but the appeal signed with his name got into the streets of the town.³³ In this situation the Bishop Curia issued their own appeal to priests in Kielce (6 July) and the congregation of the diocese (11 July 1946). It bemoaned the bloody massacre, condemned the perpetrators and called the Catholics to calm down. The Curia appeal got ignored by the communists.³⁴

Official country press correspondents and sometimes those of the foreign one interpreted the circumstances of the massacre in a similar and a very schematic way. When referring to the Church itself they employed such a mechanism: *“Those who were murdering the Jews were Catholics, but the Catholic Church in Poland did not want to condemn the incidents the way the communists did. Therefore, such the Church is anti-Semitic and is responsible for those unpleasant events in Kielce. In respect of this, it is justified to fight against the Church and weaken its position”*.³⁵ The willingness to start the fight was declared by the prime minister Osóbka-Morawski on 7 July 1946.

On the very same day, Teodor Kubina, the bishop of the Częstochowa diocese, condemned the pogrom during the holy mass. The next day, he

31 SZAYNOK, B.: *Pogrom Żydów w Kielcach 4 lipca 1946*. Wrocław 1992, p. 114; ŚLEDZIANOWSKI, J.: *Ksiądz Czesław Kaczmarek*, p. 105; ŻARYN, J.: Hierarchia Kościoła katolickiego wobec relacji polsko-żydowskich w latach 1945 – 1947. In: KAMIŃSKI, Ł. – ŻARYN, J. (eds.): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, Vol. 1, pp. 97 – 98.

32 SZAYNOK, B.: *Pogrom*, p. 113; KĄKOLEWSKI, K.: *Umarły cmentarz. Wstęp do studiów nad wyjaśnieniem przyczyn i przebiegu morderstwa na Żydach w Kielcach dnia 4 lipca 1946 roku*. Warszawa 1996, p. 117. Marcin Kaczmarczyk was one of the organizers of the communist security apparatus. See: JOŃCZYK, M.: Struktura aparatu bezpieczeństwa oraz siedziby cywilnych instytucji publicznych w Kielcach w latach 1945 – 1946. In: BUKOWSKI, L. – JANKOWSKI, A. – ŻARYN, J. (eds): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, Vol. 2, p. 94.

33 WRONA, Z. (ed.): Nieznane źródło do dziejów pogromu kieleckiego w 1946 roku. In: *Studia Kieleckie*, 1990, No. 1-2, pp. 65 – 66, p. 159; SZAYNOK, B.: *Pogrom*, p. 112.

34 WRONA, Z.: *Kościół*, pp. 291 – 293; ŚMIETANKA-KRUSZELNICKI, R.: *Pogrom w Kielcach*, pp. 54 – 56; ŻARYN, J.: *Dzieje Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce (1944 – 1989)*. Warszawa 2003, p. 82.

35 BUCZEK, R.: *Na przełomie dziejów*, p. 206.

signed the appeal prepared with Częstochowa authorities' approval. Its text was published in the press and put on the posters that got distributed in the city and across Częstochowa district which at that time belong to Kielce province. In the text they wrote about the fanaticism and ignorance of the murderers, denied the existence of so called ritual slaughter and appealed to oppose anti-Jewish incidents. One of its excerpts implied that the main people to be blamed are the Catholic residents of Kielce.³⁶ Bishop Kubina condemned the massacre one more time during the meeting with Częstochowa intelligentsia. Moreover, he added – as we can read in one of the accounts – “*The Catholic society is convinced that numerous highest administrative positions in the country are filled in by the Jews, which he personally does not believe. However, according to his opinion, it is in the public's interest to deny it.*”³⁷

On 11 July, when they condemned to death nine out of twelve individuals accused of the manslaughter, Polish primate, August Hlond, gave a special interview for the West press representatives in which he provided a thorough explanation for the complicated situation in Poland after the WWII. He told American journalists that he condemned all the murders as well as bemoaned the massacre in Kielce. He defended Catholic clergymen from Kielce from the accusations of idleness and indifference towards the fate of the murdered and he admitted that he himself rescued Jews at the time of war.³⁸ In the Kielce region the society supported the view held by the primate Hlond.³⁹ Both home and foreign press notoriously emphasized the most sensational part of the interview on Polish reluctance and dislike for Jews for their participation in the power and killing Poles on the front of internal fight.⁴⁰ Press attacks on the primate of Poland were delivered from quite a few sides, starting from the procommunist Jewish societies and ending up with Moscow enunciations. The witch-hunt was to make

36 WRONA, Z.: *Kościół*, pp. 295 – 296.

37 Archiwum Państwowe w Kielcach, Urząd Wojewódzki Kielecki II, files no. 1349, p. 79.

38 SZAYNOK, B.: *Pogrom*, p. 116.

39 GRYZ, R.: *Państwo a Kościół w Polsce 1945 – 1956 na przykładzie województwa kieleckiego*. Kraków 1999, p. 155.

40 GRYZ, R.: Stanowisko Kościoła katolickiego wobec pogromu Żydów w Kielcach. Stan badań. In: *Nasza Przeszłość*, 2000, vol. 93, p. 416. See: BLISS-LANE, A.: *Widziałem Polskę zdradzoną*. Warszawa 1984, pp. 133 – 134; BUCZEK, R.: *Na przełomie dziejów*, p. 207.

the world aware that the 'progressive' communist government in power is the only guarantee of 'upbringing' of Poles.⁴¹

The Jewish societies were pleased to accept only bishop Kubina's attitude. The communist press imputed defending of the Jewish massacre to cardinal Hlond and demanded that anti-Semitism should be condemned. Anti-Semitism was being viewed on the same level as the anticommunist underground. The propaganda of the communist authorities kept strengthening the myth that anti-Semitism and the pogroms were closely related with resistance to the new political system. This way the Church was given an alternative: either the propaganda or they themselves will deliver an attack on the Church for their joint responsibility for the massacre, even this moral one.⁴² They also insisted on condemning the opposition so fervently supported by the Catholic nation against which the regime carried out an act of absolute terror. Such a plan was meant to divide the Polish Episcopate. In the classified circular letter No 130 written on 2 August 1946 by the head of the Province Office of Propaganda and Information in Kielce one can find an order to collect information on the public's different opinions about "*the attitude of cardinal Hlond's and bishop Kubina's towards the incidents in Kielce*". Such steps brought lasting results.⁴³ Numerous disclaimers found in the press of that time (*Tygodnik Powszechny [General Weekly Magazine]*, *Tygodnik Warszawski [Warsaw Weekly Magazine]*, *Znak [The Sign]*) were not able to change the image of the hierarchs divided in their opinions. Repetitive condemnation of anti-Semitism and murder in the papers (*Kuźnica [Ironworks]*, *Naprzód [Let's go forward]*, *Robotnik [The Worker]*, *Rzeczpospolita [The Republic of Poland Magazine]*) was constantly ignored by the regime. However, they still published the articles full of accusations that the Church and the Catholic press remained silent on the Kielce issue.⁴⁴ One must admit that generalization, and not a stereotype, according to which the Jews were to get involved in supporting the new power caused the hierarchs to withhold

41 ŻARYN, J.: *Kościół a władza w Polsce (1945 – 1950)*. Warszawa 1997, p. 104 – 105; ŻARYN, J.: *Dzieje Kościoła*, p. 86; ŻARYN, J.: *Hierarchia*, p. 101 – 107.

42 KERSTEN, K.: *Polacy. Żydzi. Komunizm. Anatomia półprawd 1939 – 1968*. Warszawa 1992, p. 101.

43 SZAYNOK, B.: Spory o pogrom kielecki. In: KAMIŃSKI, Ł. – ŻARYN, J. (eds.): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, vol. 1, p. 127.

44 GRYZ, R.: *Państwo a Kościół*, p. 152; KUŚNIERZ, R.: *Pogrom*, p. 153 – 156; WRONA, Z.: *Kościół*, p. 295 – 301.

their disapproving opinion on the anti-Jewish incidents. They simply did not feel such a need in the light of the above.⁴⁵ At the plenary conference of the Polish Episcopate on 8 – 10 September 1946 all the bishops, in case of further acts of manipulation, got obliged to “*refrain from taking individual attitudes towards all the incidents and events in the country without any exceptions and not to create the situations like the one following the Kielce issue [...], that the ordinary bishop of one of the dioceses [the Częstochowa diocese] participates in making appeals whose content and intentions have been recognized by other ordinary bishops as unacceptable according to the fundamental canon principles of the Catholic Church.*”⁴⁶

The Jewish massacre in Kielce had a very destructive influence on the city reputation, its residents and Polish nation. Long years of silence concerning the issue got suddenly broken by the Świętokrzyski Region Management of the Solidarity Independent and Autonomous Trade Union Committee as well as by the Diocese Curia in Kielce. On the 35th anniversary of the Kielce massacre there was a holy service held for the murdered Jews. Also the communist propaganda broke their silence in the eighties. On the 40th anniversary of the massacre, Jerzy Urban, the press officer of the Polish People’s Republic government (PRL government) re-accused the Church and bishop Czesław Kaczmarek of not condemning the pogrom⁴⁷. In response to this the Curia in Kielce issued a statement containing their opinion on the massacre. The most significant voice, however, was given in the *Pastoral letter regarding the 25th anniversary of the conciliar declaration announcement “Nostra aetate”* which was read out in every church in Poland on 20 January 1991.⁴⁸

Conclusion

Summing up, one must say that the very aggressive communist attack on the opposition after the Jewish massacre in Kielce constituted the apogee of the fight for power. It used the home media and information monopoly. The opposition did not successfully neutralize the battle as they could not contradict the terror of the propaganda apparatus and they did not receive

45 SZAYNOK, B.: Polacy i Żydzi lipiec 1944-lipiec 1946. In: KAMIŃSKI, Ł. – ŻARYN, J. (eds.): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, vol. 1, p. 21; ŻARYN, J.: *Hierarchia*, pp. 99 – 100.

46 Quot from: WRONA, Z.: *Kościół*, p. 299.

47 ŚLEDZIANOWSKI, J.: *Pytania*, pp. 200 – 201; WRONA, Z.: *Kościół*, p. 301.

48 Ibid.

any help from the West. Soon afterwards, both legal and illegal opposition got eliminated from the political scene, which enabled extension of the society indoctrination in the totalitarian system. The only insurmountable obstacle was the Catholic Church. The propaganda theses issued in 1946 about the alleged passivity of bishops towards the massacre as well as their participation in the very incident have still been mentioned.⁴⁹

Even nowadays we still do not know the reason why this post-holocaust Jewish tragedy happened in Kielce and not, for example, in some other city. There were more Jewish citizens in many cities and towns of central Poland and the anti-Semitic attitude was even greater in there.⁵⁰ We can only imagine that it was caused by the willingness to destroy those very strong conservative and anticommunist communities existing in the Świętokrzyski region at that time, i.e. the armed underground organization, the Polish Peasant's Party and the Church. They were the propaganda's prime target. As a result Kielce got severely stigmatized. Similar punishments were put on the workers of Poznań (June'56), Gdynia (December'70), or Radom (June'76) who rebelled against the communist system in the following years. Apart from 'anti-Semites' from Kielce, the communist propaganda talked about 'imperialists', 'hooligans' and 'brawlers' in the following most important moments of Polish history. One can assume that the Kielce massacre would have never happened if the country on the Vistula river had not been enslaved by the Soviets. As regards further progress concerning the support and justification of the thesis in historical studies, it is very much dependant on the new sources. We cannot exclude some accidental discoveries but it would be extremely significant to reach and open archives in Moscow. Nevertheless, new sources of information do not guarantee that one may uncover the whole truth about the tragedy in Kielce as some politicians did not leave any traces of their activity.

49 KURTYKA, J.: Przedmowa. In: KAMIŃSKI, Ł. – ŻARYN, J. (eds.): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, vol. 1, p. 8.

50 WRONA, Z.: *Kościół*, p. 282. See: MIERNIK, G.: *Życie codzienne w Kielcach 1945 – 1946/1947*. In: BUKOWSKI, L. – JANKOWSKI, A. – ŻARYN, J. (eds.): *Wokół pogromu kieleckiego*, vol. 2, pp. 50 – 51; JOŃCZYK, M.: *Struktura*, p. 104.

Resumé

Článok uvádza rôzne formy a obsahy odpovedí antikomunistických opozičných kruhov na pokusy propagandisticky ich diskreditovať po židovskom masakri v Kielcoch dňa 4. júla 1946. Vtedy tam zabili tridsaťsedem Židov a niekoľko desiatok utrpelo početné zranenia. Komunistická strana a jej satelity spustili propagandistickú akciu, ktorej cieľom bolo zvaliť túto tragédiu po holokauste na legálnu opozíciu – Poľskú roľnícku stranu (PRS), nezávislé ozbrojené organizácie, ako aj vedúcich predstaviteľov Rímskokatolíckej cirkvi. Stanisław Mikołajczyk, vodca PRS, bojoval za zverejnenie skutočných výsledkov referenda zo dňa 30. júna 1946. Bol aj proti tomu, aby sa pozornosť svetovej verejnej mienky odvracala od volebného podvodu počas referenda. Ozbrojené ilegálne hnutie, najmä Nezávislé združenie, rozširovalo informácie o komunistickej provokácii. Poľský prímás August Hlond poskytol zástupcom západnej tlače rozhovor, v ktorom podrobne vysvetlil zložitú situáciu v Poľsku po 2. svetovej vojne. Czesław Kaczmarek, biskup v Kielckej diecéze, ktorý bol v lete 1946 na niekoľko týždennom liečení nariadil prípad vyšetriť špeciálnou komisiou. Správa, žiaľ, skončila v archíve Ministerstva zahraničných vecí USA, kde ležala dlhé roky.

Veľmi agresívny komunistický útok na opozíciu po židovskom masakri v Kielcoch vytvoril apogeum boja o moc. Využíval domáce médiá a informačný monopol. Opozícia nedokázala tento boj úspešne neutralizovať, pretože nemohla odolať teroru propagandistického aparátu a zo Západu sa jej nedostalo žiadnej pomoci. Krátko na to bola legálna, aj ilegálna opozícia eliminovaná z politickej scény, čo umožnilo rozšírenie indoktrinácie spoločnosti do totalitného systému.

Odpor proti kolektivizaci v Podkrkonoší: JZD, výhrůžky a ozbrojené zastrašování aneb proti politice KSČ jejími vlastními zbraněmi

Jiří URBAN

Podmanění venkova formou násilné kolektivizace a odpor proti němu jsou hlavními tématy příspěvku. Na příkladu obyvatel z východočeského Vrchlabska se autor snaží zodpovědět otázku, jaké formy na sebe mohla rezistence proti kolektivizaci venkova brát, z čeho pramenila, jaké byly meze její úspěšnosti a jaké reakce vyvolávala ve strukturách komunisty ovládaného státního aparátu. Strategie podrobení nepoddajného venkova cestou násilné kolektivizace byla jednou z hlavních částí plánu výstavby socialismu v Československu. Autor ve svém příspěvku přibližuje aktivní odpor vesničanů vůči realizaci této komunistické strategie v českém Podkrkonoší, reakci správních, politických a bezpečnostních složek na něj i existenční důsledky plynoucí pro jeho aktéry.

Obec Dolní Lánov leží v údolí Malého Labe v nadmořské výšce 426 m. Rozkládá se při cestě spojující Hostinné s Dolním Dvorem na území někdejšího okresu Vrchlabí, přičemž od bývalého okresního města ji dělí sotva 5 km, od krajského centra Hradce Králové je vzdálena 60 km. První písemná zmínka o obci pochází z poloviny 14. století. Podle údajů ze sčítání obyvatel zde v roce 1950 žilo 724 lidí ve 240 domech. Až do roku 1945 zde žili téměř výlučně obyvatelé německé národnosti, jejichž odsun byl ukončen v listopadu 1946. Při následném osidlování se sem přistěhovali lidé vesměs z okolí Hořic, Jilemnice a Jaroměře, ale také ze Slovenska a Volyně.¹

1 BALCAR, V. – RŮŽKOVÁ, J. – ŠKRABAL, J. et al.: *Historický lexikon obcí České republiky 1869 – 2005*. I. díl. Praha 2006, s. 500 – 501. Archiv bezpečnostních složek (dále ABS)

Aktéři


Jiří Farský (1910) se narodil v Přívklakách na Jilemnicku do zemědělské rodiny Františka a Františky, roz. Malíkové. Rodiče obhospodařovali 9 ha půdy a chovali sedm až devět kusů hovězího dobytka. Vyrůstal společně se dvěma sestrami. Obecnou školu vychodil v Přívklakách, měšťanskou v Jablonci nad Jizerou, po dvě zimy poté navštěvoval hospodářskou školu ve Vysokém nad Jizerou. V roce 1932 se oženil s Boženou Kolářovou, dcerou zedníka z Mříčné. Společně vychovávali tři dcery, Boženu (1933), Libuši (1936) a Jarmilu (1938). V roce 1937, když zemřel otec, převzal vedení usedlosti.

Polnosti v Přívklakách byly však dosti kopcovité a jejich obdělávání náročné. Proto se po válce manželé rozhodli z usedlosti po rodičích odejít. Nejprve vyhlíželi pozemky v Dolní Branné, poté - koncem října 1945 odešli do Dolního Lánova, kde zabrali usedlost s 15 ha vesměs rovinaté půdy. Pole zde však byla v dosti mokré půdě. Snadnější než podnikat meliorizační zásahy se jevilo přejít na jinou volnou usedlost, což také v květnu 1946 uskutečnili. Zabrali usedlost čp. 89 po odsunuté rodině Landwirtových. Získali tím mj. i traktor a samovaz, a tak si brzy přibráli do pachtu dalších 5 ha půdy. Jiří Farský vstoupil do KSČ a v místní stranické organizaci byl členem výboru. Od podzimu 1946 vykonával funkci předsedy rolnické komise. Při reorganizacích Místního národního výboru (MNV) byl dosazen do funkce zemědělského referenta a místopředsedy MNV. Farský tedy využil možnosti, která se naskytla při osidlování pohraničí, k získání větší hospodářské usedlosti po odsunutých Němcích a lepšího živobytí. Když se později začalo mluvit o společném hospodaření, jeho postoj byl rozhodně odmítavý. Politiku komunistické strany, v rámci níž nejprve půdu dostal, začal nenávidět, když se jí měl nyní vzdát. Pravidelně poslouchal vysílání



Jiří Farský na vazební fotografii. Zdroj: ABS Praha

Praha, fond (dále f.) Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, signatura (dále sign.) V-450 HK, Podsvazek Farský, Ustanovka, Okresní oddělení StB Vrchlábí 28. 7. 1952. KMONÍČEK, J.: Osídlování pohraničí severovýchodních Čech 1945 – 1952. In: *Krkonoše a Podkrkonoší: vlastivědný sborník muzea Trutnov*, č. 3, Hradec Králové 1967, s. 225 – 232. K problematice doosidlování pohraničí viz ČAPKA, F. – SLEZÁK, L. – VACULÍK, J.: *Nové osídlení pohraničí českých zemí po druhé světové válce*. Brno 2005; TOPINKA, J.: Zapomenutý kraj: české pohraničí 1948 – 1960 a takzvaná akce dosídlení. In: *Soudobé dějiny*, roč. 12, 2005, č. 3-4, s. 534 – 585.




Jan Schejbal na vazební fotografii. Zdroj: ABS Praha

zahraničního rozhlasu, sympatizoval s těmi, kteří odcházeli za hranice, a věřil v brzký konec diktátorského režimu.²

Jan Schejbal (1914) se narodil do dělnické rodiny Josefa a Aloisie, roz. Bartoňové v Libřicích na Jaroměřsku. Obecnou školu vychodil v rodné obci, měšťanskou absolvoval v Josefově. Poté nastoupil do učení a jako obchodní příručí pracoval u několika firem v regionu. V době velké hospodářské krize se ocitl bez zaměstnání. Jako voják základní vojenské služby prožil mobilizaci i demobilizaci. Za Protektorátu pracoval jako pomocný dělník. V roce 1942

se oženil s Marií Višanskou z Nového Plesa, společně vychovávali tři syny ve věku 4 až 9 let. V létě 1945 získal do národní správy obchod se smíšeným zbožím. Když potom obchod v roce 1949 převzal Ústřední konzum, později Jednota, byl ustanoven jeho vedoucím. Po únoru 1948 vstoupil do KSČ, následujícího roku byl však vyloučen pro neplnění členských povinností. Od léta 1951 patřil mezi pravidelné posluchače vysílání Svobodné Evropy, veřejně však své názory neprezentoval. Příslušník Müller z vrchlabské Státní bezpečnosti (dále StB) o něm napsal: „*Navenek se politicky neprojevuje [...]. Z toho plyne, že nesouhlasí a není nakloněn našemu zřízení a z obav, aby nebyl odstraněn z místa vedoucího, takticky zachovává pasivitu. Jeho bratr Bohuslav, který mu dělá příručího, naopak veřejně nadává na poměry a docela otevřeně nesouhlasí s dnešním zřízením.*“³




Jan Gregor (1918) pocházel ze Zakarpatské Ukrajiny. Narodil se v Poroškově do zemědělské

Jan Gregor na vazební fotografii. Zdroj: ABS Praha

- 2 Státní okresní archiv Trutnov, (dále SOKA Trutnov), f. Archiv obce Dolní Lánov, inventární číslo (dále inv. č.) 1, kniha Nieder-Langenau im Jahre 1930, čp. 89; ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Farský, Agenturní zpráva Karla Glasera, Hradec Králové 9. 8. 1952. Úsekový protokol z 12. 8. 1952. Zápis o výpovědi z 19. 8. 1952. Posudek, MNV Dolní Lánov 27. 8. 1952.
- 3 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Osobní spis Schejbal, Životopis, Krajská správa (dále KS) StB Hradec Králové 3. 9. 1952. Listinný doličný materiál – leták „Poselství Čechům a Slovákům“. Tamtéž, Podsvazek Schejbal, Ustanovka, Okresní oddělení StB Vrchlabi 28. 7. 1952. Zápis o výpovědi, b.d. (21. 8. 1952).


rodiny Karla a Marie, roz. Cvikové. Po absolvování osmileté školní docházky pracoval na domácím hospodářství s půdní výměrou 5 ha. Po zabrání Podkarpatské Rusi Maďarskem utekl do SSSR. Vyhnul se sice narukování do maďarské armády, za ilegální překročení hranic však strávil následující dva roky v pracovním táboře ve zlatých dolech sibiřského Dálného Východu. Poté se v Buzuluku přihlásil do nově se tvořící československé vojenské jednotky, absolvoval parašutistický výcvik, byl nasazen do bojů u Dukly, při Slovenském národním povstání byl vysazen u Banské Bystrice. Za své působení v době války obdržel několik vyznamenání, mj. medaili za chrabrost a československý válečný kříž. Po demobilizaci strávil dva až tři měsíce ve vojenské zotavovně v Piešťanech, poté se s manželkou v rámci osidlování pohraničí přestěhoval do Dolního Lánova. S domkem čp. 60 vlastnil asi 2 ha půdy, zaměstnán byl jako údržbář energetiky v národním podniku Umělé vlákno v Rudníku.⁴

Miroslava Bierová (1926) se narodila v Hradci Králové do dělnické rodiny českého Němce Rudolfa Biera a Josefy, roz. Melkové. Vyrůstala se třemi sestrami, absolvovala českou obecnou školu a německé gymnázium. Rodina se v době Protektorátu přihlásila na stranu okupantů, sestry Miloslava a Jaroslava vstoupily do Hitlerjugend. Obě byly po válce odsouzeny mimořádným lidovým soudem ke dvěma rokům vězení. Miroslava byla propuštěna v lednu 1947 a začala pracovat v zemědělství na statku v Nechanicích a později v Jeníkovících. V roce 1950 se s matkou a sestrami přestěhovala do Hostinného, zde pracovala nejprve jako tkadlena, později u obsluhy turbíny, a to ve stejném podniku jako Jaroslav Benecký a Jan Gregor, přičemž s Gregorem udržovala intimní vztah.⁵




Miroslava Bierová
na fotografii pořízené
do jejího osobního svazku.
Zdroj: ABS Praha

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- 4 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Osobní spis Gregor, Životopis, 3. 9. 1952. Přípis adresovaný Úřadu předsednictva vlády ve věci předání zabavených věcí, 1. 4. 1958. Tamtéž, Podsvazek Gregor, Kádrové zhodnocení, Umělé vlákno n. p. Rudník u Hostinného 27. 8. 1952. Tamtéž, Podsvazek Benecký, Zápis o výpovědi z 21. 7. 1952.
- 5 ABS, f. Historický fond MV, sign. H-249 MV, Všeobecný svazek, Zápis o výpovědi s Miroslavou Bierovou, KS StB Hradec Králové 15. 8. 1952; ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Benecký, Protokol o výpovědi, KS StB Hradec Králové 19. 7. 1952; Tamtéž, Podsvazek Veselý, Zápis o výpovědi z 22. 7. 1952.



**Jaroslav Benecký
na vazební fotografii.**
Zdroj: ABS Praha



**Josef Pavlič na vazební
fotografii. Zdroj: ABS
Praha**


Jaroslav Benecký (1932) se narodil v Hostinném do dělnické rodiny továrního tkalce a textilní dělnice. Společně se dvěma mladšími sourozenci vyrůstal Jaroslav v Čisté u Horek, kde vychodil obecnou i měšťanskou školu. V místním Sokole cvičil pod vedením Vladimíra Cermana,⁶ až do roku 1949.⁷ Otec byl již od 30. let přesvědčený národní socialista, mladý Jaroslav se však politickému životu vyhýbal. V roce 1947 nastoupil do Pojizerských bavlnářských závodů v nedaleké Dolní Kalné, o dva roky později přešel do národního podniku Umělé vlákno (dříve České hedvábí) v Rudníku, kde po složení zkoušek pracoval jako kvalifikovaný dělník u obsluhy parních kotlů.⁸

Josef Pavlič (1933) se narodil ve slovenských Boľkovicích nedaleko Lučence jako jeden z devíti dětí. Rodiče byli ukrajinské národnosti a na Slovensku pracovali jako deputátníci na církevních statcích i u větších sedláků v různých koutech země. Obecnou školu začal navštěvovat v Rimavě, po roce pokračoval v Choňkovicích na východním Slovensku. Otec a starší bratr Jan se zde zapojili do Slovenského národního povstání, sám malý Josef byl během bojů střelen do levé ruky, kterou měl následkem toho ochrnutou. Na podzim 1944 se dostal do německého zajetí, následně uprchl a do jara následujícího roku se skrýval v lesích u partyzánů. V létě 1945 se rodina vydala do českého pohraničí,

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- 6 O šest let starší Vladimír Cerman byl v říjnu 1952 popraven za protikomunistickou činnost. Blíže viz MÁLEK, J.: Justiční vražda Vladimíra Cermana. In: BABKA, L. – VEBER, V. (eds.). *Za svobodu a demokracii III.: třetí (protikomunistický) odboj*. Hradec Králové 2002, s. 221 – 235; PEXOVÁ, H.: Kolektivizace v okrese Jičín. In: BLAŽEK, P. – JECH, K. – KUBÁLEK, M. (eds.): *Akce „K“: Vyhnání sedláků a jejich rodin z usedlostí v padesátých letech: studie, seznamy a dokumenty*. Praha 2010, s. 244 – 255.
- 7 K zániku Sokola viz WALDAUF, J.: *Sokol: malé dějiny velké myšlenky. Díl první*. Luhačovice 2007, s. 250 – 272.
- 8 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Osobní spis Benecký, Životopis, 3. 9. 1952. Tamtéž, Podsvazek Benecký, Kádrové zhodnocení, Umělé vlákno n. p. Rudník u Hostinného 27. 8. 1952. Protokol o výpovědi, KS StB Hradec Králové 19. 7. 1952.

nejprve do Chrastavy na Liberecku a na jaře 1946 se přistěhovala do Dolního Lánova. Zde mladý Josef dokončil zbývající tři třídy obecné školy a po dva roky navštěvoval měšťanku ve Vrchlabí. Potom již zůstal doma, aby mohl rodičům vypomáhat v hospodářství s výměrou 12 ha půdy, přes zimní období se nechával zaměstnávat jako brigádník v papírnách v Hostinném. V hospodářství drželi dva koně, třináct kusů hovězího dobytka, tři vepře a drůbež. Břemeno povinných dodávek začínalo být neúnosné, a tak otec v létě 1951 podepsal přihlášku do JZD.⁹

Alexandr Veselý (1934) se narodil jako jeden ze sedmi dětí do rodiny stavitele v ukrajinském Spasive ve Lvovské oblasti, tedy na samém okraji historického území Volyně. Otec zemřel již v roce 1935 a matka žila s dětmi na malém hospodářství se 3 ha půdy. Zatímco malý Saša chodil do obecné školy ve Spasive, jeho bratři vstoupili v Buzuluku do rodící se Svobodovy armády. Když ukončil pátou třídu obecné školy, vydala se rodina do Československa.¹⁰ Přistěhovali se do Rudníku na hospodářství se 7 ha půdy. Dorůstající Alexandr zde jeden rok docházel do měšťanské školy. V roce 1949 nastoupil jako traktorista v STS v Prostředním Lánově, později začal pracovat v Krkonošských papírnách v Hostinném.¹¹




**Alexandr Veselý
na vazební fotografii.
Zdroj: ABS Praha**

Motivace – Akce

V roce 1950 se Jiří Farský ve Vrchlabí na schůzce zemědělských referentů dozvěděl, že mají být zemědělcům v Dolním Lánově pod rouškou „výkupu“ odebrány zemědělské stroje. Následující den svolal všechny

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- 9 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Osobní spis Pavlič, Životopis, 3. 9. 1952; Tamtéž, Podsvazek Pavlič, Protokol o výpovědi z 19. 7. 1952.
- 10 Srov. osudy a motivace volyňských Čechů k reemigraci do Československa: HOSTIČKA, V.: Volyňští Češi a jejich perzekuce v Sovětském svazu. In: *Střední a východní Evropa v krizi XX. století: k 70. narozeninám Zdeňka Sládka*. Praha 1998, s. 47 – 60; HOSTIČKA, V.: Vzpomínky volyňské Češky na život na Ukrajině a na Sibiři. In: VEBER, V. – CUHRA, J. (eds.): *Za svobodu a demokracii I. Odpor proti komunistické moci*. Praha 1999, s. 276 – 290.
- 11 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Osobní spis Veselý, Životopis, 3. 9. 1952. Tamtéž, Podsvazek Veselý, Protokol s obviněným z 19. 7. 1952.

hospodáře, kteří vlastnili traktory či samovazy. Aby zabránili zcizení svého majetku, dohodli se, že ustaví přípravný výbor JZD, což také asi dva dny nato provedli. Přípravný výbor byl tedy složen převážně z větších sedláků, k nimž se později přidalo několik středních rolníků, celkem čítal 18 členů, existoval však jenom na papíře. Když potom následující rok mělo JZD v Dolním Lánově přejít na vyšší provozní typ, dohodli se nespokojení hospodáři na tom, že se pokusí agilní iniciátory (hospodáře Pavlíčka a Doubka, kteří chtěli svést dobytek, aby mohli těžit z přednostních přidělů poskytovaných JZD), zastrašit, „*aby tak viděli, že zde stojí někdo, kdo sleduje jejich počínání a úsilí o utvoření JZD*“. V prosinci 1951 napsali tři výhrůžné dopisy. Hospodář Věroslav Zvírotský (1922) je v prosinci 1951 vhodil do schránky ve Vrchlabí.¹²



Jeden z výhrůžných dopisů rozeslaných v prosinci 1951. Zdroj: ABS Praha

Jeden z výhrůžných dopisů rozeslaných v prosinci 1951. Zdroj: ABS Praha

S příchodem roku 1952 se začal tlak na skutečné ustavení JZD v Dolním Lánově stupňovat. Do obce přišel okresem nově dosazený tajemník MNV, příjmením Zonek.¹³ Netrvalo dlouho a v květnu 1952 se v obci začalo JZD zakládat nanovo. Velcí sedláci, kteří před dvěma roky ustavili přípravný výbor, byli nyní vyloučeni. Mnozí menší rolníci, ač s kolektivizací nesouhlasili, viděli teď ve vstupu do JZD osvobození od dodávek, které nedokázali plnit. Myšlenka zastrašit funkcionáře JZD opět ožila.

Josef Pavlič a Jan Gregor se znali již ze Slovenska, odkud v roce 1946 přišli do Dolního Lánova. S Alexandrem Veselým se Pavlič poznal v podniku Krkonošské papírny, kde býval přes zimu jako brigádník. Na jaře 1952 se Veselý Pavličovi svěřil, že má doma vysílací stanici a pistoli. „*Veselý říkal, že pomocí své vysílačky navážeme*

12 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Skupinový spis, Protokol o výpovědi předvolaného Věroslava Zvírotského, KS StB Hradec Králové 27. 8. 1952.

13 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Farský, Posudek, MNV Dolní Lánov 27. 8. 1952. Blíže viz NOVÁK, P.: Profesionalizace místních národních výborů na přelomu 40. a 50. let 20. století. In: *Zemědělství a 50. léta*. Praha 2008, s. 73 – 84.

spojení se Západem, odkud budeme dostávat pokyny pro naši práci a zároveň že odtud nám budou posílány peníze jako odměna za naši práci, rovněž že odtud budeme dostávat i jiné věci, které nám budou shazovány z letadel.“ Jednu z následujících nedělí pak společně navštívili Gregora, jehož protikomunistické postoje znali. Večer se Gregor přišel na vysílačku podívat a přislíbil rozšířit partu o dalšího člena, kterého ostatní poznali jako Jardu. S Jaroslavem Beneckým Gregor pracoval v kotelně. Na pracovišti mu často vyprávěl o svých dojmech ze země Sovětů¹⁴ a o zprávách západních rozhlasových stanic. Benecký mu občas vypomohl s pracemi na poli tak, aby zvládl splnit povinné dodávky.¹⁵

Na jaře 1952 se Pavlič s Veselým a Schejbalem začali zabývat myšlenkou rozesílání výhrůžných dopisů. Přípravovali proto text, který by agilní komunisty, kteří zastávali nějaké funkce, zastrašil. S podnětem v tomto případě přišel Schejbal, s nímž se vídávali v obchodě. Jako donedávna soukromý obchodník začleněný pod tlakem distribuční politiky¹⁶ do sítě komunálních prodejen neměl Gottwaldův režim v lásce a říkával, že by bylo třeba něco proti rudému režimu dělat, „*aby se politický převrat uspil a dlouho to netrvalo*“. Rovněž on byl bytostně přesvědčený, „*že taková vláda, jakou máme, se nemůže dlouho udržet*“. Jelikož si uvědomovali nebezpečí, že by je při psaní výhrůžných dopisů funkcionářům KSČ mohl prozradit rukopis i pravopis, rozhodli se získat psací stroj. Veselý o jednom věděl.¹⁷

Večer 10. května 1952 se Pavlič s Veselým oblékli do dlouhých gumových pláštů, zašpinili si obličej a hlavu zakryli kloboukem, resp. kapucí. Takto zahaleni zaklepali mezi jedenáctou a půlnocí na dveře školní budovy v Rudníku, oba přitom byli ozbrojeni. Cíl byl jasný – získat psací stroj. Řídícího učitele Měšťánka, který jim otevřel, zastrašili pistolí, nechali se dovést do sborovny a zatímco jej Pavlič držel v šachu, popadl Veselý psací stroj a utíkal s ním do tmy. Potom i Pavlič pomalu vycouval ze dveří. Rozmnožovací stroj, který stál na stole vedle psacího, pobrat nezvládli. Podle

14 Srov. SLAVÍK, J.: *Co jsem viděl v sovětském Rusku*. Praha 1926; SLAVÍK, J.: *Po druhé v sovětském Rusku*. Praha 1927. SLAVÍK, J.: *Po třetí v Sovětském Rusku*. Praha 1932. MAJEROVÁ, M.: *Den po revoluci: ja jsem viděla v SSSR*. Praha 1925.

15 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Pavlič, Protokol o výpovědi z 21. 7. 1952.

16 Viz MAREK, P.: *České živnostnictvo 1945 – 1960: likvidace živnostníků, řemesníků a obchodníků v českých zemích*. Brno 2006, s. 102 – 109 a 136 – 181.

17 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Pavlič, Úsekový protokol z 19. 7. 1952, Protokol o výpovědi z 24. 7. 1952; Tamtéž, Podsvazek Benecký, Zápis o výpovědi z 21. 7. 1952.

Antonína Měšťánka (1907) jeden ze dvou neznámých mužů oslovil druhého jako Pavla, zřejmě tedy používali smyšlená jména. Velitel oddílu StB ve Vrchlabí Josef Hroch podával o „akci Rudník“ nadřízenému velitelství zprávy, musel však konstatovat, že *„nevyšly najevo žádné poznatky, které by označily pachatele“*.¹⁸

Jiří Farský a Jan Gregor byli přátelé, často se jeden u druhého zastavili na kus řeči. V červnu 1952 přišel Gregor požádat o zapůjčení zbraně, přitom se svěřil s plánem na přepadení agilních funkcionářů JZD Šubrt a Sládka. Farský mu půjčil svou Parabellu, německou vojenskou pistoli ráže 9mm, krom toho v debatě navrhnul, aby přepadli ještě předsedu JZD Nováka. Na akci se připravovali společně Benecký, Gregor, Pavlič a Veselý. Čekali na deštivé počasí. Gregor nyní do skupiny přivedl nejmenovanou dívku z Hostinného. Miluše, jak jí v partě říkali, tvrdila, že má z doby okupace zkušenosti s podzemním hnutím, nebyla to však pravda. *„Na schůzce, kde jsem poprvé viděl Bírovou, kterou jsem však ještě neznal jménem, se připravovalo přepadení předsedy JZD Nováka do všech podrobností. Bírová dostala za úkol vylákati Nováka z baráku. S tímto Bírová také souhlasila a řekla, že přijde, nedodržela však slovo a nepřišla“*, vzpomínal později Pavlič.¹⁹

Onoho úterního večera, bylo to 10. června 1952, se setkali na bicyklech. Tři z nich byli ozbrojení a odhodlaní zbraně v případě nutnosti použít. *„Gregor říkal Veselému, když by se náhodou stalo a Novák začal střílet, aby též on na nic nečekal a střílel také“*, uvedl Pavlič. Nejdříve šli k Novákovi do čp. 27.²⁰

Josef Novák (1896), který přišel do Dolního Lánova v roce 1948 z Prahy, slyšel toho červnového večera, jak někdo opakovaně zabral za kliku domovních dveří. Šel tedy dveře na dvůr otevřít a uviděl neznámé muže, z nichž jeden na něho mířil pistolí. *„Křikl na mne: ‚Ruce vzhůru!‘ Když jsem uposlechl, byl jsem tázán, zda mám u sebe zbraň. Když jsem řekl, že*

18 ABS, f. Historický fond MV, sign. H-249 MV, Všeobecný svazek, Hlášení ve věci „akce Rudník“, O-StB Vrchlabí 15. 5. 1952. Opis dálnopisu od O-StB Vrchlabí ve věci „teror Rudník“ z 11. 5. 1952 10.15 hod. ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Skupinový spis, Protokol o výpovědi Antonína Měšťánka, KS StB Hradec Králové 27. 8. 1952. Tamtéž, Podsvazek Pavlič, Úsekový protokol z 19. 7. 1952.

19 ABS, f. Historický fond MV, sign. H-249 MV, Všeobecný svazek, Zápis o výpovědi s Miroslavou Bierovou, KS StB Hradec Králové 15. 8. 1952. ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Benecký, Protokol o výpovědi, KS StB Hradec Králové 19. 7. 1952. Tamtéž, Podsvazek Veselý, Zápis o výpovědi z 22. 7. 1952.

20 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Vyhodnocení archivního svazku, Praha 24. 5. 1966. Tamtéž, Podsvazek Farský, Zápis o výpovědi z 20. 8. 1952. Tamtéž, Podsvazek Pavlič, Protokol o výpovědi z 21. 7. 1952.

zbraň u sebe nemám, říkal mi neznámý, že musím vystoupit z JZD a z KSČ, že nikoho nebudu přesvědčovat o vstupu do JZD, že můj syn musí vystoupit z ČSM.“ Až dosud této nezvyklé noční rozmluvě přihlížel z chodby Novákův 15tiletý syn. Potom byl Josef Novák odveden na zahradu za dům. „A tu jsem slyšel ze tmy hlas druhého muže: ‚Oddělej ho, svini komunistickou!‘ Neznámý muž, který mne vyvedl, poručil mi, abych si lehl obličejem do trávy. Zahlédl jsem asi čtyři osoby, které stály rozestavěny na zápraží, u plotu a za stodolou. Když jsem lehl na zem, udeřil mne první muž několikrát do spánků. Potom přišel další muž, který mne rovněž několikrát udeřil. Když odešel ode mne dále, vyzval ještě jednou prvního muže s pistolí, aby mne kopl a oddělal. Muž, který na mne mířil pistolí, mne skutečně kopl do boku a řekl: ‚To, co se nyní stalo, nikomu nevyzradíš a splníš věci, které jsem ti uložil!‘ Potom mi ještě poručili, abych zůstal půl hodiny ležet. Když odcházeli, viděl jsem, že šli všichni čtyři směrem k silnici. Za chvíli jsem se vrátil domů, ale již jsem nemohl pro rozrušení usnout. Příštího dne ráno jsem šel ohlásit případ na okresní sekretariát KSČ ve Vrchlábí. [...] Dívám se na to jako na podlost, kterou rozhodně nelze zastrašit poctivé rolníky při budování socialismu na vesnici.“ Takto Josef Novák shrnul průběh oné noci do protokolu před královéhradeckou StB.²¹


Od Nováka zamířili mladíci, nyní už jen ve trojici (Pavlič se ukázal být až příliš vystrašený), k čp. 79, stavení jednoho z členů JZD, Šubrtů. S pistolí v ruce jej vylákali z bytu a požadovali, aby vystoupil z JZD i KSČ. Stanislav Šubrt (1912), který přišel do Dolního Lánova v roce 1948 z Přívlaku na Jilemnicku, popsal události toho červnového večera následovně: „Po otevření jsem viděl venku neznámého člověka, který na mě mířil pistolí. Vyzval mne, abych dal ruce vzhůru a pak [...] na mne neznámý křikl ‚Neopovažte se někoho přemlouvat do JZD, do KSČ a do svazu mládeže!‘“ Ještě v noci zašel za předsedou MNV a následující den ráno oznámil přepadení na stanici SNB ve Vrchlábí. Jelikož třetího z vytipovaných funkcionářů, Sládka, ozbrojená trojice už doma nezastihla, rozjeli se každý do svých domovů. Následující den Gregor vrátil pistolí Farskému a ten ji ukryl mezi kořeny vzrostlého javoru.²²

21 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Skupinový spis, Protokol o výpovědi svědka Josefa Nováka, KS StB Hradec Králové 26. 8. 1952.

22 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Pavlič, Protokol o výpovědi z 19. 7. 1952. Tamtéž, Skupinový spis, Protokol o výpovědi svědka Stanislava Šubrtů, KS StB Hradec Králové 26. 8. 1952. Tamtéž, Podsvazek Farský, Zápis o výpovědi z 20. 8. 1952.

[552]

Odpor proti kolektivizaci v Podkrkonoší: JZD, výhrůžky a ozbrojené zastrašování
aneb proti politice KSČ jejími vlastními zbraněmi



**Záznam telefonního hovoru, jímž velitel StB ve Vrchlabí informoval nadřízené
o událostech v Dolním Lánově. Zdroj: ABS Praha**

Ve středu 11. června 1952 v poledne zvedl velitel oddílu StB ve Vrchlabí Josef Hroch²³ telefon, aby o „*teroru proti členům a funkcionářům JZD v Dolním Lánově*“ informoval Krajské velitelství v Hradci Králové. „*Vrchlabí žádá o vyslání příslušných orgánů*“, stojí v záznamu.²⁴ Ppor. Josef Martínek z operativního oddělení královéhradeckého KV StB následně vyrozuměl ústředí Bacílkova Ministerstva národní bezpečnosti.²⁵ Ve vesnici bylo v těchto dnech nebývale rušno. Díky dopisu, který zásluhou StB nikdy nedošel adresáta, máme k dispozici reflexi těchto dní očima jedné z místních žen. Jazykem tolik odlišným od úředních dokumentů a výslechových protokolů popisovala sestře situaci kolem ustavení nového výboru JZD v Dolním Lánově: „*Tady celý výbor rozházeli, ustanovili nový a zahájili - už asi 9 sedláků, ale těch menších - společnou práci. Nu druhý typ. Jenže co se stalo. Ve středu do rána nového předsedu vytáhli ve spodkách na dvůr a tam mu dali, to víš, že pro darmo si za ním nepřišli, pak šli ještě na nějakýho Šubrtu [...] Teď už bylo kolik lidí pozavíraných, dnes ráno šli zas do tří domů, žádná stopa, podlahy vytrhali, i ve chlívech, hledali jak gestapo. To je jisté, že se JZD musí hájit, ale kdo si dnes ty funkce vezme, když se všichni bojí. Teď je tu tajná, pátračky, četníci, inu podívaná jak lítají. [...] Jo dějou se věci, to bys slyšela, ty pohlavíři se bez pistolí nehnou ani, ale proč se bojí? Vždyť si to lid přeje, co dělají, a je to tak dobrý.*“²⁶

Smělé plány

Vzrušenost a zdánlivá bezradnost bezpečnostních složek mladé odbojáře povzbuzovala ke konstruování plánů další možné činnosti. Skupina nyní disponovala dvěma vojenskými puškami, čtyřmi pistolemi a dostatečným počtem příslušných nábojů. Výskyt zbraní na československém

23 Josef Hroch (1917) pocházel z Platišť nad Labem, obce ležící v těsném sousedství Hradce Králové. Původním povoláním byl truhlář. Do KSČ vstoupil v roce 1945. Ke StB nastoupil na vlastní žádost v květnu 1949. Oddíl StB ve Vrchlabí vedl od října 1950 až do konce roku 1955. Bydlel v Komárově u Dvora Králové nad Labem. ABS Brno - Kanice, f. Personální spisy příslušníků MV, arch. č. 641/17, Hroch Josef, nar. 16. 2. 1917, Průběh služební doby. Kádrové vyhodnocení, Praha 29. 8. 1951.

24 ABS, f. Historický fond MV, sign. H-249 MV, Všeobecný svazek, Fonogram z 11. 6. 1952.

25 ABS, f. Historický fond MV, sign. H-249 MV, Teror Dolní Lánov – zpráva, Krajské velitelství StB Hradec Králové 12. 6. 1952.

26 ABS, f. Historický fond MV, sign. H-249 MV, Opis dopisu „Drazí vespolek!“, Dolní Lánov 15. 6. 1952.

venkově v poválečných letech byl zcela běžnou záležitostí. V okolí Lánova tomu nebylo jinak. Pavlič sám našel dvě německé vojenské pušky, jednu v opuštěném domě v obci, druhou v lese za vesnicí, zbraně byly značně zrezivělé. Obě dal Veselému, u něhož se zbraně soustředily. Pistoli ráže 9 mm získal Pavlič od kamaráda Kordy, rovněž z Dolního Lánova.²⁷

Zbraně, které měla v držení teroristická skupina GREGOR-BENECKÝ-VESELÝ.

Psací stroj získaný skupinou loupežným přepadením.



Psací stroj a zbraně, které skupina shromáždila. Zdroj: ABS Praha

27 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Vyhodnocení archivního svazku, Praha 24. 5. 1966; Tamtéž, Podsvazek Pavlič, Protokol o výpovědi z 19. 7. 1952.

V rozbořeném stavení poblíž hospodářství Veselých si mladíci zřizovali bunkr, ve kterém by mohli ukrývat zbraně a vysílačku, i ukradený psací stroj by se sem vešel. Bunkr byl asi 2 m hluboko pod úrovní podlahy. Veselý byl kdysi členem radioamatérského klubu, inspiraci čerpal i z časopisu *Mladý technik*. Potřebné součástky kupoval postupně a opatrně - v Elektře a Mototechně v Hostinném, ve Vrchlabí a ve Dvoře Králové. Pavlič později vyličil návštěvu u Veselého doma v pokoji: „Bylo to asi v květnu 1952, kdy mě Veselý ukazoval vysílací stanici, kterou měl umístěnou doma v pokoji. Říkal, že ji nemá ještě v pořádku, ale že ji do chodu za každou cenu musí přivést, aby měl spojení na zahraničí. Vzpomínám si, že anténu měl podobnou, jakou mají v autech. Rovněž baterie u toho měl.” Až naváží spojení se Západem, budou za svou činnost placeni, připomínal osmnáctiletý Alexandr svým druhům s oblibou.²⁸

Nápadů, jak škodit uzurpátorskému režimu, jak brzdit násilně prosazovanou kolektivizaci, měli spoustu. Při jedné z květnových schůzek padl návrh vyhodit do vzduchu drůbežárnu JZD v Prosečné. Gregor, Pavlič i Veselý se pro tu myšlenku nadchli, scházely jim však potřebné trhaviny. Kde je získat? Trhaviny používané v těžebním průmyslu byly v nedalekém Černém dole a bylo jich tam dost. Následující neděli se vydali ke sklepům, které byly ve skále poblíž kamenolomu. Zámky však byly pevné, prozatím se vrátili s nepořízenou. Uvažovalo se také o přepadení poštovního úřadu v Hostinném, zde se chtěla parta finančně zabezpečit. Bierová tvrdila, že v minulosti na této poštovní pobočce pracovala a že proto může poskytnout cenné informace o provozu a zabezpečení úřadu. Gregor přišel s návrhem přepadnout strážného a zmocnit se zbraní z vrátnice továrny na hedvábí v Rudníku. „Bylo dohodnuto, že strážného svážeme provazem a zbraně odneseme do lesa, kde na nás on [Gregor] bude čekat“, stojí v Pavličově výpovědi. V případě, že by vše proběhlo podle plánu, zamýšleli přepadnout také nového tajemníka MNV v Dolním Lánově Zonka a po žních podpálit stodolu Stanislavu Šubrtovi, kterého nedávno přepadli.²⁹

28 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Pavlič, Protokol o výpovědi z 19. 7. 1952. Zápis o výpovědi Miloslava Kavána, KS StB Hradec Králové 19. 7. 1952; Tamtéž, Podsvazek Veselý, Zápis o výpovědi z 21. 7. 1952.

29 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Pavlič, Protokoly o výpovědi z 21. a 29. 7. 1952. Zápis o výpovědi Miloslava Kavána, KS StB Hradec Králové 19. 7. 1952; ABS, f. Historický fond MV, sign. H-249 MV, Všeobecný svazek, Dálnopis adresovaný pražské Hlavní správě StB ve věci „teror Rudník“, KS StB Hradec Králové 18. 7. 1952.

Alexandr Veselý, nejmladší člen skupiny, byl tím, kdo nejčastěji zdůrazňoval potřebu získat další zbraně. Zabývali se proto i myšlenkou na přepadení stanice SNB v Rudníku. Tyto akce byly připravovány jen výhledově. „[...] Každá akce musí být nejdříve dobře promyšlená, abysme nebyli dopadení“, ujišťovali se navzájem. Do jaké míry mohli uvažovat o skutečné realizaci, zda byli schopni a ochotni uvažovat o reálné situaci, ve které by museli zabít, dnes nelze jednoznačně posoudit. „Prohlašuji však, že bychom všechny [plánované akce] provedli, kdybychom nebyli zatčeni“, stojí v protokolu s Veselým. Podle počátečních výpovědí všech zúčastněných, tedy těch, které ještě z větší části nejsou formulovány vyšetřovateli StB a které nebyly určeny pro čtení u soudu, stejně jako dle dochovaných operativních materiálů se všichni shodovali na velice iniciativní roli Alexandra Veselého a Jana Gregora. Gregor byl přitom ostatními díky svým zkušenostem z války vnímán jako vůdce party, obvykle svolával i řídil jejich schůzky. Ty se odehrávaly většinou na loukách v okolí obce, na autobusové zastávce v Prosečném nebo v ulicích Hostinného. Gregor byl také spojovacím článkem na Farského. Občas k němu chodíval vypomoci na pole, často se jen zastavil na kus řeči.³⁰

Je pochopitelné, že přepadení způsobila ve vesnici i blízkém okolí velký rozruch. Zájem o členství v JZD značně klesl. Stávající funkcionáři a členové však z JZD nevystoupili. Proto se Farský rozhodl k tomu, že během schůze, na které se projednávalo rozorání mezí, přeruší elektrické vedení. Do plánu zasvětil Gregora, nejprve osobně, poté ho psaným vzkazem vyrozuměl o termínu konání předmětné schůze. Gregor však v ten den musel být v práci. Akci tedy odložili na další brzkou schůzi JZD, na tu měl přijet referovat poslanec Borůvka.³¹ Den před konáním této schůze byl však

30 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Pavlič, Protokoly o výpovědi z 21., 29. a 30. 7. 1952; Tamtéž, Podsvazek Veselý, Zápis o výpovědi z 19. a 24. 7. 1952.

31 Josef Borůvka (1911) pocházel z Dolan u Jaroměře. Veřejně byl vždy velice činný a nebylo divu, když se po válce dostal nejen do čela MNV v obci, ale začal získávat i okresní a krajské funkce. V květnu 1946 byl za KSČ zvolen do Ústavodárného národního shromáždění. Více než 20 let poté pracoval v poslaneckém zemědělském výboru a pro východočeský venkov se stal ztělesněním kolektivizace. V roce 1968 vykonával funkci ministra zemědělství a výživy, poté se vrátil do čela JZD v Dolanech. Archiv Poslanecké sněmovny Parlamentu ČR, f. Archiv Federálního shromáždění – Archiv Poslanecké sněmovny, Josef Borůvka, inv. č. 188, Poslanecké dotazníky 1946, 1948, 1954, 1960, 1964, 1969. Osobní karty.

Gregor zatčen. Jak k tomu došlo? V čem vězel obrat v dosavadním tápání ze strany Bezpečnosti? To nám objasní postava Miloslava Kavána.³²

Prozrazení – zatýkání – proces

Nedlouho po oné noci, kdy s pistolí v ruce přepadli předsedu JZD a před ním učitele, se Veselý s Gregorem rozhodli Pavličce ze schůzek vynechávat. Zjistili, že neuměl držet jazyk za zuby. Nejprve se svěřil s účastí na přepadení Janu Schejbalovi. Jeho protikomunistické postoje i osobní antipatii k předsedovi JZD Novákovi sice dobře znal, nicméně porušil tím pravidlo mlčenlivosti. Schejbal sám ho k ní nabádal, vyděsila ho představa, že by se tím mladík chlubil někde dál.³³ Zásadní ale přišlo poté. Devatenáctiletý Josef Pavlič se do jejich činnosti snažil zapojit Miloslava Kavána, v jehož případě protikomunistické založení pouze předpokládal. To se ukázalo být fatálním omylem.³⁴

Miloslav Kaván (1927) byl synem kováře z Dolního Lánova, učil se a pracoval v dílně svého otce. Gregor s Veselým jej na základě Pavličova doporučení seznámili se svými plány na zastrašování funkcionářů JZD. To se psal začátek června 1952. Od té doby se u něho v kovárně někdo z party sem tam zastavil a informoval jej o večerních schůzkách či dalších plánech. Veselý za ním přišel s vlastním nákresem pro výrobu rámu pro kostru vysílačky, Kaván slíbil, že mu podle toho rám zhotoví. V polovině července se v kovárně zastavil Veselý s jemu dosud neznámým mladíkem, byl to Jarda Benecký z Rudníku. Pozvali ho na čtvrtek 17. července o půl desáté večer na schůzku v Hostinném. Zmínili, že chtějí odstranit jednoho funkcionáře KSČ z Rudníku. Podrobnosti měly projednat na domluvené schůzce.³⁵

32 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Farský, Zápis o výpovědi z 20. 8. 1952.

33 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Pavlič, Protokol o výpovědi z 21. 7. 1952. „*Asi týden po přepadení Nováka a Šubrta jsem se setkal s Gregorem před jeho barákem. Gregor mě začal nadávat, že prý jsem blbec a proč jsem všechno řekl Schejbalovi a abych si dal pozor, jak ještě někomu něco řeknu, že mě na místě zastřelí. Dále mě řekl, že jsem z jejich organizace vyloučen a abych si jich vůbec nevyším.*”

34 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Zápis o výpovědi Miloslava Kavána, KS StB Hradec Králové 19. 7. 1952. Protokol o výpovědi Josefa Pavličce z 21. 7. 1952.

35 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Veselý, Zápis o výpovědi z 21. 7. 1952.

Během čtvrtčního odpoledne však Miroslav Kaván zamířil na stanici SNB. „*Zdála se mi celá věc velmi nebezpečná a nebyl jsem si jist, zda bych dalším neohlášením Veselého a jeho společníků více nepokazil, než získal, a proto jsem se rozhodl, že celou věc ohlásím*“, uvedl do protokolu na zdejší okresním oddělení SNB. Dále jej už instruovala Bezpečnost. Večer na smluvené schůzce vyslechl podrobnosti a zjistil, ve kterém domě nejmenovaný komunista bydlí. Plán byl následující: vylákat jej ven pod legendou mimořádné schůze OV KSČ ve Vrchlabí a na odlehlém místě po cestě z Hostinného do Vrchlabí jej zastřelit. Poté se hodlali vrátit a přimět manželku, aby jim vydala veškeré legitimace a doklady. Připravili variantu se zapůjčenou motorkou i alternativu pěší. Akci domluvili na následující večer. K jejímu provedení však nedošlo. Do Dolního Lánova se toho večera vrátili kolem půlnoci. Hned ráno pak Kaván podal zprávu příslušníkům Bezpečnosti, kteří za ním do Lánova přijeli. Do protokolu mj. uvedl: „*Prohlašuji, že jsem s jejich jednáním nikdy nesouhlasil, i když ve styku s nimi jsem se tvářil, jako když chci s nimi spolupracovat. [...] Ničeho jsem nezamlčel a ničeho si nevymyslel.*“³⁶

V pátek 18. července 1952 tedy přišlo na řadu zatýkání. Akci osobně řídil krajský velitel StB škpt. Vlček.³⁷ Dvě zatýkací skupiny vedené příslušníky královéhradecké StB Švenkou a Markem přijely do Rudníku a kolem poledne ve zdejší provozovně národního podniku Umělé vlákno zatknuly Jana Gregora a Jaroslava Beneckého. Na stanici SNB byli krátce vyslechnuti, oba však držení zbraní popřeli. Na ubytovně v lázních Fořt provedli příslušníci domovní prohlídky. Jaroslav Benecký měl svou automatickou pistoli zn. ČZ ráže 9 mm i se zásobníkem s ostrými náboji uloženou v posteli pod slamníkem, v cestovním kufříku pak schovával ještě starý bubínkový revolver a další

36 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Pavlič, Zápis o výpovědi Miloslava Kavána, KS StB Hradec Králové 19. 7. 1952. ABS, f. Historický fond MV, sign. H-249 MV, Všeobecný svazek, Dálnopis adresovaný pražské Hlavní správě StB ve věci „teror Rudník“, KS StB Hradec Králové 18. 7. 1952.

37 Karel Vlček (1919) pocházel z Bohušovic nad Ohří, malé obce v sousedství terezínské pevnosti. Původním povoláním byl typograf. Do KSČ vstoupil už v roce 1936. Za Protektorátu se podílel na tištění *Rudého práva*, za což byl v dubnu 1942 zatčen a vyšetřován kladenským Gestapem. Začátkem r. 1943 byl transportován do koncentračního tábora Buchenwald, kde byl až do konce války. Ke StB, resp. k ZOB II nastoupil v únoru 1946. Ve funkci krajského velitele StB v Hradci Králové byl od počátku roku 1949 do konce listopadu 1952. ABS, spis ÚDV-13/VvK-97, Zjištěné obsazení náčelnických míst na správě StB Hradec Králové v letech 1948 – 1989, Praha 1. 6. 1999. ABS Brno - Kanice, f. Personální spisy příslušníků MV, arch. č. 3244/19, Karel Vlček, nar. 12. 9. 1919, Průběh služební doby. Návrh na pověření do funkce krajského velitele Národní bezpečnosti v kraji Hradec Králové, Praha 24. 1. 1951.

náboje. S neprůhlednými brýlemi na očích byli poté odvezeni do krajské věznice v Hradci Králové, zde byli předáni v 19 hodin.³⁸

Další zatýkácká skupina, kterou tvořili příslušníci StB Špičan a Hroch, už před polednem z povzdálí pozorovala dolnolánovskou kovárnu. Očekávali Alexandra Veselého, který sem mířil s balíčkem, jež obsahoval pistoli ráže 9 mm zn. Parabellum, náboje a asi dvoumetrový provaz se smyčkou na konci. O několik desítek minut později naložili překvapeného Alexandra do auta a dovezli do Heřmanových Sejfů do místnosti bývalé stanice SNB, kde už čekal krajský velitel Vlček. Netrvalo dlouho a vystrašený mladík začal vše přiznávat. Při domovní prohlídce potom příslušníci StB zabavili psací stroj ukradený v Rudníku, dvě staré vojenské pušky a dva výhrůžné dopisy připravené k odeslání v zalepených obálkách. Budovaný bunkr ve vedlejší zbouraném domku byl ihned hloupě prozrazen nataženým drátem elektrického vedení, díky kterému se v podzemní skrýši dalo svítit. Mladý Alexandr si dokonce v zápisníku nerozvážně dělal poznámky o tom, co by bylo třeba, aby skupina vykonala, poznamenával si možné objekty plánovaných útoků. Krom toho měl v zápisníku mnoho náčrtků přijímačů a vysílačů, potřebných ke zprovoznění utajené vysílačky. Večer byl předán do královéhradecké věznice.³⁹

Další den v sobotu byl zatčen Josef Pavlič. Do Lánova se pro něj z krajského velitelství vydal vstrm. Švenka, posily přibral ve Vrchlabí. Otec se synem zrovna sváželi v lese dřevo, čas byl zatím využit pro provedení domovní prohlídky. Devatenáctiletého Josefa posléze potkali na cestě, sundali jej z otcova koňského potahu, nechali převléknout a odvezli na stanici SNB v Rudníku. Toho dne však Pavlič nic neprozradil, večer byl předán do královéhradecké věznice.⁴⁰

Hned v pondělí 21. srpna vyrazil vstrm. Švenka s kolegou Vilímkem do Lánova znovu, tentokrát pro Jana Schejbala. Aby se zatčením vedoucího prodejny nenarušilo zásobování, dohodl vrchlabský velitel StB s ředitelstvím Jednoty okamžitou náhradu. Nový vedoucí však odmítl prodejnu převzít bez inventury, a tak musel převzetí podepsat Janův bratr Bohuslav.

38 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Benecký, Zpráva o průběhu zatčení, KS StB Hradec Králové 19. 7. 1952.

39 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Veselý, Zpráva o zatčení, KS StB Hradec Králové 18. 7. 1952.

40 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Pavlič, Zpráva o průběhu zatčení, KS StB Hradec Králové 19. 7. 1952.

Rovněž Jana Schejbala si večer převzali ve vyšetřovací věznici v Hradci Králové.⁴¹

Když se Farský dozvěděl o zatčení Gregora, skoro celou noc nespal a přemýšlel. Dospěl k názoru, že bude nejlépe, když se přihlásí do JZD, což také druhý den učinil. Zároveň podepsal hospodářsko-technickou úpravu půdy, tedy souhlas s rozoráním mezí.⁴² „*Asi před dvěma měsíci mě říkal, že ho odstranili z MNV, protože prý mu již nevěří, a naznačoval, že bude asi zajištěn. Poukazoval na to, že z každé obce ten, kdo brzdí utvoření JZD, je prý zajištěn a potrestán*“, vypověděl na sklonku srpna 1952 Farského přítel, hospodář Zvírotský. „*V posledním čase před jeho zatčením, říkal mi několi-krát, že počítá se svým zatčením, ale že stejně bude pomstěn a po převratu že bude osvobozen. Několikrát mi říkal, že podle hlášení zahraničního rozhlasu bude již brzy v ČSR převrat.*“⁴³ Ve čtvrtek 7. srpna o osmé ráno vyrazila čtveřice příslušníků StB (Košnar, Marek, Špičan a Švenka) z Hradce Králové do Vrchlabí. Po poradě s místním náčelníkem Hrochem se vydali do Dolního Lánova. Akci rozhodně nepodceňovali, provedli průzkum, načrtli grafický plánec, rozdělili si úkoly. Na dvoře usedlosti čp. 89 se právě mlátilo obilí, když sem v 10.30 hod. zatýkácí skupina dorazila. Zatímco zasahující příslušníci marně prohledávali stavení, hospodář Jiří Farský se umyl a převlékl do čistých šatů. Toho dne našli pouze prázdnou krabičku od nábojů a pouzdro od pistole. Po pěti dnech již Bezpečnost úkryt zbraně znala, zasloužil se o to konfident nasazený na stejnou celu. „*Své zatčení prý se vši určitostí již očekával [...] prý se stále přesvědčoval, že je pozorován a hlídán*“, hlásil také agent z Farského cely.⁴⁴


O způsobu vyšetřování jsme zpraveni díky dokumentům někdejšího sdružení bývalých politických vězňů K 231, jež byly na podzim 2008 po 40 letech vyzvednuty ze země v Bělé u Pecky. Jan Schejbal v roce 1968 popsal průběh vazby v královéhradecké vyšetřovací věznici: „*Jakmile jsem pak v noci usnul, již mně někdo kopl do dveří a byl jsem odveden opět k výslechu. Oči jsem měl vždy zavázány ručníkem. U výslechu jsem byl*

41 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Schejbal, Zpráva o průběhu zatčení, KS StB Hradec Králové 21. 7. 1952.

42 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Farský, Zápis o výpovědi z 20. 8. 1952.

43 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Skupinový spis, Protokol o výpovědi předvolaného Věroslava Zvírotského, KS StB Hradec Králové 27. 8. 1952.

44 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Podsvazek Farský, Zpráva o zatčení, KS StB Hradec Králové 7. 8. 1952. Protokoly o domovní prohlídce ze 7. a 12. 8. 1952. Agenturní zpráva Karla Glasera, Hradec Králové 9. 8. 1952.



Božena Farská u úkrytu v zahradě. Zdroj: ABS Praha

pak za obě ruce upoután mezi nohama kovovým poutem k židli, že jsem se nemohl hnouti. Když jsem odpovídal k nespokojenosti 'referenta', tloukl mne do hlavy, nebo hlavou o zeď, až se mi v očích jiskřilo. Ráno jsem byl odveden na celu a zase jsem musel celý den prochodit. Když jsem po několika dnech byl zcela zničen, začal jsem doznávat, proti pravdě, vše co 'referent' po mně chtěl." Tím skončilo fyzické týrání, jeho odevzdanost byla nadále udržována výhrůžkou zatčení členů rodiny.⁴⁵

Do přípravy procesu nebyla zahrnuta Miroslava Bierová. Důvod nám poodhaluje rukopisný přípis na zadní straně jejího výslechového protokolu: „*K osobě Bierové jest další operativní zájem.*“ StB jí po čas využívala jako informátora, později byla odsouzena v samostatném procesu.⁴⁶ Namísto ní byl do procesu začleněn Jaroslav Hofman (1931), absolvent střední průmyslové školy ve Dvoře Králové, zaměstnanec národního podniku Umělá

45 Národní archiv, f. KPV ČR (nezprac.), karton 121, složka Zápisy a výpovědi, Klubu 231 v Jičíně, Dolní Lánov 15. 8. 1968.

46 ABS, f. Historický fond MV, sign. H-249 MV, Všeobecný svazek, Zápis o výpovědi s Miroslavou Bierovou, KS StB Hradec Králové 15. 8. 1952. ABS, f. Agenturní svazky - centrála, arch. č. 939772 MV, Osobní svazek „Renata“, Zpráva o vázání z 18. 8. 1952. Závěr komise z provedené prověrky spolupracovníka č. 5369 krycí jméno Renata, OO MV Trutnov 8. 11. 1962.

vlákna v Rudníku a spolubydlící Jaroslava Beneckého. V červenci 1952 byl odveden k výkonu základní vojenské služby k útvaru Pohraniční stráž, o měsíc později byl zatčen za to, že se zúčastnil jedné z večerních schůzek a poukázal na to, že se v závodě pracuje se zlatými tryskami, které by se daly zpeněžit.⁴⁷

Prokurátor Mykiska předal soudu vypracovanou žalobu s datem 8. září 1952. Ve středu ráno 19. září 1952 stanula sedmičlenná „*ilegální teroristická skupina*“, za jejíž organizátory byli označeni Farský, Schejbal, Gregor a Benecký,⁴⁸ před senátem Státního soudu Praha, který přijel zasedat do Vrchlabí. Senát tvořili Bohumil Smola, Jan Hlavička, Josef Pišínský, Josef Sluka a Jan Řehák jako předseda. Státní prokuraturu zastupovala Ludmila Matušínková, které sekundoval trutnovský okresní prokurátor Jan Líbezný. Druhý den odpoledne byly vyneseny tři doživotní tresty a čtyři tresty odnětí svobody v rozmezí 7 až 20 let. Všichni byli odsouzeni pro velezradu. Jejich odvolání Nejvyšší soud pochopitelně zamítl a tak na každého z nich čekala řádka let strávená v pracovních táborech a věznicích komunistického Československa.⁴⁹

Jejich příběh je vyličením osudů lidí, kteří po válce využili možnosti, jež se naskytlá při osídlování pohraničí, k získání hospodářské usedlosti a lepšího životytí po odsunutých Němcích. Byli mezi nimi lidé ze sousedních okresů, ale i rodiny ze Slovenska a Volyně. Pocházely vesměs z neutěšených sociálních poměrů. Mnoho Volyňských Čechů, kteří přinášeli informace o skutečném životě v Sovětském svazu, už dříve varovalo před zakládáním sovětských kolchozů. Když se později začalo mluvit o společném hospodaření, o zakládání JZD po vzoru sovětských kolchozů, jejich postoj byl zcela odmítavý. Politiku komunistické strany, v rámci níž nejprve půdu dostali, začínali nenávidět, když se jí měli nyní vzdát. Přesvědčení o dočasnosti pouónorového režimu bylo silné. Farský, jenž po nějaký čas zaměstnával čeledína Bohouše prchajícího za hranice, měl od něho později obdržet dopis, v němž stálo, že „*ze zahraničí již brzy přijdou do ČSR a všechny*

47 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Osobní spis Hofman, Životopis, 3. 9. 1952; Tamtéž, Podsvazek Hofman, Protokol z 13. 8. 1952. Zpráva o průběhu zatčení, IV. odbor HS-VKR 9. 8. 1952.

48 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Vyhodnocení archivního svazku, Praha 24. 5. 1966.

49 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Skupinový spis, Žaloba 7 Spt I 128/52-1 z 8. 9. 1952. Protokol o hlavním líčení a Rozsudek 5 Ts I 65/52 z 20. 9. 1952. Protokol o odvolacím líčení To III 234/52 z 6. 2. 1953.

komunisty pobíjí“.⁵⁰ Podobně vyznívaly i relace vysílané zahraničními rozhlasovými stanicemi. Aktivní odpor vesničanů v českém Podkrkonoší vůči realizaci komunistické strategie kolektivizovat československý venkov je v tomto ohledu přirozený. Nově příchozí obyvatelé viděli v cestě do pohraničí možnost pozvednutí svých životních poměrů. Možná o to více se potom někteří z nich prosazování kolektivizace, která je měla připravit o nabytý majetek i postavení, vzpírali. Fiktivní založení JZD, výhrůžné dopisy i ozbrojené zastrašování funkcionářů JZD a KSČ na Vrchlabsku jsou toho příkladem.

Summary

Subjugation of countryside by violent collectivization and resistance against it is the main theme of the contribution. The example of people from the Vrchlábí region in the East-Bohemia the author tries to answer the question of what kinds of form the resistance against collectivization itself could take, where were its roots, what were the limits of its success, and what the reaction aroused in the structures of the Communist-controlled state apparatus. Strategy of subjection of the intractable countryside through the violent collectivization was one of the main parts of the general plan of building socialism in Czechoslovakia. Author's contribution approaches the active resistance of the villagers to implement this Communist strategy in the Czech foothills of the Giant Mountains, describes the reaction of administrative and political bodies and security forces to it as well as existential implications arising for his actors.

50 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací spisy Hradec Králové, sign. V-450 HK, Skupinový spis, Protokol o výpovědi předvolaného Věroslava Zvírotského, KS StB Hradec Králové 27. 8. 1952. Tamtéž, Podsvazek Farský, Agenturní zpráva Karla Glasera, Hradec Králové 11. 8. 1952.

Conflict in the Countryside: Peasants, Resistance and the Romanian Communist State during Collectivization, 1949 – 1953

Catalin CRISTOLOVEANU

The historical narrative of Communism focuses predominantly on the actions, decrees and power struggles of political actors. This focus illustrates the course of historical events through the narrow prism of the leading elite. Such an approach, despite its merits, fails to account for the majority of the population whose constituents are not members of an elite political grouping. Subsequently, many of these studies portray Romanian society as a malleable entity that merely reflects the implementation of state policies and suffers from the whims of its leaders. These conclusions, however, bolster the Cold War era theories of totalitarianism by projecting and maintaining the image of a dominant, monolithic state, which controls the masses and renders them powerless.¹ These theories depict the top down process of rule, generally failing to recognize that the process symbolizes a reciprocal relationship, also operating from the bottom up.

1 ARENDT, H.: *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York 1958, pp. 305 – 511. Arendt is one of the pioneers in the study of totalitarianism. In 1951 *The Origins of Totalitarianism* analyzed, in detail, the intricacies and idiosyncrasies of totalitarian rule, focusing especially on the Nazi and the Soviet regimes. Part three of the book, entitled *Totalitarianism*, lays out the ways in which the totalitarian movements organized and entrenched themselves into their respective societies through the use of ideology, by creating an idealized future and perfecting an efficient bureaucratic machine led by the secret police.

The study of resistance and its array of responses to official state policies, which contrast the predominant approach; demonstrates more clearly the complexities of Communist society. The political leaders unquestionably had a powerful impact on the course of historical events, but operated within a Communist world that required manpower and the implementation of policies by complex levels of bureaucracy. In other words, the leaders depended on millions of people to fulfill their plans and further the goals of the Socialist state. Though in theory, changing and shaping the actions and mentalities of people seems attainable, the realities on the ground do not always correspond to theory. The following study aims to show how the peasantry in Romania actively resisted the official state policy of collectivization through rebellions and the spreading of anti-state rumors, how it negotiated the terms by manipulating the terms of the process to its advantage, and grudgingly accommodating itself to the changing landscape of agriculture in Communist society. In doing so, the focus will center on active resistance during the first four years of collectivization in the country, representing the initial and most contested period of a process that declared its completion only in 1962.

The study's source base includes official documentation that describes how peasants acted and reacted. Some documents relate in detail the workings of rebellions, the perceived atmosphere among the peasantry and second-hand reiterations of the words that peasants used. The current study's analysis rests on two compilations of official documentation, organized and redacted by Octavian Roske and Dan Catanus. Both collections refer specifically to the 1949-1953 period, with one focusing on the legislative aspect of collectivization and the other on repression; this one containing detailed police reports and the most frequently used of the two. Methodologically, the documents offer rich materials, but the aforementioned editors have intentionally and selectively organized them according to their own wishes.²

Depending on official police records of the Securitate to write about the peasantry contains inherent limits in interpretation. The documents, nevertheless, provide a valuable insight into the realities witnessed on the ground and also illustrate the ways in which state ideology operated in the minds of those who wrote the documents. The critical eye must extend incisively into police records and understand that, according to Lynne

2 Time and travel limitations necessarily limited the breadth of the study's research to these two collections.

Viola, these records were formed according to the observer's intentions, and not those of the observed.³ Variables enmeshing local, regional and state demands with individual perceptions further complicate the picture. One must remember, however, that in the first years of collectivization in Romania, the state apparatus, still in its proverbial 'infancy' lacked the finely-tuned mechanisms of bureaucratic repression that later characterized it. The RCP, having increased in numbers from roughly 1,000 members in 1944 to over 700,000 in 1947, exhibited difficulties in "*controlling the behavior of thousands of activists who appeared overnight.*"⁴ Thus, the party's consolidation suffered because of the inadequate training of party cadres and police informers in the Communist apparatus; many of which most likely "*had home villages and grandmothers who were hardly inured to the great Soviet project,*" just as Lynne Viola posits in her study of 1930s' Soviet Russia.⁵ In other words, these early documents illustrate events through a lens that was less distorted by Communist terminology than documents from later years, revealing at times juxtapositions that contradict official policy.

These documents may ultimately describe some of the peasantry's fears and hopes, dreams and their realizations – through the actions they performed and the words they reportedly used then, even if this story is discovered, analyzed and recorded six decades after the fact. The current study, however, does not romanticize resistance. The increased publication in post-'89 Romania of memoirs written by anti-Communist fighters in the Carpathian Mountains, as well as the focus on oral history; interviewing survivors who fought Communist forces or lent a helping hand, dispels the myth of complete passivity in Communist Romania. In doing so, these studies exaggerate occasionally the impact of resistance movements. Dennis Deletant, a political historian of Romanian Communism, describes the efforts to exaggerate the importance and heroism of anti-Communist fighters as "*important in re-establishing self-esteem and national honour*"

3 VIOLA, L.: *Contending with Stalinism: Soviet Power and Popular Resistance in the 1930s*. Ithaca 2002, p. 27. She borrows her ideas from Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese.

4 VERDERY, K.: Chiaburii vechi si noi: inchiaburirea si deschiaburirea taranilor din Aurel Vlaicu. In: DOBRINCU, D. – IORDACHI, C. (eds.): *Taranimea si Puterea: Procesul de colectivizare a agriculturii in Romania, 1949 – 1962*. Iasi 2005, p. 350.

5 VIOLA, L.: *Contending with Stalinism: Soviet Power and Popular Resistance in the 1930s*, p. 12.

after the brutal years of Ceausescu.⁶ The tendency to show that resistance existed, however, sometimes leads to undesirable results. A number of scholars studying resistance have glorified political alternatives to Communism, such as Fascism and Ion Antonescu's military dictatorship during World War II. Fascism in its Iron Guard form surely motivated some peasants to instantly rebel against Communism, but one should not also assume that many of those who resisted were in fact influenced by political motivations. As the study will show, much of the peasantry resisted because of mostly tangible and apolitical reasons.

Resistance and Collectivization: Definitions

Resistance

The concept of resistance appears nebulous at first sight. Speaking or writing about resistance assumes a binary distinction between two separate spheres; one of power and one that resists power through various means and with an assortment of intentions. This distinction leads further into the state-society bifurcation, in which the 'state' corresponds ultimately with the implementation of power and society with resistance. In his *History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*, Michel Foucault defines power however, not as an institution, a structure, or a strength possessed by a certain group, but as "*a complex strategical situation in a particular society [...] produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another.*"⁷ Understanding power as a fluid network of force relations, Foucault clarifies that "*resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power*", but instead a "*plurality of resistance [...] can only exist in the strategic field of power relations*".⁸ Though totalitarianism theories have depicted Communism as a dual world of powerful and weak, dominant and dominated, Foucault portrays more clearly the mutability of power and the possibility of cleavages in seemingly monolithic systems.

6 DELETANT, D.: Romania, 1945 – 1989: Resistance, Protest and Dissent. In: MCDERMOTT, K. – STIBBE, M. (eds.): *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule*. Oxford 2006, p. 86.

7 FOUCAULT, M.: *History of Sexuality: Volume 1, An Introduction*. New York 1990, p. 93.

8 *Ibid.*, pp. 95 – 96.

Lynne Viola, a prominent historian of Soviet Russia, defines resistance as a phenomenon that encapsulates “[...] a wide continuum of societal responses” and “involves opposition—active, passive, artfully disguised, attributed, and even inferred”.⁹ Some of the specific acts, which comprise these categories, range from assassinations, arson, and demonstrations to foot-dragging, negligence, and sabotage.¹⁰ Viola’s definition describes peasant reactions to collectivization in the 1930s Soviet Union, combining previous conceptualizations of resistance: E. P. Thompson, whose studies of peasant-led food ‘riots’ in eighteenth-century England revealed a “moral economy” that legitimated violent action¹¹; and Jim Scott, who wrote of generally non-violent, passive, “everyday forms of resistance” in Malaysia.¹² For the purposes of the current study, Viola’s definition can also extend to Communist Romania, a country that experienced a similar implementation of the Soviet collectivization model. The definition, however, does not imply that conditions and results within Romania reflected those of the Soviet Union, but rather points to the affinities between the two countries and their common precept of central planning in agriculture, which emanated from the Communist state.

The current study considers resistance, as witnessed in Romania during the first four years of collectivization, as a type of confrontational negotiation between the state and the peasantry. The state attempted to dictate Socialism onto the peasantry, while the peasantry negotiated the terms of that imposition. This negotiation proceeded on unequal levels, but as will be shown, this occurrence did not necessarily circumscribe peasant action. Though the state approached collectivization paternalistically, it feared widespread resistance and, at times, demonstrated pragmatic attempts to appease the discontented crowds. The process initially exhibited active

9 VIOLA, L.: *Contending with Stalinism: Soviet Power and Popular Resistance in the 1930s*, pp. 1 – 19 contain a detailed discussion of resistance as a concept and the difficulties in finding an exact and satisfactory definition for it.

10 *Ibid.*, pp. 18 – 19.

11 THOMPSON, E. P.: *Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century*. In: *Past and Present*, No. 50, 1971, pp. 76 – 136. On page 78, Thompson claims this moral economy was led “by the belief that they were defending traditional rights or customs; and, in general, that they were supported by the wider consensus of the community...[a] consensus so strong that it overrode motives of fear or deference.”

12 SCOTT, J.: *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven 1985. On page 6, Scott explains that he seeks to understand what the peasantry does ‘between revolts’ to defend its interests.

violence and repression and then passive forms of resistance later on. Not all peasants rebelled. Some grudgingly accepted the changes while others welcomed Socialism. The peasantry's relative visions of what the 'good life' meant during pre-Socialist times, in contrast to living conditions under the Communist regime contained regional and individual variations. In her 1994 study on peasant resistance to collectivization in Soviet Russia, Sheila Fitzpatrick refers to the good life as a "*repertoire of images of the good life on which to draw [...] and that at any time [the peasants] chose the image they thought most appropriate to the circumstances.*"¹³ Though she depicts this image as an "*imaginative construct rather than historical reality,*" she nevertheless believes that "*it was a construct that existed in the minds of Russian peasants, not just the minds of anthropologists.*"¹⁴ In the Romanian case, the image of the "good life" included recurring motifs that many rebellious peasants perceived legitimated their action. These motifs centred on property, land, social relations and subsistence; principles many believed that the state had violated through its forceful imposition.

The Communist state; whose system spread unevenly across an ethnically, socially and economically diverse country, encountered difficulties in implementing its plan to collectivize the country. Its excessive use of repression both caused, and resulted from, acts of resistance. While the Communist state expected resistance to occur as an inevitable tenet of class struggle, it nevertheless dubbed many ambiguous actions as being directed purposely against the state. The Romanian Communist state's power has been portrayed generally as monolithic, but in the first four years of collectivization it encountered intense peasant resistance and deficiencies in its bureaucratic pyramid. This was by no means a uniform phenomenon, but widespread enough to delay the completion of the project until 1962. Ultimately, studying peasant resistance to collectivization, in this manner, reveals a fragmented world in which fissures expanded over time and potentially contributed to the system's implosion.

Collectivization

Before illustrating resistance, however, the term collectivization itself demands a suitable definition. Most scholars believe that the Romanian

13 FITZPATRICK, S.: *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization*. New York 1994, p. 9.

14 Ibid.

Workers Party, originally known as the Romanian Communist Party, saw collectivization as a necessary process in consolidating its power and grip on the Romanian people, both as a way to engineer new relationships to labor, land and between people¹⁵, as also to “[generate] capital for the breakneck industrialization drive soon imposed by the Soviets, which was to be financed by obtaining a ‘Socialist accumulation’ from (presumably) increased agricultural supplies.”¹⁶ Thus, collectivization assumed a double importance of transforming a mostly agrarian country, whose population, most scholars agree, was anywhere from seventy to eighty percent rural, and of making these farmers into producers for the state by destroying traditional conceptions of individual property and ownership. Dennis Deletant, a scholar of Communist political life and terror in Romania, claims that the RCP believed the process to be “the main and most difficult task in the construction of Socialism.”¹⁷ Though the Communist state based its existence and ideology on the urban-industrial environment and its workers, it devoted considerable attention to agriculture and peasant life. One may claim that the numerical and traditional preponderance of villages and peasants in Romania¹⁸ represented the majority of the country’s population, thus further amplifying the ambitiousness of an already colossal project.

The Communist state sought to destroy private property and to amass peasant land under its control. David Kideckel, an ethnographer who spent a considerable amount of time conducting field work in Romania during the 1970s and 1980s, claims that: “Lacking industry, the state had to get capital for development initially by nationalizing and collectivizing agricultural property and channeling private agricultural production into its own hands.”¹⁹ This meant changing the aspect of one’s work from either subsistence farming for a household or employing labor in order to gain capital, to working specifically for the state, which controlled the products of labor in a state farm, *gospodarie agricola de stat* (GAS), or in a collective

15 KIDECKEL, D.: *The Solitude of Collectivism: Romanian Villagers to the Revolution and Beyond*. Ithaca 1993, pp. 55 – 56 and 80 – 81.

16 LEVY, R.: *Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist*. Berkeley 2001, p. 97.

17 DELETANT, D.: *Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948 – 1965*. New York 1999, p. 136.

18 The estimate for 1948 was that, out of a total population of 16 million, 12 million were rural. DOBRINCU, D. – IORDACHI, C. (eds.): *Taranimea si Puterea*, p. 17.

19 KIDECKEL, D.: *The Solitude of Collectivism*, p. 56.

farm, *gospodarie agricola colectiva* (GAC).²⁰ By changing the products and the results of labour, the state also changed the relationship that peasants had with their work.

Class Struggle in the Village: Before and During Socialism

The state did not limit itself to changing the peasants' relationship with work, but also intended to change relationships between the peasants themselves. The collectivization project depended on the Socialist idea of class struggle. According to the plenary of 3-5 March 1949, which officially set in motion the collectivization drive that would last until 1962, "*the main obligation of our work in the countryside consists of limiting capitalist exploitation and preparing conditions for the Socialist organization of agriculture, in order to ensure the flourishing of agriculture and a raised standard of living for the working peasantry [...] the vital interests of the poor peasantry guide them to the forefront of the struggle against the exploitation of the bourgeoisie in the villages and in favor of the Socialist transformation of agriculture.*"²¹ The plenary further outlined the poor and middle peasantry's role in the Socialist transformation by claiming that, "[t]he poor peasantry is the main ally of the working class, of the Romanian Workers Party in the countryside," while "[t]he middle peasantry is allied with the working class. It can be and must be attracted to the opera of constructing Socialism".²² The class struggle against *chiaburi*, the Romanian word for kulak, thus had to follow the construction of social classes in the countryside.

Yet, one must ask if a stark social differentiation existed in the Romanian village before the onset of Communism and whether the idea of class struggle resonated with those considered middle or poor peasants. According to David Kideckel's micro-study of the Olt Land villages in Transylvania; social networks between villagers before the Socialist period and slightly less so during it, were widely influenced by godparent-

20 The GAC was later called the CAP (cooperative agricole de productie) and the GAS was later called IAS (intreprinderi agricole de stat).

21 Rezolutia Sedintei Plenare a C.C. al P.M.R. Din 3-5 Martie Asupra Sarcinilor Partidului In Lupta Pentru Intarirea Aliantei Clasei Muncitoare Cu Taranimea Muncitoare Si Pentru Transformarea Socialista A Agriculturii. In: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Dimensiunea Politica, 1949 - 1953*. Bucuresti 2000, pp. 101 - 102.

22 Ibid., pp. 102 - 103.

hood, which “*transferred resources from the wealthy to the less affluent but related the sponsors to the sponsored as patrons to clients. The two wealthiest landowners in Hirseni sponsored seven and five families each, all of whom served as ready labour during intense agricultural activity.*”²³ In addition to these social networks that bound communities together, Kideckel claims that, “*Labour was the raison d’être of the pre-Socialist period, a symbol of individual identity [...] Individuals and households were judged by the quality of their labour [which symbolized] the prime criterion of respect.*”²⁴ As long as one worked hard and honestly, they gained the respect of other peasants regardless of their wealth. Wealth, however, endowed those who possessed it with visible prestige and with important positions within the community. Though Kideckel does not intend to idealize this picture of interwar pre-Socialist life, he believes that these factors, among others, contributed to a “*grudging acceptance of economic differences*” between peasants, who nevertheless considered the pre-Socialist period as a time “*as good as they ever had*”.²⁵

In a similar ethnographic study conducted during the 1970s in the village of Ieud, Maramures, a separate area from the Olt Land, Gail Kligman arrives at the same conclusions: “*Fellow villagers generally considered these ‘class enemies of the state’ [chiaburi] hard-working; they also accorded an idealized historical respect to the chiaburi because they were descendents of nemesi [nobles]. The chiaburi were godparents to numerous families of poor peasants.*”²⁶ Though these two studies reveal a similar phenomenon of social relationships, one cannot claim that they depict social uniformity in a variegated and largely heterogeneous country. The current study does not doubt that exploitation existed in parts of the country different from Olt Land and Maramures, but instead questions the validity of applying Communism’s social construct to the countryside. In using this knowledge of social relations in the pre-Socialist village, one can gauge more easily the seeming contradictions, as perceived by official, state observers, of peasant alliances that arose in villages during the 1949 – 1953 period, as a direct result of repressive state measures, such as forced collections of prohibitive quotas and the forced establishment of collective farms. These were seen

23 KIDECKEL, D.: *The Solitude of Collectivism*, p. 44.

24 *Ibid.*, pp. 46 – 47.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 50.

26 KLIGMAN, G.: *The Wedding of the Dead: Ritual, Poetics, and Popular Culture in Transylvania*. Berkeley 1988, p. 27.

as contradictions by state observers because they believed that poor and middle peasants would willingly join in the repression against chiaburi, but in many cases the opposite happened.

The Timeline of Collectivization: A Useful Periodization

Robert Levy, a historian whose political biography of Ana Pauker gained him considerable attention among scholars of Romanian history, divides the years 1949-1953 into five separate stages.²⁷ His division of time provides a useful periodization for understanding fluctuations in the process, as affected by internecine power struggles and errors in policy implementation. Levy states that the first stage encompassed the period of March 1949-February 1950, characterized by prudence and which resulted in attracting mostly poor, landless farmers, in an attempt to attract peasants to join collective farms of their own accord.²⁸

The second stage witnessed results largely below expectations as a result of the failure of the initial period. The Agrarian Commission wished to create an additional 1,000 collective farms, a request that the Commission's President Ana Pauker, Levy shows, considered senseless.²⁹ As he claims earlier in his biography of her, Pauker "*kept a tight lid on collectivization*" because she disagreed on several issues both with the Soviet Commission and with other members of the RCP, notably Gheorghiu-Dej; she believed the process should be slow and considered "*mechanization (and thus industrialization) as a prerequisite to collectivization, even though the Stalinist line suggested the opposite.*"³⁰ Though Levy may wish to overemphasize Pauker's role in tempering the collectivization process as a way to positively alter her negative legacy, his critique reiterates that Pauker represented a voice of reason on the issue. Dennis Deletant arrives at similar conclusions concerning Pauker's stance on the issue, but he attributes her caution to "*fear of peasant discontent,*" while Levy remains remarkably muted on ascribing a motive behind her prudent actions.³¹

27 LEVY, R.: Primul val al colectivizării: politici centrale și implementare regională, 1949 – 1953. In: DOBRINCU, D. – IORDACHI, C. (eds.): *Taranimea și Puterea*. Iași 2005, pp. 66 – 82.

28 Ibid., pp. 67 – 69.

29 Ibid., p. 72.

30 LEVY, R.: *Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall*, pp. 99 – 103.

31 DELETANT, D.: *Communist Terror in Romania*, p. 137.

Nonetheless, the third stage occurred from June 1950 to September 1950, a period in which Pauker's absence due to breast cancer allowed those in the RCP and the Agrarian Section replacing the Commission, to enact a second wave of collectivization based on force. According to Levy and Deletant, this unleashed an avalanche of forced collectivization, with the Securitate forces using violent coercion and threats to enrol peasants in collective farms. Both claim that the wave of repression led to severe peasant discontent.³² Additionally, RCP changed its attitude concerning *chiaburi* and, instead of accepting land donations from them as had occurred in previous stages, they now permitted and encouraged massive land confiscations.³³ Communist cadres and activists took it upon themselves to enact the RCP's decrees.

In the fourth stage, October 1950 – January 1952, Levy claims that Pauker's return to Romania after her cancer treatment in Moscow, led to the RCP halting forced collectivization.³⁴ The focus of this period consisted of consolidating the collectives already established and eliminating abuse, to which Deletant adds that "*Dej, too, showed himself critical of the abuses committed*", but goes on to say that "*such displays of regret can only strike the reader as cynical, since the Central Committee archives show quite clearly that the party leadership knew full well*" the extent of the devastating repression that occurred.³⁵ Nonetheless, the internal strife transpiring within the RCP soon transformed into renewed repression and 'class struggle' against *chiaburi* during the fifth stage, as the 'right-deviationists' of Pauker, Georgescu and Luca were purged and accused of "delaying collectivization".³⁶ The unexpected death of Stalin in 1953 put a temporary stop to collectivization, a process that would be forcefully renewed in the late 1950s and completed in 1962.

32 Ibid., p. 138.

33 LEVY, R.: Primul val al colectivizarii, p. 73. DELETANT, D.: *Communist Terror in Romania*, p. 139.

34 LEVY, R.: Primul val al colectivizarii, p. 74.

35 Ibid., p. 75; DELETANT, D.: *Communist Terror in Romania*, p. 140.

36 LEVY, R.: Primul val al colectivizarii, p. 76. Though other charges existed, Levy and other scholars agree that anti-Semitism played a significant role in Pauker's purge.

Quotas and Collections: A Contradiction

The state tried to alter social relations among peasants by implementing an uneven quota and collection system that set in motion the purported class struggle. Some scholars, such as Octavian Roske, have referred to this procedure as a type of “war Communism”.³⁷ According to one’s standing in the class system, the state required a certain amount of the total harvest and grains for which the peasantry would pay in kind and receive meager monetary reimbursement.³⁸ Though the requisitions varied, they nevertheless intended to achieve three objectives: the political; to debilitate the ‘enemy’ class in the countryside by requisitioning most of his harvest; the economical; to easily obtain much needed grains and to use state money to invest in industry instead of agriculture; and the social; to feed the cities and maintain low food prices and wages for the workers.³⁹ In order to illustrate the multi-faceted political connotations of the collections, one must look no further than Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the General Secretary of the RCP and his statement in 1950 during a Central Committee meeting, describing the importance of convincing peasants that the collection system meant, “*an obligation to the state [...] a patriotic duty.*”⁴⁰ These obligations, however, invariably affected not only chiaburi, but also poor and middle peasants.

Examples of the excessive quota rates abound in official documentation. Consider, for instance, the 1951 Ialomita county Securitate report on collections, which claims that, “*the poor peasant Aurel Chirita from the commune Radu Negru, Calarasi raion, with 14 members in his family, harvested 1,152 kilograms of wheat, delivered the entire harvest to the State as required quota.*”⁴¹ The document goes on to state that most poor and middle peasants from the same commune delivered their entire harvest to the state and that, “*approximately 50 other poor and middle peasants [...]*

37 ROSKE, O.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea, Vol. 1, 1949 – 1953.* Bucuresti 2004, p. 12.

38 Ibid., p. 11.

39 Ibid., pp. 11 – 12.

40 GHEORGHIU-DEJ, G.: Sedinta Secretariatului din 2 ianuarie 1950. In: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Dimensiunea Politica, 1949 – 1953.* Bucuresti 2000, p. 132.

41 Raport al Directiei Regionale a Securitatii Ialomita catre Directia Generala a Securitatii Statului, privind stadiul executarii planului de colectari. August 25, 1951. In: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea, Vol. 1, 1949 – 1953,* Bucuresti 2004, p. 334.

*do not have anything left to eat and that their situation is even more grave because the corn harvest in the fields has been completely compromised.*⁴² This commune's circumstances reflect similar conditions in the entire country, and demonstrate the destitution that resulted from the quota system of collections.

Furthermore, though the state intended the quotas to target chiaburi as a precept of class struggle, its uneven implementation led, in some cases, to poor and middle peasants sympathizing with chiaburi, or in others, to a collective suffering that went beyond class differences and antagonisms. As can be gathered from an array of Securitate documents, most poor and middle peasants allied with chiaburi. As will be described in the following section, poor and middle peasants rebelled alongside chiaburi and, in some cases, even defended them against state forces, during the widespread disturbances recorded across the country as a direct result of the forced collections in 1949 – 1950.

Active Rebellions in the Countryside: Against Quotas

Though Robert Levy and some scholars wish to see the period 1949 – 1950, or Levy's first stage, as one characterized by prudence in establishing collective farms, the same cannot be claimed for the wave of forced collections that swept the country. The enforcement of quotas and the legal decrees that severely punished refusals to deliver agricultural goods set in motion a period marked by intense disturbances. Some of the punishments for hoarding grain ranged from one to twelve years' jail time, as well as exorbitant fines ranging from 10,000 to 100,000 lei.⁴³ The peasant refusals to deliver grain and other agricultural products, and to work for the state, led to rebellions in the Bihor and Vlasca region, as well as Arad, Nasaud, and Radauti counties.

The Nasaud revolt in the Lunca Ilvei commune stands as the first recorded incident, occurring on the night of 5 – 6 May 1949. In a document recorded on May 6 by the local Securitate forces, containing a table with personal descriptions, nine members of the commune allegedly attacked

42 Ibid.

43 ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Dimensiunea Politica, 1949 – 1953*. Bucuresti 2000, p. 34.

and beat the local secretary of the RCP and an additional party member.⁴⁴ Of the nine accused; four belonged to the chiabur class, two were middle peasants, two were poor peasants, and the remaining accomplice belonged to neither. The document contains information pertaining to what each peasant owned, what his or her political orientation consisted of, and each peasant's involvement in the incident. It nevertheless does not directly attempt to establish the motivations of the accused.

In Arad county, a much more widespread disturbance took place, enveloping the communes of Sepreus, Apateu, Berechiu, Motiori, and Somosches. Having prepared beforehand the ways in which to apprehend the rebels responsible, Securitate "Comandament Unic" forces organized a swift, concentrated effort to put an end to the disturbance.⁴⁵ According to the document written on 3 August 1949, Securitate forces arrested 57 members in Sepreus and identified but did not detain 21 others.⁴⁶ In Apateu commune, 22 members were arrested, in Berechiu 18, in Motiori 10 and in Somosches only 4. Altogether, 111 peasants were arrested as a result of the rebellions, out of which another document claims 33 suffered punitive deportation.⁴⁷ Ten peasants were executed because "they tried to run and did not obey the legal summons."⁴⁸ In the documents, the language used does not mention execution, but instead uses the word 'suprimare,' a word whose English translation most closely resembles the act of 'crossing out' or liquidating something. According to Octavian Roske, the editor of *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea, 1949 – 1953*; the Securitate executed those ten peasants, not because they attempted to

44 Lotul compus din Slavoaca Constantin, Cioanca Ion si altii care au comis acte de agresiune in noaptea de 5/6 mai 1949, in comuna Lunca Ilvei. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, pp. 72 – 74.

45 Plan de lucru, ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4638, f. 19 – 22. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, pp. 74 – 76.

46 Tabele nominale cu participantii la rascoala din comunele Sepreus, Apateu, Berechiu, Motiori, Somosches, jud. Arad, August 3, 1949. ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4638, f. 23 – 33. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea, Vol. 1, 1949 – 1953*, pp. 76 – 82.

47 Tabel cu evacuati din statia Cermei, imbarcati in ziua de 3 august 1949, August 3, 1949. ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4638, f. 34, In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, pp. 82 – 83.

48 Plan de lucru, ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4638, f. 19 – 22. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, pp. 75 – 76.

flee, but instead as a way to intimidate other peasants.⁴⁹ Roske's statement comes from an interview conducted with the priest Iosif Stoica, witness to the events, who claimed that, "the bodies of the executed were displayed in the street for two days and two nights, and everyone was forbidden from approaching them."⁵⁰ The majority of the participants to the rebellion consisted of chiaburi and middle peasants; the documents identify chiaburi and middle peasants, but refrain from labelling some as poor peasants. Instead, they list some peasants and their holdings without ascribing them a class.

In comparison to the previous descriptions of the Nasaud rebellion, the Arad county documents contained descriptions of various ambiguous acts that were nevertheless considered criminal. A number of the 'organizers' did not actively participate in the violence against party members and the cooperative; instead, they "*morally supported the rebellion*", "*incited the population against the party*", "*approved of the rebellion*", "*screamed that all party members should be killed*", and one was even "*suspected of being an Adventist*".⁵¹ A closer look at the documents reveals the suspicion of officials that there existed an active organizational force behind the rebellion, with some of them arrested for merely tolling the church bell in order to attract the communes' peasants. In such a tense environment, every action, word, or even glance could become political and therefore, threatening to the regime. Official terminology, therefore, poses interpretive problems for the ease with which an act could become sabotage. In the case of the Arad incidents of work stoppage, violent rebellion and "anarchic threshing," the repression that followed reveals that the incident was not considered a minor one.⁵²

Though both of these incidents may seem minor in comparison to the much more violent upheaval in Bihor and Vlasca that followed, they nonetheless point to the source of peasants' frustration: the party. In Nasaud,

49 ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, p. 45.

50 Iosif Stoica; quoted In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, p. 46.

51 Tabele nominale cu participantii la rascoala din comunele Sepreus, Apateu, Berechiu, Motiori, Somosches, jud. Arad, August 3, 1949. ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4638, f. 23 – 33. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Vol. 1, 1949 – 1953, pp. 77 – 78.

52 Plan de lucru, ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4638, f. 19 – 22. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, p. 74.

the attackers assaulted the local secretary and another party member because even though the two were locals, they embodied the party that had disrupted their life as they knew it. In Arad, the same conclusions can be drawn, as in the case of the August incidents, in which only party members and property suffered attacks. These incidents reveal a widening gap between what the peasants perceived as rightfully their own, the products of their labor and the state's rigid demands and its consequences among the peasantry. Additionally, the mixture of social classes responsible for the so-called rebellions does not necessarily point to an alliance between the peasants but rather that widespread feelings of discontent were felt among most of the peasantry in those regions, regardless of social standing or personal wealth.

The revolt in the Bihor region in the early days of August 1949 expanded across almost thirty communes and involved hundreds of peasants. Its unfolding and repression witnessed calamitous results. This revolt, however, can be more readily studied because of the extensively detailed police and Securitate reports that surfaced after it occurred. The official version of the events, written on 12 August 1949, contains the apparent causes of the rebellion, actions of the peasants and the violent repression that followed.⁵³ According to the document, six counter-revolutionary actions occurred, in which *“chiaburi refused to deliver their grain to the collectors and instigated the middle and poor peasants to do the same”*, *“committed acts of terror against party members and state organs”*, *“destroyed state institutions and telephone lines”*, *“set on fire the threshing machines”*, *“attacked the convoys carrying cereal to collection centers”*, and *“threatened to set on fire the cereal storage depot”*.⁵⁴ The document outlined four causes of the counter-revolutionary actions, claiming that the rebellion was caused by *“subversive organizations in the regions”*, *“a lack of vigilance on the part of Securitate forces, who knew about the subversive organizations and plans but took no measures to find and arrest its members”*, *“weak political work conducted by party members in the villages”* and that, *“state organs had no knowledge of the situation in the counties, allowing instigators to unfurl*

53 Studiu informativ asupra actiunilor contrarevolutionare chiaburesti din judetele Bihor-Arad, August 12, 1949. ASRI, Fond “D”, dosar nr. 4638, f. 66 – 90. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, pp. 104 – 118. Unlike other documents, this version does not have an author, signature, nor does it signal which branch of the state formulated it.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 105.

their actions.”⁵⁵ Though these reasons may seem plausible at first sight, they nonetheless obscure the more likely causes of the rebellion. Paradoxically, the document describes the motivations of the peasants in its detailed description of the events and especially in the slogans purportedly uttered by the participants.

That the peasants resented delivering their grain to the state should come as no surprise, an admission even the document makes, citing it as the first cause of the rebellions. Reading more carefully, one sees that the peasants uttered slogans that belied their immediate desires, to be “*paid in kind and not in cash during harvest and threshing season*”, or “[*w*]e don’t need much talk, but flour and oil”, and that they: “[*W*]on’t work for money, only for grain. We don’t want the kolkhoz. We don’t need Communism. Kill the leader.”⁵⁶ A similar and even more evocative slogan came from a group of women who surrounded the commission of the Temporary Committee in Osand, Bihor and with cornflour in their hand, screaming that, “*we would rather set the grains on fire than deliver the required quotas and we will chop with an axe those who force us to do that.*”⁵⁷ These slogans shed light on the idea that peasants had the immediate need to feed their families – they believed that the state’s money could not buy much.

One of the most intriguing aspects of this document’s description deals with the influence of the *chiaburi* on the poor and middle peasants, who allegedly instigated them to join the rebellions. The document maintains that the rebellions had an organized plan at their base and that the *chiaburi* waited to unleash the rebellion during harvest season, “*when the complaints of the peasants could be more easily manipulated [...] when the issue of grain deliveries and payments for agricultural work [was most accentuated].*”⁵⁸ Considering, however, the collections that targeted peasants from all three walks of life, as well as the previously mentioned slogans coming from peasants, one can claim that, in fact, poor, middle and wealthy peasants were unified against the state. The official tendency to rationalize the allegiances of the poor and middle peasants as depending on outside influence coming from either the state, through *munca de lamurire*, meaning explanatory, indoctrinating work, or from *chiaburi*,

55 Ibid., p. 106.

56 Ibid., pp. 108 – 110.

57 Ibid., p. 111.

58 Ibid., p. 105.

does not allow those poor and middle peasants any room for personal motivations or for autonomous actions.

In actuality, the document exposes its inherent contradictions and reveals that: “*Exploitative elements, indifferent to which nationalities they belong, and in order to maintain their positions, unite [...] in their hate against the R.P.R.*”⁵⁹ The document goes on to say later that in several communes, hundreds of peasants, “*of which the majority were poor*” manifested, exclaiming: “*Do not take away the chiaburi, who gave us white bread, and we lived well when we worked for them, because we will kill the notary first, and after that all of the leaders in the commune.*”⁶⁰ The quotation brings to mind David Kideckel’s study of the peasants in the Olt Land, a region located in a different part of the country from Bihor, stressing the close relations between peasants of all economic standings, as well as the respect for one’s hard work and wealth. Recalling the importance of godparent-hood in some regions, however, it is possible that some chiaburi wielded their influence over poor peasants to manipulate them into joining the rebellions. Yet, this occurrence does not refute the actions that occurred directly against the state or preclude a complex mix of motivations. It is unlikely that hundreds of peasants would place themselves in life-threatening conflicts only because a godparent chiabur had asked them to do so. Poor peasants fought alongside chiaburi, and even with members of other national groups, such as Hungarians or Germans, against the state because of its use of force and illegitimacy in taking away the grains on which they depended. A clear sign of the peasants’ belief of the regime’s illegitimacy is once again found in their words, exclaiming their hopes in a future war between the United States and the Soviet Union that would overthrow the current regime.⁶¹ Such hopes and rumors gained ground among the peasantry all over the country, a recurring motif in most of the official documentation of those first four years.

The repressive measures corresponded to the degree of violence that erupted in the region. Sixteen peasants were executed, “*all leaders of chiabur counter-revolutionary actions*”, while thirteen were deported to Medgidia in the eastern plains of the country and 170 arrested.⁶² In contrast to the

59 Ibid., p. 105.

60 Ibid., pp. 109 – 110.

61 Ibid., p. 105.

62 Ibid., p. 116.

official documentation, however, Roske mentions that 269 peasants suffered deportations to Medgidia.⁶³ A mention should be made that three separate documents on the Bihor incidents, written before the official version and which only included tables, contained different calculations.⁶⁴ Regardless of the exact number of deportees, one can safely claim that the Bihor upheaval created major disruptions in the region and stirred fears for the regime.

Active Rebellions in the Countryside: Against Collectives

Following the failure of the initial stage of collectivization and the massive outbreak of rebellions in the countryside, the second and third stages, as outlined by Robert Levy, witnessed an increase in the preparation and establishment of collective farms. A November 1949 Central Committee document made references to the year's previous disturbances, stating that "*Chiaburi, former legionaries and some priests, especially the Catholic ones, have agitated among those peasants wishing to set up collective farms, trying to impede their creation...all of these facts prove that class struggle is intensifying in the countryside.*"⁶⁵ The document goes on to say that because of the intensified class struggle, the members of the RCP should increase their vigilance in order to liquidate the class enemy in the countryside.⁶⁶ This document foreshadows the repression that would follow in 1950 and points to the idea that the disturbances of 1949 directly caused the amplified repression in the subsequent year.

Preparing the ground for the creation of an additional 1,000 collective farms by the fall of 1950, a divisive point of contention between Gheorghiu-Dej and Pauker, required a more forceful approach of both explanatory,

63 ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, p. 46.

64 Tabel nominal, Doc. 9, ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4638, f. 45 – 55. Tabel nominal, Categoria II, Doc. 10, ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4638, f. 56. Tabel nominal, Categoria I-a, ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4638, f. 56 – 65. All three documents (tables). In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, pp. 88 – 104.

65 Proiect de Hotarare a Comitetului Central al Partidului Muncitoresc Roman din ...noiembrie 1949 asupra intaririi muncii politice la Statiunile de Masini si Tractoare si Gospodariile Agricole de Stat, ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dos. Nr. 161/1949, f. 2 – 18. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, p. 124.

66 *Ibid.*, p. 124.

propaganda work in the villages and violent measures against chiaburi. The plan to create the additional collective farms, however, remained only on paper until the summer months of 1950, as Ana Pauker considered the idea absurd; in late June 1950, however, Pauker left Romania to undergo cancer treatment and Alexandru Moghioros headed the Agrarian Commission in her absence.⁶⁷ Most scholars agree that Pauker's absence, combined with Moghioros' zealousness, as well as his close relationship with Dej, contributed to the intensification in creating collectives across the country.⁶⁸ Octavian Roske even states that the repression that occurred in Pauker's absence holds all cabinet members responsible and possibly even Pauker, by way of her position in the Commission.⁶⁹

The preparation for increasing the number of collectives by 1,000 entailed two objectives: prevention of possible loci of resistance in the countryside and the detailed investigation of farmland throughout the country that would become owned and worked by farmers on GACs (collective farms, but different from state collective farms, GAS). How this farmland would be acquired depended on the quality of land donated to the state by the peasants joining collectives, as well as massive land confiscation from disenfranchised chiaburi, which differed from the previous policy of accepting land donations from chiaburi.⁷⁰ Further, the May 1950 RCP Central Committee resolution requested all cereal, vegetable and fodder collections to be completed by middle September, with the stipulation that potatoes should be collected by November 1, 1950.⁷¹ The peasantry thus found itself between a rock and a hard place, with few options at its disposal.

67 LEVY, R.: Primul val al colectivizării p. 72; ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii în România: Represiunea, Vol. 1, 1949 – 1953*, p. 22.

68 ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii în România: Represiunea, Vol. 1, 1949 – 1953*, p. 28.

69 Ibid., pp. 22 – 23.

70 Proces verbal al sedintei cu secretarii comitetelor de partid judetene si instructorii Comitetului Central din 16.06.1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii în România: Represiunea*, Doc. 11, p. 149, from ANIC, fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dos. nr. 44/1950, f. 4 – 34.

71 Hotarare C.C. al P.M.R. si a consiliului de ministru as R.P.R. privind pregatirea si executarea la timp a strangerii recoltei si executarea planului de colectari pe anul 1950, Mai 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii în România: Dimensiunea Politica, 1949 – 1953*, Doc. 10, pp. 136 – 137, from *Rezolutii si hotarari*, vol. 1, pp. 215 – 238.

Preventing resistance meant the deportation of hundreds of peasants to labour camps in *unitati de munca*, or labor units, on the generic and largely specious, accusations of having conducted anti-regime or counter-revolutionary agitation. As an example, in April 1950, the Securitate offices in the Cluj region established lists with those suspected of having resisted against collectivization, a charge that encompassed an array of accusations.⁷² Each individual listing contains a list of headings, including information on birth date, social origins, profession, political orientation and lastly, the reasons behind the proposed labour sentencing. Chiaburi or petit bourgeois represented the majority of those deported, but middle and poor peasants also made up a small percentage. Though many of the supposed political affiliations of the suspects linked the usual scapegoats, such as the National Peasant Party, which had existed prior to Communism and had been popular among peasants, or even Legionaries of the Iron Guard, some of them included former RCP members. The spectrum of accusations included spreading rumors that war would begin between the Soviet Union and United States that the accused had insulted the RCP or leaders of the party, that God would punish the Communists and save the country from them, or that the accused had listened to imperialist radio stations, such as Radio London or Voice of America.⁷³

The rumour among the peasantry that war would begin between the ‘superpowers’ originated from the international situation at the time. The preparations for the Korean War were in place and the Communist world leaders constantly spoke about the imperial powers considering war with the Communist world. In a revealing telegram from July 1949 regarding Stalin’s meeting with the Chinese Communist leadership, Stalin reportedly claimed that, *“If imperialism wants to attack, let them attack; if they use nuclear weapons, we will also use nuclear weapons. The Americans, of course, are not planning to attack themselves, since they always think of how to use other people’s hands to attack for them. They even said so publicly, but*

72 Tabel de elemente propuse pentru incadrarea in U. M., Directiunea Regionala a Securitatii Poporului Cluj, Serviciul Securitatii Poporului Bistrita, 14 Aprilie 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 26, pp. 144 – 161. Tabel de elementele propuse pentru incadrarea in U.M., Directiunea Regionala a Securitatii Poporului Cluj. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 27, pp. 162 – 187. ASRI, Fond “D”, dosar nr. 4113, f. 99 – 141.

73 Tabel de elemente propuse pentru incadrarea in U.M. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, pp. 145 – 158.

there are not so many people willing to spill blood for America. In general, neither do we fear peace, nor do we fear war.”⁷⁴ Similarly, the May 1950 RCP Central Committee resolution resonated Stalin’s pronouncement, claiming that fulfilling the harvest and collections plan of 1950 would “contribute to strengthening the peace front, in front of which stands the Soviet Union” and which would additionally “represent a blow to the bellicose plans of the imperialist Anglo-Americans”.⁷⁵ Paradoxically, the rumours in the Communist world concerning a potential war gave many peasants hope that regime change would follow and that the Americans would come and rescue them, thus explaining the frequency with which the rumour is recorded in official documentation.

Though the aforementioned accusations included an array of others, one may be inclined to question the validity of such accusations in retrospect. The state, however, perceived these as incriminating evidence against the accused in order to give an appearance of legality to the repression. Further to this, the accusations expose the government actively seeking pretexts in order to remove individuals deemed unwanted and ‘dangerous.’ Some of the labour sentences ranged anywhere from six months to two years and these would be fulfilled in the construction of the Danube-Black Sea Canal.⁷⁶ The punitive measures planned to ‘reeducate’ those elements hostile to the Communist project and not necessarily use them as a potentially useful labour force.⁷⁷

The preparations for the push in creating collectives can be seen in the number of requests from the central Securitate offices to survey potential collective land and gather statistics on regions that remained uncollectivized. A document from March 1950 requested statistics on the productivity of lands in the Pitesti region, as well as information on the population there, including their political and religious affiliation, as well as the mood

74 A Telegram about the Meeting of Stalin with the Chinese Communist Party’s Delegation (18 July 1949). Trans. David Wolff. In: Bulletin #16, CWIHP Virtual Archive 2.0, coverage: Romania, See URL <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id>.

75 Hotarare C.C. al P.M.R. si a consiliului de ministru as R.P.R. privind pregatirea si executarea la timp a strangerii recoltei si executarea planului de colectari pe anul 1950, Mai 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Dimensiunea Politica, 1949 – 1953*, Doc. 10, p. 135.

76 DELETANT, D.: *Communist Terror in Romania*, pp. 210 – 211.

77 For a detailed discussion on the reeducation, terror, and labor projects of the early 1950s, see Chapter 9, entitled *The Romanian Gulag*. In: DELETANT, D.: *Communist Terror in Romania*, pp. 195 – 224.

of the population.⁷⁸ The document ordered taking “emergency measures” in gathering the statistics, allowing only a week for fulfilling the request.⁷⁹ In a document dating from the same month, the Securitate in Dambovita county compiled a complete statistical account of commune land around the city of Titu, much in the same way as the previous order from Pitesti requested.⁸⁰ Though these two documents relate only the specific requests in two counties, Pitesti and Dambovita; one can assume that most counties that remained uncollectivized experienced similar groundwork.

As the government carried out the plan in accordance with the approaching threshing and harvest months, disturbances spread across the country, with the most violent and prolonged incidents occurring in Vlasca county, Bucuresti region, lasting for more than one week. According to a July 3, 1950 county party report, the GAC in the Tudor Vladimirescu commune inaugurated its opening on July 2nd. Hundreds of peasants that included a considerable number of women, equipped with pitchforks and bats, attacked the state delegations in the vicinity of the collective, throwing rocks at them and beating two of its members, causing one to be hospitalized.⁸¹ Later in the afternoon, the document states that two chiaburi incited another 200 peasants to protest.⁸² The peasants were reportedly unhappy about the collection quotas, a mood that extended across a number of neighboring communes.

By July 5, the mood of the population in Vlasca county had worsened: peasants refused to thresh, complaining that not enough corn remained for themselves.⁸³ An informative document from July 7 further reveals the

78 Adresa catre Biroul de Securitate Racari cu privire la trimiterea unor situatii statistice pe fiecare comuna, ASRI, Fond “D”, dosar nr. 7381, f. 87. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Reprəsiunea*, Doc. 24, pp. 129 – 130.

79 Ibid., p. 129.

80 Statistici agricole privind comunele de pe raza plasei Titu, realizate de Biroul de Securitate Titu, Martie 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Reprəsiunea*, Doc. 25, pp. 130 – 144, ASRI, Fond “D”, dosar nr. 7381, f. 359 – 379.

81 Nota in legatura cu manifestatia cetatenilor din com. Tudor Vladimirescu, iulie 3, 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Reprəsiunea*, Doc. 32, pp. 192 – 193, in ANG, P.C.R.-Regiunea Bucuresti, dosar nr. 8609, f. 40 – 41.

82 Ibid., p. 192.

83 Nota, iulie 5, 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Reprəsiunea*, Doc. 34, pp. 193 – 194, In ANG, P.C.R.-R.B., dosar nr. 8609, f. 56 – 58.

level of discontent in Vlasca. It claims that even in the first three weeks in June, rumours circulated that eighty percent of their harvest would be taken away, leading many peasants to file complaints to the government. Because he helped the peasants write the petitions, the Ciupererceni commune's teacher, Ionescu I. Marin was identified and arrested on July 6. Upon hearing news of the teacher's arrest, the commune's population held captive two RCP members; as Securitate and Militia forces arrived, there ensued a skirmish that caused two deaths and two injuries.⁸⁴ Clarifying the disturbances even further, a 8 July eyewitness account written by the General Director of the Militia, Pavel Cristescu claims that over 800 peasants gathered in front of the Comitet Provisoriu to request the release of the teacher and also chiabur, Ionescu.⁸⁵ This report contained more detailed information, describing at length the clashes between the peasants and the Militia; according to Cristescu, the report's author, many poor peasants and women participated in the disturbances, but allegedly the chiabur instigators placed them there.⁸⁶ The crowd also attacked the local GAC and vandalized its tractors. By nighttime, the Militia had crushed the angry peasants, leaving in their wake six dead, seven injured and thirty arrested.⁸⁷

Similar incidents occurred throughout Vlasca county and elsewhere in the country. Some displayed similar peasant alliances between poor, middle and wealthy while other recorded incidents revealed more passive methods that peasants used to resist.⁸⁸ In Mosteni, Vlasca, crowds protested violently against the arrest of the village priest, beating party members and attacking them with farming equipment.⁸⁹ In Satu Mare,

84 Catre Directiunea Generala a Securitatii Poporului, iulie 7, 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 34, pp. 194 – 196. In ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4640, f. 152 – 153.

85 Nota raport, iulie 8, 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 35, pp. 196 – 198, In ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4640, f. 154 – 159.

86 Ibid., p. 197.

87 Nota raport, iulie 8, 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 35, p. 198.

88 Buletin privind Campania de recoltare si colectare a produselor agricole, iulie 10, 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 37, pp. 199 – 204. In ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4640, f. 162 – 172.

89 Nota, iulie 9, 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 36, p. 199. In ANG, P.C.R.-R.B., dosar nr. 8609, f. 58.

Ilfov, Constanta, Sibiu and Arad counties, peasants had reportedly committed other acts of resistance against the regime. These acts, nevertheless, did not mirror the violence in Vlasca. Allegedly, some peasants refused to thresh, some chose to thresh at home, some refused to work or show up at the GAC, while others attacked state property or refused to turn in their quotas, believing that war would start and the Communist regime would fall.⁹⁰ A similar report claimed that because of such rumours, some peasants were reluctant to join collectives and reportedly stated that they will “wait for August 23 [Liberation Day] to pass, and if nothing happens, then they will sign up.”⁹¹

The discontent in Vlasca lasted for most of July and by the time harvest started in August, conditions had not improved. In contrast to the rebellions in Bihor and Arad the previous year, these disturbances aimed their mounting displeasure at collection quotas and the collectives recently founded in the county’s communes. More peasants rebelled than before, with peasants from all walks of life, including women, participating with farm equipment as weapons. Communication between communes and an increasing level of resentment helped the incidents spread over large areas of the county, as well as other regions in the country.⁹² The possibility remains that an anti-Communist organization coordinated many of the events, although the evidence is doubtful. A report from late July about the incidents claimed that an organization by the name of “Frontul Plugarilor” [Ploughmen’s Front] had organized the events in seven Vlasca communes, reportedly planning a secret revolt that “would fall on the seventh month, the seventh day, the seventh hour, when there will be a downpour of fire and everyone will stay at home.”⁹³ Even if the many disturbances were coordinated however, this does not preclude the likelihood that the hundreds

90 Buletin, iulie 10, 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, p. 201.

91 Raport asupra situatiei din comuna Udeni, Vlasca in timpul rebeliunii, august 24, 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 49, p. 228. In ANG, P.C.R.-R.B., dosar nr. 8609, f. 55.

92 As many documents describe, the method peasants used to communicate with other communes was to toll the church bell. This would alert other peasants to gather around the church from various other villages.

93 Raport de felul cum s-a desfasurat activitatea de razvratire a taranilor din plasa Silistea si de felul cum se prezinta situatia treierisului, colectari si dezmiristit in judetul nostru, iulie 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 43, p. 212, from ANG, P.C.R.-R.B., dosar nr. 8609, f. 44 – 47.

of peasants who agreed to join in the violence felt their actions justified by the injustices of collections and living conditions. The tendency of official documents to find a scapegoat, usually an organization with former ties to Legionaries or liberals, reveals rather the paranoia of Communist activists and leaders as well as their tangible fear of ‘subversive’ organizations and not necessarily the existence of such organizations.

Repression, State Violence and Retreat: October 1950 – March 1953

State violence resulting from the summer of 1950 incidents corresponded with the violence of the peasants. Vlasca county and Cluj region experienced incidents with a considerable number of casualties. The state bodies responsible for the repression were the regional and county offices of the Securitate and Militia. Not all measures, however, exhibited violence. Especially in Vlasca, a document states, the county committee removed from office several high-ranking officials in the communes that experienced violence.⁹⁴ Additionally, the county committee sought to improve explanatory, propaganda work among peasants, mobilizing eighty factory workers to conduct work individually and “*to show the importance of collections and harvest.*”⁹⁵ Though none of the documents explain what *munca de lamurire* (explanatory, propaganda work) entails, most scholars have claimed that such procedures relied on intimidation.

In Turda county, Cluj region, an incident between Securitate forces and three peasants caught the attention of leaders in Bucharest. This incident further revealed alleged subordination and miscommunication between different levels of the Securitate, from the national down to the local level. The skirmish brought to attention the executions of Trifa Iosif, Pom Traian, and Andresel Ioan, who allegedly hosted two runaway anti-Communist fighters by the name of Ihut Traian and Salagea Misu. According to Mihail Kovacs, Securitate major in Turda, the three were guilty of additionally spreading rumors that caused most of the population in Bistra commune to

94 Raport, august 24, 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 50, pp. 229 – 230, from ANG, P.C.R.-R.B., dosar nr. 8609, f. 52 – 54.

95 *Ibid.*, p. 230.

refuse joining the collective, which delayed its opening.⁹⁶ For these reasons, Major Kovacs ordered the arrest of the three and their prompt execution, forcing their relatives and other chiaburi arrested in conjunction with them to take part in their burial.⁹⁷ According to Kovacs and to Securitate Major Dumitrescu, the executions occurred as an intimidation measure, as a way to scare other peasants into joining the commune's collective and to provide information about fugitive anti-Communist fighters that had passed through the area.⁹⁸ Two other eye witness reports from lower-ranking Securitate personnel further incriminated Kovacs and showed that he did not operate under official orders from above.

The incident raises a number of questions. The frequency of documents containing accusations of insubordination and improper behavior occurring within the Securitate Militia and local party leadership, points to Bucharest's fear that the level of repression could work against the state's wishes by inciting violence and further rousing peasants' hostility to the state. An enraged Major Dumitrescu concluded his report by claiming that, "*our regime does not admit terror and rejects leftist acts, which, like the present case, push peasant masses away from our regime.*"⁹⁹ Whether such proclamations were genuine is difficult to gauge, but they nevertheless show a degree of constraint, calculation and consideration of peasant attitudes. The incident did not fail to reach RCP leaders, who referred to it as an example of abuses of power occurring at the local levels; this self-critique at the topmost level in the party may strike one as cynical, considering the vague and ambiguous orders emanating from the top, as well as the widespread state-sanctioned violence and repression in 1949 and 1950.¹⁰⁰

96 Mihail Kovacs, Raport, august 20, 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 47, p. 220, from ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4638, f. 172 – 176.

97 Ibid., p. 221.

98 N. Dumitrescu, Raport, august 22, 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 48, 223 – 228, from ASRI, Fond "D", dosar nr. 4638, f. 163 – 171.

99 Ibid., p. 228.

100 Note stenografice despre sedinta tinuta cu secretarii judeteni in ziua de 2 septembrie 1950, septembrie 2, 1950 In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Dimensiunea Politica*, Doc. 15, p. 164, from ANIC, C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dos. Nr. 56/1950, f. 12 – 22. The critique belongs mostly to Teohari Georgescu, one of the three who would be purged along with Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca in 1952.

Nevertheless, the miscommunication between centre and periphery, namely between Bucharest and its local organs in each region, county and commune, indicates the difficulties of implementing Socialism evenly.¹⁰¹ Additionally, this shows that the state did not fully possess the power to control its functionaries or, most importantly, implement its directives in exactly the way it wished. The periphery, at times, operated according to the whims of local leaders, whose sudden empowerment and individual perceptions of how Socialism should be implemented differed from those in Bucharest. One should also consider opportunism as a possible symptom of Socialist leadership, as a way for individuals to profit, materially and socially and rise through the ranks of the newly formed system. The Romanian Workers' Party could not impose its perceived power evenly in the countryside during the early years of collectivization, nor could it afford to, for fear of peasant rebellions developing into a more chronic, widespread and potentially fatal phenomenon. In other words, the 1949 – 1950 conflicts in the countryside succeeded in determining the official policy and approach to collectivization.

Not coincidentally, upon Ana Pauker's arrival from cancer treatment in October 1950, the RCP retreated from the summer's previous abuses, in what seemed an astute attempt at dissimulation, seeking to disguise its guilt under a feigned appearance of contrition. As described by Levy, this period represented the fourth stage in the initial four years of collectivization, lasting until the removal of Pauker, Georgescu and Luca from office in 1952. The leaders halted forced collectivization and sought to consolidate the collectives already established, which Georgescu claimed in an 10-11 October Central Committee meeting stood at six hundred; four hundred short of the initial objective of the 1,000 that the committee had proposed in the spring of 1950.¹⁰² The relative relaxation that followed occurred because of two possibilities: the peasant revolts in the summer led to an actual wish on the part of RCP leaders to correct abuses, or as Levy argues, the catalyst that Pauker's return provided. Considering the difficulties encountered by the RCP in the summer of 1950, Levy's argument falls short of describing the complete picture. Gheorghiu-Dej's strategic politicking

101 The centre-periphery approach to collectivization has produced a number of stimulating results in Romanian scholarship recently. See DOBRINCU, D.: *Taranimea si Puterea*, part II, Centru si periferia in campania de colectivizare, pp. 177 – 345.

102 Proces verbal nr. 21 al sedintei Secretariatului C.C. din 10-11 octombrie 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Dimensiunea Politica*, Doc. 17, p. 184, from ANIC, C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dos. nr. 59/1950, f. 3 – 63.

in his attempt to remove Pauker and other rivalries within the RCP surely affected the relaxed stance, but the failures of the previous summer and the intensity of peasant anger must have contributed to a more careful and composed approach to the process.

Calling the period 1950-1952 a relaxation may, however, be deceiving. As a November 1950 resolution of the Central Committee stipulated, the government halted land confiscations from *chiaburi* and encouraged the return of confiscations of goods from middle and poor peasants who were wrongly classified as *chiaburi*.¹⁰³ In August 1951, the government granted further concessions. A number of peasants deported in the wake of the 1949 revolts were relocated back to their home villages and restituted with some of their confiscated belongings.¹⁰⁴ In September of the same year, the Central Committee resolution pronounced a renewed orientation toward *intovarasiri*, or associations, which represented a gradual step for peasants to join collectives. These associations differed from collectives in that, although peasants worked collectively, they headed their own committees, made their own decisions and, most importantly, maintained possession of their farmlands.¹⁰⁵ These were obviously popular among peasants across the country, but the RCP, nevertheless, envisioned them only as a temporary step to forming collectives. The resolution sought to improve the entire aspect of collectivization: the RCP attempted to mechanize agriculture, consolidate collectives already in use, improve working conditions within collectives and to further educate cadres so as to ensure efficient communications between the centre and local party offices.¹⁰⁶

These measures did not necessarily improve the livelihood of peasants. Rather, they improved the government's efficiency in operating more smoothly and limiting the potential of mass, armed incidents such as occurred in 1949-1950. A survey of official documentation from late 1950

103 Referat, noiembrie 1950. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 66, pp. 255 – 259, from ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar nr. 111/1950, f. 1 – 6.

104 Referat, august 1951. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, doc. 97, pp. 308 – 329, from ASRI, fond "D," dosar nr. 4638, f. 231 – 267.

105 Hotarare C.C. al P.M.R. asupra muncii pe taramul construirii gospodariilor agricole colective si a intovarasilor agricole, septembrie 18, 1951. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Dimensiunea Politica*, Doc. 21, p. 259, from *Rezolutii si hotarari*, vol. II, pp. 67 – 110.

106 *Ibid.*, pp. 246 – 265.

to the summer of 1952, the time when the ‘right-deviationists’ of Luca, Pauker, and Georgescu lost their positions of power in a highly publicized purge, reveals that violent resistance occurred much less frequently. This resulted from various factors: armed peasant rebellion succeeded in pushing the government to grant some concessions; an occurrence that may have prevented previously discontented peasants from rebelling once more. Most peasants, however, most likely understood that violent resistance led to increased repression by the Securitate and Militia. This led to other forms of resistance, such as passive behaviour, or to behaviour that may not fit under the rubric of resistance, such as accommodation, acceptance and conformity.¹⁰⁷ As an example of nonviolent methods, Katherine Verdery’s article in *Taranimea si Puterea* analyses the methods with which peasants directly negotiated the social classification system imposed by the government. Many peasants felt that the RCP had wrongly classified them as *chiaburi* and, having acquired knowledge of how to speak the new political language, wrote petitions to the government challenging its pronouncement.¹⁰⁸ Some succeeded in their efforts to become middle or poor peasants, but this occurred only after Stalin’s death in 1953 and onwards.¹⁰⁹

On the other hand, the state became more aware of efficient methods to eliminate potential resisters. Though few cases of outright resistance were recorded in the two year period, a 1961 ‘top secret’ document revealed that during the years 1951 – 1952, approximately 35,000 peasants had been arrested in the entire country, many of which were tried in 439 public trials.¹¹⁰ Though the period between Pauker’s removal in 1952 and Stalin’s death in March 1953 witnessed a renewed effort at forced collectivization, it remains largely under-recorded in comparison to the disturbances of

107 These behaviours have been recorded in a large part by ethnographic research. David Kideckel, Katherine Verdery, Gail Kligman have documented the various methods in which peasants ‘resisted’ by retreating into their households, traditions, rituals, song, and poetry.

108 This idea is reminiscent of “speaking Bolshevik” by Stephen Kotkin, in which workers under Soviet Communism learned how to properly convey themselves publicly, while allegedly maintaining different opinions privately. KOTKIN, S.: *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization*. Berkeley 1997.

109 VERDERY, K.: *Chiaburii vechi si noi*, pp. 349 – 367.

110 Nota-raport cu privire la situatia arestarilor facute de catre organelle M.A.I. si procuratori in randul taranilor in anii 1951-1952, pe intreaga tara, decembrie 1, 1961. In: ROSKE, O. – CATANUS, D.: *Colectivizarea Agriculturii in Romania: Represiunea*, Doc. 130, pp. 413 – 419, from ASRI, Fond “D”, dosar nr. 7778, vol. 27, f. 1 – 10.

1949 – 1950. Stalin's death in 1953 put a temporary halt to collectivization in the country, but it would nevertheless be forcefully renewed in the late 1950s. Stalin's death signalled a thaw in the Soviet Union; a process whose reverberations in Eastern Europe posed problems for the "little Stalins," such as Gheorghiu-Dej; according to political scientist Vladimir Tismaneanu, this occurrence did not keep Dej from gaining full control of the RCP by 1955, three years after removing his main challenger to power, Ana Pauker.¹¹¹

Conclusion

Collectivization had far reaching consequences in Romania, both for the peasantry and the RCP. Many peasants who believed that resistance invited government sanctioned violence left the countryside. An exodus to the cities occurred, with peasants flocking to factories to become peasant-workers or to begin life anew in the city. Just as in the Soviet Union, the flight to the cities during the later decades of Communism swelled the urban population and severely decreased it in the countryside. For a country nearly seventy-five percent rural in the mid-1940s, this represented social and political transformations that reverberate in Romania to this day. By 1962, the RCP led by Gheorghiu-Dej pronounced the completion of collectivization. It marked Dej's complete control of the party, government and country; a position that he would not relinquish until his sudden death in 1965. While many scholars have described his last years in power as a period marked by an intense reorientation towards national aspirations and nationalism, breaking away from the Soviet Union's influence and its New Course, they capped twenty-one turbulent years of rule by the RCP. Another twenty-four years of rule would follow under Nicolae Ceausescu, a period that deserves a separate study for its political developments and continued social programs.

Resistance to Socialism manifested itself in a variety of forms, but in the early years of collectivization, namely 1949 – 1950, the project of Socialist transformation met with mass peasant violence. This occurred throughout the country: in Western regions, such as Bihor, Arad and Cluj, as well as in regions dangerously close to Bucharest, such as Vlasca and Ilfov, or close to the Soviet Union in Moldova. Some peasants shared

111 TISMANEANU, V.: *Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism*. Berkeley 2003, p. 135.

political orientations that could never accept the tenets of Communism, while others did not accept Communism in the countryside because it destroyed their traditional livelihoods. Nevertheless, a confrontational negotiation occurred between centre and periphery, between the state and the peasantry, in which the state did not possess the pervasive power that has been traditionally associated with Communist systems. Instead, a field of power relations existed, in which competing discourses and visions battled one another. The vision of Socialist transformation met with the staunch refusal of peasants longing for the “good life.” Those peasants who resisted felt that the principles of traditional village life had been violated and to such an extent that they attacked and beat state representatives, set state buildings on fire and even committed crimes against people who, though possibly innocuous, embodied the state. Though these events may have seemed spontaneous manifestations of rage, they contained a peasant rationale with specific motivations and intentions.

The question remains, however, whether peasants succeeded in the long run by resisting state policies. The current study intends to describe and analyse actions and not necessarily long-term results. If one wishes to look at 1949 – 1953 in juxtaposition to the four decades of Communism that followed, then one may be inclined to accept Kideckel’s bleak characterization of collectivization and its disastrous, unintended results for the Romanian peasantry.¹¹² Kideckel reflects on some of the positive achievements of Socialism, such as modernization and equalization of conditions of life among peasants, in light of the negative, long-term effects of collectivization, stating that, “[t]he ability to organize the region’s communities was eroded, for the breakup of local leadership forced the party to rely on the egregiously self-interested. Though social networks were maintained, cooperation waned, households drew in upon themselves, and the differentiation of households was intensified in the Socialist political economy.”¹¹³ Romanian Socialism’s driving force, class struggle, created a society built on resentment, and thus could never achieve the system’s purported utopia. Instead, it unleashed a profound social harm, reflecting a widespread phenomenon experienced by other Communist societies in Eastern Europe.¹¹⁴

112 KIDECKEL, D.: *The Solitude of Collectivism*, p. 100.

113 Ibid.

114 This bleak, but realistic, view belongs to Jan Gross. See GROSS, J.: Social Consequences of War: Preliminaries to the Study of the Imposition of Communist Regimes in East Central Europe. In: *EEPS*, Vol. 3, 1989, No. 2, p. 211.

The present study contends that, during the first four years of collectivization, there existed a contested space in which peasants brought their own chips to the negotiation table. Kideckel's conclusions, along with those of other notable scholars who conducted ethnographic and historical research in the country during the 1970s and 1980s, suffer from a teleological view that fails to consider the initial stage of collectivization on its own account; instead, these macro approaches focus on the negative effects experienced during the latter period of Communism and its disintegration, implying the futility of open resistance to the regime. They assume a historical determination that proceeds backwards, imposing *inevitability* on the historical course of events for the millions of Romanians who experienced them.

The current study concludes that a micro approach to resistance and collectivization contributes fresh insights to the historical narrative, by treating people, places and events in a certain time period as influenced by events that occurred before and during, but not after it. A narrow approach does not entirely preclude the big picture, but instead demonstrates that the history of collectivization in Romania could have unfolded in a myriad of ways. Romanian peasants most certainly hoped and believed that the "good life" they had been forced to give up would one day return. Though their wish did not materialize, Romanian Communism officially took its last breath on 25 December 1989.

Resumé

Predkladaná štúdia hovorí, že počas prvých štyroch rokov kolektívizácie existoval istý priestor, kam roľníci priniesli k rokovaciemu stolu svoje nádeje. Kideckelove závery i závery významných učencov, ktorí robili etnografické a historické výskumy v krajine v 70. a 80. rokoch minulého storočia, trpia teleologickým pohľadom, ktorý neberie do úvahy počiatkové štádium kolektívizácie. Namiesto toho sa tieto makroprístupy zameriavajú na negatívne dopady, ku ktorým prišlo počas posledného obdobia komunizmu a jeho dezintegrácie, naznačujúce márnosť otvoreného odporu voči režimu. Predpokladajú historickú determináciu, ktorá postupuje smerom späť, predkladajúc *nevyhnutnosť* historického priebehu udalostí pre milióny Rumunov, ktorí ich zažili.

Štúdia prichádza k záveru, že mikroprístup voči odboju a kolektívizácii prispieva novými pohľadmi na historické udalosti tým, že skúma ľudí, miesta a udalosti v istom čase tak, ako ich ovplyvnili udalosti, ktoré sa stali pred a počas danej udalosti, ale nie po nej. Zúžený pohľad celkom

nebráni veľkému obrazu, ale namiesto toho ukazuje, že dejiny kolektivi-
zácie v Rumunsku sa mohli rozvinúť nespočetnými spôsobmi. Rumunskí
roľníci celkom iste dúfali a verili, že ten „dobrý život“, ktorého sa museli
z donútenia vzdať, sa raz vráti. I keď sa ich želanie naplnilo, rumunský
komunizmus oficiálne vydýchol naposledy 25. decembra 1989.

Spying and Resistance: What the Stasi's Records Show about Western Spying in the German Democratic Republic in the Early Cold War

Paul MADDRELL

The historical literature on the Western secret services and anti-Communist resistance

Throughout the Cold War, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was an important territory for Western intelligence services. This paper concerns only intelligence collection from spies, not technical intelligence collection. In the early Cold War, several Western intelligence services, chief among them those of the United States and West Germany, sought to gather intelligence on the GDR, the Soviet Union and the rest of the Bloc from large networks of spies in East Germany.

From 1945, East Germany – or ‘Middle Germany’ (*Mitteldeutschland*), as many Germans called it – was not only occupied by a foreign power but also subjected to an alien ideology. The Soviet Union’s security services carried out vicious repression there in the late 1940s and were assisted in this by the nascent East German political police, known from 1950 as the Stasi (*Ministerium für Staatssicherheit*: Ministry of State Security).¹ Resistance was natural. The Western secret services’ task was to exploit it to collect intelligence and undertake subversion in the GDR.

Those Western secret services – chief among them the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service

¹ See NAIMARK, N.: *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation*. Cambridge 1995, chapter 7.

(SIS), the Federal Republic of Germany's *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND) and France's *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure* (DGSE) – all still exist and guard their records carefully. Only the CIA has released records which shed any light at all on its cooperation with resistance groups in West Berlin and West Germany in the late 1940s and 1950s. These records enabled the well-known book *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War* to be published more than a decade ago.²

Both the Stasi and the Soviet security service (known from 1954 as the KGB³) mounted large-scale espionage and agent penetration operations to find out as much as they could about the intelligence collection and subversion of the Western secret services and the resistance organizations allied with them. The KGB's archive is, for practical purposes, entirely closed to historians. However, that of the Stasi is open - more open, indeed, than the archive of any other security service.⁴

A few historians have exploited this resource to research into the history of Western espionage and subversion, rather than the history of the Stasi. Bernd Stöver, of Potsdam University, has published a study of the United States' policy of liberating the states of Central and Eastern Europe which relies heavily on Stasi records on resistance groups such as the *Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit* (KgU: Fighting Group against Inhumanity) and the *Narodno-Trudovoi Soyuz* (NTS: People's Labour Alliance).⁵ Wolfgang Buschfort's book on the fate of the Social, Liberal and Christian Democrats' political organizations in the GDR makes use of Stasi records.⁶ Armin Wagner and Matthias Uhl's study of the military espionage of the BND relies heavily on records of the Stasi's principal

2 MURPHY, D. – KONDRASHEV, S. – BAILEY, G.: *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War*. New Haven 1997. The US Government has released further records on employment after 1945 by US intelligence agencies of war criminals and people with disturbing Nazi pasts as part of its programme to declassify records it holds relating to Nazi war crimes: see BREITMAN, R. – GODA, N. – NAFTALI, T. – WOLFE, R.: *US Intelligence and the Nazis*. Cambridge 2005.

3 *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti*: Committee of State Security.

4 The Law on the Stasi Records is set out in full and in English at URL: <<http://www.bstu.bund.de>>. For more on it, see MADDRELL, P.: The Revolution Made Law: The Work since 2001 of the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic. In: *Cold War History*, vol. 4, 2004, No. 3, pp. 153 – 162.

5 See STÖVER, B.: *Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus. Amerikanische 'Liberation Policy' im Kalten Krieg, 1947 – 1991*. Cologne 2002.

6 BUSCHFORT, W.: *Parteien im Kalten Krieg*. Berlin 2000.

counter-intelligence department, Line II.⁷ Paul Maddrell's *Spying on Science* uses records of the Stasi's trials department, Line IX, to uncover some of the spies who reported to Western secret services, were arrested by the Stasi and put before East German courts.⁸ Some information from Stasi files on resistance groups is to be found in Karl Wilhelm Fricke and Roger Engelmann's study of mass arrests of Western spies and resistance fighters carried out by the Ministry in the early and mid-1950s.⁹

Every historian who uses Stasi records to research into Western espionage and subversion has to proceed with care. Recent historical research has reached conclusions about the role of resistance in the Western states' policies of subversion and intelligence collection in the Soviet Bloc which accord with propaganda claims made by the Communists during the Cold War.¹⁰ The Communists hated the resistance organizations which fought them and they were very keen to accuse them of being vehicles of the Western secret services. Stasi records are a difficult source since they were always prone to the distorting influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology.¹¹ However, my study of Line IX's records has convinced me that the Line largely overcame the influence of ideology in investigating particular cases of spying and that it focused on obtaining reliable evidence of espionage.¹² Therefore, its reports reflect accurately the role played by resistance in the West's espionage in the GDR.

7 WAGNER, A. – UHL, M.: *BND contra Sowjetarmee. Westdeutsche Militärespionage in der DDR*. Berlin 2007.

8 MADDRELL, P.: *Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945 – 1961*. Oxford 2006.

9 FRICKE, K. W. – ENGELMAN, R.: 'Konzentrierte Schläge'. *Staatssicherheitsaktionen und politische Prozesse in der DDR, 1953 – 1956*. Berlin 1998; FRICKE, K. W.: Spionage als antikommunistischer Widerstand. In: *Deutschland Archiv*, 2002, No. 4, pp. 565 – 578.

10 For example, see MADDRELL, P.: What we have discovered about the Cold War is what we already knew: Julius Mader and the Western secret services during the Cold War. In: *Cold War History*, Vol. 5, 2005, No. 2, pp. 235 – 258.

11 On this, see HENKE, K.-D. – ENGELMANN, R. (eds.): *Aktenlage. Die Bedeutung der Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes für die Zeitgeschichtsforschung*. Berlin 1995.

12 See MADDRELL, P.: Western Espionage and Stasi Counter-espionage in East Germany, 1953 – 1961. In: FRIIS, T. W. – MACRAKIS, K. – MÜLLER-ENBERGS, H. (eds.): *East German Foreign Intelligence: Myth, Reality and Controversy*. Abingdon 2010, pp. 19 – 33.

Line IX's records

The purpose of this paper is to take understanding of the connection between resistance and spying further by examining the Stasi's records, recently published historical works which draw on them, and, in particular, the monthly reports of *Hauptabteilung IX* (HA IX), the central office of the Stasi's trials department, Line IX. These were reports between 1955 and 1989 to the Minister of State Security, the KGB's liaison officer with HA IX and the head of the *Hauptabteilung*.¹³ Line IX prepared cases of political crime for trial before courts throughout the GDR. Every month its central office, HA IX, summarized how far the Line's interrogations of people arrested on suspicion of spying had proceeded.¹⁴

Line IX played an important role both in the collection of counter-intelligence (intelligence on hostile secret services) and in the East German Communist regime's manipulation of the courts to serve its ends. Very often the Stasi's counter-intelligence departments identified spies by methods which were either illegal or unconstitutional, even in the GDR, or too secret to reveal to a court. Examples of such methods are the interception of post or telephone calls, intrusive surveillance and agent penetration of a hostile intelligence service. To convict a spy, the Stasi needed to present a court with conclusive evidence of spying without using evidence gathered in such ways. This was Line IX's task. Its interrogators were present in the GDR's investigative prisons. They interrogated those arrested on suspicion of spying and obtained further information about them from informers and electronic surveillance. They thus obtained sufficient evidence admissible before a court to ensure the suspect's conviction by the court without disclosing evidence obtained either illegally or by very sensitive means. Its records are full of evidence of Western espionage between 1955 and 1989.

These records provide further evidence that spying, anti-Communist resistance and flight from the GDR were intimately connected with one

13 Like the KGB, the Stasi was organized in Lines: it had regional branches throughout the GDR, which were directed by a central office (*Hauptabteilung*: Main Department) in East Berlin.

14 On Line IX, see BELEITES, J.: Der Untersuchungshaftvollzug des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit der DDR. In: ENGELMANN, R. – VOLLNHALS, C. (eds.): *Justiz im Dienste der Parteiherrschaft*. Berlin 2000, pp. 433 – 465; SELITRENNY, R.: *Doppelte Überwachung: Geheimdienstliche Ermittlungsmethoden in den DDR-Untersuchungshaf-tanstalten*. Berlin 2003.

another. Many East Germans agreed to become spies because they had strong anti-Communist convictions or because they wanted Western help in escaping from the GDR. Resistance organizations, usually based in West Berlin, gave valuable assistance to Western intelligence collection in the 1950s. From the 1960s onward, escape organizations had close connections with the American and West German intelligence services. The determination to resist Communist dictatorship helped the Western secret services to engage in very successful espionage in the GDR during the first two decades of the Cold War.

The Western secret services' exploitation of resistance and flight

That resistance groups played a large role in Western subversive policy towards the Soviet Bloc in the early Cold War has long been known. The US Government's first covert action directive, NSC-10/2 (1948), authorized the use of 'subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups'.¹⁵ Relying on this directive, US agencies went ahead and gave covert support to guerrilla movements in the Soviet Bloc.¹⁶

Resistance organizations were also exploited for intelligence. In theory, five uses were possible. Firstly, a 'secret section' within the resistance organization would act as a secret service in its own right, under the guidance and direction of a Western intelligence agency. The 'secret section' would run agents in East Germany and would pass on the intelligence collected from them to the intelligence service. Secondly, the organizations, or people within them, would put Western secret services in touch with promising spy candidates, either members of theirs in Communist-held territory or anti-Communist people of whom they knew (in English intelligence terminology, this is known as 'tipping').¹⁷ Thirdly, while operating

15 NSC-10/2, Office of Special Projects, 18 June 1948. In: ETZOLD, T. – GADDIS, J. L. (eds.): *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945 – 1950*. New York 1978, p. 127.

16 See PRADOS, J.: *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*. Chicago 2006, chapters 1 – 3.

17 Of course, Communist parties around the world did this for the Soviet Union's intelligence services. Among recent important works on this subject are: ANDREW, C. – MITROKHIN, V.: *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West*. London 1999; HAYNES, J. – KLEHR, H. – FIRSOV, F.: *The Secret World of American Communism*.

independently of any intelligence service, the resistance organizations could pass on to Western secret services the information they obtained from their sources behind the Iron Curtain. Fourthly, they could be used to spread propaganda covertly or engage in (perhaps violent) covert action. Fifthly, they could be held in reserve and used to conduct partisan warfare behind enemy lines and supply intelligence in the event of war.¹⁸

Stasi files (and other evidence) show that resistance organizations were used in all these ways. This paper will discuss only the first three uses because the latter two fall outside its scope. Any use of such organizations involved considerable security risks. Resistance organizations maintained lax security; in practice, anyone who expressed hatred of Communism, the GDR and USSR could join. They were easily infiltrated by agents of the KGB and Stasi. The KGB had long experience of penetrating and undermining such organizations and of influencing, kidnapping and murdering their members. Its forerunner, the Cheka, the Bolsheviks' first political police force, had conducted precisely such operations against the first wave of anti-Bolshevik unions of Russian émigrés and had proven highly successful.¹⁹

'Secret sections'

Perhaps the best example of this is the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* itself. Before it was taken over by the Federal Republic, in 1956, as the latter's official foreign intelligence agency, the BND was directed by American intelligence agencies. Created in 1946 and named the Gehlen Organization (after its chief, Reinhard Gehlen), it was first responsible to the United States Army's Counter-intelligence Corps and, from 1949, to the CIA. For its personnel, it drew heavily on the Nazis' military intelligence agency, the *Abwehr*, and even on veterans of the Gestapo and the Nazi Party's SS and SD.²⁰ Its espionage department (*Hauptabteilung Beschaffung*) was, in

New Haven 1995; HAYNES, J. – KLEHR, H.: *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America*. New Haven 1999.

18 MADDRELL, P.: *Spying on Science*, pp. 130 – 147.

19 ANDREW, C. – MITROKHIN, V.: *The Mitrokhin Archive*, chapter 1.

20 STÖVER, B.: *Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus*, pp. 252 – 253. See also RITZI, M. – SCHMIDT-EENBOOM, E.: *Im Schatten des Dritten Reiches. Der BND und sein Agent Richard Christmann*. Berlin 2011. See also BREITMAN, R. et al.: *US Intelligence and the Nazis*, pp. 347 – 352.

practice, a secret section run by a German anti-Communist resistance organization. Of course, from 1956 the BND was no longer a resistance organization but a government agency. However, it was the first of several secret organizations which in the early Cold War gathered intelligence in East Germany on behalf of Western secret services.

One celebrated resistance organization with a 'secret section' which assisted the US intelligence services was the KgU. Founded in 1948 in West Berlin to give assistance to political prisoners in the GDR, it rapidly expanded its activities, with American encouragement and financial support, to become a fully-fledged resistance organization. It ran spy networks in East Germany on behalf of the CIC. The CIC received a carbon copy of each agent report. The KgU also supplied military intelligence to the United States' Military Intelligence Service. Another fanatically anti-Communist union of Eastern European refugees, the *Vereinigung Politischer Ostflüchtlinge* (Association of Political Refugees from the East, VPO) was also regarded by the Stasi as closely aligned with the American, West German and French intelligence services; it carried out intelligence and subversive tasks in the GDR and throughout Eastern Europe, including the USSR.²¹

West Germany and West Berlin also teemed with refugees from the countries of the Soviet Union (many were Soviet Army veterans who had been taken prisoner by the Germans during the War and had not been sent back to their homeland). They organized themselves in several nationalist associations which offered intelligence opportunities for Western secret services. One such association was the *Narodno-Trudovoi Soyuz* (People's Labour Union, NTS). It had a 'secret section' which carried out intelligence and subversive tasks in several Communist states on behalf of both the CIA and, for a time, SIS. The West German government, which funded it and received information from it, in 1960 considered the NTS to be a 'well functioning intelligence service'.²² Another such association was TsOPE (Central Union of Post-war Emigrants from the USSR), another association of Displaced Persons and refugees from the Soviet Union, which actively gathered intelligence on the Soviet armed forces.²³ While it was chiefly funded by US Government's covert action agency, the Office of Policy

21 STÖVER, B.: *Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus*, pp. 269 – 270 and 274 – 277.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 323 – 331.

23 BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX, MF-11160, *Tätigkeits- und Auswertungsbericht der HA IX für Dezember 1956*, p. 4.

Coordination (OPC), it was also, according to the Stasi's information, connected with the British and French secret services.²⁴ The 'secret section' of SBONR (Union of the Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia) briefly worked on behalf of the CIA early in the 1950s, targeting Soviet citizens (mainly soldiers) in East Germany.²⁵

'Tipper' organizations and the passing on of intelligence

HA IX's monthly reports demonstrate that several organizations in West Berlin and West Germany put Western secret services in touch with promising sources in East Germany. The secret services they collaborated with were principally those of the United States and West Germany, although Britain's SIS and the French intelligence services also had connections with them and made use of them.

One natural 'tipper' organization was the West German Social Democratic Party. The Social Democrats had since the late nineteenth century been the main political force working for democracy in Germany. They opposed the establishment of a totalitarian regime in East Germany in the 1940s and 1950s just as they had opposed it throughout the German Reich in the 1930s.

The SPD's contacts with the British authorities extended back to the war period, when many Social Democrats had found refuge in Britain. Using its membership, the party had managed to obtain information from within Nazi Germany. The SPD has conceded that, in the early Cold War period, it suggested to British Intelligence Social Democrats who might be willing to spy for it.²⁶ Social Democrats certainly did spy for the British in the late 1940s. One who is believed to have done so was Wilhelm Lohrenz, whose case was made famous by Communist propaganda.²⁷ Stasi records confirm that the SPD's Eastern Bureau, which maintained links with the party's former members in East Germany and obtained much information from them, cooperated with SIS. In 1953, Erich Mielke, then the Stasi's deputy chief and the man principally responsible within it for counter-subversion and counter-intelligence, in an instruction to his officers, stated

24 STÖVER, B.: *Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus*, pp. 331 – 334.

25 MURPHY, D. – KONDRASHEV, S. – BAILEY, G.: *Battleground Berlin*, pp. 108 – 112.

26 STÖVER, B.: *Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus*, p. 259.

27 BUSCHFORT, W.: *Parteien im Kalten Krieg*, pp. 86 – 88.

that couriers for the Eastern Bureau carried out intelligence tasks directly on behalf of Western secret services. He also maintained that leading figures at the *Telegraf*, an SPD newspaper in Berlin, were SIS agents. They acted as principal agents, running other agents in East Germany.²⁸

HA IX's reports confirm Mielke's claim of cooperation with SIS. In 1956 the Stasi arrested an SIS courier. Between 1950 and 1954 he had carried out military intelligence tasks in East Germany for the Eastern Bureau. Then, in 1955, he had transferred to SIS, to act as a courier for it in the GDR.²⁹

The SPD's Eastern Bureau was a valuable partner of other Western intelligence services as well. The CIC collaborated with it. The Central Intelligence Agency maintained a looser connection, preferring to finance only its propaganda and covert action. The SPD received substantial funds from the US authorities in West Germany.³⁰ Some officials of the Eastern Bureau, when they left it, joined the BND.

The SPD was not only a 'tipper' organization; it also passed on finished intelligence reports. It has conceded that it passed on to both British and US Intelligence reports prepared by the Eastern Bureau on East Germany.³¹ A former SIS officer in Germany in the 1940s recalls that abundant political information was obtained from the SPD - so much that SIS set up a special office in Hanover to receive it.³² The CDU's Eastern Bureau also passed reports on the situation in East Germany to the Western intelligence services, particularly the BND and *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (BfV).³³

HA IX's reports identify several organizations in West Berlin and West Germany which acted as 'tippers' for Western intelligence services. One was the American radio station in West Berlin, known as RIAS (*Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor*: Radio in the American Sector).³⁴ RIAS assisted the American intelligence services just as the SPD assisted the British: it

28 BStU, ZA, MfS-BdL, Dok. Nr. 529/1859, *Dienstanweisung Nr. 20/53*, 29 June 1953.

29 BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX, MF-11150, *Tätigkeitsbericht für Januar 1956*, p. 5.

30 MURPHY, D. – KONDRASHEV, S. – BAILEY, G.: *Battleground Berlin*, pp. 112 – 113.

31 STÖVER, B.: *Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus*, pp. 259 – 262. The Stasi had made this finding long before: see BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX 17811, *Schulungsmaterial*, Hochschule Potsdam-Eiche, Vorlesung, *Die feindliche Tätigkeit der rechten Führer der SPD und des DGB sowie des "Ostbüros der SPD" im Rahmen der politisch-ideologischen Diversion gegen die Deutsche Demokratische Republik*, p. 313.

32 CAVENDISH, A.: *Inside Intelligence*. London 1997, p. 50.

33 STÖVER, B.: *Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus*, pp. 264 – 265.

34 BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX, MF-11149, *Tätigkeitsbericht für Dezember 1955*, p. 4.

put them in touch with people well suited to acting as spies and it provided them with a flood of reports based on information obtained from its own sources in East Germany. This is established by US government records as well as by Stasi files. RIAS also passed sources on to the BND.³⁵ A further 'tipper' organization was the Eastern Bureau of the CDU. HA IX's reports include one instance of it passing a source to the West German security service, the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, for which he became a source of political and security information on the GDR³⁶, and another of it putting the *Deuxieme Bureau* of the French General Staff in touch with another source³⁷. An extreme right-wing group including SS and SA veterans and called the *Burschenbund Convent* put an American secret service in touch with some of its members in East Germany.³⁸ Associations of Germans expelled from Eastern Europe (known as *Landsmannschaften*) also cooperated with the US and West German intelligence services. US Military Intelligence recruited spies among Sudeten Germans who had been expelled from Czechoslovakia to the GDR.³⁹

In 1953 Mielke identified another West German resistance organization, the Association of Victims of Stalinism (*Vereinigung der Opfer des Stalinismus*, or VOS), as closely aligned with both the US Army's Counter-intelligence Corps and Britain's SIS. The VOS's fanatically anti-Communist membership was made up of people who had been political prisoners in the GDR. According to Mielke's information, the VOS had been founded at the initiative of British intelligence officers and was controlled and funded by CIC.⁴⁰ The Stasi believed that in the 1950s (until about 1960) SIS had recruited agents from among the members of the VOS's Berlin organization. However, by the early 1960s, the Stasi believed that the VOS no longer engaged in active subversive work in the GDR.⁴¹ The NTS provided some

35 BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX, MF-11254, *Tätigkeitsbericht für November 1964*, pp. 6 – 7; BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX, MF-11255, *Tätigkeitsbericht für Dezember 1964*, pp. 6 – 7.

36 BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX, MF-11232, *Tätigkeitsbericht für Januar 1963*, pp. 4 – 5.

37 BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX, MF-11147, *Tätigkeitsbericht für Oktober 1955*, p. 5.

38 BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX, MF-11265, *Tätigkeitsbericht für Oktober 1965*, pp. 3 – 4.

39 BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX, MF-11147, *Tätigkeitsbericht für Oktober 1955*, p. 6; BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX, MF-11228, *Tätigkeitsbericht für September 1962*, pp. 7 – 8.

40 BStU, ZA, MfS-BdL/Dok. Nr. 002087, *Dienstanweisung Nr. 3/53 zur Sachakte 'Pest'*, 14 January 1953.

41 BStU, ZA, Allg. S. 66/68, Band 10, Oberst Schröder, Leiter der Hauptabteilung V, to Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, Bezirksverwaltung Gera, Abteilung IX, Tgb.-Nr. HA

of the young men who, from the late 1940s until the mid-1950s, were recruited by the CIA and dropped by parachute into the USSR to collect intelligence.

By the late 1950s the German resistance organizations had been largely broken by the Stasi's ruthless repression. So severe was the Stasi's surveillance and repression in East Germany that, for practical purposes, no organized resistance by underground groups was possible from the late 1950s. The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 further increased the GDR's security against both hostile spying and subversion. For the next quarter-century, the most significant form of resistance was flight, from which Western spying continued to draw strength. Some of the Western secret services' sources agreed to spy in order to procure their exfiltration from the GDR.⁴² The connections back to people in the GDR of East Germans who had managed to escape to the West continued to be important in recruiting new spies. Furthermore, the escape organizations (in German, *Fluchthelfer*) which emerged in West Berlin, West Germany and other places in Western Europe in the 1960s had connections with Western intelligence services and performed intelligence tasks for them.⁴³

The anti-Communism of particular individuals

The principal means of recruiting spies was not by means of resistance organizations. It was by questioning refugees from East Germany, chiefly in West Berlin, and obtaining from them the names of relatives, friends and former colleagues still in the GDR who were firmly anti-Communist, had a suitable job and might be willing to spy for the West. That this was the principal method reflects not only the wealth of good spy candidates to be found in the refugee stream from East to West Germany – about 3.25 million East Germans fled to the Federal Republic between the foundation of the GDR in 1949 and the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 – but also the security risks involved in close cooperation with resistance organizations.

V/5/I7875/63, 19 November 1963, pp. 59 – 60.

42 See MADDRELL, P.: The Scientist Who Came In from the Cold: Heinz Barwich's Flight from the GDR. In: *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 20, 2005, No. 4, pp. 608 – 630.

43 MADDRELL, P.: *Spying on Science*, pp. 253 – 256 and 268 – 270.

A spy's motivation is a complex matter; most spies betray their state for more than one reason.⁴⁴ However, anti-Communism features very strongly among the motives of East Germans who in the 1950s betrayed a state they despised and considered illegitimate. That anti-Communism was, above all, political in nature. However, religion also played a part in turning Germans against the Communists.

Karl Laurenz, who persuaded Elli Barczatis, one of the secretaries of the GDR's Prime Minister, Otto Grotewohl, to betray information to the BND, was a former Socialist Unity Party⁴⁵ member who was critical of the party and had been expelled from it. Barczatis also despised the GDR; the Stasi obtained information that she had told friends in West Berlin she was thinking of fleeing there. Fritz Fehrmann, a senior East German police official who spied for the CIA, told his Line IX interrogator, after his arrest, that there was more freedom for individual people in the Federal Republic than in the GDR, that the GDR's elections were not free or fair and that Communism stood no chance of success in East Germany. Karl Hansel, a former Stasi officer who also spied for the CIA, told his interrogator that his motive for spying was that he hated the Socialist Unity Party, the Stasi and the GDR. All four of these people were sentenced to death and executed. Hansel's will was so strong, and he was so certain of his fate, that he refused even to appeal his death sentence.⁴⁶

The Western secret services appealed to and deliberately encouraged this anti-Communism. The BND presented itself to its sources as a service working for German reunification. When controllers of all the major Western secret services met their agents in West Berlin, obtaining information from them - ostensibly the main purpose of the meeting - actually took up only a minority of the time; most of the time the controllers devoted to encouraging the agent in his or her anti-Communism. They talked about the evils of Communism and handed over anti-Communist literature - the works of Boris Pasternak were favourites. SIS was still doing this in the 1970s with its prize source in the KGB, Oleg Gordievsky.

44 A good survey of this is to be found in TAYLOR, S. - SNOW, D.: *Cold War Spies: Why They Spied and How They Got Caught*. In: *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 12, 1997, No. 2, pp. 101 - 125.

45 The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*), formed in April 1946 by the forced merger of the Communist and Social Democratic parties of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, was, in practice, the East German Communist Party.

46 FRICKE, K. W.: *Spionage als antikommunistischer Widerstand*, pp. 572 - 576.

Gordievsky was amused by this, he claims, since he knew all about the Gulag and did not need to know more. However, SIS was fully aware of the viciousness of the KGB and the difficulty of collecting intelligence in a totalitarian state. Intrusive surveillance and the known pitilessness of the KGB could intimidate any source into abandoning espionage. It was essential to maintain his or her will to fight the Communists.⁴⁷

Naturally, among the Western secret services' sources (particularly of military intelligence) were dedicated Nazis. They saw spying on the Soviet Union's armed forces and on the GDR regime as a continuation of their struggle with Bolshevism. Bernd Stöver's research has identified Western agents with very shady pasts. He points to such people as Georgi Okolovich, chief of the NTS's 'secret section' in the 1950s, who, the Stasi's records indicate, had during the Second World War been the Gestapo chief in Smolensk, Minsk and Bebruisk. Many NTS and TsOPE members had served with the Vlasov Army alongside the German *Wehrmacht* in the War.⁴⁸ HA IX's reports identify former soldiers of the Waffen-SS who spied for the CIA⁴⁹ and BND⁵⁰.

Conclusion

HA IX's monthly reports on spying cases are significant for the historiography of the Cold War operations of the Western intelligence services. They, and other Stasi records, shed unprecedented light on the collaboration between those services and West German resistance groups and fighters. Owing to the US Government's willingness to declassify even very sensitive documents, the Stasi's records are, perhaps, more significant for the historiography of British and West German Intelligence than for that of US Intelligence. Declassified US government and intelligence records establish, quite independently of Stasi records, that American intelligence and covert action agencies cooperated with such resistance organizations. However, British and West German records make no such concession.

The reports also shed much light on the Stasi. They establish that, although Line IX's investigation of suspects was cruel, it was a very capable

47 MADDRELL, P.: *Spying on Science*, pp. 123 – 124; GORDIEVSKY, O.: *Next Stop Execution*. London 1995, pp. 207 – 208.

48 STÖVER, B.: *Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus*, pp. 320 – 321 and 333.

49 BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX, MF-11147, *Tätigkeitsbericht für Oktober 1955*, p. 4.

50 BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX, MF-11235, *Tätigkeitsbericht für April 1963*, pp. 8 – 9.

service. It examined evidence of spying carefully and looked for conclusive evidence of guilt. Its investigation was little influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology, which might have led the investigators to see spies everywhere (as happened in the Soviet Union in the 1930s).

There needs to be further research into whether the same methods were used against other Bloc states and particularly against the Soviet Union. It is well-established that in the 1980s the CIA assisted the Solidarity resistance movement in Poland. However, it remains very obscure whether these methods were used against the USSR, in particular because so little is known about the history of opposition there.⁵¹

Resumé

Tento príspevok tvrdí, že záznamy Ministerstva pre štátnu bezpečnosť NDR (*Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* alebo Stasi) vrhajú svetlo na spoluprácu východonemeckých protikomunistických odbojárov so spravodajskými tajnými službami západných veľmocí (USA, Nemeckej spolkovej republiky, Británie a Francúzska) v počiatočoch Studenej vojny. Sú to záznamy tých útvarov Stasi, ktoré mali na starosti kontrarozvedku a podvratnú činnosť na území cudzích štátov, a osobitne záznamy Línie IX, čo bol vyšetrovací orgán procesov Stasi. Len veľmi málo historikov zatiaľ využilo tieto záznamy k tomu, aby zistili viac o tom, ako západné spravodajské služby získavali informácie alebo povzbudzovali protikomunistický odboj vo východnom Nemecku.

Jednou z príčin, prečo sa tieto záznamy opomínali ako pramene o činnosti západných tajných služieb, proti ktorým Stasi operovala, je skepsa voči ich dôveryhodnosti. Komunisti verili v „imperialistickú“ konšpiráciu proti nim – tajný pokus kapitalistického Západu podnecovať nespokojnosť s ich vládou a mariť výstavbu komunizmu. Vo svojej propagande rozsah a hrozbu západnej špionáže zveličovali. Ich súdy usvedčili zo špionáže mnohých úplne nevinných ľudí. Interné záznamy Stasi však ukazujú, že útvary kontrarozvedky a podvratnej činnosti na území cudzích štátov mali oveľa triezvejší a vecnejší prístup k odhaľovaniu špionáže a odboja. Štúdiá skúma predovšetkým záznamy Línie IX, ktorá pripravovala prípady politickej kriminality na pojednávania na súdoch NDR. V 50. rokoch bolo

51 See MADDRELL, P. – UHL, M.: A KGB view of CIA and other Western espionage against the Soviet Bloc, 1983. In: HUGHES, R. G. – JACKSON, P. – SCOTT, L. (eds.): *Exploring Intelligence Archives*. Abingdon 2008, pp. 243 – 254.

jednou z jej najdôležitejších úloh vyšetrovať špiónov. Veľmi starostlivo skúmala dôkazy voči tým, ktorých zatkli pre podozrenie zo špionáže. Pri vypočúvaní týchto ľudí Línia získavala informácie o západných spravodajských službách. Tieto informácie poskytovala všetkým útvarom kontrarozvedky Stasi. NDR v tom čase čelilo vážnej hrozbe špionáže zo strany veľmi schopných a skúsených západných spravodajských služieb. Stasi si nemohla dovoliť, aby ich marxisticko-leninská ideológia oklamala. Jej útvary kontrarozvedky potrebovali pravdivé fakty o západnej špionáži, aby vedeli čeliť hrozbe, ktorú predstavovala. Záznamy Línie IX [obzvlášť mesačné správy Hlavného oddelenia Línie (*Hauptabteilung*) vo východnom Berlíne ministromi štátnej bezpečnosti] dokazujú, že niekoľko nemeckých a sovietskych odbojových organizácií v 50. rokoch aktívne pomáhalo špionáži hlavných západných spravodajských služieb. Dokazujú tiež, že mnohých špiónov, ktorí súhlasili, že budú pre tieto služby vyzvedať, motivovali k tomu ich vášnivé antikomunistické postoje. Dôkazy v týchto záznamoch sa zhodujú s tými, ktoré sú k dispozícii zo západných zdrojov. Antikomunizmus v NDR bol základom snáh západných spravodajských služieb zbierať informácie od špiónov na počiatku Studenej vojny.

Útvary rozvedky pre boj s emigráciou

Michal MIKLOVIČ

Jednu z platforiem pre komunistický režim neprijateľnej politickej opozície tvorila emigrácia, predovšetkým verejne činní a voči komunistickému režimu kritickí emigranti a ich organizácie. Emigrácia bola preto jedným z objektov československej Štátnej bezpečnosti (ŠtB). Hoci sa emigrácii čiastočne venovali aj iné bezpečnostné zložky, jadro riešenia tejto problematiky bolo na rozvedke ako tej zložke ŠtB, ktorá mala na starosti výkon spravodajskej činnosti v zahraničí. Tento príspevok preto prezentuje postavenie a úlohy útvarov určených pre emigráciu v československej komunistickej rozvedke.

Dôležitosť problematiky emigrácie ukazuje aj skutočnosť, že je ako cieľ rozvedky opakovane prítomná v jej štatútoch, teda základných dokumentoch udávajúcich úlohy a organizáciu rozvedky. Napríklad jednou zo šiestich úloh rozvedky v jej štatúte z roku 1954 bola „*práca proti čl. [československej] reakčnej emigrácii*“. Spočívala v odhaľovaní emigrantov využívaných cudzími spravodajskými službami k „*podvratnej práci*“ proti ČSR, v získavaní informácií o činnosti rôznych emigrantských organizácií a skupín a v operatívnom využívaní rozporov existujúcich medzi emigrantskými organizáciami a ich vedúcimi predstaviteľmi. Rozvedka mala za úlohu aj predchádzať emigrácii československých občanov, ktorí boli vyslaní do zahraničia, a ich získaniu cudzími rozvedkami.¹ V neskoršom období emigráciu prevzala zahraničná kontrarozvedka (ZKR) ako

1 Statut první správy (rozvědky) ministerstva vnitra Československé republiky. Tajný rozkaz ministra vnitra č. 100 z 22. 5. 1954. Pozri: *První správa. Československá rozvědka v dokumentech 1945 – 1990*. Bez uvedenia miesta vydania 2000, s. 28 – 29.

útvár rozviedky určený na boj s nepriateľskými spravodajskými službami a spravodajskou ochranou československých občanov a inštitúcií v zahraničí. Obavy z prepojenia emigrácie s cudzími spravodajskými službami potvrdzuje aj štatút československej rozviedky z roku 1971, ktorý stanovuje ZKR zodpovednosť „[...] za boj proti nepriateľským rozviedkam a kontrarozviedkam, centráram psychologickéj vojny a emigrácie, za obranu čs. zastupiteľských úradov a čs. občanov v kapitalistických štátoch a za vykonávanie aktívnych a psychologických opatrení zodpovedajúcimi metódami a prostriedkami“.²

Špecializované útvary určené pre emigráciu boli v rozviedke prítomné od začiatku až do pádu komunistického režimu. Keďže však nie sú zachované, resp. prístupné všetky materiály týkajúce sa československej komunistickej rozviedky, nie je zatiaľ možné plnohodnotne popísať zloženie a úlohy jej útvarov.

Prvý v komunistickom režime zriadený útvár rozviedky pre sledovanie emigrácie pôsobil od 1. decembra 1948 na ministerstve vnútra (MV). V štruktúre vtedajšej rozviedky, *Samostatného sektoru BAB*, pôsobilo 2. oddelenie – *operatívne* a v rámci neho 3. referát – *emigrácia*. Z prehľadu organizačnej štruktúry rozviedky z roku 1952³ vyplýva, že emigrácii sa venoval 2. odbor – *emigrácia*, ktorý sa delil na dve oddelenia a tie ďalej na dva referáty. Zameranie referátov dokumentuje vtedajší záujem rozviedky o jednotlivé skupiny československej emigrácie. Referáty 1. oddelenia sa venovali Ústrediu Rady slobodného Československa a československým komitétom pre utečencov, politickým stranám v emigrácii a „slovenským separatistom“. Referáty 2. oddelenia sa venovali emigrantom ako jednotlivcom, utečeneckým táborm a špionážnym centrálam.⁴

Koncom 50. rokov spracovávali emigráciu operatívne odbory politickej rozviedky. Podľa hlavných úloh na rok 1961 sa rozviedka v problematike emigrácie zameriavala na odhaľovanie „podvratnej“ činnosti emigrácie, jej finančnej závislosti od USA a získavala kompromitujúce materiály na jednotlivcov a materiály o činnosti emigrantských organizácií. Prostredníctvom aktívnych opatrení mala rozviedka prispievať k rozvratu a likvidácii

2 Statut I. správy Ministerstva vnútra ČSSR, marec 1971. Tamže, s. 75.

3 Po vytvorení ministerstva národnej bezpečnosti pôsobila rozviedka od 21. októbra 1950 ako jeho *II. samostatný sektor*, od 3. apríla 1951 ako *Odbor Z* a od 1. júla 1952 ako *Správa zahranično-politickej rozviedky*.

4 DVOŘÁKOVÁ, J.: *Státní bezpečnost v letech 1945 - 1953. (Organizační vývoj zpravodajských a státně bezpečnostních složek)*. Praha 2007, s. 207.

emigrantských organizácií. Hlavná pozornosť bola venovaná rádiu Slobodná Európa, najmä jeho vysielaču v Mníchove, kde sa mali vykonávať aktívne opatrenia s cieľom vyvolať vnútorné problémy a nedôveru medzi jej vedením a zamestnancami.⁵

Materiál *K vývoji a ďalším úkolům československé rozvědky* z roku 1964 uvádza, že po roku 1960 problematika zahraničnej kontrarozvedky čiastočne prešla na II. správu MV (kontrarozvedku) a problematika emigrácie sa v rozvedke prestala úplne rozpracovávať na základe názoru, že v tej dobe šlo už o prekonaný jav.⁶ Rozvedka v roku 1961 skutočne ukončila viacero objektových zväzkov venovaných emigrácii, v ďalších zväzkoch založených pred rokom 1960 sa však pokračovalo aj v 60. a 70. rokoch. Z toho je možné usúdiť, že emigrácia sa na rozvedke dočasne prestala sledovať len ako samostatná problematika a naďalej sa rozpracovávala v rámci iných odborov politickej rozvedky.

Fakt, že šlo len o prechodný stav, potvrdzuje aj skutočnosť, že od 1. februára 1963 v štruktúre rozvedky vznikol *odbor zahraničnej kontrarozvedky* (OZK) s krycím označením *9. odbor*. Do jeho pôsobnosti spadala aj emigrácia, ktorej sa venovalo jeho 5. oddelenie. Pri založení OZK boli na 5. oddelenie priradení príslušníci zo 4. – nemeckého – odboru rozvedky. Náčelnikom oddelenia sa stal Josef Matějka „Malínsky“ (nar. 1923), ktorý predtým od 1. marca 1956 pôsobil vo funkcii náčelnika oddelenia na nemeckom odbore. Podľa zachovaných dokumentov sa 5. oddelenie OZK venovalo „reakčným“ emigrantským centráam a organizáciám s cieľom odhaliť ich činnosť, plány a úmysly proti Československu. V problematike emigrácie mal OZK viaceré úlohy:

1. odhaľovať plány nepriateľských spravodajských služieb smerujúcich k využívaniu emigrantských organizácií alebo jednotlivcov na nepriateľskú činnosť proti ČSSR, proti zastupiteľským úradom alebo iným československým inštitúciám alebo proti československým občanom v zahraničí,
2. využívať emigrantské organizácie na prienik tajných spolupracovníkov do nepriateľských spravodajských služieb,

5 Archiv bezpečnostních složek (ďalej ABS), fond (ďalej f.) Hlavní správa rozvědky – I. správa (ďalej len I. S-SNB), škatuľa (ďalej iba šk.) 24. Hodnocení práce I. správy MV za rok 1960 a hlavní zásady plánu na rok 1961.

6 ABS, f. I. S-SNB, šk. 24. K vývoji a ďalším úkolům československé rozvědky.

3. rozkladať „reakčné“ emigrantské organizácie prostredníctvom prehlbovania rozporov medzi jednotlivými organizáciami a ich vedúcimi osobnosťami a kompromitovať ich pred svetovou verejnosťou a pred západnými spravodajskými službami, ktoré ich využívajú,
4. v individuálnych a účelných prípadoch získavať pre návrat do Československa vedúcich funkcionárov alebo aktívnych pracovníkov k neskoršiemu propagandistickému využitiu,
5. najmä medzi krajskými organizáciami vytvárať, podporovať a rozvíjať vlastenecké a pokrokové hnutie a tým získavať spojencov k definitívnemu rozloženiu „reakčných“ emigrantských organizácií.⁷

V poslednej úlohe je zrejмый rozdiel v používaní termínu „emigrácia“ v negatívnom zmysle pre emigrantov opozične naladených voči komunistickému režimu alebo voči osobám, ktoré Československo opustili „nelegálne“, a termínu „krajania“ voči neutrálnym či prokomunistickým organizáciám. Pri reorganizácii rozvedky k 1. februáru 1964 zmenil OZK krycie označenie z 9. na 6. odbor.

Pri ďalších komplexných reorganizáciách rozvedky sa menilo označenie i postavenie zahraničnej kontrarozvedky. V rámci novozriadenej *Hlavnej správy rozvedky* pôsobila od 1. júna 1969 ako *Správa B*, problematiku emigrácie mal v kompetencii jej *2. odbor – kontrarozvedny*.

Pri reorganizácii rozvedky k 1. aprílu 1971 prevzal emigráciu novozriadený *31. odbor – emigrácia*. Jeho poverený náčelník Aleš Nádvorník „Netuka“ (nar. 1928) sa emigrácii venoval už od 15. marca 1956 na nemeckom odbore. Touto organizačnou zmenou prišlo k osamostatneniu emigrácie od ostatných problematik zahraničnej kontrarozvedky, pre ktoré boli tiež vytvorené samostatné odbory: *21. odbor – špeciálne služby* pre boj proti spravodajským službám západných krajín, *26. odbor – obrana* pre spravodajskú ochranu československých občanov v zahraničí a *36. odbor – psychologické operácie* pre aktívne a vplyvové opatrenia. Osamostatnenie problematiky emigrácie do samostatného odboru je možné vnímať v súvislosti s narastajúcou emigráciou a jej aktivitami v zahraničí po invázii sovietskych vojsk v auguste 1968. Novozriadený *31. odbor* sa zameriaval

⁷ ABS, f. Studijní ústav MV (A1), inv. j. 65. Zřízení OZK, úkoly, struktura a metody jeho práce.

na rozpracovávanie aktívnych protičeskoslovenských a protisocialistických centier a prominentov československej emigrácie. Získaval tiež informácie o politickej, špionážnej a ideodiverznej činnosti emigrácie, odhaľoval komunikačné kanály emigrácie do Československa, jej spolupracovníkov v Československu, ale aj komunikačné kanály a vplyv na komunistické strany v západných krajinách. 31. odbor navrhoval a vykonával aj aktívne opatrenia s cieľom ovplyvniť emigráciu a zlikvidovať jej protištátne a protisocialistické aktivity.⁸ Príslušníci legalizovaní v zahraničí boli k 31. odboru preradení až k 1. februáru 1972. V tomto období mal odbor svojich príslušníkov umiestnených na rezidentúrach Bern, Frankfurt, Londýn, Paríž, Rím, Viedeň a Washington.⁹

V roku 1988 pribudol v názve odboru termín „ideodiverzia“, pod ktorým komunistický režim chápal podvratnú činnosť motivovanú nenávisťou k socialistickému zriadeniu. Od 1. januára 1988 bol 31. odbor premenovaný na *odbor emigrácie a ideodiverzie*.¹⁰ K 30. septembru 1988 mal zanikajúci 31. odbor svojich príslušníkov umiestnených na rezidentúrach Bonn, Londýn, Paríž, Rím, Štokholm, Viedeň, Washington a Montreal.¹¹ K 1. októbru 1988 prichádza k ďalšej reorganizácii rozvedky, v rámci ktorej sa *31. odbor – emigrácia a ideodiverzia* zlúčil s *26. odborom – zahraničná kontrarozvedka*. Týmto zlúčením vznikol nový *26. odbor – odbor špeciálnych služieb, ideodiverzie a emigrácie*. Náčelnikom odboru sa stal Milan Jelínek „Brodský“ (nar. 1944), ktorý od vzniku 31. odboru pracoval ako jeho referent, v období od 1. apríla 1984 do 31. marca 1987 ako jeho náčelník. Cieľom tejto organizačnej zmeny bolo zabezpečiť efektívnejšiu a koordinovanejšiu prácu proti nepriateľským spravodajským službám, ideodiverzným centráam a nepriateľskej emigrácii.¹² Nový 26. odbor bol hneď po svojom vzniku premenovaný na *odbor zahraničnej kontrarozvedky, ideodiverzie a emigrácie*.¹³ V tejto podobe odbor zostal až do zániku ŠtB k 15. februáru 1990.

8 ABS, f. I. S-SNB, šk. 271. Organizace I. správy FMV, březen 1971.

9 ABS, f. I. S-SNB. Kádrový rozkaz náčelníka I.S-SNB č. 154 z 28. 12. 1971.

10 ABS, f. I. S-SNB, šk. 17. Rozkaz náčelníka I. správy SNB č. 20 z 30. 12. 1987. Organizační struktura a podřízenost I. správy SNB.

11 ABS, f. I. S-SNB. Kádrový rozkaz náčelníka I. S-SNB č. 58 z 27. 9. 1988.

12 ABS, f. I. S-SNB, šk. 1B. Rozkaz náčelníka I. správy SNB č. 21 z 22. 8. 1988. Změny v organizační struktuře I. S-SNB.

13 ABS, f. I. S-SNB, šk. 1B. Rozkaz náčelníka I. správy SNB č. 22 z 22. 8. 1988. Organizační struktura a podřízenost I. S-SNB.

Český Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů v rámci svojej webovej prezentácie udalostí spojených s pádom komunistického režimu v Československu¹⁴ ponúka prehľad štruktúry a personálneho obsadenia rozviedky k 17. novembru 1989. V rámci tohto prehľadu je možné vidieť aj personálne zloženie a organizáciu 26. odboru, ktorý tvorili: *vnútorná skupina, 1. oddelenie – analytické, 2. oddelenie – zámorské ideodiverzné centrály, 3. oddelenie – európske ideodiverzné centrály, 4. oddelenie – zámorské špeciálne služby a 5. oddelenie – európske špeciálne služby*.¹⁵ Problematika emigrácie tu nemá vlastné oddelenie, k emigrácii sa teda pristupovalo buď v nadväznosti na západné spravodajské služby alebo ako k ideodiverzným centrálam. Z terajšieho pohľadu neadekvátne spojenie emigrácie s ideodiverziou však plne vystihuje vnímanie emigrácie komunistickým režimom.

Uvedený prehľad vývoja útvarov rozviedky pre boj s emigráciou – najmä v obdobiach, v ktorých útvar pôsobil ako samostatné oddelenie či odbor – potvrdzuje, že problematika emigrácie bola jednou z priorit československej komunistickej rozviedky. Príspevok je základným východiskom pre ďalší výskum problematiky emigrácie a jej postavenia v rozviedke. V nadväznosti na to bude v budúcnosti potrebné bližšie analyzovať praktickú činnosť útvarov určených pre boj s emigráciou, či už v rozviedke, alebo aj v ďalších bezpečnostných zložkách komunistického Československa.

Summary

This paper presents the position and tasks of the Czechoslovak Communist Intelligence Service units dealing with the emigration issues. Emigration was one of the unacceptable political opposition platforms for the Communist regime, especially those publicly active emigrants and their organisations being critical towards the regime. Therefore the emigration became one of the objects monitored by the Czechoslovak State Security. Although other security units also dealt with the emigration issues, it was first of all the task of the intelligence to perform intelligence activities abroad. These activities aimed to disclose the emigrants used by foreign intelligence services to perform “subversive work” against the

14 Stránky venované událostem roku 1989. Dostupné na <http://www.ustrcr.cz/cs/listopad-1989>

15 Hlavní správa rozvědky SNB – I. správa SNB. Dostupné na <http://www.ustrcr.cz/cs/hlavni-sprava-rozvedky-snb-1sprava>

Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, gathering information on the activities of various emigrant organisations and groups, and to use the conflicts existing among the emigrant organisations and their leaders. One of the tasks of the intelligence service was also to prevent Czechoslovak citizens posted to work abroad to emigrate and the possibility they could be hired by foreign secret services.

1956 as a “*lieu de mémoire*”: Hungarian State Power and the Opposition on the Anniversaries of the Revolution

Alexandra BOTYÁNSZKI

Memory and Resistance: A Theoretical Framework

I take as my starting point the concept of the “*lieu de mémoire*” (“memory place”), a term introduced by Pierre Nora. A “*memory place*” is a “site” where cultural memory crystallizes and secretes itself, a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community.¹

Firstly, I will try to present the theoretical framework for the research with which I have been engaged since 2009. I have used the widest definition of “*lieu de mémoire*”, because in my representation, the concept has to do not only with where history occurred, but with all the elements with which it is connected; for example, the celebration of an anniversary. I interpret the concept of “memory place” not in the sense of an interiorized content, but rather as the *symptom of deficiency and oblivion*.

Under the circumstances of oppression, memory can serve as both *resistance* and a *weapon* against State Power. The memory of 1956 provided the impetus for change in the 1980s. State Power under the leadership of János Kádár dreaded the subversive content of memory. Remembrance is a mode of dissociation from the given facts, a mode of “mediation” which breaks, for short moments, the omnipresent power of the given facts.

1 NORA, P.: Emlékezet és történelem között: a helyek problematikája. In: *Aetas*, Vol. 14, 1999, No. 3, pp. 142 – 157.

Memory recalls both the terror and the hope that have passed.² In the face of totalitarian oppression, the liberating power of cultural memory can appear.³ Anniversaries are examples of the kind of rituals and practices that deal with social memory.

In the Kádár era, the real story of 1956 was replaced with counter-stories, whereby an experience of deficiency came into existence. According to Koselleck, it is possible to recall the memory of a past, heroic age by setting out from the experiences of present deficiencies. These narrations emphasise the absentee, the lost one, the disappeared one.⁴

Under the circumstances of a dictatorship, it can happen that the *contra-present* or *contra-factual mytho-motorika* (*motor functions of myth*) become revolutionary. The tradition does not confirm the views of the dictatorship, but questions its actuality, and hears summons to change and upheaval. The recalled past seems to be a political and social utopia, for which it is worthy to live and work. In this case, remembrance may turn into waiting.⁵

The revolution was the largest taboo of the Kádár system; it was forbidden to talk about the heroes of 1956. The revolution interpreted a *counter-memory*. It is not obvious whether the programme of 1956 was current in the 1980s; a common programme did not exist. However, a positive heritage from 1956 was about to take shape unambiguously in the opposition's documents. If we perceive 1956 as a symbolic "commemorative formation", then emphasising the revolution means identifying some kind of social and political identity in the 1980s. The relation of being connected with the past creates the basis for the reminiscent group's identity.⁶

Here we get to the examination of the relation between the collective and the cultural memory. The wide-ranging usage of the concept of cultural memory has its opponents. They argue with the fact that with the so-called collective memory nothing increases beyond the old forms;

2 MARCUSE, H.: *Az egydimenziós ember*. Budapest 1990, p. 120.

3 ASSMANN, J.: *A kulturális emlékezet. Írás, emlékezés és politikai identitás a korai magaskultúrákban*. Budapest 2004, p. 86.

4 KOSELLECK, R.: Az emlékezet diszkontinuitása. In: *2000*, Vol. 11. 1999, No. 11, pp. 3 – 8.

5 ASSMANN, J.: *A kulturális emlékezet*, p. 80. The mytho-motorika is the mythical driving force, which shapes the group's identity and the guideline of the act and arranging one solves strength to the group.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 63.

myths, traditions, habits, and historical consciousness. It is difficult to give an accurate definition for a people's connection with memory. However verifiable, the collective memory is not a substitute for history (or for historical recollection); memory takes shape by way of symbolism and rites.⁷

"Memory places" and memory practice are the central elements of ongoing struggles over identity. The cultural memory is composed of fields of cultural "negotiations", through which different stories vie for a place in history.⁸ Contestation is clearly at the center of both memory and identity.⁹

However, State Power made the competition of identities impossible, because history was not readily available to be used as a tool by competing identities.¹⁰ According to Robbins, "*if one controls a people's memory, one controls their dynamism*",¹¹ and therefore, the role of memory is crucial for those in power, even though they may not be able to control it totally. Their power is shaken, if the management of memory slips out of their hands. State Power is closely associated with both memory and oblivion, for looking back legitimates it, and looking ahead perpetuates it.¹²

A society creates and maintains its identities with the help of different mnemonic places, practices and forms. Celebrations of anniversaries play a decisive role in this process.¹³ The Revolution 1956 is connected with the most important memory places of the era, and is in symbiosis with other significant holidays.

The various anniversaries provided opportunities for the Opposition to refrain from giving the remembrance a "festive" shape, but that this

7 ROBBINS, J.: Social Memory Studies: From Collective Memory to Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices. In: *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 24, 1998, No. 1, p. 112.

8 STURKIN, M.: *Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, The Aids Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering*. Berkeley 1997, p. 1.

9 ROBBINS, J.: Social Memory Studies, p. 126.

10 ALONSO, A. M.: The effects of truth: representation of the past and the imagining of community. In: *Journal of Historical Sociology* Vol. 1, 1988, No. 1, pp. 33 – 57.

11 ROBBINS, J.: Social Memory Studies, p. 126.

12 ASSMANN, J.: *A kulturális emlékezet*, p. 57.

13 SPILLMAN, L. P.: *Nation and Commemoration: Creating National Identities in the United States and Australia*. New York 1997.

accentuation took place in practise, created a resistance form out of the memory.¹⁴

The most important “memory places” during the Kádár era were connected with the anniversaries of the two “failed” revolutions of 1848¹⁵ and 1956. In my paper, I examine how the Opposition used these memories to generate demonstrations, and I will also consider the nature of the response by the State Power. The paper will focus on three dates in 1956: 15 March, 16 June, 23 October, which were inseparably connected, so that their claims cannot be viewed as independent from each other. On these days, the largest crowds were attracted to the demonstrations.

15 March has a centuries-old tradition, which was not overshadowed by 4 April¹⁶, however it entered into the heritage of 1956 Revolution.¹⁷ On 16 June 1988, the Hungarian State Power attempted to ruin efforts by the Opposition to memorialise the 1956 Revolution. Plot 301, where Imre Nagy¹⁸ and his compatriots¹⁹ lay, served as the focal point for a protest that took place on the anniversary of Nagy’s execution. Cultural memory in Hungary is powerfully reinforced through various rites of memorial, which include not only the burial of the dead, but also the remembrance of symbolic figures. The events of 1956 represented a conception of a Hungary free from foreign influence and free to choose its own path. It is this cultural memory that aids each generation as it reinterprets the meaning of the events of 1956. The most significant aspect of the demonstrations was the reassertion of the symbols that the Opposition regarded as authentic to the nation. The State Power considered the anniversaries a test of strength, and 23 October had special importance for the Opposition, in that it brought to the surface the variant strategies among the different Oppositionist tendencies.

14 For more regarding the claims of the East-Central European Oppositionist see: Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történelmi Levéltára (hereafter only ÁBTL), 1.11.4. T-VIII./88. I. Poland. 7/5951/292/1988. júl. 20.; ÁBTL, 1.11.4. T-VIII./88. I. Poland. 7/6469/314/1988. aug. 17.

15 Revolution and War of Independence against the Austrian-Empire.

16 Communist National Day, commemorating the day the country was “liberated” from Nazi occupation.

17 Radio Free Europe. *Szerkesztők fóruma*, 15. 3. 1988. Zoltán Zsille.

18 The executed prime minister of Hungary.

19 Miklós Gimes, Pál Maléter, Géza Losonczy, József Szilágyi.

Memory and Resistance in 1988

The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) seems to have found 1988 an especially difficult year.²⁰ A memorandum for János Berecz had already been made in 1987,²¹ and by the time the definitive proposal came before the Agitation and Propaganda Department, the only thing left to do with the proposal was avoid the debate.²² Here we come face to face with the dictatorship's frequent preventive strategy—oblivion,²³ the State Power's constant means of escape. The Revolution was the Opposition's idea for developing one of the most important identities,²⁴ and because of this, the HSWP did not manage to maintain total rule over the memory of 1956. I consider it important to stress that the Opposition was significant, not because of the size of its membership, which is expedient to deduce, but because its social effect expanded in much wider circles.²⁵

During 1988, the HSWP had to reckon ever more seriously with alternative organisations. For the Opposition, the year started with waiting, knowing that something had to happen.²⁶ In the *Samizdat Journal*, Beszélő suggested the possibility of two kinds of political catastrophe. One of the possibilities was that there would be some kind uprising, which would be stamped out by the police, and the success of its determined plan would confirm the HSWP's order party. The other kind of political catastrophe that might occur, according to the article, was that the movement might sweep away the State Power, which would then be restored with outward aggression or the introduction of a general “state of emergency” afterwards. Something similar happened in 1956, but remembrance of the Revolution was protected from the excessive radicalism of the society. It was regarded

20 Magyar Országos Levéltár (hereafter only MOL) Budapest, M-KS 288. f. 22/1987/3. ő. e.

21 The secretary for the Central Committee (KB) and 1956 “expert”.

22 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 22/1987/4. ő. e.

23 RICOEUR, P.: Emlékezet – felejtés – történelem, In: THOMKA, B. (ed.): *Narratívák 3. A kultúra narratívái*. Budapest 1999, pp. 51 – 67.

24 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 11/4450. ő. e. MSZMP KB Közigazgatási és Adminisztratív Osztálya Tájékoztató a Központi Bizottságnak az ellenzéki, ellenséges tevékenység néhány új vonásáról (1988), március 16.

25 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 4/242-243. ő. e. Az MSZMP KB (1988). szeptember 27-i ülésének jegyzőkönyve. A párt helyzete, a pártélet és a belpolitika időszerű kérdései.

26 *Beszélő*, 1988, No. 23, pp. 217 – 220; *Hírmondó*, 1988, No. 25, p. 1.

as a lesser possibility that the Soviet Union would stamp out the uprising with armed forces just as easily in 1988, as it had in 1956.²⁷

Historical parallels could be found in Hungary and foreign countries, and there were many opinions formed in connection with the view, “*that when the dictatorial governance system was relieved in the socialist countries (1953, 1956, 1968) it always led to a big shock and incalculable reactions,*” to which the situation in 1988 was weirdly similar.²⁸

Party members worried about the appearance of “right-wing” murmurings in public life, and the muddiness of the internal political situation: “*Even if its form is different, still the events were exceptionally similar in content to the event of 1956*”.²⁹ János Berecz spoke of “*destiny-altering times*”, which intensified the endeavours of “*thinking of non-socialist alternatives*”.³⁰ Western diplomats thought that it would be harmful to imitate 1956 for the formation of states.³¹ Without having consistently thought through the differences between the events of 1988 and 1956, it appeared to be a search for unhistorical spectacular analogies.³²

The first “test of strength” in 1988: March 15 Demonstration

15 March was the first “tribulation” in 1988 for the Party leadership. In the 1970s, the spontaneous 15 March demonstrations had been a serious challenge to the Kádár system. The programme of 15 March rose up again in the middle of the 1980s, despite all of the efforts of State Power to make it insignificant or prevent it altogether. The “other holiday” served as a counterpoint to the official programmes.³³ The limitations of my lecture do not make it possible to present information regarding the previous year’s

27 Mitől féljünk? In: *Beszélő*, 1988, No. 8, p. 23; D.G.: Kezdeményezések. In: *Hírmondó* 1988, No. 25, p. 1.

28 ÁBTL, 1.11.4. T-VII./88. II. Soviet Union 39/9951/2262/1988; ÁBTL, 1.11.4. T-V/88. I. Hungary 39/2377/560/1988.

29 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 4/242-243. ő. e.

30 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 4/244-245. ő. e. MSZMP KB 1988. november 1-2-i ülésének jegyzőkönyve. A belpolitikai helyzet és a párt feladatai. János Berecz speech.

31 ÁBTL, 1.11.4. T-V/88. I. Hungary. 39/2377/560/1988. márc. 22.

32 ÁBTL, 1.11.4. T-V./88. II. Hungary. 67/87-61/11/1988. 67/9-974/1988. márc. 22.

33 SZABÓ, M. – WISLER, D. (eds.): *Tüntetés, rendőrség, demokrácia*. Budapest 1999, p. 173.

protest;³⁴ I allude to it only by saying that the history of the demonstrations going back decades and it was the decennial script of the events.

In 1988, the anniversary was celebrated during a changing political situation and society began to organise itself.³⁵ Information arrived beforehand, that the Opposition was preparing for a large-scale demonstration in Budapest.³⁶ The Opposition wished to change the traditional procession into a more general protest against the government. According to the information held by the State Security Service, the Opposition counted on the fact that social discontent would intensify until March, due to the raising of prices earlier in the year and the decrease in the people’s real income. The organisers of the protest wished to send their *12 Points* to the government.³⁷ The *Samizdat Journal, Demokrata* in the example of 1848, 1918³⁸ and 1956, required the practise of a national democratic tradition, and declared the anniversaries to be national holidays and demanded negotiations regarding the conditions and deadline for Soviet military extraction.³⁹

The Party regarded the demonstrations as the greatest trouble, in that they continually blurred the borders between legality and illegality,⁴⁰ the changes occurring under the existing circumstances, and regarded the programmes of the Opposition with a “hostile” view. Being linked to this blurred the borders between the citizens’ and the administrative organisations’ rights and duties.

The police took preventive measures. Before the demonstration, “hostile” persons were given a “warning beforehand”, and the police conducted

34 GYARMATI. G.: *Március hatalma – a hatalom márciusa. Fejezetek Március 15. ünnepelésének történetéből.* Budapest 1998; UNGVÁRY, K.: *Az állambiztonság célkeresztjében: Március 15. a pártállami diktatúrában.* In: *Rubicon*, Vol. 18, 2007, No. 3, pp. 20 – 28.

35 GYARMATI. G.: *Március hatalma – a hatalom márciusa*, pp. 189 – 194.

36 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 11/4450. ő. e. MSZMP KB Közigazgatási és Adminisztratív Osztálya Tájékoztató a Központi Bizottságnak az ellenzéki, ellenséges tevékenység néhány új vonásáról. 1988. március 16. ÁBTL, 1.11.4. T-V/87. IV. Hungary 67/9-4930/1987; ÁBTL, 1.11.4. T-V/88. I. Hungary 39/2458/579/1988; ÁBTL, 1.12.2. Demonstrations 13. 1988. III. 15.

37 ÁBTL, 1.11.4. T-V/87. IV. Magyarország. 67/9-4930/1987. dec. 22. 6/3-6/1987.

38 The Aster or Chrysanthemum Revolution.

39 MSZMP – rendőrség – szabadsajtó. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, No. 3, p. 1.

40 The association foundation and the practice of the right of assembly was not directed adequately. MOL, M-KS 288. f. 4/246-247. ő. e. A gyülekezési és az egyesülési jogról szóló törvények társadalmi vitája (22 November 1988).

house searches.⁴¹ The Budapest Police Station's experts published for "the disturbance of the national day rabble-rousing" leaflets and other publications. The State Power initiated a procedure against Péter Bokros, Gábor Demszky, György Gadó, Péter Grawátsch, Jenő Nagy, and Ottília Solt.⁴² Through them the Opposition received the threat that the State Power would take revenge on all of them for "disorderly conduct, truculent behavior, and a lawsuit would be initiated."⁴³

The rest of the Opposition's members quickly heard of the news of the night raids. According to the *Demokrata*, the aim was to intimidate the Democratic Opposition's radical wing.⁴⁴ The different Western news agencies and Radio Free Europe (RFE) dealt in detail with the police actions in their reports.⁴⁵

The preliminary arrests did not achieve the aim set by the State Power: three to five thousand people attended the demonstration.⁴⁶ According to the opinions of foreign countries, it was an essential element that this was the first protest with such a big a crowd in Hungary since 1956. However, the situation was the opposite, according to the RFE's assessment. 15 March was not an omen of a new revolution,⁴⁷ but rather the "ghost" of 1956. Slogans on the banners read: "Fifty-Six is ours! Respect the martyrs of Fifty-Six!"⁴⁸

The official reports quibbled with the numbers and wrote about smaller groups.⁴⁹ The informational summary of the Agitation and Propaganda Department wrote about the events in more detail. According to the document, the Opposition's activists were given the *Demokrata's 12 points* leaflet

41 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 11/4450. ő. e.

42 Március 10-i MTI-közlemény. A rendőrség közleménye. In: *Beszélő*, 1988, No. 25, pp. 453 – 454.

43 A Szégyen nekrológja. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, No. 4, p. 5.

44 MSZMP – rendőrség – szabadsajtó. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, No. 3, p. 2.

45 MSZMP Budapesti Bizottsága, 1988. március 15. Agitációs és Propaganda Osztály. Információs összefoglaló. In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 24, p. 454.

46 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 11/4450. ő. e.

47 ÁBTL, 1.11.4. T-V/88. I. Hungary. 39/2458/579/1988. márc. 24.

48 ÁBTL, 1.12.2. Demonstrations 13. 1988. III. 15. Mixed

49 *Népszabadság*, 16 March 1988; Három beszámoló. In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 24, pp. 453 – 455.

with the "1848 – 1849" inscription, depicting the old Kossuth coat of arms, and Zsolt Keszthelyi's⁵⁰ photocopied photograph was shared out.

First János Kis spoke to the crowd, demanding a democratic Hungary, and lauding the independent Democratic Opposition.⁵¹ On the Kossuth Square, Miklós Tamás Gáspár was declaimed and then at the Batthyány Eternal Light Memorial Róza Hodosán read out the speech of Gábor Demszky⁵², who had been arrested that morning. In his speech, he warned about the admonitions of 1956, 1958, and 1981.⁵³

According to the Party's opinion, the content of the speeches was extreme and was directed against the Party's federal contact. In the assessment of the HSWP, The speeches questioned the endeavors of the democratization and the development of the publicity.⁵⁴ The arrested Oppositionists drove home in the evening from the Budapest National Prison.

The Opposition rejected the arrests through a protest declaration, and it was regarded as big resignation after the previous year's milder intervention by the State Power.⁵⁵ They demanded that the authorities should have respect for the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and assembly.⁵⁶ The police did not try to prove the statement that the Opposition would have wanted to disturb the anniversary. The Oppositionists received a groundless "warning record" after their arrest which lasted only until six pm. The Opposition sent an appeal to the participants of the Frankfurt Human Rights Conference. In their declaration they declared that a totalitarian political institutional system reigned in Hungary, despite the sonorous propaganda of the system: "*This is a police autocracy, not democracy, and human rights do not prevail*".⁵⁷

50 Colleague of the *Samizdat*, Égtájak Között. In 1987, he was sentenced to an unprecedentedly serious, three year imprisonment for refusing military service. *Égtájak Között*. Földfogyatkozás 3:14 (1987), 69.

51 Beszédék. In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 24, pp. 456 – 457.

52 MSZMP Budapesti Bizottsága, 1988. március 15. Agitációs és Propaganda Osztály. Információs összefoglaló: In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 24, pp. 454 – 456.

53 A Szégyen nekrológja. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, No. 4, p. 12.

54 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 11/4450. ő. e.

55 *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, No. 4, p. 15.

56 A Szégyen nekrológja. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, No. 4, pp. 6 – 15.

57 A magyar demokratikus ellenzék. 1988. március 16. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, No. 4, p. 43.

16 June and the Brutality of the State Power

The commemoration of someone who has passed away, insisting on certain names, always means identifying with some kind of social and political identity.⁵⁸

It is not only possible to interpret the events of the past as something else, but the burden of a past sin may either be aggravated or liberated. It depends whether a charge detains the sinner in the painful feeling of its irreversibility, or if forgiveness opens up the way of absolution for him. This makes it all worth it— the sense that the past changes.

The future expectation rests on notions of the past.⁵⁹ The cultural memory consists of layers of cultural values. The preservation of those values happens only for those who in a given age and moment enjoy appreciation. However, with time, the stored data and events are reinterpreted. “*Perpetua oblivio et amnestia*”,⁶⁰ with this concept the Westphalian Contract goes into detail about the ethical requirements of common memory.⁶¹ Preserving the memory of Imre Nagy and his martyred companions was a serious ethical burden and a serious difficulty for the State Power and János Kádár. Some people considered the reappraisal of 1956 and Imre Nagy’s rehabilitation prerequisites of reformism.⁶²

The case of Imre Nagy’s burial placed on the agenda in 1988 raised some hard and prickly political question.⁶³ The request of Aliz Halda to deliver the corpses of Imre Nagy and his martyred companions to the relatives was rejected by the leadership. However, according to Beszélő, “*the ghosts of the unburied dead are allowed to return to the realm above to visit the living*”. The *Samizdat* warned that if this had been accomplished earlier, if the request of the relatives had been accepted, it would have showed the strength of the State Power and its intention for reconciliation. Because the government had postponed the decision, such a political allowance

58 ASSMANN, J.: *A kulturális emlékezet*, p. 63.

59 RICOEUR, P.: *Emlékezet – felejtés – történelem*, pp. 51 – 67.

60 Eternal forgetting and amnesty. Forgive and forget.

61 ASSMANN, J.: *Soziales und kollektives Gedächtnis*. See URL <http://www.bpb.de/files/0FWIJZ.pdf> (date accessed) 9. 10. 2011.

62 ÁBTL, 1.11.4. T-V./88. II. Hungary 67/1909/1988. május 27. 18/4-6/1988.

63 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 11/4450. ő. e.

demonstrated its weakness.⁶⁴ To this was added: "*it should not be expected that the funeral of Imre Nagy would turn into a second Rajk funeral!*"⁶⁵ Many people thought that the State Power had finally come to terms with the nation and society after thirty-two years.⁶⁶

The Oppositionist pressure intensified after the Party Congress in May. The HSWP attempted "double" politics and two kinds of pressure were exerted on the Oppositionists. The Committee for Historical Justice⁶⁷ presented it as just one tendency among many. The first news about them was delivered on 6 June 1988. Their first appeal reflects their aims clearly, but the authorised press did not announce it.⁶⁸ The "Fifty-Sixers" organisation had been established and they demanded full ethical, political and legal rehabilitation of the victims of the retribution.⁶⁹ They put the State Power under ethical pressure that it could not avoid.

Against this, the Opposition used the programme of 1956 directly as a political case and attacked the basis of the system. The State Power carried out a violent police action against the Democratic Opposition.⁷⁰

On 14 June, the HSWP Political Committee made the decision that it would be possible to tolerate a commemoration in the cemetery, though it would not allow for a political protest in the city centre, and if necessary, force would be used.⁷¹ They did not plan to have any kind of intervention in the cemetery, although the crowd's size would influence the necessary measures, according to Károly Grósz. He excluded shooting: "*Let the truncheon not be taken out if thirty men are singing the anthem there. However,*

64 *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 24, pp. 43 – 48.

65 Kérése nem teljesíthető. Halda Alíz levelezése. In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 24, pp. 436 – 438.

66 ÁBTL, 1.12.2. Demonstrations 13. 1988. III. 15.

67 KENEDI, J.: *Kis állambiztonsági olvasókönyv. Október 23. – március 15. – június 16. a Kádár-korszakban. II. Kötet.* Budapest 1996, pp. 187 – 189; HEGEDŰS, B. A.: *Az 1956-os forradalom és szabadságharc reneszánsza és a rendszerváltás. Visszatekintés 1988-ra, Évkönyv VI.* Budapest 1998, pp. 287 – 295; KOZÁK, G.: A TIB 1988-ban. In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 4, 1999, No. 9, pp. 89 – 93.

68 Történelmi Igazságtételt! Felhívás a magyar társadalomhoz. In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 25, pp. 603 – 604; *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, Special Issue 1956, pp. 5 – 6.

69 HEGEDŰS, B. A.: *Az 1956-os forradalom és szabadságharc reneszánsza és a rendszerváltás*, p. 291.

70 RIPP, Z. *Rendszerváltás Magyarországon 1987 – 1990.* Budapest 2006, p. 246.

71 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 5/1028. ő. e. Az MSZMP PB 1988. június 14-i ülésének jegyzőkönyve.

*if five hundred people start deriding the system, it will be necessary to give a command then. There will be no pardon.*⁷²

On 9 June, the Opposition started to repair the precincts of Imre Nagy's (supposed) grave, but the State Security Service ordered them to leave the cemetery. The Network of Free Initiations (Democratic Opposition) demanded in its appeal a worthy burial for the executed, a review of the lawsuits of the retribution, the creation of the conditions for the objective research for legal rehabilitation, and removal of the false, slanderous statements of the media. They declared 16 June to be a commemoration day for the victims of oppression and absolutism. It was said, that: "*Imre Nagy and the martyrs of the revolution are respected as the new heroes of the centuries-old Hungarian Battle for Freedom; their cause is that of democracy and independence's cause is our cause.*⁷³ *The State Power tried terror, lies and to hush things up in vain. The memory of those executed continues to live vividly even after thirty years, and their names have been turned into the symbol of the Revolution.*"⁷⁴

The police took preventive measures: the grave post created for the protest was confiscated by the police, but the Inconnu Group's pictures of the post were brought to the protest and distributed to the protesters during the ceremonies.⁷⁵

It proved true at the demonstration that it would no longer be possible to build peace upon lies.⁷⁶ There was no real shooting, but the violence was not canceled. The commemoration took place under peaceful circumstances, yet in the Plot 301 approximately three to four hundred men attended at the cemetery.⁷⁷ Many policemen had stayed near the cemetery

72 KENEDI, J.: *Kis állambiztonsági olvasókönyv*, pp. 203 – 205.

73 *Ibid.*, pp. 191 – 193.

74 Az SZKH nyilatkozata, 1988. június 12. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, Special Issue 1956, pp. 9 – 10.

75 A hatalom előkészületei. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, Special Issue 1956, pp. 1 – 10. Finally on 4 November 1988 the Inconnu Group set up the "prisoner" grave post. SZILÁGYI, S.: Tétova elszántak, elszánt tétovák Megemlékezések a forradalom 32. évfordulóján. In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 25, p. 615.

76 Az SZKH Szóvivői Testületének nyilatkozata. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, Special Issue 1956, p. 31.

77 KENEDI, J.: *Kis állambiztonsági olvasókönyv*, pp. 212 – 213; It was read out the list of executed: Temetetlen holtak. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, Special Issue 1956, pp. 13 – 20; I. Mécs, Kivégzések a forradalom után. In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 25, pp. 606 – 611.

and dared, directly after the celebrators left the cemetery, to gather up the flowers and remove the wreaths.⁷⁸

In the city centre there were serious atrocities.⁷⁹ Protests that took place later in the day at the Batthyány Eternal Light Memorial and the Hungarian Television station centered on memorialising the martyrs by reading their names out loud, but were forcibly broken up by the police.⁸⁰ The police were unprecedentedly brutal; truncheons and tear-gas bombs were used in that moment, without any kind of preliminary warning, because an "inadmissible" event (for example, a person making a speech) was beginning.⁸¹ The police started to jostle, to insult,⁸² and the Oppositionists were handcuffed.⁸³

The police struggle to avoid abusing the most prominent people. For example, in a message they warned Sándor Csoóri.⁸⁴ The *Samizdat* had written about "man hunts", and brutal beatings.⁸⁵

However, the demonstration did not end, and the crowd left towards Szabadság Square. János Kis and Imre Mécs made a speech at a Hungarian Television station. János Kis announced that the cause, for which Imre

78 This police action gained significance later in the light of the announcement of Károly Grósz that "the State Power will not prevent it, if somebody wishes to commemorate someone who passed away." quoted by RAINER, M. J.: *Tetemrehívás 1958 – 1988*. Paris; Budapest 1989, p. 149.

79 GYÖRGY, P.: *Néma hagyomány. Kollektív felejtés és a kései múltértelmezés: 1956 1989-ben (A régmúlttól az örökségig)*. Budapest 2000, pp. 163 – 165. At the same time, the Cemetery of Père Lachaise (Paris) inaugurated the monument of the martyrs of 1956. KENEDI, J.: *Kis állambiztonsági olvasókönyv*, p. 210; See RAINER, M. J.: *Tetemrehívás 1958 – 1988*, 125.

80 GYÖRGY, P.: *Néma hagyomány*, pp. 163 – 165.

81 L. Kasza, (Budapest, 1988), június 16; RAINER, M. J.: *Tetemrehívás 1958 – 1988*, pp. 148 – 154.

82 Virágkedvelő: Magyar demokrácia. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, Special Issue 1956, p. 2.

83 According to the report of the State Security Service, the police arrested 16 persons: Gábor Demszky, Róza Hodosán, Gáspár Miklós Tamás, Ferenc Kőszeg, Antal Vásárhelyi, Viktor Orbán, László Vass, Péter Csontos, József Morgós, Miklós Baksa, Ferenc Csoboth, Gábor Várady Szabó, Lajos Kósa, Péter Égető, Zsolt Pászthy, Sándor Rácz. (KENEDI, J.: *Kis állambiztonsági olvasókönyv*, p. 213) and Tibor Pákh, Tibor Philipp, Jenő Nagy, János Dénes (RAINER, M. J.: *Tetemrehívás 1958 – 1988*, p. 148). The *Demokrata* wrote about 19 names: In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, Special Issue 1956, p. 4. The police's communication reported about 5 persons. (*Népszabadság*, 17 June 1988).

84 *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, Special Issue 1956, p. 2 – 3.

85 *Ibid.*, p. 29.

Nagy had given his life, should be put on the agenda again: “*Real political openness and reconciliation are not possible while the unburied dead block the way of compromise.*”⁸⁶ Imre Mécs concluded his speech when an imposing convoy arrived with “Form 1 sound”, the reinforcements.

Speeches finished for the day⁸⁷ when motorcyclists drove straight into the crowd at Vörösmarty Square.⁸⁸ The policemen were confused, however. The prisoners reported later that there was chaos in the lockup.⁸⁹ János Dénes talked about the police’s confusion; he felt that the policemen were more embarrassed than he was.⁹⁰

The official media kept silent about the protest; only a short communication appeared in the dailies.⁹¹ In his interview with *Newsweek*, Károly Grósz talked about “fascist propaganda, irredentism, and chauvinism.” According to Grósz, with the demonstration, their tolerance had reached its limit, and he rejected all kinds of “seditious provocation”.⁹² An informational report of the Agitation and Propaganda Department offered the same opinion. At the time, according to Western diplomats, this may have been the watershed for the judgement of the members of the leadership, as to whether the police action was supported or opposed. They valued the cause of Imre Nagy, which was assessed as one of the necessary conditions for mutual understanding, but attributed it to relations with the Soviet Union.⁹³

86 RAINER, M. J.: *Tetemrehívás 1958 – 1988*, p. 152; KENEDI, J.: *Kis állambiztonsági olvasókönyv*, 197 – 198.

87 Mécs Imre emlékszavai. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, Special Issue 1956, p. 23.

88 BOGNÁR, M. – TALATA, J.: Embervadászat!? In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, Special Issue 1956, pp. 28 – 29.

89 Virágkedvelő, Magyar demokrácia. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, Special Issue 1956, p. 4.

90 Szentanúk – résztvevők a fővárosi megemlékezésekről. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, Special Issue 1956, p. 26.

91 MTI tudósítás. In: *Népszabadság*, 18 June 1988.

92 *Népszabadság*, 12 July 1988; SZIGETHY, A.: Interjú Grósz Károllyal, *Népszabadság*, 12 July 1988; Grósz Károly beszéde a SZOT Országos Tanácsa 1988. június 21-i ülésén, *Népszabadság*, 22 June 1988.

93 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 11/4453. ő. e. MSZMP KB Agitációs és Propaganda Osztály Információs jelentés az 1988. június 17-től 23-ig terjedő időszak eseményeinek visszhangjáról. 25. szám. 1988. június 23.

The "failure" of 23 October

From the viewpoint of the State Power, the violent action had an adverse effect, but the Party's leaders did not realise that it was not possible to handle the "problem of 1956" by directing it to the power-enforcement organisations.⁹⁴

The Opposition did not renounce the actions that had taken place with the commemoration, which supplied the State Security Service with a continuous job.⁹⁵ The State Security Service paid closer attention to the information of the Revolution and Imre Nagy.⁹⁶ In the days before 23 October, they checked the precincts of Plot 301.⁹⁷

The tensions inside the HSWP first came to light because of Károly Grósz' statements.⁹⁸ Most of the County Party Committee indicated that it was because of the elder HSWP members that the reevaluation of 1956 had begun,⁹⁹ however, real changes did not actually happen.¹⁰⁰ Kádár's opinion did not change, and he was the principal hindrance of the start of the rehabilitation. There could hardly have been anybody in Hungarian public life besides him, who had a bigger interest in and was connected with the concealment of the facts of the retribution.¹⁰¹

94 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 5/1040. ó. e.

95 XIX-B-I-ak *BM Főfelügyeleti Osztály Napi Tájékoztató jelentések*. 1988. 45. doboz 1988. 10. 09.

96 ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/194/1988. 5.

97 ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/211/1988. 207.

98 RIPP, Z.: *Rendszerváltás Magyarországon 1987 – 1990*, p. 247.

99 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 11/4453. ó. e. MSZMP KB Agitációs és Propaganda Osztály. Információs jelentés az 1988. július 29-től augusztus 4-ig terjedő időszak eseményeinek visszhangjáról. 31. szám. 1988. augusztus 5.

100 Grósz declared that it was not possible for American journalists to modify the assessment in the maintenance of the one-party system and assessing 1956 as a counter-revolution. *Magyar Nemzet*. LI 11 July 1988. For Hungarian Emigrants Grósz modified his point of view so much that the reevaluation of 1956 is unimaginable, but Nagy Imre and his companions' burial had to be done out of humanitarian considerations. RIPP, Z.: *Rendszerváltás Magyarországon 1987-1990*, 156; MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/1032. ó. e. *Az MSZMP PB 1988. augusztus 9-i ülésének jegyzőkönyve*.

101 „Az volt a fő módszer, hogy a vádlottakat egymás ellen kijátsszák.” Kasza László beszélgetése Lőcsei Pállal. SZER Gondolatforgató. 1988. június 11. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, Special Issue 1956, p. 38.

Whatever polarisation had already been inside the Party, now turned into an increasingly more obvious one.¹⁰² János Berecz read out a letter with unconcealed bias during the HSWP Central Committee's session. In the letter, a Party organisation wrote about its concern over the internal political situation. The letter writers warned that the events showed a similar content to those of the autumn of 1956.¹⁰³ On 4 October, the HSWP Political Committee was obliged to deal with a letter that had an even more determined sound. The letter insisted that the assessment of the Revolution should not be allowed to be modified, and that from now on it should be classified as a counter-revolution.¹⁰⁴ In the HSWP decisions, the leadership avoided the classification of 1956.¹⁰⁵

For the Opposition everything that had happened in 1988 dictated that it was necessary to publicly commemorate 23 October.¹⁰⁶ The thirty-second anniversary took place in Budapest in circumstances qualitatively different from those of previous decades. People dared to express their emotions openly this time, because the democratic actions during the year had given courage to the people. The Opposition's organising staff assembled on 14 October. They ignored the police announcement, deciding not to ask for permission, and declared that they would march without a permit.¹⁰⁷ If they could not get to the Bem Sculpture, they would keep going until they

102 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 5/1040. ő. e. *Az MSZMP PB 1988. október 18-i ülésének jegyzőkönyve.*

103 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 4/242-243. ő. e. *Az MSZMP KB 1988. szeptember 27-i ülésének jegyzőkönyve.*

104 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 5/1039. ő. e. *Az MSZMP PB 1988. október 4-i ülésének jegyzőkönyve;* MOL M-KS 288. f. 11/4506. ő. e. *MSZMP KB Társadalompolitikai Osztályának jelentése, 1989. január.*

105 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 4/244. ő. e. *MSZMP KB 1988. november 1-2-i ülésének jegyzőkönyve.* A belpolitikai helyzet és a párt feladatai. The Political Committee made a statement so yet earlier though: "*we undertake the tendency demanding the reformation of the socialism and the tendency, which was supporting the people's democratic development in 1956, for which it accomplished its revolutionary claim successfully the MSZMP.*" MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/1040. ő. e. *Az MSZMP PB 1988. október 18-i ülésének jegyzőkönyve.*

106 ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/194/1988. 5.; ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/211/1988. 207.; XIX-B-I-ak Ministry for Home Affairs. Head-supervision Class. Daily informations.1988. 45. 09/10/1988.

107 *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 25, 613; ÁBTL 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/206/1988. 137.; ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/206/1988. 144.

found a way.¹⁰⁸ The "reverse timetable" prevailed compared to the events thirty-two years previous.¹⁰⁹ The police took notice of the announcement and banned it on 21 October.¹¹⁰

The threatening voice of the police communication indicated that the State Power was going to beat up the demonstrators. On the following day, five independent organisations called a crisis staff meeting and initiated negotiations with the government. After lengthy debate and a vote, it was decided that the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Committee for Historical Justice and the Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Society were in favour of canceling the demonstration; Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats) and the Network of Free Initiations wanted to demonstrate. This was the result of a lengthy negotiation.¹¹¹

On 22 October, the crisis staff assembled again. The police were uttering the threat that the demonstrators would face police forces.¹¹² After the compromise proposal¹¹³ was rejected, the Hungarian Democratic Forum called on its members not to go out on the street on 23 October.¹¹⁴ Ultimately, the negotiations were interrupted after the Hungarian Democratic Forum's resignation. The Forum broke one of the basic principles of politics, agreements between organizations, and this caused a disturbance.¹¹⁵

The other four organisations decided similarly. For many people this was incomprehensible because it contradicted the politics, which up to that point had been radically represented.¹¹⁶ They wanted to avoid a confronta-

108 ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/206/1988. 137. See ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/206/1988. 144.

109 GYARMATI, G.: *Március hatalma*, p. 198.

110 *Népszabadság*, 21 October 1988

111 A BRFK, vezetőjének közleménye. *Népszabadság*, 21 October 1988, p. 5.

112 SZILÁGYI, S.: Tétova elszántak, elszánt tétovák Megemlékezések a forradalom 32. évfordulóján. In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 25, pp. 613 – 614.

113 The proposed compromise tried to attain that at least some from among the organisers would be allowed to place a flower at the Bem Sculpture. See N. P.: Az ellenzék (le) szereplése. Magyar október 1988-ban. In: *Demokrata*, 1989, No. 49, p. 14.

114 BOZÓKI, A. (ed.): *Tiszta lappal. A Fidesz a magyar politikában, 1988 – 1991*. Budapest 1991, pp. 89 – 91.

115 SZEKERES, L.: Tüntetések 1988-ban. In: KURTÁN, S. – SÁNDOR, P. – VASS, L. (eds.): *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 1988*. Debrecen 1989, p. 358. Activists of Fidesz demanded the Board's resignation. ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/210/1988, p. 188.

116 Fidesz Munkácsoport De! In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, No. 10, p. 6.

tion between the unarmed demonstrators and the armed police.¹¹⁷ The cancellation of the protest rested on the importance of the lesson many people drew from 16 June and the escalation of the demonstrations, leading to the thought that it was necessary to avoid the street demonstrations. Zoltán Bíró thought that the future of the Hungarian Democratic Forum depended on the declaration of calling off the protest. Everybody talked about the fears leading to the reasons for the resignation at the time of his examination.¹¹⁸

Instead of the demonstration in the Jurta Theatre, there was a program about 1956.¹¹⁹ At the memorial event, Miklós Vásárhelyi talked about the fact that the forbidding of the morning demonstration had obscured their joy.¹²⁰ The *Demokrata* wrote that “they took the street away from them, which was rightfully theirs.”¹²¹

The freedom to assemble prevailed in principle only. The administration of the law was quite different. The State Power took a stand on related cases regarding the right of assembly, and this concerned 23 October.¹²² According to Grósz, they would not be allowed to call upon “the memory of the counter-revolution as an illustrious event.”¹²³

The Opposition had originally planned two protests,¹²⁴ but there was only a “police demonstration” on 23 October. The State Power proved that in dialogue the inclination to speak the truth had only been apparent.

117 A BZSBT, Fidesz, SZKH, TIB nyilatkozata. 1988. okt. 21. In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 25, p. 617.

118 See the opinions of RUTTKAY, L. – GYENES, J.: Magyarázom a bizonyítványom... In: *Demokrata* Vol. 4, 1989, No. 9, pp. 15 – 16.

119 The representatives of the Budapest Council’s Cultural Department talked preliminary with László Romhányi about the planned Document Programme. The Department disapproved of the anti-Soviet passages and the insults admonishing the person (Antal Apró, János Kádár). ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/208/1988, pp. 161 – 162.

120 Vásárhelyi Miklós zárszavai. In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 25, p. 619.

121 N. P. Az ellenzék (le)szereplése. Magyar október 1988-ban. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 9, 1989, No. 4, p. 13.

122 SZIKINGER, I.: *A tüntetések és a rendőrség ’88-ban*. In: KURTÁN, S. – SÁNDOR, P. – VASS, L. (eds.): *Magyarország politikai évkönyve 1988*, pp. 390 – 392.; MOL, M-KS 288. f. 4/242-243. ó. e. Az MSZMP KB 1988. szeptember 27-i ülésének jegyzőkönyve. A párt helyzete, a pártélet és a belpolitika időszerű kérdései.

123 Tájékoztató csata előtt. In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 25, p. 473; *Magyar Hírlap*, október 28, 1988.

124 See Ferenc Kőszeg’s plan: ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/205/1988, 128-129.

When the delegation of Fidesz dealt with Imre Pozsgay on 12 September, the Minister of State suggested that in the course of negotiating with the State Power he did not want to compromise in two areas: in the question of 1956, Imre Nagy, and the federal contacts. He added that this did not mean that their views on these questions could not be expressed.¹²⁵

The Opposition's retreat could have created a precedent that not only jeopardised the results that had been achieved to that point, but it threatened the truthfulness of Oppositionist organisations. Because of this, the Fidesz decided that they would commemorate the Revolution anyway, publicly and demonstratively, even if it turned out only to be symbolic.¹²⁶

The protest of the Fidesz took place on the Vörösmarty Square. The number of policemen present amounted to the same as the marchers.¹²⁷ According to estimates, approximately ten thousand policemen proved that the State Power dreaded the content of 1956 on the streets of Budapest. Many foreign correspondents and tourists were present because of the ASTA congress.¹²⁸ The foreigners' presence held the police back, but the violent action was not hampered by them. In the report of the State Security Service, it was written that the realisation of the programme ("warning, identity check, arrest") had been prevented.¹²⁹

23 October 1988 entailed two important lessons for the Opposition: firstly, it realised that its evolving organisation was losing its influence, though the government was not willing to acknowledge it as a partner. Secondly, society was increasingly manifesting its discontent more openly

125 Pozsgay Imre államminiszter a Fidesz küldöttségével tárgyalt. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, No. 10, 12.

126 *Fidesz Hírek*, October 1988; *Beszélő*, 1988, No. 25, p. 615; ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/209/1988, 172. Bánlaki József beszéde. In: *Demokrata*, Vol. 3, 1988, No. 10, p. 6.

127 According to the Fidesz: 2 – 3,000. In: *Fidesz Hírek*, Vol. 1, 1988, October. Sándor Szilágyi wrote about approx. 500, In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 25, p. 615. The State Security Service reported 80 – 100 persons. ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/209/1988, p. 172.

128 Mark Palmer, the Ambassador of the USA disapproved of the Hungarian Home Affairs Organs' actions for the ASTA congress's envoys. ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/214/1988, p. 30.

129 It arrested Tibor Pákh, Ágnes Zavadáné Gyetvai, Róbert Pálinkás, Szilárd Horváth, Sándor Tóth, and Ilona Hanekomp Vera. ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/209/1988, p. 173.

and it thought that this threatened a terrible explosion because of the deficiencies of the fundamental organisation.¹³⁰

A serious debate took place in the Network of Free Initiations about the failure of 23 October,¹³¹ and the Spokesman Corps came to an agreement with the Fidesz in the expense of a declaration, in which the Hungarian Democratic Forum was classified as a collaborator. They made a statement in a derogatory sense about the behaviour of the Forum.¹³²

Summary

The Hungarian society's memory – true to the area's tradition was “living” in the 1980s. The leadership of Kádár was not able to cause 1956 to be forgotten. The State Power identified itself again and again to keep its “origin myth” alive, but this did not arise from real legitimacy.

The memory of 1956 was a weapon against the Kádár system, and its real strength appeared on the anniversaries. The changes at the end of the 1980s have appeared together with the changing of old opinions, and the demonstrations referred to above played an important role in this process. The Opposition was right to believe that the judgements of the system regarding 1956 could be swept away.

In the *Beszélő*, the Democratic Opposition defined the Revolution as an unavoidable and a national cause.¹³³ On 23 October it was reported on the demonstration that it is necessary to take on the positive heritage of the achievements of the Revolution.¹³⁴

Keeping the debate about 1956 on the agenda was not politically expedient for the State Power, but the Party could not avoid the debate altogether.¹³⁵ Because of this, the State Power wanted to direct it to the scientific-vocational sphere. It was exceptionally important to the State

130 N. P.: Az ellenzék (le)szereplése. Magyar október 1988-ban. In: *Demokrata*, 1989, No. 9, p. 14.

131 ÁBTL, 2.7.1., NOIJ 45-78/10/210/1988, 187.

132 The declaration of the five independent organisations. See ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/213/1988. pp. 227 – 228; ÁBTL 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/213/1988. pp. 218 – 219. ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/214/1988. 240.; ÁBTL, 2.7.1. NOIJ 45-78/10/213/1988, 219.

133 P. Grawátsch, *Társadalom, futóláncon*. In: *Beszélő*, Vol. 8, 1988, No. 25, p. 660.

134 Fidesz Munkács csoport: De! In: *Demokrata* Vol. 3, 1988, No. 10, p. 6.

135 MOL, M-KS 288.f. 11/4506. ő. e. MSZMP KB *Társadalompolitikai Osztálya. Jelentés a KB tagjainak a párt- és társadalmi élet főbb eseményeiről. 1988. december.*

Power that the funeral of Imre Nagy would not be held on 15 March. However, Károly Grósz did not know of a politically good time or place to hold the funeral.¹³⁶ Grósz talked about the "white terror"¹³⁷ at the end of November, after which increasingly more people recognised that the Party was no longer able to handle the crisis in the old manner. On the other hand, they thought that it would crush the HSWP sooner or later in a plural, democratic system the burden of the past.¹³⁸

Resumé

Tento príspevok predstavuje teoretický rámec maďarskej kultúry pamäti v roku 1988 zameriavajúc sa na tri dátumy: 15. marec – 16. jún – 23. október. Štúdia ilustruje ako môže opozícia použiť pamäť na demonštrácie a reakciu štátnej moci. S použitím väčšinou nevyužitých zdrojov z archívov je táto štúdia postavená na výskume v Maďarskom štátnom archíve, Historickom archíve Maďarskej štátnej bezpečnosti, Archíve Open Society (v Budapešti) a štúdiu literatúry z tejto oblasti.

136 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 4/248-249. ő. e.

137 Károly Grósz used the concepts which characterised the Rákosi era. He called the Opposition consistently an enemy. A szocializmus építésének folytatására hívjuk az egész magyar népet. In: *Népszabadság*, 30 November 1988.

138 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 4/248-249. ő. e. MSZMPKB 1988. december 15-i ülésének jegyzőkönyve. *A Nagy Imre és sorstársai perében, valamint az 1956-os „ellenforradalmi” cselekmények miatt halálra ítéltekkel kapcsolatos kegyeleti kérdések rendezése. 1988. december 15.*

**6. panel:
Politický exil v zápase
s komunistickým režimom**

**6th Block:
Political Emigration in the Battle
against the Communist Regime**

Slovenský revolučný odboj a počiatky organizovaného protikomunistického odboja v zahraničí v rokoch 1945 – 1947

Ján BOBÁK

V rokoch 1944 – 1945 sa národy a štáty strednej a juhovýchodnej Európy ocitli v zložitej situácii, keď vojenská porážka nemeckých vojsk, spojená so zbavovaním sa politickej závislosti na Nemecku, znamenala súčasne vojenskú okupáciu Červenou armádou a násilnú sovielizáciu. Tomuto nebezpečenstvu boli na sklonku vojny nútené čeliť európske národy v rozsiahlom geografickom priestore od Fínska, Estónska, Lotyšska, Litvy, Poľska, Česka, Slovenska, Maďarska, Slovinska, Chorvátska až po Albánsko a Grécko. V každom z nich mal protikomunistický odboj svoje špecifické črty.

Ozbrojený odpor násilnej sovielizácii kládli predovšetkým Fíni, Estónci, Lotyši Litovci, Ukrajinci a väčšina balkánskych národov (Slovinci, Chorváti, Srbi, Gréci). Určitým paradoxom bolo, že v uvedených krajinách sa obrana pred vojenskou agresiou ZSSR, respektíve počiatky protikomunistického odboja spájajú s aktívnou spoluprácou s nemeckými ozbrojenými a bezpečnostnými zložkami, ktoré im poskytovali výdatnú pomoc a podporu. Táto situácia vznikla v dôsledku vytvorenia neprirodzenej spojeneckej koalície, ktorej súčasťou sa nie z vlastnej vôle stal od roku 1941 aj ZSSR, bývalý spojenec Veľkonemeckej ríše. ZSSR sa však ani v tomto novom spojeneckom zväzku nevzdával svojich mocenských aspirácií na ovládnutie štátov strednej a juhovýchodnej Európy.

Snaha USA udržať ZSSR po skončení vojny v určitých geografických hraniciach, prostredníctvom rozdelenia Európy na sféry vplyvu, znamenala v konečnom dôsledku obetovanie východoeurópskych národov za cenu

uchovania slobody a demokracie západoeurópskych štátov. J. V. Stalin si s podporou USA nielenže legitimizoval tie územné zisky v Európe, ktoré získal s podporou A. Hitlera, ale s podporou Washingtonu bola mocenská sféra Moskvy posunutá hlboko do centra Európy. Atlantická charta, ktorou spojenecké veľmoci slávnostne deklarovali svoje hlavné vojnové i povojnové ciele v zápase s Nemeckom a Japonskom, sa v praxi ukázala ako bezcenný kus papiera.

Ak odhliadneme od činnosti exilových organizácií, pôsobiacich v západných demokratických štátoch, ako prvé sa na domácej pôde začali pred opätovnou hrozbou násilnej sovielizácie organizovať národy bývalého ZSSR. Z iniciatívy Hlavného veliteľstva Ukrajinskej povstaleckej armády a Organizácie ukrajinských nacionalistov sa 21. – 22. novembra 1943 konala v Rovenskej oblasti (západná Ukrajina) prvá konferencia boľševikmi utlačaných národov ZSSR, na ktorej sa zúčastnili 13 splnomocnení delegáti zastupujúci jednotlivé národy v európskej časti ZSSR. Na konferencii bola definitívne potvrdená základná stratégia boja na dvoch frontoch – proti nemeckému nacizmu a proti komunizmu, reprezentovaného Moskvou.¹ V rámci tejto organizačnej platformy sa začal po roku 1945 formovať Antiboľševický blok národov, ktoré sa v dôsledku veľmocenského diktátu Spojencov v Teheráne, Jalte a v Postupime stali súčasťou sovietskej sféry.

Hrozba sovielizácie východnej Európy vyvolala aj v exilových organizáciách potrebu užšej spolupráce s cieľom vytvoriť politicky integrovaný celok, ktorý by s medzinárodnou garanciou demokratických veľmocí dokázal odolávať hrozbám Moskvy. Takto vznikol projekt Medzimoria (Intermarium, resp. Intermarum), ktorý mal garantovať 160 miliónom obyvateľov slobodu a demokraciu v štátoch ležiacich medzi Baltickým, Čiernym a Egejským morom. Jedným z hlavných iniciátorov a propagátorom tejto myšlienky bola poľská emigrácia na čele s W. Sikorskim (1881 – 1943), ktorá zaujímala významné postavenie aj v Stredoeurópskom federálnom klube v Londýne,² ktorý bol v podstate dielom Winstona S. Churchilla.

Predstavitelia poľskej emigrácie patrili aj k najväčším kritikom nedodržiavania princípov Atlantickej charty západnými Spojencami, za splnenie ktorej poľská armáda bojovala v spojeneckých armádach tak na Západe, ako aj na Východe. Typickým z tohto obdobia je názor M. K. Dziewanowského,

1 - čič.: *Borba ukrajinského národa za slobodu*. In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 1, 15. 4. 1946 č. 1, s. 20 – 22.

2 V Stredoeurópskom federálnom klube zastupoval Slovensko predseda Slovenskej národnej rady v Londýne Peter Prídavok, ktorý v roku 1945 zastával funkciu predsedu.

ktorý plný sklamaní konštatoval, že veľmocenská politika obetovania východoeurópskych národov Moskve, v snahe udržať spojeneckú jednotu so ZSSR, úplne zlyhala. Nezabránila totiž Moskve vyvážať komunistickú revolúciu za hranice ZSSR. Keďže táto politika sa ukázala chybnou: „*Západné mocnosti sú preto nútené postupne revidovať líniu Teherán – Jalta – Postupim. Logickým dôsledkom toho bude návrat ku konštruktívnym koncepciám organizácie nášho kontinentu.*“³ Podľa Dziewanowského takúto funkciu spĺňa koncepcia Medzimoria – politické zjednotenie národov medzi sovietskym Ruskom a Nemeckom pod programovým heslom „Slobodní so slobodnými, rovní s rovnými“.

V Charte slobodného Medzimoria sa konštatovalo, že „*druhá svetová vojna nielen že neprináša slobodu národom, ktoré ju dosiahli po prvej svetovej vojne, ale pozbavuje nezávislosti dokonca mnohé už existujúce štáty a tým spôsobom uvrhuje do otroctva nové milióny ľudí*“.⁴ Veľmi ostrej kritike bola podrobená imperialistická politika ZSSR, ktorej Západ, tak ako v 30. rokoch v prípade Nemecka, robí ústupky na úkor národov východnej Európy. „*Aby sa teda vykorenila a odstránila pliaga totalitného barbarstva v Európe, nestačí vykoreniť len nacizmus Adolfa Hitlera a fašizmus Mussoliniho, ale treba vyhladiť zo sveta prototyp totalitarizmu, t. j. bolševický totalitarizmus. Po takom nadľudskom utrpení Európa dnes nepotrebuje hmlisté pochopy, antifašizmu, ani deklarácie o dvojzmyselnej, demokracii.* Európa a celý svet potrebujú dnes len slobodu, skutočnú slobodu, slobodu bez strachu, slobodu, ktorá bude zaručená v morálnych a úprimne demokratických podmienkach.

Nebezpečenstvo ruského bolševizmu vyžaduje, aby sa proti nemu mobilizovali všetky sily. Národy Medzimoria musia pokladať boj proti sovietskemu bolševizmu za svoju prvú povinnosť a za logický výsledok obrany svojich náboženských, mravných, národných a sociálnych ideálov. To je povinnosťou týchto národov voči sebe samým a voči ľudstvu vôbec. [...] Preto všetky národy, ktoré si želajú slobodu a mier, najmä však národy Medzimoria, ktorým hrozí skaza v sovietskej sfére, musia sa postaviť proti koncepcii ‚sfér vplyvu‘ a jej praktickým dôsledkom.“⁵

V Charte slobodného Medzimoria je navrhnuté vytvorenie medzinárodnej konfederácie združujúcej šesťnásť nezávislých národných štátov

3 DZIEWANOWSKI, M. K.: Idea Medzimoria. In: *Information Service Bulletin*, 14. 2. 1947. Citované podľa *Slobodné Slovensko*. Roč. 2, 15. 4. 1947, č. 4, s. 52 – 53.

4 Charta slobodného Medzimoria. In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, 2, 15. 9. 1947, č. 9, s. 31 – 37.

5 Tamže.

(Albánsko, Bielorusko, Bulharsko, Česko, Estónsko, Grécko, Chorvátsko, Litva, Lotyšsko, Maďarsko, Poľsko, Rumunsko, Slovensko, Slovinsko, Srbsko a Ukrajina). Tieto zväzové štáty Medzimoria mali postúpiť časť svojej suverenity na konfederáciu. Spoločnými mali byť zahraničná politika a obrana. Zhodné malo byť vedenie spoločných hospodárskych záležitostí, podpora všeobecne prístupného základného vzdelania a vzájomnej výmeny kultúrnych hodnôt. Na dosiahnutie týchto cieľov sa predpokladalo aj prijatie spoločnej zväzovej ústavy, pričom jednotlivé národné štáty mali mať aj svoje vlastné ústavy a legislatívu. Takisto aj národnostné menšiny mali mať legislatívne garantované svoje práva. V prípade, že by sa vytvorila zjednotená Európa na federálnom základe „[...] konfederácia nezávislých štátov Medzimoria bude hotovým a pozitívnym prvkom pre organizáciu Európy ako politickej, hospodárskej a kultúrnej jednotky, vybudovanej na zásadách dobrovoľnej spolupráce všetkých jej slobodných národov“.⁶

Na sklonku vojny a bezprostredne po jej skončení bola koncepcia Medzimoria jedným z prvých projektov európskej integrácie komunizmom ohrozených národov východnej Európy. Do roku 1943 mala táto koncepcia podporu predovšetkým Veľkej Británie, ktorej mocenský vplyv na stredo- a východoeurópske záležitosti však na sklonku vojny a najmä po jej skončení výrazne poklesol. Spojenecké veľmoci (ZSSR a USA) tým, že si na koloniálny spôsob rozdelili Európu, z egoistických dôvodov odmietli podporovať integračné tendencie východoeurópskych národov. Napriek veľmocenskému diktátu dvoch vojenských supervelmocí však myšlienka zjednotenej Európy žila aj naďalej a v prostredí politickej emigrácie (najmä zo sovietskej sféry vplyvu) si čím ďalej, tým viac získavala nových prívržencov.

Hromadný exodus civilného obyvateľstva na sklonku vojny z Východu na Západ pred Červenou armádou, ktorý zasiahol milióny obyvateľov, nemá obdobu v dejinách Európy nielen svojím rozsahom, ale predovšetkým svojimi dôsledkami. Charakter tohto rozsiahleho pohybu obyvateľstva negatívne poznamenala predovšetkým hromadná genocída nemeckého civilného obyvateľstva, ktorej sa cielavedome dopúšťali príslušníci

6 Tamže. Slovenská politická emigrácia po roku 1945 bola v podstate federalisticky založená. Vo všeobecnosti nachádzali v jej radoch priaznivý ohlas myšlienky federatívneho (konfederatívneho) usporiadania strednej Európy, respektíve federalizácie Európy ako geopolitického celku. (Pozri napr. HODŽA, M.: *Federation in Central Europe*. Londýn 1942; KIRSCHBAUM, J.: *Federalistické tendencie v strednej Európe*. In: *Nádej víťazná. Sborník slovenských spisovateľov v emigrácii o literatúre, vede a umení*. Scraton, 1947; PAUČO, J.: *Čo po komunizme?* Middletown, 1952.

Červenej armády, orgány NKVD, ako aj kolaborujúci miestni príslušníci polovojských ozbrojených zložiek, armády, bezpečnosti a civilnej správy najmä na území bývalého ZSSR, ako aj Poľska a Česka. Druhý veľký prúd utečencov tvorili občania bývalého ZSSR, ktorí už mali svoje vlastné skúsenosti so sovietskym „oslobodením“ a s totalitným režimom.⁷ Ústupom nemeckej armády sa im otvorila cesta na Západ. Slovenská republika bola jedným zo štátov, ktoré sa v rámci humanitnej akcie zapojili do pomoci utečencom zo ZSSR. Odvrátenou stranou tohto exodu sa po roku 1945 stala násilná „repatriácia“ utečencov, s podporou západných Spojencov (USA, Veľká Británia), späť do ZSSR, ktorá sa pre nich skončila násilnou smrťou alebo dlhoročným pobytom v pracovných táboroch (gulagoch) na stavbách komunizmu.

Politická emigrácia zo Slovenskej republiky smerovala v roku 1945 predovšetkým do západných okupačných pásiem v Rakúsku a do Bavorska, kde sa s určitým časovým predstihom budovali evakuačné centrá. Ďalšie centrá sa tvorili aj okolo slovenských vyslanectiev, najmä vo Vatikáne, Berne, Madride. Ak si odmyslíme činnosť Slovenskej národnej rady v Londýne, ako aj Slovenskej ligy v Amerike, v druhej polovici roka 1945 začal politické aktivity vyvíjať len skupina osôb okolo bývalého ministra zahraničných vecí Ferdinanda Ďurčanského, ktorá svojimi memorandami a petíciami upozorňovala medzinárodnú verejnosť na slovenskú otázku ako medzinárodný problém, ako aj na sovietsmi naoktrojovaný ľudovodemokratický režim, zahranično-politické postavenie Č-SR ako politického satelita Moskvy, a v neposlednom rade aj na kritickú situáciu samotných slovenských emigrantov a ich rodín v okupačných pásmach Rakúska a Nemecka. Aktivity Ďurčanského skupiny vyústili do založenia Slovenského akčného výboru, ktorý v zahraničí reprezentoval umlčaný národ v zápase s komunizmom a v úsilí o suverenitu a štátnu samostatnosť Slovenska.

Na politickú činnosť v zahraničí sa pripravovala aj mládež organizovaná v Hlinkovej mládeži a v Združení vysokoškolského študentstva. Na základe dohovorov uzavretých na Slovensku na sklonku vojny mal domáci protikomunistický odboj (Slovenskú tajnú ochranu) organizovať Jozef Vicen v napojení na zahraničnú Slovenskú tajnú ochranu, ktorú viedol Ladislav Jankovič. Podľa tejto dohody bol L. Jankovič nadriadeným pracovníkom J. Vicena. Na základe informácií domácej STO

7 Tejto téme slovenská historiografia nevenovala doposiaľ dostatočnú pozornosť a to aj napriek tomu, že sa priamo dotýka aj slovenských dejín. Výnimku tvoria len práce historika Michala Šmígela.

mala zahraničná STO (s využitím aj iných zdrojov) informovať v exile prezidenta, ako aj slovenskú exilovú vládu o vnútropolitickej situácii na Slovensku. Situácia sa medzinárodno-politicky skomplikovala tým, že Praha vyhlásila v podstate všetkých funkcionárov slovenského štátu – od ústavných činiteľov až po úradníkov štátnej správy, predstaviteľov kultúrneho života pôsobiacich v zahraničí, ako aj tých, ktorí sa angažovali proti nastolenému ľudovodemokratickému režimu a za obnovu slovenskej štátnosti – za „vojnových zločincov“. Cieľom tohto politického ťaženia bolo dostať všetkých Slovákov, predovšetkým tých, ktorí sa angažovali za slovenskú štátnosť, do Č-SR, zorganizovať s nimi politické monstreprocesy na spôsob ZSSR a zabrániť tomu, aby sa v zahraničí vytvorilo organizované hnutie za obnovu štátnej samostatnosti Slovenskej republiky. Účelovým obvineniam prívržencov štátnej samostatnosti Slovenska z „fašizmu“, zo spáchania „vojnových zločinov“ boli v rokoch 1945 – 1947 ochotní načúvať najmä Američania. V podobnej situácii boli aj národy ZSSR, Slovinci alebo Chorváti. V slovenskom exile nastalo v rokoch 1945 – 1947 veľké rozčarovanie a sklamanie z postoja Američanov, na pomoci a podpore ktorých sa exil pôvodne najviac spoliehal. A práve toto bol jeden z hlavných dôvodov, prečo sa v roku 1945 nevytvorila slovenská exilová vláda.

Jozef Vicen, ako vedúci organizátor domáceho odboja (STO), však nesplnil svoju úlohu a v postate zlyhal. Nevytvoril žiadne organizované odbojové hnutie a nevyvíjal ani rozsiahlejšiu spravodajskú činnosť tak, ako sa k tomu pod prísahou zaviazal. Na druhej strane neusiloval sa ani nadviazať priamy styk so svojim vedúcim Ladislavom Jankovičom, a to aj napriek tomu, že kuriér František Paňko ho niekoľkokrát kontaktoval a donášal pre neho z Rakúska inštrukcie a správy od L. Jankoviča.

Jozef Vicen, počas svojho pobytu na Slovensku však žiadne informácie o svojej (ne)činnosti Jankovičovej zahraničnej STO neposkytoval. Často po kuriérovi sľúbil, že požadovaný materiál dodá, ale počas celého svojho pobytu v Č-SR nič neposlal. Jozef Vicen bol príliš samolúby a ctižiadostivý, nerád sa podriaďoval iným, najmä ak mal pocit, že nestoja na pyramide moci vyššie než on. Ako píše vo svojich pamätiach „*dobrovoľne som prijal záväzok, že po sovietskej okupácii Slovenska budem viesť Slovenskú tajnú ochranu [...], ktorá mala udržiavať kontakt so slovenskou exilovou vládou*“.⁸ Neuvádza však, že ním vedená domáca Slovenská tajná ochrana

8 VICEN, J.: *Vo víroch rokov 1938 – 1988*. Bratislava 1999, s. 91. V nasledujúcej časti memoárov Jozef Vicen píše, že záväzok viesť doma Slovenskú tajnú ochranu prijal „pod prísahou“ (s. 97).

nemala udržiavať priamy kontakt s exilovou vládou, ale informácie jej mala odovzdávať prostredníctvom kuriérov zahraničnej Slovenskej tajnej ochrany (L. Jankovič) a táto ich mala priamo sprostredkovať exilovej vláde, respektíve prezidentovi. (Pôvodne sa počítalo aj s činnosťou vysokovýkonnej vysielačky, prostredníctvom ktorej sa v prípade potreby mali posielat inštrukcie pre domáci odboj.)

Napriek tomu, že Jozef Vicen, ako vedúci domácej Slovenskej tajnej ochrany, mal zostať na Slovensku a po jeho obsadení Červenou armádou organizovať protikomunistický odboj, svojvoľne sa rozhodol odísť do zahraničia. Vo svojich memoároch uvádza, že jeho cieľom bolo vyhľadať prezidenta, slovenskú exilovú vládu, pričom to bola úloha zahraničnej Slovenskej tajnej ochrany. Jeho nerozvážny krok nepriniesol žiaden výsledok a veľa nechýbalo a sám mohol skončiť v jednom z gulagov na Sibíri. Ako píše vo svojich memoároch, po stretnutí s pracovníkmi Matice slovenskej: „*Vnukli mi myšlienku, že pre ľudí môjho veku nemá význam utekať do neznáma. Bolo by lepšie, keby som sa vrátil [...]*“⁹ Po svojom dobrodružnom putovaní, spojenom aj s pobytom v sovietskom zajatí, krátko pobudol na Slovensku a odišiel do Prahy, kde chcel dokončiť svoje štúdium. L. Jankovičovi však neoznámil, že už nie je na Slovensku a že sa presťahoval do Prahy.

Uvedené faktory spôsobili, že zahraničná Slovenská tajná ochrana, okrem vlastných príprav na exilovú činnosť, vysielať kuriérov k Jozefovi Vicenovi na Slovensko, nemohla plniť v roku 1945 ten program a tú činnosť, pre ktorú bola založená. Hlavným problémom však bolo, že v domnienke, že Vicen je na Slovensku, sa ho márne usilovala zaktivizovať. Nečinnosť J. Vicena bola dôvodom, že L. Jankovič bol nakoniec nútený vyslať na Slovensko Štefana Chalmovského, jedného zo svojich najlepších a najskúsenejších spolupracovníkov. Úlohou Š. Chalmovského bolo zaktivizovať domácu Slovenskú tajnú ochranu a rozvinúť jej prácu. Štefan Chalmovský prišiel v júli 1945 legálne na Slovensko v rámci tzv. repatriácie.

Vnútropolitická situácia na Slovensku však bola podstatne rozdielna od toho, ako si ju vykreslovali v exile, respektíve, akú ju chceli v exile vidieť. Zahraničný protikomunistický odboj si preto čoskoro vyžiadal zásadnú revíziu svojej dovtedajšej politiky, propagandy, ako aj metód práce. Kardinálnym sa stával predovšetkým vzťah exilu k nekomunistickej časti

9 VICEN, J.: *Vo víroch rokov 1938 – 1988*, s. 96.

vládnej koalície (Demokratická strana), ktorý bezprostredne po skončení vojny negatívne determinovali nasledovné faktory:

Účasť vedúcich predstaviteľov Demokratickej strany na likvidácii slovenskej štátnosti a na obnovení ľudovodemokratickej Č-SR v povstaní v roku 1944.

Podiel na nastolení prosovietskeho režimu, zahranično-politicky závislého od Moskvy.

Účasť Demokratickej strany vo vláde s komunistami bola hodnotená ako kolaborácia a zrada slovenských národných a štátnych záujmov.

Dominancia evanjelikov vo vedení Demokratickej strane vyvolávala v exile značnú nedôveru a nové konfesiónálne pnutia, ktoré sa stupňovali politickými čistkami, činnosťou ľudových súdov postihujúcich najmä katolíkov, ako aj mocenskými zásahmi ľudovodemokratického štátu do života Katolíckej cirkvi.

Z uvedených dôvodov slovenský exil, pozostávajúci v podstate z katolíkov, nebol v roku 1945 pripravený a ani ochotný spolupracovať s Demokratickou stranou. Nepočítal s ňou v zápase s komunizmom a za obnovu štátnej samostatnosti Slovenska, respektíve ju z tohto zápasu vylučoval.

Štefan Chalmovský sa však na Slovensku stretol s inou situáciou, než na akú bol v exile pripravený. Slovensko sa pomerne rýchlo zotavovalo z vojnových škôd a koncom roka 1945 už nastupovala povojnová konjunktúra. Nezamestnanosť bola v podstate nulová. Spotreba obyvateľstva evidentne vzrastala. V porovnaní s Rakúskom a najmä Nemeckom, kde základné potraviny sa stávali platidlom a kde vo veľkých rozmeroch prevítal čierny obchod, na Slovensku sa žilo po materiálnej stránke relatívne dobre. V dôsledku „riešenia“ nemeckej otázky bol v republike vo všeobecnosti pociťovaný veľký nedostatok pracovných síl. Nastal značný prílev pracovných síl, najmä z preludneného vidieka, do priemyslu, stavebníctva, štátneho a stranického aparátu, do armády a bezpečnostných zložiek. Mestá i dediny začali meniť svoj predošlý charakter. Systém sociálneho a zdravotného zabezpečenia, všeobecne prístupné školstvo, pozemková reforma, pridelovanie konfiškátov a dosadzovanie tzv. národných správcov, v štáte ovládanom komunistami, v rozhodujúcej miere otupili (eliminovali) na Slovensku aktívny odpor obyvateľstva voči nedemokratickému režimu. Tento fakt nebolo možné prehliadať.

Na druhej strane surové zásahy mocenských orgánov voči odporcom režimu, pri uplatňovaní princípu retroaktivity, kolektívnej viny, sa dali porovnať len s metódami Gestapa a NKVD. Štátna bezpečnosť prenikala do všetkých vrstiev spoločnosti, nastolila systém denunciácií

a v spoločnosti vytvorila atmosféru strachu. Ak sa zahraničná Slovenská tajná ochrana chcela pôvodne vo svojej činnosti na Slovensku opierať najmä o vysokoškolskú a stredoškolskú mládež, ktorá stála v prvých radoch autonomistického hnutia a budovania slovenskej štátnosti, po rozsiahlych politických čistkách v rokoch 1945 – 1946 na univerzite a vysokých školách to už nebolo možné. Všade zavládol strach a udavačstvo. Tí, ktorí do roku 1945 aktívne pracovali v mládežníckom hnutí, boli uväznení, zaradení do pracovných táborov, vylúčení zo štúdia a zo zamestnania alebo boli nútení odísť do emigrácie. Väčšina z nich, ak chcela doštudovať a prežiť dobu neslobody, sa v nádeji na zmenu režimu utiahla do pasivity a zaujala vyčkávací postoj. Na Slovensku vo všeobecnosti zavládla voči pražskému režimu pasívna rezistencia.

Ludovodemokratický režim značne obmedzil na Slovensku demokratické slobody a ľudské práva. Z rozhodnutia česko-slovenskej exilovej vlády v Londýne boli zakázané všetky politické strany, ktoré mali do roku 1938 vo svojom programe autonómiu (HSLŠ a SNS), a preto v povstaní bola popri KSS legalizovaná len Demokratická strana. Táto nová politická strana však musela bezvýhradne súhlasiť s celým Košickým vládnym programom, ktorý Slovákom naoktrojovala v Moskve česká politická reprezentácia, a ako vládnuca strana ho musela bezpodmienečne realizovať.

Základnou podmienkou na povolenie novej politickej strany bol jej bezvýhradný súhlas s celým vládnym programom a nová politická strana sa bezpodmienečne musela stať členom tzv. Národného frontu ovládaného komunistami. Mimo tzv. Národného frontu nemohla legálne pôsobiť žiadna politická strana, v opačnom prípade jej hrozilo rozpustenie a uväznenie jej funkcionárov. Akákoľvek ideová a politická opozícia voči Košickému vládnemu programu bola kriminalizovaná a trestaná. Politická opozícia nebola nastoleným režimom akceptovaná, ktorý týmto trpel hlbokým deficitom demokracie.

Radikálne sa zhoršilo najmä postavenie národnostných menšín, predovšetkým nemeckej. Postavenie Nemcov v Česko-Slovensku, zbavených štátneho občianstva, nemalo obdobu v dovtedajších dejinách. Hromadné vraždy nemeckého civilného obyvateľstva, tzv. pochody smrti, týranie žien a detí v zaisťovacích a pracovných táboroch, ich vykorisťovanie pri pracovnom nasadení, či už v štátnom, alebo súkromnom sektore (najmä v českom pohraničí), s cieľom zmocniť sa ich majetku, úplne morálne zdevastovali spoločnosť. Vôľa národa prejaviť otvorený nesúhlas s politikou štátneho terorizmu bola týmto paralyzovaná.

Ľudovodemokratický režim zahnal svojich občanov do vnútornej emigrácie. Otvorený odpor voči režimu, smerujúcemu k úplnej totalite, kládli na Slovensku zväčša izolovaní jednotlivci a skupiny, ktoré boli režimom deklasované a vytláčané na okraj spoločnosti. Išlo o osoby, ktoré v slovenskom štáte zastávali rôzne pozície (bývalí funkcionári HSLS, pracovníci štátnej správy), ako aj osoby, ktoré v dôsledku politických čistiek prišli o zamestnanie (v školstve, armáde, bezpečnosti, súdnictve), ktoré prišli o majetok v rámci konfiškácie a tzv. znárodňovania, ale aj o osoby prenasledované z politických, národnostných alebo náboženských dôvodov a v neposlednom rade tí, ktorí sa otvorene hlásili k štátnej samostatnosti Slovenska. Ľudovodemokratický režim zabránil tomu, aby sa diskriminované a prenasledované skupiny obyvateľstva mohli legálne organizovať a legitímnym spôsobom brániť svoje základné ľudské a demokratické práva. Túto úlohu bol nútený prevziať na svoje plecia slovenský politický exil.

Aj keď sa zahraničnej Slovenskej tajnej ochrane podarilo vybudovať z Rakúska na Slovensko pomerne dobre fungujúci kuriérny styk, pociťovali určitú izolovanosť najmä od Ferdinanda Ďurčanského, ktorého politické aktivity sledovali s veľkými sympatiami. Uvedomovali si, že musia od základu zreorganizovať zahraničnú Slovenskú tajnú ochranu a od konca leta 1945 sa začali intenzívne zaoberať myšlienkou vytvorenia novej exilovej organizácie. Prv, ako sa chceli odhodlať k tomuto závažnému kroku, chceli si vypočuť názory Karola Sidora a Ferdinanda Ďurčanského na charakter a rozsah svojich aktivít. L. Jankovič a jeho blízki spolupracovníci si pritom uvedomovali, že pôvodná predstava o činnosti slovenskej exilovej vlády je už nereálna.

Zistiť názory K. Sidora a F. Ďurčanského, respektíve ľudí z ich blízkeho okolia na činnosť slovenského exilu, mala splniť misia Rudolfa Komanderu, ktorý ilegálne prešiel peši cez zasnežené vysokohorské alpské priesmyky, najprv do anglického okupačného pásma v Korutánsku a nakoniec cez rakúsko-talianske hranice do Talianska. Do Ríma prišiel 18. októbra 1945. Po niekoľkých dňoch navštívil Karola Sidora, aby si vypočul, aké kroky sa podnikli a podniknú a najmä akým spôsobom by sa mohli členovia zahraničnej Slovenskej tajnej ochrany zapojiť do exilových aktivít.

Rudolf Komandera namiesto povzbudenia a načrtnutia perspektív pre ďalšiu činnosť v Rakúsku sa však v Ríme stretol s nedôverou (bol evanjelik). Namiesto pomoci a rady vyžarovala z Karola Sidora bezradnosť, osobná urazenosť, neochota politicky sa angažovať. Podľa Komanderovej výpovede: „*Sidor vychádzal z týchto predpokladov: vojna je skončená, politicky sa nedá nič robiť pre obnovenie slovenskej štátnosti, treba sa uspokojiť s tým*

*stavom, ktorý je. [...] Je nekompromisne za slovenský štát, ale dnešná doba môže byť využitá len na politickú prípravu na obnovu štátnosti. [...] Košický vládny program mohol by byť, podľa neho, považovaný za takú základňu, na ktorej by sa dal aspoň na nejakú dobu riešiť pomer česko-slovenský. Jeho politická koncepcia v tom čase bola: vyčkávanie.*¹⁰

Výpoveď Rudolfa Komanderu sa v podstate zhoduje s tým, čo si zaznamenal do svojho denníka. Konštatoval, že exilu sa nepodarilo dosiahnuť, aby sa slovenská otázka stala medzinárodnou otázkou. V tejto súvislosti si však zaslúži pozornosť jeho prognóza budúceho vývoja slovensko-českých vzťahov a ich evolučný vývoj k štátnej samostatnosti Slovenska. História slovensko-českých vzťahov v rokoch 1945 – 1992 mu dala svojim spôsobom za pravdu: „Treba si jedno uvedomiť, že vývoj doma neostane trčať na Košickej¹¹ alebo inej dohode. Ani nová ústava nezahatí vzrast separatistických myšlienok na Slovensku. Naopak, každý deň v spoločnom štáte bude pripravovať a približovať jeho rozpad. Veď hlasy po samospráve sa ozývajú už aj z Moravy a iste nepredbieham, keď tvrdím, že ČSR sa rozpadne na zväz federatívnych štátov, ako najvýhodnejší štátny útvar pre Čechov a Slovákov. Takéto spolužitie nebude plodom radikálnych krídiel, ale to bude politika umiernených národovcov.

Slovenská otázka v ČSR nie je takým problémom, aby bolo treba zásahu mocností. Ani vnútroštátne zmeny v ČSR neprivodia medzinárodné zmeny, ale práve naopak. Akákoľvek zmena mocenského postavenia v Európe privedie zmeny štátov v strednej Európe. Keď vylúčime možnosť vojnového usporiadania status quo v strednej Európe a tým aj v ČSR, tak jedine vývojom môže nastať zmena vnútornej organizácie v ČSR. Nikdy nesmie byť našim cieľom vybudovať slovenskú štátnosť na troskách ČSR a národnej poroby Čechov a Moravanov. Je však povinnosťou brániť sa akémukoľvek nátlaku z ich strany. Vo chvíli, keď náš národ národno-politicky dozreje, navždy prestane medzi nami mátať problém čsl. jednoty, problém katolíkov a evanjelikov, problém samozvaných separatistov.

10 Archív Ústavu pamäti národa (ďalej iba A ÚPN) Bratislava, fond (ďalej iba f.) Krajská správa Zboru národnej bezpečnosti Správa Štátnej bezpečnosti (ďalej iba KS ZNB S-ŠtB) Bratislava. Fond starých písomností. Zápisnica napísaná dňa 19. 9. 1947 na Povereníctve vnútra VII. odbor za prítomnosti podpísaných. Vypočúvaný Rudolf Komandera.

11 Program prvej domácej vlády republiky, vlády Národného frontu Čechov a Slovákov, známy ako Košický vládny program, bol vyhlásený v Košiciach 5. 4. 1945. Kompetencie slovenských národných orgánov (SNR, Zbor povereníkov) boli však v nasledujúcom období radikálne obmedzované. Tento proces zavřila Ústava Č-SSR z roku 1960, ktorá uzákonila český centralizmus a zlikvidovala slovenské národné orgány.

V tom prípade, že by sa medzinárodné rozpory museli riešiť novou vojnou, nemôže dnešná emigrácia počítat so zvláštnymi privilégiami pre seba a svoje politické ciele, lebo aj v tomto usporiadaní Európy budú mať hlavné slovo domáci reprezentanti alebo nimi splnomocnení zástupcovia zahraničného odboja. Takýto odboj však budú robiť aj Česi. Teda je nemysliteľné, aby sa vzájomne nespolicovalo. A v tejto spolupráci akákoľvek zmena štátoprávneho postavenia Čechov a Slovákov, môže byť urobená len v súhlase s domovom. Lahko sa môže stať, že domáci odboj neprijme uznesenia zahraničného odboja alebo ho vôbec neuzná. Toto je osud každej emigrácie, alebo skupiny, ktorá si nevšíma politické prúdy okolo vlastného národa a za každú cenu chce udržať starý stav, čo vždy vedie k bratovražedným vojnám a revolúciám.¹²

Pokiaľ ide o hodnotenie Karola Sidora poznamenal si Rudolf Komandera do denníka nasledovnú charakteristiku: „Nekompromisný zástanca slovenskej štátnosti, protinemec, protičech, polonofil a hlavne odstavený, znemožnený, jediný nástupca Hlinku. V politike človek nevie, čo je lepšie: aktivita alebo vyčkávanie.“¹³ Objektívne totiž neobstojí obraz Karola Sidora – „čechoslováka“, údajne odmietajúceho slovenskú štátnosť tak, ako ho vykresľovala najprv nacistická a následne aj čechoslovakistická propaganda s cieľom Sidora politicky skompromitovať a vnieť do slovenského exilu rozkol. Vyfabrikovaný, falošný obraz Sidora – „čechoslováka“, ako politický folklór, doznieva však ešte aj v súčasnosti medzi niektorými historikmi skúmajúcimi slovenské dejiny z českého pohľadu.

Práve v čase, keď sa z Ríma vrátil Rudolf Komandera, doniesol kuriér František Paňko prvý ucelenejší politický prehľad o vnútro politickej situácii na Slovensku od Štefana Chalmovského. Prehľad, okrem zásahov režimu voči svojim oponentom, najmä z radov Katolíckej cirkvi, obsahoval správy o činnosti Národnej bezpečnosti, ako aj analýzu hospodárskeho vývoja. Tento materiál vedenie zahraničnej Slovenskej tajnej ochrany, spolu s analýzou tlače, spracovalo do súhrnnej správy a poslalo do Ríma K. Sidorovi a F. Ďurčanskému.

Komanderova správa o rokovaní s K. Sidorom, ako aj Chalmovského prehľad o vnútro politickej situácii na Slovensku vyvolali v zahraničnej Slovenskej tajnej ochrane prvé diskusie a polemiky týkajúce sa vzťahu exilu k Demokratickej strane, k Evanjelickej cirkvi, ku Komunistickej strane

12 Archív autora. *Denník Rudolfa Komanderu 1945 – 1947*. Kópia originálu. Zápis zo dňa 7. 3. 1947.

13 Tamže. Zápis zo dňa 18. 10. 1946.

Slovenska.¹⁴ Pomaly sa začalo obrusovať ostrie a ustupovať z bigotne konfesionálnych postojov najmä vo vzťahu k Demokratickej strane, Evanjelickej cirkvi, Košickému vládnemu programu, ale aj k Č-SR. I keď tento trend nebol ešte v radoch slovenskej emigrácie v Rakúsku v roku 1945 zreteľný, jeho reprezentantmi sa stali katolík Ladislav Jankovič a jeho dôverný a blízky priateľ evanjelik Rudolf Komandera, čo do budúcnosti dávalo určitú záruku, že uvedený trend sa presadí a stane sa stabilným prvkom v programe a politike zahraničnej Slovenskej tajnej ochrany.

Štefan Chalmovský však nestihol rozvinúť činnosť domácej Slovenskej tajnej ochrany, vybudovať jednotné centrum domáceho protikomunistického odboja, v novembri 1946 bol zatknutý. Rudolf Komandera si po zaisťení Chalmovského spätne poznamenal do denníka: „*Odhalením skupiny Dr. Chalmovského prestalo jestvovať jediné vedenie domáceho odboja, s ktorým sme boli ideologicky jednotní a s ktorým sa začal budovať styk. Preto sa začalo vážne pomýšľať a potom aj uskutočňovať zakladanie výborov SRO, zakladanie (politických) strán doma.*“¹⁵ Tento nezdar urýchlil proces hľadania iných metód ilegálnej práce na Slovensku. Na druhej strane, v dôsledku začínajúcich osobných rozporov medzi K. Sidorom a F. Ďurčanským, čím ďalej, tým viac viazlo organizačné zjednocovanie exilu.

V dôsledku uvedeného vývoja začalo sa v užšom kruhu, okolo Ladislava Jankoviča, uvažovať o nevyhnutnej potrebe prebudovať zahraničnú Slovenskú tajnú ochranu a na jej základoch vytvoriť novú organizáciu. Príkladom im bola aj emigrácia pochádzajúca zo sovietskej sféry, ktorej predstavitelia si v Rakúsku i Nemecku zakladali rôzne komitety, ktoré zároveň obhajovali aj ich skupinové záujmy pri rokovaníach s rakúskymi úradmi alebo s okupačnou správou. Jankovičovej skupine, usadenej v Raurise, však šlo prioritne o založenie organizácie, ktorá bude mať politický charakter a v tomto zmysle bude vyvíjať svoju činnosť tak v zahraničí, ako aj na Slovensku.

Takto sa zrodila myšlienka založiť jednu z prvých organizácií slovenského politického exilu Slovenský revolučný odboj (SRO),¹⁶ ktorý vo svojich

14 Zaujímavé informácie o vnútro politickej situácii na Slovensku doniesol aj kuriér SRO Viliam Mihalovič, ktorý bol na Slovensku 28. 9. – 28. 10. 1945. Vyslal ho L. Jankovič, aby sa skontaktoval s Jozefom Vicenom alebo Štefanom Chalmovským. Cestu na Slovensko a späť do Rakúska absolvoval legálne, na priepustku.

15 Archív autora. *Denník Rudolfa Komanderu 1945 – 1947*. Kópia originálu. Zápis zo dňa 1. 12. 1946.

16 Kvôli korektnosti upozorňujem na fakt, že Ferdinand Ďurčanský datuje založenie Slovenského akčného výboru na december 1945. (ĎURČANSKÝ, F.: *Právo Slovákov*

radoch združoval najmä vysokoškolskú mládež, funkcionárov a aktivistov Hlinkovej mládeže, respektíve Združenia vysokoškolských študentov. Hlavným dôvodom odchodu vysokoškolských študentov zo Slovenskej republiky bol nesúhlas s nastolovaným ľudovodemokratickým režimom, politicky závislým na Moskve, ako aj snaha prispieť k obnove štátnej samostatnosti Slovenskej republiky a zabrániť sovielizácii Slovenska. Časť vysokoškoolákov zostala doma s úlohou organizovať domáce podzemné hnutie. Do emigrácie odchádzali zväčša tí funkcionári a aktivisti mládežníckeho hnutia, ktorí boli verejne známi a opodstatnene sa obávali represálií, či už zo strany česko-slovenských bezpečnostných orgánov, alebo NKVD.

Iniciátorom založenia Slovenského revolučného odboja bol absolvent Právnickej fakulty Slovenskej univerzity Ladislav Jankovič. K jeho ustanoveniu došlo na poradách, ktoré sa konali 24. decembra 1945 až 6. januára 1946 v Raurise (obec v rakúskej spolkovej krajine Salzburgu), kde SRO mal aj svoje prvé sídlo.¹⁷ Zakladateľmi SRO boli Ladislav Jankovič, Rudolf Komandera, František Mitz, Jozef Kolmajer a Viliam Mihalovič.¹⁸ Okrem nich sa na poradách zúčastnili aj Ján Strečanský, Vojtech Košovský, Mária Kašová a Marienka Rusková. Slovenský revolučný odboj mal kolektívne vedenie, avšak za jeho formálneho vedúceho bol všeobecne uznávaný

na samostatnosť vo svetle dokumentov. Zv. 1. Biela kniha. Buenos Aires 1954, s. 870.)

- 17 Vladimír Varinský opakovane nesprávne uvádza vo svojej publicistike, že Slovenský revolučný odboj vznikol v novembri 1945 v Mníchove. Takisto jeho tvrdenie o osobách, ktoré sa mali údajne zúčastniť pri založení SRO sa nezakladá na pravde. V skutočnosti ani jedna z nich nebola prítomná pri založení SRO. Je evidentné, že Varinský vôbec nepozná okolnosti vzniku SRO. Štúdia V. Varinského o SRO je príkladom toho, že profesionálny historik sa nemôže uspokojiť s prerozprávaním a literárnym spracovaním protokolov z výsluchu Štátnej bezpečnosti, ktorý si povýši na „pramenný základ“. (VARINSKÝ, V.: Činnosť slovenskej politickej emigrácie po roku 1945 – Slovenský revolučný odboj. In: *Acta Universitatis Matthiae Belii*, Banská Bystrica 1999, s. 227.)
- 18 Václav Vondrášek nepravdivo tvrdí, že Ferdinand Ďurčanský sa vraj na prelome rokov 1945 – 1946 zúčastnil na rokovaní predstaviteľov exilu v Raurise, kde vraj bolo prijaté rozhodnutie založiť Slovenský revolučný odboj so sídlom v Mníchove. Táto Vondrášekova dezinformácia sa opiera o nespoľahlivé údaje kpt. Alexandra Domana (Dautenbauma), ktorý sa neúspešne pokúšal vypátrať a zatknúť F. Ďurčanského. (VONDRÁŠEK, V.: Poválečný slovenský exil a aktivity ČSR o vydání jeho některých představitelů. Květen 1945 – podzim 1946. In: *Vojenská historie*, roč. 7, 2003, č. 4, s. 62.) Zavádzajúce sú aj informácie, že zakladajúcim členom SRO bol aj Jozef Mikula a že vraj zastával v SRO vedúce funkcie, ako to nesprávne tvrdia Vladimír Varinský s Václavom Vondráškom. (VARINSKÝ, V.: *Jozef Vicen a Biela légia*. Banská Bystrica 2003, s. 39; VONDRÁŠEK, V.: Rok 1947 – mezník v poválečnom vývoji Slovenska. In: *Od diktatúry k diktatúre. Slovensko v rokoch 1945 – 1953. Zborník materiálov z vedeckej konferencie v Smoleniciach 6. – 8. 12. 1994*. Bratislava 1995, s. 51.)

Ladislav Jankovič. Deklarovaným programovým cieľom SRO bolo napomôcť k sformovaniu ideového hnutia na Slovensku v zápase za demokraciu a štátnu nezávislosť Slovenskej republiky.

Na poradách v Raurise bola schválená Rezolúcia Slovenského revolučného odboja, ktorá pozostávala z dvoch základných častí: z kultúrneho, sociálneho a hospodárskeho programu a zo smerníc pre činnosť jednotlivých organizácií Slovenského revolučného odboja na Slovensku a v zahraničí. V tejto súvislosti možno konštatovať, že SRO bol prvou a dlhú dobu jedinou exilovou organizáciou, ktorá mala skoncipovaný konkrétny program pre budúce, demokratické Slovensko. Podobu programu ovplyvnili pápežské encykliky o sociálnom učení cirkvi a o stavovskom štáte *Rerum novarum* (1891) a *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), ako aj názory T. Kolakoviča.

Program Slovenského revolučného odboja predstavoval na svoju dobu moderný program kresťansko-demokratického hnutia. Podľa Rudolfa Komanderu programovým cieľom SRO bolo vybudovať taký štát, aby sa v ňom mohol uplatniť každý občan „*bez ohľadu na to, ku ktorým politickým stranám kedy prináležal alebo aké je jeho zmyšľanie. Teda usporiadanie čisto demokratické. To bol cieľ a program Dr. Jankoviča a viac-menej si ho privlastnili všetci s ohľadom na funkcie, aké zastávali v bývalom slovenskom štáte.*“¹⁹ Najmä sociálny program SRO nebol v exile prijímaný s jednoznačným súhlasom. Narážal aj na nesúhlas a odpor predovšetkým bývalých funkcionárov HSĽS, ako aj časti Hlinkovej gardy. A práve v otázke usporiadania budúceho slovenského štátu nastal určitý rozkol medzi Slovenským revolučným odbojom a exilovými skupinami v Rakúsku, ktoré sa k jeho programu stavali viac-menej rezervovane.

V rámci Slovenského revolučného hnutia sa formoval zárodok budúceho politického systému obnovenej, demokratickej Slovenskej republiky. Podľa predstáv vedenia SRO mali v Slovenskej republike pôsobiť štyri základné politické strany, zodpovedajúce v podstate sociálnemu rozvrstveniu vtedajšej slovenskej spoločnosti. (Nikde však nebolo uvedené, že nemôžu pôsobiť aj iné politické strany.) Išlo o obnovenie týchto politických strán: Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana, agrárna strana, Slovenská

19 A ÚPN, KS ZNB S-ŠtB Bratislava, Fond starých písomností. Zápisnica napísaná dňa 19. 9. 1947 na Povereníctve vnútra VII. odbor za prítomnosti podpísaných. Vypočúvaný Rudolf Komandera.

národná strana a sociálno-demokratická strana. (Všetky tieto strany boli ľudovodemokratickým režimom zakázané, respektíve zlikvidované.)

Podľa svojej ideovej a politickej inklinácie boli členovia Slovenského revolučného odboja zaradení do uvedených štyroch politických strán a ich úlohou bolo napomáhať vytvorenie ilegálnych straníckych štruktúr na Slovensku.

Z programu Slovenského revolučného odboja vyplýva, že obnovenie štátnej samostatnosti Slovenskej republiky nepovažovali za samoučelný cieľ, ale predovšetkým za prostriedok, ktorým má byť na základe kresťanského svetonázoru realizovaný nasledovný program:

1. Základom medzinárodného a národného poriadku je kresťanské chápanie poslania a zmyslu človeka a národov na zemi a z toho vyplývajúce vyriešenie ich duchovných i materiálnych potrieb. Jednotlivec i národy majú svoje materiálne i duchovné potreby. V snahe rozvinúť svoju osobitosť, musia sa zachovávať najdemokratickejšie práva človeka: sloboda myslenia, sloboda prejavu a sloboda zhromažďovania sa.

2. Základnou jednotkou celej ľudskej spoločnosti je rodina, v ktorej sa má, podľa kresťanských a národných zásad, uskutočniť zákon lásky k sebe, k blížnemu i k národom celého sveta. Rodina musí preto požívať ochranu a podporu štátu. Najvlastnejšie miesto ženy je v rodine. Žene sa priznávajú všetky práva ako mužovi.

3. Každý človek má právo na vzdelanie. Musí sa preto umožniť každému ako prostriedok k rozvoju ľudskej osobnosti. Dôležité miesto vo výchove sa kládol najmä na mravnú výchovu, aby vzdelaný človek ako „mravný jednotlivec mohol prevziať podľa svojich vlôh a schopností zodpovednosť v rodine, v spoločnosti a v národe“.

4. Najvznešenejším prejavom ľudskej existencie je práca, ktorá sa stáva meradlom hodnoty človeka i národov; meradlom majetku jednotlivcov i spoločností. Majetok je iba prostriedok, cez ktorý človek rozvíja svoju osobnosť. Majetok má svoju sociálnu funkciu, a preto je určená jeho horná i dolná hranica. Dolná hranica majetku je určená tým, aby si človek mohol svojou prácou zabezpečiť základné životné potreby (strava, byt, odev, potrebný odpočinok a potrebný duchovný život). Horná hranica súkromného majetku je štátom limitovaná. Priznáva sa súkromné vlastníctvo nadobudnuté prácou. Môže však byť spoločnosťou ohraničené, aby sa zabránilo jeho zneužívaniu na úkor iných občanov. Veľké výrobné prostriedky, ktoré sa udržiavajú prácou mnohých, sú majetkom všetkých tam pracujúcich a ich rodín. (Pravdepodobne na spôsob podnikových akciových spoločností.)

5. Národné hospodárstvo sa riadi sociálnymi záujmami jednotlivca, národa i sveta „na vzájomné vyrovnávanie výkyvov a na dosiahnutie optima jednotlivca i národov“. Išlo v podstate o koncepciu akéhosi modelu sociálneho trhového hospodárstva. A to tak z hľadiska národného, ako aj z hľadiska medzinárodnej deľby práce.

6. Úlohou sociálnej politiky bolo predovšetkým dbať o spravodlivé rozdelenie práce pre všetkých a o vyrovnávanie sociálnych rozdielov v štáte.

7. „*Aby slovenský národ mohol slobodne rozhodnúť o svojej budúcnosti a aby sme mohli tento program uskutočniť, musí striasť jarmo českých a komunistických okupantov a slovenských, zavedených samozvancov. Ak tento boj má sa víťazne zakončiť, treba do jeho služieb zapojiť všetkých verných Slovákov doma i v zahraničí bez rozdielu náboženského, stranického a stavovského postavenia.*“²⁰

Na pracovnú poradu do Raurisu prišiel počas rokovania aj zástupca ukrajinskej exilovej vlády Peter Bašuk (Baschuk) z Mníchova. Ukrajinci, ako aj Poliaci poskytli formujúcej sa slovenskej politickej emigrácii v Rakúsku a Nemecku neoceniteľné služby. Ako skúsení ilegálni pracovníci nezištne odovzdávali slovenským vysokoškolákom svoje bohaté skúsenosti z bojov proti nemeckým okupantom a boľševikom. Učili ich základnej abecede organizovania ilegálneho hnutia – od ilegálnych prechodov hraníc, vydávania ilegálnych tlačív a ich distribúcie až po vedenie politického a ideologického zápasu.

Už na ustanovujúcej schôdzi v Raurise sa Slovenský revolučný odboj rozhodol požiadať o členstvo v pripravovanom Antiboľševickom bloku národov. Toto uznesenie z ustanovujúcej schôdze SRO tlmočil Peter Bašuk Ukrajinskej hlavnej oslobodzovacej rade²¹ v Mníchove. Dňa 12. januára 1946 navštívili vedúci predstavitelia SRO Ladislav Jankovič a Rudolf Komandera ukrajinské centrum protikomunistického odbojového hnutia v Mníchove, kde oficiálne rokovali o prijatí Slovenského revolučného odboja do Antiboľševického bloku národov.

20 Náš program. (Z programového vyhlásenia Slovenského revolučného odboja v roku 1945). In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 1, 15. 4. 1946, č. 1, s. 3 – 4.

21 Ukrajinska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada (UHVR) – Ukrajinská hlavná osloboditeľská rada. Reprezentatívny, politický orgán ukrajinského národa. Založená v júli 1944 z podnetu vedúcich predstaviteľov Ukrajinskej povstaleckej armády na širokej politickej základni, s výnimkou boľševikov. Užšie Prezídium UHVR tvorili prezident K. Osmak, viceprezidenti V. Mudryj, I. Hryňoch, I. Vovčuk a generálny tajomník R. Šuchevyč. Koncom roka 1944 sa časť vedenia UHVR presťahovala do Nemecka (Mníchov), kde sa vytvorilo Zahraničné zastupiteľstvo UHVR na čele s I. Hryňochom.

Pri príležitosti vstupu Slovenského revolučného odboja do Antibolševického bloku národov bola vydaná Deklarácia, v ktorej bolo vyzdvihnuté, že „slovenské nacionalistické, ľudové hnutie už pred štyridsiatimi rokmi vyslovilo vo svojom politickom programe odpor ku komunizmu. [...] Slováci po druhej svetovej vojne popri nenásytnom a koristníckom českom imperializme pociťovali najväčší nápor zo strany organizovaného bolševizmu, ktorý používal v našom prípade osobitné metódy, aby si podmanil čo najväčšiu časť slovenského národa. Dával koncesie i nacionalistom, ktorých hnutie smerovalo k osamostatneniu Slovenska. Bol to však iba agitačný trik, ako všade inde. Pravá láska bolševikov k slovenskému národu sa ukázala v druhej svetovej vojne, keď sa zišli s Čechmi na spoločnej platforme²², nešetiac nikoho, kto slúžil slovenskej štátnosti. Teraz Slovensko trpí ako všetky ostatné krajiny podrobené Kremľu. Niet nijakých umiernení, vývoj smeruje k úplnému zbolševizovaniu Slovenska. Šli sme vždy proti najväčšiemu zotročovateľovi dejín a to nie pre nejaké výhody, ktoré by nám plynuli z protivného tábora, ale preto, že celá slovenská mentalita je protibolševická, že Slovensko je veriace, kultúrne, politicky vyspelé a nacionalistické.“²³

V tomto duchu sa Slovenský revolučný odboj prihlásil Deklaráciou k politickému programu a odkazu Andreja Hlinku, ktorý sa rozhodol plniť aj s podporou národov zo sovietskej sféry vplyvu zastúpených v Antibolševickom bloku národov. „Toto hnutie národov, dnes rovnako trpiacich, ale i rovnako odhodlaných vybojovať najrozhodnejšiu bitku dejín sveta, má nielen sympatie nášho národa, ale i všetkých našich chrabrých mužov, ktorí sa neštítia nijakých strádání a nijakých obetí.“²⁴

Dňa 16. apríla 1946 sa v Mníchove konala konferencia splnomocnených zástupcov politických organizácií, reprezentujúcich národy zo sovietskej sféry vplyvu v Európe a v Ázii. Na konferencii, za aktívnej účasti predstaviteľov Slovenského revolučného odboja, sa zúčastnení delegáti rozhodli založiť Antibolševický blok národov, ktorý programovo nadväzoval na prvú konferenciu ujarmených národov ZSSR z roku 1943, na ktorej bola

22 Nepriamo sa poukazuje na Zmluvu o priateľstve, vzájomnej pomoci a povojnovej spolupráci, ktorú uzavrel 12. 12. 1943 v Moskve E. Beneš. Týmto sa ešte nejestvujúce Česko-Slovensko stalo v Európe prvým politickým satelitom ZSSR. Tento pakt Beneša so Stalinom následne poslužil ako „vzorová zmluva“ aj pre ďalšie ľudovodemokratické štáty, ktoré boli na základe diktátu v Teheráne a Jalte začlenené do sovietskej sféry vplyvu. Zmluva sa po r. 1945 stala účinným nástrojom sovietskej politiky.

23 Deklarácia Antibolševického bloku národov (ABN). In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 1, 15. 7. 1946, č. 4, s. 23. (Podčiarknuté v texte.)

24 Tamže.

vytýčená programová línia boja na dvoch frontoch – proti bolševizmu a nacizmu. Mníchov sa stal centrom európskeho protikomunistického hnutia.

Na ustanovujúcej konferencii Antibolševického bloku národov sa delegáti dohodli na nasledujúcich zásadách pre svoju najbližšiu činnosť a organizáciu:

1. Stanoviť spoločný cieľ, jednotnú základňu a jednotný politický program Antibolševického bloku národov.
2. Zostaviť jednotný, všeobecný pracovný plán ABN, najmä čo sa týka spoločných protibolševických akcií na všetkých úsekoch života a boja národov združených v Antibolševickom bloku národov.
3. Dohodnúť sa na zahraničnopolitickej i vnútro politickej činnosti.
4. Vytvoriť osobitné inštitúcie na vypracovanie smerníc pre činnosť na rozličných úsekoch.

Na konferencii bol ustanovený najvyšší orgán – Komitét Antibolševického bloku národov, ktorý tvorili predsedovia jednotlivých exilových organizácií. Za prezidenta ABN bol zvolený bývalý predseda vlády samostatnej Ukrajiny Jaroslav Semjonovič Stecko²⁵, ktorý túto funkciu vykonával až do svojej smrti.

Zakladajúcimi členmi Antibolševického bloku bolo šesťnásť exilových organizácií, reprezentujúcich národy ZSSR a národy zo sovietskej sféry vplyvu. Slovenský revolučný odboj zastupoval v ABN Ladislav Jankovič, od roku 1947 zástupca Slovenského akčného výboru v Bavarsku Ctibor Pokorný. Delegáti sa uzniesli vydávať oficiálny tlačový orgán Antibolševického bloku národov mesačník *Za slobodu národov*.

„*Antibolševický blok národov*“, konštatovalo sa vo vyhlásení Komitétu ABN, „*je združenie slobodmilovných národov s cieľom bojovať proti bolševizmu. ABN geopoliticky zahrňuje všetky národy Európy a Ázie, upiace pod bolševickou nadvládou, a to: Fínov, Estóncov, Lotyšov, Bielorusov, Poliakov, Slovákov, Čechov, Maďarov, Srbov, Chorvátov, Albáncov, Bulharov, Rumunov, Ukrajincov, Kozákov, Kalmykov, národy severného Kaukazu, Gruzíncov, Arménov, Azerbajdžancov, Turkestancov (Tadžikov, Uzbekov,*

25 Jaroslav Semjonovič Stecko (1912 – 1986), štátnik, exilový pracovník. Blízky spolupracovník Stepana Banderu. Dňa 30. 6. 1941 vyhlásil v Lvove štátnu samostatnosť Ukrajiny. Jún – júl 1941 predseda ukrajinskej vlády. V r. 1942 – 1944 väznený v koncentračnom tábore v Sachsenhausene. Jeden z iniciátorov založenia UHVR. V r. 1946 – 1986 prezident ABN. V r. 1968 – 1986 predseda Organizácie ukrajinských nacionalistov (banderovské hnutie). Od r. 1970 člen vedenia Svetovej protikomunistickej ligy.

Turkménov, Kazachov, Kirgizov, Karakalpakov) a všetky národy tzv. ZSSR, Tatárov, Baškircov, mongolské a iné národy Sibíra a ďalekého východu.

*Každý z týchto národov má svoje vlastné problémy, ktoré musí riešiť, ako i svoje vlastné ciele, ale pre ne všetky v rámci Antiboľševického bloku národov je (spoločný) cieľ – boj proti boľševizmu. Na zástave Antiboľševického bloku národov je vytýčené ako hlavný cieľ jeho boja heslo: Sloboda národom – sloboda jednotlivcovi!*²⁶

*V tejto súvislosti sa v rozsiahlom vyhlásení píše: „Boľševický totalitarizmus a imperializmus hrozí celému civilizovanému svetu, že zničí jeho duchovné a kultúrne hodnoty brutálnym násilím. Boj proti boľševizmu za slobodu národov a jednotlivca, práve tak ako boj proti fašizmu za tým istým účelom, predstavuje dnes najpokrokovejšieho a revolučného činiteľa. Po zničení fašizmu ostal boľševizmus jedinou bázou reakcie na svete ... Od tohto boja závisí záchrana alebo záhuba ľudstva [...] Kategorickým imperatívom súčasnej doby je založenie jednotného protiboľševického frontu a jednotného koordinovaného vedenia boja proti boľševizmu. Zodpovedne tomuto príkazu doby – my reprezentanti protiboľševických organizácií národov utláčaných boľševizmom, ohrozovaných a bojujúcich za slobodu – spájame všetky svoje sily na dosiahnutie spoločného cieľa a zakladáme takto Antiboľševický blok národov.“*²⁷

Členstvo Slovenského revolučného odboja v Antiboľševickom bloku národov mu umožnilo oboznámiť sa s metódami práce emigrantských organizácií, s postavením národov v ZSSR, ako aj v sovietskej sfére vplyvu. Súčasne umožnilo SRO informovať predstaviteľov jednotlivých emigrantských organizácií o vývoji vnútro politickej situácie na Slovensku, o postavení Slovenska a Slovákov v Česko-Slovensku a aj prostredníctvom ABN otvárať na medzinárodných fórach slovenskú otázku v Č-SR ako medzinárodný problém.

Členstvo v ABN umožnilo Slovenskému revolučnému odboju nadviazať prvé priame kontakty so zahraničím (USA, Londýn, Rím). Toto efektívne a rýchle spojenie zabezpečovali spočiatku ukrajinskí, ale aj poľskí kuriéri, ktorí slúžili v Andersovej armáde a mali možnosť voľného pohybu. Počas svojho pracovného pobytu v Mníchove nadviazali Ladislav Jankovič a Rudolf Komandera prostredníctvom kuriérnej služby ABN priame kontakty s predsedom Slovenskej národnej rady v Londýne Petrom Prídavkom, ale aj s Ferdinandom Ďurčanským, s bývalým vyslancom

26 Vyhlásenie. In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 1, 15. 7. 1946, č. 4, s. 25.

27 Tamže.

Slovenskej republiky vo Vatikáne Karolom Sidorom, s vedením Slovenskej ligy v Amerike.

Slovenská politická emigrácia bola v zahraničí, podobne ako aj iné emigrácie zo sovietskej zóny, ostro konfrontovaná s účelovými obvineniami z fašizmu. Na základe týchto obvinení sa Prahe podarilo v rokoch 1945 – 1947, najmä z amerického okupačného pásma, násilne deportovať časť slovenských exulantov z Rakúska a Nemecka do Česko-Slovenska, kde ich čakali politické procesy, smrť, dlhoročné väzenie, uplatňovanie princípu kolektívnej viny uvalenej nielen na ich rodinných príslušníkov, ale aj na vzdialených príbuzných a podobne. Cieľom týchto politických procesov, organizovaných Prahou takmer v pravidelných intervaloch, bolo potrestať a zastrašiť Slovákov, aby sa už nikdy viac nepokúsili založiť si svoj vlastný štát. Tento hlavný politický aspekt súdnych procesov, ktorý Praha sledovala, sa odrazil nielen v celkovom počte obžalovaných a odsúdených, ale aj v celkovom rozsahu povojnových politických čistiek na Slovensku. Toto bol nakoniec nútený priznať v emigrácii aj bývalý predseda Demokratickej strany (po voľbách predseda SNR) Jozef Lettrich: „*Politická očista od kolaborantov z čias Slovenského štátu bola na Slovensku rozsiahlejšia ako v českých krajinách.*“²⁸ A uvedenému cieľu slúžilo aj kriminalizovanie slovenskej štátnosti, ktorú Praha zámerne ideologizovala a účelovo stotožňovala s „ľudáctvom“ a „ľudáctvo“ zasa s fašizmom, resp. so slovenským „špecifikom“ – s takzvaným klérofašizmom. Každý prívrženec slovenskej štátnosti, doma, ako aj v zahraničí, bol Prahou biľagovaný a kriminalizovaný ako „fašista“. Podobne postupovala voči porobeným národom Moskva, ako aj Belehrad.

Táto protislovenská kampaň sa od roku 1945 intenzívne viedla nielen v Česko-Slovensku, ale aj v zahraničí a svojim spôsobom sa vedie aj v súčasnosti. Negatívnu úlohu pritom zohrala aj oficiálna slovenská historiografia, ktorá v rokoch 1948 – 1989 stála úplne v službách komunistického režimu. Ako v tejto súvislosti napísal vo svojich memoároch bývalý predseda Národného súdu Igor Daxner na adresu slovenských i českých historikov: „*Som [...] presvedčený, že neskoršie výskumy a ich spracovanie v zásade nebudú v rozpore s mojimi tvrdeniami a názormi, ktoré som vyslovil, či už v priebehu procesov, alebo v tejto práci. Konečne,*

už aj historická literatúra, ktorá vyšla po roku 1948, dokázala správnosť postupu Národného súdu proti ľudáctvu.“²⁹

S obvineniami z „fašizmu“ bol Prahou v zahraničí otvorene konfrontovaný aj Slovenský revolučný odboj. Už v prvom čísle tlačového orgánu SRO, Slobodného Slovenska, boli rázne odmietnuté tieto tendenčné obvinenia. Poukazovalo sa pritom na fakt, že nacistický režim v Nemecku nachádzal svoju podobu práve v komunistickom režime v ZSSR. „*Na Slovensku dnes panuje pravá éra tohto fašizmu v komunisticko-nacistickej maske. Všetky noviny píšu rovnako, všetci rečníci hovoria rovnako, kto vysloví inú mienku ide do basy. To si nemusíme pripomínať, ale to je, páni, fašizmus. Vodcu máme nového, a to generalissima Stalina [...] Nech sa nikto nečuduje, že v záujme demokratického zriadenia slovenského štátu vypovedáme boj proti nacizmu našich komunistov i pseudodemokratov, hanebných to päťolizačov Prahy.*“³⁰

Slovenský revolučný odboj priamo nadväzoval na Slovenskú tajnú ochranu, a to nielen personálne, ale aj programovo a organizačne. Začiatkom roka 1946 sa rozčlenil na dve autonómne zložky: zahraničnú (SRO) a domácu (STO). Za vedúceho Slovenskej tajnej ochrany bol naďalej považovaný Jozef Vicen, s ktorým sa však počas celého jeho pobytu v Č-SR nepodarilo nadviazať spoluprácu. Zásadnou zmenou dovtedajšej organizácie bolo, že SRO (predtým zahraničná STO) si prestal nárokovať na organizačné podriadenie domácej Slovenskej tajnej ochrany a v konaní ponechával jej vedúcemu Jozefovi Vicenovi úplnú samostatnosť.

Aj po založení Slovenského revolučného odboja sa jeho vedenie naďalej neúspešne usilovalo nadviazať spoluprácu s Jozefom Vicenom, informovať ho o založení Slovenského revolučného odboja, ako aj o črtajúcich

29 DAXNER, I.: *Ludáctvo pred Národným súdom 1945 – 1947*. Bratislava 1961, s. 14. Vedecký redaktor Daxnerových pamätí Lubomír Lipták z Historického ústavu SAV so zadosťučinením vymenoval marxisticko-leninských historikov a publicistov, ktorí si vo svojej práci už stihli osvojiť Daxnerov prokurátorský výklad slovenských dejín. Nezačul pritom ani na seba: V. Bauch, J. Čelko, J. Danáš, B. Graca, G. Gryzlov, M. Hájek, M. Hysko, A. Hornová, L. Kováčik, J. Kramer, L. Lipšer, E. Lipták, V. Prečan, A. Sirácky, J. Staněk, F. Vašečka a M. Vietor. Pokiaľ ide o tému slovenskej politickej emigrácie, tak Daxnerov prokurátorský výklad si tvorivo osvojil expert na „ľudácké podzemí“ z Vojenskej politickej akadémie K. Gottwalda v Bratislave Václav Vondrášek (pozri napr. *Ludácka emigrácia a kontrarevolučné podzemie na Slovensku v r. 1945 – 1947*. In: *Historický časopis*, roč. 30, 1985, č. 6). Po roku 1989 na Vondráškove „výskumy“ nadviazal Jozef Jablonický (Kuriér Rudolf Komandera. In: *Slovenské rozhľady*, roč. 2, 1995, č. 5; JABLONICKÝ, J.: *Podoby násilia*. Bratislava 2000 a ďalšie).

30 V. R.: *My a fašizmus*. In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 1, 15. 4. 1946, č. 1, s. 7 – 8.

sa priaznivých podmienkach na exilovú prácu v Rakúsku a Bavorsku, s cieľom koordinovať vzájomnú činnosť a najmä dohodnúť sa na spoločnom postupe.

Vo všeobecnosti možno konštatovať, že činnosť Slovenského revolučného odboja na domácej pôde bol najslabším článkom v celej jeho práci. Bolo totiž príliš veľa ambiciózných jednotlivcov i skupiniek, ktorí svojimi aktivitami na Slovensku nielen komplikovali, ale aj marili prácu SRO. Pri hodnotení výsledkov práce SRO na Slovensku však musíme vziať do úvahy, predovšetkým tú skutočnosť, že SRO viedli mladí ľudia, obetaví a zapálení pre slovenskú vec, ale z profesionálneho hľadiska absolútne nepripravení na exil, ilegalitu, organizovanie spravodajskej činnosti. Títo študenti a čerství absolventi vysokých škôl sa zapojili do protikomunistického hnutia z číreho idealizmu, bez akýchkoľvek finančných prostriedkov a práve zaobstarávanie si základných životných potrieb vo vojnu rozvrátenom Rakúsku a Nemecku (financie, potraviny, ošatenie, ubytovanie) zaberalo podstatnú časť ich aktivít. Proti nim stál odborne pripravený, profesionálny aparát česko-slovenských bezpečnostných zložiek, vyškolených Moskvou, ktorý sa mohol účinne oprieť aj o aparát NKVD so svojou rozsiahlou sieťou agentov a konfidentov v Rakúsku a v okupačných zónach Nemecka. Až neskôr sa podarilo, za cenu nevyhnutnej spolupráce, zabezpečiť pre Slovenský revolučný odboj určité profesionálne krytie zo strany bezpečnostných zložiek západných krajín (najmä USA a Francúzska).

Vo februári 1946 Slovenský revolučný zmenil svoje sídlo a natrvalo sa presídlil z Rakúska do Mníchova. Po presťahovaní sídla si SRO založil v Rakúsku svoje organizácie, a to v americkej a francúzskej okupačnej zóne. V americkej zóne bol vedúcim skupiny SRO rímskokatolícky kňaz Karol Šumichrast v Mehrnbachu (neďaleko mesta Ried im Innkreis), kde pôsobil ako duchovný správca pre slovenských emigrantov, ako aj pre nemeckých vyhnancoz z Česka. Vo francúzskej okupačnej zóne bol vedúcim skupiny SRO študent Právnickej fakulty Slovenskej univerzity Kornel Piaček. Jeho blízkymi spolupracovníkmi sa stali major Alexander Matúš, bývalý vyslanec SR v ZSSR Fraňo Tiso a bývalý poslanec Slovenského snemu Štefan Beniak.

Vzhľadom na aktivity česko-slovenskej spravodajskej služby a NKVD boli členovia SRO organizovaní v bunkách a neprichádzali priamo do styku s vedením Slovenského revolučného odboja. Kontakt medzi sebou udržiavali najmä prostredníctvom vlastnej kuriérnej pošty.

Slovenský revolučný odboj vydával v Rakúsku najprv interné periodikum Slovenský kuriér, od apríla 1946 vydával v Mníchove mesačník

Slobodné Slovensko. Bol to vôbec prvý časopis slovenskej politickej emigrácie, robený na vysokej profesionálnej úrovni, najmä vďaka bývalému šéfredaktorovi Slováka Jozefovi Paučovi. Propagačná a publikačná činnosť SRO sa zvýšila a skvalitnila najmä príchodom Konštantína Čulena do Mníchova. V tejto súvislosti sa dá hovoriť aj o medzníku v činnosti SRO. Bola založená edícia Knižnica Slovenského revolučného hnutia (vyšlo v nej okolo 20 titulov), začali vydávať monitor najmä americkej tlače pod názvom Hlas Ameriky, ako aj ďalšie časopisy. Vďaka Čulenovým osobným stykom s americkými Slovákami bol Slovenský revolučný odboj vo všeobecnosti akceptovaný krajanými organizáciami a spolkami v USA a Kanade.

Koncom roka 1945 bol založený aj Slovenský akčný výbor na čele s Ferdinandom Ďurčanským ako vrcholová organizácia slovenského politického exilu. SRO akceptoval vedúce postavenie SAV v zahraničí, zhodoval sa s ním aj v základných otázkach boja za demokraciu a obnovenie štátnej samostatnosti Slovenskej republiky. V spolupráci so SAV koordinoval svoje aktivity najmä smerom k domácejmu hnutiu odporu. Prostredníctvom svojich kuriérov posielal na Slovensko rôzne smernice a správy SAV-u. Slovenský akčný výbor taktiež informoval SRO o svojich aktivitách. Na druhej strane Slovenský revolučný odboj dával k dispozícii Slovenskému akčnému výboru informácie získané zo Slovenska, svoje analýzy a komentáre dobovej tlače, ako aj prehľady o vnútro politickej situácii na Slovensku, ktoré vypracovali najmä Konštantín Čulen, Jozef Mikula a Ján Gleiman.

Slovenský revolučný odboj nikdy nemali ambície hrať vedúcu úlohu v zahraničnom exile³¹, ale zároveň sa ani nechcel začleniť do inej organizácie (napríklad do Slovenského akčného výboru), trval na svojej autonómii a organizačnej samostatnosti.

Ako Slovenský revolučný odboj aj Slovenský akčný výbor si začal budovať svoju vlastnú organizačnú sieť v Rakúsku a Nemecku. Predstaviteľom SAV v Rakúsku bol bývalý náčelník štábu MNO a vojenský poradca SAV plk. Jozef Parčan. Slovenský akčný výbor mal svojich členov a prívržencov aj vo vedení a, samozrejme, aj v radoch Slovenského revolučného odboja,

31 Tvrdenie Vladimíra Varinského, že Slovenský revolučný odboj sa usiloval kreovať a prezentovať ako „politická reprezentácia Slovenska v zahraničí“, alebo ako „vrcholná organizácia slovenského odboja“, sa nezakladá na pravde. (VARINSKÝ, V.: Činnosť slovenskej politickej emigrácie po roku 1945 – Slovenský revolučný odboj. In: *Acta Universitatis Matthiae Belii. Sekcia spoločenskovedná*. Banská Bystrica 1999, s. 230; VARINSKÝ, V.: *Jozef Vicen a Biela légia*. Banská Bystrica 2003, s. 39 – 40.)

tak ako ich mal aj Karol Sidor. Vďaka rozsiahlym aktivitám sa Ferdinandovi Ďurčanskému podarilo vo veľmi krátkej dobe vytvoriť dobre fungujúcu organizáciu, ktorá mala svoje zastúpenie vo všetkých relevantných štátoch demokratického sveta.

Ak si odmyslíme záležitosti týkajúce sa osobných sporov medzi Sidorom a Ďurčanským, ktoré sa prenášali aj do exilových a krajanských organizácií, tak k prvému vážnejšiemu konfliktu medzi vedením Slovenského revolučného hnutia (L. Jankovič a R. Komandera) s vedením Slovenského akčného výboru došlo v otázke uznávania kontinuity Slovenskej republiky. Ferdinand Ďurčanský (podobne ako E. Beneš v emigrácii v otázke československého štátu) presadzoval koncepciu právnej kontinuity Slovenskej republiky. Z toho automaticky vyplývalo aj uznávanie hodností a funkcií bývalých predstaviteľov Slovenskej republiky. Na základe toho si niektorí bývalí funkcionári z obdobia slovenského štátu začali v emigrácii automaticky nárokovat' vedúce funkcie v zahraničnom odboji. A práve v tejto otázke narazili na zásadne odmietavé stanovisko mladých zo Slovenského revolučného odboja.

V snahe skoordinať činnosť SRO a SAV bola zvolaná pred májovými parlamentnými voľbami v Č-SR v roku 1946 porada zástupcov oboch organizácií. Porada sa uskutočnila v Mehrnbachu u predstaviteľa SRO v americkom okupačnom pásme v Rakúsku Karola Šumichrasta. Za SAV sa na porade zúčastnili Ján Ďurčanský a plk. Jozef Parčan a za SRO Rudolf Komandera a Karol Šumichrast. Ako „nestranní pozorovatelia“ boli prítomní Fraňo Tiso a Kornel Piaček. Na stretnutí sa prediskutovali možnosti obnoviť na Slovensku štyri politické strany, ktoré boli formálne združené v Slovenskom revolučnom odboji (Hlinkovu slovenskú ľudovú stranu, Slovenskú národnú stranu, agrárnu stranu a sociálno-demokratickú stranu). Ďalej bolo dohodnuté, že SRO sa aktívne zapojí do predvolebnej kampane na Slovensku. Zameria sa na propagačnú činnosť a súčasne bude zabezpečovať aj kuriérne spojenie Slovenského akčného výboru s domácim protikomunistickým odbojom. Opätovne bolo potvrdené, že politickú reprezentáciu slovenského exilu smerom k zahraničiu bude zabezpečovať Slovenský akčný výbor. Na pracovnej porade sa nepodarilo vyriešiť všetky otázky. K úplnej dohode medzi SRO a SAV malo dôjsť na spoločnom stretnutí Ladislava Jankoviča s Ferdinandom Ďurčanským.

Prvé parlamentné voľby v Č-SR po skončení vojny, ohlásené na 26. mája 1946, budili mimoriadnu pozornosť slovenského exilu. Veľkú aktivitu vyvíjal v tomto smere predovšetkým Slovenský akčný výbor, ktorý po neúspeš-

nom úsilí presadiť spolu so Slovenskou národnou radou v Londýne³² v roku 1945 na Slovensku plebiscit o otázke slovenskej štátnosti a Moskvou naoktrojovanom režime, propagoval v roku 1946 myšlienku neúčasti občanov vo voľbách ako určitú formu plebiscitu.

Ferdinand Ďurčanský predpokladal, že väčšina, najmä bývalých voličov HSLS, ako aj občanov nespokojných s nastoleným režimom, sa nezúčastní na voľbách a nebude voliť či už z politických alebo konfesijných dôvodov, respektíve budú voliť bielymi lístkami.³³ Za pravdu Ďurčanskému dávalo radikálne obmedzovanie demokracie na Slovensku, nerespektovanie základných ľudských práv, zásahy do vlastníckych práv, ako aj zásahy do života slovenskej Katolíckej cirkvi, prenasledovanie katolíckej hierarchie, kňazov a diskriminácia veriacich. Ferdinand Ďurčanský počítal s tým, že v prípade očakávaného úspechu (najmä vysoká neúčasť Slovákov vo voľbách) bude sa môcť v zahraničí oprieť o tento silný mandát.

Takzvaná Aprílová dohoda však znamenala pre Slovenský akčný výbor veľmi nepríjemné precitnutie do slovenskej reality. F. Ďurčanský si okamžite uvedomil, že dohoda značne komplikuje jeho plány s volebným plebiscitom. Reakcie Slovenského akčného výboru na Aprílovú dohodu boli preto mimoriadne nervózne až agresívne. Postoje Slovenského akčného výboru k Aprílovej dohode ovplyvnili aj politickú kampaň Slovenského revolučného odboja, ktorý sa formou letákov priamo zapájal do predvolebnej kampane.

Slovenský revolučný odboj reagoval na Aprílovú dohodu aj vo svojom tlačovom orgáne Slobodné Slovensko. Útoky sa sústredili najmä na katolíckych signatárov Aprílovej dohody a tých predstaviteľov slovenského katolicizmu, ktorí sa začali politicky angažovať v Demokratickej strane (A. Cvinček, A. Harčár, E. Böhm, J. Kempný, M. Bugár). Spochybňovaná bola najmä legitimita kanonika Andreja Cvinčeka vystupovať v mene slovenských katolíkov. Ako bývalého funkcionára Československej strany ľudovej ho obviňovali z čechoslovakizmu a z údajnej neochoty brániť

32 Slovenský revolučný odboj uverejnil a rozširoval *Petíciu Slovenskej národnej rady v Londýne na všetky členské štáty OSN, organizáciu OSN a štáty, ktoré nie sú členmi OSN*. (Bližšie pozri Slováci žiadajú plebiscit. In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 1, 15. 4. 1946, č. 1, s. 4 – 7.)

33 S iniciatívou zakotviť do volebného zákona možnosť voľby bielymi lístkami prišli komunisti. K. Gottwaldovi sa však nepodarilo získať pre tento návrh súhlas Národného frontu Čechov a Slovákov, proti sa postavili národní socialisti, ľudovci a demokrati. Až s podporou sociálnych demokratov prešiel po búrlivej diskusii tento návrh v parlamente. Podľa zákon č. 67/1946 Zb. z 11. 4. 1946 nesúhlas s pomermi v Č-SR bolo možné formálne vyjadriť neúčastou na voľbách alebo voľbou bielymi lístkami.

záujmy prenasledovanej Katolíckej cirkvi na Slovensku. „Na čo však dohody s katolíkmí, keď nemohla vzniknúť strana čo len s jemným nádychom katolíctva?“ Záver článku bol jednoznačný: „Nijaké pakty, nijaké dohody! Katolíci môžu ísť iba samostatne! [...] Slováci sami a nie samozvanci druhu Cvinčekovho rozhodnú, aké prúdy zvíťazia v slovenskej politike. Nezávisle od kadejakých dohôd vyslovia aj v nastávajúcich voľbách svoje želanie. Na týchto voľbách, demokratickému duchu nezodpovedajúcich, sa Slováci proste nezúčastnia, lebo nemôžu svojimi hlasmi prikryť proti svojej vôli a proti svojmu presvedčeniu všetok ten kal, ktorý sa valí tzv. treťou ČSR. Republikou nezákonnou, násilne proklamovanou. Najskôr sa musia Slováci osvedčiť, či súhlasia, alebo nesúhlasia³⁴ a len potom môže prísť ostatné. Najskôr žiť v právnom poriadku, najskôr sa slobodne rozhodnúť, za ktorý ste režim a potom vláda, nami uznaná a podporovaná, bude mať právo vypísať aj voľby. Tieto voľby sú vypísané nezákonne, ako je nezákonné všetko, čo sa deje u nás v poslednom roku.“³⁵

Ilegálna Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana, so zástupcami ilegálnej agrárnej, národnej a sociálno-demokratickej strany, združenými v Slovenskom revolučnom odboji, sa pred voľbami predstavili Ohlasom k slovenskému národu, ktorým vyzvali slovenských voličov, aby sa nezúčastnili na voľbách. „Slováci musia rozhodnúť najskôr plebiscitom, či sú za Slovenský štát, alebo proti nemu. Kým sa neuskutoční táto požiadavka slovenského národa, treba pokladať každú politickú akciu na Slovensku za protizákonnú. [...] Preto, sestry Slovenky, bratia Slováci, pred plebiscitom do volieb nejdem! Biele lístky všetci použijeme na propagáciu plebiscitu! V deň volieb jasne napíšte na každý biely lístok dve slová: žiadame plebiscit! A takto ho pošlite s dátumom 26. mája 1946 anglickému alebo americkému veľvyslancovi do Prahy.“³⁶

Voličské zoznamy zostavovali okresné národné výbory, do ktorých bolo zapísaných 1 740 000 občanov.³⁷ Viac ako 20 000 občanov okresné národné výbory na Slovensku vyškrtili z voličských zoznamov. Celkovo

34 Narážka na potrebu vypísania plebiscitu na Slovensku, či Slováci súhlasia s likvidáciou Slovenskej republiky a s obnovením „Československa“.

35 J. Z.: Dohoda, ktorá nič neznamená. In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 1, 15. 5. 1946, č. 2, s. 13 – 16.

36 Ohlas k slovenskému národu. Politické strany Slovenského revolučného odboja. In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 1, 15. 5. 1946, č. 2, s. 41. (Podčiarknuté v texte.)

37 KULICH, M.: *Volebné výsledky do Ústavodarného národného zhromaždenia*. Bratislava 1946, s. 7.

bolo na Slovensku z volieb vylúčených 400 000 osôb (Nemci, Maďari, tzv. kolaboranti a nepriatelia ľudovodemokratického režimu). Najväčším nedostatkom volieb bola však úplná absencia legálnej politickej opozície, ako aj tabuizovanie niektorých tém (zákaz kritiky Košického vládneho programu, spojeneckej zmluvy medzi Č-SR a ZSSR, prezidenta E. Beneša, ZSSR, J. V. Stalina, Červenej armády), preto voľby nemožno považovať za demokratické.

Z celkového počtu 1 740 000 občanov zapísaných do voličských zoznamov sa volieb zúčastnilo 1 610 000 občanov. Volebná účasť na Slovensku, aj napriek nedemokratickým zásahom do volebného systému, bola mimoriadne vysoká, 92,5 %. Prvýkrát v dejinách slovenského parlamentarizmu volilo Slovensko v takomto vysokom počte. Voľby na Slovensku svojím spôsobom skutočne nadobudli charakter referenda.

Z celkového počtu zapísaných občanov do voličských zoznamov dalo svoj hlas Democratickej strane takmer milión voličov (62 %) a Democratická strana sa na Slovensku stala suverénnym, dominantným politickým subjektom. Na základe výsledkov volieb došlo k rekonštrukcii SNR a národných výborov na všetkých stupňoch. Z celkového počtu 79 miest predsedov okresných národných výborov komunisti obsadili len šesť miest. V predvolebnej kampani, na všeobecné prevzatie exilu, Democratickú stranu otvorene podporil aj katolícky biskupský zbor. Ústredná katolícka kancelária a Katolícke noviny sa aktívne podieľali na volebnej kampani v prospech Democratickej strany, ktorá po uzavretí Aprílovej dohody nadobudla charakter protikomunistického bloku. Strana práce a Strana slobody, ktoré vznikli niekoľko mesiacov pred voľbami, boli chápané ako politické filiálky Prahy a komunistov na rozbitie tohto celonárodného bloku.

Volebná mobilizácia občanov na Slovensku, na rozdiel od Česka, kde suverénne zvíťazili politické strany, ktoré mali vo svojich programoch socializmus³⁸, mala podobu celonárodného referenda, ktorým Slováci odmietli ľudovodemokratický režim a jeho prosovietsku zahra-

38 V Čechách zvíťazila vo voľbách KSČ (43,3 %) a socialistické strany (KSČ, ČSNS, ČSD) získali 83,5 % hlasov. Aj na Morave bola víťazom volieb KSČ (34,5 %), ktorú spolu so socialistickými stranami volilo 72,0 % občanov. Keďže Slovensko nebolo suverénne, volebné víťazstvo Democratickej strany anulovali výsledky volieb v Česku. V 300-člennom Ústavodarnom národnom zhromaždení získala KSČ (spolu s KSS) tretinu mandátov (114) a spolu so socialistickými stranami (vrátane Strany práce) získali až dve tretiny poslaneckých kresiel (208). Nesocialistické strany (ČSL, DS a SS) získali len necelú tretinu poslaneckých kresiel (92).

nično-politickú orientáciu. Demokratická strana však nemohla zúžitkovať svoje volebné víťazstvo, lebo Slovensko, ani v rámci povojnového Česko-Slovenska, nebolo suverénne a ani slobodné. Len takto sa mohlo stať, že na Slovensku, kde suverénne zvíťazila Demokratická strana, sa mohla jednoznačne presadzovať naoktrojovaná politická vôľa Prahy a českého voliča na úkor slovenského voliča. O triumfálnom volebnom víťazstve KSČ v Česku rozhodli predovšetkým hlasy zo Sudet, kde sa komunisti v rozhodujúcej miere podieľali na odsune nemeckého obyvateľstva, osídľovaní a predovšetkým na pridelovaní domov, bytov, živností, pozemkov. KSČ si týmto spôsobom kúpila za nemecký majetok hlasy českého voliča.³⁹

Výsledky volieb do Ústavodarného národného zhromaždenia boli pre slovenský exil veľkým prekvapením. Na margo volebného výsledku si Rudolf Komandera poznamenal do svojho denníka: „*Výsledok volieb sme očakávali s najväčším napätím. Vyhrali demokrati. To sme raz nevedeli pochopiť. Buď boli voľby sfaľšované, alebo doma niet hnutia odporu.*“⁴⁰ Slovenský exil veľmi zle odhadol vnútropolitický vývoj na Slovensku. Na Slovensko sa díval očami z rokov 1944 – 1945, keď sa jeho činovníci pripravovali alebo odchádzali do exilu. Slovensko za obdobie rokov 1945 – 1946 prešlo zásadnými premenami, ktoré exil buď nevidel, alebo nechcel vidieť.

Volebná stratégia exilu – propagácia neúčasti občanov na voľbách, respektíve voľba bielymi lístkami – sa skončila úplným fiaskom. Napriek intenzívnym výzvam na neúčasť občanov na voľbách, bola volebná účasť na Slovensku 92,5 %, najväčšia v jeho dovedejšej histórii. Počet neodovzdaných a neplatných lístkov bol 130 000 (8,1 %) a len necelých 13 000 občanov volilo bielymi lístkami (0,8 %). Samozrejme, že nie je možné všetkých nevoličov a všetky neplatné a biele lístky prirábať na vrub aktivít SAV a SRO. Tento neúspech bol hlavnou príčinou postupného prehodnocovania politiky Slovenského revolučného odboja k vnútropolitickému vývoju na Slovensku. Nový kurz sa však rodil len veľmi ťažko, často vo vášnivých diskusiách a polemikách.

39 V Sudetách KSČ suverénne porážala svojich politických súperov. Volebný kraj: Ústí nad Labem (56,5 %), Kladno (53,6 %), Karlove Vary (52,3 %), Liberec (48,3 %), Plzeň (44,8 %), České Budějovice (42,8 %), Tábor (40,0 %) a Hradec Králové (39,5 %). (BARNOVSKÝ, M. – IVANIČKOVÁ, E. (eds.): *Prvé povojnové voľby v strednej a juhovýchodnej Európe*. Bratislava 1998, s. 215 – 218.)

40 Archív autora. *Denník Rudolfa Komanderu 1945 – 1947*. Kópia originálu. Zápis zo dňa 1. 12. 1946.

Slovenský revolučný odboj hodnotil vo svojom tlačovom orgáne *Slobodné Slovensko* povolebnú situáciu na Slovensku ako „skleslú a tiesnivú“. Podľa povolebnej analýzy SRO o hlasy slovenského voliča súperili dva hlavné politické tábory: Demokratická strana a Komunistická strana Slovenska. Predvolebná kampaň Demokratickej strany bola hodnotená ako korektná, ale zároveň boli zdôrazňované predvolebné sľuby, ktoré Demokratická strana dala najmä slovenským katolíkom. *„Ich reči, články, ohlasy, letáková kampaň, to všetko hovorilo veľmi presvedčivo, že Demokratická strana mieni urobiť kríž nad dovtedajším kolaborantstvom s komunistami a vôbec s Kremľom. Ved' hlásala celkom verejne, že katolíkom vráti školy, spolky, tlač, že jej politika je pokračovaním politiky HSLS, že DS dá satisfakciu všetkým, čo dosiaľ nevinne trpia, že sa otvoria väzenia, že z nich vyjdú zneuctení najväčší synovia slovenského národa a že budú náležite potrestaní všetci tí, čo dnes každého obviňujú zo zrady, čo prznia slovenský verejný život, čo vraždia a šíria teror. A čo navyše – demokrati agitovali za Slovenskú republiku. Slovom, slovenskí katolíci mohli sa za takých okolností dostať do pomykova.“*⁴¹ V súvislosti s volebnou kampaňou KSS sa poukazovalo aj na to, že aj komunisti sa uchádzali o hlasy slovenských katolíkov. Kritike sa však nevyhli ich metódy zastrašovania a násilia, pričom zneužívali aj mocenské orgány štátu.

Slovenský revolučný odboj neoslavoval volebné víťazstvo Demokratickej strany, bol ním zaskočený a zaujal skôr vyčkávacie stanovisko. Pričom však naďalej nešetril kritikou na adresu „evanjelického vedenia“ Demokratickej strany. S nevôľou bolo konštatované, že napríklad predseda Demokratickej strany Jozef Lettrich oslavoval prezidenta E. Beneša: *„[...] ako rýchlo sa poponáhľali osvedčiť páni, ktorí vedú Demokratickú stranu pod ľudáckymi heslami a za výdatnej pomoci ľudáckych hlasov, že sú za košický program, že sú verní soviетom a Čechom, že nemajú nič spoločného s demonštráciami proti Čechom a boľševikom. Čo to znamená v praxi? Čistý podvod! [...] Lettrichovci teraz už nemôžu ujsť. Ak nás vtiahli do svojej strany, my ten názov nepotrebujeme iba na krytie podvodov, ale chceme, aby sme demokraticky mohli rozhodovať o všetkých slovenských problémoch. [...] Ak zhromažďujú zbrane komunisti, ak vyzývajú svojich partizánov, aby sa chystali na povstanie, nuž buďte aj vy pripravení na vážne udalosti. Ale nedaňte sa vyprovokovať. Vy nevyvolávajte bratovražedný boj. To nie je náš cieľ. Na obranu však vždy povstaňte. A hlavne dokážte to v pravej chvíli, keď príde aj pre vás povel,*

41 Falošná hra so slovenskými voličmi. In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 1, 15. 6. 1946, č. 3, s. 6.

keď príde čas vyrovnania, čas odplaty a čas vyhnania bolševických fašistov z Európy, stojíte telom a dušou na strane západných demokracií a všetkých národov, ktoré sa odhodlali na porážku tohto najtyranskejšieho režimu.

Zatiaľ pokračujte v krásne začatej akcii za plebiscit. Štyri politické strany SRO nemôžu prestať a ani neprestanú v boji, kým vláda na Slovensku neprejde znova do slovenských rúk, kým nebudú splnené všetky požiadavky, ktoré nám diktujú zákony slovenskej štátnosti. Zatiaľ voľby neuznávame, lebo ovzdušie, v ktorom sme volili, nám nezaručilo možnosť slobodného rozhodovania, a aj povolebné zjavy nám nad slnko jasnejšie ukazujú, že politické strany väčšinu slovenského voličstva podvedli!⁴²

Výsledky parlamentných volieb na Slovensku podnietili v exile veľké diskusie o ďalšom smerovaní Slovenska, ako aj o úlohách a činnosti exilu. Niektorí, z pozície konfesijného fundamentalizmu, dokonca tvrdili, že pre Slovensko by bolo lepšie, keby bola zvíťazila Komunistická strana Slovenska, a nie Demokratická strana. Poukazovali najmä na predvolebnú „národnú agendu“ slovenských komunistov a kritizovali Demokratickú stranu ako povstaleckú, politickú stranu slovenských evanjelikov, ktorá presadzuje na Slovensku český centralizmus, a čechoslovakistickú ideológiu. Tieto extrémne názory boli však väčšinou zamietnuté, ale ich nositelia zastávali v exile významné pozície. Jedným z hlavných argumentov proti týmto jednostranným názorom bol výrazný nárast účasti slovenských katolíkov vo vedení a v organizačných štruktúrach Demokratickej strany, ako aj na všetkých stupňoch štátnej a verejnej správy. Vo všeobecnosti vedenie Slovenského revolučného odboja konštatovalo, že svojou dovtedajšou politikou a predvolebnou agitáciou utrpelo na Slovensku porážku.

Hlavnou otázkou, diskutovanou v Slovenskom revolučnom odboji, bolo, akým spôsobom sa zapojiť do protikomunistického, demokratického hnutia, reprezentovaného legálne pôsobiacou Demokratickou stranou. V zápase za demokraciu a obnovu štátnej samostatnosti začalo sa v SRO uvažovať o využití ilegálnych, ako aj legálnych metód práce. Novým prvkom v činnosti SRO bolo, že sa začalo otvorene diskutovať aj o potrebe nadviazania priamych kontaktov s vedúcimi predstaviteľmi Demokratickej strany a o potrebe ďalšieho rozšírenia stykov s domovom, ktoré by sa neviazali len na jednu skupinu.

Slovenský revolučný odboj sa rozhodol vybudovať na celom území Slovenska sieť samostatných odbojových stredísk. Pre pasivitu Jozefa

42 Falošná hra so slovenskými voličmi. In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 1, 15. 6. 1946, č. 3, s. 7 – 8. (Podčiarknuté v texte.)

Vicena a jeho neochotu spolupracovať, sa Slovenský revolučný odboj prestal po voľbách spoliehať a orientovať už len na neho. V diskusiách o potrebe zmeny postoja k povolebnému Slovensku sa zrodila aj myšlienka vyslať na Slovensko člena vedenia SRO Rudolfa Komanderu.

Za predsedníctva Konštantína Čulena sa v dňoch 24. – 25. júna 1946 konalo 1. plenárne zasadnutie Slovenského revolučného odboja v Mníchove, na ktorom sa prerokovala ďalšia jeho činnosť po parlamentných voľbách. Na zasadnutí pléna sa zúčastnili Ladislav Jankovič, Jozef Mikula, Jozef Paučo, mjr. Alexander Matúš, Alojz Krajčovič, Rudolf Komandera, Dominik Kvietok, Kornel Piaček, Viliam Mihalovič, František Mitz. Odznali referáty, týkajúce sa organizačnej, politickej, propagačnej, vojenskej a hospodárskej činnosti. Hlavná časť porád bola venovaná otázke koordinácie práce jednotlivých odbojových zložiek Slovenského revolučného odboja. Na adresu ilegálnej práce zazneli však aj kritické slová: „[...] *mnohé straty na životoch v radoch našich spolubojovníkov sú spôsobované vlastnou neopatrnosťou*“⁴³ a v tejto súvislosti boli prijaté konkrétne opatrenia.

Plenárne zasadnutie opäť potvrdilo predchádzajúce rozhodnutie, že Slovenský akčný výbor predstavuje v zahraničí pre SRO „politické vedenie“, tak ako ho pre Slovenskú tajnú ochranu predstavoval Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Nepodarilo sa však dosiahnuť jednotu s členmi SAV v Rakúsku. Predstavitel SAV v Rakúsku plk. Jozef Parčan začal totiž okolo seba zoskupovať aj odporcov SRO, najmä z radov bývalých príslušníkov Hlinkovej gardy, voči ktorým sa SRO staval odmietavo. Tzv. parčanovci začali preto organizovať samostatné aktivity a vyvíjať činnosť aj proti Slovenskému revolučnému odboju.

Plenárne zasadnutie v Mníchove schválilo nový organizačný poriadok SRO. Vypracoval ho a predložil na rokovanie Ladislav Jankovič. Najvyšším orgánom Slovenského revolučného hnutia sa stalo plénum. Podliehali mu výkonný výbor a predsedníctvo. Slovenský revolučný odboj nemal predsedu, túto funkciu vykonával Výkonný výbor SRO (kolektívne vedenie). Plénum SRO rozhodlo o nasledovnom rozdelení funkcií vo výkonnom výbore: organizačný vedúci L. Jankovič, hospodársky vedúci D. Kvietok, propagačno-tlačový vedúci J. Paučo a vedúci vojenského spravodajstva mjr. A. Matúš. Súčasne bolo schválené, že oblastiam, okresom, ako aj miestnym skupinám Slovenského revolučného odboja bude v ich činnosti ponechaná čo najširšia autonómia a samostatnosť.

43 Zasadnutie pléna SRO. In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 1, 15. 7. 1946, č. 4, s. 19.

Veľká pozornosť sa na plenárnom zasadnutí venovala otázkam tlače a propagandy. Tlačovým orgánom SRO naďalej zostával mesačník *Slobodné Slovensko*. Plénum prijalo uznesenie, že pre interné potreby bude Ústredie SRO vydávať okrem obežníkov aj interný časopis *Slovenský dnešok*, ktorý mal slúžiť predovšetkým pre potreby funkcionárskeho aktívu. Prvé číslo *Slovenského dneška* vyšlo v júni 1946. Takisto boli prijaté opatrenia na zefektívnenie a zlepšenie spolupráce medzi jednotlivými organizačnými útvarmi SRO najmä v oblasti výmeny informácií a tlače. Súčasne sa počítalo aj s výrazným rozšírením dovtedajšej vydavateľskej činnosti v rámci edície *Knížnica Slovenského revolučného odboja*.

Najväčším a trvalým problémom však boli financie. Slovenský revolučný odboj vydal „dôverné smernice“, ako získať finančné prostriedky na zabezpečenie svojich aktivít a dôrazne upozornil všetky bunky a skupiny, aby túto kardinálnu otázku nezanedbávali a nepodceňovali.

Na prvom plenárnom zasadnutí Slovenského revolučného hnutia v Mníchove padlo aj rozhodnutie vyslať na Slovensko Rudolfa Komanderu ako „*splnomocnenca Slovenského revolučného hnutia pre Slovensko*“. R. Komandera dostal pomerne široký mandát zastupovať Slovenský revolučný odboj na Slovensku vo veciach organizačných, hospodárskych, propagačno-tlačových a vojensko-spravodajských.

Rudolf Komandera, ako člen vedenia SRO a evanjelik, bol poverený, aby v zahraničí a na Slovensku vytváral ilegálne štruktúry Slovenskej národnej strany. V Rakúsku sa opieral najmä o Ľudovíta Kandru, ktorý bol akýmsi duchovným vodcom slovenských evanjelikov. Ľ. Kandra sa intenzívne usiloval o spoluprácu slovenských evanjelikov a katolíkov, zakladal v Rakúsku komitety Martina Rázusa. Z iniciatívy R. Komanderu sa začala obnovovať v zahraničí a na Slovensku ilegálna Slovenská národná strana. Ako si poznamenal do svojho denníka: „*Bolo ťažké presviedčať o nezaujatosť SRO, keď už vtedy tlač páchla protievanjelickým tónom. Svoju činnosť som preniesol aj na domáce pole. Aj tam mi šlo predovšetkým o to, aby ľudia zapojení do práce boli v názoroch s nami a aby mali dojem, že nejde o samospasiteľné snahy niekoľkých jednotlivcov. Všetko bolo tak vedené, že iniciatíva (bola) nami daná, ale viac sa do nich starať nebudeme. Vtedy sa vo mne zrodila myšlienka obhliadnuť sa aj po takých ľuďoch, ktorí sú vo vláde...*“⁴⁴ Išlo najmä o predstaviteľov Demokratickej strany, ktorú časť katolíckeho exilu naďalej považovala za „luteránsku“ a odmietala

44 Archív autora. *Denník Rudolfa Komanderu 1945 – 1947*. Kópia originálu. Zápis zo dňa 2. 2. 1947.

ju akceptovať. Z uvedeného hľadiska bol Rudolf Komandera vhodným kandidátom na pripravovanú politickú misiu.

Misia Rudolfa Komanderu na Slovensku sa uskutočnila v dňoch 13. júla až 2. augusta 1946.⁴⁵ Ak si odmyslíme vyslanie kuriéra SRO Viliama Mihaloviča na Slovensko (28. septembra až 28. októbra 1945) s cieľom zistiť stav organizovanosti a činnosť ilegálnych protikomunistických buniek, Komanderaova misia mala predovšetkým politické poslanie. Jeho úlohou nebolo zisťovať úroveň organizácie a činnosť ilegálneho protikomunistického hnutia, ale predovšetkým nadviazať priamy kontakt s nekomunistickými predstaviteľmi legálne pôsobiacich politických strán, v prvom rade s Demokratickou stranou a sondovať možnosti vzájomnej spolupráce.

Po zlyhaní domácej Slovenskej tajnej ochrany sa po voľbách začalo v Slovenskom revolučnom odboji intenzívne uvažovať o vytvorení nového, odbojového centra na Slovensku s organizačnou sieťou pokrývajúcou celé územie. Súčasne sa začalo diskutovať aj o možnostiach využitia spolupráce s legálne pôsobiacimi nekomunistickými politickými stranami a perspektívne pripraviť pôdu na koordináciu ich činnosti s aktivitami exilu (Slovenský akčný výbor, Slovenský revolučný odboj).

Keď Rudolf Komandera hodnotil s určitým časovým odstupom výsledky svojej cesty na Slovensku, tak plný nespokojnosti konštatoval, že Slovenská tajná ochrana nejestvuje, jej zložky nefungujú, čo bolo hlavnou úlohu, ktorú mal pod prisahou splniť Jozef Vicen. „*Samostatného nášho vedenia nebolo, ba ani len duch bývalej STO sa nedal cítiť z vydávaných časopisov. [...] Toto všetko sa dá vysvetliť tým, že najagilnejší sa dostali do väzenia⁴⁶ alebo sa skrývajú, finančná tieseň a neochota vyplývajúca z rizika, zaneprázdnenosť a bezradnosť. [...] Všetci, ktorých som navštívil, boli len pasívni obdivovatelia. Nik ma nevedel odkázať na tých pravých.*

45 Jozef Jablonický nepozná okolnosti, za akých prišiel R. Komandera na Slovensko. Nesprávne uvádza, že Komandera prišiel na Slovensko už 12. júla 1946 a takisto mu nie je známa ani doba jeho odchodu zo Slovenska do Rakúska. (JABLONICKÝ, J.: *Podoby násilia*. Bratislava 2000, s. 56.) Cez štátne hranice, z Marcheggu do Devínskej Novej Vsi, previezol Komanderu na svojej spätnej ceste na Slovensko povozník, ktorého si najali židia odchádzajúci do Palestíny. Jablonický vo svojej stati *Kuriér Rudolf Komandera* literárne spracoval a prerozprával „históriu“ napísanú v protokoloch z výsluchov vyšetrovujúcimi orgánmi ŠtB, aj so všetkými jej chybami a nedostatkami.

46 Koncom roka 1945 zaistili bezpečnostné orgány skupinu Štefana Chalmovského a Jozef Vicen, z obavy pred zatknutím, sa ukrýval na Slovensku. V čase pobytu R. Komanderu na Slovensku sa J. Vicen už zdržiaval v Ríme u F. Ďurčanského a K. Sidora.

*Všade bola ochota pracovať, no nevedelo sa, ako ísť na vec. Chýbala tu silná ruka a jednotné vedenie.*⁴⁷

Pozornosť si zaslúžia najmä aktivity, ktoré vyvíjal Rudolf Komandera smerom k Demokratickej strane. „Keď som videl, že na osoby mi určené nemožno stavať⁴⁸, rozhodol som sa pre návštevu vedúcich osôb, o ktorých bolo známe, že sa stavajú proti režimu. Vystupoval som ako poverenec pre Slovensko, no nie ako politický vyjednávač. Zdôrazňoval som trojicu Ďurčanský – Sidor – Prídavok a SRO. Všade sa mi vychádzalo v ústrety, či to bol Bugár, Kempný alebo Kvetko. Dohodol som sa (s nimi) na určitých veciach a sľúbil som návštevu o mesiac, kedy som mal doniesť zo zahraničia presné, politické veci. [...] Všeobecné zhodnotenie týchto ciest je ťažké. Ak som šiel nadviazať styk s našimi, tak sa to nestalo, s inými, k tým som nemohol dôjsť. Jediný úspech bola návšteva u veľa osôb, ktoré predstavovali pasívny odpor. No, boli veľmi dôležití pri formovaní verejnej mienky. Ja sám som sa snažil vykonať všetko možné, ale pre pomer evanjelicko-katolícky nemohol som dostať dôvery u katolíckych vedúcich (frassatistov)⁴⁹, kde som očakával pomoc po všetkých stránkach. S evanjelikmi, okrem Kvetka, som nechcel dôjsť do styku. Ba ani s Kvetkom som nič nedohodol. Snáď, keby boli bývali financie, dalo by sa nadviazať styk aj s inými centrami. Takto ostalo všetko na dohovore, ochote a budúcej mojej ceste domov. Čiže nič konkrétne. [...] No, moja cesta osvetlila nejednu nám doteraz nevysvetliteľnú vec. Ukázala, že položenie národa je iné, než sme si ho my vytvorili –, že sa treba opierať o nové myšlienkové prúdy, že sme mimo kontaktu, a teda už nechápeme domácu politiku, že otázka evanjelicko-katolícka je iná, že pomer česko-slovenský je v inom svetle, že robiť bolo treba, že je možnosť uplatniť sa. Slovom, všetky moje doterajšie tvrdenia boli v mnohom vyvrátené, čo sa zdalo takmer neuveriteľné, alebo ich bolo treba prispôsobiť domácim pomerom.”⁵⁰

Správy, ktoré priniesol Rudolf Komandera zo svojej misie na Slovensku vyvolali v Slovenskom revolučnom odboji veľké diskusie a polemiky nielen čo sa týka dôvery k evanjelikovi Komanderovi, ale najmä hodnotenia vnútor politickej situácie (možnosť obnovenia HSLS, slovensko-český pomer,

47 Archív autora. *Denník Rudolfa Komanderu 1945 – 1947*. Kópia originálu. Zápis zo dňa 1. 12. 1946.

48 Pred odchodom na Slovensko dostal Rudolf Komandera zoznam osôb, s ktorými sa mal skontaktovať.

49 Prof. Juraj Rajec, prof. Alexej Izakovič, František Paňák, Jozef Šramek.

50 Archív autora. *Denník Rudolfa Komanderu 1945 – 1947*. Kópia originálu. Zápis zo dňa 1. 12. 1946.

vzťah katolícko-evanjelický, vzťah exilu k nekomunistickým stranám, najmä k Demokratickej strane a podobne). Avšak podstata týchto sporov spočívala v tom, či domáci protikomunistický odboj možno považovať za rovnocenný s odbojom zahraničným. R. Komandera presadzoval koncepciu rovnocenného postavenia domáceho a zahraničného odboja.

V čase, keď sa R. Komandera vrátil zo Slovenska, prišiel koncom júla 1946 z Ríma do Rakúska Jozef Vicen, bývalý vedúci domácej Slovenskej tajnej ochrany. Informácie, ktoré priniesli zo Slovenska J. Vicen a R. Komandera sa však diametrálne líšili a stali sa hlavnou príčinou otvoreného podozrievania R. Komanderu, že jeho politická misia nesplnila na Slovensku vytýčený cieľ, že si ide svojou vlastnou cestou, zatajuje veci a je nekorektný.⁵¹ V plnej nahote vystúpil na povrch všadeprítomný fenomén katolícko-evanjelických vzťahov, za ktorými sa nešíkovne maskovali osobné ambície niektorých ctižiadostivých jednotlivcov ovládnuť Slovenský revolučný odboj a podriaadiť si ho svojim osobným ambíciám.

Príchodom Jozefa Vicena do Rakúska sa Slovenský revolučný odboj začal polarizovať. Vicen odmietol zložiť účty zo svojho (ne)pôsobenia na Slovensku vo funkcii vedúceho Slovenskej tajnej ochrany. Jeho nečinnosť na Slovensku sa stala v Mníchove predmetom ostrej kritiky. Napriek tomuto bol prijatý do SRO, aj keď odmietol zložiť prisahu. Zaštitil sa autoritou najmä K. Sidora a nekompromisne začal presadzovať jeho koncepciu exilovej práce – nevyvíjať žiadne politické aktivity, maximálne sa zapojiť do spravodajskej činnosti. Keďže Vicen neovládal anglický jazyk, bol odkázaný na spoluprácu s Jozefom Mikulom, prostredníctvom ktorého ponúkol svoje služby americkej CIC.

Takéto aktivity boli síce Američanmi veľmi vítané, ale ako hlavná činnosť „odbojovej“ práce boli v zásadnom rozpore s programom, ako aj s dovtedajšími aktivitami Slovenského revolučného odboja. Navyše opätovne v novej intenzite prepukol starý spor z obdobia slovenského štátu o vedenie mládeže, ktorý mal svoje korene v súperení medzi Združením vysokoškolského študentstva (J. Mikula, J. Vicen) a Vyššou vodcovskou školou Hlinkovej mládeže (L. Jankovič). Spor o smerovanie SRO a snahy

51 Michal Barnovský nesprávne uvádza, že „referát Jozefa Vicena, ktorý prišiel do Mníchova asi v septembri 1946, potvrdil Komanderove informácie“. (BARNOVSKÝ, M.: *Na ceste k monopolu moci. Mocenské zápasy na Slovensku v rokoch 1945 – 1948*. Bratislava 1993, s. 180.) J. Vicen prišiel z Ríma do Mníchova, po krátkom pobyte u bratov Piačekovcov v Mayrnhofe, už v júli a nie v septembri 1946. A práve rozdielne správy, ktoré do Rakúska priniesli zo Slovenska R. Komandera a J. Vicen, sa stali hlavnou príčinou vnútorných rozporov v Slovenskom revolučnom odboji.

o jeho ovládnutie skupinou J. Mikula a J. Vicen sa stupňovali a v konečnom dôsledku značne paralyzovali činnosť Slovenského revolučného odboja. Prvou obeťou týchto sporov bol Rudolf Komandera.

Pôvodne mal Komandera absolvovať o mesiac (v septembri 1946) novú cestu na Slovensko a nadviazať na predchádzajúce rozhovory s predstaviteľmi Demokratickej strany (J. Kempný, M. Bugár, M. Kvetko). Podľa slov R. Komanderu, keď sa vrátil zo svojej misie do Rakúska: „*V tie časy tu už bol aj Donek (krycie meno Jozefa Vicena, poznámka J. B.). S ním som tiež o všetkom debatoval a naznačil som, že sa čoskoro vrátim domov, aby som dokončil začaté dielo. [...] Prítomnosť Doneka nedoniesla svetla do tmy v domove. [...] A naše pozorovania sa úplne rozchádzajú. Zatiaľ čo ja som všetko videl v duchu: Uznáva sa veľkosť šiestich rokov slovenskej štátnosti, uznáva sa veľkosť niekoľkých osôb, ale nechce sa nikomu vracieť do bývalého režimu s ľuďmi, ktorí ho kedysi viedli. Dnešný stav považujú za dočasný a pochybujú o ďalšej existencii ČSR. Nie sú odkázaní na zahraničie, ale je povinnosťou zahraničnej emigrácie, aby niečo robila v prospech obnovenia, keď nie štátnej, tak národnej samobytnosti. Oni budú snahy zahraničia podporovať, ale nedovolia, aby im bolo diktované. V zrode je akási aliancia katolíkov s časťou evanjelickou.*‘ Takto som to zistil u politikov. [...] S týmito nemôžu súhlasiť tí, ktorí stále vidia pred sebou svoje veľké politické kariéry. Oni musia mať pravdu! Veď Donek doniesol správy o celých 180 stupňov opačné. Bola daná téma pre debaty širokých rozmerov a často aj hádok. Mal som ísť na Slovensko, robiť veľmi dôležité veci, kde je záruka, že nepripravím nejedného, o to nejaké kresielko? Môj politický postoj (v exile) bol každému známy. Preto treba zabrániť, aby našiel pôdu aj na Slovensku. Aký to je postoj? Slovenský národný – protiklíkársky – proti protikonfesijný – kresťanský. Nebol som sám, ale (bol som) súčasťou narastajúcej, podobne zmýšľajúcej masy. V takomto duchu malo byť aj SRO. Všetci tí, ktorí stáli úprimne s SRO, museli so mnou súhlasiť. A aj súhlasili. Prvý bol vari Laco (Jankovič)“⁵²

Jozef Vicen prišiel z Ríma do Rakúska ako politický exponent Karola Sidora, i keď po návšteve u F. Ďurčanského v Ríme mu slúbil, že na Slovensku splní úlohu a určeným osobám doručí jeho menovacie dekréty. Slúbil, ale nesplnil. Od odchodu zo Slovenska sa J. Vicen na Slovensko už viac nevrátil. Správy, ktoré priniesol zo Slovenska R. Komandera však

52 Archív autora. *Denník Rudolfa Komanderu 1945 – 1947*. Kópia originálu. Zápis zo dňa 23. 1. 1947.

znamenal koniec Vicenovým plánom, ktorý rátal s návratom K. Sidora do slovenskej politiky a s jeho podporou.

Podstata sporu spočívala v tom, že J. Vicen tvrdil, že na Slovensku je možný návrat k režimu z obdobia prvej Slovenskej republiky a bývalí predstavitelia slovenského štátu, na čele s K. Sidorom, zaujmú vedúce postavenie v slovenskej politike. R. Komandera tieto názory zásadne odmietol a práve naopak tvrdil, že na Slovensku je vylúčené, aby sa obnovil bývalý režim a takisto je vylúčené, aby bývalí vedúci predstavitelia slovenského štátu zaujali vedúce miesta v slovenskom politickom živote. Súčasne zdôrazňoval potrebu využitia tak ilegálnych, ako aj legálnych foriem práce v zápase proti komunizmu a za obnovenie štátnej samostatnosti Slovenska.

Za hlavnú legálne pôsobiacu politickú silu v zápase s komunizmom považoval R. Komandera Demokratickú stranu, ktorá v spojení s katolíckymi (tzv. aprílová dohoda) reprezentovala vôľu národa. Keďže veľká časť slovenskej politickej emigrácie aj po parlamentných voľbách naďalej považovala Demokratickú stranu za „luteránsku“ stranu a R. Komandera bol evanjelik, padli na jeho adresu veľmi ostré obvinenia, že je nekorektný a že v zákulisí rozohráva svoje vlastné politické hry. Pre urazeného Jozefa Vicena, odvolávajúceho sa na autoritu K. Sidora, však nebolo veľkým problémom zahrať v exilovom prostredí na tradičnú konfesiónalnu strunu, spochybniť a umlčať R. Komanderu. Vicenovi sa podarilo presvedčiť vedenie SRO, ktoré odmietlo názory R. Komanderu na vnútropolitickú situáciu na Slovensku.

Nakoniec zaváhal aj Ladislav Jankovič. Pod vplyvom správ, ktoré priniesol zo Slovenska, ako aj z Ríma Jozef Vicen, napísal L. Jankovič list, adresovaný katolíckym disidentom na Slovensku, s ktorými prišiel Komandera do styku. Upozorňoval ich v ňom, aby nabudúce Komanderu brali s rezervou, že sa mu síce verí, ale aby pritom vzali do úvahy, že ide o evanjelika. Jankovičov list zapríčinil, že Komandera odmietol za týchto podmienok ísť o mesiac opäť na Slovensko tak, ako to prisľúbil J. Kempnému a M. Bugárovi.

List na určitú dobu naštrbil priateľstvo R. Komanderu s L. Jankovičom. Rudolf Komandera sa v lete 1946 postupne stiahol do ústrania a začal sa venovať predovšetkým svojim súkromným záležitostiam. Obvinenia na svoju adresu vnímal veľmi emotívne a chápal ich ako vyslovenie nedôvery voči sebe. Tým, že odmietol ísť na Slovensko, poskytol J. Vicenovi vítanú zámienku, aby navrhol jeho vylúčenie zo Slovenského revolučného odboja.

Spory vo vedení nadobudli nakoniec taký rozsah, že R. Komandera sa rozhodol koncom leta 1947 ukončiť aktívnu činnosť v SRO. Pôvodne uvažoval, že v zahraničí dokončí štúdium, ale z finančných dôvodov bol nakoniec nútený rozhodnúť sa inak. Koncom októbra 1946 sa presťahoval do obce Sistrans neďaleko Innsbrucku. Ubytoval sa vo vile u majora Alexandra Matúša, ktorý mu našiel zamestnanie v miestnom podniku na výrobu hračiek. Do úvahy je potrebné vziať, aj tú skutočnosť, že celkové sociálne postavenie slovenských emigrantov a ich rodín sa v jeseni a v zime 1946 rapídne zhoršilo, čo vyvolávalo medzi nimi značné napätie a neistotu. Rakúsko bolo v tomto období hospodársky vo veľmi zložitej situácii, prekvital čierny obchod a pašeráctvo.

Rudolf Komandera nebol vylúčený z SRO, tak ako to požadoval Vicen, ale stiahol sa do úzadia a venoval sa osobným záležitostiam. Následne sa v Slovenskom revolučnom odboji rozbehol na plné obrátky zápas o ovládnutie jeho vedenia. Výdatne tomu napomohli aj stupňujúce sa osobné rozpory medzi Ďurčanským a Sidorom, ktoré sa preniesli aj na pôdu SRO. Nepriaznivú situáciu nepomohli zachrániť ani plenárne schôdze SRO zvolané mjr. Alexandrom Matúšom v novembri 1946 do Mayrhofenu a na prelome rokov 1946 – 1947 do Sistrans.

Celková pozícia Ladislava Jankoviča vo vedení SRO bola po odchode R. Komanderu značne oslabená. Slovenský revolučný odboj strácal svoj pôvodný charakter a stával sa konglomerátom rôznych medzi sebou súperiacich skupín. Vo všeobecnosti možno konštatovať, že mladí vysokoškooláci, ktorí založili Slovenský revolučný odboj, stratili od augusta 1946 do mája 1947 vplyv na jeho vedenie.

Na zasadnutí 2. plenárnej schôdzi v Mayrhofene (Tirolsko) bol za predsedu SRO zvolený Fraňo Tiso. O dva mesiace neskôr sa na prelome rokov 1946 – 1947 konala 3. plenárna schôdza SRO v obci Sistrans (neďaleko Innsbrucku), na ktorej došlo k malému prevratu vo vedení Slovenského revolučného odboja. Tzv. Sidorova skupina (J. Mikula, J. Vicen, A. Krajčovič), po intenzívnej príprave, odstavila z vedenia v SRO „ďurčankovca“ Fraňa Tisu a predsedom pléna SRO sa stal „neutrálny“ Konštantín Čulen, jeho zástupcom Štefan Beniak. Predsedom Výkonného výboru sa stal Alojz Krajčovič, prvým podpredsedom Jozef Vicen a druhým podpredsedom Jozef Paučo. Na okraj týchto personálnych rošád si R. Komandera poznamenal: *„Plenárka sa skončila víťazstvom Mikulu, hoc sám nemal*

*žiadnu funkciu. Na jeho strane boli všetky predpoklady, aby mohol začať svoju vlastnú akciu.*⁵³

Plénium, ako najvyšší organ Slovenského revolučného odboja, sa postavilo na stranu Karola Sidora a verejne odsúdilo činnosť Slovenského akčného výboru, pričom sa však vyhlo priamej kritike Ferdinanda Ďurčanského. Uznesenie bolo jedným z konkrétnych výsledkov práce tandemom Jozef Mikula a Jozef Vicen, ktorý ovládol vedenie SRO. K Sidorovej politickej pasivite však plénium nezaujalo žiadne stanovisko, ale v súlade s ním vyzvalo Slovenskú ligu v Amerike, aby sa ujala vedenia slovenského politického exilu tak, ako to urobila v období prvej svetovej vojny. Medzinárodná situácia po roku 1945 však bola diametrálne rozdielna v porovnaní s rokmi 1914 – 1918. Slovenská liga v Amerike, vzhľadom aj na americkú legislatívu a najmä rozdielnu politickú situáciu, túto úlohu nemohla reálne plniť, pričom sama sa začala polarizovať na Ďurčanskovcov a sidorovcov.

Uznesením plenárnej schôdze v Sistrans sa Slovenský revolučný odboj otvorene pridal na stranu Karola Sidora a týmto prilial olej do ohňa stupňujúcich sa útokov oboch táborov. Tento nešťastný krok prispel k prehĺbeniu polarizácie slovenského exilu v Rakúsku, kde začali medzi sebou zvädzať nezmyselné zápasy Slovenský akčný výbor (pplk. Jozef Parčan) a Slovenský revolučný odboj, ktorý sa navyše ešte rozdelil na sidorovcov a Ďurčanskovcov.

Uznesenie pléna SRO znamenalo predovšetkým zásadnú revíziu programu a dovtedajšej nadstraníckej politiky Slovenského revolučného hnutia. R. Komandera si v tejto súvislosti poznamenal do denníka: „*Akokoľvek sa budú veci vyvíjať, naša koncepcia krachla. Bude len na svedomí jednotlivcov, čo si z toho vyvodí. Veď ak sa schválila politika Karola Sidora: všetko pre osobnú bezpečnosť! Ak toto bol jeden z dôležitých argumentov, prečo (ísť) so Sidorom, tak skutočnosť postavila všetko proti. [...] Osobná nejednotnosť a politická roztrieštenosť je tiež výsledkom nekritického stanoviska SRO. Aké ťažké sú výčitky členov SRO, ktorí nahliadli do klikárstva jednotlivých skupín a ich snáh zachraňovať sa, nedbajúc o ostatných. Skompromitovali sme sa a nemáme viac morálny placet vystúpiť pred verejnosť s niečím novým alebo akokoľvek ospravedlňovať, čo sa doteraz robilo.*

53 Archív autora. *Denník Rudolfa Komanderu 1945 – 1947*. Kópia originálu. Zápis zo dňa 13. 5. 1947.

*Skompromitovali sme sa, lebo sme nešli vlastnou cestou...*⁵⁴ Skupina reprezentovaná Jozefom Mikulom a Jozefom Vicenom sa rozhodla vybudovať nové centrum, ktorého hlavnou úlohou bude spravodajsky pracovať pre americkú CIC a pritom chceli na svoje ciele využiť aj kontakty, ktoré so Slovenskom vybuďoval Slovenský revolučný odboj.

Predsedníctvo Slovenského revolučného odboja schválilo na poradách v Sistranse Ohlas k slovenskému národu, ktorý bol v náklade 5 000 kusov distribuovaný prostredníctvom kuriérov (T. Kóňa) na Slovensku. Ohlas vznikol na základe iniciatívy L. Jankoviča a jeho autorom bol Jozef Paučo. V ňom sa SRO opäť prihlásil k myšlienke slovenskej štátnosti ako k svojmu základnému programovému článku. Ostrej kritike bol podrobený ľudovodemokratický režim nastolený na Slovensku Červenou armádou a jeho sovietska politika: „*V protiklade s každodenne hlásanými heslami demokracie odohráva sa u nás, ale i v ostatných krajinách, ktoré obsadila Sovietska armáda, najkrvavejšie dejstvo svetovej drámy, ktoré s plnou platnosťou čím ďalej, tým viditeľnejšie oddeľuje záujmovú sféru Sovietskeho zväzu, ktorého konečným cieľom je a zostáva úplné zbožševizovanie a dôsledné zotročenie celého ľudstva mimo sveta, predstavovaného západnými demokraciami, ktoré v plnej jednote sa stavajú proti každému druhu diktatúry.*“⁵⁵ V tejto súvislosti bolo v Ohlase zdôraznené, že „*zásady kresťanstva a demokracie nedajú sa zlúčiť s programom a cieľmi medzinárodného bolševizmu, ktorý pod rúškom služby jednotlivým národom rozkladá ich mravné zásady, vyvoláva hospodársky neporiadok a sociálnu stiesnenosť, čo končí skoro všade bratovražednými bojmi, ktoré majú slúžiť na založenie nového svetového požiaru ...*“⁵⁶

Na prelome rokov 1946 – 1947, ako aj začiatkom roka 1947 pútal pozornosť celého slovenského exilu politický proces s bývalým prezidentom Slovenskej republiky Jozefom Tisom pred Národným súdom v Bratislave. Keď obžaloba žiadala pre Jozefa Tisu, Alexandra Macha a Ferdinanda Ďurčanského (in absentia) trest smrti rozpútal sa v zahraničí zápas o ich záchranu. V centre tohto politického a ideologického zápasu bola predovšetkým slovenská štátnosť, ktorú reprezentoval jej najvyšší ústavný činiteľ, prezident Jozef Tiso.

54 Archív autora. *Denník Rudolfa Komanderu 1945 – 1947*. Kópia originálu. Zápis zo dňa 19. 2. 1947.

55 Archív autora. *Ohlas k slovenskému národu*. Na Nový rok 1947. Vydalo predsedníctvo Slovenského revolučného odboja.

56 Tamže.

Okrem exilových organizácií sa za záchranu prezidenta Tisa angažovali aj krajské organizácie. V rezolúcii prijatej na zasadaní 28. kongresu Slovenskej ligy v Amerike 29. – 30. októbra 1946 v Detroite bola spochybnená objektivita tzv. ľudových súdov, ako aj demokracia v Česko-Slovensku. Delegáti kongresu sa vyslovili za prepustenie Jozefa Tisa z vyšetrovacej väzby s tým, že uvedenú žiadosť predložia príslušným orgánom v USA. Predseda Slovenskej ligy v Amerike Peter P. Jurčák poslal v mene 700 000 amerických Slovákov protestný list štátnemu tajomníkovi vo Washingtone Jamesovi F. Byrnesovi, v ktorom kritizoval neobjektívnosť tzv. ľudových súdov v sovietskej sfére vplyvu, menovite v Juhoslávii a na Slovensku, ktoré rozhodujú na základe politickej objednávky a ich činnosť je v rozpore so základnými princípmi právneho štátu, ako aj medzinárodného práva.⁵⁷

Predsedsníctvo Prvej slovenskej katolíckej jednoty zaslalo 14. decembra 1946 apel prezidentovi USA a zástupcovi Spojených národov, v ktorom kritizovalo nerovnoprávne postavenie Slovákov v ľudovodemokratickom Česko-Slovensku, zásahy Moskvou naoktrojovaného režimu do demokratických práv a slobôd občanov. Objektivitu Národného súdu otvorene spochybňoval aj Peter Prídavok, predseda Slovenskej národnej rady v Londýne. Dňa 6. februára 1947 zaslal Filip A. Hrobák v mene Prvej Katolíckej slovenskej jednoty kábelogram predsedovi SNR Jozefovi Lettrichovi, ktorým Jednota protestovala proti súdnemu procesu s prezidentom Tisom: „*Presvedčení sme, že nie slovenský národ súdi Tisu a slovenských činiteľov, ale stranícky a predpojatý súd, počínanie ktorého je nedemokratické, nekresťanské, nespravodlivé a rozhodne nie je v najvyšších záujmoch slovenského národa. Zastavte to hriešne, nebratské súdenie, ktoré národnú jednotnosť aj budúcu existenciu národa ohrozuje.*“⁵⁸ Podobným spôsobom reagovali aj ďalšie slovenské spolky a organizácie v demokratickej časti sveta, ich tlačové orgány, ako aj jednotlivci.

Politický proces s prezidentom Tisom mimoriadne vyostřil slovensko-české vzťahy, ako aj vzťahy medzi slovenskými katolíkmi a evanjelikmi. Predmetom ostrej kritiky bol prezident E. Beneš, česká politická reprezentácia, ale aj predstavitelia Demokratickej strany a evanjelická cirkevná hierarchia. Tlačový orgán Slovenského revolučného odboja Slobodné Slovensko od začiatku svojho vydávania prinášal rôzne správy a komentáre k procesom pred retribučnými súdmi. I keď v zahraničí prevládali veľké pochybnosti o demokratickom charaktere nastoleného

57 *Jednota*, 18. 12. 1946.

58 Western Union Cablegram. In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 2, 15. 3. 1947, č. 3, s. 59.

režimu, o právnom charaktere štátu, v ktorom boli v Česku hromadne vyvražďované veľké skupiny civilného nemeckého obyvateľstva z titulu svojej národnosti, predsa si len málokto pripúšťal, že Národný súd vynesie rozsudok smrti nad prezidentom a kňazom Jozefom Tisom. Preto rozhodnutie Národného súdu z 15. apríla 1947 o poprave prezidenta Tisa a najmä jeho mimoriadne rýchle vykonanie 18. apríla 1947, sprevádzané odmietnutím udelenia milosti prezidentom E. Benešom, vyvolali doma, ako aj v zahraničí šok a zdesenie. Tomuto zodpovedali aj prvé reakcie slovenského politického exilu.

Májové číslo Slobodného Slovenska z roku 1947 bolo celé venované poprave Jozefa Tisu. Jeho smrť bola chápaná ako martýrium, ktoré podstúpil v boji proti komunizmu a za obnovu štátnej samostatnosti Slovenskej republiky. „Idea slovenskej štátnosti zostane navždy čo najužšie spojená s menom prvého prezidenta Slovenskej republiky Dr. Jozefa Tisu. Úradní komentári „procesu“ a vrahovia Dr. Tisu sa nehanebne priznávajú, že smrťou prezidenta je natrvalo zažehnaná myšlienka slovenskej štátnej samostatnosti. ... Smrťou tak potupnou vykupuje Dr. Tiso, nad všetku pochybnosť svojich odporcov, myšlienku slovenskej štátnosti a povyšuje ju nad všetky dary, ktorých túžobne očakávanie si vysnívali pokolenia nášho rodu.“⁵⁹

Antibolševický blok národov v Mníchove už v deň popravy Jozefa Tisu, 18. apríla 1947, vydal vyhlásenie v ktorom vyzdvihol jeho celoživotný zápas s komunizmom. Vo vyhlásení sa konštatovalo, že „*Dr. Jozef Tiso nepatrí len Slovákom, ale všetkým národom, ktoré nastúpili boj proti bolševizmu. [...] Slováci nie sú opustení v tejto tragickej chvíli. Stojí s nimi a po ich boku celý svet, ktorý prisahal pomstu a smrť bolševizmu. Tisovo martýrium znamená v histórii odboja slobody milovních národov novú vzpruhu: v boji vydržať a všetky, červenou Moskvou, tyranizované národy oslobodiť. Svitne deň slobody aj pre udatný slovenský národ a veľký, nezabudnuteľný prezident Dr. Jozef Tiso zostane symbolom pre všetkých, ktorí majú rovnaké ciele ako Slováci a pre ktorých terajšia hrozná strata a veľká bolesť je aj ich stratou a bolesťou.*“⁶⁰ Výkonný výbor Stredoeurópskeho federálneho klubu si uctil pamiatku popraveného Jozefa Tisu na svojom zasadnutí 25. apríla 1947 v Londýne. Z tohto spomienkového zasadnutia boli zaslané kondolenčné telegramy predsedovi Slovenskej ligy v Amerike, ako aj Karolovi Sidorovi

59 Zomrel za slovenský štát. In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 2, 15. 5. 1947, č. 5, s. 10 – 12.

60 Pamiatke veľkého prezidenta Slovákov. In: *Slobodné Slovensko*, roč. 2, 15. 5. 1947, č. 5, s. 8 – 10. (Podčiarknuté v texte.)

do Vatikánu. Telegramy podpísal predseda Stredoeurópskeho klubu český generál Lev Prchala a generálny tajomník Jan Zaleski.

V čase vyhlásenia rozsudku Národného súdu nad Jozefom Tisom bol ilegálne na Slovensku vedúci spravodajského oddelenia SRO mjr. Alexander Matúš. Cieľom jeho cesty bolo vybudovať efektívnu spravodajskú sieť na Slovensku. Mjr. Matúšovi sa podarilo dostať zo Slovenska do Rakúska materiál z Národného súdu týkajúci sa J. Tisa, A. Macha a F. Ďurčanského. Analýzy a komentáre k tomuto materiálu slúžili nielen pre potreby slovenského exilu, ale boli dané k dispozícii aj predstaviteľom demokratických štátov, ako aj ich bezpečnostným zložkám.

Hneď po poprave prezidenta Tisa odišiel do emigrácie jeho osobný tajomník Karol Murín. Následne prišli do Nemecka (Rakúska) aj Štefan Chalmovský, Anton Kšinant. A práve správy, ktoré doniesli zo Slovenska Štefan Chalmovský, Anton Kšinant, Jozef Bačkor, nedali za pravdu Jozefovi Vicenovi, ale jednoznačne potvrdili to, čo po príchode z misie na Slovensku hovoril v júli 1946 Rudolf Komandera v polemike s Jozefom Vicenom. Toto bol začiatok definitívneho obratu v politike Slovenského revolučného odboja a v jeho návrate k pôvodnému programu. Tieto správy, ako si zapísal do svojho denníka R. Komandera, „*obrátili však hore nohami sidorovskú koncepciu Joža Mikulu*“.⁶¹ Správy, ktoré doniesol Štefan Chalmovský, ale aj mjr. Alexander Matúš a Karol Murín, dali totiž v mnohom za pravdu „mladým“ v SRO a stali sa nielen impulzom pre ich nové aktivity, ale súčasne znamenali opätovné posilnenie ich pozícií v Slovenskom revolučnom odboji.

Zakladajúci členovia SRO, združení okolo L. Jankoviča a mjr. Alexandra Matúša, sa chopili iniciatívy a neutralizovali skupinu Jozefa Mikulu a Jozefa Vicena, ktorá sa v nasledujúcom období venovala už len výlučne spravodajskej činnosti v službách americkej CIC. Vývoj v Slovenskom revolučnom odboji vyústil do „rehabilitácie“ Rudolfa Komanderu a jeho opätovného zapojenia sa do činnosti.

Došlo k akémusi „rozčleneniu“ Slovenského revolučného odboja na tri centrá. Jedno centrum bolo v Mníchove okolo mesačníka Slobodné Slovensko, ktorý redigoval Jozef Paučo. Sústreďovalo sa zväčša na vydavateľské a propagačné aktivity. Druhé centrum sa vytvorilo okolo vedúceho spravodajského oddelenia SRO mjr. A. Matúša. V jeho tirolskej vile v obci Sistrans

61 Archív autora. *Denník Rudolfa Komanderu 1945 – 1947*. Kópia originálu. Zápis zo dňa 12. 7. 1947. Podstatou koncepcie K. Sidora bolo nevyvíjať žiadnu politickú činnosť. Vyčkávať, až dozrie čas.

sa v roku 1947 konali zasadnutia členov a funkcionárov SRO. Táto skupina pracovala v duchu pôvodného programu SRO – zamerala sa na politickú činnosť a organizovanie protikomunistického hnutia na Slovensku. Pre osobné rozpory v Mníchove sa k nim pridali aj L. Jankovič, ktorý sa sem z Mníchova presťahoval. (L. Jankovič žil striedavo v Mníchove a v Tirolsku.) Takisto sa k nim pridali aj Š. Chalmovský, V. Magdolen, J. Bačkor, Kornel, Emil a Karol Piačkovci a ďalší. Tretiu skupinu predstavovali členovia SRO (išlo zväčša o kuriérov) zoskupení okolo Jozefa Mikulu a Jozefa Vicena, ktorí sa separovali a uzavreli do seba. Ich hlavnou činnosťou bolo spravodajstvo pre americkú CIC.

Medzi týmito skupinami prebiehal v exile otvorený, ako aj skrytý zápas o vedenie a najmä smerovanie Slovenského revolučného odboja. Najostrejšie rozpory však prepukali medzi skupinou J. Mikulu a J. Vicena a skupinou L. Jankoviča a mjr. A. Matúša. Spory sa točili najmä okolo Jozefa Vicena, ktorý ignoroval a porušoval dohody a štatút SRO. Vývoj nakoniec došiel až do takého štádia, že padlo rozhodnutie, aby mjr. A. Matúš predložil v júli 1947 celú záležitosť na posúdenie disciplinárneho súdu Slovenského revolučného odboja.⁶² Tieto vnútorné spory v SRO sa prenášali aj do odbojového hnutia na Slovensku, pričom sa používali aj veľmi neetické metódy.⁶³

Vnútorný rozvrát, aký nastal v Slovenskom revolučnom odboji príchodom Jozefa Vicena do Rakúska, zasiahol aj domáci protikomunistický odboj. Podľa Rudolfa Komanderu: „*Akcie sa doma pravdepodobne nerozvíli. Pretože i keď je porozumenie, nemá to kto vykonávať a sú veľké obavy pred prezradením. Konštatovalo sa, že doma každá skupina má v zahraničí*

62 Disciplinárny súd SRO s Jozefom Vicenom sa konal 26. 11. 1947 v Nattersi, obec neďaleko Innsbrucku. Súdu predsedal Fraňo Tiso a súd dal za pravdu L. Jankovičovi a mjr. A. Matúšovi. Výsledky súdu však svojím spôsobom „anulovali“ udalosti okolo zatknutia R. Komanderu na Slovensku a hysterická kampaň v Česko-Slovensku v súvislosti s tzv. protištátnym sprisaháním na Slovensku. Čo značne oslabilo pozíciu mjr. A. Matúša a L. Jankoviča.

63 Jozef Vicen ešte aj po desaťročiach, po páde komunizmu, bagatelizoval činnosť Slovenského revolučného odboja a píše o jeho „odbojových“ aktivitách. Uvádza, že do aktivít SRO sa zapájal so zdráhaním a nepovažoval za vhodné informovať ich o svojom poslaní, ktorým ho v Ríme poveril F. Ďurčanský. Ako sa priznáva: „*Mňa však zaujímali z toho hľadiska, či niekoho z SRO môžem použiť na spoľahlivé prenášanie inštrukcií na Slovensko.*“ (VICEN, J.: *Vo víroch rokov*, s. 187 – 188.) A práve toto úsilie J. Vicena bolo hlavným predmetom sporov v SRO o jeho ďalšom smerovaní. Vedenie SRO (L. Jankovič a R. Komander) odmietalo snahu J. Mikulu a J. Vicena stať sa servisným pracoviskom americkej CIC.

*krúžok svojich spolupracovníkov, oddaných veci, no neinformovaných.*⁶⁴ Rudolf Komandera navrhoval vytvoriť na Slovensku jednotné vedenie, pozostávajúce z malej skupiny osôb, ktoré by riadilo odbojové hnutie na celom území Slovenska a ktoré by sústreďovalo všetky informácie. V zahraničí mal túto úlohu plniť Slovenský revolučný odboj, ktorý by sústreďoval všetky politické a vojenské správy zo Slovenska.

V máji 1947 navštívil Rudolf Komandera v Mníchove Ladislava Jankoviča, aby s ním prediskutoval činnosť Slovenského revolučného odboja na najbližšie obdobie. Počas týchto rozhovorov opäť prediskutovali výsledky Komanderovej misie na Slovensku v lete 1946 a dospeli k záveru, že Rudolf Komandera by mal opäť ísť na Slovensko s úlohou: nadviazať na minuloročné kontakty a pokúsiť sa iniciovať vytvorenie jednotného vedenia domáceho odboja. Situáciu v exile komplikovala aj tá skutočnosť, že časť exilových pracovníkov, najmä bývalí funkcionári slovenského štátu, zaznávala úlohu domáceho odboja a vyzdvihovala predovšetkým zahraničný odboj. Mala veľmi vyhranený vzťah k legálne pôsobiacim nekomunistickým stranám na Slovensku, najmä k Demokratickej strane. Zdôrazňovali princíp kontinuity Slovenskej republiky a počítali s tým, že po páde ľudovodemokratického režimu v Česko-Slovensku dôjde k obnove štátnej samostatnosti Slovenska a oni sa automaticky vrátia do svojich pôvodných funkcií.

Takúto politiku od počiatku odmietali akceptovať mladí v SRO, ktorí stáli pri jeho založení, reprezentovaní katolíkom Ladislavom Jankovičom a evanjelikom Rudolfom Komanderom. Títo otvorene kritizovali nielen uvedené názory, ale kriticky prehodnocovali aj vnútropolitické pomery v období prvej Slovenskej republiky (monopol HSLS v politickom systéme; exkluzívne postavenie Hlinkovej gardy v spoločnosti; prejavy klientelizmu, korupcie a straníckosti; vzťah katolíkov a evanjelikov a podobne). Na druhej strane slovenská štátnosť nemala v zahraničí obetavejších a nezištnejších obhajcov, než boli mladí vysokoškooláci a absolventi vysokých škôl v Slovenskom revolučnom odboji, vychovaní v podmienkach samostatného štátu.

Vývoj medzinárodnej situácie v roku 1947 bol už priaznivejší pre činnosť politickej emigrácie. Agresívna zahraničná politika Moskvy a stupňujúce sa rozpory medzi USA a ZSSR prispeli k všeobecnej aktivizácii politickej emigrácie z východnej Európy. Západná tlač bola preplnená

64 Archív autora. *Denník Rudolfa Komanderu 1945 – 1947*. Kópia originálu. Zápis zo dňa 24. 5. 1947.

rôznymi úvahami a komentármi o blížiacom sa globálnom vojenskom konflikte medzi nastupujúcim komunizmom a západnými demokraciami, vedenými USA. V prípravách na otvorenú vojenskú konfrontáciu s komunizmom začali západné demokracie intenzívne podporovať emigrantské organizácie z východnej Európy. V nebývanej miere vrástol záujem o ich znalosti domáceho prostredia a o správy hospodárskeho, politického alebo vojenského charakteru.

V centre záujmu americkej aj francúzskej rozviedky sa ocitol aj Slovenský revolučný odboj. Táto spolupráca však v žiadnom prípade nebola jednostranná. SRO si dokázal uchovať svoju autonómiu. Spoluprácu, či už s Francúzmi, alebo Američanmi, využíval aj na to, aby informoval západné demokracie o slovenskej otázke a postupne ich získal pre podporu svojho programu obnovy štátnej samostatnosti Slovenska.

V snahe zvládnuť úlohy, ktoré boli kladené zo strany Francúzov a Američanov, si Slovenský revolučný odboj (L. Jankovič a mjr. A. Matúš) vytýčil v lete 1947 tri základné úlohy:

1. Detailne sa oboznámiť so stavom a úrovňou organizácie domáceho protikomunistického odboja. Zjednotiť na Slovensku všetky politické zložky národa v zápase proti komunizmu a využiť pritom možnosti tak legálnej, ako aj ilegálnej práce.

2. Opätovne iniciovať vytvorenie jednoty medzi F. Ďurčanským a K. Sidorom, čo veľmi komplikovalo situáciu aj v samotnom Slovenskom revolučnom odboji.

3. Iniciovať vytvorenie jednotnej slovenskej politickej reprezentácie na Západe, ktorej by sa v zahraničí podriadili všetky ostatné exilové organizácie.

V čase od 14. do 17. júla 1947 sa v tirolskej obci Sistrans konala porada členov pléna Slovenského revolučného odboja. Keďže sa Slovenskému revolučnému odboju nedarilo preklenúť osobné rozpory medzi K. Sidorom a F. Ďurčanským a vyhliadky na ich prekonanie boli v podstate nulové, začalo sa na porade uvažovať o ilegálnom prechode niektorých politikov zo Slovenska do emigrácie, ktorí by boli schopní zjednotiť rozdelený slovenský exil a zaujať v ňom vedúce postavenie. Podľa informácií Jozefa Bačkora očakával sa v zahraničí príchod kňaza.⁶⁵ V spolupráci s CIC túto akciu zabezpečoval vo Viedni Jozef Mikula.

65 A ÚPN Bratislava, KS ZNB S-ŠtB Bratislava, Fond starých písomností. Zápisnica napísaná dňa 19. 9. 1947 na Povereníctve vnútra VII. odbor za prítomnosti podpísaných. Vypočúvaný Rudolf Komandera.

Keď Američania a Francúzi boli ochotní oficiálne uznať požiadavky slovenského exilu na štátnu samostatnosť Slovenska a začali ich v tomto otvorene podporovať, ich zápas za slobodu a demokraciu začal nadobúdať medzinárodno-politický rozmer.⁶⁶ Podobne ako to bolo aj v prípade pobaltských národov, Poliakov, Ukrajincov, Slovincov alebo Chorvátov.

V úsilí skoordinať činnosť domáceho a zahraničného protikomunistického odboja sa Slovenský revolučný odboj rozhodol v júli 1947 vyslať do zahraničia dve misie. Dňa 20. júla 1947 odišla do Ríma ku Karolovi Sidorovi a Ferdinandovi Ďurčanskému delegácia Slovenského revolučného odboja vedená Ladislavom Jankovičom. Členmi delegácie boli mjr. A. Matúš, Š. Chalmovský, A. Kšinant, J. Bačkor a K. Piaček. Bezprostredne po tejto delegácii nasledovala do Ríma ďalšia, vedená Fraňom Tisom, ktorej členmi boli bývalí poslanci Slovenského snemu Štefan Beniak a Jozef Orlický.

V rovnakom čase, z rozhodnutia Slovenského revolučného odboja (L. Jankovič, mjr. A. Matúš), odchádzal z Innsbrucku na Slovensko Rudolf Komandera na svoju druhú politickú misiu. Na základe inštrukcií mjr. Alexandra Matúša⁶⁷ navštívil v Bratislave Rudolf Komandera najprv plk. Eugena Janečka, ktorý mu mal sprostredkovať kontakt s katolíckymi disidentmi, potvrdiť jeho dôveryhodnosť a týmto spôsobom eliminovať nepriaznivé dôsledky listu, ktorý im v lete 1946 poslal z Rakúska L. Jankovič. Išlo predovšetkým o odbojovú skupinu napojenú na Pavla Žigu, ktorá sa sformovala z iniciatívy mjr. A. Matúša počas jeho návštevy na Slovensku v apríli 1947.

66 Bližšie pozri BOBÁK, J.: Jozef M. Kirschbaum: Keď Paríž a Washington chceli uznať slovenský exil. (K začiatkom činnosti slovenského politického exilu). In: *Historický zborník*, roč. 12, 2002, č. 1 – 2.

67 Tvrdenie Jozefa Jablonického, ktoré nekriticky a ľahkomyselne ďalej rozširuje Matej Medvecký, že Rudolf Komandera išiel na Slovensko „na vlastnú päsť“ sa absolútne nezakladá na pravde. Jablonický sa odvoláva na súkromný list A. Matúša z roku 1993. (JABLONICKÝ, J.: *Podoby násilia*, s. 65; MEDVECKÝ, M.: *Za červené Slovensko. Štátna bezpečnosť a politické spravodajstvo na Slovensku v rokoch 1945 – 1948*. Bratislava 2011, s. 236.) Z určitého hľadiska je dištancovanie sa mjr. Matúša od R. Komanderu pochopiteľné. Podiel na zatknutí R. Komanderu má totiž aj mjr. Matúš, ktorý nechtiac ho poslal do nastavenej pasce. Plk. E. Janeček, ktorého si mjr. Matúš osobne vybral v apríli 1947 na spravodajskú činnosť, bol dvojitým agentom. A bol to práve plk. Janeček, kto vydal R. Komanderu do rúk bezpečnostných orgánov. Štátna bezpečnosť ešte aj po desiatich rokoch si vysoko cenila spoluprácu s plk. Janečkom, ktorý ako mimoriadne úspešný agent ŠtB pomohol zlikvidovať činnosť Komanderovej skupiny. (A ÚPN, KS ZNB S-ŠtB. Fond starých písomností, a. j. 509, šk. č. 1. Pozri tiež ŽIGO, P.: *Cesty osudu*. Nové Mesto n/V. 1998, s. 66, 83 – 88).

Rudolf Komandera si veľmi dobre uvedomoval zložitú svoju politickú úlohu na Slovensku, ako aj nebezpečenstvo, ktorému sa vystavoval. „Úloha, ktorú chcem splniť nie je ľahká, najmä keď uvážime, že nemám v rukách to, čo si o nás myslia doma. Som však presvedčený, že sa to podarí, ak dostanem seriózne správy zo zahraničia, ak sa to udrží v tajnosti pred určitými kruhmi.⁶⁸ Neúspech alebo akékoľvek vyzradenie by znamenalo skompromitovanie tých, ktorí podporovali moje zámery.⁶⁹ Ja osobne som sa vyrovnal s každou eventualitou. Buď vykonám alebo padnem a vtedy všetko beriem na seba, zodpovednosť za svoje činy, za všetko, čo som doteraz robil a čo bude ďalej. Jediná pohnutka, ktorá ma vedie k tomuto rozhodnutiu pramení z úprimnej starosti o budúcnosť a jednotu národa. Všetko ostatné je mizivo podradné. Viem aj kriticky ohodnotiť svoje schopnosti a čo nemám, nahrádzujem skúsenosťami, ktoré vzhľadom na môj vek sú veľké a mravnou silou, ktorá ma vie vždy udržať nad všetkým osobníckarstvom, vie dať nadstranícky prehľad vecí. Pre túto veľkú úlohu považujem seba za jediného, kto by ju dnes vedel zvládnuť.⁷⁰ To mi dodáva sebavedomia a sily.“⁷¹

Príchod Rudolfa Komanderu na Slovensko mal v domácom odbojovom hnutí vopred avizovať kuriér Slovenského revolučného odboja Otakar Vitkovský, ktorý súčasne mal na Slovensko priniesť aj materiál potrebný k splneniu jeho misie.⁷² Rudolf Komandera ilegálne prekročil rakúsko-slovenské hranice medzi Devínom a Devínskou Novou Vsou dňa 23. júla 1947, približne hodinu po polnoci. Cez hranice mu pomohol dostať sa na čln príslušník rakúskej finančnej stráže z neďalekého Markthofu, ktorý ako miestny rybár veľmi dobre poznal terén v tomto úseku rieky Moravy.

Misia Rudolfa Komanderu sa na Slovensku skončila neúspešne. Bezpečnostné orgány ho 17. augusta 1947 po krátkom sledovaní zaistili, keď opustil byt plk. Janečka. Následne sa komunisti pokúsili R. Komanderu

68 Narážal pravdepodobne na skupinu okolo Jozefa Mikulu a Jozefa Vicena.

69 Skupina okolo Ladislava Jankoviča a mjr. Alexandra Matúša.

70 Išlo najmä o prekonanie povojnových katolícko-evanjelických antagonizmov doma, ako aj v zahraničí.

71 Archív autora. *Denník Rudolfa Komanderu 1945 – 1947*. Kópia originálu. Zápis zo dňa 24. 5. 1947.

72 Podľa výpovede R. Komanderu mal O. Vitkovský nechať tento materiál u Jána Michalíka (spolupracoval s P. Žigom), kde si ho mal vyzdvihnúť na heslo „Karol“. (A ÚPN Bratislava. KS ZNB S-ŠtB Bratislava. Fond starých písomností. Zápisnica napísaná dňa 19. 9. 1947 na Povereníctve vnútra VII. odbor za prítomnosti podpísaných. Vypočúvaný Rudolf Komandera.)

propagandisticky zneužiť na politické ťaženie proti Demokratickej strane a jej vedúcim funkcionárom. Praha, aj na základe iných káuz (J. Staško, O. Obuch, A. Meltzer a spol. a ďalšie), vyfabrikovala v jeseni 1947 rozsiahle protištátne sprisahanie na Slovensku. Hlavným cieľom tohto protislovenského ťaženia bolo definitívne zlikvidovať na Slovensku akékoľvek úsilie po štátnej suverenite a samostatnosti. Doma, ako aj v zahraničí Praha cieľavedome kriminalizovala tieto snahy ako prejavy slovenského „fašizmu“ alebo „klérofašizmu“.⁷³

Tzv. sprisahanie na Slovensku sa stalo generálnou skúškou na komunistický puč v Česko-Slovensku. Po stupňujúcich sa rozporoch J. B. Tita s J. V. Stalinom, ktoré prebiehali v atmosfére hroziaceho vojnového konfliktu medzi USA a ZSSR, Informbyro (Kominforma) vyvíjalo od septembra 1947 silný nátlak na K. Gottwalda a KSČ, aby ako v poslednej krajine sovietskej sféry urýchlene uskutočnili politický prevrat, nastolili otvorenú diktatúru Komunistickej strany a očistili KSČ od titoizmu (buržoázneho nacionalizmu).

Príbeh Rudolfa Komanderu je v slovenskej historiografii viac-menej známy. Avšak pri jeho hodnotení, ako aj hodnotení Slovenského revolučného odboja ešte stále pretrvávajú v slovenskej historiografii prokurátorskopolicajný výklad z roku 1947 tak, ako je zachytený v známom politickom pamflete Spiknutí proti republike (Praha 1947), a ako si ho v nasledujúcich rokoch osvojila marxisticko-leninská historiografia.

V súlade s týmto prokurátorskopolicajným výkladom ešte aj dnes Jozef Jablonický tvrdí, že Rudolf Komandera bol vraj prívržencom „čiernej totality“ (fašizmu) a k tomu ešte dodáva, že „Komandera nebol bojovníkom za demokraciu“.⁷⁴ Toto Jablonického ideologické hodnotenie slovenského exilu si v súčasnosti bezmyšlienkovito osvojujú a po ňom opakujú aj niektorí mladší historici, ktorí v snahe vyniknúť za každú cenu sklzávajú

73 *Spiknutí proti republike. Dokumentární vyličení cílů, organisace, rozsahu a vývoje odhaleného protištátního spiknutí na Slovensku.* Praha 1947.

74 JABLONICKÝ, J.: *Podoby násilia*, s. 55. Jozef Jablonický svojimi výsledkami výskumu o R. Komanderovi prekonal aj samotných vyšetrovateľov Štátnej bezpečnosti. Na rozdiel od nich totiž „objavil“, čo sa ani ŠtB nepodarilo fyzickým mučením vytĺcť z Komanderu, že vraj na Zjazde mladej slovenskej generácie v Piešťanoch (1945) „nadsene tleskal“ (!) (s. 55) za program, ktorý ho vraj pripútal k prívržencom čiernej totality. O neetickej a nekorektnom konaní Jablonického svedčí fakt, že svoje vymyslené tvrdenie „o nadsenom tleskaní“ nie je schopný doložiť žiadnym hodnoverným dokumentom a tak, ako za komunizmu aj teraz sa uchyluje k mystifikácii svojich triednych nepriateľov.

až na úroveň bulvárnej tlače.⁷⁵ S úmyslom kriminalizovať a spochybniť v očiach verejnosti činnosť slovenskej politickej emigrácie v zápase za štátnu samostatnosť sú niektorými tiež historikmi publikované hlavne z prostredia ŠtB rôzne dezinformácie o tom, že Rudolf Komandera bol agentom – provokátorom ŠtB, že už do zahraničia odchádzal ako agent ŠtB, že bol agentom Gestapa a podobne.⁷⁶

Tragický osud slovenského vlastenca Rudolfa Komanderu a odhalenie „sprisahania na Slovensku“ mali veľmi negatívny dopad na Slovenský revolučný odboj. Tento neúspech okamžite zneužili proti SRO prívrženci K. Sidora v Rakúsku na veľmi nekorektné útoky proti L. Jankovičovi, ale aj F. Ďurčanskému. Z veľkej časti naleteli na dezinformácie ŠtB, ktoré sa doma, ale najmä v zahraničí začali rozširovať, že Rudolf Komandera je „zradca“, že je „agent – provokátor“ a podobne. Jednu z kľúčových úloh zohrávalo v tejto kampani aj zneužívanie konfesijných rozporov medzi katolíkmi a evanjelikmi na politické ciele. Väčšinu zatknutých v rokoch 1947 – 1948 tvorili slovenskí katolíci. Praha touto rozsiahlou dezinformačnou kampaňou zdôvodňovala nielen hromadné zatýkanie, aké nemalo obdobu v slovenských dejinách, ale sledovala predovšetkým politické ciele – raz a navždy umlčať a skompromitovať akékoľvek snahy po štátnej samostatnosti Slovenska.

Slovenský revolučný odboj sa z tohto úderu veľmi ťažko spamätával a v rokoch 1947 – 1948 zanikol. Jeho funkcionársky aktív a členskú základňu netvorili profesionálni politici, ale študenti a čerství absolventi vysokých škôl, ktorí sa chceli v prvom rade realizovať vo svojom odbore, založiť si rodiny. Koncom 40. rokov časť z nich, na čele s Ladislavom Jankovičom, odišla do Francúzska. Iní odišli dokončiť alebo začať štúdiá do Španielska, Talianska, USA, Kanady. A tí, ktorí zostali v Rakúsku alebo Nemecku sa pridali, buď na stranu Karola Sidora, alebo Ferdinanda Ďurčanského. Mjr. A. Matúš sa v službách Francúzov venoval spravodajskej činnosti.

75 Pozri napríklad MEDVECKÝ, M.: *Za červené Slovensko. Štátna bezpečnosť a politické spravodajstvo na Slovensku v rokoch 1945 – 1948*. Bratislava 2011.

76 V tomto smere sa ešte v období komunizmu veľmi aktívne angažovali predovšetkým „vedci“ z Vojenskej politickej akadémie Klementa Gottwalda v Bratislave, pozri napríklad práce Václava Vondráška. Z rôznych príčin tieto dezinformácie o R. Komanderovi rozširoval v zahraničí aj český exil, ako aj niektorí činní slovenského exilu. Cieľom týchto výmyslov, ohováraní a rôznych spravodajských hier bolo prilievať olej do ohnivých sporov medzi sidorovcami a Ďurčanskovcami, keď sa už Prahe zazdalo, že plameň týchto sporov začína slabnúť.

Posledný z vedúcich predstaviteľov SRO, ktorý zostal v Mníchove bol redaktor Slobodného Slovenska Jozef Paučo. Funkciu vykonával do roku 1948. Jeho odchod do USA v apríli 1950 znamenal formálne aj definitívny koniec Slovenského revolučného hnutia. Jediné, čo zostalo po mladých slovenských vlastencoch a idealistoch, bol časopis Slobodné Slovensko, ktorý vychádzal v Mníchove nepretržite štyridsaťšesť rokov, až do roku 1992.

Summary

In this study the author deals with the beginnings of the organised anticommunist resistance, namely in the period before the Communist coup in February 1948. The first emigration wave left Slovakia in relation to the arrival of the Red Army and it headed mostly to Austria and Bavaria. The first group that started to be politically active was the one of Ferdinand Ďurčanský. His activities resulted in the established of the Slovak Action Committee representing the squelched nation fighting with Communism and striving to preserve the sovereignty and independence of Slovakia abroad. The youth organised in Hlinka Youth and The Association of University Students was also preparing itself for political activities abroad. Due to the agreements concluded in Slovakia at the end of the war, the local anticommunist resistance should have been organised by Jozef Vicen, connected to foreign Slovak Secret Protection led by Ladislav Jankovič. The author analyses the activities of personalities as Štefan Chalmovský, Ladislav Jankovič and Rudolf Komandera, and their share in organising anticommunist resistance and underground activities in Slovakia.

Český protikomunistický a protibenešovský exil po roce 1945

Petr KUBÍK

I.

Český politický exil na Západě po roce 1945 vzešel ze skupin, které se od roku 1939 snažily prosazovat jiné koncepce vývoje ČSR proti Benešovi a jeho lidem. V jejich čele stál generál Lev Prchala¹, dalšími významnými osobnostmi například byli Vladimír Ležák-Borin,² dr. Karel Locher,³ Jiří Bertl,⁴ Josef Kratochvíl,⁵ major Zdeněk Sládeček.⁶ Po odjezdu Benešovy skupiny do Moskvy k vytvoření vlády s komunisty se k Prchalovi přidali další lidé jako Václav Míšek.⁷ Jiní jako poslanec František Schwarz ale v další spolupráci nepokračovali.⁸

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- 1 Lev Prchala (1892 – 1963), čs. důstojník, od 1939 vedoucí činitel protibenešovského exilu.
 - 2 Vladimír Ležák-Borin (1902 – 1970), za I. ČSR levicový žurnalista, od 1939 v exilu.
 - 3 Karel Locher (1893 – 1959), JUDr., do 1926 diplomat, pak pravicový publicista, člen Národního sjednocení, od 1939 v exilu.
 - 4 Jiří Bertl (1901), národní demokrat, od 1939 exil, do 1944 voják.
 - 5 Josef Kratochvíl (1914), čs. důstojník, 1939 exil, za protibenešovské postoje 1940 propuštěn z armády.
 - 6 Zdeněk Sládeček (1901), čs. důstojník, od 1939 s Prchalou v exilu.
 - 7 Václav Míšek (1910), agrárník, od 1939 exil, člen Státní rady, 1944 se rozešel s Benešovým směrem.
 - 8 František Schwarz (1893 – 1947), záhadná postava čs. politiky, opozičník proti všem.

Prchalovská skupina vytvořila 14. dubna 1945 novou organizaci nazvanou Český národní výbor (ČNV).⁹ ČNV začal aktivně rozesílat množství memorand a vyhlášení. Z nich alespoň nejdůležitější. V ustavující den 14. dubna 1945 vyšlo základní *Provolání*, které zavrhovalo nacistickou i komunistickou diktaturu, stavělo se za soukromé vlastnictví, křesťanskou kulturu a zřízení střeoevropské federace. České země navrhovalo uspořádat podle kantonů, žádalo potrestání nacistů mezi sudetskými Němci, ale zároveň mezi nimi vidělo mnoho slušných lidí. Provolání otiskl 26. dubna britský týdeník *Patriot*. 15. května 1945 ČNV zaslal memorandum britskému ministru zahraničí Edenovi o tragédii českých zemí, nesmyslném pražském povstání a samozvanosti Beneše. 23. května 1945 vydal agrární člen výboru ČNV Míšek provolání k rolníkům a 24. května 1945 národně-demokratický člen výboru dr. Locher provolání ke stoupencům této bývalé strany. 1. června 1945 vyšlo *Poselství do vlasti* žádající střeoevropskou jednotu, ale ne společný stát se Slováky, dále ostře stavějící se proti Benešovi a SSSR a odsuzující teror v ČSR. Generál Prchala vydal 21. června 1945 výzvu *Češi k odporu proti bolševismu*. ČNV se také vyjádřil k vyhánění sudetoněmeckého obyvatelstva. Prchala odsoudil nelidskost vyhánění v článku z 21. září 1945 v katolickém týdeníku *Catholic Herald*. 12. prosince 1945 pak vyšlo společné česko-polské vyhlášení exilových londýnských skupin pro OSN, které odsoudilo vyhánění a uvedlo, že plnou odpovědnost nesou vnucené vlády obou zemí.¹⁰

Nejaktivnějším tiskovým členem ČNV se stal Vladimír Ležák-Borin, který řídil vydávání *Czech Press Service* s ostrou kritikou poměrů v benešovsko-komunistické ČSR. Například číslo 6 ze 7. května 1945 odsoudilo komunisticko-benešovské povstání v Praze, které zmařilo pokojný odchod Němců a přineslo nesmyslné lidské ztráty. Číslo 7 z 11. května 1945 psalo o dnech smutku pro celou Střední Evropu, kde řadí bolševický útlak. Československé zpravodajství jen obtížně získávalo během roku 1945 tyto tiskoviny a zasílalo je do Prahy k informaci a protiopatřením.¹¹

9 O válečné době prchalovské opozice více: KUKLÍK, J. – NĚMEČEK, J.: *Proti Benešovi!* Praha 2004. O prchalovském exilu po 1945 též: KAPLAN, K.: *Poúnorový exil 1948 – 1949*. Liberec 2007.

10 Archiv bezpečnostních složek (dál pouze ABS), fond (dál pouze f.) 2M, složka (dál pouze sl.) 10648; též ABS, f. Ústředna státní bezpečnosti (dál pouze ÚSB), sl. 305-344-3; též Národní archiv (dál pouze NA) Praha, f. MV II – Nosek, karton (dál pouze k.) 232.

11 ABS, f. 2M, sl. 11508, 11704 a 11878.

Od poloviny června 1945 řídil Ležák i vydávání bulletinu *Centropress*, který se zabýval celou východní Evropou pod sovětským vlivem. V září 1945 ale britské úřady vydávání obou listů zastavily z důvodu porušení předpisů o hospodaření s papírem. Ležák pak začal vydávat neperiodický tisk *The Letter*. I tato tiskovina měla okolo 250 abonentů. Dále Ležák stále přispíval do britského katolického konzervativního listu *Patriot a Time and Tide*. Mimo Ležáka byl činný i dr. Locher. V létě 1945 vydal brožuru *Naše akce* (2 525 výtisků) a přispíval články do *Patriot*. Vedle těchto tiskovin vycházel nadále časopis *Naše Hlasy* řízený ing. Malíkem, bývalým ředitelem Národní banky, který sice nebyl členem prchalovského výboru, ale názorově se mu podobal.¹²

II.

Od poloviny léta 1945 se rozběhl pokus o vytvoření ilegální sítě z Londýna do Čech. Londýnský exil k tomu využil služeb několika osob, které úředně cestovaly z Prahy na Západ jako byl dr. Hýža z ministerstva zahraničního obchodu nebo důstojníci major Chlup a škt. Kovanda, či se pokoušel zasílat balíčky svým příbuzným a známým jako Václav Míšek své sestře Anně do Dolních Chaber u Prahy a Karel Locher své manželce Vilmě. Klíčovými postavami v další distribuci se stali škt. Jirsa a profesor Stanislav Nikolau, bývalý redaktor Národní politiky.

Bohužel pro prchalovce celá akce zkrachovala dříve, než se mohla rozvinout. Jeden z držitelů letáků Rudolf Svoboda je přečetl na silvestrovském setkání 31. prosince 1945 v přítomnosti své ženy a dalších šesti osob. Jeho žena ale udržovala poměr s jistým člověkem, který vše záhy prozradil úředníkovi StB. Proto již 3. ledna 1946 mohla StB a ZOB II Praha rozvinout rozsáhlou zatýkací akci, při níž byla prchalovská síť prakticky zlikvidována. Předvedeno bylo celkem 53 osob, většina propuštěna po několika dnech, delší dobu bylo zadržováno devět osob (Svoboda, Nikolau, Jirsa, Hýža, Míšková, Bejšovec, Slabý, Černý, Pess). Proti nim plánovala StB soud, který se ale nikdy nekonal. Relativní nezávislost tehdejšího soudnictví dokumentuje kritika z Mimořádného lidového soudu Praha na ZOB v březnu

12 Archív Ministerstva zahraničních věcí Praha (dál pouze A MZV), f. Teritoriální odbory – obyčejné (dál pouze TO-O) 1945 – 1959, k. Velká Británie 10; též NA, f. MV II – Nosek, k. 232.

1946 kvůli stížnosti škpt. Jirsy na tlučení při výslechu. Jako poslední byla z vazby propuštěna Anna Míšková 17. ledna 1947.¹³

V druhém lednovém týdnu roku 1946 rozpoutala československá oficiální média kampaň proti „zrádným prchalovcům“ (zahájil ji čs. rozhlas 11. ledna 1946). Komunisté ale i další síly zahájily nechutnou podpisovou akci po továrnách a školách, která děkovala ministerstvu vnitra za zásah a žádala přísné tresty a vydání z Anglie, velebil se přitom prezident Beneš (např. „Obchodní akademie Praha stojí za milovaným prezidentem Benešem“).¹⁴

Vláda se 15. ledna 1946 usnesla, aby ministerstvo spravedlnosti zkoumalo možnost vydání členů ČNV z Británie, to se 14. února vyjádřilo negativně – žádost nemá šanci. Navrhlo ale zákrok u Komise OSN pro válečné zločiny, i to vyznělo do ztracena.¹⁵ 19. ledna vyhlásil komunistický ministr informací Kopecký veřejně v Chomutově, že čs. vláda bude žádat o vydání Prchaly. Příští den, 20. ledna to oznámila agentura Reuter v Londýně. Na žádost ČNV vznesl 30. ledna poslanec Sir Ernest Graham-Little dotaz v Dolní sněmovně, jak se zachová britské ministerstvo zahraničí, neboť v případě vydání hrozí dotčeným smrt. Britské ministerstvo odpovědělo 2. února, že neodbrželo žádnou žádost. Což byla pravda. Praha viděla beznadějnost své akce a raději nic nepodnikla.¹⁶ I část britského tisku reagovala, největší článek o prchalovské aféře se objevil 24. ledna v *Daily Express*. ČNV se ale zabýval již první reakcí britského tisku 12. ledna v *Daily Herald* a *Evening News*, která přejala pražskou propagandu. ČNV vydal 15. ledna prohlášení o lživosti pražské bolševické propagandy.¹⁷

Pražské ministerstvo vnitra zatím vypracovalo 40-stránkovou zprávu o ČNV, kterou s datem 2. února 1946 rozesílalo hlavním státním činitelům. Zpráva samozřejmě v duchu dobové propagandy vinila prchalovce z „reakčních“ a „fašistických“ tendencí.¹⁸ Určitou pikantností bylo, že sestra předního člena ČNV Jiřího Bertla Ludmila byla manželkou zná-

13 ABS, f. 2M, sl. 10648 a 11088. Dále f. ZOB, sl. 300-34-3.

14 ABS, f. 2M, sl. 13357.

15 ABS, f. 2M, sl. 13357, č. Z/I-3938-28/2-46.

16 A MZV, f. TO-O 1945-59, k. Velká Británie 11.

17 ABS, f. ÚSB, sl. 305-879-1.

18 A MZV, f. TO 1945-59, k. Velká Británie 11, č. Z/VIII-3938-31/9-46.

mého hudebníka Rafaela Kubelíka, na zákrok proti nim se čs. úřady neodhodlaly.¹⁹

Zničení pražské prchalovské sítě počátkem ledna 1946 silně zasáhlo naděje na ilegální kontaktní síť po Čechách, ale jsou důkazy, že příznivci ČNV o sobě dávali čas od času i nadále vědět. V druhé polovině ledna 1946 byly zachyceny prchalovské letáky v Ostravě. 9. února se objevily letáčky „*Ať žije generál Prchala*“ v Poběžbradech. Od 5. dubna se šířila vlna letáků po Praze, dokonce některé se dostaly i do pankrácké věznice.²⁰

III.

Aktivity ČNV ve Velké Británii směřovaly i k mezinárodní spolupráci. Členové ČNV se aktivně podíleli na středoevropských federativních hnutích, navazujících již na snahy z válečné doby. V organizaci Central European Federal Club se pravidelně setkávali s exilovými Poláky, Slováky, Rakušany, Maďary, Estonci a Ukrajinci. Od počátku podporovala činnost ČNV i Liga pro evropskou svobodu (League of European Freedom). Velkou akcí její skotské pobočky se stal manifestační sjezd delegátů utlačených národů Evropy v Edinburghu ve dnech 24. – 25. června 1946. Za Čechy promluvil Lev Prchala, za Slováky Peter Prídavok, v diskusi vystoupili i Ležák-Borin a Locher. Právě s Prídavkom a jeho Slovenskou národní radou v zahraničí také pokračovala velmi dobrá spolupráce již z válečných časů. Například 10. ledna 1946 vydaly ČNV a SNRvZ společné prohlášení pro OSN, ve kterém odmítly současnou pražskou československou vládu jako zákonného zástupce Čechů a Slováků a označily ČSR za sovětský protektorát.²¹

V červnu 1946 potkal ČNV personální rozkol, tak typický pro exilová hnutí. Agilní tajemník Vladimír Ležák-Borin se rozešel s generálem Prchalou kvůli personálním a organizačním záležitostem a založil svou Českou dělnickou unii (Czech Labour Union). Z vedoucích činitelů ČNV ho podpořil Václav Míšek, ostatní zůstali u Prchaly. Ležák-Borin zpočátku pokračoval ve své neúnavné tiskové činnosti, ale během roku 1947 ztrácel finanční zázemí a jeho aktivity upadaly. Ale stále se snažil pomáhat Čechům v západním Německu získat pracovní povolení do Británie,

19 ABS, f. 2M, sl. 13357, č. Z II – 3138-21/1.

20 ABS, f. 2M, sl. 13357, č. 02-5/2222 a ZT-20/1946.

21 ABS, f. ÚSB, sl. 305-344-3. Též A MZV Praha, f. TO-O 1945-59, k. Velká Británie 10 a 11; též NA, f. MV II – Nosek, k. 232.

na německém území pro něj pracoval hlavně Jaroslav Šafr. Po Únoru 1948 se znesvářené strany smířily a Ležák-Borin se vrátil do řad ČNV.²²

IV.

Od léta 1946 věnovala StB zvýšenou pozornost zprávám o vytváření prchalovských jednotek v západním Německu a náboru mladých Čechů k těmto jednotkám. Věc byla pravděpodobně zveličena, ale přesto stojí za zmínku.

Podle několika výpovědí mluvil Prchala každý pátek v 22.30 v londýnském vysílání pro Německo a vyzýval i sudetoněmecké vyhnance ke vstupu do jeho armády.²³ Údaje o početním stavu prchalovské armády značně kolísaly. Tak podle jednoho z 26. listopadu 1946 měli prchalovci v Regensburgu a Rosenheimu 3 000 mužů, 2 roty tanků a 73 letadel. Ale předtím 8. a 9. října hovoří zprávy jen o 300 – 500 mužích a jejich začlenění k Polákům.²⁴ Až fantasmagorické zprávy z roku 1947 mluví o tisících českých legionářů v Kielu, Hamburgu, Bremách, Mnichově a mnoha dalších místech.²⁵

Hlavní náborová kancelář měla být v Mnichově (Vídeňská kavárna) s obsazením dr. Mandling, Gotlinck, Prešovský, Seidl, Černoهورský. Podle jiné zprávy prováděl nábor v Mnichově poručík František Němec.²⁶

Celý podzim 1946 se objevují i hlášení o zatýkání osob pro pokus přejít hranice za účelem vstupu do prchalovské armády. Věc neskončila ani v roce 1947. 18. února 1947 se objevila hlášení o dobře placených skupinách prchalovců u Angličanů ve Vestfálsku.²⁷

Rok 1947 přinesl sice určitý útlum činnosti prchalovců, ale některé akce jsou dokumentovány. 17. srpna 1947 zaslal ČNV memorandum britskému ministru zahraničí Bevinovi, které reagovalo na československé odmítnutí Marshallova plánu. Shrnuje opět celý dosavadní neblahý vývoj benešovské

22 A MZV, f. TO-O 1945-59, k. Velká Británie 11.

23 ABS, f. 2M, sl. 10607, č. 109-I-827/46.

24 ABS, f. 2M, sl. 10607 a 13784.

25 ABS, f. ÚSB, sl. 305-397-3, též 305-522-1.

26 ABS, f. 2M, sl. 13787 a 13793.

27 ABS, f. 2M, sl. 13791 a 11066.

politiky od roku 1939 a poníženost Prahy vůči Moskvě v červenci 1947 vidělo jako logický důsledek tohoto vývoje.²⁸

Na podzim 1947 podnikl Prchala velkou cestu po západní Evropě. 30. – 31. října jednal ve Frankfurtu s americkou administrativou o českých emigrantech, pak odcestoval do Bruselu a 19. listopadu dorazil do Paříže, kde se ubytoval u polského senátora Kattelbacha. V Paříži jednal hlavně se zástupci gaullistického hnutí, i když k vrcholným představitelům se nedostal.²⁹

Paříž byla vůbec po Londýnu určitým druhým zázemím prchalovců, i když zde žádná větší organizovaná skupina nevznikla. Již od roku 1946 aktivně v prchalovském duchu vystupovali někteří Češi jako dr. Dubína, dr. Štůla, dr. Brzák a dr. Weinstein.³⁰

V.

V americké zóně Německa vznikly i další organizované skupiny, s generálem Prchalou buď spolupracující nebo sympatizující. 5. července 1946 se sešel v Mnichově sněm Nového Česko-Slovenska, na kterém byla o den později 6. července založena Novočeská strana středostavovská s programem svobody a demokracie a ostrým odsouzením vlády benešovsko-komunistické kliky. Ve vedení se angažovali dr. Pecháček, Jiří Svoboda a Vojtěch Jas. Personálně stejná skupina založila později hnutí Nové Československo. K 28. říjnu 1946 vydal Pecháček česko-německý leták, kde označil ČSR za společnou vlast Čechů i Němců ovládnutou bolševiky a vyzýval k boji za její osvobození.³¹

Československé úřady se snažily ochromit činnost Novočeské strany středostavovské žádostmi u amerických úřadů o zatčení Pecháčka a spol. za jejich válečnou činnost. Nakonec se jim to povedlo. V listopadu 1946 byl zatčen a převezen do ČSR kpt. Živnůstka, v prosinci 1946 Martin Stříž a v lednu 1947 samotný Pecháček.³²

Jinou skupinu založili na jaře 1947 Miloš Svoboda a Karel Kramář s původním názvem Svobodní křižáci, později Českoslovenští křižáci.

28 A MZV, f. TO-O 1945-59, k. Velká Británie 10.

29 A MZV, f. GS-A 1945-54, k. 95.

30 A MZV, f. SM-T 1945-63, k. 4 a k. 5.

31 ABS, f. 2M, sl. 13793. Též f. Úsb, sl. 305-375-1.

32 ABS, f. Vyšetřovací komise pro NS a LS, sl. 301-78-3.

Aktivity vyvíjela v Bavorsku a Rakousku, vydávala listy *Integrál* a *Palcát*, které psaly o nutnosti křížového boje proti největšímu zlu všech věků – bolševismu, počítalo se s brzkou válkou. V členstvu převažovali bývalí funkcionáři Vlajky. Křížáci spolupracovali s ČNV do března 1948, kdy se předseda Svoboda a část členů odmítla přímo začlenit do ČNV. Někteří „křížáci“ ale prchalovskou výzvu uposlechli a Svoboda a jeho věrní pak přežívali jen jako izolovaná skupinka.³³

VI.

Únor 1948 potvrdil prchalovcům správnost jejich úvah o zhoubnosti spolupráce benešovců s komunisty a oživil jejich upadající aktivitu. Situace přiměla V. Ležáka-Borina k usmíření s Prchalou, v květnu 1948 se opět začlenil do ČNV. Mezi novými emigranty se prchalovci snažili o podchytení dalších stoupenců. Jejich naděje se splnily jen zčásti. V různých částech světa sice vzniklo snad až 146 skupin prchalovců, většina byla ale malá a pasivní. Aktivnější a větší skupiny působily jen v několika zemích.

Ve Francii se 24. června 1948 ustavila Česká národní skupina za účasti 38 osob. Ale již počátkem podzimu 1948 se rozpadla na věrné prchalovce a skupinku v čele s Helenou Koželuhovou. Syn generála Prchalý Ladislav vyvíjel činnost v Belgii, také jen s dočasným úspěchem. Relativně úspěšně se rozvíjela činnost v západním Německu v čele s Vladimírem Pekelským, ústředím v Mnichově a tiskovinou *Zprávy české národní skupiny* s nákladem až 2 000 výtisků. Pekelský z vlastní iniciativy navazoval další kontakty s řadou agrárníků a lidovců, ustanovil se Český studentský svaz a České křesťansko-sociální hnutí (26. června 1949). Během roku 1949 ale činnost ochromoval odchod mnoha emigrantů z Německa do dalších zemí. Roku 1950 se Pekelský snažil o vybudování českých vojenských jednotek, 15. ledna 1950 vyzýval k registraci mužů pro osvobozenou armádu. 7. srpna 1950 vydal leták Prchalý *Všem českým vojínům*, který měl oslabit snahy konkurenční Rady svobodného Československa za vstup Čechů do americké armády. Úspěšně se dá hodnotit mezi lety 1945 – 1950 i činnost prchalovců v Rakousku, kde ji řídil major Jaroslav Táborek s pevnou strukturou a zpravodajským zázemím. ČNV založil i svou mládežnickou

33 ABS, f. Kabinet StB materiálů, sl. 323-13-1-9.

organizaci Svobodná česká mládež (1. března 1948), kterou vedl Stanislav Brzobohatý.³⁴

V letech 1948 – 1950 prchalovský exil rozšířil svůj program o křesťansko-sociální prvky a hlavně o politiku sblížení s organizacemi sudetoněmeckých vyhnanců v západním Německu. Nebyl to úplně nový postoj, ČNV odsoudil vyhánění již v prosinci 1945, roku 1948 jednal Prchala se sudetoněmeckým politikem Reitznerem, ale nyní nastoupila cesta reálné spolupráce. Pekelský připravil na léto 1950 cestu Prchalou do Německa. 4. srpna 1950 došlo k dohodě mezi Prchalou a Lodgmannem von Auen (Arbeitergemeinschaft zur Wahrung sudetendeutschen Interessen), kde se hovořilo o spravedlivém návratu vyhnanců. V září 1950 pokračoval Prchala v rozhovorech v Bonnu. Na přelomu let 1950/1951 se ustanovil Česko-sudetoněmecký federativní výbor. Němci věděli, že prchalovci představují jen menší část českého exilu, ale přesto dohodu vítali. Prchala se ovšem stal terčem ostrých útoků národněfrontovních politiků z RSC. Těch ale zažil již nespočetně. Na závěr se hodí uvést jedno prorocké prohlášení České národní skupiny v listu *Der Sudetendeutsche* z 25. listopadu 1950: „*Bud' se vrátíme do osvobozené vlasti společně nebo vůbec ne*“. Naplnila se druhá část věty.³⁵

Ostrý protikomunistický a protibenešovský kurs prchalovců zůstal v českém exilu po roce 1948 vždy menšinou. Sami prchalovci postupně utlumovali svou činnost či se přetvářeli do různých jiných skupinek. Na rozdíl od slovenského exilu po roce 1945 tak upadli do nespravedlivého zapomenutí a oficiální část exilu okolo RSC se je tam snažila mohutně vytěsnit. Tento příspěvek měl alespoň v základních črtech připomenout jejich činnost, která v určitých obdobích zase tak marginální nebyla. Například dohoda prchalovců se sudetoněmeckými vyhnanci i se stoupenci samostatného Slovenska ukazuje, že při dobré vůli z obou stran se shoda nalézt dala. To ale současná oficiální česká reprezentace nechce přiznat dodnes. Studie samozřejmě čerpá jen z dostupných pražských archívů a je prvním základem rozsáhlejšího bádání. Je úkolem do budoucna toto bádání rozšířit a případně doplnit i o archívní materiály exilových organizací.

34 ABS, f. Kabinet StB materiálů, sl. 323-14-1-14. Těž ABS, f. ÚSB, sl. 305-344-3; též A MZV, f. GS-Žourek 1945-54, k. 4.

35 ABS, f. ÚSB, sl. 305-450-1; též A MZV, f. GS-Žourek 1945-54, k. 4.

Přílohy:

Dokument č. 1

1945, 14. dubna Londýn. Vybrané pasáže z prohlášení ČNV.

Zavrhuje nacistickou diktaturu [...]

Zavrhuje pokus vnutit našemu národu komunistickou diktaturu vnucenou prostřednictvím loutkové vlády pana Beneše.

Trváme na právu českého národa svobodně rozhodovat o svém osudu ... navrhuje, aby v zájmu obyvatelstva byla tato země organizována podle vzoru švýcarského kantonového systému.

Trváme na čtyřech politických svobodách pro náš národ podle Atlantické charty.

Jsme pro zachování práva soukromého vlastnictví [...]

Zdůrazňujeme zásadu, že každý člen společnosti má právo na práci a zabezpečení minimální mzdy.

Připojujeme se k programu federace evropských národů [...]

Domníváme se, že republika střeoevropských národů je prvním krokem k uskutečnění této velké myšlenky. Podle našeho mínění jejím základním kamenem by byla federální unie Čechů, Poláků a Slováků.

Trváme na tom, že taková organizace by měla být založena na zásadách křesťanské kultury a v rámci západní civilizace.³⁶

Dokument č. 2

1945, 15. května, Londýn. Vybrané pasáže memoranda ČNV britskému ministrovi zahraničních věcí Anthony Edenovi:

[...] Právě jméno květnových událostí není ani revoluce ani povstání, ale puč. Krátce potom, když sovětská armáda obsadila Prahu a větší část českých zemí, vrátil se i dr. Beneš a jeho vláda, vytvořená v Moskvě. Tak byl český národ oklamán a zbaven jakékoliv možnosti vyjádřit svobodně svou vůli. Ušlechtilá zásada, že každý národ má právo na sebeurčení a svobodu, zaručená Atlantickou chartou, byla nahrazena starou zásadou brutální síly [...]. V současné době jsou české země stejně tak jako zbytek světa,

36 ABS, f. 2M, sl. 11704.

ve dne v noci vystaveny působení rafinované a pečlivé propagandy šířené rozhlasovými stanicemi Benešovy vlády a komunistů.

ČNV v Londýně konstatuje toto. Edvard Beneš se zřekl dobrovolně a legálně prezidentského úřadu v říjnu 1938 a nebyl zvolen. Nemůže být považován za legálního prezidenta ČSR, protože stát téhož jména, vytvořený v Moskvě, není totožný s předmnichovskou ČSR. Jeho prozatímní ústava, diktovaná komunisty, je v naprostém rozporu s ústavou předmnichovské ČSR. [...]

ČNV prohlašuje:

Edvard Beneš a jeho vláda, ustavená v Moskvě, jsou samozvaní uchvatitelé moci, pracující pro cizí zájmy a podporovaní ozbrojenou mocí.

P. Beneš a jeho vláda postrádají tudíž jakékoliv právní základny a nemohou jednat jménem českého národa. Všechny zákony, státní akty, nařízení [...] podepsané Benešem a jeho vládou jsou neplatné a nikterak závazné pro český národ. Jednání p. Beneše a jeho vlády, ustavené v Moskvě, představuje hrubé znásilnění zásad a ducha Atlantické charty.

Dokument č. 3

1946, 24. června, Edinburgh. Část projevu generála Lva Prchaly na sjezdu delegátů utlačených národů Evropy.

[...] Postavení nynějšího Československa se poněkud liší od postavení jiných zemí na východ od železné opony. Komunistický útlak je ovšem stejný, avšak metody a způsoby jsou rozdílné. Dnešní Československo bylo rovněž obsazeno sovětskými armádami na jaře 1945. [...] Rudoarmějci se dopustili při obsazování ČSR četných zločinů jako znásilňování žen a dívek, krádeží, loupeží, drancování a svévolného ničení majetku. Zděšení, které se zmocnilo obyvatelstva, obratnost komunistické propagandy a beznadějnost většiny národa umožnilo komunistickým vůdcům provést jedinečný experiment, který byl úspěšný. Sovětský svaz odvolal své armády koncem roku 1945. Nebyla to náhoda, že si Moskva vybrala Československo pro tento experiment. [...]

Vše, co se přihodilo nyní v Československu, potvrzuje plně názor, vyjádřený před nedávnem ČNV v Londýně. Je vskutku tragické, jak se varování od roku 1939 [...] ukázala býti pravdivými.

Náš politický program a cíle jsou stále stejné [...]:

Zbavit český národ cizího protektorátu a nadvlády, jakož i diktátorského režimu z ciziny i doma.

Vrátit český národ jeho tradiční západní demokratické orientaci a civilizaci.

Zajistit českému národu jednou provždy právo rozhodovat svobodně o svém vlastním osudu.

Vybudovat jednotu svobodných národů Střední Evropy, která by zaručila bezpečnost před vnější agresí a která jediná by byla sto umožnit úplný vývoj politických, kulturních a hospodářských sil každého členského národa.

Zřídit federaci středoevropských národů jako nástroj míru v Evropě.³⁷

Dokument č. 4

1947, 17. srpna, Londýn. Vybrané pasáže memoranda ČNV britskému ministrovi zahraničních věcí Ernstovi Bevinovi

[...] Protestujeme proti novému znásilnění svobody a práva českého národa vládou československou, která jest opanována komunisty a podřízena Sovětskému svazu.

Již na jaře 1943 dospěli jsme k hlubokému přesvědčení, že politika Dr. Beneše [...] povede k nastolení panství komunistické strany v českém národě. [...] V květnu 1945 bylo území republiky z větší části zaplaveno Rudou armádou, pod jejíž ochranou přibyl samozvaný prezident dr. Beneš se svou vládou, utvořenou v Moskvě a začal řídit v zemi způsobem samozvaným a diktátorským. [...] Nic se nezměnilo volbami na jaře 1946. Tyto volby nebyly, což je samozřejmé, volbami svobodnými a podle pojmu západních demokracií.

Poslední události ukázaly v světle jasném jak blesek pravdivě stav dnešní politické situace v ČSR. Celý svět byl svědkem poniženého postupu po tlaku Moskvy a náhle poznal stupeň závislosti. [...]

Jsme nuceni, což je samozřejmé, klást vinu nejen komunistům v Praze, ale také dr. Benešovi, jehož celá politika za války a po ní měla tendenci změnit tisíciletou tradici křesťanské civilizace a nahradit ji falešným evangeliem Východu pod pláštíkem nové panslavistické a komunistické víry. [...]

Ještě jednou prohlašujeme, že všechna rozhodnutí ujednaná dnešní československou vládou v Praze jménem národa českého zbaveného

37 Oba dokumenty – A MZV, f. TO – O 1945-59, k. Velká Británie 11.

jakýchkoliv možností vyjádřit svou svobodnou vůli, nejsou platná a nezávazují žádným způsobem český národ.³⁸

Summary

In his paper the author deals with those Czech political exile groups that left the concept of Edvard Beneš after 1945, at that time the President of Czechoslovakia. There were several groups of that kind. They were mostly led by the politicians who got in conflict with Beneš already during the WWII, and they stayed in exile in Great Britain after the war. The anticommunist attitude was characteristic to them, as it was one of the main reasons not to go back to their liberated homeland. The members of those organisations took an active part in Central European federative movements, following their efforts from the period of the war. Among such organisations there was also the Czech National Committee led by Lev Prchal. The State Security in Czechoslovakia also paid considerable attention to their activities. There were other smaller groups as well, e.g. Nové Československo, Českoslovenští křižáci and others.

38 A MZV, f. TO-O 1945-59, k. Velká Británie 10.

Český a slovenský protikomunistický odboj v zahraničí po únoru 1948. Sonda do vztahů Čechů a Slováků neuznávajících Radu svobodného Československa

Jan CHOLÍNSKÝ

V období od 25. února 1948 do 17. listopadu 1989 mohli Češi a Slováci svobodně prezentovat své politické názory pouze v zahraničním exilu. Jejich politická a občanská práva však byla podstatně omezena již po květnu 1945 v obnoveném Československu v době autoritativní vlády koalice politických stran známé pod propagandistickým názvem Národní fronta. Atributy poválečného politického režimu vlády Národní fronty přímo souvisely s nastolením komunistické vlády, jakož i s vývojem a programem politického aktivismu českých a slovenských exulantů. Následující text se zabývá vztahy mezi těmi Čechy a Slováky v exilu, kteří odmítli legitimitu mocenského monopolu poválečné Národní fronty a odsoudili její *Košický vládní program* jako komplot, který po porážce nacistického Německa připravil Čechy a Slováky o politickou svobodu a základní občanská práva.¹

1 *Košický vládní program* byl základní státoprávní dokument přijatý a politicky realizovaný v Čechách a na Slovensku po skončení druhé světové války. Byl formulován česko-slovenskými komunisty v Moskvě, poté přijat českými a slovenskými představiteli londýnského prozatímního státního zřízení v exilu a Slovenské národní rady a oficiálně stvrzen 5. dubna 1945 v Košicích. V poválečném období fakticky nahradil ústavu (s níž byl v rozporu) a svým obsahem připravil podmínky pro vnitřní sovětizaci českých a slovenských zemí a zahraničněpolitickou podřízenost Sovětskému svazu pod heslem prosovětské „*neochvějně vůdčí linie československé zahraniční politiky pro veškerou budoucnost*“.

Politický aktivismus Čechů a Slováků v exilu po 25. únoru 1948

Politický aktivismus všech stran, skupin a jednotlivců v rámci exilového hnutí po 25. únoru 1948 deklaroval jednoznačný protest proti komunistické totalitní vládě ve vlasti.² Avšak zásadně odlišná ideová východiska a z nich plynoucí politické postoje byly příčinou rozkolu, k němuž mezi uprchlíky z Československa došlo.³ Předmětem tohoto rozkolu – jak se ukázalo nesmiřitelného – byla odlišná stanoviska k následujícím problémům: a) legitimita poválečného československého státu a jeho politického režimu⁴; b) právo Slováků na národnostní sebeurčení resp. na vlastní stát⁵; c) právo

- 2 Podle individuálního přesvědčení exulantů se jednalo o vlast českou, slovenskou nebo československou.
- 3 Představitelé skupin odmítajících Národní frontu se podle vztahu ke *Košickému vládnímu programu* vymezovali jako „protikošičané“ a své protivníky nazývali pejorativně „košičany“. Představitelé bývalé Národní fronty nazývali své odpůrce rovněž pejorativně separatisty a reakcionáři. Obě strany zároveň označovaly své oponenty ve vyostřených tiskových přestřelkách za fašisty. Jmenovitě rozdělení exilových politických stran (českých i slovenských) a skupin na tábor „košický“ a „protikošický“ viz JANÍK-HORÁK, F.: Přehled našeho exilu. In: *Sborník Bohemia*, Köln, č. 1, 1956, s. 19 – 21.
- 4 Zatímco představitelé Národní fronty až na výjimky hájili poválečný politický režim, jejich odpůrci jim vytýkali spřeženectví s komunisty, nastolení diktatury pod ochranou Rudé armády, zpolitizování justice, kriminalizaci politických odpůrců atd. V české historiografii není ani po více než šedesáti letech otázka legitimacy nastolení vlády Národní fronty a její tříletá činnost v intencích *Košického vládního programu* pojmána jednoznačně. Někteří autoři považují vládu Národní fronty za standardní demokracii, jiní ji charakterizují jako legitimní limitovanou (omezenou, částečnou) demokracii, další její legitimitu i termín demokracie odmítají, někteří hovoří o totalizující zločinné diktatuře. Kritické postoje českých exulantů k Národní frontě viz exilová periodika *Bohemia* (Mnichov, Köln), *Český boj* (Londýn), *Křesťanská demokracie* (New York), *Modrá revue* (Rotterdam), *Národ* (Londýn), *Rozpravy* (Brusel), *Zpravodaj* (Chicago) aj. Tato periodika jsou přístupná v pražské knihovně Libri pohibiti, výběr článků z *Křesťanské demokracie* a *Rozprav* viz KALVODA, J.: *Z bojů o zítřek, 1. díl. Dokumentace*. Toronto 1995. Souhrnná studie viz CHOLÍNSKÝ, J.: Nesmiřitelný rozkol 1948 – 1956. Politický aktivismus v první etapě českého exilového hnutí. In: *Securitas Imperii*, 2010, č. 16, s. 52 – 87; dále též CHOLÍNSKÝ, J.: Vojáci Kristovi, aréna volá! Sursum corda! Josef Kalvoda a český protikomunistický odboj v zahraničí. In: *Paměť a dějiny*. 2010, č. 2, s. 94 – 108.
- 5 Tento problém zároveň zahrnoval postoje k vykonstruované ideologii tzv. čechoslovakismu využitě při vzniku tzv. první československé republiky a protežované během jejího trvání, která označovala Čechy a Slováky za jeden národ. S odůvodněním zklamáním z vývoje v letech 1918 až 1938, kdy Slovensku nebyla v rámci Československa umožněna příslibená autonomní správa a dalšího vývoje po druhé světové válce, se většina slovenských politických aktivistů v exilu (tzv. secesionisté) přiklonila k obnovení samostatného slovenského státu (menšinu tvořili tzv. unitaristé vyznávající ideu společného

vysídlených sudetských Němců na návrat⁶; d) způsob vedení protikomunistického odboje v zahraničí⁷. Z těchto sporných bodů pak vyplývaly vedle deklarované snahy přispět k odstranění komunistické totalitní vlády i odlišné sekundární cíle. V jejich intencích exilové politické programy oscillovaly mezi zachováním atributů Národní fronty a tradiční liberální demokracií, jakož i mezi zachováním a rozdělením Československa. Tak vznikly v „československém“ pounorovém exilu dva politické tábory resp. tři politické proudy. V prvním táboře (a zároveň proudu) působili čeští a slovenští političtí reprezentanti (resp. představitelé politických stran) v nadstranické Radě svobodného Československa, druhý tábor byl rozdělen na samostatný český a slovenský proud, jejichž představitelé spolu loajálně komunikovali.

První tábor (proud) sdružený pod hlavičkou Rady svobodného Československa (RSC) byl podporován ministerstvem zahraničí Spojených

- státu Čechů a Slováků, kteří se ještě dělili na zastánce federalismu-autonomismu a českoslovakismu). GONĚC, V.: *Česko-slovenský vztah v exilových diskusích počátkem padesátých let*. Brno 2006; CHOVAN-REHÁK, J. – GRÁCOVÁ, G. – MARUNIAK, P. (eds): *Slovenský povojnový exil. Zborník zo seminára Dejiny slovenského exilu po roku 1945 v Matici slovenskej v Martine 27. – 28. júna 1996*, Martin 1996; MICHÁLEK, S.: *Formovanie názorov slovenského demokratického exilu v rokoch 1948 – 1989*. In: HÁJEK, J. – KOCIAN, J. – ZÍTKO, M.: *Fragmentsy dějin. Sborník k šedesátinám Jana Gebharta*, Praha 2006, s. 559 – 573; RAŠKA, F. D.: *Opuštění bojovníci. Historie Rady svobodného Československa 1949 – 1961*. Praha 2009, s. 154 – 167; Martin 1996; ŠPETKO, J.: *Slovenská politická emigrácia v 20. storočí*. Praha 1994 s. 190 – 201.
- 6 Tato otázka byla předmětem sporu mezi českými exulanty. Představitelé bývalé Národní fronty považovali vysídlení sudetských Němců za nezpochybnitelný výsledek druhé světové války a odmítali jakoukoli možnost revidování tohoto aktu, zatímco opoziční politické skupiny otevřeně prohlásily poválečné vyhánění (tzv. divoký odsun) sudetských Němců, jakož i jejich oficiální vyvlastnění a vysídlení na základě národnostně-kolektivní viny, za zločin. K postojům představitelů bývalé Národní fronty v této věci viz RAŠKA, F. D.: *Opuštění bojovníci*, s. 168 – 191; HOUŽVIČKA, V.: *Návraty sudetské otázky*. Praha 2005, s. 345 – 354; ČELOVSKÝ, B.: *Politici bez moci. První léta exilové Rady svobodného Československa*. Šenov u Ostravy 2000, s. 102 – 125. K postojům jejich oponentů viz odkazy uvedené v poznámce č. 4 a dosud nepublikovaná rozsáhlá studie autora tohoto textu: CHOLÍNSKÝ, J.: *Causa Vladimír Pekelský a fenomén viny*.
- 7 Z období konce čtyřicátých let a z padesátých let 20. století lze popsat tato pojetí: a) participování na mezinárodněpolitické strategii Spojených států amerických resp. Západu (ČELOVSKÝ, B.: *Politici bez moci*, s. 47 – 73; GONĚC, V.: *Jak se vymanit z komunismu a co po komunismu. Iniciativy pod koordinací Huberta Ripky v padesátých letech*. Brno 2010; RAŠKA, *Opuštění bojovníci*, s. 19 – 55), b) aktivní podněcování Západu k ofenzivnější protikomunistické politice (KALVODA, J.: *Studená válka 1946 – 1989. Svoboda znamená odpovědnost*. Kladno 2001; KALVODA, *Z bojů o zítřek, 1. díl*, s. 5 – 11); c) spojení boje za osvobození od komunismu s bojem za obnovení slovenské samostatnosti (sborník *Slovenský povojnový exil*).

států amerických vzhledem k uznané politické reprezentační kontinuitě jeho představitelů. Prostřednictvím nevládní resp. krycí organizace National Committee for Free Europe (později přejmenované na Free Europe Committee) byla RSC sídlící ve Washingtonu dotována a řízena v intencích americké zahraničněpolitické strategie.⁸ V RSC se sdružili čeští a slovenští představitelé poválečné Národní fronty s dalšími aktivisty vesměs zastánci společného československého státu. Z bývalé Národní fronty to byli představitelé⁹ Československé strany národně socialistické v exilu, Československé sociální demokracie v exilu, Československé strany lidové v exilu, slovenské Demokratické strany v exilu, slovenské Strany svobody a jednotlivci zastávající před únorovým převratem významné posty diplomatů, vojenských hodnostářů, novinářů apod. Mezi těmi, kdo k Národní frontě nepatřili, se k RSC připojili slovenský diplomat Štefan Osuský, představitelé Československé republikánské (agrární) strany v exilu¹⁰ a představitelé marginálních frakcí Československé strany národně demokratické v exilu¹¹ a Československé živnostensko-obchodnické strany v exilu.

8 Viz ČELOVSKÝ, B.: *Politici bez moci*; RAŠKA, F. D.: *Opuštění bojovníci*. Finanční podpora RSC jako celku trvala do roku 1956, poté byla orientována pouze na vybrané bývalé politiky, jako byl např. Petr Zenkl aj. K problematice americké nevládní organizace National Committee for Free Europe viz PALEČEK, P.: *Protikomunistická propaganda ve studené válce. Výbor pro svobodnou Evropu a exil*. Dizertační práce. Historický ústav Filozofické fakulty Masarykovy univerzity v Brně, Brno 2010. K zahraničněpolitické strategii Západu: CHOLÍNSKÝ, J.: *Studená válka a mezníky v české exilové politice*. In: *Střední Evropa*, roč. 23, 2010, č. 134, s. 88 – 110 (přetištěno také: *Distance*, 2010, č. 1).

9 Respektive představitelé těchto politických stran obnovených v exilu.

10 Funkcionáři této v meziválečném Československu nejsilnější politické strany (známé jako agrární) byli v době poválečné vlády Národní fronty politicky pronásledováni a její předseda Rudolf Beran byl ve zmanipulovaném politickém procesu v dubnu 1947 odsouzen k trestu dvaceti let odnětí svobody. V exilu vydala agrární strana v říjnu 1948 prohlášení pod názvem *Svatováclavská deklarace*, v němž se od Národní fronty distancovala, ale nedlouho poté z pragmatických důvodů přijala členství v RSC, kde představitelé Národní fronty dominovali. Text *Svatováclavské deklarace* viz KAPLAN, K.: *Poúnorový exil 1948 – 49*. Liberec 2007, s. 176 – 178; pronásledování agrárníků viz ROKOSKÝ, J.: *Agrárníci – političtí vězni Národní fronty*. In: *Československo na rozhraní dvou etap nesvobody. Sborník z konference k 60. výročí konce druhé světové války*, Praha 2005, s. 144 – 153.

11 Jako reprezentantka exilové národně demokratické strany se stala členkou RSC např. populární poválečná publicistka a politička (tehdy v řadách Československé strany lidové z níž byla právě pro své postoje v červnu 1946 vyloučena), přesvědčená antikomunistka Helena Koželuhová, která ovšem po ročním členství v RSC odešla a v odůvodnění tohoto kroku mj. uvedla: „Dopustila jsem se, a přiznávám se k tomu otevřeně, chyby, že jsem již dříve nevyvodila důsledky z toho, že RSC není demokratickým orgánem, nýbrž samozvanou pokračovatelkou Národní fronty a to nejen svými představiteli nýbrž

Ve druhém táboře (či druhém a třetím politickém proudu) se etablovala na české i na slovenské straně dvě výrazná politická uskupení, jejichž vzájemné kontakty budou níže popsány. Na české straně to byly Sdružení českých demokratických federalistů (SČDF) a České křesťansko-demokratické hnutí (ČKDH) – obě tyto skupiny odmítající důsledně poválečnou Národní frontu a její atributy. Na slovenské straně to byly Slovenský osvobodovací výbor (ustavený ještě před únorovým převrátím jako Slovenský akční výbor) v čele s Ferdinandem Ďurčanským a Slovenská národní rada v zahraničí (vzešlá z reorganizace někdejší Slovenské národní rady Petera Pridavka) v čele s Karolem Sidorem – obě tyto skupiny odmítající Národní frontu a hájící obnovení samostatného slovenského státu.¹² Prvním výrazným představitelem tohoto „protikošického“ tábora na české straně byl Český národní výbor (dále jen ČNV) vedený generálem Lvem Prchalou ustavený v roce 1945 a sídlící v Londýně.¹³ Prchala a spol. představovali opozici vůči politice Edvarda Beneše a varovali před

i svým smýšlením. V RSC zvitězil duch Košického programu, proti němuž jsem doma marně bojovala a jemuž jsem šťastně unikla. Bylo by nejen nelogické, nýbrž i nečestné podporovati to, co jsem právem považovala za zhubu národa.“ KOŽELUHOVÁ, H.: Proč odejdu 28. února 1950 z RSC. In: *Návrat, Paříž*, č. 5–6, 1950, s. 3.

- 12 K ustavení, programům, činnosti a vývoji těchto slovenských organizací viz KIR-CHBAUM, J.: Keď Paříž a Washington chceli uznať slovenský exil (K začiatkom činnosti slovenského politického exilu). In: *Historický zborník*, roč. 12, 2002, č. 1-2, s. 82 – 107; POLAKOVIČ, Š. – VNUK, F.: *Zahraničné akcie na záchranu a obnovenie slovenskej samostatnosti 1943 – 1948*, Lakewood Hamilton 1988; *Slovenský povojnový exil*; ŠPETKO, J.: *Slovenská politická emigrácia*, s. 155 – 198. Tyto dvě organizace měly podporu jasně většiny Slováků v exilu. Počet českých exulantů názorově souznějících s českými organizacemi mimo RSC lze odhadovat mnohem obtížněji. Slovenská národní rada v zahraničí získala podporu krajanské Slovenské ligy v Americe, nejpočetnější krajanská organizace ve Spojených státech amerických, v níž byli sdružení Češi (se slovenskými unitaristy) – Československá národní rada americká, podporovala RSC a koncepci společného československého státu.
- 13 K činnosti ČNV viz KUBÍK, Petr – příspěvek na této konferenci; CHOLÍNSKÝ, J.: Nesmiřitelný rozkol 1948 – 1956. Politický aktivismus v první etapě českého exilového hnutí. In: *Securitas Imperii*, roč. 16, 2010, č. 1, s. 65 – 69; KUKLÍK, J. – NĚMEČEK, J.: *Proti Benešovi. Česká a slovenská protibenešovská opozice v Londýně 1939 – 1945*. Praha 2004, s. 229 – 241, 310 – 317; rovněž periodika: *Bohemia* (Mnichov) – jen do č. 12–13/1951, *Český boj za svobodu a demokracii* (Londýn), *České listy* (Londýn), *Obzory* (Londýn). Na slovenské straně byla v době druhé světové války aktivní Slovenská národní rada (SNR) vedená Peterem Pridavkem. K činnosti SNR viz KUKLÍK, J. – NĚMEČEK, J.: *Proti Benešovi*, s. 318 – 356; GRÁCOVÁ, G.: Peter Pridavok – spisovateľ, novinár, politik. In: MARUNIAK, P. – GRÁCOVÁ, G.: *Slovenská štátnosť a Slovenský povojnový exil. (Zborník prednášok v dome Matice slovenskej v Žiline r. 2007)*. Martin 2008, s. 58 – 67; ŠPETKO, J.: *Slovenská politická emigrácia*, s. 177 – 181.

sovětofilstvím a komunistickým nebezpečím už v době druhé světové války. Po jejím skončení ustavili v Londýně ČNV a odvolávají se na politická práva a svobody v intencích vítěznými spojenci přijaté *Deklarace o osvobozené Evropě* zahájili odboj proti Národní frontě, na který po únoru 1948 navázali odbojem proti komunistické vládě.¹⁴

Nesmiřitelný ideově-politický rozkol a neochota RSC distancovat se od poválečné politiky bránily komunikaci, jakož i dohodě alespoň na minimálním společném programu mezi oběma zmiňovanými tábory. Minimální program mohl být teoreticky postaven na všemi uznaných cílech – osvobození vlasti (vlastí) od komunismu, zavedení civilizovaného právního řádu a začlenění do západoevropského společenství, ale v praxi nikdy nedošlo ani k pokusu o jeho zformulování.¹⁵ Nesvornost mezi exilovými aktivisty se ovšem projevovala nejen v tomto zásadním rozkolu, ale zároveň i uvnitř obou znesvářených táborů a většiny jejich stran a skupin. V RSC probíhaly vedle třenic o dominantní vliv a americkým ministerstvem zahraničí (prostřednictvím CIA a NCFE-FEC) placená místa také bouřlivé česko-slovenské diskuse o podobě společného státu. Ty postupem času vyvrcholily odchodem slovenských členů z RSC a vznikem samostatné Stálé konference slovenských demoratických exulantů v roce 1962.¹⁶ Tyto události jsou v odborné a memoárové literatuře dostatečně popsány včetně definitivního útlumu činnosti RSC v šedesátých letech 20. století a jejího obnovení v roce 1974.¹⁷ Částečně je zaznamenán i ve stejných

14 ČNV se však pro svoji autoritativnost, nedostatek činnosti a malou členskou základnu dostal do izolace i uvnitř českého politického proudu, k němuž náležel a jeho význam se postupně zmenšoval. V padesátých a šedesátých letech 20. století aktivně spolupracoval zejména s představiteli vysídlených sudetských Němců.

15 O této promarněné možnosti se v několika textech zmiňoval český žurnalista (BBC) a zakladatel Československé strany národně demokratické v exilu Rudolf Kopecký ve svém časopisu *Národ* v roce 1953. Například v článku *Na cestě k sjednocení* Kopecký prezentoval názor, že rozkol zavinili bývalí představitelé Národní fronty usilující o ovládnutí exilu, o nichž tento velmi distingovaný žurnalista napsal: „*Kdo měl potěšení přijít ve styk s nadutci, kteří všechen nárok na slávu a na veřejné postavení vyvozovali z toho, že kolaborovali s komunismem, že byli komunisty povýšeni na veřejné hodnostáře, a kteří nebyli ani ochotni doznat své chyby, ani připustit, že by nekolaboranti měli právo na život, ten ví, že spolupráce s kolaboranty je nemožná. Přesto se mnozí o to pokoušeli s trpělivostí hodné lepší věci. Zmoudřeli vlastní škodou.*“ CHOLÍNSKÝ, J.: Nesmiřitelný rozkol 1948 – 1956, s. 76.

16 Vztahy mezi Čechy a Slováky v RSC viz RAŠKA, F. D.: *Opuštění bojovníci*, s. 217 – 241; MICHÁLEK, S.: *Formovanie názorov slovenského demokratického exilu*, s. 569 – 572.

17 V odborné literatuře je činnost RSC dokumentována v několika monografiích. Od vzniku RSC do šedesátých let 20. století: ČELOVSKÝ, B.: *Politici bez moci*; RAŠKA,

intencích probíhající aktivismus početnější krajansko-exulantské „čechoslovakistické“ Československé národní rady americké zejména v osmdesátých letech 20. století.¹⁸ Méně známé však jsou česko-slovenské vztahy v táboře opozičním, o němž platí, že reprezentoval (alespoň na slovenské straně nezpochybnitelně) většinu, ale měl menší vliv, které probíhaly po únoru 1948 a v padesátých letech 20. století na úrovni politických organizací. V roce 1960 se tento slovenský politický proud sjednotil, zatímco na české straně se politický aktivismus postupně měnil v aktivismus publicistický. V roce 1970 byl založen nezpochybnitelně reprezentativní Světový kongres Slováků, zatímco na české straně se nekonstituovala žádná podobně silná skupina, která by navazovala na „protikošický“ tábor. Proto další kontakty mezi názorově si blízkými Čechy a Slováky probíhaly od šedesátých let 20. století už jen na úrovni jednotlivců.

Vztahy mezi českými a slovenskými představiteli „protikošického“ tábora je možné sledovat už před komunistickým únorovým převratem, stěžejní roli v nich zaujímal kontakty mezi Prchalovým ČNV a Prídavkovou Slovenskou národní radou v Londýně. Po komunistickém převratu uprchli před komunismem mnozí představitelé Národní fronty na Západ, ale od poválečného režimu a koexistence s komunisty se vesměs odmítli distancovat. Jednou z nemnoha výjimek v tomto ohledu byl bývalý poslanec československého Národního shromáždění za Československou stranu lidovou, historik Bohdan Chudoba, který se zároveň netajil svým vstřícným postojem k slovenskému právu na státní samostatnost. Od příchodu do exilu prezentoval stejný názor jaký uvedl v roce 1953 v rozhovoru pro časopis *Rozpravy*, kde na otázku *co chce podniknout se Slováky* odpověděl: „Místo abychom jim vnucovali jakoukoliv „trvací“ ústavu, počítejme raději s tím, co je jim samotným zřejmé: s nutností federalisace malých národů v Podunají. [...] Je samozřejmé, že druhým národům při tom musíme popřát stejné míry samostatnosti, jakou v takové federaci požadujeme sami pro

F. D.: *Opuštění bojovníci; v sedmdesátých a osmdesátých letech: POVOLNÝ, M.: Zápas o lidská práva. Rada svobodného Československa a Helsinský proces 1975 – 1989.* Brno 2007. Vybrané dokumenty vztahující se k činnosti RSC viz práce BUNŽA, B.: Kromě toho jsou v pražské knihovně Libri prohibiti k dispozici periodika vydávaná RSC (*Hlas Československa*).

18 K činnosti Československé národní rady americké: POVOLNÝ, M.: *Zápas o lidská práva; ROZBOŘIL, L.: Z války do exilu.* Praha 1994, s. 153 – 167; CHOLÍNSKÝ, J.: Vlastislav Chalupa a Josef Kalvoda. Dva osudy a dva odboje. In: VEBER, V. – BUREŠ, J. a kol.: *Třetí odboj. Kapitoly z dějin protikomunistické rezistence v Československu v padesátých letech 20. století.* Plzeň 2010, s. 72 – 80.

sebe“.¹⁹ Především pro tento „separatismus“ se Chudoba dostal na okraj reprezentace exilové lidové strany a nebylo mu umožněno podílet se na utváření RSC, jejíž program byl ostatně s jeho názory neslučitelný. Zakladatelé RSC odmítli spolupráci se slovenskými secesionistickými organizacemi a s ČNV, jejichž představitelé oproti tomu nebyli ochotni uznat exilovou kontinuitu vůdcovství Národní fronty. Dále bude stručně nastíněn vzájemný vztah mezi představiteli českých a slovenských uskupení druhého „protikošického“ tábora s důrazem na období let 1948 až 1956.²⁰

Sdružení českých demokratických federalistů a slovenský exil

SČDF vzniklo v září 1951 v Mnichově z německé skupiny londýnského ČNV po její roztržce s vedením ČNV.²¹ Předsedou byl zvolen politický aktivista, redaktor a archivář Vladimír Pekelský, který stál od roku 1947 v čele neaktivnější složky Prchalova ČNV – České národní skupiny působící v Německu. Místopředsedou se stal bývalý profesor církevních dějin na brněnské Masarykově univerzitě – historik Rudolf Wierer a tajemníkem žurnalista František Janík-Horák.²² V programu SČDF mimo jiné stálo: „*Zavrhneme každou totalitu, ať již bolševickou, nacistickou či jinou, tak i její nutné důsledky: nenávisť rasovou, národnostní, třídní či náboženskou. Proto bojujeme proti otrokářskému bolševismu*“.²³ Čeští

19 Rozhovor s Bohdanem Chudobou k 28. říjnu. In: *Rozpravy* (Brusel), č. 13, říjen 1953, s. 9. Chudoba byl zejména pro mladší generaci lidovců symbolem naděje na obrodu strany v budoucnu a v prvních exilových letech měl velmi silný mandát zdola, zatímco z centristické skupiny lidoveckých funkcionářů byl vyobcován. Chudobovy názory jsou shrnuty v rozšířeném exilovém vydání jeho knihy *Jindy a nyní* (Frankfurt nad Mohanem – Mnichov 1975).

20 Z hlediska periodicity je možné rozdělit exilový protikomunistický odboj na čtyři etapy s předělý v letech 1956 (maďarské povstání a po jeho potlačení útlum politické aktivity exulantů), 1968 (sovětská invaze do Československa a příliv druhé exilové vlny) a 1975 (počátek tzv. helsinského procesu).

21 Reflexe rozchodu ČNV a ČNS v tisku viz HORÁK-JANÍK, F.: Proč se rozcházíme. In: *Bohemia* (Mnichov), 1951, č. 12 – 13, s. 1 a 4.

22 Vladimír Pekelský byl nedostudovaný medik, který uprchl z Československa v roce 1947 před trestním stíháním pro členství v nacionalistických organizacích Vlajka a Kuratorium pro výchovu mládeže. Také Rudolf Wierer uprchl před poválečnou Národní frontou, když byl stíhán pro členství v organizaci Liga proti bolševismu.

23 Programové body Českých demokratických federalistů. In: *Bohemia* (Mnichov), 1951, č. 12-13, s. 2 – 3.

demokratičtí federalisté měli početnou obec členů a příznivců po celém světě. Vydávali tištěná periodika – měsíčník *Bohemia* a občasník *Sborník Bohemia*, budovali archiv exilových periodik a dokumentů, podíleli se na vytvoření Ústředí demokratického exilu (ÚDE) – české politické organizace zastřešující skupiny neuznávající RSČ, udržovali loajální (a s některými představiteli přátelské) vztahy se zástupci slovenských exilových secesionistických organizací, spolupracovali s exulanty z dalších komunisty ztročených států a národů (v rámci společenství Intermarium i dalších sdružení) i s reprezentanty sudetských Němců, navázali kontakty s německými křesťanskými politiky a posílali memoranda mezinárodním institucím. Ohledně slovenské otázky v programu SČDF stálo: „*Slovenský národ rozhodne svobodně o svém státním sebeurčení*“²⁴, a tomuto východisku odpovídala i snaha o dorozumění se zástupci slovenských organizací usilujících o obnovení samostatného Slovenska a neuznávajících RSČ. Pekelský byl kromě toho spolupracovníkem americké (CIC a OSI) a americko-německé zpravodajské služby (tzv. Gehlenovy organizace), jakož i slovenské organizace Biela légia a vedl vlastní zpravodajskou skupinu s agenty přecházejícími ilegálně hranice.

V Německu se Pekelský ještě jako představitel ČNV seznámil s žurnalistou a představitelem slovenského secesionistického exilu, zástupcem Slovenské národní rady v zahraničí Jozefem Paučem. O jejich spolupráci a přátelském vztahu svědčí dochovaná korespondence z let 1949 až 1955. Paučo už na počátku vzájemných kontaktů informoval o Pekelského skupině Karola Sidora a ten Pekelskému v březnu 1949 napsal: „*Vážený priateľ, [...] Dr. Paučo a Ing. Hollý v svojich listoch často pripomínajú mi Vaše hnutie i Vašu osobu a teším sa, že Vám možem poďakovať sa za tak bratské chápanie slovenskej otázky zo strany nacionálne uvedomelých Čechov. Je to dôkaz, že existuje medzi nami isté spojivo a ako Vy, tak i my budeme sa snažiť, aby sa ono zosilňovalo v prospech lepšej budúcnosti oboch našich národov*“.²⁵ Krátce na to píše Pekelskému Paučo: „*Milý pán kolega, [...] Naša odbočka Slovenskej národnej rady v Nemecku a Vaša Česká národní skupina mali už doteraz možnosti dokázat, že im záleží na úprimnej spolupráci. Zo svojej strany budem sa i naďalej snažiť, aby sme svorne pracovali podľa*

24 Tamtéž.

25 *Pekelsky Nachlass*, Collegium Carolinum, Mnichov. Dopis Karola Sidora Vladimíru Pekelskému, 21. 3. 1949, Vatikán. (Pod označením *Pekelsky Nachlass* je v knihovně mnichovské instituce Collegium Carolinum přístupná neinventarizovaná písemná pozůstalost Vladimíra Pekelského, kopie tohoto i dále citovaných dopisů jsou ve vlastnictví autora článku.)

zásad našej tradície proti spoločným nepriateľom: proti bolševikom a českoslovákum”.²⁶ Spolupráce Pekelského skupiny se Slovenskou národní radou v zahraničí pokračovala v Německu i po Paučově odchodu do Spojených států a odtržení SČDF od Prchalova ČNV. V dubnu 1950 Paučo píše Pekelskému: „*Drahý priateľ, nič sa nemení mojím odchodom z Európy. Chcem sa zasa do nej vrátiť a pokiaľ budeme mimo nej, vynaložím všetko, aby medzi hnutím generála Leva Prchalou a medzi hnutím slovenského národa za jeho štátnu samostatnosť bolo vždy tolko kladných vzťahov, aby sa svet presvedčil, že budujeme naozaj na správnom susedskom a priateľskom pomere, dvoch národov, ktoré Pán Boh určil vedľa seba.*“²⁷ V červnu 1952 píše Pekelský Paučovi: „*Milý příteli, gratulujeme Ti, že jsi byl opětovně zvolen předsedou SNRvZ pro USA. [...] Rozchod s gen. Prchalou (ČNV) byl bolestnou událostí, ale nebylo možno pro jejich naprostou neschopnost a neaktivitu jiné řešení. Náš postoj ke slovenskému národu a jeho boji se však nezměnil.*” V tomtéž dopisu projevuje Pekelský přání, zlepšit spolupráci se Slovenskou národní radou v zahraničí prostřednictvím zlepšení vztahů s Matúšem Černákem, které hodnotí oproti komunikaci s Paučem jako výrazné zhoršení.²⁸ Paučo odpovídá: „*Milý Vlodo, [...] Dúfam, že aj spolupráca s min. Černákom sa prehĺbi. Hovorili sme veľa o Tebe, keď tu bol a ja myslím, že to bude tak, ako bývalo za mojich časov. Prosím Ťa, buď taký dobrý a nezabúdaj popri tom, že máš spojenie s Dr. Ďurčanským, že SNRvZ reprezentuje veľkú silu v slovenskom exile. Čo sa týka RSČ, tá je v úplnom rozklade, bitka o masné hrnce pokračuje.*“²⁹ Pekelský poté v dalších dopisech až do Černákovy násilné smrti potvrzoval, že vzájemná spolupráce se velmi zlepšila a ve věci komunikace s Ďurčanského Slovenským osvobozovacím výborem dával najevo, že pokračuje pouze na formální úrovni. Korespondence Pekelský-Paučo dále dokládá nezdar ve věci přípravy oficiální dohody mezi Slovenskou národní radou v zahraničí a českým ÚDE. Paučo v tomto ohledu Pekelskému v listopadu 1954 píše: „*Milý Vlodo, ďakujem Ti za návrh, na dohodu so SNRvZ. Ako vidím, nie je to to, čo by sme mohli vziať za základ rokovaní. [...] Píšem Ti otvorene, lebo sme priatelia a dobre sa poznáme. Vieš dobre, že nebudem nikdy podporovať dohodu s nejakým združením z Československa, ani dohodu, ktorá nehovorí jasne o prirodzenom práve slovenského*

26 Tamtéž. Dopis Jozefa Pauča Vladimíru Pekelskému, 23. 4. 1949, Mnichov.

27 Tamtéž. Dopis Jozefa Pauča Vladimíru Pekelskému, 12. 4. 1950, Middletown.

28 Tamtéž. Dopis Vladimíra Pekelského Jozefu Paučovi, 5. 6. 1952, Mnichov.

29 Tamtéž. Dopis Jozefa Pauča Vladimíru Pekelskému, 12. 12. 1953, Middletown.

*národa na svoj samostatný štát. [...] Koncept, ktorý si mi poslal, nemože si vážny slovenský politik prisvojiť, ani ho brať za základ rokovania. [...] Nuž, my sme za federáciu, ale slobodnej slovenskej štátnej jednotky s inými štátnymi jednotkami v strednej Európe. Kým toto ktokoľvek z našich susedov nebude rešpektovať, nemôžeme rokovať s ním ani o federácii.*³⁰ Na Paučovu odpoveď Pekelský reagoval sdelením, že návrh ÚDE bude po konzultaci s Ghelfandem upraven. Dohodu se však uzavřít nepodařilo ani Pekelskému ani představiteli ČKDH Jozefu Kalvodovi – viz níže. Poslední vzájemné dopisy Pekelského a Pauča se zabývají vraždou Matúše Černáka. Pekelský například píše: *„Milý Jozef, [...] V pátrání po vrazích nebohého M. Černáka nebylo dosaženo zatím žádných výsledků, zřejmě byla celá akce připravena z Východu. Zatím měl být jen v souvislosti s atentátem 19. t. m. zatčen bývalý plukovník čsl. justiční služby – do léta 1948 – Dr. Springer-Strašecký, ale nic o tom není bližšího známo. Charakteristiku dra. Springera jsme přinesli v poslední Bohemia v rubrice „Co říkali včera“. [...] Tragická smrt M. Černáka je i pro nás velkou ranou, neboť právě v poslední době byla naše spolupráce velmi dobrou a rovněž i Černákova nezlomná aktivita v DEU byla velkou posilou pro všechny exilní skupiny v Německu.*³¹ Na Paučův dotaz, kdo by mohl Černáka v Německu adekvátně nahradit, Pekelský uvádí, že pouze někdo z trojice Kirchbaum-Paučo-Cieker.

Ojedinelým počinem v exilovém hnutí bylo ze strany SČDF zorganizování a publikování ankety s představiteli českých a slovenských organizací stojících mimo RSČ. Dotazy se týkaly možnosti federativního soužití středoevropských národů, poválečné politiky Národní fronty a exilové spolupráce Čechů a Slováků odmítajících *Košický vládní program* z roku 1945. Odpovědi Ferdinanda Ďurčanského, Simeona Ghelfanda, Jozefa Pauča, Vladimíra Pekelského a dalších politických aktivistů byly publikovány v mnichovské *Bohemii* v květnu 1953. Ďurčanský mimo jiné uvedl: *„Politika Národního frontu a jeho činnosť od roku 1943 znamenala postupné zavedenie diktatúry proletariátu nielen na Slovensku, ale tiež v českých krajinách, udalosti z februára 1948 znamenali len formálne vyvodenie dôsledkov z toho, čo už dávno bolo skutočnosťou. [...] Nešťastie, ktoré postihlo Slovákov uvedením Košického programu do života, postihlo tiež Čechov. Preto spolupráca Slovákov a Čechov v slobodnom svete je záujmom oboch národov. Môže sa úspešne rozvinúť na podklade úsilia o odstránenie komunistického režimu a uplatnenia samurčovacieho práva*

30 Tamtéž. Dopis Jozefa Pauča Vladimíru Pekelskému, 16. 11. 1954, Middletown.

31 Tamtéž. Dopis Vladimíra Pekelského Jozefu Paučovi, 30. 8. 1955, Mnichov.

pre každý z nich.“ Zakladatel ČKDH Ghelfand odpověděl na otázku, zda mohou Češi spolupracovat se Slováky, aniž by jim chtěli vnutit společný stát: „Prohlásíme-li otevřeně, že přiznáváme Slovákům právo na národní svébytnost, tedy také i právo na státnost, pak podle mého názoru nestojí nic v cestě spolupráci české a slovenské emigrace zejména na poli mezinárodním. [...] Je dále historickým úkolem české emigrace, aby obnovila přátelský a bratrský poměr k Slovákům, který byl takměř úplně zničen asimilační a imperialistickou politikou kolaborantské Rady (míněno RSC, pozn. aut). Ať již se poměry vyvinou jakkoliv, nesmíme připustiti, aby mezi našimi zeměmi vyvstala čínská zeď.“ Paučo k možnosti spolupráce Slováků a Čechů uvedl: „Spolupráca Slovákov žiada sa s každým národom. Česi v tomto nie sú a nemôžu byť výnimkou. [...] Každý objektívny slovenský pracovník s radosťou víta, že v českom tábore naberajú na sile rady, ktoré sa odvážili pozdvihnúť svoj varovný hlas proti nešťastnej politike medzi dvoma svetovými vojnami i po roku 1945, a ktoré sa stavajú nielen na obranu autochtonného národa slovenského, ale nič nenamietajú ani proti tomu, aby sa Slováci rozhodovali dobrovoľne a bez českej kontroly, ako si zariadiť svoju budúcnosť a určiť svoje štátoprávne postavenie. Kto odmieta tzv. košícký program, je spojenec Slovákov bojujúcich proti komunizmu a marxizmu.“ Pekelský prezentoval svoji představu o poměru ke Slovákům: „Jest mým největším přáním, aby poměr ke Slovákům byl ten nejlepší a spolupráce s nimi v exilu co nejužší. Bohužel, nedá se tvrdit, že by dnes mezi mnohými Čechy a Slováky, ať již v exilu, aneb, jak zprávy z domova o tom mluví, v ČSR, byl poměr dobrý. Mnozí Češi ještě nepochopili, že Slováci jsou stejně tak národem jako my, a že tedy mají právo sami rozhodovat o uspořádání svého budoucího politického a národního života. To jest svaté právo každého národního života a my jako demokrati a humanisté nemůžeme jim v tom zabránit, ale můžeme zabránit, aby mezi Českými zeměmi a Slovenskem nebyl špatný sousedský poměr.“³²

Vedle korespondence Pekelský-Paučo se dochovaly ještě příležitostně dopisy Pekelského s dalšími zastánci slovenské státnosti, jakož i rozsáhlejší korespondence Pekelského a Janíka-Horáka z let 1954 – 1960 se slovenským nezávislým publicistou žijícím v Chicagu, bývalým poslancem československého Národního shromáždění za Demokratickou stranu Michalem

32 Rozhovor s předními politiky exilu. In: *Bohemia*, 1953, únor-březen, s. 3. Příspěvky slovenských aktivistů jsou citovány v originálním znění podle dochované korespondence, v *Bohemii* byly publikovány v českém překladu.

Zibrínem.³³ Ten svůj postoj k česko-slovenské otázce charakterizoval v jednom z dopisů následovně: „*Ja som za svoj štát, to vidíte – ale nie som za štvanie a tupenie národa susedného, a najmä nie Čechov.*“³⁴ Během korespondenčního kontaktu s Pekelským byl Zibrín občasným přispěvatelem *Bohemia*, kde ve svých textech vyostřenými formulacemi stvrzoval nesmiřitelný rozkol mezi dvěma exilovými tábory Čechů a Slováků, ale současně poukazoval i na nesvornost ve vlastních řadách. V článku *Je již skutečně nejvyšší čas* například píše: „*Toto si přiznejme a pak si položíme otázku, zda je správné, když protikomunističtí Slováci, stejně jako Češi – jindy opět Češi a Slováci – navzájem se štvou, místo aby jednotně útočili proti rudým? Prohlašuji ještě jednou, že nechci budovat čechoslováctví nebo nějakou ČSR. Ale proti nám stojí právě ono čechoslováctví a ČSR a my útočíme ne rozdvojeně, ale aspoň v deseti organisacích a nemine dne, abychom nenapsali více proti sobě než proti rudé frontě. [...] Naše nejednotnost, naše rozhárané poměry udržují pány Peroutku, Kvetka, Ducháčka a další kolaboranty, jako Vaňka a j. u zřídla zpráv a propagandy a hlavně u dolarových žlabů.*“³⁵ V reportáži z přednášky bývalého ministra Národní fronty a čelního funkcionáře národněsocialistické strany a RSC *Obnovený Ripka v Chicagu* připomíná epizody z (pre)historie Národní fronty: „*Jak dobře víme, byl to právě Ripka, který v r. 1943 v Londýně, jako zástupce Jana Masaryka, roztrhal svazky s exilovými Poláky a zrušil i spojení s gen. Sikorským. Později spěchal jako první uznat prosovětskou polskou vládu, vedenou tehdy z Moskvy a Moskvou. Tyto protipolské činy jsou dobře známy a Ripka je nikdy ani netajil. Přesto však delegaci oslovil „bratři Poláci“, a milostně se na ně usmíval, aby zapoměli na to, co bylo a uvěřili ještě jednou tomu samému Ripkovi. Pak podobně ty Maďary, jež v r. 1945 vyštval a nechal vyvézt ze Slovenska a proti kterým štal celé roky z Londýna a později z Prahy, nazval rovněž „bratry“ a nasliboval jim všemožnou pomoc a ubezpečil je o svých citech a přátelství k maďarskému národu. Nevíme, zda se najde Maďar, který tomu věří, ale od Ripky to bylo něco nového a neobvyklého.* Současně informuje: *Jako na povel se před*

33 Zibrín v dopisech Pekelskému proklamoval svoji nezávislost, ale jak z dopisů vyplývá, měl blízko k Ferdinandu Ďurčanskému a byl ostře kritický k vedení Slovenské národní rady v zahraničí (jeho členy označoval v dopisech dokonce za katolické fašistické radikály), čechoslovakisty a federalisty ve slovenských řadách zcela odmítal. Viz *Pekelsky Nachlass*.

34 Tamtéž. Nedatovaný dopis Michala Zibrína Vladimíru Pekelskému.

35 ZIBRÍN, M.: *Je již skutečně nejvyšší čas*. In: *Bohemia*, 1956, č. 57, s. 2.

*budovou, kde Ripka měl mít svůj projev dostavil zástup protestujících anti-komunistů, aby piketoval služebníka Kremlu. (Pozn. red.: Piketující nesli transparenty s nápisy: „Ripka prodal ČSR“, „Ripka loutka komunismu“, „Ripko nech si svoji revoluci, nechceme titoismus“ atd.).³⁶ V článku *Náš problém musíme řešit již dnes* Zibrín píše: „U mne není rozdíl mezi Zápotockým a Širokým na straně jedné a mezi Zenklem a Lettrichem na straně druhé. Jsou stejným nepřitelem, jen s tím rozdílem, že jeden slouží u pěšáků a druhý u špatného dělostřelectva. Z těch v exilu jeden se sluní v rozhlase RFE a druhý jej podporuje, stejně tak jeho tisk a vychvalují nový komunismus a tomu starému napomáhají různě, ale plánovitě. Jeden vystavuje bumáčky do úřadů ve Washingtoně a vydává falešné svědectví, jako v případě Dr. Ferjenčíka, druhý opět zaměstnává pražské agenty, jako to činí Peroutka. Tak nám, ať Čechům či Slovákům, kteří jsme proti komunismu, zůstává jediná možnost: vytvořit jednotnou frontu proti společnému nepříteli.“³⁷ V článku *Zapomínaná výročí* připomíná Čechy nedodržené dohody o slovenské autonomii v meziválečném období a odsuzuje poválečnou spolupráci politiků Národní fronty s komunisty: „Ale podívejme se, co jim přirostlo k srdci: pan bolševizátor Gottwald. Na jeho padesátku nezapomněli; k té vydali opěvný památník – samozřejmě za státní peníze –, který nazvali „Kytičku Gottwaldovi“. Do nebes v něm oslavovali svého soudruha Gottwalda a dávali ho občanům za zářný vzor ctnosti a národovectví.“³⁸ V korespondenci přes oceán si Zibrín s Pekelským vyměňovali informace, posílali si tiskoviny a vystřižené články. Zibrín například Pekelskému psal o tom, co zažil v poválečném parlamentu a v Demokratické straně a korigoval některé drobné nepřesnosti otištěné v *Bohemii*. Pekelský Zibrínovi posílal *Bohemii* a zprávy o situaci v Německu, například v roce 1957 informace o zaměstnancích RFE, kteří se vrátili do Československa. Zibrín je využíval při jednání s americkými zákonodárci, s nimiž byl v kontaktu, ve snaze odstavit Ferdinanda Peroutku a socialistické křídlo z vedení československé sekce RFE.³⁹*

36 ZIBRÍN, M.: Obnovený Ripka v Chicagu. In: *Bohemia*, 1957, leden, č. 65, s. 1. Kritizovaná přednáška Huberta Ripky se konala 1. 12. 1956 v Chicagu pro členy Československých demokratických exulantských organizací.

37 ZIBRÍN, M.: Náš problém musíme řešit již dnes. In: *Bohemia*, 1957, březen, č. 67, s. 3.

38 ZIBRÍN, M.: Zapomínaná výročí. In: *Bohemia* (Mnichov), 1958, č. 76, s. 3.

39 Pekelský i Zibrín vystupovali konzistentně proti propagaci socialismu a „titoistického“ národního komunismu v RFE od počátku československého vysílání (1951) pod vedením Ferdinanda Peroutky. Seznam exulantů včetně údajů o jejich působení v exilu, kteří byli spolupracovníky RFE a vrátili se do komunistického Československa, poslal Pekelský

Rozsáhlou aktivitu Vladimíra Pekelského v protikomunistickém odboji (a do jisté míry i celého SČDF) překrývá temný stín jeho osobní tragédie. Do jeho pracovního i soukromého života se nabouraly komunistické zpravodajské složky prostřednictvím agentky Marie Blastowitschkowé roz. Tomšů. Tato agentka byla na Pekelského cíleně nasazena a podařilo se jí získat jeho důvěru. Stala se postupně v červnu 1948 jeho sekretářkou, v září 1951 jeho manželkou a v dubnu 1953 spoluorganizátorkou jeho únosu agenty československé a sovětské zpravodajské služby. Na pokyn svých řídicích orgánů přiměla manžela k návštěvě Vídně, kde byl na smluveném místě přepaden komandem složeným z příslušníků StB a jejich sovětských kolegů a unesen společně s ní do sovětské zóny. Během internace Pekelský přijal možnost vrátit se do Mnichova jako agent StB a na tuto spolupráci přistoupila podle předem připraveného scénáře nejprve naoko neústupná a až po manželově přemlouvání svolná „spoluunesená“ Pekelská. Po svém návratu do Mnichova dodávali do Československa společné zprávy o exulantech a exilových organizacích včetně těch slovenských. Jejich pražské řídicí orgány však v hlášeních opakovaně poukazovali na možnost, že Pekelský pracuje současně pro nějakou západní zpravodajskou službu a také na to, že zprávy, které podává, nejsou dostatečně hodnotné. Například podle záznamů StB – oproti dřívějším samostatným zprávám jeho manželky – na základě Pekelského zpráv nedošlo nikdy k zatčení žádného nepřátelského agenta. Složky obou manželů vedených pod krycími jmény TONDA a MARINA byly archivovány v roce 1972.⁴⁰

Činnost českých demokratických federalistů pokračovala i po návratu Pekelského z Vídně beze změny politické orientace. Blízcí spolupracovníci Pekelských, manželé Wiererovi, však měli již ve druhé polovině padesátých let vážné podezření zejména vůči Pekelské, že pracuje pro československý komunistický režim. Rozešli se jak s Pekelskými, tak i se SČDF a opustili Německo, což učinil pravděpodobně z podobných důvodů i tajemník SČDF a šéfredaktor *Bohemie* František Janík-Horák. SČDF jako politická orga-

Zibrínovi v únoru 1957. Snaha o změny v československé redakci RFE byla limitována americkými zájmy a americkým vnitropolitickým vývojem a z pohledu oponentů nebyla úspěšná.

40 Dochovaná dokumentace k případu manželů Pekelských je uložena v Archivu bezpečnostních složek, ve fondu Hlavní správa rozvědky (I. správa) ve svazcích pod archivními čísly 25641 (Vladimír Pekelský), 4556 (Vladimír Pekelský, krycí jméno Tonda) a 4557 (Marie Pekelská, krycí jméno Marina). Celý případ Vladimíra Pekelského je obsírně vyličen v dosud nepublikované studii autora tohoto textu (CHOLÍNSKÝ, J.: *Causa Vladimír Pekelský a fenomén viny*). Prozatím není vyjasněno, zda Pekelský po přijetí závazku vůči StB zamlčel či oznámil svoji situaci druhé straně.

nizace poté zaniklo zároveň s ukončením vydávání *Bohemia* v roce 1961, kdy již manželé Pekelští pracovali jako zaměstnanci rozhlasové stanice Deutsche Welle v Kolíně nad Rýnem. Vladimír Pekelský zemřel předčasně na srdeční selhání v roce 1975, ve svých pětapadesáti letech. Marie Pekelská prodala jejím manželem shromážděný exilový archiv v Mnichově sídlící instituci Collegium Carolinum.⁴¹

České křesťansko-demokratické hnutí a slovenský exil

ČKDH se zformovalo z bývalých členů Československé strany lidové, kteří v exilu z této strany odešli poté, co její někdejší funkcionáři odmítli svolat exilový stranický sjezd a distancovat se od Národní fronty. Nejprve se utvořilo početné neformální seskupení kolem časopisu *Rozpravy* vydávaného v Bruselu od roku 1950 žurnalistou Simeonem Ghelfandem.⁴² ČKDH jako organizace bylo ustaveno v roce 1953, předsedou byl zvolen Bohdan Chudoba, tajemníkem Simeon Ghelfand a jedním z místopředsedů Josef Kalvoda. V následujícím roce však byl Chudoba po rozmísce s Ghelfandem zbaven předsednictví (později se připojil k Prchalovu ČNV) a jeho místo zaujal v New Yorku při zaměstnání studující dělník, publicista a vydavatel časopisu *Křesťanská demokracie* Josef Kalvoda. Program českých křesťanských demokratů deklaroval jako svůj hlavní cíl osvobození vlasti od komunistického režimu, přihlásil se k sociální nauce římskokatolické církve a mimo jiné uváděl: „ČKDH odmítá řešení sociální otázky cestou zespolečnění výrobních prostředků. Odmítá proto kategoricky marxismus, socialismus a Košický vládní program z 5. dubna 1945; a ke slovenské otázce: ČKDH přiznává Slovákům bezvýhradné právo na sebeurčení a přeje si ze srdce co nejlepší spolupráci v budoucnu.”⁴³

41 Písemná pozůstalost Vladimíra Pekelského včetně citované korespondence je uložena v knihovně mnichovské instituce Collegium Carolinum (katalogizována je jen část této pozůstalosti – rozsáhlý fond českých a slovenských exilových periodik). Souhrnný text o SČDF viz CHOLÍNSKÝ, J.: *Nesmiřitelný rozkol 1948 – 1956*, s. 70 – 73; dále periodikum *Bohemia* (Mnichov) a *Sborník Bohemia* (Köln).

42 *Rozpravy* vycházely v letech 1950 až 1954 a 1957. Měly několik stovek odběratelů, zatímco Československá strana lidová v exilu fakticky sestávala jen z nemnoha bývalých funkcionářů spoluzakládajících RSČ.

43 Programové cíle KDH. In: KALVODA, J.: *Z bojů o zítřek, 1. díl*, s. 166.

Čeští křesťanští demokraté vydávali vedle tištěných *Rozprav* ještě cyklostylovanou *Křesťanskou demokracii*, podíleli se na vytvoření ÚDE⁴⁴, komunikovali se zástupci Slovenské národní rady v zahraničí, podávali memoranda a písemnými apely protestovali u příslušných amerických institucí proti složení RSČ a jejím vůdčím představitelům – někdejšími vůdci Národní fronty, spolupracovali s americkými senátory a kongresmany republikánské strany, účastnili se konferencí pořádaných americkými i evropskými politiky. Jejich nejúspěšnějším počinem na mezinárodním poli bylo podání (v říjnu 1954) memoranda vládě a Kongresu Spojených států amerických s tezemi nabádajícími k účinnějšímu vedení studené války. Memorandum mělo ohlas mezi americkými zákonodárci, bylo čteno na zasedání senátu a publikováno v kongresním tisku. Varovalo před politikou koexistence s komunismem a navrhovalo devítibodový program zahraničněpolitické strategie zaměřené na osvobození komunismem zotročených zemí bez válečného konfliktu prostřednictvím aktivní propagandy, budování evropských a zejména německých ozbrojených sil a rozhodnou politikou vůči Sovětskému svazu. V bodě 4, který se dotýkal rozhlasového vysílání za železnou oponou, stálo: „*Vysílání do Československa by se mělo rozdělit na tři oddělení: české, slovenské a sudetoněmecké. Jednotlivé pořady by měly zdůrazňovat právo slovenského národa na sebeurčení, právo sudetských Němců na návrat do Sudet a podporovat nezbytnost federativního řešení problémů společného soužití.*”⁴⁵

Dochovala se korespondence Josefa Kalvody s předsedou Slovenské ligy v Americe Phillipem Hrobákem a se zástupcem Slovenské národní rady v zahraničí pro Spojené státy Jozefem Paučem z let 1954 až 1955. Kalvoda se podobně jako Pekelský snažil sjednat písemnou dohodu ČKDH nebo ÚDE se Slovenskou národní radou v zahraničí a oslovil Pauča také s návrhem společného postupu ve snaze o přijetí do mezinárodního exilového sdružení – Křesťanské unie střední Evropy (angl. zkratka CDUCE), kam byli jako představitelé Čechů a Slováků do té doby přijati pouze zástupci

44 Základ ÚDE tvořily ČKDH se SČDF a k nim se připojily „protikošické“ frakce Československé národní demokracie v exilu, Československé sociální demokracie v exilu (nazvané Sbor důvěrníků) a skupina tvořená bývalými vojáky Československá legie v exilu. „Dohoda“ In: KALVODA, Z *Bojů o zítřek 1. díl*, s. 119 – 122. Výzvu ke spolupráci nepřijali předseda ČNV Lev Prchala ani předseda Československé republikánské strany v exilu Josef Černý.

45 Text memoranda viz KALVODA, J.: *Studená válka 1946 – 1989*. Kladno 2000, s. 10 – 12. Poslední věta bodu 4 se stala předmětem nesouhlasu slovenských secesionistů, kteří namítali, že Slováci stojí o federaci nezávislých států a nikoli o federaci s Čechy.

RŠČ. Kalvoda v této věci Paučovi píše: „Vážený pane doktore, [...] V odpovědi na naši přihlášku vybízí nás gen. tajemník Sieniewicz, abychom se spojili s čsl. skupinou v CDUCE vedenou dr. Procházkou. [...] V odpovědi na jejich přepis chceme uvést několik bodů proč spolupracovat s dr. Procházkou a jeho skupinou nemůžeme. Je to zejména kolaborace některých členů této skupiny s komunisty. Procházkův podpis na Košické dohodě, postátnění církevních škol, konfiskace církevního majetku, odsun Němců a Maďarů atd. v době, kdy Procházka seděl ve vládě. Jako samostatný bod chceme uvést, že podle Article 3, point 1., členem CDUCE může být křesťanskodemokratický trend z jedné země, státu, lidu či národa. Chceme zdůraznit, že Slováci jsou národem a jako takoví nejsou v CDUCE zastoupeni vůbec, ač mají plné právo na zastoupení v Unii, jako kterýkoliv jiný národ ze zemí Střední Evropy.“⁴⁶ Paučo odpovídá: „Ctení páni, [...] Je isté, až sa budú pýtať v CDUCE na Vás nás, budeme sa zo všetkých síl pridržat toho, aby Vás vypočuli a keby sme sa dostali Vy a my čo len za pozorovateľov, vzájomne by sme sa vo všetkom podporovali proti čechoslovákovi a českým socialistom i slovenským nekresťanom, ktorí chcú zastupovať kresťanské Slovensko.“⁴⁷ Poté, co Kalvoda zaslal Paučovi výše zmíněné memorandum, začalo vyjasňování postojů, které mělo vést k uzavření dohody. Paučo píše: „Ctený pán Kalvoda, [...] S obsahom Vášho memoranda plne súhlasím okrem druhej časti druhej vety v bode 4. Tu totiž hovoríte o tom, že by sme mali Vy, sudetskí Nemci a Slováci tvoriť federáciu. Čiže inými slovami sa tu hovorí o nejakej forme Česko-Slovenska. A to je pre nás neprijateľné. My sme dôsledne proti Č-SR, či centralistickej, alebo federovanej, či konfederovanej. Sme za stredoeurópsku alebo európsku federáciu, v ktorej Slovensko bude samostatnou súčiastkou. [...] Možno sa mýlim v interpretácii onoho 4. bodu Vášho memoranda. Ak je tak, budem Vám povďačný za váš výklad.“ Kalvoda odpovídá: „Vážený pane Paučo, [...] Co se týče bodu 4. druhé věty našeho memoranda nutno konstatovat nejprve, že celý odstavec se týká rozhlasu do ČSR. Československo je uznáváno jako existující stát a z tohoto faktu musíme vycházet, ať už se nám to líbí či nelíbí, a i když jsme proti „čechoslovakismu a benešovství“ právě tak jako Vy.“ Dále pokračuje, že se ČKD v memorandu nikde nevyslovuje pro československou koncepci a uvádí: „Správny výklad je tento: Rozhlas – dle našeho návrhu rozdelený

46 Osobní archivní fond profesora Josefa Kalvody, Knihovna samizdatové a exilové literatury Libri prohibiti, Praha. Dopis Josefa Kalvody Jozefu Paučovi, 2. 9. 1954, New York. (Kopie tohoto i dále citovaných dopisů jsou ve vlastnictví autora článku.)

47 Tamtéž. Dopis Jozefa Pauča Josefu Kalvodovi, 13. 9. 1954, Middletown.

do tří sekcí – má zdůrazňovati právo Slováků na sebeurčení a v tom je obsaženo i právo na stát, jak jsme dostatečně zdůraznili v našem programu otištěném v Křesťanské demokracii č. květen-červen [...] Druhá část § 4.: vypracování federálního řešení „spolužití“ neříká, že toto spolužití má být i v československé federaci. Jak je Vám jistě známo, jsme pro federální řešení středoevropské otázky a to v rámci federace ať už Dunajské, Středoevropské či Evropské.⁴⁸ Paučo reaguje: „Ctený pán Kalvoda, ja plne rešpektujem Vaše náhľady a vidím, že sa dosť približujeme vo všetkom. [...] Vec zásadnej povahy, ako je slovenská štátnosť, je vecou u nás bez debaty. Preto aj činnosť RFE a iných agencií bude nám len vtedy prijateľná, ak sa nebude hovoriť o činnosti smerom na ČSR, alebo národom v ČSR alebo z ČSR. Slováci sú jednoducho národom zo Strednej Európy, z vlastného slovenského územia, bez ohľadu na to, do akého štátného zväzku ich prinútili Sovieti alebo národní socialisti pána Beneša. Preto akcie pre národy v ČSR sú akýmsi precedentom pre budúcu politiku. Rovnako tak nemôžeme a nebudeme podporovať politiku federácie česko-sudetsko-slovenskej. To je len akási obmena Pittsburskej dohody. A my sme ju dávno prekonalí. Tenor budúcej dohody slovenského exilu s ktoroukoľvek českou zložkou môže byť len jeden: Česi budú spolupracovať so Slovákmi v každej medzinárodnej protikomunistickej organizácii a nič nenamietajú proti tomu, ba budú podporovať boj Slovákov za vytvorenie samostatného slovenského štátu.“⁴⁹ Kalvoda tentokrát odpoveděl stroze s tím, že pokud má Slovenská národní rada v zahraničí zájem o nějakou formu dohody, měla by připravit její návrh. Paučo navrhl schůzku po jejímž uskutečnění Kalvoda píše: „Vážený pane dr. Paučo, navazuji na naši nedávnou rozmluvu a jsem velmi rád, že jsem Vás poznal osobně. Myslím, že jsme si vše řekli jasně. [...] Pokud se Vy, Slováci, nedohovórite s námi, Čechy, do té doby budou jménem Čechů i Slováků mluvíti na mezinárodním fóru Čechoslováci. [...] Čím dříve bude uzavřena dohoda mezi našimi dvěma representacemi, tím lépe pro nás i pro vás.“⁵⁰ Dohoda měla preambuli zformulovanou Kalvodou a samotný šestibodový text, který navrhl Paučo, celý návrh zněl následovně:

Prohlášení:

Zásady křesťanského humanismu zdůrazňují rovnost lidí bez ohledu na rasu, národnost a náboženství. Všichni lidé mají právo na život, svobodu

48 Tamtéž. Dopis Josefa Kalvody Jozefu Paučovi, 18. 11. 1954, New York.

49 Tamtéž. Dopis Jozefa Pauča Josefu Kalvodovi, 30. 12. 1954, Middletown.

50 Tamtéž. Dopis Josefa Kalvody Jozefu Paučovi, 2. 2. 1955, New York.

a štěstí; mají stejná práva a stejné povinnosti. Totéž platí i o národech bez ohledu na jejich historickou minulost a jejich početnost. Právem každého národa je právo na sebeurčení, právo na stát, nezávislost a rovnoprávnost v zastoupení v mezinárodních organizacích. Povinností národa jako celku je úsilí o sebezáchovu, o všestranný rozvoj jeho příslušníků a o zabezpečení tohoto zdravého rozvoje mezinárodními smlouvami a dohodami. Respektování práv druhých národů je rovněž povinností národa hlásícího se k etickým principům, ať už křesťanským či humanitním, čímž v praxi rozumíme přiznání druhým národům tatáž práva, která reklamujeme pro národ vlastní. Odmítáme vykořisťování jednoho národa národem druhým a to v jakékoliv formě.

Zástupcové Ústředí českého demokratického exilu a Slovenské národné rady v zahraničí, hlásíce se k principu rovnoprávnosti obou těchto národů a zdůrazňující jejich křesťanský charakter, vyslovují tímto rozhodnutí spolupracovati ve smyslu výše uvedených zásad za účelem dosažení především těchto cílů: Odstranění komunistické tyranie a nastolení svobody a demokracie v našich zemích. V zájmu zabezpečení politického, kulturního a ekonomického rozvoje našich národů chceme v budoucnu spolupracovati co nejužěji v rámci Evropské či jiné federace, v níž by oba naše národy byly zastoupeny jako samostatné politické celky. Byla proto za tímto účelem uzavřena:

**Dohoda
mezi Ústředím českého demokratického exilu a Slovenskou
národní radou v zahraničí:**

Jsouce zplnomocněni ÚČDE na straně jedné a SNRvZ na straně druhé, vyhlášíme:

1. Plně respektujeme vzájemná práva representace českého exilu na straně jedné a slovenského exilu na druhé straně.
2. Jsme připraveni v každé formě společně i s jinými středoevropskými exilovými representacemi vystupovat proti bolševismu a každému druhu komunismu.
3. Ochotně budeme napomáhat ve všech stranách o utvoření Evropské či Středoevropské federace, v níž by byly země České samostatnou složkou, právě tak jako Slovensko a jiné evropské státy.

4. ÚČDE plně respektuje právo slovenského národa na sebeurčení a souhlasí s programem SNRvZ, který sleduje v prvé řadě vybojování samostatné Slovenské republiky.
5. SNRvZ vyhlašuje, že je ochotna spolupracovat s ÚČDE v dnešní i rozšířené formě, pokud se jeho program nebude rozcházet s bodem č. 4 této dohody.
6. Text této dohody se sestaví v originálním znění dvojmo: v řeči české a slovenské.⁵¹

Na tento návrh Paučo odpověděl: „Milý pán Kalvoda, [...] Ako vidím, v druhej časti ste pojali všetky moje body. Je prirodzené, že tento obsah je pre mňa osobne prijateľný a budem sa domáhať, aby ho SNRvZ prijala. Šlo by len o vybrúsenie niektorých formulácií a o ich presné právnické formulovanie.“⁵² K podpisu dohody však přece jen nakonec nedošlo, což Kalvoda komentoval roztrpčeně ještě v roce 1957 v dopise Ghelfandovi v souvislosti s dalším pokusem SNRvZ vstoupit do CDUCE: „Se Slováci se spolupracovat nechtějí. Jejich „návrh“ dohody jsme přijali, ale byl to Paučo a spol., kdo přestali mít zájem na jejím uzavření. Zjevně nás nepovažují za skupinu dost vlivnou a silnou, aby se s námi „kompromitovali v očích Slováků“ [...] Jsme přece [míněno Češi, pozn. aut] jejich úhlavními nepřáteli, podle toho, jak Hrobákovsko-Paučovská „Jednota“ píše.“⁵³ Avšak i přes toto zklamání byl vždy k secesionistickému směru slovenského aktivismu loajální a udržoval dále přátelské kontakty s některými jeho představiteli. K dalšímu jednání o písemné dohodě však už nedošlo a tak zůstal výše uvedený navrhovaný text vlastně jediným dokladem o možnosti dohody mezi exilovou většinou Slováků a jejich v exilu etablovanými (byť s menším mandátem) českými partnery.

České ÚDE přestalo vyvíjet činnost koncem padesátých let 20. století v souvislosti s celkovým útlumem exilového aktivismu po potlačení maďarského povstání v roce 1956, během něhož daly Spojené státy americké Sovětskému svazu jasně najevo, že se nebudou vměšovat do situace na jeho „výsostném území“. Činnost ČKDH ustala po smrti Simeona

51 Tamtéž. Dopis Josefa Kalvody Jozefu Paučovi, 2. 2. 1955, New York.

52 Tamtéž. Dopis Jozefa Pauča Josefu Kalvodovi, 10. 2. 1955, Middletown.

53 Tamtéž. Dopis Josefa Kalvody Simeonu Ghelfandovi, 20. 6. 1957, New York.

Ghelfanda v roce 1964, ale Josef Kalvoda ještě v dalších letech příležitostně vystupoval jako jeho úřadující předseda.⁵⁴

Soužití Čechů a Slováků v pojetí Josefa Kalvody

Josef Kalvoda získal v roce 1960 doktorát politických věd a ústavního práva na prestižní Kolumbijské univerzitě v New Yorku, nastoupil akademickou kariéru a stal se uznávaným americkým univerzitním profesorem ústavního práva, politologie a dějin 20. století. S ohledem na jeho další rozsáhlou publicistickou (včetně analýz pro americké vládní organizace a studií publikovaných v kongresním zpravodaji), přednáškovou a spolkovou činnost ho lze považovat za nejvýznamnějšího reprezentanta křesťanskodemokratického či v širším pojetí konzervativního a „protikošického“ proudu českého politického aktivismu v exilu. Od počátku do konce svého exilového působení – ve svých anglických odborných textech, v člancích pro exilové časopisy a v univerzitních i veřejných přednáškách – Kalvoda uznával právo Slováků na národní sebeurčení, propagoval přátelský respekt mezi Čechy a Slováky a doporučoval federativní uspořádání střeoevropského prostoru. Dlouhodobě také udržoval přátelské kontakty se Slováky prosazujícími slovenskou státnost, o čemž svědčí dochovaná korespondence s Jozefem Kirschbaumem, Imrichem Kružliakem, Jozefem Mikušem, Jozefem Staškem a dalšími.

Když byl Josef Kalvoda v roce 1987 požádán Americkou federální radou pro mezinárodní rozhlasové vysílání (ang. zkratka BIB) o obsáhlé hodnocení úrovně československé sekce Rádia svobodná Evropa (RFE), konzultoval příslušné dílčí problémy s představiteli Světového kongresu Slováků a v závěrečné hodnotící zprávě pojal problém „slovenské otázky“ vysoce korektně a v souladu s jejich názory. Ve zprávě kritizoval opomíjení činnosti Světového kongresu Slováků, poukazoval na nevhodnost směšování češtiny a slovenštiny v jednom vysílacím programu a doporučoval, aby byly české a slovenské programy vysílány odděleně. Kromě toho kriticky zmiňoval převahu bývalých komunistů v československé redakci RFE, čehož důsledkem byl podle něho trend nahrazovat náboženské vysílání

54 Souhrnné informace o ČKDH viz CHOLÍNSKÝ, J.: *Poutník Josef Kalvoda. Život a dílo historika a ideologa protikomunistického odboje v exilu*. Kladno 2002, s. 134 – 175; rovněž CHOLÍNSKÝ, J.: *Nesmiřitelný rozkol 1948 – 1956*, s. 77 – 83. Dochovaná dokumentace k činnosti ČKDH včetně citované korespondence je dostupná v inventarizovaném *Osobním archivním fondu profesora Josefa Kalvody* v pražské Knihovně samizdatové a exilové literatury Libri prohibiti.

propagováním „socialismu s lidskou tváří“. Opomíjení Světového kongresu Slováků zmiňuje Kalvodova zpráva na několika místech, například: „Ve slovenské části pořadu Události a názory č. 297 je zmínka o exilových organizacích, které mají v plánu vyslat své zástupce do Vídně u příležitosti zasedání Konference o bezpečnosti a spolupráci v Evropě. Jmenovitě je uvedena Rada svobodného Československa, Pobaltský světový kongres a Ukrajinský světový kongres, ale Světový kongres Slováků zmíněn není, přestože je to největší slovenská organizace mimo Československo. Podle odhadů je nejméně 80 % organizovaných Slováků žijících v zahraničí členy této organizace. [...] V zájmu objektivity a korektnosti by bylo zapotřebí, aby byla v pořadu zmíněna i tato organizace.“

Ve věci jazykově smíšeného vysílání Kalvoda analyzoval situaci následovně: „V rámci československého vysílání by se mělo zřídit „české oddělení“ a „slovenské oddělení“. Pracovníci zodpovědní za pořady v každém oddělení by měli připravovat vlastní pravidelné programy v příslušném jazyce. [...] Směšování češtiny a slovenštiny v pořadech je v rozporu se zásadou stanovenou v normách Výboru pro mezinárodní vysílání (BIB Mission Statement), podle nichž pořady RFE/RL nečiní rozdíly na národnostním základě. Táž zásada je vyjádřena v Programových směrnících rozhlasové stanice Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – Program Policy Guidelines. Tyto směrnice se navíc hlásí k „zásadě rovných práv a sebeurčení národů“. Ve směrnících rovněž stojí: „Specifické okolnosti odlišují jednu zemi od druhé a jednu oblast od jiné. Jemné nuance v přístupu jsou zásadně nutné k tomu, aby se daly účinně oslovit odlišné skupiny posluchačů. Zatímco dodržování výše uvedených zásad je základním předpokladem k tomu, aby pořady RFE/RL byly konzistentní, je rovněž zásadně důležitý náležitý zřetel ke specifikům různých skupin posluchačů.“ [...] Ve směrnících je chyba ve zmínce o „pěti národech východní Evropy, kam RFE vysílá“. RFE totiž ve skutečnosti vysílá šesti národům, neboť Češi a Slováci jsou dva odlišné národy. Směrnice zdůrazňují, že „při vysílání do oblastí, které byly do značné míry zasazeny nacionalistickými excesy, se RFE musí vystříhat jakýchkoli pořadů, které by posluchači ve východní Evropě mohli chápat jako vnucování kulturních a národnostních předsudků národům východní Evropy.“ [...] Ačkoli se RFE/RL hlásí k zásadě „nediskriminace mezi národy“, byli Češi a Slováci naopak vyčleněni, aby byli diskriminováni. Je-li třeba vyhýbat se jakémukoli antagonismu, a jestliže všechny národnostní skupiny mají právo „vzkvétat, být hrdé na své historické a kulturní výdobytky a vyjadřovat se ve svém vlastním jazyce“, pak by Češi a Slováci měli mít zvláštní vysílání. Odráželo by to proklamovanou „úctu ke všem národům, náboženstvím a kulturám“

*a rovněž by to bránilo rozdmýchávání šovinismu. Potřeby českých a slovenských posluchačů jsou odlišné a zatím jsou uspokojovány směřováním obou jazyků ve vysílání. Dosavadní praxe je tedy kontraproduktivní a mělo by se od ní upustit.*⁵⁵

Svoji hodnotící zprávu poslal Kalvoda i místopředsedovi Světového kongresu Slováků Jozefu M. Kirschbaumovi, který mu vzápětí odpovídá: „Vážený pán profesor, [...] Kópiu Vašej správy o pomeroch v RFE som odovzdal aj p. predsedovi Romanovi aj Rev. D. Tóthovi, ktorý sa obrátil listom na prof. Novaka o jeho mienku. [Michael Novak byl členem vedení BIB, pozn. aut.] Osobne som veľmi pozorne čítal Vašu správu a sme Vám vďační za Váš postoj k našim snahám vysielat' v slovenskom jazyku oddelene. Nakoľko po všetky roky som tam mal niektorých osobných priateľov, mnohé veci mi boli známe, no Vaša správa ich nielen potvrdila, ale aj doplnila. Memorandum Rev. Tótha to tak isto dopĺňuje. Čítal aj on Vašu správu s veľkým záujmom a tak isto Vám ďakuje za Váš postoj k Slovákom. Mrzí nás, že malinká skupinka slovenských emigrantov, ktorí vydávajú „Nашe snahy“ a spolupracujú s Radou slobodného Československa, poslala nielen memorandum proti požiadavke osobitného slovenského vysielania, ale znova svoj postoj obhajujú v poslednom čísle svojho časopisu. Je to skupinka dr. Kvetku, ktorá aj po 40. rokoch sa sústreďuje na útoky proti prevažnej väčšine Slovákov v zahraničí a ich snahám o lepšiu budúcnosť slovenského národa.”⁵⁶

Kirschbaum zaslal Kalvodovi také kopii dopisu, který obdržel od Rev. Dušana Tótha, v němž stojí: „O vynikajúcej správe dr. Josefa Kalvodu som nepočul [při své návštěvě v redakci RFE v Mnichově a rozhovorech s vedoucím čs. oddělení Zdeňkem Šedivým a redaktory Neoveským a dr. Hlinkou, pozn. aut.] jedno jediné slovo a som z toho nešťastný, pretože táto správa je po každej stránke na vysokej úrovni. [...]“ Tóth se také zmiňuje o ambiciózní skupině v redakci RFE složené z bývalých komunistů, „ktorí prišli do redakcie v rokoch 1967 – 1969.“ Píše: „Skupina bývalých komunistov tvrdí, že doteraz nebolo silného vedenia v čl. oddelení a po 20. rokoch dokázali, že sú vhodnými a schopnými partnermi a sú presvedčení, že vedenie teraz patrí im. Preto sa snažia ovládať aj prijímanie nových redaktorov, ktorých

55 Osobní archivní fond profesora Josefa Kalvody. 3. 8. Posudky, 299 A Summary of the Evaluation Report on Radio Free Europe Czechoslovak Broadcasts (*Návrh hodnotící zprávy a Hodnotící zpráva o českém vysílání rozhlasové stanice Svobodná Evropa pro BIB ve Washingtonu*, český překlad Vladimír Petkevič).

56 Tamtéž. Dopis Jozefa Kirschbauma Jozefu Kalvodovi, 12. 11. 1987, Toronto.

by malo v priebehu dvoch rokov prísť vyše 20, aby mohli ovplyvniť a posilniť svoje rady.⁵⁷ Tóthovo vyjádření tak doplnilo Kalvodovu zprávu, v níž bylo uvedeno: „Je dobře známo, že mezi zaměstnanci československého vysílání je mnoho bývalých členů Komunistické strany Československa. Jelikož pracují převážně jako redaktori, jejich celková formace a ideologická orientace se nutně odráží v jejich redaktorské práci a v obhajobě eurokomunismu nebo „socialismu s lidskou tváří“. Zatímco ve Svobodné Evropě by těžko mohl být zaměstnán nějaký bývalý nacista, je s podivem, že v československém vysílání si našlo práci tolik bývalých komunistů. Posluchačům to připadá divné, neboť někteří z těchto lidí pracovalo v československých sdělovacích prostředcích před pádem Dubčekova režimu.“⁵⁸

Josef Kalvoda publikoval ve Spojených státech amerických v angličtině vedle mnoha článků a studií tři úspěšné knihy – *Titoism and Masters of Imposture* (1958); *Czechoslovakia's Role in Soviet Strategy* (1978); *Genesis of Czechoslovakia* (1986). Poslední dvě – po pádu komunismu přeložené do češtiny – přináší historiografické odpovědi na zásadní otázky řešené v exilu: Jaká byla příčina pádu Čechů a Slováků do komunistického područí? (viz *Role Československa v sovětské strategii*, 1999) a Proč byl narušen vztah mezi Čechy a Slováky vedoucí až k slovenské nechuti sdílet společný stát? (viz *Genese Československa*, 1998). Kniha *Role Československa v sovětské strategii* obsahuje ojedinelé zpracování československých politických dějin v mezinárodním kontextu s ohledem na vliv komunistické strategie od vzniku tohoto státu až po sovětskou invazi v roce 1968. Stěžejní pasáže se zabývají prosovětskou zahraniční politikou Edvarda Beneše v době druhé světové války a prokazují jeho zásadní podíl na zbolševizování Československa a jeho klíčovou roli při uskutečňování komunistické dvoufázové revoluce.⁵⁹ V závěru knihy Kalvoda o druhém československém prezidentovi píše: „Počtem nevelká KSC se musela opírat o nekomunistu Beneše, kterého považovala za maloburžoazního „spojence“ či „sympatizanta“ patřícího k identifikovatelné psychologické kategorii lidí, jejichž zájmů a obav lze využít k dosažení revolučních cílů. Komunisté věděli, že

57 Tamtéž. Memorandum Dušana Tótha Jozefu Kirschbaumovi, 11. 11. 1987.

58 Osobní archivní fond profesora Josefa Kalvody. Hodnotící zpráva.

59 Taktika dvoufázové revoluce spočívala v odstavení politické pravice a středu v první fázi komunisty nazývané národní a demokratická revoluce (byla uskutečněna v období květen 1945 – únor 1948) a v převzetí výhradní moci ve státě během druhé fáze nazývané socialistická revoluce (25. únor 1948 a dále). KALVODA, J.: *Role Československa v sovětské strategii*. Kladno 1999, s. 216 – 258.

Benešovy politické metody jsou subjektivistické, že Beneš je veden sobeckými zájmy a ctižádostí, kterou morální ohledy nedrží v patřičných mezích, a že Beneš si pro sebe chce zajistit místo v dějinách. Poněvadž zkušenost Mnichova hluboce zranila Benešovo já a vedla v něm ke vzniku pocitu odcizení, Beneš si velice přál spolupracovat se Sovětským svazem v naději, že se pomstí, že ukojí potřeby svého vlastního já a zúctuje s těmi, kdo byli podle jeho názoru zodpovědni za jeho ponížení. Jeho pýcha mu znemožnila, aby sám sebe viděl očima těch druhých, např. očima Sovětů a československých komunistů, pro něž byl pouze jejich maloburžoazním přísluhovačem. [...] Ačkoli jeho prosovětské názory byly již v roce 1942 v diplomatických kruzích dobře známé, Beneš vehementně popíral, že „jej Moskva má pod palcem“ a prostřednictvím Jana Masaryka sdělil britským a americkým diplomatům, že „je příliš inteligentní, než aby se stal nástrojem moskevské politiky“. [...] Byl si vědom touhy komunistů ovládnout oblast východní a střední Evropy a Balkán a také úlohy, kterou sám hrál v jejich plánech, ale s fakty nezacházel otevřeně – skrýval je. Jeho pýcha a strach z toho, že na něj zapomenou, až bude střední a východní Evropa směřovat k revoluci, mu znemožňovaly jasně nahlédnout a přiznat si, jak to doopravdy je, a odvážně čelit nebezpečí. Mít politickou moc bylo pro něho důležitější než pravda a Beneš byl ochoten obětovat pravdu na oltář své moci.“⁶⁰

Slovenský historik Jozef Mikuš po prvním ze tří vyprodaných vydání *Czechoslovakia's Role in Soviet Strategy* Kalvodovi píše: „Milý a vzácný priateľ! [...] Vaša kniha je monument osobnej odvahy, statočnosti a mravnej práce. Viete, ako ťažko je Slovákom nielen v Amerike, ale v Západnom svete odmytologizovať Masaryka a Beneša. Ja som sa o to pokúsil v knihe *Slovakia – A Political History* a najnovšie v *Slovakia and the Slovaks*, 1977. [...] Blahoželám Vám teda k tomu, čo sa dosiaľ nikomu nepodarilo. Ako historik urobili ste záslužný čin. Postavili ste sa na stanovisko univerzálnej pravdy, akú hlásame aj my. No Vaše dielo je vyššieho významu. Ono demaskuje Beneša ako agenta komunizmu, ako záškodníka celoeurópskych záujmov. [...] Vaša kniha je presvedčivým argumentom menovite proti Rade slobodného Československa a proti tým ľuďom, ktorí pod jej protekciou ešte stále majú významné pozície v rôznych tunajších inštitúciách ako je *Congressional Library*, *CIA*, *Voice of America*, atď.“⁶¹ Kalvoda odpovídá: „Milý a vážený příteli, [...] Děkuji Vám srdečně za Váš příznivý posudek

60 KALVODA, J.: *Role Československa v sovětské strategii*, s. 299 – 300.

61 Osobní archivní fond profesora Josefa Kalvody. Dopis Jozefa Mikuše Josefu Kalvodovi, 5. 2. 1978, Washington.

*o mojí knížce a za ochotu napsat o ní recenzi ve slovenštině i v angličtině. [...] Odmytologizovat Masaryka a Beneše je nesnadné. Je zde stále ještě mnoho Masarykových peněz, z nichž jsou vypláceny subvence lidem, kteří ho oslavují. Beneš je už na tom hůře, poněvadž mnoho kritik o něm už vyšlo z pera lidí, kteří mu kdysi sloužili.*⁶²

Kniha *Genese Československa* – téměř sedmisetstránkové autorovo vrcholné vědecké dílo – je patrně nepřekonatelným historiografickým zpracováním tématu vzniku Československa v roce 1918 v domácích a mezinárodněpolitických souvislostech, její význam však spočívá i v kritickém a vědecky objektivním zhodnocení (odmytologizování) činnosti prvního československého prezidenta. Přinesla Kalvodovi uznání amerických, kanadských, německých i slovenských historiků a kritiku českých „čechoslovakistů“ a „masarykovců“. Slovenští čtenáři na ní oceňovali zejména vyličení cesty Andreje Hlinky na pařížskou mírovou konferenci v roce 1919, informace o jeho uvěznění po návratu do Československa a kritiku nedodržení Pittsburské dohody (a Clevelandské dohody) ze strany T. G. Masaryka a dalších českých politiků. Jozef M. Kirschbaum Kalvodovi krátce po vydání knihy píše: „Vysokovážený pán profesor, dovoľte, aby som Vám srdečne blahoželel ku knihe *The Genesis of Czechoslovakia*. Čítal som ju s veľkým záujmom aj iné Vaše práce a články a tešil som sa, že na českej strane sa našla osobnosť, ktorá s odvahou píše pravdu a kliesni cestu k lepšiemu spolunažívaniu nielen Čechov a Slovákov, ale všetkých národov strednej Európy.” Pro Čechy z ideově protichůdného tábora byly důvodem k ostrým výpadům proti *Genesi Československa* mimo jiné i pasáže ze závěrečné kapitoly kritické vůči prvním dvěma československým prezidentům: „Přestože se Masaryk a Beneš lišili svým postojem ke světu, měli mnoho společného. Oba měli tendence zaměňovat politické iluze za realismus a střízlivost, jak dokládají Masarykův dopis Čičerinovi a Benešova víra v kouzlo Společnosti národů a jeho důvěra ve Stalina. Vnímali realitu pouze svými vlastníma očima – na sebe a události kolem nikdy nepohlíželi jinou optikou. Upadali tak do sebestřednosti a pokrytectví, uplatňující v konkrétních situacích „svatý zákon sobectví”. [...] Masaryk a Beneš věděli o strukturální slabosti Rakouska-Uherska, ale přesto se dopustili těchže chyb, když do nového státu včlenili tolik menšin. Vytvořili tak zmenšeninu Rakouska-Uherska s jeho národnostními problémy, ale bez hospodářských a vojenských předností zaniklé monarchie. Situace se zhoršila neochotou Masaryka a Beneše dát Slovákům autonomii, kterou jim slibovala

62 Tamtéž. Dopis Josefa Kalvody Jozefu Mikušovi, 25. 2. 1978, Avon.

*Pittsburská dohoda. Dvacet let po Pařížské mírové konferenci konstatoval Lloyd George, že britská delegace byla oklamána „úmyslnými podvody“⁶³ – to byl důvod, jenž byl použit k revizionismu Nevilla Chamberlaina a lorda Halifaxe během mnichovské krize. Nemesis předložila svůj účet. Od pařížské mírové konference v roce 1919 vedl řetěz událostí k Mnichovu, Teheránu, Jaltě a Postupimi, a nakonec k roku 1948 a sovětské invazi do Československa v roce 1968. Zatímco pro Masaryka a Beneše byl bolševický režim v Rusku a komunismus vůbec vnitřní věcí Ruska, historie ukázala, že to je problém evropský a světový.*⁶⁴ Stejně jako v posledním odstavci své knihy, apeloval Kalvoda i v českém a slovenském exilovém tisku, například v anketě slovenského časopisu *Horizont*: „Majúc na pamäti problémy prvej republiky a jej pád, Česi a Slováci sa musia pozerat' do budúcnosti. Je v ich záujme, aby neopakovali minulé chyby a aby spolupracovali na vytvorení federácie, či by už išlo o federáciu európsku, stredoeurópsku či česko-slovensko-poľskú. Ak malé národy v strednej Európe nechcú byť ovládané mocnejšími susedmi, musia spolupracovať vo federatívnom štáte.“⁶⁵

Josef Kalvoda se dožil pádu komunismu ve věku osmašedesáti let, svoji rodnou vlast poté několikrát navštívil, ale natrvalo se již nevrátil. Zprostředkoval však pro české čtenáře vydání svých knih a esejistických sbírek, které jsou stále významným impulsem a inspirací pro české historiky. Zemřel 8. března 1999 v Avonu ve Spojených státech amerických.⁶⁶ Jeho konzistentní postoj k česko-slovenské otázce shrnují věty z dopisu Františku Braxátorovi, v němž píše: „Na slovenskou otázku jsem nikdy názor nezměnil: Vždy jsem říkal, že chce-li někdo žádat právo na sebeur-

63 Na Pařížské mírové konferenci konané v roce 1919 podal československý zástupce Edvard Beneš několik memorand se záměrně zkreslenými informacemi, například o počtu Němců žijících v historických českých zemích. K „mnichovské“ problematice viz CHOLÍNSKÝ, J.: Mnichovská zrada, nebo pražský krach? Nečasova mise a rozpad Československa v roce 1938. In: *Obrázek libereckých farností*, roč. 7, 2009, č. 9 (Příloha) a č. 10 (Příloha).

64 KALVODA, J.: *Genese Československa*. Praha 1998, s. 447 a 462.

65 České hlasy o slovenskej otázke. Kalvoda-Brom-Hoffmann-Krempl. In: *Horizont*, 1988, júl/august.

66 Životopisná monografie o Josefu Kalvodovi: CHOLÍNSKÝ, J.: *Poutník Josef Kalvoda. Život a dílo historika a ideologa českého protikomunistického odboje v exilu*. Kladno 2002. Další informace: Osobní archivní fond profesora Josefa Kalvody v knihovně Libri prohibiti v Praze (roztřídil a inventář zhotovil Jan Cholínský); internetové stránky www.josefkalvoda.ic.cz a soukromý archiv autora tohoto textu.

čení pro sebe a svůj národ, nesmí totéž právo upírat druhým. O slovenské národní svěbytnosti jsem pochyby neměl a nikdy jsem se za „Čechoslováka“ nepovažoval.”⁶⁷

Závěr

Pro doplnění předkládaného textu, který je vyjma části o Josefu Kalvodovi zaměřen zejména na padesátá léta 20. století, je na místě ještě stručně načrtnout další vývoj exilového politického aktivismu na české a slovenské straně. RSC byla od svého vzniku nestabilní organizací a vnitřní mocenské souboje jednotlivých frakcí vedly několikrát k odstoupení skupin, které se poté zase na společnou platformu RSC vrátily. Ve druhé polovině padesátých let 20. století RSC ztratila finanční podporu Ministerstva zahraničí Spojených států amerických, což společně s její nesourodostí vedlo k útlumu její činnosti a posléze k jejímu zániku ve druhé polovině let šedesátých.⁶⁸ Ještě předtím z RSC vystoupila většina Slováků, kteří v roce 1963 založili Stálou konferenci slovenských demokratických exulantů pod vedením Jozefa Lettricha (po němž vedení převzal Martin Kvetko). Někteří čeští a slovenští představitelé bývalé Národní fronty a poté RSC vstoupili na přelomu padesátých a šedesátých let 20. století do původně krajanské Československé národní rady americké a stali se jejími funkcionáři, bývalý slovenský generál Mikuláš Ferjenčík byl dokonce jejím dlouholetým předsedou. Radikálně socialistická část českého politického exilu spojená s RSC⁶⁹ se sdružila za vedení žurnalisty Pavla Tigrida pod hlavičkou časopisu *Svědectví*, kde začala – s americkou podporou – propagovat tzv. gradualistický program založený na snaze navázat dialog s komunisty a na jeho základě liberalizovat československý totalitní režim za příslibu zachování zestátněného a centrálně řízeného hospodářství.

67 Osobní archivní fond profesora Josefa Kalvody. Dopis Josefa Kalvody Františku Braxátovi, 20. 4. 1987.

68 RSC byla i se slovenskou účastí (pod vedením Martina Kvetka) obnovena v roce 1974, ale její politický význam už byl marginální – stala se jednou z mnoha desítek českých a slovenských exilových organizací.

69 Jednalo se o představitele krajně levicového Československého zahraničního ústavu v exilu v čele s Mojmírem Povolným a krajně levicové sociální demokraty v čele s Radomírem Lužou, s nimiž spolupracovali podobně orientovaní starší představitelé Národní fronty a RSC jako např. národní socialista Hubert Ripka aj. Program *Svědectví*, tj. snahu o domluvu s komunisty rázně odmítli nejen představitelé „protikošického“ tábora, ale i někteří „košičané“ – např. předseda exilové sociální demokracie Václav Majer.

K okruhu *Svědectví* se v sedmdesátých a osmdesátých letech 20. století neformálně připojily další skupiny jako například sdružení bývalých komunistů, kteří odešli na Západ po sovětské invazi do Československa v roce 1968, vedené Jiřím Pelikánem a vystupující pod hlavičkou časopisu *Listy*. Tento okruh v českém (čechoslovakistickém) exilovém politickém aktivismu, jehož centrum se přesunulo ze Spojených států amerických do Evropy, dominoval až do pádu komunismu. Byl propojen také s československou redakcí RFE a s československým tzv. disidentským hnutím představovaným sdružením Charta 77 s převažující českou účastí.

Někteří čeští představitelé „protikošického“ tábora se v první polovině šedesátých let 20. století přidali ke spolku Sdružení československých demokratických exulantů v Chicagu.⁷⁰ Sdružení ovšem, jak o tom svědčí i jeho název, nezastávalo ve věci slovenské otázky stejný postoj jako dříve ČNV, SČDF a ČKDH. Široký ohlas v „protikošickém“ táboře měl časopis *Zpravodaj* vydávaný tímto spolkem, kam přispívali významní publicisté (ač nečlenové Sdružení) „protikošického“ ideově-politického zaměření – Bohdan Chudoba, Josef Kalvoda, Radko Klein-Jánský (pseudonym Emil Ludvík, Jan Klánský, Jan Akord), Rudolf Kopecký, Vladimír Štědrý aj. Po zániku *Zpravodaje* (1975) se v českém exilu nesocialistické a křesťanskodemokratické orientace začalo utvářet nepříliš sourodé neformální hnutí zahrnující autory a čtenářskou obec časopisů *Nedělení Hlasatel* (Chicago), *Národní politika* (Mnichov), *Nové Obzory* (St. Gallen) a *Rozmach* (Rotterdam). Jeho někteří představitelé se v sedmdesátých letech 20. století pokoušeli zformovat organizaci Světová reprezentace československého exilu (ovšem bez ohledu na stanoviska většiny exilových Slováků – viz název) a v osmdesátých letech organizaci Česká světová unie⁷¹ – obě tato uskupení však nezískala ani početnou členskou základnu ani politický

70 Na schůzi tohoto Sdružení vystoupil v prosinci 1956 slovenský „košičan“, předseda slovenské Strany Svobody a do té doby člen RSČ Jozef Dieška se silně kritickým referátem, v němž ostře kritizoval poměry v RSČ a její hlavní představitel. Mimo jiné uvedl: „Vzalo mi to plných pět let než jsem se přesvědčil, že náš čl. exil je řízený tajnou rukou socialistických spekulantů. [...] Nikdy v životě jsem neviděl víc duchovního primitivismu, myšlenkové prázdnoty, osobní zloby, mravní bezzákladnosti a politické úskočnosti jako mezi těmi, kteří měli kdysi rozhodovat o osudu národa po roce 1945 [...] Absolutní neznalost mravní podstaty marxistického komunismu, dokonalá popletenost základních politických pojmů a hlavně jejich mravní a charakterová bezohlednost budila a ještě budí ve mně hrůzu.“ Citováno podle brožury *Projev Dr. Jozefa Diešky. Časové úvahy*, Chicago 1956, č. 1.

71 Mezi zakladatele a aktivisty spojené s Českou světovou unií patřili například Libor Brom, Rudolf Kreml, Jaroslav Vrzala.

význam. Na slovenské straně došlo v roce 1960 k dohodě – podle dostupných svědectví spíše formální – mezi Slovenskou národní radou v zahraničí a Slovenským osvobozovacím výborem a k jejich sloučení do Slovenské osvobozovací rady. V období od prosince 1968 do června 1971⁷² vznikala nová zastřešující organizace Světový kongres Slováků (SKS), jejíž ustavení bylo nejvýznamnějším počinem v historii slovenského exilu po druhé světové válce. O přivedení SKS k životu se zasloužili Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Jozef M. Kirschbaum a zejména úspěšný slovenský podnikatel žijící v Kanadě Štefan B. Roman, který se stal mecenášem této organizace.⁷³ Roman byl zvolen předsedou SKS a tuto funkci zastával až do své smrti v roce 1988 (druhým předsedou byl zvolen bývalý známý hokejista, exulant Marián Šťastný). SKS reprezentující zdrcující většinu slovenských exulantů a starousedlíků rozptýlených po celém světě vyvíjel téměř po dvacet let soustavnou politickou a kulturní činnost zaměřenou na stmelení slovenské diaspory, zrovnoprávnění slovenského národa s ostatními světovými národy a zřízení svobodného demokratického státu v souladu se slovenskými historickými tradicemi.

České a slovenské exilové hnutí bylo po celých 41 let trvání komunistického režimu důležitou složkou kultury obou národů, která se nemohla v totalitním Československu přirozeně rozvíjet, jasně deklarovalo odpor proti komunismu a bylo i přes svoji ideovou a politickou rozštěpenost nejpočetnější a nejtrvalejší součástí protikomunistické rezistence obou národů. Přesto není v českých (a podle namátkového průzkumu autora ani ve slovenských) publikacích – včetně školních učebnic dějepisu – zaměřených na československé dějiny druhé poloviny 20. století jeho význam zohledněn a jeho existence bývá v lepším případě odbyta několika vesměs zavádějícími větami. Stávající zpracování tématu českou historiografií je

72 Organizační práce zakladatelů započala v prosinci 1968, první sjezd této organizace se sešel v červnu 1970 v New Yorku, k definitivnímu ustavení SKS došlo na generálním shromáždění v Torontu o rok později. KIRSCHBAUM, J. M.: Význam založenia Svetového kongresu Slovákov. In: *Slovenský povojnový exil*, s. 313 – 326.

73 Štefan B. Roman (1921 – 1988) byl mimořádnou osobností slovenského exilu, jako úspěšný velkopodnikatel spolupracoval s kanadskou vládou, jako politický aktivista získal osobně i pro SKS respekt mezi exilovými Slováky i na mezinárodní politické scéně. Byl také národohospodářským teoretikem – společně s Eugenem Löblem napsal knihu (1977) pod názvem *The Responsible Society* (Regina Ryan Books, New York 1977), která vyšla i slovensky pod názvem *Zodpovedná spoločnosť* (Světový kongres Slovákov, 1983) a jejíž závěry přijal SKS jako součást svého programu. Viz též GRÁCOVÁ, G.: Štefan Boleslav Roman (17. 4. 1921 – 23. 3. 1988). In: MARUNIAK, P. a GRÁCOVÁ, G.: *Slovenská štátnosť a slovenský povojnový exil*, Matica slovenská, Martin 2008, s. 243 – 255.

pouze dílčí, chybí monografie o významných exilových osobnostech a organizacích a přehledné zhodnocení jejich činnosti v kontextu studené války, jakož i relevantní studie o fenoménu rozhlasové stanice RFE.⁷⁴ V českých odborných textech na exilové téma se kromě toho projevuje tendence, jejímž důsledkem je opomíjení či marginalizování českých odpůrců RSC a na ni ideově navazujících skupin, jakož i odmítnutí legitimacy programu slovenského secesionistického exilu, jehož představitelé jsou s pejorativním akcentem stále označováni jako slovenští separatisté či luďácký exil.⁷⁵ A to i navzdory realitě, že krátce po pádu komunismu v Československu byl program onoho marginalizovaného a delegitimizovaného exilového tábora fakticky naplněn – namísto Československa vznikly dva demokratické (nikoli lidovědemokratické ve smyslu poválečné Národní fronty) svěbytné a do evropského sjednocovacího procesu začleněné státy, které udržují dobré sousedské vztahy.

Činnost českého i slovenského exilu tedy čeká na své podrobnější historiografické zpracování a zapracování do vyučovaných dějin. K tomu, aby se stala předmětem specializovaného výzkumu, však již jsou vytvořeny dobré výchozí podmínky. Dostupné jsou na jedné straně početné dobové archivní materiály včetně pozůstalostí exulantů či svazků provenience StB a na druhé straně jsou k dispozici publikované dílčí odborné práce, ať již mají či nemají sklon preferovat hodnotová a politická východiska některého ze znesvářených táborů. Dalším mimořádným zdrojem pro badatele jsou exilová periodika, v tomto směru je unikátním archivním

74 Přehledné byť stručné zpracování tématu v širším časovém horizontu nabízí německy psaná publikace českého exilového aktivisty (po smrti L. Prchaly a krátkém předsednictví B. Chudoby byl dlouholetým předsedou ČNV) – SLÁDEČEK, Z.: *Struktur und Programm des tschechischen und slowakischen Exils*. München 1976. Průkopnické pokusy českých historiků z druhé poloviny devadesátých let 20. století (JIRÁSEK, Z. – TRAPL, M.: *Exilová politika v letech 1948 – 1956*. Olomouc 1996; JIRÁSEK, Z.: *Československá poúnorová emigrace a počátky exilu*. Brno 1999) přináší jen dílčí a z dnešního pohledu nedostačující zpracování tématu podobně jako výše citovaná práce Karla Kaplana. Oproti tomu je k dispozici několik obsáhlých publikací zaměřených na vydavatelskou a publicistickou exilovou produkci. Za všechny alespoň mimořádná encyklopedie autorského kolektivu Libri prohibiti: FORMANOVÁ, J. – GRUNTORÁD, J. – PŘIBÁŇ, M.: *Exilová periodika. Katalog periodik českého a slovenského exilu a krajanských tisků vydávaných po roce 1945*. Praha 1999.

75 Problematika slovenského poválečného exilu je nejnověji pojednána v monografii vydané s podporou Slovenské akademie vied VONDRÁŠEK, V. – PEŠEK, J.: *Slovenský poválečný exil a jeho aktivity 1945 – 1970. Mýty a reality*. Bratislava 2012. Období po únoru 1948 zde zaujímá přibližně třetinu textu. Tato – vůči slovenskému secesionistickému resp. „protikošickému“ exilu výrazně kritická – monografie byla vydána po sepsání této studie, proto se její autor zdrží hodnotícího komentáře.

střediskem pražská knihovna Libri prohibiti, kde je shromážděna a zkompleťována většina českých a mnoho slovenských exilových titulů, ale také bezpočet monografií a sborníků. V roce 1996 se v Martině pod záštitou Matice slovenské uskutečnila konference nazvaná *Slovenský povojnový exil*⁷⁶, na níž vystoupili mnozí významní exiloví aktivisté secesionistického proudu společně se slovenskými historiky a připravili tak podklady pro další historiografické bádání. Co se týče souhrnného zpracování česko-slovenských vztahů, nejrozsáhlejší a nejaktuálnější v českém prostředí je rozsáhlá dvoudílná práce českého historika Jana Rychlíka *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století*. Přes její mimořádný přínos daný mimo jiné bohatým rozsahem zasvěceně prezentovaných informací a přehlednou chronologickou strukturou lze kriticky poukázat i na některá autorova diskutabilní tvrzení. Jako příklad zde může posloužit věta: „*Benešův postoj ve věci jednotného československého národa byl jeho soukromým názorem, který nikomu nevnucoval a který neměl na další vývoj česko-slovenských vztahů vliv.*”⁷⁷ Jako nedostatek Rychlíkovy práce se jeví také to, že problematice pouňorového exilu věnoval z více než tří set stran druhého dílu pouze dvě strany.⁷⁸ Problematikou vztahu Čechů a Slováků v pouňorovém exilu v dimenzi „košického” tábora se zabývá (a současně bezvýhradně přejímá i jeho dikci) český historik Vladimír Goněc v monografii *Česko-slovenský vztah v exilových diskusích počátkem padesátých let*.⁷⁹ Toutéž problematikou v dimenzi druhé názorové strany se zabývá zde předkládaný text, který je patrně prvním rozsáhlejším pokusem přispět k poznání česko-slovenských vztahů v „protikošickém” táboře.

Důsledné zpracování a zhodnocení intelektuálního a kulturního dědictví poválečného a pouňorového exilu včetně jeho politického aktivismu a protikomunistické rezistence může přispět k poznání procesů formujících

76 Viz výše citovaný stejnojmenný sborník z této konference.

77 RYCHLÍK, J.: *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století. Česko-slovenské vztahy 1945 – 1992*. Praha, Bratislava 1998, s. 12. Po sepsání této studie bylo publikováno druhé vydání citované dvoudílné knihy v jednom svazku (RYCHLÍK, J.: *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století. Česko-slovenské vztahy 1914 – 1992*, Praha 2012).

78 Ani ve druhém vydání Rychlíkovy monumentální práce nebyla problematika vzájemných vztahů v exilu zmíněna širěji, viz s. 557 – 558.

79 GONĚC, V.: *Česko-slovenský vztah v exilových diskusích počátkem padesátých let*. Brno 2006. Tímtež tématem a se stejnou tendencí se tento autor zabývá v jedné z kapitol své další monografie zaměřené na („košický”) exil: GONĚC, V.: *Jak se vymanit z komunismu a co po komunismu. Iniciativy pod koordinací Huberta Ripky v padesátých letech*. Brno 2010, s. 67 – 74.

českou a slovenskou společnost před únorem 1948 i po listopadu 1989. Exiloví představitelé (jakož i jejich myšlenkový odkaz) obou znesvářených proudů jsou však prozatím alespoň na české straně širší veřejnosti až na výjimky (Ferdinand Peroutka, Pavel Tigríd) prakticky neznámi. Z „protikošického“ tábora je znám Josef Kalvoda (exilový křesťanský antipod liberála Pavla Tigrída) pouze v obci historiků, kde je hodnocen převážně jako kontroverzní kritik Edvarda Beneše a Tomáše G. Masaryka. Zcela neznámi zůstali žurnalista Rudolf Kopecký, jenž je pro změnu liberálním protipólem „košického“ žurnalisty Ferdinanda Peroutky, politolog a sociolog Radko-Klein Jánský⁸⁰, žurnalista Simeon Ghelfand⁸¹ a další. To, co se v českém exilu nikdy nezdařilo – etablování stmelující a zastřešující všeobecně uznávané organizace – se na slovenské straně uskutečnilo zásluhou Štefana B. Romana. Přesto ani on, ač je nesporně velikánem slovenských dějin, není patrně slovenské veřejnosti příliš znám a to ani její mladší generaci ze školního dějepisu. Nasvědčují tomu výsledky namátkové průzkumné sondy mezi vysokoškolskými studenty oboru politologie – 90 % respondentům bylo jméno Štefan B. Roman neznámé.⁸²

Z názorů týchž respondentů na problematiku česko-slovenských vztahů a slovenské národní svébytnosti je patrné, že nejsou zatíženy emocionálními limity starších generací a jsou pozitivně ovlivněny přednostmi otevřené společnosti a akademické svobody. Ve výročích vztahujících se k Slovenskému státu 1939 – 1945, k poválečnému národněfrontovnímu

80 Radko Klein-Jánský byl v šedesátých a sedmdesátých letech 20. století v chicagském *Zpravodaji* autorem brilantních vnitropolitických a mezinárodněpolitických analýz pod pseudonymem Emil Ludvík. Po svém příchodu do exilu pracoval v Německu pro americkou zpravodajskou službu jako asistent Charlese Kateka, později působil jako profesor sociologie a mezinárodních vztahů na Maryville Univerzity v St. Louis. Po pádu komunismu se vrátil do vlasti a vyučoval sociologii náboženství a politologii na Jihočeské univerzitě v Českých Budějovicích. Podle názoru některých exilových pamětníků byl prof. Klein-Jánský jednou z nejbystřejších českých hlav v exilu.

81 Zakladatel ČKDH Simeon Ghelfand byl lingvistou, filosofem a sociologem. Po druhé světové válce působil jako školitel politiků Československé strany lidové, byl znalcem a zároveň kritikem marxismu – na toto téma vydal v Československu dvě brožury, v nichž marxismus podrobil kritice a jako alternativu propagoval sociální učení římskokatolické církve. Své úvahy na stejné téma v exilu publikoval v rozšířené verzi v knize *V předvečer druhého dne* vydané vlastním nákladem v Bruselu (tato kniha je dostupná v Knižovně samizdatové a exilové literatury Libri prohibiti v Praze).

82 Karola Sidora neznalo 80 % a Ferdinanda Ďurčanského 60 % respondentů. Dotazníkového šetření se zúčastnilo 20 studentů prvního ročníku oboru politologie Trenčianské univerzity Alexandra Dubčeka v Trenčíně, otázky formulovala a vyhodnotila Miroslava Valicek v listopadu 2011. Soukromý archiv autora tohoto článku.

Československu a ke vzniku Slovenské republiky v roce 1993 se objevuje přirozená názorová rozmanitost. Odpovědi týkající se vzniku Slovenské republiky po pádu komunismu se pohybují většinou v intencích souhlasného uznání kulturního významu slovenské samostatnosti, ale poukazují i na paralelní ekonomické ztráty. I zde se však objevily rozmanité pohledy: „Slovensko dozrelo a bolo schopné sa osamostatniť, určite to pomohlo národnému povedomiu, autonómii krajiny a pod.; Myslím, že toto obdobie bolo pre Slovenskú republiku dosť podstatné, pretože mala priestor pre ďalší rozvoj či už v ekonomike, priemysle a najmä v politike; Áno, bol to prínos, kvôli tomu, že sme sa stali samostatným štátom, no spolu s Českom by bol rozvoj pravdepodobne väčší; V danej dobe, teda v čase rozdelenia republík som sa len narodila a tak neviem, ako to fungovalo, no z počutia iných (najmä rodiny) si myslím, že rozdelenie nebolo prínosom; Myslím si, že keby táto otázka bola na ľuďoch – obyvateľoch, tak by sa ČSSR nerozdělilo, rozvoj SR však prebiehal, ale priemyselne sme ČR nedobehli“ atd.⁸³ Je jisté, že představitelé mladé generace historiků a politologů na české i slovenské straně, oproštění od dobových emocí, myšlenkových stereotypů a předsudků, budou schopni problematiku česko-slovenských vztahů a poválečného exilu ve 20. století racionálně zhodnotit. Podrobné rozpracování těchto témat se pro ně může stát i přes bezpočet nových impulsů třetího tisíciletí výzvou hodnou vážného zájmu.

Summary

The article deals with an irreconcilable politically ideological rift between the refugees coming from Czechoslovakia in the period of an absolute Communist power beginning February 25, 1948, and ending November 17, 1989. The first part of the contribution focuses on the description of two politically ideological groups that showed and proclaimed their will to fight against Communism abroad. However, these groups had very different approaches to the past, present and future: they were so different that no common strategy was possible. In both of these groups, several political parties and subgroups formed in the 1950s and also independent individuals adhered to them. In these groups there were Czechs as well as

83 Tamtéž. Citované výroky jsou odpovědi na otázku: Jaký je váš názor na rozdělení Československa a vznik samostatné České republiky a Slovenské republiky v roce 1993? Považujete toto období za přínosné v rámci rozvoje Slovenska (národní povědomí, jazyk, průmysl atd.)?

Slovaks. The content of the controversy was constituted by the four basic problems: a) acceptance or refusal of the legitimacy and attributes of the postwar (8 May 1945 – 25 February 1948) Czechoslovak state established and led by the authoritative government of the coalition of the political parties within the so-called National Front; b) acceptance or refusal of the right of self-determination for the Slovaks, i.e. the right of their own state; c) acceptance or refusal of the right of return for the so-called Sudeten Germans after the end of the war, these Germans having been expelled predominantly from the Czech lands; d) the forms of political activism towards western states and political objectives after the assumed fall of Communism. In its second and third part the text deals exclusively with the cooperation of the Czech and Slovak subgroups of the politically ideological group opposing the postwar National Front and advocating the Slovak right of self-determination in the 1950s. The cooperation of the two most prominent Czech subgroups within this group is described: The Association of the Czech Democratic Federalists and Czech Christian Democratic Movement with the strongest Slovak group - Slovak National Council Abroad. In the fourth part of the text, consistent views of the Czech representative of this politically ideological group, historian and political scientist Josef Kalvoda are characterized that concern the Czech-Slovak question during the whole period he spent in exile. The citations from his historiographic works (*Czechoslovakia's Role in Soviet Strategy*, New York 1978 and *Genesis of Czechoslovakia*, New York 1986) are presented where Kalvoda criticizes the first two Czechoslovak presidents and their approach to the solution of the ethnic problem in Czechoslovakia; also citations from the evaluation report on the situation in the Radio Free Europe broadcast and from his correspondence with Slovak emigrés are presented. Kalvodas slogan used against the approaches of the Czech centralists (so-called Czechoslovakists) belonging to the other opinion group (represented in the 1950s by the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, where representatives of the postwar National Front were grouped) read: „If a state wants independence for itself, it must never deny it to another nation.“ In the conclusion, the author refers to the shortcomings of Czech historiography in the research of the Czech and Slovak movement in exile in the second half of the 20th century. He states that notwithstanding the politically ideological rift mentioned above the Czech and Slovak movement in exile was the most numerous and most stable representative of the anticommunist resistance of Czechs and Slovaks.

Exilová činnost Františka prince Schwarzenberga (1913–1992) jako výraz snahy o udržení hodnotové kontinuity s Masarykovým Československem¹

Zdeněk HAZDRA

„Máme možnost pomáhat při budování lepšího světa a při tom zachraňovat sebe samy...“

Jeden z nejslavnějších světových spisovatelů 20. století, Graham Greene, byl očitým svědkem mrazivého únorového dění, které zasáhlo Československo v roce 1948. Z Prahy odjížděl 27. února, pouhé dva dny poté, co komunisté provedli převrat. Na ruzyňské letiště ho doprovázel spisovatel Jan Čep, který – varován přáteli, aby se do svého bytu již nevracel, neboť na něho čekají jistí „dva páni“ – velmi záhy opustil komunisty ovládanou republiku. Vypjatou situaci Greene zachytil ve své autobiografické knize nazvané *Ways of Escape* (česky pod titulem *Úniky*). Onoho dne na palubě

1 Cílem příspěvku není analyzovat veškerou činnost Františka Schwarzenberga v exilu, ale ukázat příběh člověka, který se – přestože pocházel z aristokratického prostředí – ztotožnil s prvorepublikovým Československem, přičemž právě tato identifikace ho přivedla (podobně jako celou řadu dalších příslušníků jeho generace) jak do střetu s nacistickým režimem, tak posléze s komunistickou mocí. Jeho odchod do exilu pro něho sice znamenal život mimo komunisty ovládanou vlast, současně však byl provázen snahou o udržení jisté kontinuity s odkazem Masarykova Československa a vírou v obnovení svobody a demokracie v rodné zemi. V tomto duchu se také nesly i veškeré Schwarzenbergovy aktivity v exilu. Aby bylo zřejmé, jaké bylo Schwarzenbergovo zázemí a odkud vyrůstalo jeho ideové smýšlení, obsahuje studie i pasáže o jeho životě před rokem 1948, což umožňuje lépe porozumět jeho krokům po komunistickém převratu.

takřka prázdné dakoty DC-3 na lince Praha–Řím cestoval kromě známého literáta také mladý manželský pár. Princ František Schwarzenberg se zrovna se svojí ženou Amalií vracel do Vatikánu, kde od roku 1946 působil ve funkci chargé d'affaire jako diplomatický zástupce Československa u Svatého stolce.² Greene si u manželů Schwarzenbergových všiml velkého počtu zavazadel a tudíž ho, jak ve výše jmenované knize přiznal, o několik týdnů později ani nepřekvapily zprávy ohlašující jejich odchod do exilu.³ Již během letu do „věčného města“, kdy František s Amalií byli pevně rozhodnutí opustit rodnou zem, věděli, že cesta zpět pro ně nadlouho zůstane uzavřena. Letadlo zatím přelétalo nad Svatou horou u Příbrami a František spatřil, aniž by tušil, že to je naposledy, vltavské údolí a orlické lesy – krajinu svého mládí.

Když s odstupem téměř třiceti let si vybavoval tyto chvíle, vzpomínal nejvíce na poslední rozhovory se svým přítelem, ministrem zahraničních věcí Janem Masarykem, jež se odehrávaly v době převratu. Ptal se ho, zda „nestojí zády u zdi“ a zda také neodejde za nimi do zahraničí organizovat hnutí, které by vedlo k obnově svobody a demokracie v Československu. Masaryk se podle Schwarzenberga domníval, že „*má dosud kam couvat*“. Myšlenky na 2. světovou válku, kterou prožil v relativním bezpečí britských ostrovů – kdežto za okupace se „*po vás střílelo*“, podotkl – jej vedly k rozhodnutí setrvat doma a „*zachraňovat z tátova odkazu, co se snad ještě zachránit dá*“. K lítosti Františka Schwarzenberga se, bohužel, v obou bodech mylil: „*Ani couvat, ani co zachraňovat již nemohl.*“⁴

Krátce nato zastihla Františka Schwarzenberga zpráva o Masarykově smrti, kterou dodnes obestírají nejasnosti umocňující dohady o způsobu jeho konce. Ať už se jednalo o dobrovolný odchod ze života, který měl lidi vyburcovat k odporu proti pádu do další nesvobody, ať šlo o výraz zoufalství a bezmoci z pošlapání „masarykovského“ demokratického dědictví,

2 K diplomatické dráze Františka Schwarzenberga srov. Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí ČR (dále jen A MZV), osobní spis Františka Schwarzenberga.

3 GREENE, G.: *Ways of Escape*. London 1981, s. 104 – 105; český překlad vyšel pod názvem *Úniky*. Praha 2006; na okolnosti svého odchodu z Československa osobně zavzpomínal František Schwarzenberg v rozhovoru Jana Beneše. In: *Zpravodaj. Časopis Čechů a Slováků ve Švýcarsku*, roč. 7, 1975, s. 13 – 14; srov. Schwarzenbergisches Archiv Murau (dál jen SAM), fond (dále jen f.) Pozůstalost Františka Schwarzenberga, nezpracováno, karton (dále jen k.) 23.

4 Viz rozhovor Jana Beneše s Františkem Schwarzenbergem ve *Zpravodaji* (srov. Schwarzenbergisches Archiv Murau, f. Pozůstalost Františka Schwarzenberga, nezpracováno, k. 23).

nebo dokonce o vraždu, o tom se jistě nadále povedou nekonečné diskuse. Schwarzenberg však nikdy nepochyboval o třetí z možností, tedy že jeho nejvyšší nadřízený a zároveň jemu blízký člověk neodešel ze světa dobrovolně. Masarykova smrt pro něho nebyla pouze ztrátou osobní, nýbrž odrážela někdejší politický vývoj v Československu, symbolizovala násilné přerování vazeb s dílem Janova otce, pošlapání hodnotového fundamentu, který se – při vědomí všech nedostatků – prezident snažil prvorepublikovému Československu vtisknout.

Schwarzenbergova reakce na Janovo úmrtí byla okamžitá – a v podstatě také symbolická. Téhož dne, 10. března 1948, se vzdal svého diplomatického místa⁵ a koncem roku zamířil s rodinou do USA. Ze závěru stejného roku pochází i agenturní zpráva Státní bezpečnosti, v níž Schwarzenbergovi přisuzovala značný význam od prvních chvil jeho exilové činnosti. V relaci, datované 15. prosince 1948, ho dokonce označila za potenciálního prezidenta československé emigrace a charakterizovala následujícími slovy: „*Je doktorem práv, celý život se zabýval pouze diplomacií, umí několik cizích jazyků a je to velice schopný, tedy nebezpečný člověk, který je v cizině ve vyšších kruzích velmi dobře znám.*“⁶

Četnost a rozsah mezinárodních kontaktů předznamenával již jeho urozený původ. Vřazoval ho do kosmopolitního světa evropské aristokracie, což však nic neměnilo na skutečnosti, že se současně cítil být Čechem. Pocházel ze schwarzenberské sekundogenitury,⁷ usídlené na romantickém zámku Orlík ležícím na rozhraní středních a jižních Čech, jež se zejména v průběhu 19. století značně sžila s českým prostředím. Na svět přišel na prahu Velké války, 24. března 1913 v Praze, jako druhorozený syn Karla V. a Eleonory, za svobodna hraběnky Clam-Gallas. Velmi záhy s o necelé dva roky starším bratrem Karlem,⁸ který rovněž po únoru 1948 s rodinou opustil Československo a usadil se v Rakousku, přišli o otce, když c. k. nadporučík hulánů

5 A MZV, osobní spis Františka Schwarzenberga, prohlášení o vystoupení ze státních služeb, Řím, 10. března 1948.

6 Zpráva se též zmiňuje o Františkově sourozenci Karlovi, který však podle mínění autora hlášení „zdaleka nedosahuje kvalit svého bratra“, a všimá si i spřízněnosti Schwarzenbergů s Kinskými. Srov. Archiv bezpečnostních složek (dále jen ABS), f. Odbor politického zpravodajství MV, sign. 2M: 12415.

7 Schwarzenbergové, původně stará francká rodina pánů ze Seinsheimu, jejíž kořeny leží v 12. století, se na českém území trvale usídlili v polovině 17. století (1654).

8 Karel Schwarzenberg (5. 7. 1911, Čimelice – 9. 4. 1986, Vídeň), šestý kníže orlické linie, československý podporučík v záloze, historik a heraldik, maltézský rytíř a obnovitel řádu Svatého Lazara Jeruzalémského v českých zemích.

Karel V. (1886 – 1914) krátce po vypuknutí první světové války podlehl ve Vukovaru útlavici. Sedm let po otcově smrti, v roce 1921, se Františkova matka Eleonora (1887 – 1967) provdala podruhé, tentokrát za Zdenko Radslava hraběte Kinského (1896 – 1975) z Chlumce nad Cidlinou. Nejen že se tímto spojily dvě přední šlechtické rodiny, které se hlásily k češství, ale toto Eleonořino rozhodnutí ovlivnilo i pozdější kroky obou jejích synů z prvního manželství v konfrontaci s nacistickou totalitou.

Rozpad habsburské monarchie a vznik Československé republiky znamenal pro šlechtu klíčový existenční předěl. Musela se adaptovat, zvláště mentálně, na demokratické podmínky občanské společnosti, která neuznávala její privilegované postavení. Jeden z prvních zákonů nového státu rušil šlechtické tituly, výsady z nich plynoucí a vůbec šlechtický stav jako takový.⁹ Pozemková reforma vzápětí aristokracii připravila o značný díl půdy, od níž odvozovala svoji identitu a vlastenectví, které se pojilo k zemi, nikoliv k jazyku – ten byl pro většinu aristokracie jen komunikačním prostředkem.

Přestože vztah šlechty k první Československé republice byl od okamžiku jejího zrodu zatížen řadou problematických faktorů, v průběhu meziválečného dvacetiletí se mezi zemskou šlechtou – vedle té inklinující k německu – vyprofiloval pročecky orientovaný tábor, jehož příslušníci na sebe poprvé upozornili jako sociálně-politická skupina na konci třicátých let, kdy Československo čelilo agresi nacistického Německa. Své přesvědčení postupně vyjádřili ve třech prohlášeních. V prvních dvou, ze září 1938 a z ledna 1939, se šlechta postavila za nedotknutelnost historických hranic českého státu, respektive vyslovila svoji věrnost a loajalitu zemi v nejvyšším stupni ohrožení. Ve třetím z nich se více než osmdesát šlechticů (ať už vlastním podpisem či v zastoupení jiného příslušníka rodiny) přihlásilo k českému národu a jeho jazyku, ačkoliv ne všichni signatáři byli českého původu a ne každý z podepsaných se bytostně ztotožňoval s československým státem, jeho formou a státním zřízením. Spojoval je cit a sounáležitost se zemí a jejím obyvatelstvem, s kterým po staletí sdíleli své osudy, a odpor k nacistické okupační moci. Impuls k deklaraci ze září 1938 vzešel od Františkova otčima Zdenko Radslava Kinského a text sepsal Františkův bratr Karel. Františkovi pak přináležel hlavní autorství národnostního prohlášení ze září 1939, které doručil státnímu prezidentovi Emilu Háchovi.¹⁰

9 Viz Zákon č. 61 ze dne 10. 12. 1918, jímž zrušují se šlechtictví, řády a tituly. In: *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého*. Roč. 1918, Praha 1918, s. 50.

10 K deklaracím české šlechty viz Archiv Kanceláře prezidenta republiky (dále jen A KPR), Česká šlechta – memoranda; z literatury srov. KÁRNÍK, Z: Česká národní aristokracie

Avšak ani v osudovém „mnichovském“ roce nemlčel. Vlastní „světo-názor“ vyjádřil v promoční řeči, kterou jako čerstvý absolvent Právnické fakulty Univerzity Karlovy v Praze pronesl v čase květnové mobilizace roku 1938: „[...] Dnes nejde již pouze o hájení práv jednotlivců a vyšších právních celků. Dnes jde o vzkříšení a udržení právního citu. Vždyť vidíme, že celé národy mlčí k zřejmému bezpráví. Vždyť vidíme, že svědomí světa mlčí tam, kde jde o základy všeho práva. I nejdokonalejší právní soustava pozbývá smyslu tam, kde není citu pro právo a vědomí nutnosti existence a zachování právního řádu [...] Vždyť vidíme, že čím dále tím častěji je porušována stěžejní zásada všeho práva, zásada ‚pacta sunt servanda‘, zásada zachování smluv a věrnosti k danému slovu. Kdyby tyto poměry zavládly mezi jednotlivci, pak věru nevím, kam by se řítila naše kultura, pak nevím, byl-li by ještě život snesitelným a důstojným svobodných lidí.“¹¹

V Schwarzenbergově proslovu se odrážel neklid a obavy z budoucího vývoje, současně ale obsahoval stěžejní principy, jichž se po celý život držel. Všemi jeho pozdějšími projevy, články a přednáškami – již namířenými proti komunistickému režimu v období amerického exilu – se prolínal důraz, jenž kladl na hodnoty svobody, lidské důstojnosti, právního řádu a míru, které považoval za „ústřední pojmy, společné všem lidem dobré vůle na celém světě“.¹² Vědom si nedávné historie navázal na státoprávní odkaz svých předků, kteří v 19. století usilovali o zrovnoprávnění českých zemí v rámci někdejší rakousko-uherské monarchie. Podstata onoho zápasu zůstávala nadále stejná, pouze kontext se změnil. Pro Schwarzenberga, vychovaného v podmínkách meziválečného Československa, s nímž se ztotožnil, dostával nyní boj za české státní právo novou podobu. Zatímco vlastenectví šlechty v průběhu dvacátých a třicátých let se mnohdy

ve 20. století jako sociální vrstva? Úloha První republiky ve formování národní identity české aristokracie. (Krátká úvaha). In: *Studie k sociálním dějinám*, sv. 7, Opava 2001, s. 243 – 259; HAZDRA, Z.: Ve znamení tří deklarácí. Česká šlechta v době ohrožení československého státu. In: *Dějiny a současnost*, 2009, č. 1, s. 26 – 29; HAZDRA, Z.: Mnichovské dny jako milník ve vztahu šlechty a novodobé české společnosti. In: HAZDRA, Z. – VLČEK, L. (eds.): *Mnichov 1938 a česká společnost. Sborník z mezinárodního symposia k 70. výročí mnichovské dohody*. Praha 2008, s. 37 – 51.

- 11 Státní oblastní archiv v Třeboni, f. Rodinný archiv Schwarzenbergů (sekundogenitura), k. 413, úryvek z promoční řeči Františka Schwarzenberga dne 20. 5. 1938 v Collegiu Maximu Právnické fakulty Karlovy university v Praze.
- 12 Viz SCHWARZENBERG, F.: Má to vůbec ještě nějaký smysl? In: *Věstník Československé Národní rady americké*, květen 1982, č. 320, s. 1 – 4 (srov. SAM, f. Pozůstalost Františka Schwarzenberga, nezpracováno, k. 3).

silně nacionalizovalo¹³ (ať v českém nebo německém duchu), tak i souboj o charakter české státnosti se proměnil. Stal se součástí obhajoby demokratických hodnot svobodné společnosti v konfliktu s dvěma nadvládami, užito Schwarzenbergova přirovnání: „hitlerovskou“, jež ničí tělo, a „moskevskou“, která ničí duši.¹⁴

První z nich prožil František Schwarzenberg na domácí půdě. Krátce před zřízením protektorátu měl nastoupit do diplomacie (do té doby působil u Zemského úřadu v Praze). Jelikož ale ministerstvo zahraničí nacistickou okupací pozbylo na významu, byl převeden do Kanceláře prezidenta republiky Emila Háchy. Zde však setrval jen do začátku dubna následujícího roku. Odešel na vlastní žádost, protože odmítl podepsat slib věrnosti Adolfu Hitlerovi. Navenek se stáhl do ústraní, o to více pracoval pro odboj, do něhož ho zasvěcoval bývalý Masarykův kancléř a „maffián“ z 1. světové války Přemysl Šámal. Styky v něm dále udržoval s generálem a protektorátním premiérem Aloisem Eliášem, se Zdeňkem hrabětem Bořkem-Dohalským, Arnoštem Heidrichem, Rudolfem Jílovským nebo podplukovníkem Josefem Balabánem. Podílel se na získávání a odesílání zpráv pro londýnskou odbojovou reprezentaci, pomáhal rodinám postiženým nacistickou perzekucí či hmotně zaopatřoval lidi působící v ilegality. V závěru války se ve funkci spojovacího důstojníka generála Karla Kutlvašra účastnil pražského květnového povstání. Kromě jiného

13 K problematice nacionalizace české zemské šlechty po roce 1918 srov. GLASSHEIM, E.: *Noble Nationalists. The Transformation of the Bohemian Aristocracy*. Cambridge, London 2005. Eagle Glassheim ve své práci rozdělil šlechtu českých zemí z hlediska národnosti následujícím způsobem: 73 procent jejích příslušníků se identifikovalo s němectvím, zatímco 27 procent se hlásilo k češtví. Glassheim si všímá i zajímavé spojitosti mezi polohou šlechtických majetků a národností. 83 procent těch šlechticů, kteří se považovali za Čechy, vlastnilo statky v převážně českých oblastech, 15 procent pak v jazykově smíšených nebo jak v českých, tak i německých krajích. Oproti tomu identifikace šlechty s němectvím nebyla tolik svázána s jejím usídlením v německojazyčných regionech: 53 procent německých šlechticů soustředilo své majetky hlavně v českých okresech, jen 20 procent v německých a 27 procent jak v českých, tak německých či v oboujazyčných oblastech. Srov. Tamtéž, s. 98 – 99.

14 Schwarzenbergisches Archiv Murau, f. Pozůstalost Františka Schwarzenberga, nezpracováno, k. 4, osobní poznámky Františka Schwarzenberga. Pozoruhodný je přetrvávající kladný postoj české státoprávní šlechty k Palackého politické koncepci, neboť, jak píše František Schwarzenberg, si uvědomovala „*nebezpečí německé a ruské expanse, pokud by malé středoevropské národy nebyly sdruženy ve státoprávně a národnostně spravedlivém soustátí, schopném společné obrany proti obojímu imperialismu a poskytujícím výhody velikého národohospodářského celku či „společného trhu“*“ SCHWARZENBERG, F.: *Svědectví*, 1986, č. 79, s. 703.

překládal provolání České národní rady o převzetí moci do francouzštiny a angličtiny a přečetl je v rozhlase.¹⁵

Po skončení 2. světové války se ujal diplomatického zastupování Československa u Svatého stolce. Byl hluboce věřícím katolíkem, navíc k diplomacii tíhnul od druhé poloviny třicátých let. Nastolení komunistické totality jej však přimělo zvolit si nejistou perspektivu života mimo vlast. Pokud by se přesto rozhodl domov neopustit, nepochybně by byl brzy z diplomatických služeb propuštěn a jako „třídní nepřítel“ by s jistotou mohl očekávat perzekuci celé své rodiny, ne-li přímo uvěznění.

Útočiště našel v americkém Chicagu, kde žila početná česko-slovenská komunita. Přijal zde místo profesora politických věd na Loyolově univerzitě. Přednášel především o mezinárodních vztazích a historii střední a východní Evropy. Zemím, které se ocitly mezi železnou oponou a Sovětským svazem, dokonce věnoval zvláštní seminář, v němž se mimo jiné snažil studentům trpělivě vysvětlovat, že Československo je státem s demokratickou tradicí a nikoliv pouhou sovětskou kolonií ležící neznámo kde.

Vedle univerzitní dráhy se aktivně zapojil do činnosti exilových organizací a krajanských spolků. Byl členem Rady svobodného Československa. Podílel se na založení Společnosti pro vědy a umění (SVU), jíž v letech 1972 – 1974 předsedal. Hlavní úkol SVU spočíval v propagaci české vědy a kultury ve svobodném světě. Ke kultuře měl František Schwarzenberg vždy pozitivní vztah a tato činnost mu byla velmi blízká. Ostatně mezi jeho přátele patřili světově uznávaný dirigent Rafael Kubelík nebo klavírista Rudolf Firkušný. S českým misionářem Vojtěchem Vítem z Národního svazu českých katolíků zakládal Klub „Domov“ a po celou dobu chicagského pobytu byl jeho místopředsedou. Rovněž se zasloužil o založení chicagského Velehradu, jehož se stal prvním předsedou. V neposlední řadě byl členem redakční rady týdeníku *Hlas národa*.¹⁶ Určitě k jednomu z vrcholů jeho exilových aktivit se zařadila návštěva kardinála Josefa Berana ve Spojených státech v roce 1966, během které ho doprovázel. Když Josef Beran o tři roky později zemřel, pronesl František Schwarzenberg během smuteční tryzny prorocké přání, že „[...] *nadejde doba, kdy již nikdo nevzpomene vězňitelů kardinála Berana a kdy vděčný národ bude*

15 K profesní dráze i odbojovým aktivitám Františka Schwarzenberga viz A KPR, osobní spis Františka Schwarzenberga; rovněž A MZV, osobní spis Františka Schwarzenberga.

16 Srov. životopisný medailon Františka Schwarzenberga. In: PEJSKAR, J.: *Poslední pocta. Památník na zemřelé československé exulanty v letech 1948 – 1994*. Sv. 4, 1994, s. 146 – 147.

*vzpomínat toho, který dovedl smiřovat, který dovedl jednotit a který nás všichni nevyřlovně miloval“.*¹⁷

Značné úsilí Schwarzenberg věnoval práci ve vedení Československé národní rady americké (ČSNRA), jejímž byl dlouholetým místopředsedou a předsedou jejího politického výboru. Z této pozice formuloval rezoluci, která byla přijata sjezdem ČSNRA 29. dubna 1962 v Chicagu. Hlavní úkoly Rady se měly odvíjet od snahy zachovat americkou svobodu jako předpoklad budoucího osvobození Československa a ostatních porobených národů. S ohledem na uhájení americké svobody měla Rada podporovat americkou vládu ve všech jejích aktivitách namířených proti komunismu. S tím souvisela jak podpora v úsilí o udržení a zvýšení americké brannosti, aby vojenská síla USA odpovídala velikosti vnějšího nebezpečí, tak při utužování spojeneckých pout se spřátelenými nekomunistickými národy celého světa. Rezoluce deklarovala podporu americké vládě i ve snaze o prohlubování právní rovnosti všech občanů v duchu zásad Deklarace nezávislosti a o zvyšování sociální spravedlnosti, aby se USA staly vzorem též pro jiné státy.

Status quo ve střední a východní Evropě byl pro vedení Rady nepřijatelný. Zahraniční politika USA se podle jejího mínění neměla uchýlovat ke zbytečným ústupkům vůči komunistickému bloku a americká administrativa měla mezi své cíle zahrnout i osvobození Československa. Aby se jednou takto osvobozené Československo mohlo vyvíjet v rámci sjednocující se svobodné Evropy, k tomu bylo podle zmíněné rezoluce zapotřebí:

1. Udržovat národní vědomí amerických občanů původem z předmnichovské ČSR.
2. Informovat krajskou veřejnost o nutnosti i úkolech boje za americkou i československou svobodu.
3. Získat pro tento boj jednotlivce i krajské organizace.
4. Spolupracovat s organizacemi etnickými, americkými a exulant-skými, které si vytkly obdobné cíle s ČSNRA.

17 SAM, f. Pozůstalost Františka Schwarzenberga, nezpracováno, k. 11, projev Františka Schwarzenberga na smuteční tryzně za kardinála Josefa Berana.

5. Informovat a ovlivňovat americkou veřejnost.
6. Působit na americké vládní činitele v duchu těchto zásad.¹⁸

Osud Československa František Schwarzenberg spojoval s osudem svobodného světa. „*Budoucí svoboda Československa do jisté míry závisí od toho, co a jak budeme říkat a dělat my zde ve svobodném světě,*“ shrnul úlohu československých exulantů a smysl jejich činnosti.¹⁹ Ve svých vystoupeních a publikační činnosti se obracel k nejrůznějším tématům a osobnostem spjatým s českými novodobými dějinami. Zejména reflektoval vznik Československa, mnichovské události, 15. března 1939 a vyhlášení Protektorátu Čechy a Morava, protinacistický odboj, komunistický převrat v únoru 1948 či okupaci Československa vojsky Varšavské smlouvy v srpnu 1968. Zvláště poté jeho volání po svobodě ještě zesílilo. V projevu na krajanském shromáždění v New Yorku při příležitosti 51. výročí vzniku Československa zdůraznil, že československý případ je „*přednostně všelidským problémem mravním*“.²⁰ A znovu, již poněkoliťáté ve svém životě, zopakoval své hodnotové vyznání: „*Svoboda je nedělitelná. Podupání svobody kdekoliv na světě je přímým ohrožením svobody všude tam, kde svoboda dosud stává. Aby uhájil svobodu vlastní, musí se svobodný svět postarat o obnovení svobody v Československu.*“²¹

Na rozdíl od nacistické okupace, která trvala šest let, komunistická vláda skončila až po více než čtyřiceti letech, což se rozcházel s původními očekáváními exulantů, kteří předpokládali brzký střet západního bloku s východním, porážku Sovětského svazu a tím i obnovení demokracie v Československu. S přibývajícimi roky v exilu a trváním sovětského impéria propadali mnozí marnosti. Přesto František Schwarzenberg nepřestával věřit ve smysl práce československých exulantů, ani poté, co v roce 1979 odešel na penzi a přestěhoval se z USA do rakouského Unzmarkt, kde v bývalé schwarzenberské hájovně strávil podzim svého plodného života.

18 *Věstník ČSNRA*, květen 1962, č. 100, s. 3. (srov. SAM, f. Pozůstalost Františka Schwarzenberga, nezpracováno, k. 3).

19 SAM, f. Pozůstalost Františka Schwarzenberga, nezpracováno, k. 23, rozhlasové vysílání Jožky Pejskara (Czech and Slovak K-29, 15. 11. 1969), myšlenky z projevu Františka Schwarzenberga na krajanském shromáždění v New Yorku při 51. výročí vzniku Československa, strojopis, s. 1 – 2.

20 Tamtéž.

21 Tamtéž.

I odtud své kolegy nepřestával povzbuzovat a vybízet k tomu, aby ve své činnosti neustali: „*Máme možnost pomáhat při budování lepšího světa a při tom zachraňovat sebe samy, Ameriku i svoje bratry a sestry doma ve vlasti svých předků. Máme možnost pomoci pravdě k vítězství a v tom boji nesmíme scházet a nesmíme selhat, nechceme-li se zpronevřit odkazu svých předků, který bohdá nikdy neztratíme.*“²²

Ve střetnutí demokratických idejí s komunistickou totalitou spatřoval zápas o „*hodnoty všelidské pod zorným úhlem věčnosti*“,²³ čímž se odvolával na prezidenta Masaryka, kterého si hluboce vážil a jehož odkaz mu sloužil jako posila a vítaný symbol, nad jehož významem se nejednou zamýšlel: „*[...] jméno Masaryk stále světu připomíná, že jakýsi malý národ chce žítí svobodně a že jeho synové raději umírají, než by žili v porobě. Alespoň toto vědí, a vědí to ve spojení se jménem Tomáše i Jana Masaryka,*“ napsal v jednom ze svých článků v Novém světě ve výroční den Masarykova narození 7. března 1962.²⁴ Bylo přece nezbytné, aby lidé v cizině věděli, že nejen „hrstka“ Čechoslováků, kteří z politických důvodů opustili své domovy, ale především Češi a Slováci doma, kdesi uprostřed daleké Evropy, také touží po svobodné společnosti v demokratickém státě.

Pádu komunistického režimu v Československu se nakonec František Schwarzenberg dočkal až na samém sklonku svého života. V den státního svátku 28. října 1991 mu prezident Václav Havel udělil Řád Tomáše Garrigua Masaryka za zásluhy a podporu úsilí o obnovu svobody a demokracie v Československu. Státní vyznamenání však za něho – z důvodu Františkova špatného zdravotního stavu v důsledku prodělané mozkové příhody – přebírala manželka Amalie. Za několik málo měsíců, 9. března 1992, František Schwarzenberg zemřel. Během pohřbu, který se konal v rakouském Murau, kde se nachází jedno ze schwarzenberských rodových sídel, hovořil nad jeho hrobem biskup Jaroslav Škarvada. Podle vzpomínek Amalie Schwarzenbergové vystihl charakter jejího zesnulého manžela následujícími slovy: „*Byl jsi katolík, ale nebyl jsi fanatik, byl jsi Čech, ale měl jsi tolerantní vztah k nepřátelům. A byl jsi apoštol nešťastných rozhádaných exulantů.*“²⁵

22 Viz SCHWARZENBERG, F.: Má to vůbec ještě nějaký smysl?, s. 4 (srov. SAM, f. Pozůstalost Františka Schwarzenberga, nezpracováno, k. 3).

23 Tamtéž.

24 SCHWARZENBERG, F.: Jméno Masaryk. In: *Nový svět*, 7. 3. 1962 (srov. SAM, f. Pozůstalost Františka Schwarzenberga, k. 14).

25 VOTÝPKA, V.: *Návraty české šlechty*. Praha; Litomyšl 2002, s. 68.


František Schwarzenberg nebyl jediným představitelem šlechty, který po komunistickém převratu odešel do exilu. Když koncem února 1948 opouštěl Československo, na římském letišti jej přivítal František Antonín Kinský (z Kostelce nad Orlicí), tamější zástupce Československých aerolinií. Také on se rozhodl hledat nový domov v zahraničí. Do Ameriky Schwarzenberga následovali např. Jindřich Kolowrat-Krakovský, někdejší československý vyslanec v Ankaře, nebo Max Lobkowicz, bývalý československý velvyslanec ve Velké Británii. Oba se zapojili do protinacistického odboje, avšak za oceánem již žádný z nich výrazné společensko-politické aktivity nevyvíjel (byť Jindřich Kolowrat se stal členem Rady svobodného Československa). František Schwarzenberg tak v podstatě zosobňuje jediného zástupce z exilových řad české aristokracie, který se narodil na sklonku monarchie, dozrál v ovzduší prvorepublikového Československa a hodnotový fundament demokratického státu přijal do té míry za svůj, že jej bránil jak v boji proti nacismu, tak posléze proti komunismu. Schwarzenbergův život významně určovaly momenty symbolizující československé dějiny. A nejinak tomu bylo téměř na jeho konci, když mu byl na podzim 1991 udělen Řád TGM. Opět šlo o symbolický akt, neboť svůj osud spojil s údělem státu, který Masaryk vytvořil a do jehož služeb vložil symbolický kapitál plynoucí z jeho původu. Šlechtictví a jeho hodnoty (obsažené v pojmu „služba“) tak udržel životaschopné i v podmínkách moderního světa. Smrt ho pak zastihla v roce, v jehož závěru odešlo ze světa i Československo.

Summary


František Schwarzenberg began to be engaged in public life in the second half of the 1930's when Nazi Germany pressure on the Czechoslovak state was growing. He first expressed his opinion in a graduation speech given over the May mobilization in 1938 (the same year as "Munich") and soon afterwards took part in a pro-Czech declaration by aristocrats. He spent the war years in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. At one point Schwarzenberg served in the office of President Emil Hácha, although he lasted there only until early April next year. He left at his own request because he refused to sign an oath of allegiance to Hitler. Despite in public he kept a low profile, in fact he played an active role in the resistance. In peace time he stuck with diplomacy. However, only three years after the war when the Communist totalitarian system was initiated in February 1948, Schwarzenberg elected was sent into exile.

[754] Exilová činnost Františka prince Schwarzenberga (1913–1992) jako výraz snahy o udržení hodnotové kontinuity s Masarykovým Československem

He was a professor of political science at Chicago's Loyola University, an active member of numerous exile organisations and sought to defeat Communism. He spent his last years of life in Unzmarkt, Austria, where he passed away in 1992.




Diplomat a profesor politických věd František Schwarzenberg.
(Zdroj: Schwarzenbergisches Archiv Murau)




**Diplomat a profesor politických věd František Schwarzenberg.
(Zdroj: Schwarzenbergisches Archiv Murau)**

[756]

Exilová činnost Františka prince Schwarzenberga (1913–1992) jako výraz snahy o udržení hodnotové kontinuity s Masarykovým Československem




**František Schwarzenberg coby účastník Pražského povstání (1945).
(Zdroj: Schwarzenbergisches Archiv Murau)**




V americkém exilu vystupoval František Schwarzenberg při různých výročních československých dějin.
(Zdroj: Schwarzenbergisches Archiv Murau)

[758]

Exilová činnost Františka prince Schwarzenberga (1913–1992) jako výraz snahy o udržení hodnotové kontinuity s Masarykovým Československem



František Schwarzenberg se svojí rodinou při setkání s kardinálem Josefem Beranem během jeho cesty po Spojených státech amerických (1966). (Zdroj: Schwarzenbergisches Archiv Murau)



**František Schwarzenberg se světoznámým dirigentem Rafelem Kubelíkem.
(Zdroj: Schwarzenbergisches Archiv Murau)**

The Baltic Path in American Anti-Communism: the Policy in Action (1945 – 1963)

Leo JANSONS

Introduction

The modern notion of the anti-communist state, which was developed by the leading Western powers after World War II (WWII), reached its peak in the first decades of the Cold War. Then almost every opportunity of both shaded and open criticism of the USSR's policy was used in order to discredit the socialist system and communist ideology in particular.

The examination of the American anti-communism phenomenon normally follows numerous methodological paths and covers all the spheres of the social, political and economical activities of the state and its subjects. However, most of these paths are not static and show a great deal of case changeability, and only very few could be regarded as long lasting or permanent. The so-called Baltic path, known also as the Baltic question¹, might be named as one of these rare, long-lasting anti-communism phenomena in the American political agenda.²

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- 1 Throughout this article the concept of the Baltic question (also known as the post-war (World War II) Baltic question and the Cold War Baltic question) includes following research categories: a) the genesis of the political and legal aspects of Baltic statehood after 1940; b) the formation and the social consolidation of the Baltic exiles; c) the socio-legal strengthening of the Baltic exile communities; d) the development of ideas regarding the possibilities to restore Baltic sovereignty; e) the Baltic countries as the paradox of international law; f) the Baltic trend in Cold War geopolitics, axiology, political culture and metageography.
 - 2 The post WWII Baltic question could be called long-lasting because of its formal parameters – it continued its existence all through the Cold War period and disappeared

The Baltic path in American anti-communism, based on the US policy of non-recognition of the annexation of the Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, proclaimed in July 1940 and re-affirmed after the end of WWII – highlights a long lasting process of keeping the elements of Baltic statehood alive in exile despite Soviet pressure to eliminate them as de facto illegal. De facto non-existing states with no governments in exile kept their virtually legal existence in several countries of Western Europe and the Americas by means of their diplomatic missions.³ This legal and political paradox, straightened by American ability to provide its political and social assistance to various groups of Baltic exiles, can also be interpreted as a multifunctional tool in American combat against the Communist regime and as propaganda both at home and abroad.⁴

Although the starting point of the Baltic path in American anti-communism can be dated back to 1940 or the late 1940s to early 1950s, when, under the provision of the *Displaced Persons Act of 1948*, many tens of thousands of Baltic refugees managed to get into the US and settle there, the ideological and propaganda aspects of it were coined in the next decade. During this period the Baltic States were positioned and symbolised as one the most suppressed and devastated among the captive territories/nations of Eastern Europe.⁵ These nations were not even able to keep their formal statehood as Soviet satellites like Poland, Hungary and some others post WWII, but instead were irreversibly absorbed by the USSR.⁶

only with the collapse of the classical geopolitical bipolarity of the Cold War itself.

- 3 The Baltic diplomatic mission remaining in those countries, which allowed them to continue with their work and did not annihilated their status, were the only structural elements of the statehood type characteristic to the Baltic States in the West post WWII until the restoration of their independence in 1991.
- 4 Thanks to their strong and sometimes rather aggressive anti-communist position.
- 5 As seen for instance in the The National Archives (further only TNA), Records Relating to the Baltic States, 1940–1961 (further only RRtBS), RG 59 General Records of the Department of State (further only RG 59 GRoDS), Bureau of European Affairs (further only BoEA), Country Director for Eastern Europe (further only CDfEE), Box 3 – B 22 Military Service under the US to B 900.1 FS Contributions to Baltic Investigations, Draft Statement by the Secretary before the Kersten Committee [the last draft used for the original presentation], 25 November 1953, House Committee to Investigate Incorporation of Baltic States into Soviet Union, Folder: Congressional Committee, 1953, p. 3.
- 6 Later interpreted as the de facto annexed territories. According to the necessity to clarify de facto annexations practical geographical implications in post-war Europe, as it was required for the provision of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, State Department officials created the list of de facto annexed territories/countries, with such territories/

The current research, done as the part of a complex study, explores some specific issues of the Baltic path in American anti-communism as reflected in the institutional archival sources of the 1950s. Particular accents here are put on methodological and critical explorations of the textual content of American archival documents (primary from the holdings of the Department of State), and on attempts to have a closer look at the American version of anti-communism ideology in connection with Baltic exiles as both America's partners and its hypothetical tools in the emerging worldwide struggle of the Cold War.

The construction and the teleology of the Baltic path in American anti-Communism

Among various geostrategic and propaganda-based phenomena of the post-WWII period manifesting all over the world, some stand out of the general line. Not because of their magnitude perhaps, but mostly because of the precedential significance, even uniqueness.

The so called Baltic question or “strange existence” of the Baltic States in the West after 1945⁷ might be named as political, legal and social irregularities, where the American ideological vector plays the most significant or crucial role. The construction of the post-war Baltic question and the continuity of Baltic statehood in the West is rather unthinkable without the political and practical support of the American authorities – primarily, the State and Justice Departments, as well as the American anti-Communism agenda in the practical, general lines cannot be regarded as complete without mentioning and exploring of its Baltic path.⁸

countries falling into three major categories. The first one corresponded to formerly independent states absorbed by the USSR – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, folder: Baltic General, Box 1 – Baltic General – 1940-1958 to B 717 Border Violations, Letter, H.J. L'Heureux, Chief, Visa Division, to Mr. Rudolf Flesh, 20 December, 1949, p. 2.

- 7 In fact, there can be two actual chronological reference (starting points) mentioned – a) June 1940, when the Baltic States lost their sovereign status, and b) 1945, when, according to post-war geopolitical status quo settlement in Europe, the status and belonging of the Baltic territories was never questioned and disputed.
- 8 The statement cannot be seen and interpreted as absolute, but there are still grounds to consider that American political decision to apply the principles of the Stimson doctrine to the case of the Baltic States was a main practical issue for the creation of the post-war Baltic question or the “strange existence” of the Baltic States in the West as it was experienced for more than four decades.

In a formal comparative scale the Baltic question can hardly be compared to the major renowned political, diplomatic and military tensions of the Cold War, but in precedential scale it refers directly to the few most multidimensional and complicated phenomena of the Cold War period. Moreover, this phenomenon is significant also because of its longitude nature – it stretches through all almost five decades of the Cold War geopolitical order's existence, and manifests itself in various different ways. Its significance also gains more specific outlines in connection with the timing: the phenomenon itself emerges in the period of WWII – with absorbance of the Baltic States by the USSR in June, 1940, but after the war it was not dissolved due to a brand new global geostrategic order. On the contrary, it merges rather naturally into the geopolitical and propaganda structures of the Cold War. The speculative yet rather justified statement here could be made regarding the Baltic path in American Cold War strategies – this path was constructed before the actual Cold War, but with a hypothetical vision of a possibility of the major post-war global geopolitical and ideological schism.

As mentioned before, the beginning of actual construction of the Baltic path in American anti-Communism is marked by the physical and legal annihilation of Baltic statehood in June 1940, or – to be absolutely correct – by the American response to these Soviet actions published on 23 July, 1940 in the form of the Statement of the Secretary of State Sumner Welles. In this statement he, inter alia, expresses the position of the American Government and the nation toward the above-mentioned action taken by the USSR, and sets the tone for all of the Baltic rhetoric for the following years and even decades. This document, even lacking the form and content of the classical institutional kind, became the most quoted paper regarding annihilation of Baltic statehood. And indeed, it contains the very essence (mostly political and rhetorical, but not legal) of the American declarative position.

The Statement says: “[...] *During these past few days, the devious processes where under the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic Republics – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – were to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful neighbors, have been rapidly drawing to a close [...]* The policy of this government is universally known. The people of the United States are opposed to the predatory activities no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force. They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part of

one state, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign state, however weak”⁹

It might be added that the impromptu *inter regnum* period between the Soviet action taking place in June 1940 and the American statement made available on 23 July, 1940, as far as the author is concerned, is not very well covered in American institutional documentation – just a few points of significance appear in the archival holding regarding this particular period of time.

Probably one of the most important issues here is the decision made by the American authorities regarding the monetary and golden reserves of the three Baltic States amounting to more than 15 million in the American dollar equivalence that were transferred to the several US banks before the Soviet invasion.¹⁰

The decision was made in the following manner – on 10 July (or 15, according to different sources) all the monetary and golden reserves kept in American banks in the name of the governments of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were blocked and put under the immediate authority of Division of the Alien Property, the Department of Justice.¹¹ Therefore, even before the first and the only political statement regarding the Soviets taking forceful possession of the Baltic States was aired, the American principal decision was made and realised regarding these reserves. It was later stated by the several American officials that such action was dictated

9 Quoted from: TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, folder B 890 Basic Statement, Box 3 – B 822 Military Service under the US to B 900.1 FS Contributions to Baltic Investigations Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Prepared for Congressman McCormick’s Speech, 26 October 1950), October 26, 1950, p. 1; the following legal formula (the analogue of this statement) later was used in the institutional documents of the US: “*The statement which we [the Department of State] are now using in reply to inquiries involving our position with respect to the Baltic States is as follows: The United States does not recognize the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union and continues to recognize the diplomatic representatives of the Baltic States in the United States. The United States have no diplomatic or consular officers in the Baltic States*”. In: TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, Box 3 – B 822 Military Service under the US to B 900.1 FS Contributions to Baltic Investigations, folder B 890 Basic Statement, Memorandum, Fred K. Salter/EE to Mr. Snow E/P, 14 October 1949.

10 TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, Box 8 – La 840.1 (a) Refugee Ship (Masen) to Latvia I, Folder: Latvia I., Memorandum, Investment of Blocked Baltic funds, sent by Mr. Frolich, Confidential, 19 January 1950, p. 2.

11 *Ibid.*, Interdepartmental reference, 19 January 1950, Investment of Blocked Baltic Funds, Confidential, p. 2, Folder – Latvia I, Box 8 – La 840.1 (a) Refugee Ship (Masen) to Latvia I.

by the willing to keep the financial resources for the Baltic States safe and avoid their falling into the hands of the Soviet authorities¹², which raised claims in this regard continually for several years.

This action, with its very practical determination and aim, also finds the spot within the construction of the Baltic path in American anti-Communism – mostly because it is the real political procedure of targeting Soviet claims for full recognition of the geopolitical transformation in the Baltic region in front of international society. Needless to say, there are not many examples of such real political contradiction in the first decades of the Cold War.

Starting with the Soviets' unfriendly decisions regarding the Baltic monetary and golden reserves in the US and following the single yet clearly defined political proclamation about non recognition of annihilation of the Baltic statehood, the emerging Baltic path of American anti-Communism soon fell into different levels and targeting groups. It is almost impossible to determinate the single, common line here with a strictly defined ideological axis or the center of gravity. But it is rather justifiably to state with a great deal of confidence that all the diversity of such elements might be linked to a single general teleological pattern. Namely, it follows the ideological and propaganda path based on the notion of illegality of the Soviet geopolitical claims in the Baltic and, in a much wider sense, in all of post-war Central and Eastern Europe, too.

The legal aspect here could be brought out and cited as the formal teleological essence of the Baltic path in American anti-Communism, with the peak of its ideological escalation reached in mid-1950 during the work of Kersten¹³ or *The Baltic Committee*, most formally known as *The Select Committee to Investigate the Incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the U.S.S.R.* On 27 July 1953 the House of Representatives passed a Resolution providing the creation of a Select Committee for the purpose of conducting a full and complete investigation and study of the

12 „*The funds in the United States of the Estonian and other Baltic Republics were blocked under an Executive order issued 15 July 1940. This blocking order did not give the United States title to these assets but was issued by the United States government in order to preserve the assets of the governments of the Baltic Republics and to prevent the funds coming into the possession or control of the Soviet Union.*” TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, Folder: Baltic general, Box 1 – Baltic General – 1940-1958 to B 717 Border Violations, Letter, Harold C. Vedeler to Mr. Reiert, 24 March 1954.

13 Kersten Committee – named after its chair, Congressman of Wisconsin Charles Kersten.

seizure and forceful “incorporation” of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the Soviet Union.¹⁴ The committee performed its routine activities till the second half of 1954, when the final reports on these Baltic matters were presented at the end of December. However, in late 1954 the committee’s name was changed to *The Select Committee on Communist Aggression* and its investigative authority was widened as well by means of H.Res.438. After these rearrangements, its investigative domain was meant to include all other captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe, too.

If it is possible to assume that from the real political point of view the creation of such a committee thirteen years after the actual seizure of the Baltic territories and attempts to point and stress the illegal action taken place during this seizure and beyond was on little practical merit, the expected propaganda impact of such an action was meant to be more far reaching - almost *tangible*. And in some particular aspects most likely it was. For instance, it broke the almost permanent silence in communication between the USA and the USSR regarding the faith of the Baltic States. Needless to say, such braking was full of openly hostile rhetoric from both sides, but still it initiated the bringing of the Baltic issues back to the political agenda of international society for some short, yet significant period.

Thus, being declared as legally orientated, the investigation or the Baltic-related information accumulation performed by the Kersten Committee in 1953 – 1954 was more like a processing of the eyewitness accounts regarding the action of the Soviet Union in the Baltic and regarding Baltic in 1939 – June 1940 than the classical legal investigation carried out by the authority entitled with the highest political mandate. The primarity of the anthropocentric approach soon prevailed over other purely legal or socio-legal vectors in this research.

The so called “people’s rhetoric” of the Baltic question that had its source in the declaration of Sumner Welles¹⁵ flourished and reached the

14 TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, Folder: Congressional Committee, 1953, Box 3 – B 22 Military Service under the US to B 900.1 FS Contributions to Baltic Investigations, Memorandum, V. Johnson to the Files, 4 September 1953, House Committee to Investigate Incorporation of Baltic States into Soviet Union.

15 The actual state position in his statement No. 354 issued on July 23, 1940, is expressed as from the position of the American people (nation), not the government or/and the president. The main two fragments of it involving the American people read: 1) The people of the United States are opposed to the predatory activities no matter whether they are carried out by force or by the threat of force; 2) the United States will continue to stand by these principles, because of the conviction of the American people that unless the doctrine in which these principles are inherent once again governs the

significant level of ideological maturity thanks to and during the activities of the Kersten Committee.

Perhaps one of the most significant pair of documents dealing with the anthropocentricity as the major element of the propaganda struggle with Baltic States being the bone of contention, is the statement made by the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the Kersten Committee on 30 November, 1953¹⁶ and Moscow's reply to this statement aired the next day – 1 December 1953.¹⁷

Both documents deal of course with a great portion of legal and political rhetoric arguments denouncing the hostile position and illegal action of the opponent, but at the same time, both also refer to their anthropological teleology. In reality, it means that these documents appeal not only to the needs or preferences of the political or geopolitical magnitude – they refer in quite high words to the primary vital interests of the nations, the common American and Soviet (Baltic) peoples as well. It means that two struggling documents follow the same path in construction of the propaganda or ideologically manipulative text and both utilise the same anthropological frame of the conceptual references.

J. F. Dulles' statement quoted, among others, the principles reflected in the Welles' declaration of 1940, and added some new anthropocentric patterns into his speech¹⁸, which were understood or deliberately misinterpreted by the Soviet contra part as the instigation of the American people (nation) against the USSR and its satellite regimes.

As the reply to such an accusation, which Soviets obviously found absolutely groundless, Moscow's channel gave the following comment: *“What is important is that he [J.F. Dulles – L.J.] is calling on the American people to take up a holy crusade against the free democratic countries. We*

relationship between nations. Quoted from: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Prepared for Congressman McCormick's Speech, 10-26-50), October 26, 1950, p. 1, The National Archives.

16 Draft Statement by the Secretary before the Kersten Committee, 25 November 1953, The National Archives.

17 TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDFEE, Folder: Congressional Committee, 1954, Box 3 – B 22 Military Service under the US to B 900.1 FS Contributions to Baltic Investigations, Dulles Voices Designs on Baltic Area, Moscow, In English to North America, 1 December 1953, (Commentary by Leontyev: The Statement which Dulles Made Before a House Committee Yesterday) (text), p. 2.

18 Draft Statement by the Secretary before the Kersten Committee, 25 November 1953, p. 3–4.

feel sure, however, that, unlike this, the American people want peace and friendly relations with the Soviet people. We know this and do not believe for one moment that Dulles is speaking for the American people".¹⁹

The most significant feature in this dialogue is the actual conceptual switching from the state sovereignty or even political regimes' level of discussion to the category of peoples and whole nations. These people, as every of two contra parts seemed to be convinced, were opposed to the political manipulation of their source country and presumably referred with a notable sympathy to its ideological opponent. The Soviet source expressed its faith in Americans as a peace-loving nation, who will understand and support the proclaimed efforts of the Soviet government (or people), but the American source, on its turn, called upon freedom-loving, but hardly suffering Baltic people (at that time – citizens of the USSR) as knowing that the Western countries and people are on their side and have not left them behind at the full mercy of the Soviets.

Significantly, the people in the Soviet Baltic republics were proclaimed by the US not only as the target of general ideological and propaganda interactions of the state level, but also as the receivers of direct, almost personal appeals. It manifests in various ways – primarily, in the plans of the daily radio broadcasts to the Baltic territory within the *Voice of America* and *Radio Free Europe* projects.

It is quite interesting to review the attempts of the *American-Baltic exile partnerships*, such as those of the *Baltic Desks*' organisation management to outline the possible targets of such broadcasts in the early 1950s. Among other information gathered, actual reviews of the potential, physical (technical) receivers left behind in the Baltic area after 1940 and possibly remaining operational in the early 1950s were done. In this regard, the *Baltic Desks*' management groups gave the following information about prospective situation in radio listeners/receivers area: "*In 1940, according to the head of the Tallinn Radio, who is now in this country, there were between 50 and 60 thousand paying subscribers to the Estonian Broadcasting System, which indicates a minimum of between 50 and 60 thousand radio receiving sets in the country. What part of this number might remain is unknown, but it can be safely estimated that at least 1/10 or between 5*

19 TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, Folder: Congressional Committee, 1954, Box 3 – B 22 Military Service under the US to B 900.1 FS Contributions to Baltic Investigations, Dulles Voices Designs on Baltic Area, Moscow, In English to North America, 1 December 1953, (Commentary by Leontyev: The Statement which Dulles Made Before a House Committee Yesterday) (text).

and 6 thousand radio receivers remain here in good condition, and would constitute an excellent propaganda medium for combating Communism. [...] Mr. A. Berzins, the Minister of Social Affairs and Propaganda of Latvia who was in office until the first Russian occupation, states that there were 165,000 radio subscribers in Latvia in 1940, a minimum of 165,000 radio receiving sets there. Estimating most conservatively that 9/10 of these receiving sets have been confiscated or destroyed, there still remains 16,500 to receive news and encouragements from abroad, should one wish to make use of this medium.”²⁰

Here the primary target groups also were pointed out. They were thought to cover large parts of the local Baltic societies, which were already reshaped in many parameters after “the image and the likeness” of the typical Soviet society structure in the Russian version.

These target groups were: a) agriculture workers, b) industrial workers, c) youth, d) church members, and e) intellectuals [...] and also these broadcasts might consider: 1) Communist party members and government officials, 2) soldiers, who might most likely disagree with the Soviet regime and its deeds in the Baltic and also might not like to bear arms under the Soviet command.²¹

Therefore, the Baltic path in American anti-Communism cannot be regarded only as the abstract, notional set of categories and application, functional only in relations between the US from one side and the USSR from the other – in anthropocentric discourse it gains very precise social outlines. In some aspects, it might be tended to communicate its inside and outside Baltic target auditory at the same time with the rather high level of intensity. If the inside target auditory here was meant to consist of the groups of the Baltic exiles residing in the US, the outside auditory, however, was composed of the groups of the former Baltic citizens left behind the Iron Curtain in the Baltic Soviet Republics.

20 TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, Folder: B 801.4 Consultative Panels, 1950 – 1954, Box 2 – B 800 General Political Affairs Internal to B 821 Military Service under Germany, Memorandum, Robert F. Kelley to Mr. Robert P. Joyce, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, Question of formation of National Committees by refugees from Baltic States, October 2, 1950, Secret, p. 3.

21 TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, folder: B 801.4 Consultative Panels, 1950 – 1954, Box 2 – B 800 General Political Affairs Internal to B 821 Military Service under Germany, Memorandum, Mr. Hooker S/P to Mr. Vedeler, RFE Broadcasts to the Baltic States, 24 October 1951, Secret, pp. 1 – 2.

It is also significant in some aspects that the practical anthropological dimension of the Baltic path in the American anti-Communism showed a less rebellious nature than the purely ideological and notional dimension, which deals mainly with indirect communication of the target auditory or communicates only with the highest political spheres of global bipolar ideological interactions. The actual information from American strategic political sources that pointed to the outside Baltic target groups in many aspects were much softer than some exiles sometimes might like it to be. For example, the American propaganda makers basically agreed with the Latvian [consultative] panel's rather reasonable, yet at that time also liberal, position that it is not acceptable to call upon the physical violence and premature revolt against the Soviet regime in the Baltic area. It was clearly stated that: “[...] *one of the principal aims of the broadcasts [of Radio Free Europe in Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian – L.J.] is the support and encouragement of the hope of those Balts remaining in the homelands that the future will bring a change for the better. The Latvian panel, however, was the only group which tempered this aim with the important qualification that the broadcasts should carefully avoid the incitation of the Baltic peoples to revolt prematurely against the communist authorities*”.²²

Anthropological dimensions also included such long running processes as the formation and consolidation of the Baltic exile communities in the US, and monitoring of the social situation in the Baltic area (deportations, the mistreatment of the population by the Soviet authorities, Sovietisation, collectivisation, reconstruction and transformation of the national economy both on a strategic level and a level of the common working people).

This trend in American anti-Communism manifested two edges of a single process – it refers to taking care of the faith of the Baltic people, both those driven into exile and scattered over post-war Europe, and those left in the Soviet Baltic territories behind the Iron Curtain. Of course, it is understandable that taking care of those Balts who managed to flee to Western Europe or to the French, American and British occupation zones of Germany during the very end and immediately after the war, was much easier in a practical sense – but again, it also had a bigger ideological impact and value, too.

22 TNA, RRtBS 1940 – 1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, folder: B 801.4 Consultative Panels, 1950 – 1954, Memorandum, Mr. Hooker S/P to Mr. Vedeler, RFE Broadcasts to the Baltic States, 24 October 1951, Secret, p.1.

The American authorities were able to create a favourable environment for those people to apply for permanent residence to the United States and were therefore able to affirm their goodwill and sincere efforts to support Baltic refugees who in fact faced a rather complicate situation of actual Baltic statelessness after the war. The statistic account of the Department of State read that from the adoption of the *Displaced Persons Act* in 1948 till late 1950 [September 30] 60,471 persons from the Baltic States were granted immigration visas and allowed to settle in the US as the permanent residents²³ with rights to become naturalised American citizens in future. It was also pointed out, in the analytic reports of the European refugees' statistic dynamics that the amount of the Baltic refugees allowed to move to the US under point 2 of the *Displaced Persons Act* was quite large in comparison with other national or ethnical groups coming from more numerous nations.

The report dated 31 March 1952, says that from 309,850 persons granted American immigration visas under the Act, 20% were Balts (or persons formerly residing in territories of the Baltic States).²⁴ The Baltic path here shows its purely practical discourse, which does not end with the decision to grant tens of thousands of Baltic nationals permanent resident status in the US – it also stretches far more forward and includes such aspects as regular and exclusive sociolegal protection of the Baltic nationals, involving them in political and sociopolitical activities both initiated by the exile communities themselves and the US authorities/ organisations and usage of the Baltic factor as the unified ideological entity in the propaganda polemics with the USSR on different levels.

Taking care of those Baltic people left behind in the Soviet Baltic territories was of course a much more theoretical concept than a practical one due to the impossibility of accessing the trustworthy information about the actual lives and the social and legal situations of these people, and was also related to their physical inaccessibility. Needless to say, the Soviet State was not fully accessible to any kind of foreigners (especially

23 TNA, RRtBS 1940 – 1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, folder: La 801.1 Émigré Organizations, Box 7 – La 711 (a) Jules Feldmans to La 822 Military Service under the US, Memorandum, Robert P. Joyce, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from Robert Kelley, 26. November, 1951 with enclosed copy of report "Latvian Emigrants and Their Political Groups", p. 1.

24 TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, folder: Refugees and Displaced Persons, Box 3 – B 22 Military Service under the US to B 900.1 FS Contributions to Baltic Investigations, Estimate Baltic Displaced Persons in Germany, DY/DP's file, p. 1.

those from non-Soviet satellite areas) for travelling around up to the late Cold War period, but in the late 1940s till early 1960s the Soviet Union in general could be regarded as an almost fully closed territory. At least, in regards to the Baltic region it surely was. Even the capital city of Latvian SSR (in the former Republic of Latvia), Riga was removed from the list of proscribed destination for persons from non-Soviet satellite countries only on 28 August 1957, and the first visit of American diplomatic officials (excluding the ambassador L. Thomson) to this city took place in October of the same year – more than seventeen years after the seizure of Latvia by the USSR.²⁵

Regarding the monitoring of the processes in the Baltic, one more specific aspect must be highlighted – it is the moral deprivation of the local society as the result of the forced Sovietisation, where so-called Soviet workers moral with features such as the denunciation of closest relatives or even denunciation of the parents by their minor child, took place. These specific phenomena are described in the comparative discourse in one of the letters from the diplomatic officer of the American Embassy in Paris, France to the official of the Division of the Eastern European Affairs, the Department of State, which read: *“One thing which appears to interest him [throughout this quotation – the Congressman Charles Kersten, the chair of the Kersten committee – L.J.] strongly is the use made by the Soviets of children to inform against their parents and wives to inform against their husbands. We were able to furnish him with citations to the pertinent Soviet publications. By chance we had in the unit a Soviet textbook, which is devoted to instructing Soviet children how to watch their parents and how to inform on them. He found this useful and we had long excerpts translated for him”*.²⁶

Even more, the same source reflects the possible contextual widening of this process – making a link between such a moral deprivation on the level of one individual or a few individuals from the circle of common Soviet people and the much broader constructs of the slightly different

25 TNA, RRtBS 1940 – 1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, folder: Recognition, Box 1 – Baltic General – 1940 – 1958 to B 717 Border Violations, Memorandum for the Files, Valdemar N.L. Johnson, Reported Visit of Ambassador Thompson to Riga, 29 August 1960.

26 TNA, RRtBS 1940 – 1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, Folder: Congressional Committee, 1953, Box 3 – B 22 Military Service under the US to B 900.1 FS Contributions to Baltic Investigations, Letter, Landreth M. Harrison, First Secretary of the Embassy (American Embassy in Paris) to Walworth Barbour, 31 August 1953, p. 1.

nature. Such as prospective political denunciation within the Soviet satellite regimes' top political circles and the possible danger of spreading of the "denunciation disease" within the Western societies: *"In this connection, the Slansky trials at Praha²⁷ were mentioned and the London case (wife against husband)²⁸ and the case of the young son demanding punishment if his father attracted his attention. He [throughout this quotation – the Congressman Charles Kersten, the chair of the Kersten committee – L.J.] feels that the material thereon is exactly what he wants, particularly since it covers the extension of the Soviet system to a Western satellite. Apparently he feels such material can be used effectively in the Baltic States investigation".²⁹*

It might be speculated that attempts to *map* and explore such examples of the contextual widening of the anthropological dimension in relation with so called Soviet moral deprivation phenomenon could also help the US political and strategic policy analysts to understand the prospected scales and paths of the Sovietisation impact in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic region particularly.

The Western Baltic, the Eastern Baltic and the emerging Cold War geopolitics

The ideological split between the territory and the nation, or between the nation and the ruling political regime, manifested itself rather vividly in the case of the Baltic path in terms of American anti-Communism. In fact, this aspect, among many others, might be regarded as a direct result of the bipolar geostrategic contrary of the two supreme powers. One of

27 The Slánský trial or officially known as the "Trial of anti-state conspiracy centered around Rudolf Slánský (Proces s protistátním spikleneckým centrem Rudolfa Slánského) - a show trial against members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia who were thought to have adopted the line of the maverick Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito. The trial took place on 20 November 1952. As the result of the trial, R. Slansky himself and 13 other Communist leaders or bureaucrats, 11 of them Jews, were accused of participating in a "Trotskyite-Titoite-Zionist conspiracy" and convicted: 11 were executed and three were sentenced to life imprisonment.

28 Also known as "relatives' denunciation trials" all over the Soviet satellite regimes.

29 TNA, RRtBS 1940 – 1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, Folder: Congressional Committee, 1953, Box 3 – B 22 Military Service under the US to B 900.1 FS Contributions to Baltic Investigations, Letter, Landreth M. Harrison, First Secretary of the Embassy (American Embassy in Paris) to Walworth Barbour, 31 August 1953.

these powers maintained the Baltic fragmentary statehood in the West³⁰, but the other ruled over the Baltic territories in the East and kept the sovereign power over the biggest part of the former Baltic citizens and their posterity. This logical contrary action marks another – secondary – split of the Baltic path in the American anti-communist agenda. This path therefore falls into two general yet fully separate lines – the Western and the Eastern one, where both of them have absolutely unique, in some cases even contradictory, content.

The quintessence of the American position regarding the legitimate elements of Baltic statehood deliberately and artificially preserved in the West could be described as follows: *“Following the forced incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the Soviet Union in 1940, this Government has continued to recognize and to deal with the Baltic diplomatic and consular representatives accredited by the Baltic Governments destroyed in 1940. At the same time there are no Baltic governments in exile recognized as such by the United States Government, and by any other government, so far as it is known here”*.³¹

It might be assumed that the Western version of the post-war Baltic (the Western Baltic) – everywhere in the American institutional documents consequently called Baltic States³² – was in many aspects notional, and not a real political entity itself. Even more, it was an entity with many

30 Statehood in fact was reduced until the few tens of people belonging to the Baltic diplomatic corps residing in the Western countries during the annihilation of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian sovereignty. Because they were continually proclaimed as being the only elements of the Baltic statehood, the West (and the US in particularly) is ready to deal with. See for instance formulation given in Draft Statement by the Secretary before the Kersten Committee, November 25, 1953, p. 3, which read: *“We continue to recognize these Republics [Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – L.J.] as independent States, despite their present subjection to Soviet occupation. We continue to recognize and deal with the diplomatic and consular representatives of the Baltic countries who served the last independent governments of these States, prior to the liquidation of those governments by the Soviet occupier”*.

31 TNA, RRtBS 1940 – 1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, Folder: Recognition, Box 1 – Baltic General – 1940 – 1958 to B 717 Border Violations, Letter, Richard G. Johnson to Mrs. Williams, 3 February 1955, Proposed Reply to Inquiry about Governments in Exile, p. 1.

32 As the motivation was used, the principle of the non-recognition of the Baltic annexation, according to which remained elements of the Baltic statehood – in this case, the diplomatic representatives accredited by the last legitimate governments of three states – were formally granted the all fullness of the sovereign power. And at the same time, they were the only elements of such “self-representing” statehood, not having the sovereign territory, the unity of the citizens, governmental bodies or any other “minor”

aspects in common with the classical ideological and propaganda structures created by means of direct “quotation” of the real processes, events or phenomena. Therefore the Western Baltic was a type of the geopolitical and legal particularity entitled with a status of the sovereign state by few influential members of the international society³³ – firstly, the US, but actually bearing almost none of the functions and structural elements of such magnitude.³⁴

But, what makes the situation even more complicated and special, is that these elements – no matter whether they are diplomatic missions, heads of diplomatic corps granted exclusive political mandate or the governments in exile – “[...]still had to fulfill a task which normally does not belong, or, if somehow modified, belongs to the functions of ruling. [...] This task is propaganda concerning fight for liberation of homeland”³⁵. Moreover, in case of the exile government it would be its “moral duty [...] and also the justification of its existence”.³⁶

It could be questioned, however, what was the level of interaction, if any, between the Western Baltic and the most visible anti-communist political and ideological patterns exploited in the US during the late 1940s and early 1950s, when the universally famous, widely examined and criticised phenomenon of *McCarthyism* ‘red fears’ or ‘reds under the bed’ hysteria flourished with pretension to impact not only domestic, but also foreign

sovereignty attributes that were characteristic to every independent country in the classical sense.

33 By March, 1961, the following diplomatic missions of the Baltic States existed in the US and other countries, and this system remained practically unaltered till the collapse of the USSR: a) Latvia: legation (Washington D.C.), legation (London), consulate (Montreal), consular agent (Melbourne), also consular or diplomatic representatives in Madrid, Geneva, Paris, Bonn, Hamburg, Stockholm, Brussels and The Hague; b) Lithuania: legation (Washington D.C.), Consulate General (New York, the US), consulate (Chicago), legation (London), legation (Montevideo), consulate general (Montreal), also diplomatic representatives in Paris, Rome (Holy See) and Bonn; c) Estonia: legation (London), consulate general (New York, the US), consulate (Montreal), also diplomatic representatives in Bonn and Madrid. See TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, Folder: B 811 Passports, Box 2 – B 800 General Political Affairs Internal to B 821 Military Service under Germany, Informative material, Current Status of the Baltic Missions.

34 TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, Folder: Committees for the Free, 1955 801.4, Box 2 – B 800 General Political Affairs Internal to B 821 Military Service under Germany, PERANDI, A.: *On Estonian Governments in Exile*, pp. 1 – 2.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 2

36 *Ibid.*

affairs of the world's leading democracy as well. As far as the author is concerned, only a few possible traces linking these two processes could be detected, and even they appear by means of indirect references. For instance, the famous *Communist hunting* project or the *McCarran act* (The Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 993³⁷) was meant to be subjected also to the emigres from the Soviet dominated territories that were mostly considered friendly and trustworthy – like Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian refugees. But, as it is known, the principal political battles over this document ended up with some of its sections even being ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The participation of the Baltic émigrés in *McCarthyism campaigns or public activities of such kind are currently unknown but might be an interesting subject in further explorations.*

The Eastern Baltic, in turn, was pictured and perceived as the group of people – the part of the universally divided Baltic society, almost absolutely detached from the territory and the geographical region of their actual residence. Here, the purely ideological, rather significant geostrategic paradox appears – the Soviet Baltic (Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian) SSRs were not regarded by the Westerners, particularly Americans, as the same geopolitical entity as the Baltic States of 1940.³⁸ Even more, the actual geographic region linked to the territorial entities of the formerly sovereign states were somehow excluded from the prospected set of tools regarding the assurance or description of their states' continuity.

Also, Soviet Baltic society was perceived mostly like a monotone mass of suppressed and suffering people a priori opposing any type and kind of

37 Full text of the act can be found on URL here: http://tucnak.fsv.cuni.cz/~calda/Documents/1950s/Inter_Security_50.html

38 The idea is based on the notion of the physical differences of the territories of the former Baltic States and the new made Baltic SSRs: in the office memorandum of the United States Government dated 6 August 1957, regarding BNG Gazetteer Policy for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is written that, despite the use of former national area numbers (332, 333 and 334 respectively) for Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian SSR in the new gazetteer of the USSR, the equality of the Baltic States and present SSRs cannot be proclaimed because of their territorial irregularities. In Estonia, the area of the former republic is larger than the present Estonian SSR; in Latvia, the area of the former republic is larger than the present Latvian SSR and in Lithuania, the area of the former republic is smaller than the present Lithuanian SSR. TNA, RRTBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, Folder: Foreign Relations – the US, Box 1 – Baltic General B 711 – 1940-1958 to B 717 Border Violations, Memorandum, G. Etzel Percy to Thomas A. Donovan, 6 August, 1957, BGN Gazetteer Policy toward Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, pp. 1 – 2.

Sovietisation.³⁹ Lacking statehood or any kind of real political autonomy (as seen in the reviewed documents, Soviet Baltic republics were not entitled to have their representatives at the UN as Ukrainian and Belarussian SSRs, for instance, were)⁴⁰, the Soviet Baltic societies at the same time were not directly linked to the Western Baltic and its fragmentary sovereignty. At least, to the author's knowledge, there are no incontestable documental signs in the reviewed American archival holdings, indicating such a link and, moreover, specifying its applications.

American officials and the Baltic émigré political organisations in some ways demonstrated a simplified attitude to the Eastern Balts as the prospective American anti-Communism propaganda target point⁴¹, but at the same time, they were regarded as a rather special audience, as they were located in the territory of the USSR. So, it was a prospective and captive anti-communist audience within the actual Soviet land.

It is possible to define grounds for the possible discussion whether there is a missing link or several links between the Western and the Eastern Baltic, which were geopolitically and socially divided in two alien worlds for more than four decades. The answer might be positive, of course, but it is actually a serious research challenge to unearth and reconstruct such a link or a path with maximal precision. It is possible to state that at least one such link really existed and emerged from the Western Baltic ideological and political origin, and was not initiated by US policymakers. Even more, this link lay within the level of the legal and political discussion that was unwelcome by the most influential American political circles – it related

39 As it is stated for example in Draft Statement by the Secretary before the Kersten Committee, 25 November 1953, p. 4.

40 Two Soviet SSRs out of fifteen – Belarussian SSR and Ukrainian SSR – despite their dependent political status as the integral parts of the USSR, were among the founding members of the UN and continued to have their own formal representation in this organisation throughout the Cold War period. Only in 1991, when these states gained *de iure* and *de facto* sovereignty, however, did their status in the UN become equivalent to this prescribed in the Charter of the UN and other framework documents of modern international law with comparable status.

41 There were propositions for instance to use the broadcasts of folk songs or fairy tales with participation of national heroes instead of giving wider and detailed informative insight into the actual political problems in the world (the daily broadcasts of the Radio Free Europe to the Baltic SSRs); See TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, Memorandum, Mr. Hooker S/P to Mr. Vedeler, RFE Broadcasts to the Baltic States, 24 October 1951, Secret, p. 3.

to the topic of the creation and prospective full legitimation of the Baltic governments in exile.⁴²

At least one document describing and analysing this issue uncovers the direct political continuity and legal succession of the exile government and the homeland societies left behind in the USSR. Written sometime between late 1953 and mid 1954, the paper of the Estonian exile law professor Adolf Perandi entitled *On Estonian Governments in Exile* puts these pathway references in such logical order: “*The first question should be the need for a government in exile. An exile government is not necessary for the people in exile. It also cannot “reign” over people, which means to be a ruling power to them. Concerning state power the people in exile are subordinated to the government of the state where they live. To be subordinated also to the exile government is not possible, because the state power cannot be divided. Besides that the exile government has not means to put into operation the executive power over refugees. An exile government, concerning state power, is not meant for refugees, it is for people in the homeland. So an exile government exists and is meant for the moment when it could be an executive power in homeland again*”.⁴³

It can be speculated, however, that attempts were taken by several Baltic émigré political groups and organisations to create the legitimate governments, which:

- firstly, would have a mandate of confidence from the largest part of the exile society,
- secondly, would be granted full international recognition, and,⁴⁴

42 There are many American institutional documents pointing to the actual denial of the necessity to create the exile Baltic governments in the US or elsewhere, but, what is rather significant, is that not only American institutions remain sceptical in this regard – so did some high ranking Baltic diplomats. For example, the Latvian Minister in Washington Jules Feldmans once assured that the creation of the government in exile is not necessary as such a government would “represent nothing”. But in this aspect the counter question arises whether the institution represented by him has more legitimate power or much wider immediate “representation”. See TNA, RRtBS 1940–1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, folder: B 801.4 Consultative Panels, 1950-1954, Box 2 – B 800 General Political Affairs Internal to B 821 Military Service under Germany, Memorandum for Mr. Robert P. Joyce, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, Question of formulation of National Committees by refugees from Baltic States, p. 3.

43 PERANDI, A.: *On Estonian Governments in Exile*, pp. 1 – 2 (See footnote 34).

44 *Ibid.*, p. 1

– thirdly, would claim that they were being created not for the exile ruling, but for the possessing the political power in the former ethical sovereign territory of, for instance, Lithuania, was not regarded by the American side as an idea that was suitable in the immediate post-war geopolitical situation.⁴⁵

At least a hypothetic claim could be made that such an idea somehow did not correlate with their vision of the Baltic path being not only the vector of anti-communist propaganda, but also possibly a specific dimension within the structural layout of the emerging Cold War geopolitics. This aspect of the Baltic question or the Baltic States' exile history has not been widely explored by the researchers and historians so far, but it might uncover interesting and particular elements in tailoring the so-called frontier trends in the Cold War geopolitical, geostrategic and metageographic designs.

Once the Iron Curtain was erected to divide Europe and particularly seal the Baltic from the democracy and the West⁴⁶ in the mid-1940s, nobody was about to destroy it overnight a few years later – and the territory of the former Baltic States needed to be positioned somewhere within this brand new global geostrategic system. Moreover, its conceptual functions, along with the separate functions of the Baltic exile society and legal political establishments, needed to be clearly determined as soon as possible. Yet, it actually was never done.

The Baltic path in American anti-Communism, as it might be assumed, never reached the level of the unified and clearly defined structure within the evolutioning and case changeable Cold War geostrategic and ideological agenda. But in some cases it manifested itself more or less visibly or even sharply. These aspects of manifestation mainly related to the margin or border areas of global bipolar tension, with references to the other longitude sources of possible destabilisation. One of these sources came from the rather distant areas of the world – from the colonial territories in the African continent and South Asia. The Baltic aspect was highlighted in the Cold War geopolitical and propaganda context in parity with such distant and actually alien problems. But some trends in common were pointed here – if the USSR put a lot of pressure on the Western colonial domination in Africa and Asia, calling it a predatory, exploitative

45 *Ibid.*, p. 2

46 Draft Statement by the Secretary before the Kersten Committee, 25 November 1953, p. 4.

and incompatible with modern principles of democracy the West is so enthusiastic to invoke, the West, and particularly the US – a non-colonial superpower but somehow internally inferior because of federally non-outlawed race segregation – pointed at the Baltic problem with the same rhetoric.⁴⁷ Therefore the Baltic path gains an extra outer dimension that could be branded as anti-colonial.

Although the documents uncovering the Baltic path in American anti-Communism in the practical teleological discourse are not quite as numerous and thematically diverse, some of them are more significant than others. As an eloquent example here is how the untitled and unsigned informative note, containing only five questions regarding the Baltic path and the possible Cold War tension going hot, could be presented.

The four out of five immediate questions, related directly to the Baltic path without national specifications are:

- 1.) Does the Department of State consider it possible that each of the Baltic [...] emigrations be united for the purpose of supporting Cold War activities against the Soviet regime?
- 2.) What would the attitude of the Department be toward the unified organisations of the respective Baltic émigré groups during the Cold War period and immediately upon the outbreak of hostility with the USSR?
- 3.) Would the Department recognise such united organisations as governments in exile upon the outbreak of hostility with the USSR?
- 4.) Would recognition of such organisations as the governments in exile be dependent upon support of such organisations by their respective accredited national diplomatic and consular representatives?⁴⁸

47 See for instance TNA, RRtBS 1940 – 1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, folder: United Nations, deportations, Box 1 – Baltic General – 1940-1958 to B 717 Border Violations, Draft letter regarding the UN matters to Senator Kuchel. Letter, EE to Senator Kuchel, 12 November 1960.

48 TNA, RRtBS 1940 – 1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDfEE, folder: B 801 Political affairs, external, Box 2 – B 800 General Political Affairs Internal to B 821 Military Service under Germany, Untitled informative note, January 1953, Secret, Security Information.

If even there was no evidence that the written reply to this questionnaire is ever given (at least nothing of that kind is found in the same documental holding and a few other thematically related to it so far), it is possible to state with a great deal of confidence that the defragmented Cold War discourse of the American policy involving the Baltic path in late 1940s and early 1950s was about getting another line of development and level of consolidation in case of direct military conflict between two global superpowers.

The use of Baltic statelessness as Cold War fighting propaganda imperative by the US never actually took place – the utilisation of this specific geopolitical, legal and ideological concept was more considered by the Baltic émigrés themselves as the part of the American supported national fighting propaganda for liberation of the homelands.⁴⁹

However, if looking at the Cold War as the phenomenon referable to particular geopolitical grouping of the states/nations, where the factor of the territory not always might be considered as the crucial one, the Baltic States (the Western Baltic presumably) were officially placed within the category belonging to the Free World, and therefore have nothing in common with the Communist Block, Soviet de facto territory and its ideological allies.⁵⁰

Conclusive remarks

During the entire period of the Cold War – until the collapse of the Soviet Union and everything that goes with it (all of the bipolar aligned post-WWII global geopolitical systems), the Baltic path in American anti-Communism remained a valid yet not always very visible ideological line.

It overcame gradual content and manifestations-related changes in a period lasting more than forty five years, but actually never gained the

49 PERANDI, A.: *On Estonian Governments in Exile*, p. 4.

50 There are documents in the archival holdings that give a full list of so-called countries of the Free World, for instance, the invitation of the Acting Secretary of State to all countries of the Free World to participate in the First International Instrument Congress and Exposition to be held in Philadelphia, from 13 to 25 September 1954, followed by list of these countries (where all three Baltic States are included). TNA, RRtBS 1940 – 1961, RG 59 GRoDS, BoEA, CDFEE, Folder: Recognition, Box 1 – Baltic General – 1940 – 1958 to B 717 Border Violations Secretary of State to Their Excellences and Messieurs the Chefs of the Missions of the Governments named on the enclosed list, p. 1.

more or less complete outlines within the overall designs of American ideological and political fighting propaganda.

It might be speculated that the Baltic path always remains a bit deconstructed, fragmented and, in general, incomplete. Having legitimate links with several significant aspects of the Cold War interactions and the changeable American anti-Communism line, this concept has always kept its internal uncertainty. Lacking the organising axis or the core for sovereign construction of the Baltic path in global anti-Communism as such, the Baltic émigrés as the different social, political and ideological groups pointed their activities in different directions within American anti-Communism's ideological domain.

Still, as the reviewed institutional sources show, such activities did not always lead to desirable results. If in terms of purely ideological discourse it did succeed in highlighting the Baltic problem, both as the sovereign phenomenon or the part of the larger sources of ideological/political tension, in a practical sense, however, all the efforts faced the irreversible geopolitical order where the physical entities of the former Baltic States appeared to be detached from their conceptual entities. As such, they were not validated as the real political targets in construction of the Baltic path in American anti-Communism for at least the first two post-war decades. But, as indicated before, there are at least a few lines of documental research that could be successfully followed and explored in order to reconstruct a more complete, detailed and diverse image of the Baltic path both within and without the American anti-Communism agenda.

Resumé

Príspevok sa venuje špecifickému bodu politického a právneho programu amerického antikomunizmu počas prvých dvadsiatich rokov po 2. svetovej vojne – (znovu)vybudovaniu a podpore tzv. baltickej štátnosti na Západe napriek objektívnej situácii, ktorá neposkytovala žiadne právne ani politicky udržateľné dôvody, prečo takýto štát po anihilácii Estónska, Lotyšska a Litvy v júni 1940 udržiavať.

Autor sa však pokúša sústrediť niekoľko dôležitých prvkov Západom vytvorenej baltickej štátnosti, ktorú možno po prvé spojiť s osobitosťou amerického štátneho antikomunizmu, a až po druhé ju možno považovať za pokus poskytnúť humanitárnu pomoc zotročeným baltickým národom a udržať posledné prvky baltickej štátnosti po anexii území týchto troch štátov nažive. Pretože baltická cesta zapadá v samotnom

americkom antikomunizme do dvoch všeobecných línií: štátnej a neštátnej. Aktuálny výskum naznačuje iba niekoľko hlavných aspektov, ktoré sa zaoberajú tou štátnou líniou alebo (znovu)vybudovaním a podporou tzv. baltickej štátnosti v USA v uvedenom čase. Tento príspevok plne vychádza z interpretácií informácií získaných zo zdrojov amerických inštitúcií a dokumentov z Ministerstva zahraničných vecí (Department of State), ktoré tvorili jadro výskumu.

The Radicalization of the Croatian Émigré Community in West Germany, 1955 – 1970

Christopher A. MOLNAR

At the end of World War II there were millions of Eastern European displaced persons (DPs) on German soil, most of whom had been forced laborers in the Third Reich. Allied forces and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration organized the voluntary repatriation of the vast majority of DPs and the International Refugee Organization arranged for the resettlement abroad of over one million remaining DPs between 1947 and 1951.¹ This left, by the summer of 1952, a so-called hard core of about 170,000 Eastern European DPs in West Germany. Every country in Eastern Europe was represented in this hard core, with Poles making up the largest group and Yugoslavs, primarily Croats, the second largest.² Virtually all of the remaining DPs were anticommunists, and each

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- 1 Important studies of this phase of the DP problem include JACOBMEYER, W.: *Vom Zwangsarbeiter zum Heimatlosen Ausländer: Die Displaced Persons in Westdeutschland, 1945 – 1951*. Göttingen 1985; WYMAN, M.: *DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1941 – 1945*. Ithaca 1998; COHEN, G. D.: *In War's Wake: Europe's Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order*. New York 2011; see also REINISCH, J. –WHITE, E. (eds.): *The Disentanglement of Populations: Migration, Expulsion and Displacement in Postwar Europe*. New York 2011. It should be noted that Russian DPs were forcibly repatriated to Russia, see MARRUS, M. R.: *European Refugees from the First World War through the Cold War*. Oxford 1985, pp. 313 – 317. There is also a large body of scholarship on Jewish DPs in postwar Germany. Important recent works include GROSSMANN, A.: *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany*. Princeton 2007; GELLER, J. H.: *Jews in Post-Holocaust Germany, 1945 – 1953*. Cambridge 2005.
 - 2 Bundesminister für Vertriebene: *Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, Kriegsgefangene, heimatlose Ausländer: 1949 – 1952*. Bonn 1953, p. 10.

national group founded numerous political organizations on West German soil that were dedicated to the destruction of the communist regimes in their Eastern European homelands.³ But by the late 1960s, with members having grown older and the policy of *détente* making the West unwilling to confront the communist East, most of these political organizations went into decline. There was one exception. Out of all of the Eastern European émigrés in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Croats proved to be the most radical, and the most inclined to use violence to achieve their goal: the destruction of communist Yugoslavia and the recreation of an independent Croatian state. Moreover, they remained active through the 1970s and 1980s when every other Eastern European émigré group had drifted into numerical and political insignificance.⁴

What accounts for the radical character of the Croatian émigré community in the FRG? I argue that the encounter between the older generation of Croatian émigrés who settled in Germany in the immediate aftermath of World War II and the younger Croatian immigrants who began arriving in the FRG in the mid-1950s explains both the violent nature and staying power of the Croatian émigré community in West Germany. Mate Tokić has also located the radicalization of the Croatian emigration in the encounter between postwar émigrés and younger Croatian immigrants, but whereas he suggests that the diasporic and transnational character of the Croatian émigré community – dispersed as it was throughout the world after World War II – fostered radicalization, my analysis emphasizes the importance of local context, in this case West Germany.⁵

Located geographically and politically at the front lines of the Cold War, and with nationalism discredited because of the horrors of the Third Reich, anticommunism, according to Eric Weitz, “*provided the integrating*

3 For a recent study of Polish, Ukrainian, Russian, and Jewish DPs in West Germany up to the early 1950s, see HOLLAN, A.: *Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism: Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany*. Ann Arbor 2011.

4 On the general decline of the Eastern European émigrés in the late 1960s, and Croats’ continuing radical activism, see Bundesministerium des Innern: *Erfahrungsbericht über die Beobachtungen der Ämter für Verfassungsschutz im Jahre 1968*. Bonn 1969, pp. 39 – 40; Bundesminister des Innern: *Verfassungsschutz 1969/1970*. Bonn 1971, pp. 54 – 55 and 61; Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern: *Verfassungsschutz Bayern – 1980*. Munich 1981, pp. 134 – 136. On the use of violence by Croatian émigrés based in the FRG, see TOKIĆ, M. N.: Landscapes of Conflict: Unity and Disunity in post-Second World War Croatian Émigré Separatism. In: *European Review of History*, Vol. 16, 2009, No. 5, pp. 739 – 753.

5 TOKIĆ, M. N.: Landscapes of Conflict, pp. 740 and 743 – 748.

ideology of the Federal Republic”, at least until the mid-1960s.⁶ The anti-communist consensus in the young Federal Republic had two important consequences for the Croatian émigré community. First, it created a political environment in which foreign anticommunist groups, often seen as allies in the struggle against world communism, could flourish.⁷ Second, it contributed to the construction of a distinctive Yugoslav-West German migration regime that allowed Croatian émigrés – many of whom were still committed to the ideology of the fascist Ustaša movement – to exert a powerful and radicalizing influence upon the young Croats who began arriving in West Germany as labor migrants and asylum seekers in the mid-1950s. I will focus here on the Yugoslav-West German migration regime and its effect on the Croatian émigré community.

By the mid-1950s West Germany’s economy was growing at a remarkable rate and regional labor shortages had begun to appear. In order to guarantee a supply of labor for German employers, the government concluded a labor recruitment treaty with Italy in December 1955 and similar agreements with a handful of other countries by the mid-1960s.⁸ Despite an insatiable demand for foreign labor, the FRG was unwilling to conclude a labor recruitment treaty with Yugoslavia. In 1957, when Yugoslavia became the first state outside of the Sino-Soviet bloc to extend diplomatic recognition to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the FRG, following the dictates of the Hallstein Doctrine, immediately broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.⁹ If the FRG reached a labor recruitment

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- 6 WEITZ, E.: The Ever-Present Other: Communism and the Making of West Germany. In: SCHISSLER, H. (ed.): *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949 – 1968*. Princeton 2001, p. 229; see also MAJOR, P.: *The Death of the KPD: Communism and Anti-Communism in West Germany, 1945 – 1956*. Oxford 1997, pp. 259 – 261.
- 7 This is the subject of the first chapter of my dissertation, tentatively entitled *Nation, Migration, and Cold War: Yugoslavs in Germany, 1945 – 2000*. On this subject see also SHONICK, K.: *Émigrés, Guest Workers, and Refugees: Yugoslav Migrants in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945 – 1995*. PhD dissertation, University of Washington 2008, Chapter one; and CLARKSON, A.: *‘Who is My Neighbour?’ Immigrant Politics and Cold War Conflict in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945 – 1975*. PhD dissertation, University of Oxford 2007, Chapter two.
- 8 HERBERT, U. – HUNN, K.: Guestworkers and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic: From the Beginning of Recruitment in 1955 until its Halt in 1973. In: SCHISSLER, H. (ed.): *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949 – 1968*. Princeton 2001, pp. 188 – 190.
- 9 ANIČ DE OSANA, M.: *Die erste Anerkennung der DDR: Der Bruch der deutsch-jugoslawischen Beziehungen 1957*. Baden-Baden 1990.

agreement with Yugoslavia, the deterrent effect of the Hallstein Doctrine would be weakened, and other states might be encouraged to recognize the GDR. From the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, the Labor, Interior, and Foreign Ministries therefore rejected “*as a matter of principle*” the large-scale recruitment of Yugoslav laborers “*because of the break in diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia*.”¹⁰ Cold War foreign policy was not the only reason that the FRG hesitated to sign a labor recruitment treaty with Yugoslavia. The anticommunism that pervaded West German society and politics until the mid-1960s made German officials wary of allowing large-scale migration from a communist country. In an effort to avoid “*communist infiltration*”, Ministry of Labor officials attempted to bar all immigration from Yugoslavia in 1955.¹¹ This ban was never implemented, but West German officials, fearing that the Yugoslav government would infiltrate communist agents into the FRG, repeatedly sought to restrict immigration from Yugoslavia.¹² West Germany would not sign a labor recruitment treaty with Yugoslavia until 1968, when it sought to show, in the spirit of *détente*, that the Cold War conflict could be overcome.¹³ By the

10 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt (further only PA AA), sign. B 42 / 138, Claussen (BMA) to AA, Betr.: In der Bundesrepublik beschäftigte Arbeitnehmer aus Jugoslawien und den europäischen Satellitenstaaten aus der UdSSR, 5 January, 1962, p. 3

11 Treck aus Titos Land. In: *Der Spiegel*, 27 December, 1961, p. 21.

12 See, for example, PA AA, sign. B 85 / 641, Referat 705 an das Referat 505, Betr.: Gastarbeiter aus Jugoslawien und den europäischen Satellitenstaaten der SU, 4 December, 1961; and PA AA, sign. B 85 / 641, Meyer-Lindenberg an die Abteilung 7, Betr.: Bitte um Mitzeichnung der dortigen Aufzeichnung über Zwischenfall in der Liederhalle in Stuttgart am 25. November 1961 anlässlich einer jugoslawischen Veranstaltung, 13 December, 1961, p. 2.

13 On the lengthy negotiations leading up to the labor recruitment treaty, and particularly on the foreign policy considerations that shaped the negotiations, see NOVINŠČAK, K.: The Recruiting and Sending of Yugoslav ‘Gastarbeiter’ to Germany: Between Socialist Demands and Economic Needs. In: BRUNNBAUER, U. (ed.): *Transnational Societies, Transterritorial Politics: Migrations in the (Post-) Yugoslav Region, 19th – 21st Century*. Munich 2009, pp. 121 – 143; SHONICK, K.: Politics, Culture, and Economics: Reassessing the West German Guest Worker Agreement with Yugoslavia. In: *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 44, 2009, No. 4, pp. 719 – 736; HADŽIĆ, S.: Titos ‘Gastarbeiter.’ Hintergründe und Ursachen des Anwerbeabkommens zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Jugoslawien. In: NEUTATZ, D. – ZIMMERMANN V. (eds.): *Die Deutschen und das östliche Europa: Aspekte einer vielfältigen Beziehungsgeschicht*. Essen 2006, pp. 103 – 114; KNORTZ, H.: *Diplomatische Tauschgeschäfte: “Gastarbeiter” in der westdeutschen Diplomatie und Beschäftigungspolitik, 1953-1973*. Cologne 2008, pp. 140 – 152.

time the treaty went into effect in early 1969, however, more than 148,000 Yugoslavs were already employed in the FRG.¹⁴

Unable to benefit from a formal recruitment agreement, Croats, who represented the largest group of immigrants from Yugoslavia during this era, arrived through a variety of legal, semi-legal, and illegal pathways that were generally complex and time-consuming and opened them up to exploitation by German employers and immigrant smugglers.¹⁵ Immigrants from states with which the FRG had labor recruitment treaties were provided with organized transport to the FRG, guaranteed housing, and assistance with bureaucratic hurdles such as applying for residency and employment permits. German authorities enrolled private welfare organizations such as *Caritas* and *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* to minister to the guest workers' needs. These organizations often hired individuals from the immigrant-sending states so that, for example, an Italian guest worker could seek help from an Italian social worker employed by a German welfare organization. Moreover, government representatives from the major immigrant-sending states could pressure the FRG to improve their citizens' legal status and living conditions in West Germany.¹⁶ Because the FRG and Yugoslavia had neither a labor recruitment treaty nor diplomatic relations, Croats received few of these benefits, particularly if they entered the FRG illegally. Who did Croats turn to to help them secure jobs and housing, and, more generally, to help them find their way in a confusing foreign land? Many of them turned to the Croatian émigrés who had established themselves in West Germany in the aftermath of World War II.

The émigrés provided essential support to many of the newly arrived Croats, often with the encouragement and blessing of German officials. Utilizing his connections with German employers, the Catholic Church hierarchy, sympathetic German officials, and German expellees from

14 HABERL, O. N.: *Die Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften aus Jugoslawien: Zur Problematik ihrer Auslandsbeschäftigung und Rückführung*. Munich 1978, p. 276.

15 BAUČIĆ, I.: *Porijeklo i struktura radnika iz Jugoslavije u SR Njemačkoj*. Zagreb 1970, p. 103; also see the map between pages 176 – 177 in BAUČIĆ, I.: *Die Auswirkung der Arbeitskräftewanderung in Jugoslawien*. In: LOHRMANN, R. – MANFRASS, K. (eds.): *Ausländerbeschäftigung und international Politik: Zur Analyse transnationaler Sozialprozesse*. Munich 1974; the area of heavy emigration from southwestern Bosnia-Herzegovina was a predominantly Croatian region.

16 SCHÖNWÄLDER, K.: *Assigning the State its Rightful Place? Migration, Integration and the State in Germany*. In: LUCASSEN, L. – FELDMAN, D. – OLTMER, J. (eds): *Paths of Integration: Migrants in Western Europe (1880 – 2004)*. Amsterdam 2006, p. 85.

Eastern Europe, the Croatian Ustaša priest Krunoslav Draganović—the same priest who created and operated the ratline¹⁷ that allowed thousands of Croatian and German war criminals to flee Europe and avoid prosecution—paved the way for thousands of young Croats to enter the FRG from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s.¹⁸ Draganović was not alone in his efforts to bring Croats to the FRG. Branimir Jelić, a cofounder of the Ustaša movement in interwar Yugoslavia and the head of the revanchist Croatian National Committee (HNO – *Hrvatski Narodni Odbor*) in West Germany, used his contacts with German officials to convince them that they should allow more Croats, particularly those in refugee camps in Italy and Austria, to immigrate to the Federal Republic.¹⁹ In 1958 the Ministry for Expellee Affairs, always a staunch supporter of Croatian émigrés and their anticommunist cause, decided to enlist Jelić's HNO to help provide support services for newly arriving Croatian refugees.²⁰ The ministry funded the HNO's work among Croatian refugees, which included assisting with finding jobs and gaining legal protection, and organizing cultural activities, undoubtedly of a Croatian nationalist character.²¹ Croatian émigrés also had strong alliances with leaders of the

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- 17 For accounts of the role of Croatian priests, and particularly Draganović, in the Ratlines, see PHAYER, M.: *Pius XII, the Holocaust, and the Cold War*. Bloomington 2008, pp. 220 – 251; GONI, U.: *The Real Odessa: Smuggling the Nazis to Perón's Argentina*. New York 2002, pp. 200 – 228; and AARONS, M. – LOFTUS, J.: *Unholy Trinity: The Vatican, the Nazis, and the Swiss Banks*. New York 1998, pp. 70 – 139. Aarons and Loftus must be taken with a grain of salt. Their study is a popular and sensationalistic account, but their findings regarding the Croatian-run ratlines are mostly confirmed by Phayer and Goñi.
- 18 PA AA, sign. B 12 / 561, p. 19, Büro für heimatvertriebene Ausländer an das Auswärtige Amt, Betr.: Die kroatische politische Emigration in Westdeutschland, 18 September, 1959; Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv / Sudetendeutschen Archiv (further only BHStA / SdA), Draganovic to Berger, 10 December, 1960, p. 3; and Lodgman to Draganović, Betr.: Arbeitsmöglichkeit für eine Gruppe kroatische Emigranten, 30 July, 1956, Sprecherregistratur Lodgman v. Auen / 901.
- 19 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (further only BAK), sign. B 106 / 45244, Käfferbitz (BMA) to Jelic, Betr.: Hereinnahme von kroatischen Flüchtlingen aus Aufnahmelagern in Italien für eine Beschäftigung in der Bundesrepublik, 1 February, 1963, pp. 1 – 2.
- 20 Vermerk; PA AA, sign. B 85 / 259, Betr.: Kroatische Emigration, 24 July, 1958, p. 1. The Foreign Ministry informed the BMVt that any cooperation with émigré organizations was a foreign affairs issue and that that it therefore had to be consulted, but it had no objections to BMVt cooperation with the HNO.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 2; BAK, sign. B 106 / 25097, Aufstellung über die den heimatlosen Ausländern in den Jahren 1955 – 1959 gewährten Bundesbeihilfen aus Tit. 603, Januar 1960, pp. 1, 3; BAK, B 106 / 25098, Aufstellung über Beihilfen im Rechnungsjahr 1963 aus Kapital 2602,

Catholic Church in Germany, and they mobilized these connections to bring more Croats into the FRG.²²

The influx of Croatian immigrants beginning in the mid-1950s led to a furious competition among Croatian émigré organizations, as they all wanted to recruit new arrivals and to exert influence over the Croatian community in West Germany. A German intelligence report from 1956 claimed that “*the battle between the three main groups in Europe (the Croatian National Committee, the ‘Pavelić-Ustaša,’ and the Croatian Peasant Party) is now based primarily upon the recruitment of new refugees.*”²³ The HNO had a distinct advantage in this competition because of its members’ extensive connections with German government officials and the Catholic Church. The HNO also controlled *Caritas Croata*, the Catholic charity that aided Croats throughout the world and was especially active among Croats in refugee camps in Italy, Austria, and West Germany.²⁴ These advantages made the HNO the early winner of the competition to gain adherents among the newly arriving Croatian immigrants. But Pavelić, who was closely monitoring developments in West Germany from Argentina, decided in 1956 to make a major push to strengthen the German wing of his organization, the United Croats of West Germany (UHNj – *Ujedinjeni Hrvati Njemačke*), in order to benefit from the surge of Croatian immigrants.²⁵ Unlike the HNO, the UHNj did not possess high-level connections with German officials, but it was still able to provide residency permits and jobs for young Croats, with the stipulation that those who they brought to the FRG had to join the organization.²⁶

Titel 603 an Volksgruppen, überationale Verbände und Kirchengruppen, (undated, but likely from 1963).

22 See, for example, BAK, sign. B 106 / 45244, Niemeyer, Aufzeichnung; Betr.: Aufnahme kroatischer Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik, 7 February, 1962; Niemeyer, Katholisches Büro Bonn, Kommissariat der Deutschen Bischöfe, to Schäfer (BMI), Aufzeichnung; Betreff: Aufnahme kroatischer Flüchtlinge in die Bundesrepublik, November 5, 1962; Breull and Schäfer, Betr.: Aufnahme kroatische Flüchtlinge im Bundesgebiet, 26 October, 1962.

23 PA AA, sign. B 12 / 561, Botschaft der BDR, Belgrad, to AA, Betr.: Auseinandersetzungen in der kroatischen Emigration, June 28, 1956, pp. 1 – 2.

24 PA AA, sign. B 12 / 561, Studiengruppe Südost report to AA, Aus der kroatischen Emigration, Mai-Juni 1956, 10 July, 1956, p. 5.

25 *Ibid.*, pp. 4 – 5.

26 PA AA, sign. B 42 / 98, Studiengruppe Südost Report: Die kroatische Exil-Ustaschen, 1 December, 1961, p. 5.

Because they could provide residency permits and jobs, along with other forms of support, Croatian émigrés were in a position to exert significant political influence over Croats who arrived in the FRG during this era, especially since the Yugoslav government and its representatives had virtually no official presence or influence in the Federal Republic. The Croats who settled in the FRG during this period tended to be very young, poor, relatively uneducated, and, compared to the émigrés, less politically developed. As Tokić has noted, they “*could not have been better suited for recruitment into the radical Croatian separatist movement.*”²⁷ It appears, however, that most of the Croats who arrived in the FRG between the mid-1950s and the late 1960s were primarily interested not in politics, but in taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the West German economic miracle. Nonetheless, Croatian émigrés’ efforts to gain recruits were not made in vain. They did win supporters among the new arrivals, some of whom were undoubtedly anticommunists and Croatian nationalists even before encountering the émigrés.²⁸ Their recruitment efforts were particularly successful in the refugee camps Valka and Zirndorf, both in the suburbs of Nuremberg, where the émigrés had maintained a strong organizational presence since the early 1950s.²⁹ When Croatian asylum seekers began arriving in Valka in 1954, the émigrés were perfectly positioned to exercise a powerful influence over them. Agitation by the émigrés, together with the unsanitary and demoralizing conditions at the camps, made the camps a prime site for the radicalization of Croatian asylum seekers.

When Croatian nationalists in Germany adopted violent tactics in the 1960s, most notoriously their bombing of the Yugoslav trade mission in Bonn-Mehlem in November of 1962, it was the younger generation throwing the bombs. The Mehlem attackers did not come from the ranks of the postwar political émigrés or the labor migrants; they were young men who had come to the FRG as asylum seekers.³⁰ In refugee camps they fell under

27 TOKIĆ, I.: *Landscapes of Conflict*, p. 743.

28 See, for example the case of Nikola Stedul in HOCKENOS, P.: *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars*. Ithaca 2003, pp. 30 – 31.

29 Staatsarchiv München (further only StAM), sign. AGMüRG / 30435, Protokoll über die Gründungsversammlung des Vereins “Vereinigte Kroaten,” 6 July, 1952, p. 1; BAK, sign. B 136 / 6491, Mende to Bundeskanzleramt, Betr.: Kroatisches Nationalkomitee in Europa, Sitz München, February 11, 1954, pp. 1 – 2.

30 POUTRUS, P. G.: *Zuflucht im Nachkriegsdeutschland. Politik und Praxis der Flüchtlingsaufnahme in Bundesrepublik und DDR von den späten 1940er bis zu den 1970er Jahren.*

the influence of the older generation of radical and militant nationalist Croatian émigrés, who recruited them to carry out the dirty work that they hoped would lead to a Croatian revolution.³¹ In the 1960s young Croats in West Germany increasingly resorted to violent tactics in their struggle against Tito's Yugoslavia, including the assassination of Yugoslav diplomats, the detonation of bombs in crowded areas such as train stations and movie theaters within Yugoslavia, and the establishment of guerilla training camps that prepared young recruits for armed incursions into Yugoslavia.³² Like the Mehlem bombers, the members of this second generation of Croatian radical nationalists had typically encountered the Ustaša émigrés of the immediate postwar era on their paths to the FRG, often in refugee camps in Italy, Austria, or West Germany.³³ The meeting of World War II era Croatian émigrés with young, disaffected, and disoriented Croats in need of advice and support had, as we have seen, explosive results. Moreover, it revived Croatian émigré organizations that risked becoming nothing more than debating clubs for old men, a fate that befell many other Eastern European émigré organizations in West Germany.

The émigrés' extensive engagement with recently arrived Croats was supported and facilitated by German officials, expellees, the Catholic Church, and employers. Indeed, West German officials knowingly placed Croatian immigrants into the hands of radical émigré groups. At a time when German authorities and the press repeatedly raised the specter of communist infiltration by foreigners, radical Croatian émigré groups were allowed not only to flourish, but to extend their influence over the wider Croatian community and to radicalize a new generation of Croats. While

In: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 35, 2009, No. 1, p. 170; and TOKIĆ, I.: *Landscapes of Conflict*, p. 747.

- 31 The Mehlem bombing was organized by Rafael Medic-Skoko, a Catholic priest and Ustaši who had been Pavelić's personal chaplain during World War II. In the years prior to the attack Medic-Skoko, as a Catholic priest, had access to Valka and Zirndorf, and he was in charge of recruiting young Croatian asylum seekers for Ustaša organizations in the FRG, see BHStA, sign. MArb / LaFlüVerw, 1889 / 1, Kohler to Burmeister, Betr.: Vorkommnisse im Sammellager für Ausländer Nürnberg; hier: Auseinandersetzungen zwischen serbischen und kroatischen Lagerinsassen, 13 February, 1959, p. 2.
- 32 TOKIĆ, I.: *Landscapes of Conflict*, p. 747; and Jugoslawien, Attentate: Bombe im Koffer. In: *Der Spiegel*, October 21, 1968, pp. 134 – 136.
- 33 See for instance, the biographical details on Stjepan Bilandžić, Ante Kardum, Stanko Kardum, and Branko Orlović, all second-generation leaders of militant Croatian nationalist organizations in the FRG, in TAFRA, R. (ed.): *Dosjei UDBE o hrvatskoj emigraciji iz B i H-a: 1977*. g. Prozor 2000.

other scholars have noted that Croatian émigrés radicalized some of the Croats who arrived in the Federal Republic in the 1960s and 1970s, they have not recognized that it was the distinctive Yugoslav-West German migration regime that existed from the mid-1950s until 1968 that gave émigrés the space and opportunity to recruit new adherents to the Croatian nationalist cause.³⁴ The end of this migration regime also brought a conclusion to the period that saw the most intensive interaction between Croatian émigrés and the younger generation of Croatian immigrants. After signing a labor recruitment agreement with West Germany in 1968, Yugoslav officials quickly built up a major official presence on West German soil, in the form of expanded consulates, the establishment of hundreds of so-called Yugo-Clubs, and the sending of hundreds of Yugoslav social workers, labor union officials, and school teachers to work with and monitor Yugoslav immigrants.³⁵ Moreover, after the 1968 agreement Croats who wanted to immigrate to the Federal Republic no longer had to rely on support networks operated by Croatian émigrés; they could now immigrate through official channels. Both of these developments significantly weakened Croatian émigrés' influence upon Croatian immigrants and set limits on the potential for future radicalization.

Resumé

Na konci 2. svetovej vojny sa v západnej okupačnej zóne Nemecka nachádzali vyše štyri milióny presídlencov z východnej Európy, ale na začiatku 50. rokov ich v Západnom Nemecku zostalo už len menej ako 200 000. Prakticky všetci presídlenci, ktorí tam zostali, boli antikomunisti a každá národnostná skupina založila na západonemeckej pôde množstvo politických organizácií, ktoré sa venovali zničeniu komunistických režimov v ich domovinách vo východnej Európe. Zo všetkých týchto skupín sa ukázali Chorváti ako najradikálnejší s najväčším sklonom použiť násilie na dosiahnutie svojho cieľa obnoviť nezávislý chorvátsky štát. Tvrdím, že zrážka medzi staršou generáciou chorvátskych presídlencov, ktorí sa v Nemecku usadili hneď po 2. svetovej vojne, a mladšími

34 TOKIĆ, I.: *Landscapes of Conflict*, pp. 743 – 747; CLARKSON, A.: *Home and Away: Immigration and Political Violence in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945 – 1990*. In: *Cold War History*, Vol. 8, 2008, No. 1, pp. 5 – 7; CLARKSON, A.: *Who is My Neighbor?*, p. 120.

35 ZIMMERMAN, W.: *Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia*. Princeton 1987, pp. 118 – 124, and chapter five.

chorvátskymi pracovnými migrantmi a ľuďmi, ktorí v Nemecku hľadali politický azyl a prichádzali do Západného Nemecka v polovici 50. rokov, vysvetľuje násilnú povahu i trvalú moc chorvátskej emigrácie v Západnom Nemecku. Do roku 1968 nechcelo Západné Nemecko podpísať s Titovou komunistickou Juhosláviou dohovor o nábore pracovníkov, čo znamenalo, že tí Chorváti, ktorí migrovali do Spolkovej republiky, sa museli spoliehať na radikálnych chorvátskych emigrantov, aby im zabezpečili víza, prácu a ubytovanie. Stretnutie chorvátskych emigrantov z obdobia 2. svetovej vojny, z ktorých mnohí boli stále oddaní ustašovskej ideológii, s mladými, odcudzenými a dezorientovanými Chorvátmi, ktorí potrebovali radu a oporu, prinieslo výbušné a často násilné dôsledky. A čo viac, oživilo to chorvátske emigrantské organizácie, ktorým hrozilo, že už budú len debatnými klubmi starých pánov – osud, ktorý postihol mnohé východo-európske emigrantské organizácie v Západnom Nemecku.

Attempts to Create Unity in Hungarian Political Emigration after the 1956 Revolution

Magdolna BARÁTH

There were two great waves of Hungarian emigration before the revolution in 1956. The beginning was in 1944 – 1945 when the end of the war saw many Hungarians go west. The majority of refugees in 1945 were mainly soldiers, police and gendarme officers, politicians, and leading state officials. As such, Hungarian military emigration represented a considerable crowd. According to estimated data there were about 35,000 active military officers in Hungary in the last few years of the Horthy regime, approximately 27-28,000 of whom left Hungary for the west, mainly for Austria and West-Germany during the 1944-45 events of World War II or afterwards.¹ The former soldiers soon joined forces and built up their own organisations. There were two rival associations inside the so-called Hungarian Military Emigration. One of these was the Movement for Hungarian Liberty, founded by Ferenc Farkas from Kisbarnak. There were both civilian and military members of this association. The other community was the Fraternal Society of Hungarian Soldiers led by András Zákó, which only had military members. The Fraternal Society of Hungarian Soldiers had made its network both in Europe and overseas, and by the end of 1952 it had 31 local branches in 23 different countries.²

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- 1 Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára (further only ÁBTL) [Historical Archives of Hungarian State Security], 4. 1. A-2127/16. The document *Basic material for the book entitled 'The Aim of the US Government with Putting Immigrants to Military Use'* estimated the number of Hungarian military emigrants at 46,500.
 - 2 About the organisation of the Hungarian military emigration see Antal Radnóczy's memoirs: RADNÓCZY, A.: A magyar katonai emigráció története (1945 – 1990). In:

The second wave of emigration began in 1946 – 1947. The refugees and those who left the country after that time were compelled to choose emigration because of the invasion and its unlawfulness, which endangered their personal freedom. Around 1947 – 1948 even those who believed in the democratic order and social changes might have been forced to emigrate. The beginning of this process was when Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy left for the west after he resigned on 1 June 1947. On 2 June Béla Varga, President of the National Assembly, also left the country. In the weeks following the resignation of Ferenc Nagy the Hungarian Ambassadors of Washington, Bern, Paris, Ankara, Prague, Vienna, Brussels and Rome also fled their home country. Their example was followed in the same year by Dezső Sulyok, former President of the Party of Liberty, Zoltán Pfeiffer, President of the Party of Independence, Károly Peyer, former Leader of the Social Democratic Party and Imre Kovács, former Secretary General of the National Peasants' Party. Numerous other diplomats, MPs, party officials and public writers also left the country.

The second wave of emigration was not as huge as the first one in 1945, but its influence and importance exceeded that of the first one. Their aim was to continue the political struggle that they had started at home so they started to build up the frames of political life in emigration and founded institutions that looked necessary for political action. The most important of these was the Hungarian National Council, whose foundation was declared on 15 November 1947 and whose aim was “*to represent the suppressed Hungarian nation in the world of freedom*”.

The emigration of the so-called right-wing social democratic leaders and middle cadres started in 1947-48. Emigrant social democrats settled down their centre in London. In the early phase of emigration the emigrants broke into two groups, which opposed each other from first to last.

A common feature of those who emigrated in 1947 – 1948 was that they not only condemned the arrangements for a Communist autocracy but they also had an aversion towards the governing system before and during World War II. Thus, unfriendliness and hostility characterised the behaviour between the group that emigrated in 1945 and those who left the country in 1947.

The Hungarian emigrants in the West supported the cause of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 without exception, and no one questioned

the justification of the revolution. The emigrants' organisations did not have any ideas or plans on how to respond to a revolution. Since no one was prepared for the outbreak of a revolution, no plans had been prepared and no preparations had been made by these organisations, including the Hungarian National Committee, in case the Communist system collapsed. These groups were in a state of uncertainty and confusion. Their activity was limited to obtaining information and the expression of solidarity.³ However, it was clear from the very beginning that events in Budapest would have a profound impact on Hungarian emigrants in the West. First of all, the events in Hungary had a galvanising effect on the activities of Hungarian emigration. Ferenc Nagy, the former Hungarian prime minister, was expected to return home by some of his supporters. He arrived in Vienna, but the Austrian government advised him not to go any further for foreign policy reasons. Three Christian People's Party politicians spent several days in Budapest and spoke with Cardinal Mindszenty.

The consequences of the suppression of the Revolution included not only injuries, arrests, trials, imprisonment and harassment, but also the loss of great numbers of people who left the country as refugees. 1956 was the date of the beginning of the third great exodus. Around 200,000 Hungarians left their country after the 1956 revolution. According to statistics, around 181,000 Hungarian people arrived in Austria in 1956 – 1957: 8,300 of them returned to Hungary until 1959 and 62,000 Hungarians moved on to other countries. About 20,000 Hungarians fled to Yugoslavia with the aim of travelling westwards from there. However, only 4-500 of them remained there; 2,800 returned to Hungary and the others emigrated to different western European countries or overseas.⁴ On the whole no earlier layer of emigrants was as mixed as those who left their country in 1956. In 1956 it was not only people who had taken part in the revolution who left but also all those who considered life in Hungary without a future. Owing to this diversity the 1956 emigrants were considered as a possible

3 BORBÁNDI, G.: Hungarian Emigrants and the Revolution. In: CONGDON, L. – KIRÁLY, B. K. – NAGY, K. (eds.): *1956: The Hungarian Revolution and War for Independence*. Columbia 2006, p. 681.

4 Owing to the "Displaced Persons" law in 1948 and 1950 16,718 Hungarian "DPs" settled down in the United States, and other (approx. 9,500) Hungarian immigrants joined them on account of the *Refugee Relief Act* in 1953. In accordance with Béla Várdy's data, 60% of the Hungarian political emigration consisted of those who emigrated in 1945. VÁRDY, B.: Az 1956-os magyar forradalom és az amerikai magyar politikai emigráció. In: *Valóság*, 2007, No. 5, pp. 87 – 88.

source of replacement by all of the political trends and groups. The new emigrants had two alternatives, they either fitted into the old frames or they created new organisations.

Among the prevailing emigrant organisations the most significant political organisation was the Hungarian National Committee, established in 1948. Its president was Béla Varga, formerly president of the Hungarian Parliament, who was also a leading member of the Hungarian Small-holders' Party. After the Revolution this organisation was transformed. The Free Europe Committee continued to support it financially, but a condition of continued support was the inclusion of representatives of the Revolution. Some members of the executive committee, "conservatives" such as Tibor Eckhardt, Miklós Kállay, György Bakách-Bessenyei and József Közi-Horváth, opposed this idea. The leaders of the 1956 Revolution did not want to cooperate with these politicians.

The Hungarian leadership regarded Hungarian emigration as a dangerous weapon. The appearance of Hungarian emigrants in the West was a kind of "defeat" for the government, since people who left the country "voted with their feet" against the existing Communist regime in Hungary. In the first period, dealing with the emigration was only a question of internal matters. The official opinion according the emigration was that: *"those, who we cannot win for the sake of the old country, or we cannot neutralise them either, will get on the moving belt of imperialistic spy organisations, will serve their propaganda machine and will be used in numerous cases against us."*⁵

The Hungarian politicians feared that the emigration could be used in propaganda to influence the Western public's opinion and the policy of government circles towards Hungary. A united emigration was more dangerous for them. While the American government did not spare the material costs for creating the unity of the emigration, the Hungarian government spared neither trouble nor pains to hamper it.

At the meeting of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, on 2 July 1957, the body set an important task for the State Security Organs: to infiltrate into the hostile organisations of émigrés. Lajos Czinege suggested infiltration into

5 Magyar Országos Levéltár (further only MOL), sign. XIX-J-1-o. 5. d. A Külügyminisztérium Kollégiumának 1957. október 15-ei ülése. Quoted by SZABÓ, J.: Fellazítási politika a Kádár-rendszerben. Az MSZMP propagandatevékenysége 1958 és 1963 között. In: *Múltunk*, Vol. 54, 2009, No. 2., pp. 184 – 185.

emigration centres, referring to the fact that the emigrants were in close connection with their relatives and friends at home and “*they can carry out demoralising activity in their correspondence.*”⁶

The new wave of emigrants after the 1956 revolution created a new situation for the State Security Organisations as well. The importance of the old organisations of émigrés was decreasing and those who had some role in the revolution wanted to create new organisations that worked according to the ideals of 1956. The Hungarian State Security Organisations considered preventing the formation of a well organised and unified hostile block as their main task. Their most important objective was to prevent a union between members of the former state apparatus of the Horthy regime and the groups of emigrants who opposed fascism but also rejected the existing Hungarian regime. Their way of demoralising the members was to discredit certain leaders of émigrés and breed hostility. They searched for compromising data in people’s pasts and they sent them through appropriate channels to the members of the opposing party or the emigration media.

At the beginning of 1957 the first efforts were made to create an ideological and organisational union of the Hungarian émigrés. Discussions on these organisational efforts started in Vienna at the beginning of 1957 between Anna Kéthly, Béla Király and József Kővágó and in March 1957 the Hungarian Revolutionary Council was founded in Strasbourg. The organisational congress of the Hungarian Revolutionary Council opened in Strasbourg on 5 January 1957 with the presidency of Béla Király. The participants confirmed the main principles of the revolution: the demands for independence, freedom and self-government, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. The Revolutionary Council elected Anna Kéthly, leader of the Hungarian Socialist Party, as president, and József Kővágó and Béla Király as vice-presidents.

The Hungarian state security organisations were of the opinion that the main aim of the Revolutionary Council was “*to round up the counter-revolutionary elements refused from Hungary and use them against the Hungarian People’s Republic according to the interests of different imperialistic circles.*”⁷

6 BARÁTH, M. – FEITL, I. (eds.): *A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt Politikai Bizottságának jegyzőkönyvei 1957. július 2-december 28.* Budapest 2006, p. 81.

7 ÁBTL, sign. 3. 2. 4. K-1919/2.

In the summer of 1957 the Free Europe Committee asked the National Committee and the Revolutionary Council to unite in the interests of facilitating common activities and making more effective use of financial resources. Discussions on this issue were initiated in Vienna with the participation of Béla Varga, Anna Kéthly, István Barankovics, Béla Király, József Kóvágó, Ferenc Nagy, Zoltán Pfeiffer and Imre Szélig.

Both organisations wanted to obtain the leading role among the Hungarian émigrés. The Hungarian National Committee did not possess a mass base, but had good relationships and political experience. On the other hand, the Revolutionary Council had a mass base. At the same time both organisations regarded themselves as the only leading organ of Hungarian emigration.

In the summer of 1957 the two organisations were united and established the Hungarian Committee with Béla Varga as president. The Hungarian Committee consisted of 16 members, and two places were offered to the Social Democrats while Radio Free Europe covered its expenses for up to 1 million dollars.⁸

Anna Kéthly met Béla Király and Imre Kovács (former leader of the Hungarian Peasant Party) in London to negotiate about joining the Social Democrats in the Hungarian Committee. Because Béla Király and the other members of the Committee refused to accept the resolution of organisational congress of the Hungarian Revolutionary Council in Strasbourg as a basis of activity the Social Democrats refused to join.⁹ As such, the Social Democrats in October 1957 founded an organisation called the Hungarian Social Democratic Party in Exile.¹⁰ The organisation had leaders in different western countries but the only organisation that worked in practice was the one in London.

The Hungarian state security services recognised that the efforts to create an organisational union of the Hungarian émigrés were broken down because of the position of the Social Democrats. That's why its main aim to achieve this position did not change. The state security organs wanted to carry out their undermining of Hungarian emigration through the

8 ÁBTL, sign. 3. 2. 4. K-1919/2.

9 BORBÁNDI, G.: *Hungarian Emigrants and the Revolution*, pp. 686 – 688.

10 The organisation was founded in Bonn at the Party Congress, which was held on 19 – 20 October 1957. The leaders were also elected; Anna Kéthly became President, Imre Szélig Main Secretary and Olivér Benjámín Deputy Main Secretary.

Social Democratic emigration and at the same time undermine this group by discrediting its leaders.

According to the State Security Organisations, the emigrant Social Democrats were an insignificant threat before 1956, but their role became more important after the Revolution. They kept the so-called “Hungarian case” on the agenda, thus displaying active hostile activity against Hungary in different international forums. Home Office Subdivision II/3-B opened an object file for the Hungarian Social Democrat émigrés in England to help Intelligence Service work.

Two agents of the Hungarian State Security Organisations managed to create a third group beside the two opposing groups within the Social Democratic Emigration before the Revolution, which was supported by the Belgian Socialist Party.

In the beginning they acquired secret information and documents about the activity and the plans of the Social Democratic émigrés through the agency. Later they published a paper called the ‘Socialist Review’ with the help of this group. Their aim was to expose and demoralise the fascist Hungarian emigration. After the revolution they used the paper to expose and demoralise the wing of the Social Democratic Emigration led by Anna Kéthly.

However, this activity was not successful. The Belgian wing of the Socialist Emigration was very weak, and their attack against Anna Kéthly was not commensurate with their strength. The Hungarian state security services also made a mistake, because they gave them improper instructions, thus giving these attacks anti-American direction.¹¹

Anna Kéthly was a person of authority and she had a valuable influence. When an article under title the “Anna Kéthly’s road from Budapest to Hiroshima” was published the Hungarian Social Democratic Party in Exile took great efforts to isolate the group created by the State Security Organisations.¹² This resulted in the Belgian Socialist Party withdrawing their financial support for publishing the ‘Socialist Review’ and the Belgian Police then made it impossible for the group to continue their work.¹³ However, the conflicts between Anna Kéthly and the Belgian wing prevented the emigrant social democrats from organising their party.

11 ÁBTL, sign. 3. 2. 4. K-1919/2, Report of the Division II/3 of the Ministry of Home Affairs. 29th December 1958.

12 Ibid.

13 ÁBTL, sign. 4. 1. A-2127/11.

Building in agents proved to be more successful. The agent under the cover name Sági was sent to Austria in 1957 where he built up a good relationship with not only the Social Democratic émigrés but also with Austrian politicians; so it was not only the activities and plans of the Social Democratic emigration but SPÖ as well that he got precious information about. Another agent, under the cover name Szepesi, worked for counter-intelligence. In accordance with some elaborate plans he was sent to the World Exhibition in Brussels, so he could get in touch with Anna Kéthly and other emigrant leaders. He could get information about conflicts inside the Social Democratic emigration and about the Social Democratic tactical policy of keeping the “Hungarian case” on the agenda.¹⁴

Wanting to demoralise the Social Democratic Emigration, they organised a fly-bill campaign to compromise Anna Kéthly. She was in the focus of attention in the west, too, not only because of her political past, but because having been a member of the Imre Nagy Government, she had the highest rank among 1956 political émigrés. The illegally spread fly-bills were meant to make people believe that they had been prepared by Social Democrats – individuals and groups – who opposed Anna Kéthly. In this way they managed to create some disturbances. Yet, Hungarian Home Office officials thought that it was not wise to start a front attack against emigrant Social Democrats as they represented the left-wing within the emigration so their presence was a sort of inside buffer. Instead, they decided “*to prepare and deal well-based and well-timed blows to certain extremist, imperialist-friendly leaders, like Anna Kéthly, who poison the political atmosphere with their activity at different international forums and organize attacks against Hungary and the other socialist countries.*” In accordance with these they proposed that some well-known Social Democrat leaders who had stayed in Hungary should be given better circumstances or a pension because they thought this might have a demoralising effect both in Hungary and for people living in emigration.¹⁵

According to the data of the Home Office Division II, Béla Király, the commander-in-chief of the National Guard of Hungary during the Revolution of 1956, undertook the most active political work among the Hungarian emigration. The Hungarian state security services had only

14 ÁBTL, sign. 4. 1. A-2127/13. See also KÁDÁR, Zs. B.: A szociáldemokraták fürkészése itthon és külföldön. In: *Rubicon*, 2002, No. 6-7, pp. 47 – 50.

15 ÁBTL, sign. 4. 1. A-2127/13. A summary about the Hungarian emigration by Subdivision 5 of Division II/3 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, 18 April 1959.

opened a file on him on 6th October 1961, but they had been gathering data concerning his activity since he left Hungary. Király gave evidence to the special Commission of the UN created for the investigation of the so-called “Hungarian case”.

In 1957 Király established the Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation and became its president.¹⁶ Conflicts and rivalry were increasing within the military type of organisations as well. There were a conflict among the members of the Federation from almost the very beginning, because in the statutes of the Federation Király wanted to make distinctions between the members who were fighting during the revolution with weapons or not. Király was attacked also personally by the military émigrés.

The main aims of the Hungarian state security services were to disrupt and morally compromise Béla Király’s group, create factions among them, and set this group against the other groups of the old and new émigrés. In July 1957 an operative commission of the state security services was set up and a concrete operative plan was worked out to achieve this goal.¹⁷

The commission sent a letter by the Foreign Residency of the Hungarian Intelligence in Vienna to the most powerful leaders of the Hungarian émigrés and attached to it the documentation with Király’s prison confessions and documents certifying his activity as an agent of the Hungarian State Security Authority¹⁸. In October 1958 a new compromising action was begun against Király. That time the Foreign Residency of the Hungarian Intelligence in Paris had to send a letter to the emigrant leaders and the press of the emigration, which contained a photocopy of Király’s confessions about his bisexuality.¹⁹

According the report of the Home Office Division II/3 this action was successful: an attack was begun against Király and he lost the confidence of the Hungarian émigrés. There were also efforts to expel Király from the leadership of the organisations of the émigrés. The main goal of the Hungarian secret services was to strengthen and help this tendency artificially.²⁰

16 The Federation has organisations in 14 countries: USA, Great Britain, Canada, West Germany, Sweden, Norway, Turkey, Australia, Austria, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Argentina and Switzerland. ÁBTL, sign. 3. 2. 4. K-1525/1

17 ÁBTL, sign. 3. 2. 4. K-1525/1

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

At the beginning of the 1960's the Hungarian State Security organs concentrated their main strength against Király, but a new element appeared in this compromising action. They planned to send a letter to the emigrant leaders and the press in the name of Király's acquaintances in Hungary with documentary evidence about Király's betrayal against his comrades.²¹ At that time these actions had no further effect on the Hungarian émigrés.

In 1963 the so-called "Hungarian case" was removed from the agenda of the United Nations and parallels with the importance of the Hungarian émigrés decreased. Consequently, more realistic analyses of the political situation in Hungary became dominant among the émigrés and they began to search for the possibility of a "compromise".

Resumé

Medzi dôsledky potlačenia revolúcie v roku 1956 patrili nielen zranenia, zatknutia, súdne procesy, väznenie a týranie, ale aj strata veľkého počtu ľudí, ktorí krajinu opustili ako utečenci. Noví emigranti mali dve možnosti: buď sa zaradiť do existujúcich štruktúr, alebo si vytvoriť nové organizácie. Nová vlna emigrantov po revolúcii roku 1956 vytvorila novú situáciu aj pre organizácie Štátnej bezpečnosti. Význam starých emigrantských organizácii rástol a tí, ktorí zohrali v revolúcii určitú úlohu, chceli vytvoriť nové organizácie, ktoré by pracovali v súlade s ideálmi roku 1956.

Vedúce orgány v Maďarsku vnímali maďarskú emigráciu ako nebezpečnú zbraň, pretože propaganda by ju mohla využiť na ovplyvňovanie verejnej mienky na Západe a politiky vládnych kruhov proti Maďarsku. Organizácie Štátnej bezpečnosti v Maďarsku považovali za svoju hlavnú úlohu zabrániť vytvoreniu dobre organizovaného a jednotného nepriateľského bloku. Ich najdôležitejším cieľom bolo zabrániť zjednoteniu členov bývalého štátneho aparátu Horthyho režimu a skupín emigrantov, ktorí sa postavili proti fašizmu, ale odmietali aktuálny režim v Maďarsku.

Štúdiá skúma na jednej strane pokusy starej i novej emigrácie o zjednotenie maďarskej politickej emigrácie a na druhej strane nástroje a metódy maďarskej štátnej bezpečnosti tomu zabrániť.

21 Ibid.

From 'Liberation' to 'Détente': Britain and the Anti-Communist Movement in the Soviet Sattellites

Jacek **TEBINKA**

The consolidation of power by communist parties in Central Europe from 1945 to 1948, which ended with a coup in Prague in February 1948, was met with a weak response from a Great Britain ruled by a Labour government. The British tried to follow developments in these countries and to refer to the Yalta agreements in the case of Poland and Yugoslavia, or to the Declaration of Liberated Europe when it came to Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, previously allied with the Third Reich. Diplomatic interventions in the Kremlin, however, could not prevent the communists from strengthening their position or the gradual liquidation of the legal opposition. London tried to maintain cautious contact with the opposition, as in the case of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), trying not to expose it to communist accusations of collaboration with foreign countries. A symbolic failure of this policy was the assistance of the British and American diplomats to Stanisław Mikołajczyk, leader of the PSL. He was threatened with arrest and was helped to escape to the West by sea in the autumn of 1947. Thus, the hope that any non-communist party, such as the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), in Poland could survive as an independent element was not fulfilled.¹

Apart from intelligence collection, British diplomacy before 1948 did not intend to support the armed anti-communist groups which existed on a large scale in Poland, in the Baltic States annexed by the Soviet Union,

1 COUTOUVIDIS, J. – REYNOLDS, J.: *Poland 1939 – 1947*. Leicester, 1986, pp. 290 – 310.

and in Soviet Ukraine. The Special Operations Executive was disbanded and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) was banned from delivering weapons and equipment to anti-communist guerillas. Abandoned by the British, the anti-communist guerrillas in the early postwar era did not interfere with SIS actions, such as recruiting agents among immigrants and refugees from Soviet Bloc countries. These were recruited from among resistance fighters against the Third Reich or, as in the case of the Baltic States and Ukraine, from among those who collaborated with Nazi Germany, seeing them as liberators from Soviet occupation.²

At the beginning of 1948, even before the coup in Prague, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, came to the sad conclusion expressed in the memorandum for the Cabinet: "*It must be recognised that the Soviet Government has formed a solid political and economic block behind a line running from the Baltic along the Oder, through Trieste to the Black Sea. There is no prospect in the immediate future that we shall be able to re-establish and maintain normal relations with European countries behind that line*".³

Bevin proposed to adopt the following position in the propaganda: "*We should represent the satellite countries as "Russia's new colonial empire", serving Russia's strategic and economic interests at the cost of the freedom and living standards of the Eastern European peoples. Something far more positive is clearly now required. If we are to give a moral lead to the forces of anti-Communism in Europe and Asia, we must be prepared to pass over to the offensive and not leave the initiative to the enemy, but make them defend themselves*".⁴

In order to achieve these objectives, Bevin supported the proposal to create a special covert propaganda institution for anti-communist political warfare. The Information Research Department (IRD) was called into existence by Bevin in February 1948. After the destruction of legal and illegal opposition in the Soviet satellites, political warfare played the main role in British anti-communist policy.⁵

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- 2 ALDRICH, R. J.: *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence*. London, 2001, pp. 142 – 146, 334 – 337; JEFFERY, K.: *MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909 – 1949*. London. 2010, pp. 660 – 663, 705 – 710.
 - 3 The National Archives, Kew (further only TNA), sign. CAB 129/23, CP(48)6, The First Aim of British Foreign Policy, 4 January 1948.
 - 4 TNA, sign. CAB 129/23, CP(48)6, Future Foreign Publicity Policy, 4 January 1948.
 - 5 LASHMAR, P. – OLIVER, J.: *Britain's Secret Propaganda War*. Stroud 1998, pp. 25 – 33; TEBINKA, J.: *British Propaganda Directed at Poland Between 1947 and 1956*. In: *Acta Poloniae Historica*, 2007, No. 95, pp. 106 – 108.

However, the coup in Prague confirmed Bevin in his pessimistic belief that, “*there is nothing we can do about it in Czechoslovakia itself except to express our disapproval. One of the points which have gone most against us in Eastern Europe has been the fact that we cannot help our friends there, and that the Russians had armed forces on the spot or in the vicinity and could act whenever they wished to do so.* The fact is that continental electorates are impressed by power, and in the East of Europe we have not had power”.⁶

In 1948, the Russia Committee held ongoing discussions about the direction of policy toward the satellites. The Foreign Office had established this forum two years earlier, especially for such a purpose. The denouncement of Tito as a traitor by Cominform in June 1948 opened a new opportunity in the policy of liberation in the form of special operations, which was encouraged by the Marshals, Lord Tedder and Viscount Montgomery. The United Kingdom and the US came with economic help for Yugoslavia which, though under communist rule, had become (in the opinion of British diplomacy) a model worth copying (Titoism). Yugoslavia leaving the Soviet Bloc encouraged London and Washington to consider more ambitious actions against the Soviet empire in Europe. At the meeting of the Russia Committee on 28 October 1948, there was for the first time a debate about the overthrow of communist rule in Albania. Chief of Air Staff Marshal, Lord Tedder, even suggested that the West “*should aim at winning the cold war in five years’ time*”. Sir Frank Roberts from the Foreign Office soberly noted that, “*if we are aimed at unseating the Soviet Government in five years by means other than war, we were undertaking an impossible task*”.⁷

Starting in October 1949, after the Berlin crisis, the British–American operation ‘Valuable’ was aimed at the overthrow of the Hoxha regime in Albania. This was the only real attempt of liberation in the Western powers’ policy towards satellites. The operation sent groups of saboteurs to Albania in order to create an anti-communist resistance movement but ended in failure. The defeat was due to Kim Philby’s treason and, at the same time, the weakness of the anti-communist movement in Albania. In 1950, the SIS had already passed the initiative on to the Americans⁸. However, the

6 TNA, sign. CAB 129/25, CP(48)71, The Czechoslovak Crisis, 3 March 1948.

7 ALDRICH, R. J.: *Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain 1945 – 1970*. Manchester 1998, pp. 192–194.

8 HEUSER, B.: *Western ‘Containment’ Policies in the Cold War. The Yugoslav Case 1948 – 1953*. London 1989, pp. 75 – 80. See also BETHELL, N.: *The Great Betrayal. The*

overthrow of the regime in Albania would not have a major impact on the functioning of the Soviet Bloc as was demonstrated when this country left the Warsaw Pact in the next decade.

The Labour Cabinet saw a greater chance of weakening the communist regimes through political warfare rather than through special operations against the Soviet satellites. This was the result of not only the fear of war, but also of the economic weakness of Great Britain which had to pay the costs of involvement in the Korean War and the build-up of armed forces in Europe. Despite the fiasco in Albania, a memorandum from the Foreign Office Permanent Undersecretary's Committee from 17 January 1952 considered that, "*useful measures could be taken to cause trouble and disturbances' in the Soviet satellites in order to weaken the Soviet Union. It was hoped in London that this might lead to 'some at least of the Satellites countries detaching themselves from the Soviet Bloc'*".⁹

Britain and the United States defined the states which were in Moscow's sphere of influence by the term 'Soviet satellites', considering them to be the weak spot of the Communist Bloc. In London, however, there was not much conviction about the possibility of their liberation without a global war with the Soviet Union. The British did not have sufficient resources to support the opponents of communist regimes imposed on these countries. The fiasco of the special operations conducted with the Americans in Albania, and the failure in December 1952 to build the anti-communist resistance in Poland, discouraged the British Government from attempting to stir up unrest in the satellite states. Instead, they conducted a boycott policy in the sphere of political contacts and criticised the regimes by using radio propaganda addressed to the nations of Eastern Europe.¹⁰

A Foreign Office memorandum on *Policy towards Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe*, from 23 February 1953, was another testimony as to how little remained from the policy of liberation. British policy towards the satellites was a function of policy towards the Soviet Union. The ultimate aim was to free Eastern Europe but the satellites could not be liberated

Untold Story of Kim Philby's Final Act of Treachery. Sevenoaks 1986.

- 9 TNA, Foreign Office (further only FO), sign. 371/116116, N 1052/9: memorandum by J. Ward, 15 October 1955.
- 10 ALDRICH, R. J.: *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence*, pp. 160 – 179, 334 – 337; DORRILL, S.: *M16. Fifty Years of Special Operations*. London, 2000, pp. 483 – 517; GROSE, P.: *Operation Rollback. Americas's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain*. Boston 2000, pp. 156 – 179.

without war. It was claimed that, “*to incite premature rebellion will do more harm than good*”. The British were sceptical towards émigré organisations, finding them useful for intelligence and propaganda but not for playing a major role in liberation. The Foreign Office decided to avoid too close a commitment to émigrés. Yet, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told senators on 15 January 1953 that, “*the hope of liberalisation must be kept alive*”, and it does not mean war. Publicly, the British supported this policy but they understood that it was impractical in real terms. Political warfare remained the only weapon available.¹¹

A couple of months later the British knew that Dulles’ ideas were “*over-optimistic*” and, after the death of Stalin, they became completely “*unrealistic*”, despite the Berlin uprising in June 1953. Failure of the Anglo-American special operations whose aim was to rebuild a network of future underground resistance movements (in case of war) in Poland and other communist countries convinced London to return to a traditional policy of containment, as of the mid-1950s.

Soviet leaders rejected any discussion of the satellites during the Geneva summit in July 1955. After Geneva, British diplomacy wanted to explore, to the best advantage, the possibility of increased contacts with Soviet satellites. During the meeting in the Foreign Office on 14 October 1955, Secretary of State Harold Macmillan concluded that there was no sense in dealing with Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary or even Czechoslovakia, but Poland was different. In case of the unification of Germany, he saw in Poland the best chance for Western powers to re-establish Western influence in Eastern Europe. Macmillan was ready to welcome national communism in any of the Soviet satellites as a step to wean one of these countries from the Soviet Union. Also, Yugoslav diplomacy tried to encourage London to focus on possible political changes in Poland but, until October 1956, the British were reluctant to change the policy of avoiding official conflicts with satellite governments.¹²

At the beginning of 1956, before Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s meeting with President Eisenhower in Washington, the Foreign Office prepared a memorandum on policy towards the satellites. The main assumption of British policy was the belief that an armed attempt at the liberation of allies of the Soviet Union would lead to global war. The concept of eliminating Soviet influence on the satellites by encouraging local communist leaders

11 TNA, FO 371/106531, sign. NS 1024/1: D. Cleary to Dominions, 23 February 1953.

12 TNA, FO 371/116116, sign. N 1052/9: memorandum by Ward, 15 October 1955.

to follow the way of Yugoslavia, or 'national communism', seemed more appealing; but British diplomats did not perceive it then as manageable in Eastern Europe.¹³

In a memorandum for the British delegation with Eden at the head, the Foreign Office sought to emphasise the far-reaching convergence of policy objectives and methods of Great Britain and the United States towards satellite countries. In reality, there were differences between the Western powers, the genesis of which went back to an earlier period of the Cold War. Although both Washington and London had a common goal of the liberation of Eastern Europe from communist rule without force, the British were increasingly reluctant and their material resources were limited. British diplomacy approached with great scepticism the use by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of emigrants from satellite states for political warfare, special operations and intelligence activity directed against communist countries. The rhetoric of the policy of liberation was less prevalent on BBC radio programmes addressed to the Warsaw Pact countries than in the programmes of Voice of America, and especially, Radio Free Europe.¹⁴

Prime Minister Eden raised the issue of compliance with the Yalta agreement regarding free elections in Poland on 19 April 1956, in a meeting with Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin and First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, during their visit to the UK. However, the Russians refused to discuss it, which was not surprising in light of their attitude, even at the first Geneva conference in 1955. They claimed that the European socialist countries were sovereign states and the British should contact them directly if they had any problems to solve.¹⁵

Eden, encouraged by the Polish Government in exile, also raised the issue of free elections in Poland, the release of Poles imprisoned in the Soviet Union and the explanation of the fate of 11,000 Polish officers who disappeared in Soviet captivity during talks with Khrushchev.¹⁶ It was

13 TNA, FO 371/122078, sign. N 1051/1: FO to Washington 30 January 1956.

14 Ibid.; HIXSON, W. L.: *Parting the Curtain. Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War 1945 – 1961*. Basingstoke 1998, pp. 51 – 86.

15 TNA, sign. PREM 11/1625: visit of Mr N. A. Bulganin and Mr N. S. Khrushchev to the United Kingdom, 19 – 27 April 1956.

16 TNA, FO 371/122677, sign. NP 1821/21: minutes by: J. Graham 23 April and Ward 24. April 1956.

the last time during the Cold War when British diplomacy, in relations with the Soviet Union, took into account demands put forward by the anti-communist immigration centres.

For years the British and the Americans tried to foster discontent among the nations in the Soviet Bloc through political warfare. Yet the passive attitude of Western powers towards the Berlin uprising in June 1953 was a clear sign of the end of the liberation policy and its restrictions on such a sensitive area as Germany. The Poznan riots in June 1956 were the most serious challenge to communist rule in Eastern Europe since the uprising in East Germany, but were quickly suppressed by the Polish army at the cost of 70 victims. Communist propaganda accused the Western secret services of provoking the riots. It had nothing to do with the truth, although the experience of the communist secret services of the earlier period seemed to provide some evidence of similar intentions from London and Washington.

The Foreign Office acknowledged as unrealistic American diplomacy's ideas of advising Polish rebels to request free elections after the Poznan riots. Harry Hohler, the head of the Northern Department, even allowed himself the statement that, "*democracy has always been a rare plant in Eastern Europe*".¹⁷ Differences between London and Washington in relation to the events in Poznan resulted primarily from a more aggressive approach by the Americans, although – from their point of view – the Poznan events lacked an important element of what would be the bloody suppression of the revolt directly by Soviet troops.

Notwithstanding the caution with which London regarded the events in Eastern Europe, the importance of Poland – the largest satellite of the USSR in the area – was acknowledged. The level of British interest in the Warsaw Pact countries differed depending on their strategic and economic interests. In second place after Poland, Czechoslovakia was perceived by the British as the only Eastern European country with a functioning democratic system, prior to 1939. In October 1956, British diplomacy assessed, however, that the Czechs were accustomed to negotiating with their persecutors, and Britain was sceptical about the process of de-Stalinisation. Higher hopes for change were associated with Hungary. At the opposite

17 TNA, FO 371/122594, sign. NP 10110/63: minutes by H. Hohler 3 July 1956 (released in 1997); BEKES, C. – BYRNE, M. – RAINER, J. (eds.): *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*. Budapest 2002, pp. 129 – 139.

extreme were Bulgaria and Romania, regarded by the Foreign Office almost as Soviet colonies.¹⁸

Polish October and Gomulka's rise to power in Warsaw, in spite of Khrushchev's initial opposition, backed by the threat of Soviet intervention, fundamentally changed British policy towards Poland. Polish October and the Hungarian Revolution marked the definitive failure of liberation policy in 1956. A policy emerged in London supporting the 'national Communist regime' in Poland and differentiation towards the rest of the Communist Bloc. The opinion in London was that future freedom leaders would emerge in an evolutionary process within the satellite countries, rather than in exile.

The assumptions of the new British policy towards Poland were presented by the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, at the NATO Ministerial Council meeting on 11 December 1956. He stated that, after the experience of Hungary, Western military intervention in another Eastern Europe uprising should be ruled out. Any action that might cause an armed revolt should also be avoided. The British minister said: "*In the belief of the Government of Her Majesty, best hope for Eastern Europe lies in the policy of gradual changes on the model of Poland*". The British wanted to develop contacts with Warsaw to encourage Gomulka to maintain the greatest possible independence from the Soviet Union while avoiding provoking violent reactions from the Kremlin.¹⁹

After 1956, the East European émigré community ceased to be a partner in British diplomacy. There was also the end of special operations in Soviet Bloc countries, in which it turned out that the 'resistance' was controlled by the the Committee for State Security (KGB). Normal intelligence gathering became the priority for the SIS. The strategy of recruitment was changed, abandoning hastily the picking up of agents from the refugees and immigrants who were later sent to Eastern Europe where the communist secret police was catching them easily.

By 1956, the breakdown of the remaining armed resistance in the Baltic states and Ukraine, and earlier in Poland, along with the belief in London that the emigration groups were being penetrated by the communist secret service, finally put an end to hopes for the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination in the foreseeable future. The impossibility of the

18 TNA, FO 371/122063, sign. N 1012/13; T. Brimelow to D. Greenhill 16 October 1956.

19 TNA, FO 371/124796, sign. WU 10740/89/90/109/110; UKDEL NATO to London 11 and 13 December 1956.

existence of legal opposition in the Soviet Bloc meant that the British and the Americans had to count on evolutionary changes in Eastern Europe, according to the Polish model.

British diplomatic and intelligence documents show that, in early March 1957, Great Britain still adhered in theory to the target of the liberation of the Eastern European countries from the communist regime, although there was an awareness in London that it was unrealistic for the “foreseeable future”. An attempt to achieve this objective meant global war. The British also ruled out the possibility of NATO military support for any uprisings in satellite countries. Gomulka’s Poland, however, was seen as a state where ‘national communism’ was born, which could serve as an example to be followed by other members of the Warsaw Pact. In relation to Poland, the aim of the policy was to develop many contacts and to encourage the communist authorities to preserve the widest possible autonomy from the Kremlin. British policy towards the rest of the allies of the USSR was still aimed at strengthening the national resentment against the ruling communist regimes. After the Hungarian experiences, the Foreign Office again recommended that the BBC was cautious about propaganda and about not inciting the population of these countries to further uprisings.²⁰

The Foreign Office memorandum, *United Kingdom Policy towards the East European Satellites*, from 27 April 1959, contained the basic goals and methods of London in relation to Eastern Europe in the coming years. British policy towards the Soviet satellites was subordinated to the USSR–London strategy and anticipated the use of the weakness of Moscow in Eastern Europe to push it to end the Cold War. The British recognised that this conflict could not be won only by conducting defensive operations. London, however, did not intend to stir up national uprisings in Eastern Europe, realising that such uprisings would be brutally crushed by the Russians and that this could even lead to global war. The Foreign Office recognised that there was no sense in sacrificing the security of the United Kingdom for the rather unrealistic goal of liberating the Soviet satellites.²¹

20 TNA, FO 371/128397, sign. N 1011/10: memorandum 19. February 1957; N 10011/13: FO to UKDEL NATO 2. March 1957.

21 TNA, FO 371/143689, sign. ZP 12/3: memorandum *United Kingdom Policy towards the East European Satellites*, SC (58)46, 5 May 1959.

In the memorandum of 27 April 1959, the Foreign Office upheld the earlier plans of British politics, in supporting the evolutionary changes in the satellite states, aiming to reduce Soviet domination over them. Exposing 'communist' tyranny in Eastern Europe through propaganda, the open channel – the BBC and covert Information Research Department was intended to discredit the Soviet position in the Third World and cause discontent in the Soviet Bloc countries. Poland still occupied a unique place, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, despite the retreat from October reforms in Gomulka's policy. In London, however, Gomulka was still seen as the most independent Communist Party leader in the Warsaw Pact. Most of the funds for propaganda and cultural contacts were to be spent on Poland, trying also to affect the ruling elite. The purpose of this policy was not, this time, to incite public discontent with the ruling communists nor stoke conflict between Warsaw and Moscow.²²

The British diplomacy saw opportunities for action outside Poland, in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, hoping that there would one day be a government 'à la Gomułka'. Greater chances of such success had not been seen in Romania and Bulgaria. Yet, in the first case, the Foreign Office found out that the assessment of the situation was incorrect because of more independent policies of Romanian Party leaders – first, Gheorghiu-Dej and then Nicolae Ceaucescu.²³

The idea to revise the memorandum of April 1959 was raised in the Foreign Office in February 1961. This was due to the reports of British diplomats who resided in satellite countries. They suggested that London should begin to lead a more active policy in the sphere of cultural, economic and political contacts. This postulate did not concern Poland which, since October 1956, was treated differently from other members of the Warsaw Pact and was subject to just such a policy already.²⁴

The next Foreign Office memorandum on Soviet satellites – *United Kingdom Policy towards the East European Satellites* – was prepared in May 1961. The main difference, compared to the situation in 1959, was

22 TNA, FO 371/143689, sign. ZP 12/3: memorandum *United Kingdom Policy towards the East European Satellites*, SC (58)46, 5 May 1959; the US's view, see *Foreign Relations of the United States 1958 – 1960, Vol. X, part 2, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey*. Washington 1993, pp. 163 – 171.

23 TNA, FO 371/143689, sign. ZP 12/3: memorandum *United Kingdom Policy towards the East European Satellites*, SC (58)46, 5 May 1959.

24 TNA, FO 371/159191, sign. N 1052/1: minutes by R.H. Mason 17 February 1961; N 1052/2: minutes by Mason 13 February 1961.

the Sino–Soviet conflict which weakened the consistency and strength of the Communist Bloc. The document suggested that, for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, the policy which was established for Poland should be adopted.²⁵ The memorandum also developed the thesis of the document from 1959, assuming that any weakening of Soviet power and changes in the satellite countries would be made through an evolution, rather than through violent revolution.

The Foreign Office paper focused on the policy towards all Soviet satellites, apart from the German Democratic Republic which was not recognised by Great Britain and was treated as part of overall German policy, and Albania. In both memoranda of 1959 and 1961, British diplomacy excluded the use of force by the West, or any idea encouraging the population of these countries to rise against communist rule. In relation to the Poland memorandum, it did not provide new provisions, but in practice it spread Polish solutions to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.²⁶

An important change in comparison to the earlier British policy was that it lacked any mention of the problem of liberation of Soviet satellites as a long-term policy objective of London. This was due to the fact that the Western powers were not willing to risk war to achieve this aim. Foreseeing that the communist regimes would remain in power in Eastern Europe for a long time, the Foreign Office recognised efforts to undermine Soviet influence in this part of the continent as the main objective. It did not mean, however, Western readiness to recognise Moscow's dominance in this part of the continent. British diplomacy saw European allies of the USSR as its weak point in the Cold War struggle due to the susceptibility of Eastern European nations to the influence of Western culture, and apathy towards communist slogans.²⁷

Until 1961, the British maintained political contacts at ministerial level only with the People's Republic of Poland among the Soviet satellites. Then this policy, executed primarily in the economic and cultural fields, was to be extended to four more countries of the Bloc: Czechoslovakia, Hungary,

25 TNA, FO 371/159191, sign. N 1052/3: minutes by A. D. Wilsona 27 April 1961, minutes by Masona 12 June 1961, G. Clutton to FO 20 April 1961, R. McAlpine to Brimelow 10 August 1961; N 1052/10: memorandum *United Kingdom Policy towards the East European Satellites*, 29 August 1961.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

Romania and Bulgaria. The Foreign Office intended to encourage the governments of Eastern Europe to behave truly independently, strengthen the national spirit and make use of friction between the satellites and the USSR, if it appeared. Contacts with the governments of satellite states had to facilitate London's impact on society in the Soviet Bloc, especially on communist technocrats perceived by the British as susceptible to Western influence.²⁸

The Foreign Office did not predict the imminent possibility of the disintegration of the Communist Bloc, assuming that, in the second half of the 1960s, it would continue to last, though subjected to various internal and external tensions, resulting from the process of de-Stalinisation, the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Soviet desire to maintain control over the Bloc and the conservatism of communist authorities. In 1964, British diplomacy planned to pursue a policy of development of relations with East European countries, with the exception of the GDR and Albania. There was no intention for the propaganda to avoid negative commenting on the domestic situations in these countries, provided that this was done without "*undue provocation*".²⁹

Evidence of a change of the policy was the replacement in 1964 of the word "satellites" to a more neutral term: "East European Countries", as used in internal communication by British diplomats. The continuation of this policy can be seen in the cautious attitude of the Foreign Office toward the Prague Spring because the British Government did not want to encourage the Soviet Union to suppress changes in the communist system in Czechoslovakia. Since Alexander Dubček was the author of democratic changes, it was not a dilemma for British policy as to whether to support his moves.³⁰

The condemnation by Romanian leader, Nicolae Ceaucescu of the Warsaw Pact invasion on Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968, further strengthened his position in London. It was enough for the West that the Communist dictator suspended the participation of his country in the

28 Ibid.

29 TNA, FO 371/177821, sign. PLA 13/2: memorandum *Policy towards the East European Countries*, 24 February 1964.

30 TEBINKA, J.: Policy of Great Britain towards Poland between 1956 – 1970. In: *Acta Poloniae Historica*, 2006, No. 93, pp. 161 – 162; TEBINKA, J.: The Attitude of British Diplomacy to the Events of 1968 in Poland. In: *Acta Poloniae Historica*, 2005, No. 92, pp. 177 – 180.

military structures of the Warsaw Pact and occasionally irritated Moscow by his 'independent' policy. The issue of repression by the dictatorship in Romania did not have any greater significance since Margaret Thatcher, as Conservative opposition leader, visited this country twice in the 1970s.

Détente in East–West relations in this decade resulted in unexpected consequences for the internal developments in some Soviet Bloc countries, particularly in Poland. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), on 1 August 1975, and especially the Third Basket on human rights law, did not formally give British diplomacy the right to intervene on behalf of political prisoners in the Soviet Bloc but created an opportunity to express concerns about whether detention of dissidents had not violated the letter and spirit of the Helsinki agreement.³¹

The birth of the democratic opposition in Poland in 1976 was a process that the communist authorities failed to stop. On a much smaller scale, opposition movements calling for respect for human rights also appeared in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Apart from singular cases, it is difficult to talk then about a strong opposition in Bulgaria, Romania and the German Democratic Republic. However, quite unexpectedly, various opposition groups emerged in the Soviet Union, meeting with a strong reaction from the Communist regime, and particularly the KGB.³²

The emergence of organised opposition in Eastern Europe was a completely new event for Great Britain and the countries of the Soviet Bloc, unseen since the early postwar years. Up until the second half of the 1970s, the Foreign Office had had a lot of experience intervening in matters of human rights in communist countries, but they were mostly concerned when the interests of British citizens or their families were at stake. For decades, the British did not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries as long as British interests were not threatened. London continued this policy in the 1970s but cautiously started using the CSCE process as a tool to defend political dissidents in Soviet satellites.

At the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Oslo in May 1976, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strongly denied media inferences that US policy followed Sonnenfeldt's doctrine, indicating recognition of the Soviet

31 JARZĄBEK, W.: Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1964 – 1989. In: *Cold War History Project*, Working Paper 56, pp. 43 – 46.

32 BEAMISH, T. – HADLEY, G.: *The Kremlin's Dilemma: The Struggle for Human Rights in Eastern Europe*. London 1979, pp. 33 – 41, 84 – 106.

sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The head of American diplomacy reminded ministers of the efforts of his country to broaden the sphere of freedom there, but found as “unreasonable” any attempt to involve NATO in the “rhetoric of liberation”. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland responded by supporting without hesitation the American position of developing as many different contacts with the countries of Eastern Europe as possible.³³

In June 1976, despite the Helsinki agreement, the British treated riots in Poland – resulting from price increases – and the resulting wave of repression against protesters, as the internal affair of the Communist government in Warsaw. The British Cabinet did not even discuss the situation in Poland that summer. Events in Radom and Ursus did not affect formal Anglo–Polish relations. In the following months, the British Embassy in Warsaw often reported the activities of the opposition in Poland to the Foreign Office, including the creation of an organised opposition, especially the emergence of the Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR) in late September 1976, and the repression directed against it. This information was used in BBC broadcasts in the Polish language.³⁴

The activity of KOR in Poland, and the birth of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia in January 1977, did not change British policy towards the authorities in the Soviet satellites. Watching the actions of a more or less organised opposition, British diplomats did not intend to expose opponents of communist regimes to reprisals by getting into close contact with them. There was no question of covert operations by the SIS to support the opposition in the Soviet Bloc countries. Dissidents in communist countries received small funds from the émigré community and occasionally from NGOs.³⁵

The British assumed, after the experience of 1956, that the peoples of Eastern Europe would not give up their aspirations of liberation, even if the Western powers would not speak up for their rights in talks with the Kremlin. The liberation of the satellite states was never a priority of

33 TNA, sign. FCO 46/1361, Oslo to FCO 20 May 1976; RIBUFFO, L. P.: Is Poland a Soviet Satellite? Gerald Ford, the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, and the Election of 1976. In: *Diplomatic History*, 1990, No. 3, pp. 385 – 403.

34 PSZENICKI, K.: *Tu mówi Londyn. Historia Sekcji Polskiej BBC*. Warszawa 2009, pp. 86 and 287.

35 FRISZKE, A.: *Życie polityczne emigracji*. Warszawa 1999, pp. 399 – 408.

British foreign policy, even during the Poland's Solidarity Revolution of 1980 – 1981.

Resumé

Autor vo svojom článku analyzuje politiku Veľkej Británie voči Poľsku, ktoré sa v dôsledku vojensko-diplomatických faktorov ocitlo po 2. svetovej vojne v tábore socialistických štátov, so zameraním na postoje britskej politiky voči protikomunistickému hnutiu, ktoré existovalo nielen v Poľsku, ale aj v okolitých komunistických štátoch. Tieto postoje, samozrejme, neboli jednotné počas celých 40 rokov, ale prechádzali rôznymi modifikáciami. Pritom bola pozícia Veľkej Británie voči protikomunistickému hnutiu špecifická v tom, že musela uznať veľmocenské postavenie Sovietskeho zväzu a jeho faktickú nadvládu nad východoeurópskymi štátmi. Najmä v 50. rokoch sa Veľká Británia spoliehala v zápase s komunizmom skôr na politické vedenie boja ako na priamu podporu protikomunistických hnutí. Čiastočná zmena nastala až v druhej polovici 60. rokov, ale ani vznik disidentských hnutí v 70. rokoch apelujúcich na dodržiavanie ľudských práv neprinútil Británii k zásadnej revízii postoja voči komunistickým štátom. Oslobodenie stredo- a východoeurópskych štátov od komunizmu nebolo prioritou britskej zahraničnej politiky v druhej polovici 20. storočia.

The NSZZ Solidarnosc Coordinating Office Abroad in Fight against Polish Regime

Alexandra AFTARUK

When Martial Law was introduced in Poland, many NSZZ Solidarność members remained behind Polish borders. Together with Polish émigrés and citizens of Western states, they started to organize humanitarian help for Polish society and political support for the trade union in their homeland. As soon as December some of these union members made attempts to coordinate actions run by Solidarność on foreign territories. However, the organizational and communicational chaos, which at that time characterized the situation in Poland, was reflected in the actions of the Solidarność members abroad. Although the centralization of efforts to act for the benefit of the Polish union was in the Solidarność interest; the task of establishing a coordinating unit was too complicated to be carried out within a short time period. A few factors contributed to this state of affairs.

None of the trade union members living in the West could be considered as having a decisive voice on the movement's matters. Therefore, in order to create an official representation and manage actions abroad, Solidarność authorities in Poland had to authorize a certain group of people (or an individual) to carry out these tasks. To make that happen, two main obstacles had to be dealt with. First of all Solidarność had to rebuild its structures in Poland. All important Solidarność members in the country were either arrested, interned or in hiding. The trade union had to adapt itself to new conditions and constitute underground authorities. Only then it could start to plan the expansion of its activities behind Polish borders. The second obstacle which had to be removed was enormous

communication difficulties. It was necessary to create fast and secure communication channels which would carry the guidelines both within Poland and from Poland to the Western states.

The question of who could and would legitimize official representation was, for a long time, left without an answer. Until May 1982 there were no instructions from the movement's authorities on this matter. On the other hand, those *Solidarność* members who found themselves abroad could not predict how long they would have to stay in a foreign country. They mostly expected to go back to Poland soon, which did not encourage the development of any long term strategies on the movement's activities regarding foreign territories.

In March 1982, 483 *Solidarność* members remained behind Polish borders.¹ In the same month, the Polish Security Service (SB) launched an operation which was aimed at encouraging *Solidarność* activists to leave the country. It resulted in a new wave of political emigrants who, a few months earlier, represented an opposition movement in Poland.

In some opinions *Solidarność* members who, on the 13 December found themselves abroad as a part of the union's delegation, had a special mandate and moral obligation to act on behalf of *Solidarność* in the West. The majority of them initiated or joined actions of support for the Polish trade union. They usually understood the advantages of centrally synchronized actions. Thus, in December 1981 efforts were made to coordinate *Solidarność* activities abroad.

It is believed that the first group who made such an attempt was a group of *Solidarność* delegates who met in Zurich (Switzerland) and constituted themselves under the name of the "Solidarity Trade Union Working Group". They wrote an appeal to the United Nations Organizations and representatives of Western states to send observers to Poland, to condemn Martial Law and to impose sanctions, but above all, they tried to create some kind of a coordinating office. Faced with an objection of the Swiss authorities the latter did not succeed.²

Also in December in the United Kingdom another group consisting of *Solidarność* members tried to take action for the benefit of the Polish movement. It attended a press conference in the House of Commons, where,

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- 1 Archive of the Institute for National Remembrance (further only A IPN), signature (further only sign). BU 0236/344t. 1, Informacja Wydziału III Dep. V MSW z 16. 3. 1982.
 - 2 A IPN, sign. BU 1820/49t. 12, Notatka dot. Biura Koordynacyjnego NSZZ „Solidarność” za granicą, MSZ z 30. 5. 1985.

besides appeals for help for the Polish society and Solidarność trade union, they asked to support a nascent foreign structure of the movement.

In the next months, a few meetings of the Solidarność activists abroad were held. The most important one, which confirmed the establishment of the official Foreign Office, took place in Oslo in July 1982.³

Until August 1982 there existed fifteen unofficial Solidarność representations in ten states of Western Europe, Canada and the United States.⁴ Although, they were all composed of at least one Solidarność representative, none of these representations acted as a coordinating centre. They organized humanitarian help and political support for Solidarność workers and gathered and propagated information on the situation in Poland. In the beginning, these posts were often recognized as foreign representations of the Polish union, and as such, were supported by the Western trade unions. In some cases, Western trade unions helped to manage or even initiated establishing these committees.⁵ Apart from those representations, a substantial number of other committees and organizations existed which, unlike the unofficial representations, were not made up of former Solidarność members. Nevertheless, they also advocated in favor of the Solidarność movement in Poland and undertook the same activities. Such a big quantity of pro-Solidarność committees and organizations resulted in some problems.

Quite common were situations when different pro Solidarność committees appealed to the same institutions or organizations for financial support. This caused disintegration of funds and also repetition of efforts. Some cases were also reported when individuals asking for funds, allegedly for the Solidarność movement, kept the received sums of money (or parts of it) for themselves. Foreign trade unionists were eager to help the Polish movement but the organizational chaos and lack of official representation awoke feelings of consternation and reluctance. Therefore, there was a pressing need to create a body that would act on behalf of the underground authorities of the Polish trade union.⁶ Solidarność needed its

3 Two other important meetings took place in Brussels in January and in Paris in February.

4 According to information gathered by the III. Department, in March there were 483 *Solidarność* members abroad.

5 Swedish Labor union organization LO not only established the committee of support for *Solidarność* in Stockholm (mainly run by the Poles) but also for many years financed its maintenance.

6 In the Polish underground press one could find proposals to create a top secret foreign headquarters which would consist of highly qualified individuals, who knew traditions

foreign branch, on the one hand, to request Western help and use obtained support more effectively, on the other, to stop individuals from abusing the name of the movement in order to gain personal financial profits.

When the situation in Poland stabilized, the newly created Provisional Coordinating Commission (acronym TKK), that became illegal authorities of *Solidarność*, decided to set up its foreign office.⁷ The person responsible in the Provisional Coordinating Commission for foreign matters was Bogdan Lis. On behalf of the union, he sent a letter to Jerzy Milewski, asking him if he would agree to run the *Solidarność* foreign office.⁸ In the same letter he explained the need to unify *Solidarność* activities abroad. Milewski's first task was to subordinate all *Solidarność* representations to his office and create a centre which would act according to guidelines wrought by underground authorities in Poland. A copy of this letter was also sent to two international trade union organizations: the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) and the WCL (World Confederation of Labor), who, from the very beginning of the *Solidarność* existence, supported it in its union activities.

Milewski agreed to become a director of *Solidarność* representation abroad on the conditions imposed by the Provisional Coordinating Commission. The TKK chose Milewski's working team and presented him with names of people they trusted.⁹ Sławomir Blumsztajn was assigned to be responsible for information, Mirosław Chojecki and Sławomir Czarlewski for transport and communication with the country, Bohdan Cywiński for ideological and political issues and Barbara Ruchniewicz for the office's finances. All of them had already been involved in organizing help for *Solidarność* members in Poland.

and political ideologies of Western states. In: Hoover Institution (further only HI), Wojtek, Kilka propozycji, s. d.

- 7 The official propaganda in Poland tried to prove that formation of the Coordination Office in Brussels was inspired by Western governments (mainly the American one) and the CIA. Such information can be found in many documents prepared by the Polish security forces (SB) or intelligence service, collected by the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN). For example: A IPN, sign. BU 0236/344, t. 1 and t. 2, A IPN, sign. BU 0582/261, t. 9, A; IPN, sign. BU 01820/49, t. 4. This thesis was strongly contradicted by Pilarska. In: interview with J. Pilarska, 17. 4. 2010. Author's collection.
- 8 Letter from B. Lis to J. Milewski from 8. 5. 1982. In: Pilarska personal collection.
- 9 A few months later, Milewski was already authorized to make decisions regarding personnel. Upoważnienie wydane przez TKK 22. 11. 1982, Zestawienie danych podstawowych z 15. 4. 1990. In: Pilarska personal collection.

On the 1 July 1982, the TKK wrote an authorization letter for the NSZZ “Solidarnosc” Coordinating Office in Brussels headed by Milewski. The office’s two main tasks were to represent NSZZ Solidarność abroad and to coordinate the activities of Solidarność members behind the Polish borders. Again, the letter was also sent to the IFCTU and the WCL. The two international trade union organizations were asked to support the formation and maintenance of the foreign office. The ICFTU and the WCL, who were the biggest and most loyal supporters of *Solidarność*, agreed to help its foreign representation. Their offices were placed in Brussels, which is the main reason why this city was chosen for a location of the Coordinating Office.

The *Solidarność* Foreign Office in Brussels was officially established during a meeting of *Solidarność* activists in Oslo on 17th -19th July 1982.¹⁰ At this meeting the participants developed an official document on the tasks and framework of the NSZZ Solidarność Coordinating Office in Brussels. First of all, the office was entrusted to coordinate all help for the Polish trade union organized abroad. Secondly, on behalf of the underground authorities, it cooperated with foreign trade unions and international trade union organizations. Thirdly, it ran the information campaign in the West on the current *Solidarność* situation in Poland.

Besides this, participants of the meeting created a structure of the Coordinating Office which consisted of the head office in Belgium and its affiliates in other states. Theoretically, in 1982 the Office in Brussels had its affiliates in Amsterdam, Bremen, London, New York, Rome, Stockholm and Toronto and one department in Paris. In reality, hardly any committees agreed to submit to Milewski entirely.

These committees often had closer and wider access to information on the needs and possibilities of *Solidarność* actions in their states than the headquarters in Brussels. Thus, they were seen as a useful source of information on certain matters.¹¹ With time, financial problems, personal conflicts and differences in opinion, caused the number of affiliated posts to largely diminish. According to the office’s mail, in 1987 the Coordinating Office had only two affiliated departments left in Stockholm and Toronto, and one department in Paris (run for a long time by S. Blumsztajn).

10 The meeting was financed by the Norwegian organization *Norge-Polen Solidaritat*. In: HI, M. Zieliński, *Struktury Emigracyjne byłej NSZZ Solidarność*, 1985 Warszawa, Akademia Spraw Wewnętrznych, pp. 10 – 11.

11 Interview with J. Pilarska, 17. 4. 2010. In: Author’s collection.

The Coordinating Office in Paris operated on different grounds.¹² The Coordinating Office in Paris cooperated closely with the head office in Brussels but had a high level of authority and independence.¹³ Until the end of 1983 the collaboration between the offices in Brussels and Paris could be described as harmonious.¹⁴ Some objections and questions which emerged from time to time, only lightly influenced relations between the two representations.

Moreover, at the meeting in Oslo a council was created whose aim was to control the Brussels team and provide it with opinions and ideas. It consisted of representatives of all Solidarność offices abroad and the delegates for the first Solidarność National Congress who remained in the West. The council was supposed to meet at least once each six months, however, mainly because of financial reasons; it never really began to work.¹⁵

The Office in Brussels, as a foreign representative of a trade union, was supposed to resemble its Western counterparts. According to Milewski, it was one of the main reasons for a limited number of office workers, which was one of the characteristics of a regular foreign department of a Western trade union.¹⁶ However, considering the enormous amount of work with which the Brussels team had to struggle, it seems that the main reason for hiring only five office workers on average, was simply a lack of funds.

Only two to four people from Milewski's team were employed on a regular contract basis.¹⁷ The Coordinating Office did not have a right to be an employer, and therefore, the ICFTU and the WCL, through Western trade unions, formally provided it with few contracts. Other office members who worked as volunteers obtained, from the office itself, the small amount of money necessary to make a living in Brussels and an apartment.

12 AOK, letter from J. Pilarska to L.Gut, 9. 2. 1987.

13 GODDEERIS, I.: Lobbying Allies, The NSZZ Solidarność Coordinating Office Abroad, In: *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 13. 2011, No. 3, p. 88.

14 HI, M. Zieliński, *Struktury Emigracyjne b. NSZZ Solidarność*, 1985 Warszawa, Akademia Spraw Wewnętrznych, pp. 25 – 26.

15 A few councillors who disapproved of Milewski's undertakings met in January 1983 and decided to change the list of council's members. The new board was clearly in opposition to the head of the Coordinating Office in Brussels and tried to remove him from his post. This was one of the examples of personal conflicts, which accompanied the Solidarność foreign representation from the very beginning to its closure.

16 HI, Interview with Milewski, s. n.

17 In the beginning it was two contracts. In 1987 the Coordinating Office had four regular office workers: J. Milewski, J. Pilarska, H. Jagiełło, E. Seniuta and 4 volunteers.

The sum they got was the equivalent of an allowance for an unemployed lower grade trade union office worker in Belgium. These expenses, together with the rest of the office's running costs, were covered by: the IFCTU, the American AFL- CIO and the British PTTI.¹⁸ The running expenses of the Coordinating Office amounted to an average of 100 dollars a year.¹⁹ The money was transferred to a special bank account, separated from the main Solidarność account. Milewski's team, aware of the dollar value in Poland, tried to save money on running costs, in order to send more of it to Poland. As a result the office was organized in a very modest way.

Almost all office workers lived in the same building where the office was located. This, on the one hand, allowed them to work longer hours including nights, on the other, made it almost impossible to separate work from free time. As a consequence, the director and his deputy manager worked eighteen hours on average and felt as though they were on a foreign delegation.²⁰

Poles in the office did not command foreign languages to an extent which could let them correspond fluently and with no mistakes.²¹ This ability was crucial, because French and English were the languages in which they communicated with foreign trade unions. Translation was one of the tasks carried out by volunteers who were usually French or English native speakers (with some connection to Poland), therefore, they contributed greatly to fulfilling the office's tasks. However, volunteers usually worked for one year periods and thus, there was a constant staff rotation, which affected the results of the office's work.

The Office in Brussels also had a council of advisors with whom Milewski's team discussed all important and difficult issues. Such personalities as Bohdan Cywiński, Zdzisław Najder, Stefan Nędzyński and Krzysztof Pomian supported the Coordinating Office in its struggles. They provided the representation in Brussels with additional authority and respect abroad. Apart from their counselling role, it was also hoped that councillors' support would bring Milewski's moves more trust amongst Solidarność authorities in Poland; one factor he constantly lacked.²²

18 MILEWSKI, J.: Zestawienie danych podstawowych.

19 Polska jaka może być. Interview with Pilarska, RFE program, 13. 9. 1986.

20 Solidarność w Brukseli. RFE program, 20. 11. 1988.

21 Polska jaka może być. Interview with Pilarska, RFE program, 13. 9. 1986.

22 Interview with J. Pilarska, 17. 4. 2010. In: Author's collection.

Jerzy Milewski was the most important person in the Coordinating Office in Brussels. The TKK believed that among all Solidarnosc members staying abroad, he was the most suitable person to be put in charge of the foreign office, and asked him to accept the position. Milewski was appointed a director, despite some objections from both Polish emigration in the West and the Americans, who found Milewski`s character inappropriate for the task of representing Solidarność movement abroad.²³

In the 1960s and 1970s Milewski worked as a physician at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Gdańsk. Part of his work was attending conferences and seminars in the Western states.²⁴ Additionally, in 1967 – 1968 he went on a scholarship to Illinois, USA. At first Milewski`s frequent travels and broad Western contacts encouraged Polish services to recruit him.²⁵ However, after failed collaboration, unsuccessful recruitment attempts and also because of Milewski`s “suspicious” contacts in the West, he was soon erased from a list of potential “collaborators”.

In August 1980, Milewski joined a strike in Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk and in the next few months took an active part in the activities of Solidarność on the Polish coast. He also joined the Solidarność National Coordinating Commission (KKP) and took part in the 1st National Congress of Solidarność. Moreover, Milewski was a co-founder and a chairman of the Network of Solidarność Workplace Organizations of Leading Workplaces acronym Network (Sieć), which served as a consulting body for the Solidarność National Commission.²⁶

His activities reached out farther into the political sphere than the major current of Solidarność. On the 22 November at a Network meeting,

23 Interview with B. Lis, 27. 7. 2010. In: Author`s collection; also A IPN, sign. BU 0582/26 t. 9 J. Żyzelewicz, Informacje o Biurze Koordynacyjnym w Brukseli, 18. 8. 1984 and ZIELINSKI, M.: Struktury Emigracyjne byłej NSZZ Solidarność.

24 He also took part in expeditions in Alps as a member of Alpine Club. In: A IPN, sign. 01820/49, t. 12.

25 Before his departure to the United States, the I. Polish Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs tried to recruit him, however, Milewski strongly rejected the offer. In: A IPN, sign. BU 0204/1570, Informacja z 2. 6. 1981 dot. Figuranta sprawy operacyjnego sprawdzenia krypt. LEW. According to the same document, in the early 1960s Milewski was recruited by the II. Department, however, he never supplied any interesting information and after two years, he was no longer considered as a collaborator. Also v. HI, W. Pożoga, report, cassette no. 2, s. d.

26 See more on URL <<http://www.encyklopediasolidarnosci.pl/wiki/index.php>>.

he proposed a program for a Polish Labour Party.²⁷ Because of his strong interest in self management and the engagement in the Party, Milewski was sometimes identified as a radical current of the Polish movement. This part of his past activities, combined with what some saw as an authoritarian character, raised voices of discontent and objection when information about his nomination was revealed. He was also criticized for excessive interference in other committees' matters and imposing his own manner of action without respecting democratic rules of governance.²⁸

Two days before Martial Law was imposed in Poland, Milewski had gone to New Orleans for a Lasers' 81 Conference.²⁹ In the United States, in response to Polish events, he co-founded a committee called "Solidarity International", which was allegedly supported by American political circles and the CIA. Already in March 1982 he went to Belgium, where he continued to advocate for Solidarność. Undeniably, Milewski was the one who determined the course of action of his team in the Coordinating Office in Brussels.³⁰

Apart from Milewski, Joanna Pilarska had a leading role in the Coordinating Office. Milewski asked the TKK for permission to include her in the office team in Brussels. She took her position in March 1983 and stayed there until 1992, being at first his deputy, and after his return to Poland, the head of the Office in Brussels. Pilarska was a biologist by profession and, like him, worked in the Polish Academy of Sciences. She was engaged in the Solidarność movement already in its legal time period in the Warsaw region, yet, had little connection to Solidarność Mazovia structures. Milewski appreciated Pilarska's skills and character when in Poland. In Brussels she gained his absolute confidence.³¹ She came to Belgium already a few months after the introduction of Martial Law, and thanks to it, was aware of differences in perspectives on the foreign matters between the Solidarność members in Poland and abroad. Pilarska

27 NORR, H.: *Quite a frog to eat: Self- Management Movement and the Politics of Solidarity*. Manuscript, 1983

28 HI, notatka dot. Zjazdu emigracyjnych struktur na Zachodzie w Brukseli w dn. 29. – 30. 1. 1983.

29 A IPN, sign. BU 01820/49 t.11, Pismo JMP PAN w Gdańsku nr DN/739/82 z 1. 3. 1982 do Biura Kadr.

30 HI, Letter to Radek, 13. 11. 1984.

31 They got to know each other during mountain expeditions. In: Interview with J. Pilarska, 17. 4. 2010.

accompanied Milewski in all his foreign “business meetings”, except for the United States. There the Office in Brussels had its close co-worker – Elżbieta Wasiutyńska, who to a great extent contributed to all achievements of Milewski’s team in this country. The Coordinating Office in Brussels, apart from its affiliates, had also trusted co-workers including among others: in Australia- Sikora, in Canada- Gilewski and in Italy – Konopka.

The Coordinating Office in Brussels was given a lot of independence when fulfilling its tasks. All directives about aims which were to be achieved by the office workers came from the Provisional Coordinating Commission and Lech Wałęsa. At the same time Milewski himself decided on what means should be used to reach those goals.³²

According to the document from the year 1990 which summed up the activities of the Coordinating Office in Brussels, the office was in constant touch with the underground authorities and the head of the *Solidarność* trade union in Poland.³³ The office workers provided the authorities in Poland with reports, which described the activities of the office, presented the situation abroad and proposed possible measures. Letters from Brussels often included strong suggestions on how certain foreign matters should be dealt with. Milewski, in his letters, informed union activists in Poland on what steps they should take to gain support for the union abroad. For example, he informed them to whom they should write letters and what such letters should include.³⁴ He also updated them on foreign events, in which according to him, *Solidarność* should have been represented.³⁵ Moreover, he described Western democratic mechanisms, which he believed Polish trade unions should follow, whenever entering the international arena.

Apart from letters, the Office in Brussels communicated with Poland through special couriers. There were also failed attempts to create a communication system using sailors and later on, mini computers.³⁶

In the first years of activities of the Office in Brussels, correspondence that came from Poland was rare and short, both from the Provisional

32 A IPN, sign. BU 514.35, t. 10, Rozmowa z Pilarską o polityce zagranicznej *Solidarności*, RFE program, 7. 1. 1986.

33 Milewski, J.: Zestawienie danych podstawowych z 15. 4. 1990.

34 Według danych zawartych w Zestawieniu, Biuro wysłało do kraju około 10 obszernych raportów rocznie.

35 Korespondencja Biura w Brukseli była od 1984 roku szyfrowana.

36 HI, Report on *Solidarność* emigration in the West, c.f.

Coordinating Commission and Lech Wałęsa.³⁷ There were also time periods when letters from Poland did not come at all.³⁸ Such situations were caused by exacerbating the regime's repressions against the underground authorities of the movement, most of all by arrests. When the situation in Poland normalized and the opposition was given more space for a manoeuvre, communication between Brussels and Poland visibly improved. One of the factors which also contributed to more frequent communication was a change in the position of a person responsible for communication with the Coordinating Office within the Provisional Coordinating Commission. Jacek Merkel replaced Bogdan Lis at this post. He knew Milewski from Network and was also a good link between the office in Brussels and Lech Wałęsa. Merkel helped to convince underground authorities of the movement to take certain moves proposed by Milewski.

Although, the members of the Provisional Coordinating Commission were mostly aware of the fact that the office workers in Brussels had more knowledge on the socio-political and economic situation in the West, they were not always sure if Milewski was correct in his judgments. Underground authorities in Poland had a limited access to information on matters regarding the Western part of the Iron Curtain and no experience of democratic systems or capitalist economy. Many times, their views on the Western situation were much different from the ones in Brussels and even contradicted Milewski's opinions. In such cases, the director of the Coordinating Office tried to persuade Solidarność members in Poland that a given undertaking was rational and would bring profits for the Polish movement.³⁹

Nevertheless, not always did he manage to convince trade union authorities in Poland that he was right and thus, sometimes his team had to take certain steps with which it did not agree.⁴⁰ Although, disaccord in judgments between Solidarność authorities in Poland and its official

37 Sometimes Office Workers were not sure if their mail was read by the right addressee. Joanna Pilarska, Biuro Koordynacyjne NSZZ Solidarność za Granicą. Interview with J. Pilarska, 17. 4. 2010. In: Author's collection.

38 In one of his letters Milewski complains that he hadn't had any contact with TKK representatives for almost a year. AOK, Letter from Milewski to Wałęsa, TKK i RKW from 28. 4. 1985.

39 For instance, after a long process of argumentation, Milewski's team managed to convince the authorities in Poland that affiliation with ICFTU and WCL was in Solidarność interest.

40 Interview with J. Pilarska, 17. 4. 2010. In: Author's collection.

foreign representation was detrimental to the effectiveness of *Solidarność* activities abroad, it seemed to be a natural outcome of two different perspectives: Eastern and Western. There was no doubt that the leadership in Poland was the only decision-maker in the movement and all Milewski could do, was to strongly suggest certain behaviour.

One of the most important tasks of Milewski's team in Brussels was representing NSZZ *Solidarność* in the international trade union movement.⁴¹ The activities of the Office in Brussels were also to be proof that the Polish trade union not only existed and was active in Poland, but had also enough strength to act abroad. Therefore, the Coordinating Office continuously cooperated with Western trade unions and their trade union organizations and acted as a mediator between foreign trade union authorities and *Solidarność* authorities in Poland. The Coordinating Office also had the task of running a registry of cooperation agreements between foreign trade union organizations and *Solidarność*.⁴²

At the start, the Provisional Coordinating Commission did not allow Milewski to represent *Solidarność* in front of other non trade union international and national organizations or at the governmental level.⁴³ It was feared that if the Office in Brussels had involved itself in any political arrangements, it would have hindered future *Solidarność* talks with Polish authorities. Any activities associated with political engagement were seen as an obstacle for mitigating the regime's repressions and restoring *Solidarność* rights. When the situation in Poland stabilized and the underground authorities lost hopes for Polish authorities' good will, this rule was changed. As a result, the Coordinating Office could, without any further authorizations, represent *Solidarność* anywhere where it saw a chance to obtain unconditional support for the Polish trade union.

The second vital office's assignment was to organize financial and technical aid in the West and transport it to the country. Material help was the most measurable contribution to the movement's fight against Communism which came from Brussels. It constantly supplied the trade union authorities in Poland, with technical aid and money, which was the answer to requests from Poland.

41 AOK, Najder Collection, Uchwała TKK w sprawie Biura Koordynacyjnego w Brukseli, 15. 4. 1986.

42 CHWALBA, A.: *Czasy Solidarności. Francuscy Związkowcy i NSZZ „Solidarność” 1980 – 1990*. Kraków 1997, p. 142.

43 AOK, Letter from Lis to Milewski, 8. 5. 1982.

Each year the Provisional Coordinating Commission provided the Coordinating Office with a budget for the coming year, which contained a list of demands for technical equipment and financial supplies. As its basis the Coordinating Office solicited funds for *Solidarność*. The budget was brought forward, most of all, to the trade union organizations, who covered between 80 to 85 percent of the whole costs.⁴⁴ The biggest part of the budget was covered by the American trade union organization AFL-CIO. The remaining 15 – 20% came from the polish émigré organizations in the West.⁴⁵ All money that went through the Coordinating Office was meticulously checked by a special commission, made up of representatives from the ICFTU and the WCL. Donators had to be certain that money they transferred reached its Polish addressee. At the same time, all the confirmations did not include much detail, and were organized in a way which would not risk *Solidarność* members' security.

The Coordinating Office in Brussels was forbidden to choose the addressee for *Solidarność* funds that it managed to obtain. All decisions on who would get the material support were made by the *Solidarność* authorities in Poland. The biggest part of the material help sent to Poland was technical equipment. All technical devices necessary to run oppositional activities, especially the ones associated with print and communication, were almost impossible to acquire in Poland. They were either not for sale on the Polish market, or their purchase entailed serious risk of being charged with anti-regime activities. Thus, western money was of a secondary importance when compared with concrete equipment.⁴⁶

The underground authorities in Poland followed a special pattern when distributing material aid to specific regions. They decided that only the *Solidarność* structures which proved to be well organized and successful in the fight against the Communist regime, deserved to be provided with such foreign support.⁴⁷ According to the Provisional Coordinating Commission, trade union activists had to, first of all, rely on themselves and not on foreign help. This rule was supposed to encourage *Solidarność* members to be more active and efficient. What is more, it was one of the ways to diminish a possibility of confiscating a new set of devices, by the

44 Polska jaka może być. Interview with Pilarska, RFE program, 13. 9. 1986.

45 According to Chwalba, the remaining sum was also financed by the Western governments In: CHWALBA, A.: *Czasy Solidarności*, p. 160.

46 Interview with B. Lis, 27. 7. 2010. In: Author's collection.

47 AOK, Letter from Lis to Milewski from 28. 8. 1982.

Security Forces, as a consequence of irresponsible actions taken by certain Solidarność structures. In reality the majority of foreign help went to structures closely cooperating with TKK.

It was not the office's job to provide help for Solidarność emigrés and their families.⁴⁸ The Coordinating Office only supported political emigration by providing them with contacts to appropriate émigré or Polish institutions abroad.⁴⁹ This rule was not set up by the office itself but came as a directive from the underground authorities in Poland.

Another important task assigned to Milewski's team was to gain political support for NSZZ Solidarność. The office workers tried to stimulate foreign actions in defence of persecuted Polish activists and put pressure on the Polish regime to recognize NSZZ Solidarność rights to its existence.

Moreover, Milewski's team propagated information on the situation of the illegal NSZZ Solidarność and socio-political situation in Poland. The Coordinating Office in Brussels tried to keep the issue of the Polish workers on the international agenda. It presented information on the current state of affairs of the Polish movement on the international forums of such organizations as the International Labour Organization, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. It also supplied the foreign media with such information. What is more, Western state institutions saw it as a good source of information. The Office in Brussels was in permanent contact with labor attachés of foreign states. There were time periods when American ambassadors visited the office at least once a week.⁵⁰

Keeping foreign interest focused on Polish affairs was not an easy task. In the eighties the world suffered various political and humanitarian crises, and although Polish opposition was also in need, there were groups or movements who needed international help more urgently. Moreover, it is the nature of the media to quickly abandon their previous subject of research to change it for something new. Therefore, constant drawing attention of the West to the repressed trade union in Poland was the office's great success.

In order to obtain Western help for Solidarność, the Brussels' team tried to strengthen the movements placed among Western trade unions. Already in its legal time period the Polish movement created a network of contacts

48 AOK, Oświadczenie TKK, 22. 11. 1982.

49 HI, Interview with J. Milewski, s. n.

50 Interview with J. Pilarska, 17. 4. 2010. In: Author's collection.

with foreign trade union organizations. Therefore, the Coordinating Office did not have to start from the very beginning. Its task was to intensify and develop existing contacts in order to bring Polish workers maximum material and political support. To achieve that, Milewski decided to create a false image of Solidarnosc where it was pictured as a trade union instead of a resistance movement. This enabled Western trade unions to treat Solidarność as their real counterpart. Obviously, such a narrow definition of Solidarność was far away from the truth, which Milewski was fully aware of. Although, Solidarność was a social movement in form of a trade union who fought against the Communist regime, Milewski and his co-workers in Brussels, believed that maintaining a purely trade union character of Solidarność was a sine qua non for its existence on the Western agenda and the most crucial condition which had to be fulfilled in order to obtain any support. If Solidarność had been pictured as an amorphous movement, with no clear structures or authorities, which also involved no responsibility, it would not have been a trustworthy partner for any cooperation or worthy support.⁵¹

His picture of the Polish trade union was quite often contradicted by Solidarność members in Poland and caused misunderstandings in the West about its real nature.⁵² Nevertheless, it seems that Milewski did manage to achieve his goal. Western trade unions were the biggest supporters of the Polish movement in the West.

The Coordinating Office also tried to counter fight an image of Solidarność which depicted it as a divided movement. Milewski's team knew that such a picture seriously weakened trust and confidence in the Polish trade union. This image was also used as an argument for pointing out that help for Solidarność was a pointless waste of resources and time.⁵³ Therefore, the office workers tried to conceal all the fractures visible in the movement's structures. Thus, falsifying the real image of Solidarność was one of the office's important tasks.

The two biggest Solidarność advocates: the ICFTU and the WCL from the very beginning supported Solidarność.⁵⁴ The independent Polish

51 Ibid.

52 HI, Najder memoire, 1987.

53 AOK, List doradców do TKK, s.n.

54 According to Goddeeris their support should not be seen as the office's success, as the ICFTU and the WCL always supported foreign trade unions persecuted by their governments. GODDEERIS, I.: *Lobbying Allies?*, pp. 83 – 125.

movement attracted a lot of interest in the trade union world. It brought new elements into the Western trade union structures, which in the eighties were going through difficulties. *Solidarność* who came into being and continued its activities against all the circumstances and who also united all employees, instead of only certain professions, appeared as a potential inspiration for an improvement, and thus deserved attention.⁵⁵

However, not all ICFTU and WCL members were always voting in favour of the Polish trade union. Sometimes, a Western trade union believed that it was in its interest to oppose a certain proposal made by the Polish movement. German DGBs, stand on *Solidarność* membership in the European Confederation of Trade Unions could serve as an example. DGB supported many *Solidarność* foreign undertakings, however, strongly opposed its affiliation with ETUC (forum uniting West European trade union organizations). Whenever such a situation took place, Milewski's team in Brussels tried to either change Western opinions or to work out some compromise with West European trade unions. Indeed Milewski often succeeded in persuading Western trade union authorities to support *Solidarność* in certain cases.⁵⁶ At the same time, his success was dependant on external factors such as political situation or current policy of a Western trade union.

One of the biggest achievements of Milewski's team was NSZZ *Solidarność* double affiliation with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World Confederation of Labor. The members of the Coordinating Office in Brussels made a lot of effort to convince both underground authorities in Poland and Western trade unions to accept Polish union into these two international organizations.⁵⁷ When in November 1986, *Solidarność* became a member of those two trade union organizations; it gained legal status and support deriving from an obligation to help a member of the same organization. Double affiliation was a great achievement for two reasons. First of all, *Solidarność* was illegal

55 According to Chwalba, trade unions regarded internationalization of *Solidarność* issues as one of their important tasks. CHWALBA, A.: *Czasy Solidarności*, p. 178.

56 To get to know more about relations between *Solidarność* and Western trade unions see GODDEERIS, I.: *Lobbying Allies?*.

57 There were three main arguments against affiliation in Poland. Firstly, it was feared that affiliation would give regime authorities an excuse for intensifying repressions. Secondly, some members were afraid that the Western side would reject their request. Finally, there were objections against the Leftist character of the ICFTU and doubts based on the small size of the WCL.

in its own country and thus, its recognition by Western international organizations was seen as a symbolic blow to the Polish regime. Secondly, until 1986, double affiliation took place only once. The ICFTU and the WCL competed with each other and therefore, it was difficult to develop an affiliation formula which would satisfy both organizations. Milewski's team managed to encourage international trade unions to work out a compromise and strengthen Solidarność position on the international arena. Today, affiliation with ICFTU and WCL is mentioned as one of Solidarność most important achievements in the field of foreign relations.

The second big attribution in the fight against the Polish regime was the office's engagement in the case of examination as to whether Poland breached law guaranteed by the International Labor Organization (ILO)'s conventions.⁵⁸ The examination focused on two conventions: numbers 87 and 98, which among other things, stated that setting up a new trade union did not require the state's approval. The Coordinating Office in Brussels had a leading role in the process of preparing documentation, providing witnesses and fulfilling all procedures associated with the case of accusing Poland for violating these two agreements. In response, the Polish government unsuccessfully tried to blackmail ILO's authorities and refused to provide information that it was asked for by the examination commission. As a result of the whole examination process, in 1984 Poland (for a few years) withdrew from this organization. For Solidarność, ILO was an important international forum; because it included not only voices of representatives of employers and trade unions but also representatives of governments. It enabled the illegal trade union to win a symbolic battle with the Polish authorities. Poland was condemned for breaching ILO's law and at the same time, Solidarność' status as a regime's victim was one more time loudly emphasized on the international arena.

Another great achievement of the Office in Brussels was obtaining one million dollars from American Congress in July 1987 and similar sums of money in the years that followed. It took the Coordinating Office a lot of effort to, first of all, convince American congressmen to financially support Polish opposition and secondly, to allocate money for NSZZ Solidarność. Many opponents in Poland, also from Solidarność ruling circles, believed that it was better to assign funds to the Polish opposition including other anti-Communist organizations, and similarly as in the case of affiliation,

58 The whole process of accusing the Polish government of breaking ILO's law started already in June 1982.

were afraid that accepting money from the illegal trade union would cause intensified repression. Milewski's team managed to persuade both the American and Polish side that one million dollars would be profitable for *Solidarność*.⁵⁹

One million dollars could be seen as the office's success in two dimensions. Apart from its most obvious financial aspect; *Solidarność* case was brought to the attention of American Congress and thus, added political aspect to this achievement.

Other small political successes of Milewski were his meetings with the representatives of the Western states. The most significant of these meetings was an audience by the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan on the 21 October 1985. Milewski represented the illegal trade union in front of the head of the world superpower, which once again enhanced *Solidarność* position on the international arena.⁶⁰ The office's director also advocated for *Solidarność* to Western ministers and Prime Ministers. For example, in November 1984 he asked the Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme for supporting *Solidarność* and in December he made a similar request to the Portuguese Prime Minister Mario Soares. Although, Milewski's team did not believe that such meetings could bring any concrete political results, it was important to remind the international public opinion that the Polish movement was still active in the fight against the regime.

The office workers in Brussels also tried to influence the development of a final document of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe during the Madrid session. They tried to exert political pressure on Western foreign ministers to add to the document more anti-Communist character.⁶¹ However, as it was a forum for both East and West, where both sides had to reach an agreement, they did not manage to change the outcome of the talks.

The Coordinating Office in Brussels also experienced difficult time periods and failures. The Office lost a lot in terms of its reputation in 1985 when Polish Security Forces simulated a burglary into its headquarters.⁶²

59 Ela Wasiutyńska – the office's co-worker in the USA, had an enormous contribution to convincing American congressmen to allocate money to *Solidarność*.

60 The meeting lasted around 20 minutes and Wasiutyńska was also present.

61 A IPN, sign. BU 236/344, t. 4, Informacja dot. Aktualnych kierunków działania zagranicznych struktur S 22. 6. 1983, MSW, Dep I.

62 HI, W. Pożoga, report, cassette no. 2, s. d.

In Poland public opinion believed that documents presented by Polish authorities indeed were stolen by Jacek Knapik from Brussels. Although, it was not true, Milewski's team struggled to regain trust among Solidarność members in Poland and make them feel secure about the correspondence which they sent abroad.

The biggest failure of the Coordinating Office was the confiscation of a 20 ton truck with the technical equipment heading to Solidarność structures in Poland. The truck was denounced by a Swedish customs official and stopped in Świnoujście on the 28th November 1986.⁶³ It was worth approximately 200,000 dollars.⁶⁴ Milewski was criticized for sending such a big transport, instead of dividing it into smaller loads, which caused a loss of a significant amount of trade union funds.

The Coordinating Office in Brussels was the only foreign post which agreed to fulfill instructions sent from Poland and was ready to account for them. Without a doubt, the office workers from Brussels to a large extent influenced maintenance of support for Solidarność on the international arena from its founding to the end of the eighties. It also supplied Solidarność oppositional structures with the funds and equipment necessary to fight against the Polish regime. The Polish authorities regarded its activities as detrimental and a few times protested to the Belgian government against its existence.

It is difficult to measure the size of Milewski's team's contribution to the fight against the Polish regime. Once answering this question, one should take into account very limited resources and difficult conditions with which the Coordinating Office had to deal. The office had an insufficient amount of personnel and money. All its actions were confined to directives and guidelines provided by the authorities in Poland, who did not have time to give much attention to its efforts. Additionally, for a long time, Milewski's team had to deal with communication difficulties with Poland and detrimental activities of the Polish intelligence services, which tried to destroy the office. Despite all these difficult conditions, apart from political and material support, it managed to keep the issue of the persecuted Polish trade union on the international agenda, mediated with Western trade unions and served as a source of information both on the West and for the West. The Provisional Coordinating Commission never

63 The driver was arrested and later bought out from Solidarność funds.

64 CHWALBA, A.: *Czasy Solidarności*, p. 183.

attempted to replace Milewski in his position and was satisfied with the results of his work.

As one of the emigrational activists wrote in his letter: *“Brussels [...] supports Polish oppositional underground and is an official embassy of TKK. It runs “big politics” supported by the Western states. And it provides the funds. God be with them!”*⁶⁵

Although, it is difficult to measure to what extent the NSZZ Solidarnosc Coordinating Office in Brussels contributed to the fight against the Polish regime, it definitely played its part in dismantling the Polish regime and deserves the attention of contemporary scholars.

Resumé

Keď bolo v Poľsku nastolené stanné právo, represie režimu donútili mnohých aktivistov Solidarity, aby opustili svoju domovinu. Viacerí však aj v zahraničí pokračovali v boji za slobodné Poľsko, ľudské a sociálne práva. Vytvorili výbory a organizácie na podporu odborov. Až do polovice roku 1982 nemal žiadny z týchto orgánov oficiálne poverenie od Solidarity v Poľsku. Iba novovytvorený Dočasný koordinačný výbor inicioval založenie kancelárie, ktorá by oficiálne zastupovala toto poľské hnutie.

Koordinačná kancelária NSZZ Solidarita v Bruseli zastupovala Solidaritu v medzinárodnom odborovom hnutí a spolupracovala s mnohými jej pobočkami a odborárskymi organizáciami. Sústreďovala materiálnu i politickú pomoc pre najväčšie opozičné hnutie vo východnej Európe a západnú verejnú mienku informovala o aktuálnej situácii v Poľsku.

Podľa potreby fungovala verejne alebo v utajení, ale vždy podľa pravidiel, ktoré prijali najvyššie ilegálne orgány Solidarity. Činnosť Koordinačnej kancelárie v Bruseli prispela k tomu, aby sa problematika poľskej opozície udržiavala v pozornosti zahraničia a pomohla aktivistom Solidarity v Poľsku, aby pokračovali v ich boji na území Poľska.

65 HI, letter Drogi Radku from 13. 11. 1984, s.n.

The Romanian Anti-Communist Resistance: the League for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania from Paris (1979 – 1989)

Beatrice SCUTARU

“*The Romanian dissidence exists in Paris and its name is Paul Goma*”.¹ Michael Shafir’s deliberately exaggerated statement is meant to emphasise the absence of actions opposed to the Romanian communist regime prior to what we are used to calling the ‘Goma movement’, from 1977.²

After the establishment of communism in Romania, some intellectuals fled the country and settled on the other side of the Iron Curtain (France, England, Federal Republic of Germany, the United States...). The historical and emotional bond connecting Romanians to France, viewed as a land of freedom and protection of human rights, has played an important role in the decision that many of them made to choose Paris as their new home. Some of the Romanians living in Paris felt that they had to show Western European citizens what they thought to be the truth about the Romanian regime. By founding organisations, creating newspapers and literary reviews, publishing articles in well-known Western newspapers and taking a public stand, they continued their fight against the Ceausescu

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- 1 The Romanian writer Paul Goma sent, in January 1977, two letters, one to Pavel Kohout and the signatories of the Charter 77, expressing his solidarity and the second to Ceausescu, asking him to support the initiative.
 - 2 DELETANT, D.: *Ceausescu si Securitatea. Constrângere si dizidență în Romania anilor 1965 – 1989*. Bucuresti 1998, p. 225.

regime. When asked why he decided to act against the Romanian regime and not just enjoy his life as a free man, Ion Dumitriu (a Romanian in exile in Western Germany) said that it was “*the commitment towards my friends [...] to be the messenger of their cry of despair and of the tragic reality they were living*”.³ This was also a way for them to justify their coming to France and their situation as political refugees.

The dissidents’ purpose was not to overthrow the regime but to make the Romanian government establish new relations with its own citizens, based on conformation to internal and international legislation. The event that has played a crucial role in the propagation of anti-communist movements was the signature, on 1 August 1975, of the Final Helsinki Act by the representatives of 35 states, including communist ones. By signing this document, the states committed themselves to respect and apply its principles.⁴ Historians agree that all dissident movements that took place in Eastern countries were possible, thanks to a change in the international situation. After the signing of the Helsinki act, dissidence took a different turn. All dissidents understood that they had to talk about human rights in order to move international public opinion. As it was guaranteed by the communist countries’ constitutions, the movement demanding the respect of the legislation could not attack the political, social or economic order of the regime.⁵ The dissidents were thus offered the legal support they needed to prove that the communist regimes violated the international conventions ratified by their own governments. The League for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania (LDHR) is part of this protest movement.

If many studies have been conducted on the anti-communist actions of Romanian citizens, they concerned almost exclusively those organised inside the country’s borders. Aside from a study on the Association of the Former Political Prisoners from Romania, most of the research on the Romanian exile concerns the literary reviews and radio shows produced in Western countries. For example, while analysing Radio Free Europe broadcasts, researchers showed more interest in the literary programmes than in the political ones. This situation is rather surprising as one might

3 POPESCU, T.: *Convorbiri despre exil si literatură*. Bucuresti 2001, p. 60.

4 CATANUS, A.-M.: Disidentă si represiune în epoca Nicolae Ceausescu. O analiză comparativă: Paul Goma-Vlad Georgescu. In: BUDEANCA, C. – OLTEANU, F. (eds.): *Forme de represiune în regimurile comuniste*. Iasi 2009, p. 257.

5 *Comisia prezidentiala pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste din Romania, Raport final*. Bucuresti 2006, pp. 360 – 362.

think political shows would have a more important influence on Romanian citizens. The specificity may be a result of the great amount of information concerning this particular group of Romanian dissidents. Either way, despite the available documentation, the history of the League is yet to be written.

The purpose of our study is to present how the League for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania has struggled against the communist regime and has tried to show the world the human rights violations that were being committed in Romania. This research will be divided into three different sections: after introducing some historical facts on the creation and evolution of the League, we shall present the organisation's means of action and finish our study with a focus on the Free Trade Union of the Working People of Romania.

In order to carry out this study, the comparison of documents from different archival centres has been very useful. I was able to analyse the League's archives (at the BDIC), some of Gabanyi Anneli Ute's documents preserved at the Romanian national archives⁶, the official archives of the Romanian secret police, the *Securitate*, and the documents preserved by the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile. Interviews conducted by the author with former dissidents brought out the personal perspective, thus complementing the classical archival research and giving life to the information found therein. The interest of our study lies in the fact that it brings out the role of regular citizens in Cold War international relations.

1. The League for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania from Paris. Structure and evolution:

Following the signing of the Final Helsinki Act in 1975, several protest movements were born in Eastern Europe. In Romania, Paul Goma initiated the first human rights protest in 1977. The Romanian regime reacted rapidly, trying to contain the spread of this action and most of the internal and international media coverage. In order to inform international public opinion about the goals of this movement and the Romanian regime's reaction towards its members, by February 1977, the creation of a Committee

6 Gabanyi Anneli Ute was the director of the Romanian Research section of RFE.

for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania seemed necessary.⁷ Soon after the creation of this Committee, other cases of persecution perpetrated by the Socialist Republic of Romania came to its attention. These concerned the miners' strike in the Jiu Valley, that took place in 1977, the persecution of Romanian citizens for their religious beliefs and of the members of the Free Trade Union of the Working People in Romania (1979). It was also during this last year, 1979, that the Committee changed its status and became the League for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania (LDHR), in order to provide the organisation with a more precise legal status. At this time, the organisation had about 70 members⁸.

The League's main goal has been to collect and communicate information to international organisations and the media concerning the violations of human rights committed by the Romanian communist regime. The League also supported the creation of links between all the people, groups, organisms or federations fighting for the respect of human rights.⁹ Even if the Romanian government signed several international agreements on the respect of human rights or citizens' freedom, these laws were not applied in Romania. The League wanted to emphasise the difference between Romania's international image and the realities of its domestic politics.

The League was very selective with its members. Only natural persons could become members of the League, as opposed to artificial, legal or juristic persons. To become a member, each person had to write and sign a request explaining the reasons for his/her demand. Two persons, already members of the League, had to vouch for him/her.¹⁰ Organisations or groups could not become members of the League. This seems to be a security measure as it was easier to check information on one individual and to find out if they were infiltrated agents of the Romanian government. The members of the League were certain that the Romanian authorities would try to infiltrate their organisation. The same security measures were

7 Arhivele Institutului de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului și Memoria Exilului Românesc (Archives of the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile, further only AIICCMER), Bucharest, Archives of Sanda Stolojan, File No 9, *Rapport of the League for the FIDH*, September 1983, 7 p.

8 Ibid.

9 Archives de la Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine (Archives of the International Contemporary Documentation Library, further only ABDIC) Paris, LDHR, Box No. 1, File No. 4, *Statutes of the League for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania (LDHR)*, 1983, 5 p.

10 Ibid.

used by other dissident groups or associations as, for example, Leonid Mamaliga's literary circle, created in Paris.¹¹ Files created by the Romanian political police show that infiltration was one classic measure used by the *Securitate* when dealing with this kind of group. Its purpose was to find out information about the activities and relations of the Romanian dissidents. This information was later used against the group, in order to neutralise its actions.

The League's members were several Romanians living in France and some French citizens interested in the Eastern country's realities. Among them, we wish to emphasise the names of the most active members of the Committee: Constantin Cesianu, Mihai Korne, Mihnea Berindei, Sanda Stolojan, Maria Bratianu, Marie-France Ionesco, Dan Bosnief-Paraschivescu, Anne and François Planche¹². Anne Planche studied in Cluj, in the 1950s. During her stay with a peasant family from Ardeal, the central region of Romania, she witnessed the collectivisation of agriculture. Even after she went back to France, she continued to show interest in Romania's evolution and played an active part in the anti-communist movements.¹³ The others were well known members of the Romanian Diaspora in Paris. Constantin Cesianu was a former political prisoner who came to France in 1967. Soon after settling, he initiated a series of actions hostile to the Romanian communist regime.¹⁴ Mihai Korne fled the country in 1949. He was known by the *Securitate* especially for spreading hateful pamphlets on the Socialist Republic of Romania.¹⁵ Maria Bratianu came from a very famous and ancient family of liberal Romanian politicians, victims of the communist regime. Marie-France Ionesco is the daughter of the well-known playwright, Eugen Ionesco. Sanda Stolojan came to France in 1961

11 Arhivele Centrului National pentru Studiul Arhivelor Securitatii (Archives of the National Council for the Study of the Securitate's Archives, further only ACNSAS), Bucharest. File No. 6809, vol. I, *Note No. 225/R5/0041633/08.04.1977*.

12 AIICCMER, Archives of Sanda Stolojan, File No. 9, *The League for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania from Paris*, 1983, 7 p.

13 PARASCHIV, V.: *Lupta mea pentru sindicatelor libere în Romania*. Iasi 2005, p. 67.

14 ACNSAS, File No, 44169, Note No. a-15: 0044002/03.02.1981.

15 ACNSAS, File No. 162918, vol. I, *Sheet concerning Korne Mihai* (25 May 1965) and *Sheet of measures concerning Korne Mihai* (22 November 1965).

and was the interpreter for the French presidents' relations with Romania (Charles de Gaulle and François Mitterand).¹⁶

The association's steering committee consisted of a chairman, a treasurer and a secretary who had to be French citizens¹⁷. This obligation of being a French citizen seems to be another security measure. In order to become a French citizen each person must meet several criteria, one of which is having lived in France for a certain period of time. Maybe this was seen as a means to avoid the risk of an infiltrated government agent.

The first members of the steering committee were Constantin Cesianu as the chairman, the treasurer Dan Bosnief-Paraschivesco and the secretary Maria Bratianu.¹⁸ She was the only member of the steering committee that kept her position all through the existence of the association. All three were well-known members of the Romanian Diaspora in Paris. In 1983, upon the death of Constantin Cesianu, Sanda Stolojan became the new chairman of the association, until 1991, when Alexandru Paleologu (former Ambassador of Romania in France) took over until 1992.¹⁹ Dan Bosnief-Paraschivesco was the League's treasurer until 1988 when Dinu Zamfirescu replaced him (1988-1992). The same year, Mihnea Berindei was elected vice-chairman of the LDHR. He was in charge of relations with the media.²⁰ Dinu Zamfirescu fled the country in 1975. When he arrived in France, he joined the anti-communist groups of Romanian emigration and created the Association of the Former Political Prisoners in Romania. For the League, he also questioned Romanians who fled their country in order to gather information on the 'discriminations' perpetrated against ancient members of the traditional political parties of Romania, data that he then sent to Radio Free Europe²¹. Ariadna Iuhă Combes, the daughter

16 PELIN, M.: *Opisul emigrasiei politice: destine în 1222 de fise alcătuite pe baza dosarelor din arhivele Securității*. Bucuresti 2002, pp. 309 – 310.

17 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 1, File No. 4, *Statutes of the association League for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania (LDHR)*, 1983, 5 p.

18 Ibid.

19 AIICCMER, Archives of Sanda Stolojan, File No. 9, *The League for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania from Paris*, 1983, 7 p.

20 ABDIC, Box No. 1, File No. 1, *Minutes of the General Assembly of the League of Defence of Human Rights of Romania*, 25 May 1988, 2 p.

21 DUMITRU, D. – HUIU, I. – NANU, V.: *Personalități ale exilului românesc în arhivele securității*. Bucuresti 2007, p. 127.

of the well-known Romanian dissident Doina Cornea, became the second vice-chairman in 1989.²²

Table No 1: Steering committee of the League for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania, from Paris.

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1983	1985	1985	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Chairman	Constantin Cesianu				Sanda Stolojan						Alexandru Paleologu			
Secretary	Maria Bratianu													
Treasurer	Dan Bosnief-Paraschivescu						Dinu Zamfirescu							

In 1982, at the International Congress of the Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) held in Montreal, the LDHR was accepted as a member of the International Federation of Human Rights. This allowed the League to enhance its international impact, due to the Federation's prestige and increased possibility of diffusing information. From that moment on, the line "*member of the International Federation of Human Rights*" was always present on the official documents of the League.²³

In 1983, in order to improve its representative platform on the international stage, the organisation introduced a new section to its statutes (7bis.). They were now able to create sections of the LDHR in other states, and extend the activity of the association outside of France. All sections had to be situated outside of France and had a mandatory name: the term *Section* had to be followed by the name of the state, the region or the city of the section and the line "*of the League for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania*". The full name had to be mentioned on all official documents of the section.²⁴ Ever since 1985, the League had a correspondent in England, which helped to transmit information to the local media and translate the Romanian journals created in France, that were specially meant for Romanians; the *Newsletter* of the LDHR, as well as the documents of its General Assembly, have all been written in French.

22 ABDIC, Box No. 1, File No. 1, *Minutes of the General Assembly of the League of Defence of Human Rights of Romania*, 7 June 1989.

23 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 2, File No. 1, *Discourse of the chairman of the League, Constantin Cesianu, on the occasion of LDHR becoming a member of the FIDH*, Montréal, May 1982, 4 p.

24 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 1, File No. 4, *Statutes of the association League for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania (LDHR)*, 1983, 5 p.

2. *The League's means of action:*

As said earlier, the League's purpose was to collect and communicate information about the violations of human rights committed in Romania. Like all the dissidents living in Paris, the LDHR members had several means of obtaining information about Romania: talking to the family members or friends living in Romania, meeting with Romanians visiting France and sometimes Romanians called them to inform them of their actions. The active members were part of a network of dissidents. Despite their differences, they all tried to ensure the spread of the information. Some of the members of the League were also working for Western newspapers or public service broadcasters (BBC, Reuters) or radio (RFE). This way they could have access to all the information from and concerning Romania, but also transmit the League's messages.²⁵ For some dissidents from Romania, being known on the other side of the Iron Curtain was a guarantee of safety. It was more difficult to make them disappear without arousing any reaction from the West. The purpose was to make their name known, putting international pressure on the Romanian government. In one of his articles, Dinu Zamfirescu asked: "*Are the Romanian authorities capable of respecting human rights only under the pressure of the international public opinion?*"²⁶ The dissidents understood that international pressure was the only element able to determine changes in the Socialist Republic of Romania.

During the late 1970s and the 1980s, it was difficult for Romanians to make their protest known on the other side of the Iron Curtain. There were no more foreign media representatives in Romania and few Western journalists were able to enter Romania, compared to other European communist states. This is why their visibility on the other side of the Iron Curtain depended almost exclusively on personal or occasional links with foreign countries and their access to radio stations like RFE, Voice of America or the BBC.²⁷ The League played a major part in making these dissidents known.

The main human rights violations from Romania, against which the League has fought, were the lack of freedom of association, existence of political prisoners, obstruction of family reunification, disappearance

25 Interview with Dinu Zamfirescu on 7 June 2011, Bucharest.

26 ZAFIRESCU, D.: "O grevă a foamei la Paris". In: *Dialog*, No. 76, June 1987.

27 *Comisia prezidentiala pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste din Romania*, p. 367.

of dissidents and development of repressive legislation.²⁸ In order to better monitor the different types of human rights violations, several working groups were formed inside the League. Dinu Zamfirescu and D. Cernavodeanu gathered information on political prisoners, while Sanda Stolojan worked on religious persecution. Dinu Zamfirescu covered Romanian legislation, Doru Novacovici freedom of movement, Radu Campeanu²⁹ civil and political rights, Mihai Korne the social and economic situation in Romania, D. Corlaci. Paul Goma, Mihnea Berindei and M. Cazacu freedom of artistic expression and B. Tunduri gathered information on Eastern countries' minorities, while Ion Vianu³⁰ and Maria Bratianu worked on the abusive use of psychology on prisoners of conscience.³¹ The League was well organised, which made the gathering of information more efficient.

The information conveyed to the League from Romanian sources was transmitted to international organisations (Amnesty International, FIDH, Helsinki Watch), to the French and foreign press and to governments.³² The LDHR attempted to raise awareness on the violations of human rights in Romania through press releases and press conferences, articles in newspapers, letters and street protests.

The League took a stand on several cases of violation of the freedom of Romanian citizens. Files concerning individuals and specific issues were being regularly sent to Amnesty International, FIDH, governments and the press. The League has also participated in several street protests organised by the Committees of other Eastern European countries. Prior to the French ministerial or even the presidential visits to Romania, the League had made a habit of sending files on the human rights situation in Romania to delegation members. The LDHR requested their intervention on behalf of individuals who were detained or missing (the priest Caliciu

28 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 2, File No. 1, *The human rights violations in Romania*, Paris, 16 April 1984, 2 p.

29 Doru Novacovici and Radu Campeanu are former political prisoners. After emigrating to France, they became active in the fight against the communist regime of Romania.

30 Ion Vianu was a Romanian psychiatrist and writer. After emigrating to Switzerland, he militated against the political use of psychiatry, especially through shows broadcast by RFE.

31 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 1, File No. 1, *Minutes of the General Assembly of the LHDR*, Paris, 23 May 1980

32 AIICCMER, Archives of Sanda Stolojan, File No 9, *Rapport of the League for the FIDH*, September 1983, 7 p.

Dumitreasa, Vasile Paraschiv, Doina Cornea...³³ The League's members also reacted to public statements made by politicians. In April 1977, Maria Bratianu sent a letter to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, in response to an interview in which he spoke about the dissidents' situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. After presenting the situation of Paul Goma, she asked the president to intervene for his release, because "*France must report them [the human rights violations] and help those brave men*" who fight for respect. In addition to the letter, several documents were sent to the French head of state, in order to inform him of the situation.³⁴ The League acted in the same way for the priest Gheorghe Caliciu Dumitreasa. In a letter, the French president François Mitterrand was asked to intervene for his release. A file was equally sent with the letter, presenting human rights abuses in Romania.³⁵ Several other similar examples could be presented and it seems that we are in the presence of a pattern of behaviour of the League.

Sometimes, the League managed to arouse the curiosity of some journalists who decided to go to Romania and verify the veracity of the information or collect new data. That was the case for B. Poulet. In February 1982, the French journalist went to Ploiesti in order to inquire after the disappearance of a Romanian worker. Vasile Paraschiv encountered several problems with the *Securitate*. Since 1979, when he became a member of the Free Trade Union of the Working People in Romania, he disappeared and nobody could find out anything about him.³⁶ While trying to come into contact with Vasile Paraschiv, B. Poulet was assaulted by plainclothes police officers. As soon as he returned to France, the LDHR held a press conference where he and M. Calef from the FIDH presented the case of Vasile Paraschiv, and the repression and economic situation in Romania. The main French newspapers, as well as Amnesty International, the Paraschiv Committee, the Psychiatrists Committee Against the Political Use of Psychiatry, Radio Free Europe, several free radios and union representatives from FO and FEN participated at the press conference. On

33 AIICCMER, Archives of Sanda Stolojan, File No. 9, *The League for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania from Paris*, 1983, 7 p.

34 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 3, File No. 7, *Letter from the CDHR to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, president of France*, Paris, 25 April 1977.

35 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 3, File No. 8, *Letter from the LDHR to François Mitterrand*, Paris, 4 January 1982.

36 PARASCHIV, V.: *Lupta mea pentru sindicatele libere în România*, p. 78.

this occasion, the League also presented to the audience its files on the violations of free movement rights and on religious repression. Several street protests were also organised, in February, April and May of the same year, for the release of Vasile Paraschiv, the priest Caliciu Dumitreasa and Virgil Tanase in front of the Romanian Embassy in Paris.³⁷ The Romanian authorities hated this kind of publicity and often asked the French authorities not to allow the protesters to manifest in public. They considered that the permission to organise street protests was a political movement against the Romanian government.

After the press conference, several French unions, as well as three representatives of the FIDH, asked for visas in order to conduct an investigation in Ploiesti but the answer was negative.³⁸ The situation with B. Poulet was very unusual for the Romanian Socialist Republic. After trying, for many years, to create a positive image of Romania on the other side of the Iron Curtain, attacking a French journalist was not the best possible reaction. Maybe a mistake was made because they didn't know who he was or they were trying to take a stand and discourage anyone else who wanted to inquire about Romania.

As a result of all this turmoil, after three years of silence, Vasile Paraschiv was allowed to call his friends living in France. His name reappeared on the list of the building's tenants in Ploiesti and two people managed to talk to him in person.³⁹ It seems that the international publicity had an effect on the Romanian authorities. This showed the members of the League that with international pressure, anything was possible. For Romania, having a positive image on the other side of the Iron Curtain was useful, especially for commercial matters and keeping the clause of the most favoured nation.

The information provided by the League was also the subject of numerous articles, especially in the French newspaper *L'Alternative*, where several members of the League published their articles. In order to maximise its impact, the information had to be diffused by the French national and local press. Many articles could be found in journals like *Le Monde*, *Libération*, *Le Matin*, *Quotidien de Paris*, *Les nouvelles littéraires*. If we analyse the

37 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 2, File No. 1, *Newsletter of the LDHR*, No. 2, January-August 1982, 3 p.

38 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 1, File No. 1, *Minutes of the General Assembly of the LDHR*, 22 April 1982.

39 Ibid.

French media coverage of this period we can easily distinguish an evolution in the subject, size and titles of the articles. In the late 1980s, titles were aggressive and condemned Ceausescu: “*Romania sick of Ceausescu*”, “*How to get rid of a dissident?*”, “*While Ceausescu celebrates his 60th birthday, Romania is hungry, cold and frightened*”, “*The Ubu king*”, “*In the clutches of Securitate*”. In the 1970s, we find shorter articles and less aggressive titles: “*The Romanian No 1 is still the man of the Détente in Eastern Europe*”, “*In the Eastern countries, a hundred dissidents ask for the respect of Helsinki agreements*”, “*French unions answer the solidarity call of Eastern workers*”. The information provided by the League was transmitted by the journalists who sometimes used phrases like “*according to the information provided by the League*”, “*indicated in one of the League’s press releases*”. When the League members felt that the newspaper articles did not present the truth about Romania, they reacted rapidly in order to correct the situation. This was the case in 1977 when Maria Bratianu wrote a letter to Manuel Lucbert from *Le Monde* expressing the League’s discontentment with the way the miners’ strike was presented by the journal. She also asked for the miners’ right to present their side of the story.⁴⁰

One of the League’s first important actions was in 1980, during the Madrid Conference. It was the first time LDHR had got involved in an international action and this is why we wish to present some details on it. The purpose was to present the human rights violations perpetrated by the Romanian regime. The League intervened in order to obtain freedom for all of those who had been unjustly arrested or committed to a mental institution and for those who wished to receive the right to leave the country. First, the League’s members prepared files on Romanian legislation, the Free Trade Union of the Working People in Romania, political prisoners and labour camps, the abusive use of psychiatry, the citizens’ freedom of movement and religious persecution. These files were sent to all of the main Western heads of state present at the Conference. The file also included a letter, demanding the creation of a commission of human rights which would verify the complaints regarding the human rights violations and would put pressure on the Romanian authorities. Secondly, the LDHR organised a press conference where files were also given to the media

40 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 3, File No. 7, *Letter from Maria Bratianu to Manuel Lucbert*, Paris, 12 October 1977.

representatives.⁴¹ The League also spoke against the idea of holding the next conference in Bucharest.⁴² In February 1981, right before the end of the Conference, the Helsinki Watch wrote a paper called Bucharest Should Not be the Site of the Next Helsinki Review Conference, where it was said: “we strongly oppose this choice of location. A conference in Bucharest would appear to condone or minimize the manifold violations of human rights that exist in Romania [...] it would virtually eliminate any opportunity for the kind of active citizens’ participation that has characterized the conference in Madrid”.⁴³ Helsinki Watch was convinced by the information provided by the LHDR and wished for its actions to be able to continue. Romania’s image was affected by this event. The League participated in several other conferences, each time trying to increase the effects of its actions (Vienna, Paris...).

This constant pressure and struggle to prove the human rights abuses and the freedom of citizens in Romania was not only intended to help the victims and force the communist regime to change its actions but also to provide proof of the existence of international monitoring.

3. The League’s reaction in the case of the Free Trade Union of the Working People in Romania (SLOMR):

The union was created in February 1979 by a group of 15 workers and several intellectuals from Turnu Severin.⁴⁴ Immediately after the broadcast of their statutes on Radio Free Europe⁴⁵, from 4 to 6 March, 30 Romanian citizens individually joined the union. At the same time, Virgil Chender, a worker from Sighisoara, came to Bucharest in order to bring the joint membership of a group of 1,487 persons from the county of Mures. Faced with an ever-growing number of members, the Romanian authorities decided to react: arrests, threats, assaults, internment in psychiatric

41 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 1, File No. 1, *Letter from the steering committee to all the members of the League*, Paris, 10 November 1980, 1 p.

42 ACNSAS, file No. 44169, *Note on Constantin Cesianu No 0044002*, 3 February 1981.

43 Helsinki Watch, *Bucharest Should Not be the Site of the Next Helsinki Review Conference*, Helsinki, February 1981, p. 1.

44 ANIC, Archives of Anneli Gabanyi Ute, File No. 77, *Radio Free Europe. Radio Liberty Romania-Situation Report*, ‘Recurring Workers’ Protest, 25 November 1987.

45 Ibid, File No. 156, *The Foundation of a Free Trade Union in Romania*, the text of a programme broadcast by the Romanian BD on 3 March 1979, 6 p.

hospitals of both founders and members of the new trade union. Their phones had been cut off and Romanian policemen had prevented anyone from coming into contact with them. Romanian authorities resorted to particularly strict measures during Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Romania (8 – 10 March 1979). The founders and members of the union were arrested and detained for several days. Having predicted the reaction of the *Securitate*, the founding members thought of a way to circumvent its movements: if one spokesman got arrested, he was immediately replaced with someone else.⁴⁶ The authorities acted in order to prevent Western officials from finding out about the workers' protest. The trick used by the trade union founders made it more difficult for the Romanian government to 'cut off the head' of the resistance, assured a longer existence to the union and therefore higher possibilities of international publicity. This also proves that the union founders were aware of the *Securitate*'s reaction: that everything would be done in order to stop them.

The creation of the Free Trade Union of the Working People in Romania was seen by the League as "*a new step in the protest movement of Romania*" and as "*the most serious, the bravest [...] action ever attempted by the Romanian citizens in their fight for the respect of human rights*".⁴⁷ This is why the organisation committed itself to supporting the founders and members of the trade union against persecution by the communist regime.

When it was no longer possible to contact the union members and find out what happened to them, the League's only option was to inform the French citizens of these events, through press releases and press conferences. The purpose was to put international pressure on the Romanian government. The French public opinion reacted rapidly. The French Federation of the National Education sent a telegram to Ceausescu, on 11 April 1979, in order to protest against the arrest and harassment of the founders of the trade union, especially Ionel Cana, Vasile Praschiv, Gheorghe Brasoveanu and Virgil Chender⁴⁸. In time, the League's interventions through international organisations (UNESCO, FIDH, International Red Cross) and public figures (President of the French Republic, French ministers)

46 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 2, File No. 2, *Release of the CDHR*, 10 March 1979, 1 p.

47 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 1, File No. 2, *Press conference of the CDHR*, Paris, 11 April 1979, 5 p.

48 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 2, File No. 2, *Telegram for Nicolae Ceaușescu from André Henry, general secretary of the National Education Federation*, 11 April 1979.

became more and more frequent, each and every time accompanied by files concerning the most recent events⁴⁹.

The International Bureau of Labour (BIL) from Geneva, using the files provided by the League, filed a complaint to the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) against the Romanian government for the trade union's rights violations.⁵⁰ Impressed by the plight of union members in Romania, the Confederation requested, on 10 July 1981, that an investigation be conducted in Romania on the regime's anti-trade union campaign. The complaint focused on the difficult situation of Romanian workers and Romania's breach of the agreements signed with the International Labour Organisation. "*In Romania, the living and working conditions, the economic and social situation has been deteriorating for several years now as part of an authoritarian (a totalitarian) regime where workers can not freely express and defend their interests [...] During March 1979 and afterward, the Romanian authorities engaged in terrorist methods of intimidation*". The BIL also explained why the complaint was filed in 1981 while the union was created in 1979: "*At the time of the listed events, reliable information was hard to come by, given the difficulties to contact and exchange information with Romanians especially regarding SLOMR [...] Since then, further information gathered by Amnesty International and reports provided by some members of SLOMR which have been evicted to the West support the studies conducted by the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania (Paris)*".⁵¹ The information provided by the League was taken seriously and led to investigations in order to find proof for the presented facts. The LDHR managed to arouse interest and so achieved its goal.

The WCL requested that a procedure be initiated in order to stop the actions against the SLOMR, to free the unjustly detained workers and to provide information on the situation of miners on strike in the Jiu Valley. Moreover, they demanded that the Romanian government show on what charges the workers were convicted and to provide the texts of the rul-

49 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 1, File No. 1, *Minutes of the General Assembly of the LDHR*, 25 May 1983.

50 AIICMER, Archives of Sanda Stolojan, File No. 9, *Rapport of the League for the FIDH*, September 1983, 7 p.

51 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 2, File No. 2, *Complaint filed by the International Bureau of Labour from Geneva against the Romanian government*, Genève, 10 July 1981, 4 p.

ings, to recognise the union's right to exist, to respect and to apply the international conventions.⁵²

Case No. 1066 (Complaint by the World Confederation of Labour against the Romanian government) was discussed on three occasions by the International Labour Office Committee. On 28 August and 9 December 1981, the WCL provided the Committee with additional information to sustain the complaint filed on 10 July of the same year. The Confederation sent the testimonials of two formal members of the SLOMR, Nicolae Dascalu and Karl Gibson, who claimed to have been arrested, convicted and then expelled from Romania. They described the creation of the Free Trade Union of the Working People in Romania, in February 1979, the arrest and punishment of union leaders and even the expulsion of several members. Nicolae Dascalu asserted that, during the first five days following the creation of the trade union, more than 2000 citizens joined it. At the same time, Dr Ionel Cana and Gheorghe Brasoveanu, the leaders of SLOMR, were arrested. The Romanian authorities also initiated a smear campaign in order to destroy the image of the union and of anyone connected to it. Nicolae Dascalu stated that, in May and June 1979, 30,000 to 50,000 people were arrested and sentenced to prison. All the information provided by the WCL was sent to the Romanian authorities, which answered on 8 February 1982. As the response of the government included only information on related Romanian law (constitution and laws concerning the unions), without any details on the situation of the union members, upon the request of the International Labour Office Committee, it had to supply additional information⁵³.

On 30 April 1982, the Romanian government sent a new notice. It claimed to have proven that Romania ensured a wide range of rights to its workers, even on trade union membership. Moreover, Romanian legislation was consistent with international conventions on this subject. The government added that the alleged violations of freedom of association in Romania were not real. The Committee examining the case found that the Romanian government did not provide information to refute the claims formulated against it. The examining committee wished for the Romanian government to provide more information on the claims of arrest and exile of trade unionists and on the alleged disappearance of

52 Ibid.

53 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 2, File No. 2, *Document of the International Labour Bureau concerning the case No 1066*, May 1982, 6 p.

Vasile Paraschiv, Virgil Chender, Melania Mateescu, Constantin Acrinei, Ionel Cana and George Brasoveanu. Information was also required on the measures allegedly taken against the strikers and on the deaths of Ion Dabra and G. Iurca, leaders of the strike.⁵⁴ The Romanian authorities did not ignore the complaint, which means that international opinion was taken seriously. However, the information and the answers provided respected the communist doublespeak tradition. The Committee had to ask several times for some information. This might also have been a tactic to make the plaintiffs give up.

On 20 October 1982, the Romanian government claimed that, after further investigations, it was unable to identify many of the persons mentioned in the complaint. Ionel Cana and Gheorghe Brasoveanu, retired at the moment of the investigation, had indeed served prison sentences but for fascist propaganda and not for trade union activity. They were granted a pardon and were living in Bucharest. Vasile Paraschiv was living and working in Ploiesti. The other persons on the plaintiffs list could not be identified or had been allowed to leave Romania and settle abroad. Dissatisfied with this answer, the International Labour Office Committee asked for more information.⁵⁵ On 9 February 1983, the Romanian authorities gave a new and final answer: they considered that, as the union's existence could not be proven, the charges against them were baseless. Additional information was provided on Virgil Chender, Melanie Mateescu and Constantin Acrinei. The allegations on the miners' strike from 1977 were also considered unfounded. Despite all the information provided, due to the absence of concrete facts which might help either party, the International Labour Office Committee was unable to reach a firm conclusion.⁵⁶

The limited room for manoeuvre available to international organisations and the impossibility of obtaining information from disobedient states is surprising. Despite the initiative's lack of success, what should be remembered is the pressure placed upon the Romanian state and the important media coverage of the events, especially because a so-called people's democracy did not respect the workers' rights. All these accusa-

54 Ibid.

55 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 2, File No. 2, *Document of the International Labour Bureau concerning the case No 1066*, November 1982, 6 p.

56 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 2, File No. 2, *Document of the International Labour Bureau concerning the case No 1066*, March 1983, 6 p.

tions have had a bad effect on Romania's image abroad, on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

Even when the union no longer existed, the League continued its actions with a focus on the labour conditions, the violations of the international agreements signed by the Socialist Republic of Romania. Until the fall of communism, the League continued its fight against the Romanian regime and Ceausescu. Critics became more and more frequent until, in the late 1980s, Romania was completely isolated on the international scene. By 16 March 1989 even the European parliament "*condemns the violations of human rights in Romania*" and "*expresses its solidarity to the Romanian people*". It requested the establishment of a very strict policy towards Romania, in order to force the respect of human rights.⁵⁷

The Helsinki act helped Eastern Europeans internationalise their protest by calling out to Western authorities (governments of signatory states, organisations monitoring the respect of human rights or news agencies). Human rights became a central element in diplomatic relations. But all of this would not have been possible without some changes in the international context. The economic context of the 1970s made communist states even more dependent on Western loans. Therefore, the communist governments could no longer disregard human rights issues.⁵⁸ Dissidents rapidly understood the importance of this evolution and tried to use it as leverage in order to achieve their goals. The League for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania deployed a significant amount of energy and resources in order to reveal to public opinion and to international organisations the other reality, the other face of Romanian communism, very different from the image conveyed by the regime's propaganda. Even if the international focus on human rights was seen as a severe interference in Romania's internal affairs, in the new economic context the regime could no longer ignore Western public opinion. Even though the persecutions did not stop, it was no longer possible to dispose of the dissidents as easily as it used to be.

Resumé

Po nastolení komunistického režimu utiekli niektorí rumunskí intelektuáli z krajiny a usadili sa na druhej strane železnej opony (vo Francúzsku,

57 ABDIC, LDHR, Box No. 2, File No. 8, *Motion concerning Romania adopted by the European Parliament*, 16 March 1989, 2 p.

58 *Comisia prezidentiala pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste din Romania*, pp. 360 – 361.

Anglicku, Nemeckej spolkovkej republike, Spojených štátoch atď.). Niektorí Rumuni žijúci v Paríži mali pocit, že musia obyvateľom západnej Európy ukázať to, čo považovali za pravdu o režime v Rumunsku. Cieľom našej štúdie je prezentovať, ako Liga na obranu ľudských práv v Rumunsku bojovala proti komunistickému režimu a pokúšala sa ukázať svetu porušovanie ľudských práv, ku ktorým dochádzalo v Rumunsku. Liga na obranu ľudských práv v Rumunsku nasadila veľké množstvo úsilia i zdrojov na to, aby verejnosti a medzinárodným organizáciám odhalila inú realitu, druhú tvár rumunského komunizmu, celkom inú od obrazu, ktorý poskytovala propaganda režimu.

Svetový kongres Slovákov v zápase o slobodnú, demokratickú a pluralitnú Slovenskú republiku

Viliam JABLONICKÝ

Historik František Hrušovský, zároveň po Karolovi Sidorovi krátkodobo druhý predseda Slovenskej národnej rady v zahraničí v rokoch 1954 – 1956, zadefinoval úsilie svojej generácie a súpútnikov v politických a organizačných zámeroch nielen povojnových politických exulantov, ale aj predchádzajúcich slovenských vystaňovalcov a ich potomkov /Slovenskej národnej rady v Londýne a v zahraničí, Slovenského akčného výboru, Slovenského oslobodzovacieho výboru, Slovenskej oslobodzovacej rady ako predchodcov najviac zjednocujúceho Svetového kongresu Slovákov/ zrejme najvýstižnejšie. Dokument z jeho pozostalosti zverejnil ešte v roku 1965 *Literárny almanach Slováka v Amerike*: „[...] každý kultúrny národ, ktorý si je vedomý svojej národnej osobitosti, svojich práv na slobodu a svojich schopností rozhodovať o svojom osude, chápe svoju štátnu samostatnosť nielen ako formu svojej národnej slobody, ale i ako zložku a obsah svojho slobodného národného života. Pre kultúrne vyspelý a politicky zrelý národ je otázka štátnej samostatnosti prirodzenou požiadavkou bytia a otázkou národnej cti, pretože takýto národ len samostatný život pokladá za život národa dôstojný a v nedostatku vlastného štátu vidí svoje degradovanie. Len národy slobodné, čiže žijúce vo vlastnom štáte sú plnoprávnymi členmi veľkej rodiny slobodných národov a len takéto národy, ktoré majú možnosť starať sa zodpovedne o seba, môžu a vedia svoje vlastné záujmy prispôbovať záujmom iných národov, a tak slúžiť spoločným záujmom ľudstva [...]“¹

1 MARUNIAK, P.: Vedecko-odborné a politické aktivity Dr. F. Hrušovského v exile. In: MARUNIAK, P. – GRÁCOVÁ, G.: *Život a dielo ďalších exilových pracovníkov. Zborník*

Štefan Roman, prvý a dlhoročný predseda Svetového kongresu Slovákov v rokoch 1970 – 1988, ako reakciu na neslobodu svojho národa, spolu aj s ostatnými príslušníkmi slovenského národa žijúceho v zahraničí, považoval nielen za právo, ale aj povinnosť hovoriť „*v mene zotročeného národa, dožadovať sa oslobodenia a formulovať jeho ciele*“. Podľa neho Svetový kongres Slovákov založený v roku 1970 nevznikol preto, aby si Slováci pomáhali sami sebe „*v slobodnom svete, ale aby sme pomohli slovenskému národu v našej starej vlasti. Za nich sme sa rozhodli hovoriť a konať, pretože oni za seba hovoriť nemôžu. Na ich osude vidíme strašnú tragédiu národa, za ktorý rozhoduje niekto iný.*“

Pritom SKS nechcel zaväzovať slovenský národ k žiadnym „*politickým režimom alebo konečnému riešeniu slovenskej otázky*“. Chcel iba pripraviť „*cestu k spoločnému cieľu, ktorým je od založenia Kongresu slobodné a samostatné Slovensko vo vlastnom demokratickom štáte, pri plnom uplatnení suverenity a samourčovacieho práva slovenského národa...*“²

SKS vznikol na prvom valnom zhromaždení 19. – 21. júna 1970 v New Yorku. Prakticky združil až 93 najvýznamnejších slovenských organizácií a ďalšie tisíce jednotlivcov v západnom svete. Postupne sa konali generálne kongresové zhromaždenia v Toronte – 1971, Chicagu – 1973, Ríme – 1975, Washingtone – 1978, znovu v Toronte – 1981, New Yorku – 1984, Toronte – 1987 a 1990, Bratislave – 1993.³

V základnej *Deklarácii* podpísanej slovenským biskupom Andrejom G. Grutkom v Amerike ako predsedom a Štefanom B. Romanom ako podpredsedom prijatej na prípravnom, prvom Svetovom kongrese Slovákov v New Yorku v 1970, zaiste aj vo vedomí tragickej okupácie ČSSR a Slovenska v roku 1968 vojskami Sovietskeho zväzu a Varšavského paktu, predstavitelia slovenských organizácií a jednotlivci z mnohých krajín západného sveta, predovšetkým Ameriky, Európy a Austrálie vyhlásili: „*Zmyslom slovenských dejín je zápas o národnú slobodu a sebauplatnenie. Dosahovanie tohto cieľa sa neobišlo bez prekážok, bez práce a boja mnohých generácií a vyžiadalo premnoho obetí. Aj teraz, keď slovenský národ nemôže*

prednášok v Dome Matice slovenskej v Žiline r. 2008. Martin 2010, s. 217.

- 2 Svetový kongres Slovákov, *Slovak World Congress. Toronto, 1987, b. s.*
- 3 Pozri aj GRÁCOVÁ, G.: Činnosť Slovenského akčného výboru (Slovenského oslobodzovacieho výboru), Slovenskej národnej rady v zahraničí a Svetového kongresu Slovákov. In: MARUNIAK, P. – GRÁCOVÁ, G.: *Historická genéza slovenského povojnového exilu a jeho spätosť so Slovenskom. Zborník prednášok v Dome Matice slovenskej v Žiline r. 2005. Žilina, b. v., s. 125 – 148.*

voľne rozhodovať o svojom osude, veľké obety musia prinášať všetky časti národa. Slovinci žijúci vo svete, z ktorých mnohí sa narodili na americkom kontinente a inde, považujú si za mravnú povinnosť zjednotiť sa v práci za prirodzené práva slovenského národa, za jeho úplnú slobodu a samostatné určovanie svojich osudov a pokladajú si za svoju povinnosť a poslanie podať svetu pravdivý obraz o živote a národných snahách slovenského národa po slobodnom a demokratickom živote. Dnes cítime túto povinnosť tým hlbšie, že na Slovensku sa znovu nanucuje režim, ktorý sa protiví slovenským národným tradíciám a že Slovensko je okupované cudzou veľmocou.“ Preto prehlasujú, že sa hlásia „k tým tradičným hodnotám slovenských dejín, z ktorých sa náš národ zrodil, ktorými sa udržiaval a začlenil do západnej civilizácie a medzi kultúrne národy“. Vyhlasujú tiež, že „slovenská otázka je otázkou medzinárodnou, preto žiadame pre slovenský národ medzinárodnú spravodlivosť vyjadrenú plnou demokratickou štátnosťou“. Navyše už vtedy sa s veľkou prezieravosťou a vizionársky stavali „kladne k integračnému procesu v Európe a žiadame, aby sa slovenský národ mohol slobodne a bezprostredne zúčastniť na tomto procese“. Želali si tiež „aby sa situácia v strednej a východnej Európe vyvinula tak, že by nebola na prekážku pri nadväzovaní a udržiavaní kultúrnych stykov medzi Slovenskom a Slovákmi vo svete, čo dnešný stav už vôbec, alebo len v obmedzenej miere dovoľuje“. Trvalá ustanovizeň SKS má sa riadiť princípmi bratskosti a vzájomnej úcty: „Konfesionálna príslušnosť alebo stranícko-politické smery, pokiaľ sú v súlade s demokraciou, pokiaľ sú v súlade s demokraciou a vyššie uvedeními zásadami, nebudú nikomu na prekážku pri práci a členstve v tejto ustanovizni. Jej ciele budú a musia byť usmerňované a jej konanie bude ovládané demokratickými princípmi.“ Preto chcú zastupovať slovenské národné záujmy „na svetových vedeckých, kultúrnych, náboženských alebo politických fórach“, koordinovať národné podujatia, starať sa „o prehĺbenie ducha jednoty“ medzi Slovákmi.⁴

Okrem predsedu SKS Štefana Romana a čestného predsedu Andreja G. Grutku sa ocitlo vo vedení a predsedníctve veľa mimoriadnych krajan-ských, politických, vedeckých a kultúrnych osobností ako Peter Hletko, Emanuel Böhm, Jozef Kirschbaum, Anton Bugar, Ferdinand Ďurčanský, John V. Stephens, Jozef Paučo, Jozef Suchý, Jozef Mikuš, František Braxátor. V nasledujúcich komisiách: štatisticko-evidenčnej, finančnej, pre slovenské menšiny za železnou oponou, politickej, pre otázky Neslovákov na Slovensku, kultúrnej, náboženskej, vedecko-publikačnej, organizačno-

4 KIRSCHBAUM, J. M. (ed.): *Desať rokov činnosti SKS*. Toronto 1981, s. 41 – 42.

-plánovacej, sociálnej, pre styky so Slovenskom, informačnej a mládeže boli ďalšie reprezentatívne a angažované osobnosti, ktoré slovenské dejiny nemôžu tiež obísť – ako Rudolf Dilong, Štefan Náhalka, Jozef Trubinský, Imrich Stolárik, Felix Litva, Štefan Blaško, František Vnuk, Jozef Staško, Jaroslav Krupa, Arvéd Grébert, Michal Lacko, Imrich Kružliak, Stanislav Mečiar, Andrej Pier, Mikuláš Šprinc, František Šubík /Žarnov/, Michal Rusnák, Ján Gunčaga, Milan Ďurica, Andrej Hudák, Jozef Vrba, Viktor Bucko, Method Balco, Dominik Hrušovský, Joseph C. Krajsa, František Fuga, John Hvasta, Ján Beliansky, Anton Hlinka a mnohé ďalšie známe a angažované mená už i v predchádzajúcich zoskupeniach, usilujúcich sa o nastolenie základných demokratických slobôd na Slovensku, právo na jeho sebaurčenie. Alebo sa úspešne angažovali v početných a po svete roztrúsených aktívnych krajanských a fraternalistických organizáciách a časopisoch Slovákov po celom svete. Po ďalších kongresoch ich dopĺňali a obmieňali ďalší funkcionári ako Dušan Tóth, Eugen Löbl, Jozef Šramek, Ján Okál, Štefan Polakovič, Imrich Zapletal, Marián Šťastný, bez toho, aby sme mohli zahrnúť ich úplný výpočet.⁵

Podľa *Bulletinu SKS*, č. 30, s. 5, Kongres v Ríme 21. júna 1975 stanovil a schválil trinásť zakladajúcich a doživotných členov SKS, ktorí ho „*mimoriadne morálne alebo hmotne podporili*“: Igora Bazovského, podnikateľa a vedca z Kalifornie, Edwarda Behunčika, advokáta a predsedu Slovenskej ligy v Amerike, Františka Braxátora, hospodárskeho právniku zo Švajčiarska, Andreja Grutku, rímskokatolíckeho biskupa z Gary, Indiana, USA, Stanislava Hlucháňa, podnikateľa z Brazílie, Felixu Litvu, člena rádu slovenských jezuitov z Kanady, Eugena Löbla, vedca a spisovateľa z USA, George Millyho, atómového vedca z USA, Josepha Patricka, riaditeľa Denison Mines z New Yorku, Jána Puhkého, bývalého tajomníka Denison Mines z Kanady, Štefana Romana, predsedu Denison Mines z Kanady a predsedu SKS, Michala Rusnáka, gréckokatolíckeho biskupa z Toronta, reverenda Dušana Tótha, generálneho tajomníka SKS z Toronta.⁶

Predsedníctvo SKS na svojom ďalšom zasadnutí v New Yorku 16. apríla 1971 vyhlásilo tretiu nedeľu mesiaca júna každého roku za *Deň slovenskej spolupatričnosti*, kedy majú Slováci čo najvhodnejším spôsobom prejaviť úctu „*voči otcom, ktorí padli, obetovali sa a bojovali za slobodu a práva*

5 Tamže, s. 43 – 45.

6 Zakladajúci členovia Svetového kongresu Slovákov. *Bulletin SKS*, č. 30, s. 5. In: TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Spomienky v dokumentoch. Z archívu slovenského emigranta*. Zväzok druhý. 1988, s. 540 a nasl.

svojho národa“. Aby všetci mohli navonok prejavovať vzťah k Slovensku schôdzami, zbierkami, kultúrnymi podujatiami a prednáškami, aby „Slováci doma mohli cítiť, že ich deti, nech sú kdekoľvek, neprestali milovať svoj rod a neprestali bojovať o národné práva“.

Vzápätí z generálneho zhromaždenia z Toronta nasledovala ďalšia rezolúcia, prijatá 19. júna 1971. Analyzovala situáciu strednej Európy za posledných 150 rokov, kde sa aj v 20. storočí mocenské ideológie „usilovali alebo usilujú o politické a hospodárske ovládanie tohto priestoru, boli a sú popretím demokratického princípu v medzinárodných vzťahoch [...] Svetový kongres Slovákov, ako vrcholná organizácia Slovákov v slobodnom svete, pokladá si za prirodzené právo a povinnosť reprezentovať Slovensko a slovenský národ vo všetkých organizáciách a hnutiach, ktoré pracujú na reorganizácii strednej Európy. Preto popiera a bude popierať, či skupinám, alebo jednotlivcom iných národností právo vystupovať v akejkoľvek úlohe v mene Slovenska a Slovákov.“⁷

Mimochodom, v svedectve Dušana Tótha, v čase, keď sa doma brutálne nastoľovala nekompromisná mocenská stranícka normalizácia po roku 1969, „Torontské generálne zhromaždenie v júni 1971 prekvapilo svojou mohutnosťou, početnosťou delegácií a bolo dovedy najväčším a najodusevnelejším prejavom slovenskej spolupatričnosti a vôle podniknúť všetko, čo sa v našich pomeroch môže a dá, aby sme v medziach našich prostriedkov pomohli slovenskému národu doma na Slovensku“.⁸

V rámci svojej mnohostrannej činnosti a získavania medzinárodného ohlasu uskutočnil SKS pod predsedníctvom Štefana Romana (1970 – 1988) veľa dôležitých podujatí, aby získal spojencov na svoju stranu. Zjednodušeným sloganom, ktorým sa prezentoval, bolo znenie, že „*tlmočí a presadzuje právo slovenského národa na sebaurčenie, podporuje kultúrny a náboženský život medzi Slovákami v zahraničí*“.

Okrem generálnych zhromaždení členov SKS to uskutočňoval spravidla sprievodnými vedeckými konferenciami a publikáciami, vychádzajúcimi aj v angličtine i nemčine, oboznamujúcimi svet s dejinami a kultúrou Slovákov doma a v zahraničí: *Slovensko v 19. a 20. storočí* (1971), *Slovenská kultúra v priebehu storočí* (1975), *Sympózium o slovenskej histórii a kultúre* (1979), *Budúcnosť strednej Európy* (1981), *Mier v slobode pre Európu* (Mníchov 1983), politický seminár venovaný mladej inteligencii (Dulliken, Švajčiarsko 1982), mládeži *História Slovenska* (Mníchov 1984). Viaceré konferenčné

7 *Desať rokov činnosti SKS*, s. 54 – 55.

8 TÓTH, D.: Generálne zhromaždenia SKS. In: *Desať rokov činnosti SKS*, s. 58.

texty, najmä v angličtine, boli distribuované do najvýznamnejších knižníc predovšetkým západného sveta a prinášali alternatívny obraz slovenských dejín, ktoré odmietali a priamo polemizovali s domácimi marxistickými víziami a reflexiami prítomnosti a budúcnosti Slovenska v socialistickej náruči ideológie proletárskeho internacionalizmu. Hoci možnosť voľby a rozhodnutia, prirodzene, nechávali na budúci a slobodný demokratický vývoj doma. Základné vyhlásenia Kongresu, ako aj početné knižné tituly a činnosť z jeho dielne boli aj preto úporne odmietané predstaviteľmi a ideológmi domáceho režimu v normalizačnom období. A ak sa o ňom objavovali akékoľvek zmienky, boli úplne skreslené a tendenčné. Všetky tituly vychádzajúce z iniciatívy SKS boli na Slovensku prísne zakázané, nemohli sa legitímne dostať do knižníc bežným čitateľom, na druhej strane boli dôsledne zbierané a triedené v knižnici Ústavu marxizmu-leninizmu v Bratislave. Všetky časopisy a knihy, predovšetkým politickej emigrácie, marxistickí, spoločenský vedci úporne rešeršovali, študovali a komentovali s výlučne negatívnym označením, kde sa nepripúšťal akýkoľvek dialóg, ale naopak, všetko sa vnímalo a odsudzovalo neraz najvulgárnejšou komunistickou antipropagandou.

Z verejne prístupných textov najďalej v nej zachádzal asi Ondrej Dányi vulgarizujúco hodnotiac už prvé zhromaždenie SKS: „*Zvolávatelia okrem honosných a demagogických prejavov nepripravili nijaký perspektívny program. V plnej nahote sa ukázala ideová a organizačná nejednotnosť a roztrieštenosť týchto samozvancov. Kormidla na lodi trosičníkov sa ujal uránový multimilionár Š. B. Roman, aby pod jeho vedením plávala v kalných protimierových a protikomunistických vodách.*“⁹

V súvislosti so zasadnutím orgánov SKS v Londýne v roku 1976 hovoril priamo o podvratnej činnosti najmä v spätosti s tam prijatými tézami: „*Obsahujú politické ciele, prostriedky, stratégiu a taktiku, ako aj metodiku argumentácie proti suverenite a štátoprávnemu usporiadaniu ČSSR. Neprihliadajú na realitu a smer vývoja medzinárodného života a rozloženie síl. Tak ako uznávajú za vhodné, alebo ako to zapadá do plánov reakčných síl, harašia s medzinárodným riešením ,slovenskej otázky‘.*“ Čas však onedlho ukázal, ako sa aj Dányi vo svojich odsudkoch hlboko mýlil a realitou sa naplňal práve dve desaťročia vopred vytýčený program a ciele SKS.¹⁰

Aj keď ďalší domáci dvorní ideológovia nachádzali pri SKS iba odsudky k tam združeným „najreakčnejším antisocialistickým silám“ alebo konceptu

9 DÁNYI, O.: *Falošní proroci*. Bratislava 1978, s. 31.

10 Tamže, s. 38.

„militantného antikomunizmu reagonovského križiackeho typu“, ako to pomenovávala Viera Hudečková ešte tesne pred pádom rozkladajúceho sa komunizmu u nás, nenachádzali už ani dodatočné argumentačné zbrane voči zásadne vyslovovaným výhradám, ako ich napríklad formoval jeden z popredných funkcionárov Imrich Kružliak v Bulletinu Svetového kongresu Slovákov č. 53, ešte v roku 1982: „S komunizmom sa predovšetkým musíme vedieť vysporiadať ideologicky, odkryť ho ako nepriateľa slobodného myslenia, slobodnej kultúry, slobodného náboženského vyznania [...] musíme sa s ním vedieť vysporiadať i hospodársky ako so systémom, ktorý odstránil súkromné vlastníctvo, potlačil súkromné podnikanie, a tým zbavil človeka prirodzeného práva vo vzájomnej súťaži dosahovať zdravé ovocie ľudskej práce.“¹¹

Ak sa aj veľmi tendenčné, úporne scenzurované, či najskôr úplne zamlčané informácie o SKS dostali napríklad do dobových encyklopédií v ČSSR, mali podobu najväčšieho ideového nepriateľa ohrozujúceho nielen integritu a ideológiu socialistické štátu, ale aj zoskupenie komunistickej sústavy, ktorej sa prejudikoval „večný a nezmeniteľný život“ v povojnovom stredo-východnom európskom priestore. Charakteristické je to napríklad v „najreprezentatívnejšej vedeckej“ *Encyklopédii Slovenska*, z dobovej dielne Slovenskej akadémie vied, ktorú sme dodnes, dvadsať rokov po páde komunizmu, niečím obdobným, ale podstatne objektívnejším a nepodliehajúcim ideologickým muštrám, zároveň v obdobnej šírke a ambíciách záberu, žiaľ, stále nenahradili.¹²

Tam jednoducho v piatom zväzku, v samostatnom a anonymnom hesle, plnom málo prehľadných skratiek z roku 1981, najvýznamnejšiu slovenskú povojnovú exilovú organizáciu a inštitúciu, Svetový kongres Slovákov, okrem minima základných faktov, iba tendenčne vykreslili v ideologicky neprijateľných, najtemnejších možných farbách a ďalšie informácie jednoducho scenzurovali: „S. k. S., kt. sídlo je v Toronte, je najmilitantnejšou protikom. protičs. organizáciou slov. emigrácie. Obhajuje ľudácky klérofažizmus. Plní funkciu príslušného nástroja antikom. centrál v USA v boji proti ČSSR a jej spojeneckým zväzkom, najmä proti spolenectvu a spolupráci so ZSSR. Ciele a úlohy S. k. S. jasne svedčia o tom, že mu nejde o sústreďenie al. zjednotenie slov. emigrantov a o reprezentáciu zahr. Slovákov, ale najmä o vytváranie ilúzií, že vystupuje pred svet. verejnosťou ako zástanca

11 HUDEČKOVÁ, V.: *Politický klerikalizmus a súčasný antikomunizmus*. Bratislava 1987, s. 96.

12 JABLONICKÝ, V.: Mlynárikova kritika normalizačnej historiografie. In: MARUŠIAK, J. (ed.): *Slovensko a režim normalizácie*. Prešov 2000, s. 288 – 302.

*Slovákov. Politika S. k. S. je zameraná proti záujmom národa v social. Československu a má jediný cieľ – očierňovať ČSSR, jej social. zriadenie a propagovať vytvorenie samostatného slov. burž. štátu ľudácko-nacionalistického zamerania v rámci tzv. zjednotenej Európy, resp. stredoeur. federácie al. konfederácie.*¹³

Zakladajúci a dlhoročný predseda SKS Štefan Roman, ktorý sa záujmom a potrebám Slovákov systematicky, cielavedome, nezištne a obetavo venoval, predovšetkým už ako funkcionár Kanadskej slovenskej ligy od štyridsiatych rokov 20. storočia, bol v inom – samostatnom mikrohesle Encyklopédie Slovenska charakterizovaný obdobne odstrašujúco takto: „*Od 1970 predsedá Svet. kongresu Slovákov, najmilitantnejšej a najreakčnejšej organizácie slov. protikom. emigrácie, kt. sa hlási k ideológii ľudáckeho klérofašizmu a požaduje vytvorenie protičes. orientovaného burž. slov. štátu.*“¹⁴

K objektívnejšie rozpracovaným heslám o SKS a jeho predsedovi i ďalším osobnostiam z okruhu Kongresu sme sa na Slovensku dostali až po roku 1990, napríklad v prvom a druhom anglickom vydaní jednozväzkovej *Encyklopedie Beliana: Slovakia and the Slovaks*¹⁵ a tiež *jednozväzkovom Reprezentačnom biografickom lexikóne Slovenska*.¹⁶ Až na ojedinelé konferenčné podujatia, prednášky jednotlivcov, niekoľko ďalších kníh venovaných osobnostiam *vystáhalovectva a exilu, nadviazanie na vydávanie vedeckého zborníka – ročenky Slováci v zahraničí, systematické a objektívnejšie poznanie tejto významnej problematiky pre dejiny Slovenska, či aj samozrejmé napísanie komplexných dejín staršieho a novodobého vystáhalovectva i s účinkovaním a všetkými prejavmi emigrácie a vystáhalovectva nás však stále ešte iba očakáva... A pribúdajúcimi rokmi a neustálym vystáhalovectvom zo Slovenska aj v 21. storočí sa náš dlh vôbec neumenšuje...*

Svetový kongres Slovákov, aby získal na svoju stranu početnú generáciu nielen starších potomkov, krajanov z predchádzajúcich početných vln vystáhalovectva združených v rozmanitých spolkoch po celom západnom svete, ale aj najmladších emigrantov a ich potomkov, najmä z generácie po okupácii ČSSR vojskami piatich krajín Varšavského paktu v roku 1968, zorganizoval aj viaceré Svetové festivaly slovenskej mládeže. Po troch

13 HAJKO, V. a kol.: *Encyklopédia Slovenska*, V. zväzok R – Š. Bratislava 1981, s. 659.

14 Tamže, s. 135.

15 STRHAN, M. – DANIEL, D. P. (eds.): *Slovakia and the Slovaks. A Concise Encyklopedia*. Bratislava 1994, s. 511 a 595.

16 MAŤOVČÍK, A. a kol.: *Reprezentačný biografický lexikón Slovenska*. Martin 1999, s. 283.

festivaloch na americkom a európskom kontinente Štefan Roman navrhoval vtedajšiemu predsedovi Matice Slovenskej Vladimírovi Mináčovi, aby sa v období gorbačovského uvoľnenia ďalší už uskutočnil priamo na Slovensku. V liste zo 7. septembra 1987 ten mu však na návrh odpovedal jednoznačne odmietavo, pretože vraj so SKS nie je možné viesť zmysluplný rozhovor, hoci by ho rád začal... Písal: „[...] my skutočne chceme prekonať mnohé nedorozumenia, umele pestované nevraživosti, jednostranné propagandistické predstavy, chceme, chceli by sme nadviazať dotyk s každým Slovákom žijúcim za hranicami vlasti, s každým, ktorý je ‚súci na slovo‘. Aby bolo jasné, myslím tým takých krajanov a emigrantov, ktorí uznávajú zákony nášho štátu a ktorí proti nemu politicky nepracujú. S týmto jediným, ale zásadným obmedzením vstupujeme a budeme vstupovať do rozhovoru s krajanmi; nechceme obnovovať staré spory a nechceme otvárať nové, chceli by sme zdôrazňovať to, čo nás spája, vedomie národnej historicity, spoločnej reči a kultúry, spoločnej starej vlasti, ktorá je výslednicou práce mnohých generácií. To sú naše pozície, jasné a nezáluďné, bez postranných myšlienok a politického čachrärenia.“ Ibaže Svetový kongres Slovákov považoval vtedy Mináč, v duchu dobovej ideológie, ktorú doma, napriek intelektuálnemu kriticismu a istému straníckemu nonkonformizmu reprezentoval, ešte za organizáciu, ktorá „nie je zárukou nezáluďnosti a dobrej vôle. Zo všetkého, čo vieme o Vašej organizácii, jasne vyplýva, že je to militantná politická organizácia s ideovo-politickým jadrom separatisticko-luďáckym. Preto aj Vašu žiadosť o uskutočnenie festivalu slovenskej diasporickej mládeže na území Slovenskej socialistickej republiky posudzujeme ako nekorektné hodenú udičku s priotrávenou návnadou.“¹⁷

Štefan Roman mu vzápätí 22. decembra 1987 odpovedal v mene SKS, ktorý podľa neho združuje „takmer všetky slovenské organizácie a združenia v demokratickom svete“. Upozorňoval, že doposiaľ mala Matica kontakty iba s „veľmi malou časťou zahraničných Slovákov. V skutočnosti iba s tými na Západe, ktorí súhlasia so súčasným režimom a jeho ideológiou...“ Odmietá neopodstatnené odsudky a politickú predpojatosť voči SKS aj „lekciu“ o slovenskom ľuďe. Píše, že je jeho povinnosťou „brániť česť slovenského národa, zoznamovať svet s jeho históriou a kultúrou a obhajovať jeho právo na rovnoprávnosť so slobodnými národmi Európy a sveta“. Vyznáva sa, že pozná náš národ, „lebo som uprostred neho vyrástol a nikdy sa od neho nevzďaloval. Tak je to aj s mnohými inými pracovníkmi

17 Vladimír Mináč Štefanovi B. Romanovi: In: TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Slovenský exil za suverenitu a štátnosť slovenského národa. Výber z dokumentov*. Martin 2003, s. 258.

a členmi Svetového kongresu Slovákov. Nie je to však ináč ani s tými, čo sa už na Slovensku nenarodili a v druhej alebo tretej generácii stále ešte majú záujem o svoje korene, pracujú a obetujú sa za udržanie svojho kultúrneho dedičstva, a preto chceli mať svoj festival v krajine svojich otcov a praotcov.“ Roman pripomína, že mládež, ktorá chce prísť na Slovensko, je prirodzene orientovaná na politiku a ideológiu krajín, kde žije, teda na kritériá „demokracie, humanity a tolerancie“. A jej vzťah ku Slovensku „je vzťah ľudskej bytosti k rodnej zemi a k vlastným koreňom, a preto kladný, bez ohľadu na režim, aký tam súčasne vládne“. Preto si úplne prirodzene želajú aj pre Slovensko „slobodu, demokraciu a nezávislosť, v akej žijú alebo sa narodili“, teda aj presadzovanie všeobecných zásad ľudskosti a ústavnosti, na ktorých je vybudovaný aj SKS. V závere Mináčovi s poľutovaním pripomína vtedajšie písanie svetovej tlače o dobovej ČSSR ako neostalinskom režime, „najservilnejšom satelite Moskvy“, vystavenému ostrému pranierovaniu „prenasledovania náboženstva a veriacich“, ale aj asimilácii Slovákov v Českej socialistickej republike, problémom, ktorým sa však v predchádzajúcom liste vyhol, pretože rozlišuje medzi národom a režimami aj neustále v dejinách menenou medzinárodnou situáciou „nadvlády nad strednou Európou“.¹⁸

Štvrtý Svetový festival slovenskej mládeže sa ešte aj preto so všetkými kultúrnymi, umeleckými, literárnymi, ale aj politickými a historickými diskusiami a prednáškami, ako jedným z profilujúcich podujatí SKS, uskutočnil naposledy mimo hraníc Slovenska, v rakúskom Semmeringu. Konal sa dokonca ešte v prelomovom roku 1989 po predchádzajúcich: prvom vo Waldkraiburgu, NSR, 1980, druhom a treťom v Mount Pocono, Pensylvánia, USA, 1983 a 1986. Až piaty sa však mohol slobodne uskutočniť po nasledujúcich politických zmenách u nás na martinskej pôde v roku 1992.

Vo svojich početných a významných aktivitách Svetový kongres Slovákov adresoval okrem iného memorandum Svätej stolici o potrebe zriadiť slovenskú cirkevnú provinciu (Rím 1971), memorandum o situácii na Slovensku po Helsinskej konferencii signatárom Helsinskej deklarácie a členským krajinám OSN (1977) či vydal kritické vyhlásenie SKS

18 Štefan B. Roman Vladimírovi Mináčovi: In: TRUBINSKÝ, J., C.: *Slovenský exil za suverenitu a štátnosť slovenského národa*, s. 258 – 260. *Encyklopédia Slovenska*, V. zväzok R – Š, uvádza iba heslo: Svetové festivaly mládeže a študentstva /SFMSŠ/ – „stretnutia pokrokovej mládeže študentstva sveta ako forma upevňovania jednoty a spolupráce“. *Výber z dokumentov*. Martin 2003, s. 658. Iba veľmi stručným heslom ho pod anglickým titulom World Festival of Slovak Youth predsa charakterizuje aspoň *Slovakia and the Slovaks. A Concise Encyclopedia*, s. 709.

k 10. výročiu okupácie Slovenska vojskami Varšavského paktu (Toronto 1978). Predstavitelia SKS na čele so Štefanom Romanom sa stretli s členmi Európskeho parlamentu v Štrasburgu, aby im predostreli svoju budúcu víziu demokratického a suverénneho Slovenska ako prirodzenú súčasť rozšírenej Európskej únie už v roku 1976. V Saarbrückene roku 1977 sa zúčastnili na konferencii Paneurópskej únie o budúcom usporiadaní Európy aj s prirodzene integrovaným slovenským subjektom. SKS organizovala rozsiahlu kultúrnu akadémiu v Mníchove (1972). Významná bola aktívna prezentácia na konferenciách o bezpečnosti a spolupráci v Európe v Belehrade (1977) a Madride (1980), na ktorých vyslaní zástupcovia odovzdávali významné memorandá, popisujúce kritickú situáciu na Slovensku i v Česko-Slovensku v rámci obmedzovania ľudských a náboženských práv komunistickým režimom. Všetky tieto vystúpenia a dokumenty – doposiaľ na Slovensku známe iba veľmi okrajovo a vôbec ani po desaťročiach slobodnej existencie druhej SR a demokracie nepublikované – presadzované vtedy na medzinárodnej pôde vyvolávali „znepokojivé reakcie“ u vládnych a straníckych, komunistických predstaviteľov doma a neraz ich veľmi kritickou a tendenčnou antipropagandou komentovali i v kľúčových dobových denníkoch, médiách i vedeckých, najmä programovo ateistických časopisoch, knihách a ústavoch. Pamätným a na Slovensku doposiaľ neznámym a nekomentovaným ani nepreloženým spisom je aj *Memorandum o násilí na ľudských právach na Slovensku*, ktoré predstavitelia SKS predložili v angličtine prezidentovi USA Jamesovi Earl Carterovi v mene slovenských organizácií z pätnástich štátov „slobodného sveta“ pri príležitosti storočnice masovej emigrácie Slovákov do Spojených štátov amerických a Kanady a piateho generálneho zhromaždenia SKS, ktorý sa uskutočnilo vo Washingtone v máji v roku 1978. Vecne, ale kriticky tam analyzujú situáciu Slovenska v období pred významným medzinárodným celoeurópskym helsinským dohovorom: popisujú negatívne prejavy „normalizačnej politiky“ po okupácii v roku 1968 s okliešťovaním práv Matice slovenskej, opätovnú transformáciu Slovenskej akadémie vied na inštrument marxistickej vedy bez objektívnych kritérií riadený „politicko-triednymi tendenciami a ideologickou materialistickou orientáciou“, násilné pozastavenie Slovenského filmového a televízneho zväzu Slovfítez, zákaz významných a populárnych kultúrnych a literárnych časopisov *Kultúrny život* a *Mladá tvorba*.¹⁹

19 *Memorandum on the Violation of Human Rights in Slovakia*. Presented to the President of the United States of America James Earl Carter, jr. on the occasion of the centenary

Podstatnú časť *Memoranda* tvorila kritická analýza situácie na Slovensku po podpísaní Helsinského dohovoru aj komunistickými predstaviteľmi ČSSR. Dokument zdôrazňoval porušovanie ľudských práv a základných slobôd a požadoval od pražskej vlády nielen slovné a deklaratívne ich napĺňanie, ale aj faktické, k čomu sa podpismi zaviazala: umožnenie spájania rodín oddelene žijúcich v zahraničí a doma, najmä rodičov, starých rodičov, detí a vnukov, umožnenie slobodných kontaktov so západným svetom, slobodnú výmenu informácií, časopisov a kníh. Tu sa odvolávali a protestovali autori *Memoranda* aj proti nemožnosti prísunu akýchkoľvek diel prominentných slovenských spisovateľov a básnikov žijúcich v zahraničí do vlasti, ako napríklad Cígera-Hronského, Žrnova, Dilonga, Strmeňa, Šprinca, Zvonického, Hrtúsa-Jurinu, Klasa a ďalších. Upozorňovali, že v postokupačnom období je zakázané publikovať diela nielen katolíckych autorov Silana a Veigla, ale aj významných komunistických ako Tatarku, Karvaša, Ťažkého, historikov Jozefa Jablonického, Liptáka, Mlynárika, Gajdoša, Štvrteckého, literárnych historikov Hamadu, Winklera, Bžocha, Gašparíka, Gáfrika, Poláka, filozofov Strinku, Fabiána a Várossa, publicistov Manáka, Kopčoka, Čierneho, Friša, ekonómov Kočútúcha, Pavlendu, Hatalu, Kostku, filmárov ako Jakubisko, novinárov Sedláková, Plávková, Olšínský, Kaliský, Hysko, Nadubinský, Gryzlov, Kalný, Kalinová, Földvári. Obzvlášť upozorňovali na prenasledovanie spisovateľky Hany Ponickéj po jej kritickom vystúpení na 3. zjazde slovenských spisovateľov, diskriminačnú kampaň proti signatárom Charty 77, obrancov náboženských slobôd ako Pavol Čarnogurský, či ďalších, mnohých zatvorených, alebo „len“ neoprávnene zo zamestnania prepustených ako V. Fabriciho a veľa iných, najmä učiteľov. Aj nátlaky na rodičov a žiakov len za to, že verejne chceli prejavovať kresťanskú vieru. *Memorandum* poukazovalo aj na stiahnutie z obehu nedávno vydaných dejín Slovenska: *Slovenskej vlastivedy* z roku 1970 len za to, že pozitívne hodnotila dubčekovskú politiku v roku 1968. Tiež prepustenie zo zamestnaní početných vedcov a pedagógov i nemožnosť ďalšieho vydávania ich diel. Polemizovali s *Učiteľskými novinami* i *Smenou*, ktoré v polovici sedemdesiatych rokov minulého storočia viedli systematickú kampaň za výchovu iba v duchu vedeckého ateizmu i represii-ách voči kňazom nielen v minulosti, päťdesiatych rokoch, ako donedávna

of the mass emigration of Slovaks to the United States and Canada by the Slovak World Congress comprising representatives of Slovak- American fraternal, religious and cultural organisations and delegates of Slovak organisations from 15 countries of the free world, gathered at the 5th General Assembly of the Congress held in Washington, D.C. 15 – 20 May 1978. Toronto. Slovak World Congress, 1978, pp. 8 – 20.

väzneným biskupom Vojtaššákovi, Buzalkovi, Gojdičovi, Hopkovi, ale aj novým kauzám prenasledovania náboženských činiteľov, publikovaných aj v západnej tlači v rokoch 1976 a 1977. Predovšetkým biskupa Jána Korca, Viktora Trstenského, Štefana Javorského a básnika, kňaza Štefana Sandtnera, ktorému policajne skonfiškovali, po predchádzajúcom dlhoročnom väznení, všetky knihy, rukopisy a náboženské predmety. Rozsiahlou a vecnou analýzou poukazovali na likvidáciu a nátlaky na náboženské inštitúcie a spoločnosti, nielen rímskokatolícke, ale aj gréckokatolícke a evanjelické, zrušenie rehoľných spoločností, obmedzovania teologického školstva a náboženskej tlače i ďalšie previnenia voči náboženským slobodám a medzinárodným záväzkom. V špeciálnej kapitole Odnárodňovanie Slovákov kritizovali pokračujúcu „systematickú a plánovanú“ asimiláciu prinajmenej pol milióna Slovákov v Českej socialistickej republike, ktorá kontinuálne pokračovala po roku 1945, o ktorých prvé kritické zmienky sa objavili v tlači až za dubčekovskej éry. Po jeho politickom páde znovu zmizli zo stránok novín v ČSSR aj napriek viacerým následným poukazovaniam zo strany SKS i ďalších zahraničných slovenských médií v období aj po podpísaní helsinských humanitárnych záväzkov.

Ďalším významným dokumentom v *Memorande*, koncipovanom z dielne SKS, bol adresovaný otvorený list už predtým, v roku 1976, prostredníctvom Katolíckej konferencie Spojených štátov ministrovi zahraničia Henry A. Kissingerovi, v ktorom kriticky podrobne analyzovali prípad biskupa Jána Korca a uvádzali informácie aj o ďalších päťsto kňazoch, ktorí mali zákaz vykonávať svoje povolanie v komunistickom režime. Ďalej referovali o liste Pavla Čarnogurského biskupovi J. Ferancovi o prejavocho náboženského útlaku na Slovensku, aj o kritických postojoch vtedy kňaza Aloisa Tkáča k obmedzovaniu náboženských práv a slobôd na školách i v spoločnosti. Rovnako o kritickom vystúpení spisovateľky Hany Ponickéj, ktorá poukazovala na nemožnosť publikovania mnohých významných autorov poézie, prózy i prekladateľov už začiatkom normalizácie po roku 1969. Poukazujúc na jej parafrázu literárneho klasika, že ak nie je možné publikovať diela básnikov, je niečo zlé v štáte a národe.²⁰

Z hľadiska medzinárodného uznania a priblíženia záujmu o slovenskú otázku docielil Svetový kongres Slovákov nemálo, hoci očividne sa snažil presadiť oveľa viac. V prípravnej fáze vzniku kongresu agilnému

20 RAUSH, J. S.: Memorandum of the United States Catholic Conference to the Secretary of State Dr. Henry A. Kissinger: In: *Memorandum on the Violation of Human Rights in Slovakia*, s. 21 – 26.

organizačnému tajomníkovi Jozefovi Trubinskému mimoriadne priaznivú a podpornú korešpondenciu SKS zaslal okrem iného aj senátor Edward M. Kennedy, budúci kandidát na prezidenta USA 17. júna 1970:²¹ „*I want to congratulate you and your associates on the creation of the Slovak World Congress [...] Chcem Vám a Vaším spolupracovníkom zagrätulovať ku vzniku Svetového kongresu Slovákov. Pomôcť slovenskému národu doma a zároveň vo všetkých krajinách v slobodnom svete, kde Slováci žijú, je skutočne vznešený a obdivuhodný cieľ. Dlhý a odvážny boj slovenského národa za slobodu a samostatnosť je mi veľmi dobre známy. My ako národ sme tiež bojovali za tie isté práva a usilovali sa ich udržať. Preto Spojené štáty sympatizujú s očakávaniami slovenského národa. Prežívame s Vami Vaše nádeje na slobodu a samostatnosť, ktoré horia v srdciach slovenského ľudu a ľudu všetkých porobených národov. Ja veľmi dobre viem, že túžby slovenského národa po slobode krajiny ich pôvodu nie sú založené na žiadnej vládnej forme alebo ideológii z minulosti alebo súčasného Slovenska. Slováci sa obracajú na slobodný svet v záujme spravodlivosti a samostatnosti pre Slovensko, pretože veria vo vecnú pravdu týchto slávnych slov v Deklarácii americkej samostatnosti.*“²²

Obdobnú podporu vyjadrili aj ďalší senátori a kongresmani USA ako Joseph M. Gaydos či newyorský Frank Horton, ktorý priamo aplaudoval druhému cieľu Svetového kongresu Slovákov, jeho úsiliu pracovať za právo slovenského národa na sebaurčenie a pokračovanie zápasu proti komunistickej hrozbe („*I applaud the goal of the Slovak World Congress to work for the right of the Slovak nation for self-determination and to continue to struggle against the Communist threat.*“) a snahu aj v druhom domove Slovákov ochraňovať ich kolektívnu identitu. Vyslovil to dokonca v americkom Kongrese, a keď to vyšlo v *Congressional Record* 22. júna 1970: *Congressman Frank Horton commends Slovak organisations*, zaslal to SKS.²³ Rovnako vtedajší prezident USA Gerald G. Ford, ktorý 28. mája 1970 poďakoval za informáciu o vytvorení SKS a zaželal mu úspech na rokovaní v júni:

21 TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Spomienky v dokumentoch. Z archívu slovenského emigranta*. Zväzok druhý. Vydané v Spojených štátoch amerických, 1988, s. 447.

22 Porovnaj: TRUBINSKÝ, J., C.: *Slovenský exil za suverenitu a štátnosť slovenského národa*, s. 207 – 208.

23 *Congressman Frank Horton commends Slovak organisations*. In: TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Spomienky v dokumentoch*, s. 447.

„The aim and objectives of the Congress should be commended by free men everywhere. There could be no finer cause for Slovak people to be dedicated to than assisting Slovak people behind the iron curtain to regain their freedom and independence, contributing as citizens Communist encroachment. A Slovak voice with these aim would be a decided asset to the free world.“²⁴

Viacerí ďalší kongresmani a senátori zaslali podporné listy a výrazy sympatií a prejavili záujem zúčastniť sa oficiálneho založenia Kongresu či tam usporiadaného banketu Bob Taft, Ray J. Madden, William Stanton, Charles E. Goodell, Shirley Chisholmová, ktorá to tiež vnímala nielen ako zápas o národnú slobodu, ale aj s komunistickou ideológiou ako (hlavným) utláčateľom individuálnych a kolektívnych slobôd.²⁵

Jeden z kľúčových autorov dobového bratislavského Ústavu marxizmu-leninizmu ÚV KSS v Bratislave, Ondrej Grieš, v spojitosti s „kritickou a veľmi tendenčnou“ analýzou dvoch z kľúčových časopisov kultúrnej emigrácie – *Mostu* a *Horizontu* referuje aj o udelení Národnej ceny SKS prezidentovi USA J. Carterovi. Uverejňuje citát z listu predsedu SKS Š. Romana publikovaný v *Horizonte*, ktorý píše: „[...] občania slovenského pôvodu mnohých štátov slobodného sveta sa rozhodli venovať Vám najvyššie uznanie vo forme Národnej ceny SKS za Vaše smelé a cenné uplatňovanie náuky o ľudských právach, ideál to civilizovaného ľudstva“. Pre Grieša však toto doceňovanie Carterovej doktríny o obrane ľudských práv „len potvrdzuje reakčný, protisocialistický a antisovietsky kurz politiky Svetového kongresu Slovákov“.²⁶

Obdobným dôkazom je mu aj široká publicita „pamfletu“ *Memoranda* pre belehradskú konferenciu zaslaného americkej i kanadskej delegácii, ale aj významným časopisom a novinám, univerzitám a politickým inštitúciám, kde SKS obviňoval ČSSR z porušovania helsinských dohôd. Ako

24 Preklad: „Ciele a snahy Vášho kongresu by mali byť vítané a prijaté slobodnými ľuďmi všade na svete. Pre Slovákov vo svete nemôže byť lepšej kauzy, ktorej by sa zaslúžili, ako pomáhať slovenskému národu za železnou oponou znovu nadobudnúť slobodu, samostatnosť a nezávislosť a zabrániť ako občania ďalšiemu komunistickému prenikaniu. Slovenský hlas s týmito cieľmi môže byť rozhodujúcim prínosom pre slobodný svet.“ TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Spomienky v dokumentoch*, s. 451.

25 Tamže, s. 457.

26 GRIEŠ, O.: Tendencie v kultúrnej politike slovenskej politickej emigrácie (1977 – 1979). In: *Informácia o činnosti slovenského politickej emigrácie Slovenská politická emigrácia a jej kultúra v rokoch 1977 – 1979*. Bulletin – séria A, č. 1. február 1981, Bratislava, III. odbor ÚML ÚV KSS, s. 9.

argumenty doložil pre Grierša iba takzvané dokumenty v úvodzovkách: o biskupovi Tkáčovi, liste Pavla Čarnogurského biskupovi Ferancovi, proteste Hany Ponickej na 3. zjazde slovenských spisovateľov v marci 1977.²⁷ Autor sa očividne k Memorandu v origináli ani preklade nedostal, ale sotva by zmenil schematický názor, že široká publicita „svedčí o cielavedomom úsilí narúšať politiku uvoľňovania medzinárodného napätia a vzájomne výhodnej spolupráce“. Navyše „Paktovanie s nepriateľmi vlasti a národa“ je mu „ďalším dôkazom reakčnosti Svetového kongresu Slovákov“.²⁸

Grieš nepriamou referenciou poskytne síce istú sumu informácií o kultúrno-politickom dianí v exile, najmä na pozadí kultúrnych, konferenčných a vedeckých aktivít jednotlivcov i SKS, o ktorých sa inak buď vôbec, alebo len devalvujúco písalo doma. Principiálne všetko mu však je predmetom odmietnutia a polemík: „[...] *tendencie politickej emigrácie v kultúrnej oblasti jasne dokazujú, že jej kultúrna činnosť je len pláštikom, ktorý má zakryť politické pravé ciele politickej emigrácie*“. Je výrazom „*nie záchrany kultúrnych hodnôt slovenského národa, ako to radi hlásajú pri svojich útokoch proti rozvoju našej socialistickej kultúry, ale hlásateľom antikomunistickej a antisocialistickej ideológie zameranej proti záujmom slovenského národa. Kultúrna činnosť politickej emigrácie je teda poslušným vykonávateľom politických snažení predstaviteľov slovenskej politickej emigrácie, ktorí svojou antikomunistickou činnosťou zrádzajú slovenský národ, jeho kultúrne tradície a národné záujmy*.“ V skutočnosti to bolo však práve naopak. Grieš už aj oproti istému liberálnejšiemu zmiereniu, aspoň tak, ako to bolo v šesťdesiatych rokoch, požadoval „*zintenzívnenie a zefektívnenie*“ boja proti dobovému antikomunizmu aj v kultúrnej oblasti. Pretože „iba“ jej socialistickej prejavy doma – pritom celý rad neraz najtalentovanejších umelcov a tvorcov bolo prakticky v normalizácii umlčaných, či vyradovaných z encyklopédií i akýchkoľvek aktivít, či museli emigrovať – sú ak nie výlučnými, prinajmenej „*najdôstojnejšími tľmočníkmi kultúrnych hodnôt národa*“.²⁹

Aj náš ideológ sa musí kriticky k niečomu priznať napríklad pri nekrológu nad Ivanom Stodolom v exilovom štvrťročníku pre slovenskú kultúru *Most* (č. 1 a 2 z roku 1977). Tvrdenie, že ho „*komunisti dlhé roky obchádzali a väznili*“, ospravedlňuje tým, že i jeho dielo a ostatných slovenských

27 Tamže. Pozri aj *Memorandum on the Violation of Human Rights in Slovakia*.

28 GRIEŠ, O.: *Tendencie v kultúrnej politike slovenskej politickej emigrácie (1977 – 1979)*, s. 9.

29 Tamže, s. 29.

spisovateľov bolo predsa len nakoniec prehodnotené v „*duchu leninskej teórie dvoch kultúr v jednej národnej kultúre*“.³⁰

Ústav marxizmu-leninizmu ÚV KSS v Bratislave vo svojich Informáciách o činnosti slovenskej politickej emigrácie podrobne mapoval činnosť exilu zrejme až do svojho rozpustenia v roku 1990, kde sa zameriaval nielen na všeobecné hľadiská či citlivú problematiku kritiky cirkevnej politiky v ČSSR vo svete, ale aj na účinkovanie Vatikánu, nepriamo aj Ústavu svätých Cyrila a Metoda v Ríme a Svetového kongresu Slovákov, ako dvoch najkonceptnejších a najintenzívnejšie činnosť vyvíjajúcich inštitúcií Slovákov vo svete, ktoré sa mu pre budúci vývoj socializmu a komunizmu u nás javili aj najnebezpečnejšie. Informácie boli pritom určené výhradne iba niektorým významným predstaviteľom dobového režimu a citovali sa v nich nesúrodno, ale rozdelené po skupinách, fragmenty z jednotlivých emigrantských časopisov, bez ohľadu, či mali slovenskú, alebo česko-slovenskú orientáciu. Úzkostlivo vnímali udelenie Európskej ceny Karola IV, priznávanú vynikajúcim osobnostiam politického a kultúrneho života stredoeurópskych národov, predsedovi SKS Š. Romanovi, ktorú dostal ako druhý Slovak vôbec, po predsedovi Slovenskej ligy v Amerike, Filipovi A. Hrobákovi. Aspoň, ako podľa Grieša o tom referoval nielen slovensko-americký týždenník Jednota, ale aj mníchovský mesačník Horizont v roku 1986.³¹

Predmetom kritického záujmu mu bol aj III. svetový festival slovenskej mládeže, ktorý ako jedno z profilových podujatí SKS, sa uskutočnil v tom roku pod heslom *Slovák som aj Slovak budem*. Dobových domácich komunistických politikov muselo znepokojovať nielen vystúpenie Š. B. Romana, ktorý tvrdil, že týmto festivalom sa mladí zaradili „*medzi mladých bernolákovcov, medzi mladých štúrovcov, príslušníkov hnutia mladého Slovenska, ktorí v rôznych obdobiach vyorávali národnú brázdú*“. Navyše hrdo majúci nadväzovať „*na prácu mládeže, ktorú vítali a pozdravovali Sládkovič, Rázus, Žarnov až po básnikov mladších generácií*“. Vy máte príležitosť pokračovať v stopách mládeže, ktorá chodila na historický Devín i na Bradlo,“ tvrdil Roman. Navyše veľmi znepokojovalo domáceho slovenského dogmatického ideológa, že na festivale aj verejne skladali sľub: „*Pretože mládež v krajine našich rodičov a prarodičov nemôže slobodne za seba hovoriť a rozhodovať, uvedomujeme si povinnosť hovoriť aj za nich. S plným vedomím zodpovednosti, ktorý osud položil na naše plecia, sľubujeme, že slovenskému národu a jeho túžbe po slobode a samostatnosti verní*

30 Tamže, s. 46.

31 Tamže, s. 20.

ostaneme, a za tieto ideály hotoví sme pracovať a obetovať sa.“ Popritom organizátori festivalu adresovali aj množstvo posolstiev, predovšetkým významným zahraničným politickým osobnostiam a inštitúciám, z ktorých pozdrav účastníkom festivalu zaslal dokonca aj prezident USA Ronald Reagan, vysoko oceňujúc tradície našich predkov: „*Hrdinský slovenský národ nemá možnosť využívať základné práva, ktoré sú neoddeliteľnou súčasťou amerického národa. Duch slobody a základné ľudské práva sú v krajine Vašich predkov systematicky potláčané neľudskosťou štátnej totality... Napriek tejto situácii Slováci na celom svete žijú vo viere, že nič neuhasí ich hlboké národné povedomie a nikomu sa nepodarí zničiť túžbu ľudského ducha po slobode.*“³²

Predseda SKS Štefan Roman v interview pre *Jednotu* z 23. júla 1986 považoval síce festival za perfektne zorganizovaný, nedostatok však videl v zložení účastníkov, kde bola iba polovica mladých. Zároveň oceňoval „prekrásny stánok“ Jankolovej knižnice, kde boli aj knihy priamo zo Slovenska, ale podľa neho vrátane časopisu Slovensko „*prešpikované komunistickou, protislovenskou a protiamerickou propagandou*“.³³ Nezabudol spomenúť, že si váži aj celotýždňovú prítomnosť reportérov zo slovenských redakcií *BBC*, *Hlasu Ameriky*, *Rádia Kanady* a *Slobodnej Európy*, ktoré zrejme dostatočne informovali o dianí na festivale.³⁴

Medzi početnými a dodnes verejne nedostupnými a zamlčivanými odsudzujúcimi analýzami exilu na ÚML ÚV KSS si napríklad profesor Robert Hrbek v štúdii *Činnosť slovenskej politickej emigrácie medzi Belehradom a Madridom* všíma všetky generácie a smery československej a slovenskej politickej emigrácie vrátane poslednej „*poaugustovej, antikomunistickej a antičeskoslovenskej emigrácie z roku 1968*“, ktorá sa v jeho tradičnom dogmatickom hodnotení zjednotila vraj na „*spoločnej línii zúrivého antikomunizmu a antisovietizmu*“. Ako stúpenci „*zahraničnopolitickej línie Spojených štátov, tak ako ju presadzovali americkí prezidenti Truman, Eisenhower a Johnson*“.³⁵

32 Tamže, s. 23.

33 HUDEČKOVÁ, V. (ed.): *Informácie o činnosti slovenskej politickej emigrácie*. Bratislava 1986, s. 24.

34 Tamže, s. 25.

35 *Slovenská politická emigrácia a jej kultúra v rokoch 1977 – 1979*. Bulletin – séria A, č. 1, február 1981, Bratislava, III. odbor ÚML ÚV KSS, s. 3. Tento a ďalšie pôvodne utajené materiály z rozsiahlej a dobre zachovanej knižnice Ústavu marxizmu-leninizmu ÚV KSS v Bratislave sú v súčasnosti k dispozícii na štúdiu v Ústave pamäti národa v Bratislave.

Medzi inými postojmi a dokumentmi posudzuje v čase zostrenej politickej situácie, okupácie Afganistanu sovietskymi vojskami, obzvlášť stanoviská slovenskej politickej emigrácie, ktorá sa vraj stavia „na pozície najreaktívnejších amerických kruhov“. V Manifeste Európskeho výboru Svetového kongresu Slovákov k situácii vo svete a na Slovensku so znepokojením číta „obnaženú“ celú strategickú koncepciu, kde sa hovorí úplne samozrejme aj o vzdialenej perspektíve, že „národy chcú žiť slobodne a nezávisle. Prvým predpokladom k tomu je slobodná a zjednotená Európa [...] ako Európa slobodných demokratických štátov.“ Rovnako Hrbeka zaráža predvídajúca slovenská požiadavka na poslancov Európskeho parlamentu, aby solidaritu s ujarmenými národmi stredovýchodnej Európy „dokumentovali symbolickým gestom aspoň jedného prázdneho miesta v EP s označením rezervované pre zástupcov národov stredovýchodnej Európy“. V Memorande sa totiž uvádzalo, že by to malo byť „trvalou pripomienkou národov v západnej Európe, že Európa môže bezpečne žiť v slobode a pokoji len vtedy, keď bude celá slobodná a jednotná. Upozorňuje tiež svetovú verejnosť, že Slováci pod komunistickou vládou túžia rovnako po samostatnosti a slobode svojho národa ako ostatné ujarmené národy v stredovýchodnej Európe.“³⁶

Ako priamo falzifikát označuje Hrbek už spomínané predchádzajúce Memorandum o situácii na Slovensku po Helsinskej konferencii, ktoré SKS vydal v Toronte. Odmieťa oprávnený kritický „útok“ predstaviteľov Slovákov v zahraničí na normalizačný proces, obviňovanie čs. vlády z porušovania „Helsinskej dohody v otázke zlučovania rodín, kontaktov so západným svetom, kultúrnej výmeny a informácií, kultúrnych správ a základných slobôd tzv. náboženského prenasledovania a ‚denacionalizácie‘ Slovákov v českých krajinách“. Jednoducho namiesto vecného argumentovania uchyluje sa iba k tradičnému obrannému kliše a obvineniu SKS i emigrácie vôbec „z antikomunistických a protičeskoslovenských útokov“.³⁷

Ako úzkostlivo, ale aj utajene sledoval ÚV KSS činnosť slovenskej emigrácie všetkých orientácií i zameraní, a to nielen politickej, svedčí aj encyklopédia zostavovateľky Ruženy Machánkovej *Kto je kto v emigrácii*, vydanéj v počte číslovaných a iba adresátom určených 80 exemplárov. Pri tom ani v takejto vecnej a nekomentovanej podobe prevzatej z exilovej tlače sa základné informácie o osobnostiach a inštitúciách Slovákov v zahraničí nemohli dostať ani nedostali do všeobecne dostupnej a aj tým vtedy veľmi

36 *Slovenská politická emigrácia a jej kultúra v rokoch 1977 – 1979*, s. 33.

37 *Slovenská politická emigrácia medzi Belehradom a Madridom*. Bulletin – séria A, júl 1980, Bratislava, III. odbor ÚML ÚV KSS, s. 11.

skreslenej Encyklopédii Slovenska zo SAV v Bratislave či Slovenského biografického slovníka vydanom MS v Martine.

Utajená „encyklopédia“ exilu sa podrobne enumeratívne, hoci predsa tiež neúplne, aj keď v mnohom prekonáva i súčasne dostupné encyklopédie z roku 2011 /sic!/, venuje emigrantským osobnostiam, organizáciám a inštitúciám, tlači a vydavateľstvám. Prirodzene najrozsiahlejšie a pomerne objektívne heslo má tu SKS s rozsiahlym výpočtom všetkých funkcionárov i jej predsedom Romanom. Rovnako poskytuje informácie aj o Bulletine SKS, ako tlačovom orgáne s výpočtom všetkých členov rozsiahlej a obmieňanej redakcie, počnúc E. T. Böhmom a nekončiac Jánom Okálom, Jánom Belianskym či Dušanom Tóthom.³⁸

Už pri založení Svetového kongresu Slovákov sa zadefinovalo, že *„organizácia nechce byť žiadnou slovenskou vládou v exile. Takisto nechce a nebude sa vmiešavať do vnútorných záležitostí Slovenska. Chce však vytvoriť predpoklady na to, aby slovenský národ mohol v rozhodujúcej chvíli sám sa slobodne rozhodnúť o svojej budúcnosti. Okrem toho SKS považuje za svoju povinnosť informovať svet o neslobode slovenského národa a v prípade potreby zasiahnuť v jeho prospech.“* V roku 1987 sekretariát SKS uvádzal, že má 93 inštitucionálnych členov, pritom niektoré z organizácií mali mať aj vyše stotisíc členov – prinajmenej Slovenská liga v Amerike a početných individuálnych členov – zakladajúcich, doživotných, podporných a čestných – jednotlivcov *„bez rozdielu pohlavia, stavu, veku, náboženského alebo politického presvedčenia, ktorí sa riadia demokratickými a ľudskými zásadami“*.³⁹

Ako reakciu na požadované zapojenie do diskusie o budúcej koncepcii Svetového kongresu Slovákov listom organizačnému tajomníkovi Jozefovi Trubinskému z 11. januára 1971 podrobne odpovedá na dotazník jeden z najskúsenejších slovenských politikov, bývalý funkcionár Demokratickej strany, Emanuel T. Böhm, vtedy člen výkonného výboru Slovenskej oslobodzovacej rady, ale aj neskorší predseda redakčného kruhu kongresového Bulletinu. Vytvorenie SKS považuje za jeden *„z najdôležitejších činov Slovákov, či už doma, alebo v zahraničí“* a v jeho vytvorení vidí *„predpoklady, bez ktorých úspech slovenských podujatí je takmer nemožný“*. Pretože *„Slováci doteraz nikdy nehovorili voči ostatnému svetu jednotným hlasom. Naopak, vieme, že naše náhľady a snaženia sa predstavovali po celý čas konfúzne*

38 MACHÁNKOVÁ, R.: *Kto je kto v emigrácii*. Bratislava 1986, s. 151.

39 Svetový kongres Slovákov, Slovak World Congress. Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 1987, b. s.

a že naše právo na sebaurčenie sme si, ako Žarnov hovoril, „romanticky prerečnili alebo politicky prekupčili“. Tí, čo nám nepriali, ľahko dokazovali mocným sveta, že Slováci vlastne nevedia, čo chcú, a teda, že sa nedá na nás zakladať, keďže nemôžeme garantovať akúsi stabilitu a cielavedomosť ani len vo vlastných radoch a pravda tým menej v širokom meradle v oblastiach vzťahov s inými národmi.“ Považuje za veľmi dôležité „mať mandát hovoriť v mene všetkých Slovákov“ za vec „ďalekosiahleho významu“. A napriek spochybňovaniu niektorými, podľa neho, tento mandát SKS má. S tým, aby sa „vo vhodnom čase pomohla realizovať túžba slovenského národa po úplnej národnej a politickej samostatnosti“.⁴⁰

Za nanajvýš dôležité považuje „aby organizačná a osobná štruktúra SKS bola taká, aby v nej nerozhodovali len úzke osobné záujmy niekoľkých priateľov toho istého zmysľania, ale predovšetkým aby SKS bol skutočnou reprezentáciou všetkých rozdielnych smerov slovenského politického a národno-kultúrneho života, kde sa naše problémy budú už konečne riešiť demokratickým spôsobom“. SKS má byť pritom podľa neho všetko: „národná, kultúrna, ale i politická organizácia“. Považuje za dôležité, aby SKS „vedel využiť v záujme slovenskej veci, našu kultúrnu, náboženskú, vedeckú a inú činnosť na politické ciele národa“.⁴¹

Za rovnako dôležité považuje, aby SKS „zaujal protikomunistické stanovisko“. Uvedomuje si však, že Slováci celosvetovo nebudú rozhodovať o tom, pokiaľ bude trpený komunistický systém. Ani „či komunistické praktiky sa budú udomáňovať v niektorých častiach teraz ešte slobodného sveta, alebo nie“. Vie, že o tom budú rozhodovať veľmoci, ale: „Nie sme však zase celkom bezvýznamní a mali by sme priliehať našim silám rozhodne prispieť v boji proti komunistickej rozpínavosti. Takýto náš postoj bude určite raz vítaný u všetkých tých národov, ktoré v budúcej konfrontácii s komunizmom zistia, že majú čo najviac stratiť. [...] Netreba nám však byť špeciálne proti slovenským komunistom za každú cenu len preto, že nepostupujú tak, ako by sme si to v slobodnom svete priali. Očakávať od nich niečo podobné bolo by naivné a nereálne. Slovenská situácia je taká, že každá zo slovenských politických strán má možnosť v otázke ‚slovenskej samostatnosti‘ zohrať historickú úlohu. Nie je pochyby o tom, že takúto možnosť majú momentálne slovenskí komunisti, lebo len tí môžu teraz trvať na tom, aby v komunistickom orbite slovenskí komunisti dostali úplnú politickú samostatnosť v spravovaní Slovenska. Všetky slovenské politické strany a smery

40 TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Spomienky v dokumentoch*, s. 509.

41 Tamže, s. 510.

mali by za každých okolností ako samozrejme predpokladať, že v otázke slovenskej politickej samostatnosti majú jeden v druhom oporu. Filozofie strán môžu byť odlišné, v otázke samostatnosti mali by byť však jednotné, lebo jedine len takto budú môcť Slováci dosiahnuť svoj cieľ. Potom slovenské vlády sa budú môcť meniť, ale samostatnosť bude vždy ostávať. Teda, áno, kritizujeme, kampaňujeme a budíme proti komunizmu, lenže nerobme to tak, aby sme zo slovenských komunistov robili tých ,najobávanejších komunistov na zemeguli‘ – lebo sa mi zdá, že by sa týmto škodilo slovenskej veci.’⁴²

Böhm sa tiež samozrejme nazdával, že „politická štátnosť je konečný cieľ samourčenia každého národa“ a obmieňajúc výrok Andreja Hlinku tvrdil, že „nepozná prípad, kde by štátnosť nebola cieľom samourčenia hociktorého z národov sveta“. Vizionársky presne si uvedomoval, že iba ako rovnocenný partner môže robiť rozhodnutia, aby sa mohol stať členom väčšej alebo menšej federácie či (európskeho) zoskupenia národov.⁴³

Vyžadoval tiež väčšie vtiahnutie nielen evanjelikov, slovenských Čecho-Slovákov, ale aj slovenských Židov do politických úsilí a spolupráci, pretože „prvý raz v histórii Židia vo svete so svojimi požiadavkami nachádzajú sa a budú sa nachádzať v medzinárodnej politike na tej istej strane politických záujmov, od ktorej strany taktiež Slováci očakávajú riešenie ich otázky“. To všetko a celá činnosť SKS dôsledne vyžaduje, aby sa diala na samozrejmych demokratických princípoch.⁴⁴

Ak sa Jozef Trubinský, vtedy ako tajomník SKS pre USA, vyslovoval, obmieňajúc názory Böhma, za ponechanie priestoru slovenským komunistom doma v rámci formovania slovenskej samostatnosti pred III. zasadnutím generálneho zhromaždenia SKS v Chicagu 25. marca 1975, vyvolalo to prudké odmietnutie a obavy Slovákov z Chicaga v otvorenom liste všetkým delegátom kongresu. Považovali to za politický diletantizmus, „ktorý chce dezorientovať predovšetkým našich krajanov v USA a v Kanade“. Tvrdili, že rovnako ako všetkým komunistom, „tak i slovenským, a to bez výnimky ide predovšetkým o víťazstvo socializmu na celom svete. Proletársky internacionalizmus opretý o ZSSR je jedinou silou a ideológiou vo vzťahu komunistov k vlastnému a ostatným národom. Takzvaný národno-oslobodzovací boj utlačovaných národov, ktorý v istých etapách vývoja medzinárodných vzťahov komunisti podporujú i organizujú, smeruje nie k budovaniu národných štátov, ale predovšetkým k oslabeniu kapitalistického imperializmu

42 Svetový kongres Slovákov, b. s.

43 TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Spomienky v dokumentoch*, s. 512.

44 Tamže, s. 513.

a k vytváraní vhodných podmienok na uchopenie moci v oslobodených krajinách komunistami. Tam, kde komunisti pri moci už sú, je každá i tá najmenšia snaha po nacionálnom hnutí ‚reakčná‘, a preto socialistickému zriadeniu nepriateľská. Teda iba človek, ktorý nemá ani tie najelementárnejšie znalosti marxizmu, sa môže domnievať, že v krajinách so socialistickým zriadením je vôbec možné aplikovať zásadu sebaurčenia národov na uplatnenie nacionálnych snáh, na vytvorenie predpokladov na vznik samostatného štátu.⁴⁵

Obdobný list J. Trubinskému adresoval Ladislav Macko zo Slovensko-amerického združenia v Kalifornii zo 7. septembra 1973: „V žiadnom prípade by sme sa nemali opierať o komunistov, i keď sa pretvárajú, že sú bojovníkmi za práva nášho národa.“ Vráťane Dubčeka, ktorý sa, podľa neho, „spočiatku ukázal ako bojovník za reformy v rámci brutálneho systému komunizmu“. Na základe správ, ktoré dostával z domova, Macko usudzoval, že „komunizmus je tam nenávidený aj medzi mládežou, ktorá už sa narodila a bola vychovaná týmto systémom, a preto sa musíme vyhnúť, aby sme spomenuli akúkoľvek spoluprácu s komunistami na Slovensku“. „Podľa môjho názoru si urobil dobromyseľnú, ale taktickú chybu, keď si sa zmienil v Tvojej reči o komunizme,“ vyčíta Trubinskému.⁴⁶

V pozadí činnosti SKS boli mnohé zložité osobnostné, koncepčné a organizačno-politické zápasy. Časopis Černákov odkaz z februára 1974 napríklad uviedol pod titulom Slovenskí kňazi v Ríme: „nie“, že slovenskí katolícki kňazi z Európy na svojej tradičnej pastoračnej porade 11. – 14. februára 1974 v Ríme v tajnom hlasovaní sa 41 hlasmi pri jednom zdržaní vyslovili proti tomu, aby „budúce generálne zhromaždenie, ktoré má byť 1975 v Európe, sa konalo v Ríme“. S minikomentárom, že Štefan Roman predsa len trvá na tom, aby sa kongres v tom roku uskutočnil práve aj v Ríme, čo sa neskôr aj stalo. Zaiste sa tu prejavili obavy z politizácie a možných ešte väčších represívnych zásahov na predstaviteľov cirkvi i ďalších náboženstiev na Slovensku a v ČSSR.⁴⁷

SKS sa významne snažil získať podporu najvyšších predstaviteľov USA, čo sa mu mnohokrát aj úspešne darilo napriek niektorým neskorším kritikom, ktorí vyčítali činnosti SKS medzinárodnú izolovanosť. Napríklad

45 Otvorený list všetkým delegátom III. zasadnutia generálneho zhromaždenia SKS v Chicagu. In: TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Spomienky v dokumentoch*, s. 567.

46 Ladislav Macko píše J. Trubinskému. In: TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Spomienky v dokumentoch*, s. 569.

47 TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Spomienky v dokumentoch*, s. 607.

kongresman Robert Hanrahan za štát Illinois pred generálnym zhromaždením s 1 500 Slovákmí v Chicagu, konanom od 28. júna do 1. júla 1973, predniesol významný prejav, ktorý zaznamenal aj časopis *Congressional Record* 11. júla 1973: *Extension of Remarks. Speech before the Slovak World Congress* (Rozšírenie poznámky. Prejav pred Svetovým kongresom Slovákov), kde predstavil nielen novodobé dejiny Slovákov ako okupovanej krajiny po vpáde Varšavského paktu do Česko-Slovenska päť rokov po brutálnom medzinárodnom akte piatich komunistických štátov, ale sa vrátil aj do dávnej minulosti: „*The existence of the Slovak nation can be measured by millenia. However, while historian of some nations recorded the glory of their dynasties and wrote the pages of triumphant victories over other nations, Slovak wrote their history by honest and hard work. Notwithstaning trials and tribulations the Slovaks were always God-fearing people, and continued their contribution to the brotherhood of man. From the earliest days of its existence Slovakia has been a land of full spiritual and cultural resources. The Slovak plains and valleys were the cradle of Slavic civilization. The first literary Works in the Slavonic language were created there; the Holy Scriptures were there translated into the vernacular and the uniquely warm and stirringly beautiful Slavonic Liturgy was born there. After their proud emergency on the scene of history in the 9th century the Slovaks were forced to recede into the shadow of European development; but, Slovakia did not cese to be land of culture and a place for new ideas. All cultural and artistic currents found an echo and fertile soil in Slovakia, and Slovak contribution became a part of the European cultural heritage. [...] Even, under the present oppresors the people of Slovakia are surviving, as they survived under similar tyrannies in the past. The annals of history will not fail to record that it was in Slovakia where an effort, by a Slovak, Dubček, was successful, even though brief, to give a human face to the brutal system of Soviet Communism.*“⁴⁸

Pravdaže o smerovaní SKS, jeho zložení a reprezentatívnosti sa viedli početné diskusie nielen v exilových a krajanských časopisoch, ale aj „doma“, kde bol predmetom neraz nevyberaných a tendenčných i demagogických útokov, vyplývajúcich z principiálneho odporu voči jeho základnej orientácii, ktorá sa v podstate svojím pluralistickým demokratizmom považovala za principiálne antikomunistickú či antisocialistickú. Zároveň

48 HANRAHAN, R.: *Extension of Remarks. Speech before the Slovak World Congress.* (Rozšírenie poznámky. Prejav pred Svetovým kongresom Slovákov.) *Congressional Record*. 11 July 1973. In: TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Spomienky v dokumentoch*, s. 609 – 610.

za separatistickú, v jemnejšej terminológii za secesionistickú v rámci úsilia o štátne usporiadanie vzťahov Slovákov a Čechov na princípe úplnej a medzinárodnej rovnosti, rovnako ako so všetkými národmi a štátmi sveta. Rozkladné prvky, ktoré boli vnášané do mnohých emigrantských skupín, aj prostredníctvom tam vysielaných agentov ŠtB, bude treba ešte len vydolovať z archívov a presne pomenovať aj vrátane účinkovania v SKS.

Na to v roku 1979 reagoval jeden z podpredsedov SKS v *Kanadskom Slovákovi*: „Od založenia SKS komunisti na Slovensku a v Prahe a ich agenti v slobodnom svete vynaložili veľa úsilia, aby zdiskreditovali Svetový kongres Slovákov v očiach národa doma, aj širšej slovenskej rodiny v zahraničí. Zároveň sa snažili vnieť sváry a nedorozumenia do radov pracovníkov a členstva, aby činnosť oslabili a lovili v mútnych vodách. Komunistom ani zástancom čechoslovakizmu, ktorí chceli postaviť Kongres do nesprávneho svetla najmä v politických kruhoch Západu, sa nepodarilo SKS ani zdiskreditovať, ani rozložiť. Naopak, od založenia Kongresu r. 1970 sa stáva každým rokom uznávanejšou reprezentáciou Slovákov a tlmočníkom slovenských národných snáh nielen smerom k slovenským organizáciám po všetkých kontinentoch, ale, čo je dôležité, aj v kultúrnych kruhoch krajín západného sveta. Napriek neprajnej medzinárodnej situácii Kongresu sa podarilo predniesť slovenskú otázku v Európskom parlamente, na kongrese celoeurópskeho hnutia ‚Paneuropa‘, na konferencii o ľudských právach v Belehrade, na konferenciách o východnej Európe, ako aj v politických kruhoch, ktoré vplyvom protislovenskej propagandy dlho nepokladali za potrebné zaujímať sa o slovenskú otázku. SKS zainteresovalo cudzích kultúrnych pracovníkov o Slovensko a jeho kultúru a je zásluhou Kongresu, že sa do univerzitných verejných knižníc dostali seriózne vedecké knihy o Slovensku.“ Tieto medzinárodné aktivity kontinuálne pokračovali viac či menej úspešne, avšak neprehliadnuteľne, prinajmenej za Romanovho predsedníctva až do jeho smrti (1988) a v istej limitovanej podobe aj neskôr. Autor proti priznávanej, aj istej rozdrobenosti práce, nesvornosti exilu, zápasom vnútorným i vonkajším, volal skôr po väčšej „dôvere, spolupráci, spoluzodpovednosti a duchu spolupatričnosti“, aby sa podarilo presvedčiť západný demokratický svet „o práve slovenského národa na samostatnosť, pomôcť slovenskému národu k plnej slobode, demokratickému rozhodovaniu o svojom osude a k takej

štátnosti, akú po oslobodení strednej Európy budú mať iné susedné národy, či už v rámci zjednotenej Európy, alebo federovanej strednej Európy“.⁴⁹

Deliaca čiara slovenského exilu bola od počiatku a dodnes aj dožíva nielen v zahraničí na otázke vtedy pre nich kľúčovej verzii budúcej štátnosti. Nezávisle stanovisko SKS svojim zásadným vyhlásením Sami za seba v roku 1974 podporila významná skupina intelektuálov, zväčša emigrácie po roku 1968, ktorá sa združovala okolo vplyvného európskeho mníchovského exilového časopisu Horizont, hoci ten i jeho redaktori a okruh čitateľov boli vždy významnými podporovateľmi SKS: „*Sami za seba nechceme hovoriť len na adresu našich slovenských bratov, ale aj na adresu zahraničných príslušníkov tohto národa, s ktorým Slováci dosiaľ žijú v spoločnom štátnom útvare – na adresu českej emigrácie. Boli by sme radi, keby pochopili, že medzi Slovákami je definitívne koniec akejkoľvek forme čechoslovakizmu, že Slováci chcú a musia hovoriť za seba. Preto udržovať alebo zakladať v zahraničí hocijaké ‚československé‘ organizácie je prežitkom, ktorý nezodpovedá skutočnosti. – Slováci a Česi žijú síce pod spoločnou strechou, ale vo dvoch národných a kultúrnych realitách, z ktorých každá má svoju vlastnú tvár, vlastné meno, vlastný život, vlastné záujmy. A vývoj v smere seberealizácie v plnom slova zmysle pôjde nezadržateľne ďalej. Očakávame preto od českých priateľov v zahraničí, najmä však od tých, ktorí prišli na Západ ako my po auguste 1968, že upustia od užívania starých koncepcií, termínov a prívlastkov, ktoré sú aj tak len sebaklamom. Pracujme pre dobro našich národov vedľa seba, ako partneri svorne i s ostatnými ujarmenými národmi strednej a východnej Európy. Ale každý pod vlastný menom! – Či je to v časopisoch, vydavateľstvách, rozhlasoch alebo organizáciách. Označujme veci pravdivo a nazývajme ich vlastnými menami. Čo je české, nech zostane české, čo je slovenské – nech je slovenské.*“⁵⁰

Ešte i dnes sporadicky dochádza k zväčša nepochopiteľnému nadradovaniu niektorých historikov a analytikov exilu československej orientácie v zjednodušenom členení týchto takzvaných (niekedy vraj výlučne demokratických) pluralistov nad „iba“ (menej či nedemokratickými, sic!) slovenskými monistami či secesionistami – napríklad je to zreteľné aj v hodnotení skôr viac federalizmu naklonenému Jozefovi Špetkovi, ktorý im venoval samostatnú publikáciu. Podľa neho: „*Kým monisti chceli byť*

49 KIRSCHBAUM, J.: SKS má správny smer – konfúzia zbytočná. *Kanadský Slovák*, 24. februára 1979. In: TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Spomienky v dokumentoch*, s. 657-B.

50 Sami za seba. *Horizont*, január 1974. In: TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Spomienky v dokumentoch*, s. 624.

„Európanmi“ v samostatnom slovenskom vydaní, pluralisti chceli do európskej integračnej jednoty vstúpiť v demokratickom rúchu a boli jednoznačne a natrvalo presvedčení, že k tomu Slováci potrebujú spolupúť s Čechmi. Ak monisti predpokladali, že samostatné Slovensko obrodí Európu, pluralisti verili, že Európa obrodí Slovensko.“ Nepochybne však príspevok oboch skupín pre náš budúci demokratický a suverénny vývoj po roku 1989 bude treba hlbšie preanalyzovať. Pritom je neodmysliteľne podnetný z oboch strán, hoci v nepomernej váhe, zároveň jasne diferencovaný. Prekvapuje však, že Špetko úplne zanedbával demokratický koncept smerovania SKS a nadradoval nadovšetko československú orientáciu pluralistov. Ako keby v jeho ponímaní monisti neboli hlásateľmi demokratického pluralizmu a ich teoreticko-politický koncept, dlho na rôznych úrovniach odmietaný, sa nakoniec v budúcej podobe druhej slovenskej štátnosti z 1. januára 1993 jednoznačne nepresadil, na rozdiel od konceptu federalistov. A to aj v praktických a teoretických súbojoch a rozhodnutiach predovšetkým politikov doma. Pre Špetka slovenská otázka nebola európskou alebo svetovou, nanajvýš jej v spätosti s úsilím „monistov“ degradujúco priznával podobu „kauzy“?! A hľadanie cesty k svojbytnosti a zvrchovanosti, ako pre väčšinu exulantov jedinej možnej, považoval za nehistorický a neživotný separatizmus. Priznával však aspoň okrem stúpencov kontinuity ľudového smeru a idealizácii prvej SR aj existenciu „umiernenejších“ stúpencov stredovej orientácie: reprezentovaných Staškovou pragmatickou skupinou, Löblovou nového demokratického smeru, Braxátorovou ako stúpencov evolučnej štátnosti, ktorí sa všetci združovali pod hlavičkou SKS. Pritom aspoň akceptoval kompenzáciu ich „separatistickej“ orientácie poukazovaním na to, že Slovensko bolo „odjakživa krajinou západnou“ a že verili v spätosť kresťanskej (cyrilo-metodskej) kultúry so „štúrovskou“ ideou štátnosti, čo však koniec koncov tiež považoval za politickú mytológiu „ignorujúcu akékoľvek vedecké poznatky“!⁵¹

Štefan Roman, ale predsa aj podľa Špetka ďalší monisti sa však so značným nadhľadom zasadzovali o maximálne otvorený a pluralitný priestor všetkých smerovaní slovenskej politiky v exile. Napriek tomu, že Roman na GZ SKS v Toronte roku 1987 povedal: „Sme v tej šťastnej situácii, že môžeme seriózne tvrdiť, že – až na malú skupinu Slovákov v diaspóre – kongresu sa podarilo dosiahnuť zjednotenie, aké medzi Slovákami nejestvovalo ani nejestvuje, ani u iných emigrácií. Od počiatku sme volali k spolupráci

51 ŠPETKO, J.: *Líšky kontra ježe. Slovenská politická emigrácia 1948 – 1979. Analýzy a dokumenty*. Bratislava 2002, s. 106.

*všetkých Slovákov, ktorým leží osud Slovenska na srdci a zdôrazňovali sme pluralizmus presvedčenia pre prítomnosť i budúcnosť. Len v otázke práva Slovenska na sebaurčenie musíme byť jednotní.*⁵²

Romanovi i ďalším širokospektrálne politicky orientovaným predstaviteľom SKS sa, napriek tomu, predsa nepodarilo získať aj významných unitaristov, združených najmä v Rade slobodného Československa alebo Stálej konferencie slovenských demokratických exulantov, pre ktorých bolo spojenie Slovenska s Čechmi fundamentálnou otázkou vyriešenou takpovediac na večné časy. Často hľadal vysvetlenie, prečo je to tak, najmä v prípade Fraštackého a Kvetka zo SKSDE, ale aj Štefana Osuského, ktorý „pred smrťou prijal SKS veľá úspechov a odkázal Š. B. Romanovi, že nastúpil na správnu cestu“.⁵³

Všetci spomínaní oponenti mali začas blízko nielen ku spolupráci, ale aj priamo k vstupu do SKS: „Niektorých Slovákov vedie do neslovenských – ináč povedané československých organizácií údajne ohľad na našu národnú a územnú bezpečnosť. Cítia sa Slovákmí a nárokujú si, aby boli uznávaní za Slovákov. Zaiste ťažko rozumieť, prečo sa oddelili od slovenskej väčšiny, keď koncept SKS o práve národa rozhodnúť sa, ako chce žiť, je predsa omnoho širší ako koncept, ktorý zbavuje národ alternatívy a tým aj slobodného rozhodnutia [...] Pri kritickom pohľade na československé organizácie jasne zbadáme, že tam nikdy nejde o formálne zdôraznenie dvoch národov. Vždy sa kladie vyššie „československá štátnosť“ bez čiarky, ktorá pohltí to slovenské a o Slovákoch v Československu západný svet hovorí len ako o Čechoch. Zotrvanie tejto skupiny Slovákov v neslovenských organizáciách neslúži slovenskej veci a je prekážkou pre spoluprácu s českými exilovými organizáciami na spoločnom boji proti sovietskej hegemonii nad strednou Európou a proti komunistickým vládám nad jej národmi.“⁵⁴ Jozef Staško sa vyjadril ešte priamočiarejšie a kritickejšie: „Akcíe „československej“ skupiny plnia len raison d' être Č-SR, ale neprispievajú paritne do slovenskej národnej, kultúrnej a politickej pokladnice.“⁵⁵

Martin Kvetko kritikom z radov SKS kontroval v časopise slovenských federalistov Naše snahy už v roku 1971. Kongresu vyčítal nielen neúplnosť organizačnej základne, ale aj jej odraz v ideovej a programovej

52 ŠPETKO, J.: *Slovenská politická emigrácia v 20. storočí*. Praha 1994, s. 220.

53 BRAXÁTOR, F.: *Slovenský exil 1968*. Bratislava 1992, s. 238.

54 Tamže, s. 221.

55 Tamže, s. 220.

jednostrannosti: „Kým sa ideová a programová náplň Kongresu predkladá len v obvyklých zásadách, je to prijateľné. Hneď ako sa však konfrontuje s minulosťou a prítomnosťou, začínajú námietky, vystupujú nedostatky, vystupujú pochybnosti o tom, či predstavitelia nezabúdajú na realitu. Je možné vyhlásiť, že nám treba tak pracovať, aby sa náš ľud mohol vyjadriť v rámci úplnej slobody, neobmedzovanej susedmi a mocnosťami, ale zdá sa nám, že práve preto, aby sme si, nedali brať ani piad' zo slovenskej zeme a neprehrali svojou vinou tie, neodcudziteľné práva treba pamätať na realitu medzinárodného boja, neharašiť len tak hocikedy a nezodpovedne, s medzinárodným riešením slovenskej otázky. Mohli by sme sa pritom potknúť a doplatili by sme na to skôr, ako by sme sa zbadali.“ Kvetko bránil pozíciu Kongresom v dejinách vraj zaznávaných „čechoslovákov“, ako Blaha, Okánika, Šrobára, Hodžu, Slávika, Stodolovcov a dokonca aj Štefánika, ktorí mu boli významnejší ako Romanom a Kongresom predkladaný okruh politikov okolo Hlinku, či Rázusa, alebo dokonca Tisu. Argumentuje, že „[...]ani po vojne Slovensko nerástlo národne, duchovne a demokraticky len na zhromaždeniach ľudovej strany, lež aj v tých politických a záujmových organizáciách, ktoré hádam nekládli taký dôraz na nacionálny aspekt slovenskej politiky, zato tým väčší na občiansko-demokratický a stavovsko-záujmový. Kto teda radí zabudnúť na minulosť, na spory, musí správne všetko hodnotiť, nezabúdať ani na jednu, ani na druhú zložku tohto veľkého zápasu, ktorý skončil takou mohutnou a svojráznou renesanciou nášho národného života, akú história vtedy nepoznala.“⁵⁶

Inou vážnou výhradou a otvoreným protestom proti jednej zmierlivej línii bolo stanovisko Emila Vidru angažovaného v boji za národné aj ľudské práva Slovákov, ktorý v princípe sa identifikoval so založením SKS. Predstavoval si, že „organizácia bude výlučne národná, demokratická a antikomunistická“. Komunistu v predsedníctve SKS, narážal tým na pozíciu neskôr takmer kľúčového ideológa Kongresu a v článku nespomenutého Eugena Löbla, považoval za „znak slovenskej neuvedomelosti“, najmä pokiaľ sa verejne od komunizmu dostatočne nedištancoval. Hoci aj ďalší bývalí reformní komunisti, ktorí odišli na Západ, sa navonok tam už ku komunizmu vôbec nehlásili.⁵⁷

56 KVETKO, M.: Na okraj založenia Svetového kongresu Slovákov. In: LIČKO, M., J.: *Ako chutí cudzina? Slovenská demokracia v exile 1948 – 1989*. Bratislava 1999, s. 220.

57 VIDRA, E.: Svetovému kongresu Slovákov. In: LIČKO, M., J.: *Ako chutí cudzina?*, s. 221.

Verejne, opäť v Našich snahách sa pýta, či je v SKS „*tolko komunistov, aby si mohli, demokraticky nárokovat až jedného podpredsedu*“. Nepozná kompromis, argumentujúc, že pre neho „*a pre každého, že zakiaľ národ proti komunizmu rezistuje (a to rezistuje), alebo zakiaľ pod komunizmom trpí (a to trpí), zatiaľ sa nielen nemôže, ale ani nesmie do čela exilovej organizácie dať komunista (aj keby bol už anjelom alebo trebárs len prozelytom). Je to najelementárnejší príkaz elementárnej taktiky a ohľadu (nehovoriac o morálke a logike)*“. Myslí si, že to „*demoralizuje rezistenciu národa proti útlaku a okupantom*“ a môže to odnímať dôveryhodnosť národu v jeho právach i celému exilu. Považuje za nevyhnutné, aby Slováci pevne stáli na strane demokracie a nespájali sa do „*zahanbujúcich komplotov*“, čo by ich politiku viedlo „*do slepej uličky*“. Podľa neho komunista „*ako nositeľ komunistického systému nemôže byť reprezentantom SKS a národa, a to nielen preto, že je iba reprezentantom tých horných desaťtisíc, ktorí nad národom bez legitímácie vládnu, ale hlavne preto, že SKS nikdy nebude môcť byť exilovou obdobou demokratického parlamentu /kde sa nemá vylučovať možnosť uplatnenia rozličných názorov, politických a ideologických koncepcií, ako to funkcionári SKS štylizujú/, pretože exil – či chce alebo nechce – je stelesnením prirodzenej tendencie bojovať alebo sa aspoň nestotožňovať s tým, čo exil zapríčinilo. Exil z komunistických štátov musí byť preto prirodzene proti komunizmu. Idea kvázi parlamentu – najmä v kombinácii s komunizmom je preto logickou kontradikciou a mravnou dekadenciou.*“⁵⁸

Pritom odmietnutie komunistu v predsedníctve SKS neznamená podľa Vidru „*privátnu, alebo politickú perzekúciu dotyčnej osoby. Antikomunizmus je predsa len odstraňovanie prekážok k ľudskosti a je okamžite nepotrebným, hneď ako je už daná voľná cesta k demokracii. Preto aj antikomunizmus môže byť maximálne len politickou alebo ideologickou taktikou, lebo nikdy nebude môcť byť ani len minimálne politickým či ideovým krédom*“, ktoré preňho zrejme znamená v podstatnej miere práve kresťanstvo. Aj svoj protest považuje skôr za taktický variant svojho logického a paradoxného poznania vychádzajúceho z axiómy, že „*obrana demokracie proti komunizmu musí byť taká nekompromisná, ako je nekompromisný útok komunizmu proti demokracii*“.⁵⁹

58 Tamže, s. 222 – 223.

59 Tamže, s. 224.

Po vyše desaťročí, na okraj konferencie Mier a sloboda pre Európu,⁶⁰ v *Bulletine SKS* v roku 1983, Eugen Löbl možno až príliš nekompromisne zhrňal aj poznatky o radikálnom krídle niektorých svojich secesionistických spolubojovníkov v Kongrese: „*Drvivá väčšina z nich presadzovala svoje staré, historicky prekonané predstavy a náhľady na budúcnosť, čo nevyhnutne zapríčinilo vážne a poľutovaniahodné rozpory, ako aj izoláciu, nebezpečnú slovenskému exilu, vo vzťahu k hostiteľským krajinám a ich vládam, najmä v USA a Nemecku, teda v krajinách, ktoré budú mať rozhodujúce slovo pri budúcom usporiadaní pomerov v strednej a východnej Európe, teda aj na Slovensku.*“⁶¹

O hlbšiu diagnózu všetkých kritikov či až odporcov SKS sa vo svojich memoároch pokúsil ďalší z podpredsedov František Braxátor vo svojej spomienkovo-analytickej knihe *Slovenský exil 1968* z roku 1992: Podľa Špetka našiel štyri príčiny. 1/ nevedomosť, 2/ ľahostajnosť k národným záujmom, 3/ emócie (oprávnené zábrany Židov, ľudí zo zmiešaných manželstiev, doma prenasledovaných, ktorým dal iný národ možnosť uplatniť sa, ľudia, u ktorých prevažujú resentimenty), 4/ najzávažnejšie politické dôvody: odmietajú SKS, lebo sa podľa predstáv, ktoré si o ňom oponenti urobili, stotožňuje s istým smerom, s istou ideológiou, s ktorou nesúhlasia. Pluralizmus SKS, jeho mnohotvárnosť a nadpolitickosť v straníckom zmysle slova (pozor, nie apolitickosť), nie sú im dosť presvedčivé. Navyše nachádza dve skupiny protirečivých posudkov: buď je SKS pre jedných „*ľudácko-klerikálna organizácia*“ alebo podľa iných „*ide vo svojom pluralizme príďaleko, akceptuje z oportunistických dôvodov komunistov alebo bývalých komunistov*“.⁶²

V schválenom programe SKS na Kongrese roku 1987, okrem uplatnenia samourčovacieho práva pre Slovákov, požadovali základné demokratické slobody, a to nielen pripustením palety demokratických politických strán, ale aj uskutočnením „*slobodných, všeobecných, priamych a tajných volieb*“ a zvolenie „*ústavných orgánov, ktoré rozhodnú o spoločenskom systéme na Slovensku a o jeho štátnej forme*“. Podľa Braxátora za najvhodnejšiu štátnu formu pokladali „*demokratickú republiku západného typu*“ s „*otvorenou, beztriednou, pluralistickou spoločnosťou so silným sociálnym akcentom, garantujúcu každému občanovi maximum občianskych, ľudských*

60 BLACHNICKI, F. – KRUŽLIAK, I. (eds.): *Frieden in Freiheit für Europa*. Toronto 1984, s. 122.

61 VIDRA, E.: Svetovému kongresu Slovákov, s. 207.

62 ŠPETKO, J.: *Slovenská politická emigrácia v 20. storočí*, s. 221.

a politických práv, ktorá vytvorí pre každého podmienky na zabezpečenie jeho duchovného a materiálneho vývoja“. V modernom programe aplikovateľnom i dnes odporúčali dvojkomorový parlament a „nezávislú sústavu súdnych orgánov“ s prísnou delbou štátnej moci ako „jednu z hlavných podmienok demokratického usporiadania“. Kongres bol aj miesto „štátneho plánovaného hospodárstva“ za „volné trhové hospodárstvo“, za plnú slobodu uznaných cirkví a náboženských spoločností, „za zrovnoprávnenie štátneho a súkromného školstva, za slobodu a podporu vedeckého bádania a za primerané podmienky kultúrneho rozvoja pre menšiny“.⁶³

Romanova viera v reálnosť a správnosť programu SKS bola neochvejná, s nadhľadom prehliadal niektoré osobné a preňho podenkové spory v svojom okolí. Až tak, že Imrichovi Kružliakovi pripomínal Štefánika, ako dodával vieru Slovákom, že môžu vlastnými silami, húževnate a sebavedome naplniť „vznešenú cestu“, ktorú si vytýčili už aj povýšením slovenskej otázky na výsostne medzinárodnú. Zrejme ako jeden z neveľa nepochyboval o blízkosti a reálnosti vytýčenej vízie, ako to vyslovil aj v roku 1986, trinásť rokov pred jej skutočným naplnením, vznikom druhej Slovenskej republiky v roku 1993, ešte pri preberaní európskej ceny Karla IV.: „Môžeme si byť istí, že okovy, ktoré dnes zvierajú národy strednej Európy, budú jedného dňa zlomené a že ľud strednej Európy bude slobodný.“ Iba pomocou hodnôt slobody a demokracie „budeme schopní spojiť národy strednej Európy vo veľkej hospodárskej a politickej jednote“, vyslovoval sa nekompromisne a bez váhania.⁶⁴

Veľmi pozoruhodná je aj antitotalitná, etická a humanitná Rezolúcia Svetového kongresu Slovákov z roku 1987 dostupná aj na Wikisource. Svetový kongres Slovákov v nej: „[...] odsudzuje všetky totalitárne systémy, ktoré upierali a upierajú občianske právo svojim štátnym príslušníkom. Kongres vyjadruje svoju úprimnú ľútosť nad ujмами a nespravodlivosťami, ktoré postihli našich židovských spoluobčanov v rokoch vojny. Dištancujeme sa od týchto tragédií, lebo ich pokladáme za nemravné a nekresťanské, protiviacie sa morálnym základom nášho národa. Prehlasujeme, že týchto zločinov sa dopustili pomýlení jednotlivci u moci, ale nie so súhlasom slovenského národa, ktorý je vo svojej podstate demokratický, súcitný a znášanlivý. Svedectvom tejto súcitnosti sú premnohé činy a záchranné akcie zo strany oficiálnych osobností a jednotlivcov, ktorí poskytli pomoc našim rasovo prenasledovaným spoluobčanom. V tejto súvislosti pripomína, že

63 BRAXÁTOR, F.: *Slovenský exil 1968*, s. 58 – 59.

64 Tamže, s. 244.

v danej dobe tragédia slovenských Židov by nebola bývala menšia v nijakej inej konštelácii. SKS ľutuje, že k týmto tragédiám došlo a že sa na záchranu našich spoluobčanov viacej nevykonalo. Ako kresťania uplatňujeme našu lásku voči tým, ktorí tragédiu prežili, a v mene Slovákov, ktorí si hĺbku neprávosti uvedomujú, žiadame o porozumenie a odpustenie. SKS je ochotný vstúpiť do konštruktívnych stykov so zodpovednými reprezentantmi židovských organizácií a bude s nimi hľadať možnosť upraviť vzájomné vzťahy na princípoch mravných a všeludských. Napokon prehlasuje, že ktokoľvek, kto priamo alebo nepriamo hlása a šíri názory, ktoré sú v rozpore s princípom ľudských práv, je nepriateľom ľudskosti a tým sa automaticky vyraduje z našich kruhov.“⁶⁵

Štefan Roman sa však už naplnenia svojich hlavných ideí nedožil. Zomrel roku 1988. Po roku 1989 bol do funkcie predsedu zvolený Marián Šťastný a vytvorila sa čiastočne nová koncepcia SKS v roku 1990 s ohľadom na pád režimov v strednej a východnej Európe. Nedôveru voči politickej vyspelosti i vážavosti Slovákov doma Slováci na Západe zväčša vnímali ako dôsledok dlhoročnej vlády komunistického režimu, ktorý bránil „národu doma v rozhlade, a teda aj v presadzovaní toho, čo je preň najlepšie“. Pre nich bolo nepochopiteľné zaostávanie vedomia a skutkov Slovákov po tom, čo si už väčšina národov Európy práve vtedy zvolila neraz aj za veľmi komplikovaných okolností slobodu a samostatnosť. V medziobdobí, do prvého januára roku 1993, pre predstaviteľov Svetového kongresu Slovákov „slovenskí politici, tvorcovia verejnej mienky, spisovatelia, novinári a ďalší verejní činitelia zatiaľ vo veľkej väčšine prejavujú absurdnú váhavosť nielen v konaní, ale predovšetkým v myslení, keď odmietajú prijať ako samozrejmosť to, čo je samozrejmosťou pre všetky národy na svete – totiž národnú suverenitu [...] V politickej oblasti sa teda poslanie SKS nemení, až kým slovenský národ nenadobudne úplnú štátnu suverenitu... Slovenský exil už nesmie figurovať v predstavách slovenských inštitúcií len ako pospolitost valutových krajanov v exotической cudzine, ale ako dejinný partner na uskutočňovanie slovenského národného programu.“⁶⁶

Kapitolu ako intenzívne prebiehala komunikácia medzi novými predstaviteľmi SKS, ale aj ďalšími viac či menej vplyvnými zoskupeniami a organizáciami Slovákov v zahraničí⁶⁷ i jej staršími činovníkmi

65 Rezolúcia svetového kongresu Slovákov. In: *Kritika a kontext*, 1999, č. 1.

66 ŠPETKO, J.: *Líšky kontra ježe*, s. 54.

67 KOLLÁR, F.: *Boj za samostatné Slovensko v zahraničí a na Slovensku 1945 – 1992. Dokumentácia. Diel I. Zahraničný odboj. Diel II. Odboj na Slovensku*. Bratislava, b. v., s. 398.

a domácimi slovenskými politickými stranami, osobnosťami i inštitúciami, predstaviteľmi v parlamente a vo vláde, kým naozaj po politických turbulenciách vznikla demokratická a suverénna Slovenská republika 1. januára 1993, bude treba ešte len spresňujúco napísať a zdokumentovať. Stretnutí, vystúpení a diskusií aj naliehavých listov, ako zaslal napríklad Jozef C. Trubinský z Floridy 11. júla 1990 predsedovi vlády Slovenska, vtedy ešte v rámci neúplne federalizovanej ČSFR Vladimírovi Mečiarovi, i s priloženými dokumentmi o dlhoročných úsilíach Svetového kongresu Slovákov, pri príležitosti vymenovania do jeho funkcie, bolo zaiste viac. Požadoval nielen situáciu z jeho pozície podrobne analyzovať, ale aj „*ciele nášho národa nielen jednoznačne formulovať, ale hlavne zasadzovať sa za ich uskutočnenie*“. V tom nový premiér bude „*potrebovať pomoc všetkých Slovákov a všetci Slováci budú očakávať pomoc*“ od vrcholnej pozície politika. Okrem vyslovovanej dôvery mu zdôrazňoval „*historickú príležitosť uviesť slovenský národ do spojenej Európy ako národ so svojou štátnosťou, a tak rovnoprávny s inými národmi*“. Slováci bez ohľadu na rôznu politickú príslušnosť by sa mali zjednotiť, aby dosiahli cieľ, „*ktorý je predpokladom nerušeného rozmachu slovenského národa pre budúce pokolenia*“.⁶⁸ Trubinského odpoveď V. Mečiara, že „*do Európy chceme vstúpiť v spoločnej federácii s národom českým, ináč to nie je možné*“ z 20. augusta 1990, pravdaže veľmi zarazila a do jedného z neuvedených „našich“ časopisov zaslal článok, kde s výrokom vyjadril zásadný nesúhlas. Aj keď vnímal snahy Prahy pri akomkoľvek úsilí po samostatnom počínaní ihneď „*dotyčného skompromitovať a eliminovať*“ a dobovo účelovo medializovanú deľbu Čechov na „*demokratických, pokrokových a tolerantných*“ a Slovákov, dožadujúcich sa „*rovnoprávnosti/samostatnosti*“ na „*fašistických, rasistických, separatistických, antisemitských, demagogických a zaostalých*“ upozorňoval premiéra na mimoriadnu zodpovednosť, v ktorej sa nachádzal „*pre zaisťovanie osudov Slovenska v takej kľúčovej pozícii ako nikto iný*“. A s nádejou, že sa odhodlá pri tejto výnimočnej príležitosti celý proces nielen urýchliť, ale aj „*dosiahnuť slovenskú samostatnosť*“.⁶⁹

68 Jozef C. Trubinský Vladimírovi Mečiarovi. Florida 11. júla 1990. In: TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Slovenský exil za suverenitu a štátnosť slovenského národa*, s. 301.

69 Jozef C. Trubinský Vladimírovi Mečiarovi. Florida 2. apríla 1991. In: TRUBINSKÝ, J. C.: *Slovenský exil za suverenitu a štátnosť slovenského národa*, s. 302.

Summary

After the previous active political and organizational clusters in Western exile - Slovak National Council in London, Slovak National Council Abroad, Slovak Committee of the Liberation Slovak Action Committee - created numerous generations of emigrants and exulants, its highest and unifying institution until after the occupation of the armies of the Warsaw Pact in 1968 Czeko-Slovakia: Slovak World Congress /New York 1970, June 19-21/. Štefan Roman, whose Imrich Kružliak compares with a rank of Milan Rastislav Štefánik in Slovak modern history, first and longtime President of the Slovak World Congress in the years 1970-1988, as a reaction to the unfreedom of his nation, together with the Slovaks living abroad, was considered not only a right but also the duty to speak on behalf of the slavery nation at home, crave relief and to formulate its objectives. Slovak question considered international, demanded for the Slovak nation democratic statehood and integration into the European Community countries. In the Czeko-Slovakia the objectives of the Declaration, and the entire activity of the SWC, met with a sharp dogmatic conviction of the communist regime and his followers and centralitic power until 1990, and January 1, 1993 too - the emergence of the second and democratic Slovak Republic. Surprising that the domestic Slovak historiography till this day didn't produce some important and objective study about Slovak World Congress.

Koreferáty, reflexie

Papers, Reflexions

The Anti-Communist Resistance in Dobrogea¹

Dumitru LACATUSU

The anti-communist resistance is one of the main research topics approached by Romanian historians after 1989. During the communist regime, this was an extremely sensitive topic because it challenged the legitimacy of the regime. Because of this, the subject could only be analysed from an ideological perspective.

Shortly after 1989, a lot of studies, articles and interviews were published, and films were created. The first film, *Somewhere in the East*, was shot in 1991 by Nicolae Mărgineanu, the son of a former political prisoner and the nephew of an anti-communist fighter from the 50's, who had been executed. The last film on this subject, *The Portrait of a Young Fighter*, is considered a controversial one because its main hero is Ioan Gavrița Ogoranu, one of the resistance leaders and a former iron-guard. Because of this, the film was criticised by the Jewish community.

1 This paper is based on following materials. Published Collections of Documents: COJOC, M. (ed.): *Rezistența Armată din Dobrogea*. București 2004; DOBRE, F. (ed.): *"Bande, bandiți, și eroi". Grupurile de rezistență și Securitatea (1948 – 1968). Documente*. București 2003; IONAȘCU, C. (ed.): *Rezistența Anticomunistă din Dobrogea*. Constanța 2001; PELIN, M. (ed.): *Cartea albă a Securității. Vol. II*. București 1994. Scientific Studies: ANGHELESCU, S.: "Născută din nevoile țăranilor". *Rezistența anticomunistă din Dobrogea (1945 – 1952)*. In: *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Orală*, Vol. 2, Cluj-Napoca 2001, pp. 293 – 310; DOBRINCULU, D.: *Macedo-Românii și rezistența armată din anticomunistă din Dobrogea 1948 – 1952*. In: RADOS, L. (ed.): *Interferențe româno-elene (secolele XV-XX)*. Iași 2002, pp. 233 – 275. ȘAHAN, E.: *Aspecte din rezistența românească împotriva sovietizării în perioada 1944–1962*. In: RUSAN, R. (ed.): *Instaurarea comunismului – între represiune și rezistență*, București 1995, pp. 213 – 278.

As with all other subjects, the anti-communist resistance did not lack exaggerations and odds from historians and also from former political prisoners who were involved in the re-writing of this recent episode in history. Among these exaggerations was the idea that the anti-communist resistance was generally considered by former political prisoners as a unique phenomenon and typical of Romania.

My presentation will focus on the anti-communist resistance movement in Dobrogea, a region in the South-East of Romania. In comparison with other resistance movements, the one in Dobrogea has occupied a marginal place in historical studies. The main reasons for the historians' reserve in approaching this topic are the restrictive access to the *Securitate* archives, at least so far, the few survivors and, consequently, the small number of testimonies, as well as the complicated recent history of this province. In the last century, this province has been claimed by Romanians and Bulgarians as well.

First of all, the studies published about this subject emphasised the massive presence of Macedo-Romanians in the resistance, although there has not yet been any study published to describe the ethnic composition and political affiliation of the Dobrogea resistance members. Another important presence, maybe more important than the previous one but neglected by researchers, is that of members without any political affiliation before and after 23 August 1944.

Among the resistance members, the Greek and Turk-Tatar presence is mentioned in various files and memoirs. The Turk-Tatar resistance is another subject which has not been analysed by post-communist Romanian historiography.

The anti-communist resistance in Dobrogea cannot be understood without knowing the history of the province and its status in the 20th Century during the inter-war and communist periods. In the following paragraphs, I will try to summarise a complicated history.

For almost four centuries, Dobrogea was under Ottoman rule and the main consequences of this are an ethnically mixed population, and ethnic and territorial conflicts. The last one was solved by a population exchange between Romania and Bulgaria.

The old part of Dobrogea fell under Romanian authority in 1878 after the War of Independence, when Romania fought against the Ottoman Empire together with its ally, the Russian Empire. The new part of Dobrogea became Romanian after the Balkan War in 1912 – 1913. In New Dobrogea, encompassing the Durostorum and Caliacra counties,

the Romanian authority was contested by Romanians of Bulgarian origin, also known as “*comitagii*”, who were organised in revolutionary groups. In these two counties, conflicts took place between Bulgarian ethnics and Macedo-Romanian colonists, located there by the Romanian state starting in 1925, as well as between gendarmes and “*comitagii*” troupes, resulting in many casualties, with dead and wounded on both sides. The existing conflicts in these two counties, including the civilians and “paramilitary” organisations contesting the state authority, were exported to old Dobrogea (Tulcea and Constanta counties) after the World War. In 1929, more trials of the locals who were arrested for supporting and not denouncing the *comitagi*, took place in Durostorum and Caliacra counties.

In their studies, researchers neglected this aspect, focusing more on the years following the Second World War. There are some similarities between this conflict (1930’s) and the anti-communist resistance from the 3rd and 4th decades, such as the *comitagi* organisation, paramilitary organisation or subversive groups.

Also, the way they acted (attacking gendarme posts, representatives of new authorities and the Romanian colonists). Further similarities are the methods used for obtaining the financial resources necessary for their activities and the support given by Bulgarian inhabitants.

Gendarmes were the ones leading the fight against the *comitagii*. In 1949, gendarmes were replaced by the *Securitate* troupes, which had a main role in the discovery and annihilation of anti-communist groups from Dobrogea. Therefore, based on previous conflicts the anti-communist resistance in Dobrogea can be investigated and researched following this conflict pattern between the communist authorities and the civil population (Macedo-Romanians and Romanian). At the same time, it can be researched following a “centre/outskirts” pattern or a “new/old” conflict pattern (communists vs civilians), but not only from a nationalistic perspective.

Chronologically speaking, the anti-communist resistance in Dobrogea can be divided into two stages: 1945 – 1948 and 1948 – 1952. The first attempts to create anti-communist resistance groups took place in 1945, but they never materialised and remained at the stage of initiatives.

In 1948, the various resistance groups coagulated after the return of Gogu Puiu, a former legionary (the Fascist Movement in Romania), described by files as the main leader of the resistance, together with the brothers Nicolae and Dumitru Fudulea, and Nicolae Ciolacu.

The resistance organisation's moment of creation is considered to be the meeting which took place in 1948, in Stere Grasu's home, in Ceamburlia de Jos village. According to the archive documents and memoirs, the meeting was attended by delegates from 25 villages from Dobrogea. During this meeting, the following decisions were taken:

- creation of organisations in as many villages as possible;
- members' preparation for a potential conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States;
- attracting new members to join the cause;
- obtaining weapons;
- stopping the local authorities from requisitioning wheat

On this occasion, the leaders of the organisation were appointed: Gogu Puiu and Nicolae Fudulea. More meetings between the leaders took place during the following months.

During the meeting of December 1948, in Lunca village, the participants created a Provisional Committee and decided to be called "*haiduc*" (outlaws), rather than *partisans*, a word considered to have Bolshevik / communist roots. At the same time, the decision was taken that, in case of a general upheaval, horseback riding couriers should be sent to local organisations with the password "*Dobrogea's outlaws*" for the rising of all anti-communist organisations from Dobrogea.

The main method chosen for the creation of anti-communist organisations in other villages was the leaders' travelling from one village to another with the purpose of recruiting trustworthy members, especially local leaders, like teachers and priests, elements hostile to the new regime, mentioned in the *Securitate* documents as former iron-guards, members of historical parties, landowners and kulaks.

For the first stage, especially between 1947 and 1948, the organisation's activity can be considered offensive, especially with regards to the objectives set.

The second stage started after the repressive structures of the communist regime (*Securitate* troupes and militia) had been created and the official beginning of collectivisation (end of 1948 – March 1949). Starting with this period, the *Securitate* started arresting those opposing collectivisation; arrests were also made in the autumn of 1948. The main targets of these arrests were members of the legionary organisations in Dobrogea.

The year 1949 also meant a change in the *Securitate*'s fighting tactics against various resistance organisations scattered across Dobrogea. Up to that year, the tactics used had been to discover the organisation and its

members, a Securitate informer joining the organisation undercover and the creation of false partisans. The change of tactics led to quick executions of villagers. During this period, there is information saying that some locals had been executed because they were believed to have connections to the organisation members. Other measures taken by the Securitate were the arrest of family members, relatives and other people supporting the resistance.

During the same year, a number of conflicts took place between the authorities and the organisation members, leading to the murder of one of the most important leaders – Gogu Puiu. There are at least two versions of how he was killed. Securitate documents say he was killed using a grenade by soldiers sent to apprehend him, but memoirs mention he committed suicide so as not to be captured.

With regards to the anti-communist organisation tactics, these also changed, from offensive to defensive, having as their main goal the members' survival, rather than the fight against communism. The same goal of members' survival and protection included the possibility of their fleeing the country, many plans and options being discussed for this.

In September 1949, during one of the meetings with the remaining leaders, the decision was taken to break the organisation down into smaller groups, in the belief that this would lead to a greater chance of survival.

At this point, the anti-communist leaders were disappointed and lost confidence. Memoirs mention the fact that Gogu Puiu himself showed his disappointment during the last meeting he attended, telling those present that he had realised the West had tricked them. It is also believed that he gave this advice to the organisation leaders: *“If something happens to us from now on, you should keep the last bullet for yourselves. We will otherwise destroy thousands of people.”* His prediction turned out to be true, as the Securitate began massive arrests of Dobrogea inhabitants. According to Silvia Anghelescu, over 300 peasants had been arrested by the end of December 1949.

Between 1950 and 1952, anti-communist resistance in Dobrogea was completely annihilated, most of the members being arrested, put on trial and convicted. Some of them, around 34 people, who were arrested in 1949 were killed in the “death trains” of spring 1950, under the false pretext of attempted escape. After 1952, in the Securitate documents, no anti-communist resistance is mentioned as existing in Dobrogea, a proof of its complete annihilation.

According to Dorin Dorbincu, one of the researchers studying the resistance in Dobrogea, there were 21 trials against members of anti-communist organisations in Dobrogea. The number of those put on trial is estimated to be 279 people.

And yet, the Securitate documents, created at the end of the 1950's, talk about over "600 counter-revolutionary elements" organised in terrorist groups by Gogu Puiu, a legionary.


Resumé

Autor v článku poukazuje na protikomunistické hnutie v regióne Dobrogea v Rumunsku. Už v roku 1945 sa začali tvoriť prvé formácie vystupujúce proti komunizmu. Rozvoj protikomunistického hnutia nastal až po roku 1948. Vzniklo viacero skupín, ktoré pôsobili v horách, ale aj na dedinách. Reakcie štátnej moci boli tvrdé a do regiónu poslali formácie Securitate, tajnej komunistickej polície, ktorá hnutie odporu tvrdo potlačila. Až 279 ľudí sa ocitlo pred súdnym tribunálom.


Obr. 1 – 3 Fotografie protikomunistických bojovníků v regioně Dobrogea.



Obr. 1



Obr. 2



Obr. 3

Švajčiarski Slováci spájali boj proti komunistickej diktatúre so zápasom o vlastný štát

Aristid ZELENAY

Švajčiarsko a Slovensko sú si nielen zemepisne blízke, ale aj podobné. Obe krajiny sú na vrchoch Karpatského oblúka, ktorý výrazne delí Európu na severnú a južnú časť. Plocha Švajčiarska je skoro o 10 000 km² menšia než Slovenska, zato Švajčiarsko malo koncom šesťdesiatych rokov minulého storočia asi o jeden a pol milióna obyvateľov viacej.¹

V rokoch 1968 – 1969 emigrovalo do Švajčiarska do 2 500 Slovákov. Tento počet sa rozrástol do konca roku 1989 na maximálne 7 500 osôb. Spohľadlivé štatistické údaje nejestvujú, lebo v údajoch sa neuvádza národnosť, ale štátna príslušnosť. Uvedené čísla spočívajú na odhadoch na základe rozličných štatistických údajov, ale i vlastného prieskumu.

Aké akcie podnikali švajčiarski Slováci proti komunistickej diktatúre? Ako reagovala protistrana na ich akcie?

Každý novoprichádzajúci emigrant dostal listinu s informáciou o jeho postavení vo Švajčiarsku, právach a povinnostiach. Medzi nimi bol uvedený aj zákaz akejkoľvek politickej činnosti. Tento zákaz nemal na začiatku emigrácie nejakú mimoriadnú dôležitosť, pretože väčšina emigrantov mala starosť zabezpečiť svoje rodiny, nájsť si primerané zamestnanie, byť, vhodné školy pre deti, mnohí mali aj rečové nedostatky. Problém sme pociťovali v otázke, čo sme, akej sme národnosti pre zvyklosť zaužívanú

1 GRÉBERT, A. L.: *Die Schweiz und die Slowakei*. Mníchov 1981.

na Západe, kde pojem národnosť a štátna príslušnosť sú totožné. Niektorí úradníci akceptovali údaj národnosti slovenská, niektorí odmietali uznať takúto národnosť, stotožňujúc ju so štátnou príslušnosťou. Takisto sme postupne zisťovali, že pojem Slovensko je známy iba skutočne malému okruhu domácich osôb.

V júni 1969 sa schádza malá skupina iniciatívnych dobrovoľníkov, ktorí sa rozhodli vyhovieť volaniu krajanov po vlastnej organizácii a vytvorili prípravný výbor na jej založenie.² Medzi nimi boli aj dvaja členovia Spolku slovenských akademikov Aurela Stodolu. Založili ho slovenskí študenti na vysokých školách v Zürichu, ktorí sa rozhodli po Februárovom puči v roku 1948 zostať v zahraničí. Dostali povolenie doštudovať vo Švajčiarsku, ale po promócií mali opustiť krajinu. Zostali iba traja, ktorí si tu založili rodiny. Informovali prítomných o skúsenostiach z predchádzajúcej činnosti. Jedným z ich poznatkov bola skutočnosť, že príslušné úrady už vtedy veľmi starostlivo kontrolovali, či sa ako cudzinci vo Švajčiarsku nezaoberajú politickou činnosťou. Aj aktuálny zákaz akejkoľvek politickej činnosti bol dôvodom, že návrh názvu novej organizácie Slovákov bol „Združenie priateľov Slovenska“, pričom, samozrejme, mali na mysli aj to, aby členmi novej organizácie boli aj švajčiarski občania a nový „*spolok je nepolitickou, celošvajčiarskou, spoločenskou organizáciou...*“³

Prípravný výbor dostal ponuku od jestvujúceho Svazu československých spolku ve Švýcarsku, aby nové Združenie vstúpilo do jestvujúceho Svazu a nepôsobilo mimo neho.⁴ Zakladajúce Generálne zhromaždenie Združenia priateľov Slovenska prijalo návrh prípravného výboru na jeho meno⁵ aj definíciu jeho podstaty.⁶ Na spoluprácu so Svazom stanovilo podmienky: z názvu musí byť jasné, že je to zväz dvoch rovnoprávných samostatných národov. Za vstup do jestvujúceho Svazu československých spolku nehlasoval nik.⁷ Pretože tieto podmienky neboli splnené, Slováci išli vlastnou cestou zoznamovať prostredie, v ktorom žijú, so Slovenskom a Slovákmí. Vhodnou príležitosťou boli aj spoločné slávnosti etnických

2 Archív Združenia Slovákov vo Švajčiarsku (ďalej iba A ZSS), *Informačný list*, č. 1.

3 A ZSS, *Informačný list*, č. 1, s. 2.

4 A ZSS, List Svazu československých spolkov.

5 A ZSS, Zápisnica z ustanovujúceho zhromaždenia Združenia priateľov Slovenska, ktoré sa konalo 5. 10. 1969 v Zürichu, bod 8.

6 A ZSS, Stanovy Združenia priateľov Slovenska, bod 2.

7 A ZSS, Zápisnica z ustanovujúceho zhromaždenia Združenia priateľov Slovenska, bod 14; Informácie marec 1/1970, s. 1 – 3.

skupín, ktoré boli v jednotlivých kantónoch a umožňovali tam bývajúcim Slovákom zviditeľňovať sa, výstavy slovenských umelcov, koncerty slovenských spevákov a podobné podujatia.⁸

Súčasne s budovaním organizácie náborom členstva výbor pripomínal Slovákom, aby reagovali listami čitateľov redakciám na nesprávne údaje v novinách, snažili sa predstavovať Slovensko a Slovákov vo svojom prostredí. Pripomínal významné osobnosti slovenského života, výročia dôležitých udalostí v živote národa, poskytoval pravdivé informácie tam, kde panovala nejasnosť alebo nevedomosť. Uverejnené tlačové opravy a aj listy čitateľov vyvolávali neraz priam zúrivé protireakcie našich nepriaznivcov. Ojedinelé hlasy z vlastných radov zdvíhali varovný prst – ale len do vlastných radov – pripomínajúc povinnosť zdržiavať sa akejkolvek politickej činnosti a stále sa dovolávajúc akejsi širšej platformy. Chceli zastaviť tok správnych informácií o Slovensku.⁹

Medzi Sloákmi v zahraničí vyvrcholili na začiatku sedemdesiatych rokov snahy aj o politické zjednotenie slovenského exilu a našli svoje vyjadrenie v založení Svetového kongresu Slovákov.¹⁰ Zakladajúceho zhromaždenia sa zúčastnili aj delegáti Združenia¹¹, ktoré sa hlásilo k myšlienke Svetového kongresu Slovákov a propagovalo ju medzi krajanmi. Ale i tu sa zdvíhal varovný prst, pozor, politizujete!

Mesto Zürich sa pokúsilo akciou Zürich v Európe – Európa v Zürichu upozorniť na svoj význam. Na mapu Zürichu premietli mapu Európy a v miestach, ktoré prekrývali jednotlivé štáty, sa mohli tieto predstaviť, ba mesto Zürich vyzvalo reprezentácie jednotlivých štátov vo Švajčiarsku, aby sa akcie zúčastnili a vyzývali svojich občanov aktívne spolupracovať. Dvaja delegáti Združenia navštívili príslušného referenta na mestskom úrade v Zürichu a vyjadrili záujem Slovákov spolupracovať, samozrejme nepoliticky, predstavovaním slovenskej kultúry, propagáciou slovenskej prírody, poukazovaním na podobnosť Švajčiarska a Slovenska i predstavením slovenskej histórie. Našu iniciatívu referent privítal, lebo podľa neho Československé zastupiteľstvo na výzvu mesta vôbec nereagovalo a povedal nám, že sa vyjadrí k našej ponuke. Dodnes neprišla nijaká odpoveď. Pre Československé zastupiteľstvo, kde sa referent s najväčšou pravdepodobnosťou

8 Pozri priebežné informácie o podujatiach v *Informáciách* Združenia priateľov Slovenska, oznamovacím bulletinom Združenia.

9 Tamže.

10 A ZSS, *Informácie*, marec 1970 a nasledujúce čísla a ročníky.

11 A ZSS, *Informácie*, júl – august 1970, s. 1 – 5.

informoval, organizácia emigrantov bola červeným súknom. Reakcie sme sa dočkali z inej strany vo forme brožúry – plagiátu *Vyznanie a stanoviská k politike exilu*, ktorej autorom mal byť slovenský politik Karol Sidor, ako vydavateľ figurovala nejestvujúca odbočka Združenia priateľov Slovenska v Zürichu a plagiát bol podávaný na poštu v Bonne.¹² V brožúrke jej autor bije hlava-nehlava každého, kto sa hlási k myšlienke slovenskej štátnej samostatnosti a v komentári k jednotlivcom nezabúda pripomenúť, že dotyčná osoba je členom Svetového kongresu Slovákov, hoci tento bol založený až dvadsať rokov po smrti údajného autora! Uvedomili sme si, že sme vzbudili pozornosť Štátnej bezpečnosti a ten varovne zvihnutý prst a reči o nepolitičnosti a platformách nie sú iba dôsledkom nedostatočnej informovanosti ich autorov.

Vzácnnej pozornosti sa však ušlo aj Združeniu priateľov Slovenska. V piatom roku jeho trvania skupinka „reformátorov“ sa pustila do revízie Stanov¹³ a namiesto zmeny jedného jediného čísla začala navrhovať také zmeny, podľa ktorých Združenie nemalo mať slovenský charakter, zabudlo sa na upevňovania priateľstva ku Slovensku, slovenskému národu, jeho reči a kultúre¹⁴, objavil sa prvý „nepoliticý“ spolok Slovákov, venujúci sa výlučne kultúre¹⁵ a jeden z jeho tvorcov avizoval vznik takýchto spolkov vo viacerých mestách Švajčiarska. Urážlivým listom zaslaným krajanom ich kádruval a delil na dobrých, ktorí sa zúčastnili podujatí tejto skupinky alebo si od nich kúpil nejaký predmet, a na tých ostatných, ktorí podľa autora do národa nepatria.¹⁶ Keďže sa skrývali pod slovenskými národnými symbolmi, veľa ľudí ich list považovalo za list Združenia Slovákov a trvalo to značný čas, kým si ľudia svoj omyl uvedomili a opäť venovali svoju dôveru Združeniu.

Keď sa začal približovať čas, keď si emigranti mohli začať podávať žiadosti o udelenie švajčiarskeho štátneho občianstva, začali kolovať ničím nepodložené fámy: „*Počkajte, až si budete žiadať o udelenie občianstva, opýtajú sa Vás, či ste chodili do slovenského spolku, a keď poviete áno, nedostanete ho!*“ Takisto zo Slovenska dostávali krajanovia odkazy od rodinných

12 Plagiát: SIDOR, K.: *Vyznanie a stanoviská k politike exilu*, 44 s, miesto vydania neuvedené, v predslove je ako vydavateľ odbočka Združenia priateľov Slovenska v Zürichu – v Knižnici Združenia.

13 A ZSŠ, *Informácie*, november 1974, s. 3 – 4.

14 A ZSŠ, *Informácie*, november 1974, s. 5 – 7.

15 A ZSŠ, *Informácie*, 1974, č. 9, s. 7.

16 List SŠKK Bern, v súkromnom archíve autora.

príslušníkov, aby sa nikde neangažovali, lebo to by mohlo nepriaznivo vplyvať na udelenie cestovného povolenia pre nich do zahraničia. A tam, kde takéto zvodné hlasy sirén nezabrali, nasledovali viac-menej skryté vyhrážky často formou otázky rodinnému príslušníkovi aktívneho člena, či sa nebojí o svojho manžela, manželku či príbuzného, že sa mu stane tak, ako sa stalo niektorým inonárodným odporcom komunizmu niekde v Európe? Ďalším, častejšie používaným prostriedkom na rozsievanie nenávisti a množenie nešvárov bolo rozširovanie sfalšovaných vyhlásení písaných na hlavičkovom papieri slovenských organizácií, v ktorých údajný odosielateľ útočí na svojho politického protivníka.¹⁷

Keď sa nepotvrdilo zastrašovanie o neudelení občianstva zostával totalitnému režimu jeden z posledných prostriedkov: odnímanie štátneho občianstva.¹⁸

Život emigrantov sa však neodvíjal iba v záujmovej rovine štátnej bezpečnosti o nich, ale vo Švajčiarsku a jeho problémoch. Keď začalo pribúdať mimoeurópskych utečencov Švajčiarska, pomocná organizácia pre utečencov začala organizovať Dni utečencov, na ktorých sa mohli jednotlivé skupiny predstaviť svojou kultúrou, kuchyňou alebo iným, im vyhovujúcim spôsobom.¹⁹ Túto príležitosť Slováci využili nielen svojimi typickými jedlami, ale aj vystavovaním a predajom tlače so slovenskou problematikou v nemčine, francúzštine či angličtine. Navyše sme každý rok pripravili leták, v ktorom sme predstavili iný úsek života Slovákov v zahraničí: od predstavenia Svetového kongresu Slovákov a jeho cieľov, cez slovenskú emigráciu vo Švajčiarsku a jej príčiny, slovenskú históriu v skratke, pomery na Slovensku, prenasledovanie Cirkvi, vraždy kňazov, snahy Slovákov o plnoprávne postavenie v rodine národov sveta až po významne slovenské osobnosti politiky, vedy a techniky.²⁰ Týmito letákmi sme oslovovali návštevníkov slovenského stánku a viedli s nimi rozhovory o slovenskej problematike. Na našom stánku bol nápis SLOWAKEI, prípadne vo francúzsky hovoriacej časti Švajčiarska SLOVAQUIE, vedľa nápisu z jednej strany slovenská zástava a z druhej strany slovenský dvojkríž na troch vrchoch. Jeden rok sa v televíznej reportáži o Dni utečencov objavil aj slovenský stánok a dianie okolo neho, rozhovory s návštevníkmi. Ale len

17 A ZSS, *Informácie*, 1980, č. 1, s. 6.

18 Napr. podpredsedovi i tajomníkovi výboru Združenia, aj predsedovi Kontrolnej a zmierovacej komisie Združenia.

19 A ZSS, *Informácie*, 1981, č. 5 – 6, s. 4 a iné.

20 A ZSS, *Letáky*.

v prvom vydaní večerných správ. Do ich druhého vydania už zasiahla cenzúra...

Svojím vystupovaním sme dosiahli, že nás Švajčiarska pomocná organizácie pre utečencov požiadala, aby sme na výstavu o jej činnosti pri príležitosti 50. ročného jubilea jej trvania pripravili slovenské zákusky do bufetu k aperitívu a dali k dispozícii aj krojovanú obsluhu. Mladé Slovenky a Slováci sa vďaka ich rečovým schopnostiam tejto úlohy zhostili na výbornú a mohli predstaviť Slovensko v iných kruhoch švajčiarskej spoločnosti.²¹

Spolčili sme sa aj s ostanými reprezentantmi utečencov zo strednej a východnej Európy a založili sme ich pracovné spoločenstvo. Cez toto spoločenstvo sa nám podarilo dosiahnuť prijatie na švajčiarskom ministerstve zahraničia pred Belehradskou konferenciou o mieri a bezpečnosti v Európe. Každý zúčastnený národ mohol informovať tunajšie úrady o stave dodržiavania či porušovania ľudských práv v ich krajine. Slovenský delegát prezentoval a odovzdal materiály, ktoré pripravil a spracoval Svetový kongres Slovákov.²²

V Združení sa zrodila myšlienka demonštrácie za náboženskú slobodu na Slovensku, ktorá by mala byť v jeden deň ako na Slovensku, tak aj v zahraničí. Vtedajší predseda Združenia využil svoje dobré vzťahy s podpredsedom Svetového kongresu Slovákov pre styk so Slovenskom, predložil mu tento návrh. On ho postúpil ďalej na Slovensko, kde dostal podobu Sviečkovej demonštrácie. Žiaľ, vo Švajčiarsku sa nám podarilo túto demonštráciu uskutočniť v roku 1988 pre rozličné byrokratické prekážky, ale aj prieťahy v slovenských kruhoch v zahraničí až o mesiac neskoršie.²³ Naše *Memorandum o dodržiavaní náboženskej slobody na Slovensku* adresované Slovenskej národnej rade ako najvyššiemu orgánu štátnej moci na Slovensku²⁴ sme nemohli na veľvyslanectve Československej federatívnej republiky odovzdať, pretože bolo akoby náhodou zatvorené. Zato účastníci cítili pozornosť horlivých fotografov z okoloidúcich áut, ktorí sa neštítali namáhať sa prejsť okolo demonštrantov viackrát. V roku 1989 táto demonštrácia bola presne rok po Sviečkovej demonštrácii v Bratislave

21 A ZSŠ, *Informácie*, 1981, č. 5 – 6, s. 4 a 6.

22 Uznesenie 11. Generálneho zhromaždenia dňa 17. 11. 1979 v Badene. In: A ZSŠ, *Informácie*, 1980, č. 1, s. 2.

23 A ZSŠ, *Slovenské zvesti*, 1988, č. 2, s. 4.

24 A ZSŠ, *Slovenské zvesti*, 1988, č. 4, s. 5.

minulého roku.²⁵ Fotografovanie ako minulý rok, zavreté vyslanectvo ako minulý rok. Jediný rozdiel bol iba v tom, že v roku 1988 totalitný režim nemohol odobrať štátne občianstvo osobám podpísaným na žiadosti o povolenie tejto demonštrácie, lebo im ho odňal už v minulosti, zatiaľ čo v roku 1989 bol medzi žiadateľmi o jej povolenie jeden, ktorý to občianstvo ešte dovtedy mal.²⁶ Ale len dovtedy.

Potom začalo nad totalitným režimom zapadať slnko...

Aké výsledky dosiahli švajčiarski Slováci?

Dokázali sme svoju vernosť myšlienke slovenskej štátnej samostatnosti, i keď k polnoci medzi 31. decembrom 1992 a 1. januárom 1993 museli uplynúť ešte viac ako tri roky.

Dokázali sme, že si vieme spravovať a riadiť svoje veci sami a nájsť riešenie problémov i pri veľkej rozdielnosti názorov.

Nepodľahli sme hrozbám represálií ani totalitného režimu, ani pražského centralizmu a ich slovenských nohsledov.

Slovákovi v zahraničí sa dostalo uznania aj v Ústave Slovenskej republiky tým, že boli akceptovaní ako súčasť národa pod Tatrami.

Až teraz, keď tento zápas o slobodu defluje pred našimi očami, si uvedomujeme, ako okamžite reagovali orgány totalitnej moci na každé naše počínanie, smerujúce čo len k šíreniu myšlienky na slovenskú štátnu samostatnosť, ako po každej akcii sa ukázal aspoň varovne zdvihnutý prst, ak nie priamy verbálny zásah niektorého zo spolupracovníkov totalitného režimu.

Túto prácu venujem všetkým, ktorí stáli čestne v spoločnom šíku zápasu proti totalite za vlastný, demokratický štát a dnes už nie sú medzi nami.

Summary

The author examines the activities of the Slovaks living in Switzerland in his paper and their activities against the Communist regime. These activities were related also to the struggle to renew the Slovak state. The association was very active. It reminded about significant Slovak personalities, anniversaries of important events in the national life, provided true information in cases of uncertainty or ignorance. The association strived

25 A ZSŠ, *Slovenské zvesti*, 1989, č. 2, s. 6.

26 Predseda miestnej skupiny Združenia Zürich.

intensively to reach the political unity of the Slovak exile that resulted in the establishment of the Slovak World Congress. The delegates of the Association supporting the idea of the Slovak World Congress took part in its founding session and promoted the Congress among the fellow-countrymen. Besides others, the idea was born in the Association to organise demonstrations for religious freedom in Slovakia that would have been organised on the same day in Slovakia and abroad. The idea resulted in the Candle Demonstration in March 1988 in Bratislava.

Študentská demonštrácia v Bratislave v roku 1956

Pavol RAKOVSKÝ

Československo je v protikomunistickom odboji známe Pražskou jarou 1968, ktorá symbolizuje odboj proti stalinskému komunizmu naivným pokusom o zavedenie socializmu s ľudskou tvárou. Je nespravodlivé najmä proti desiatkam obetí perzekúcie z radov vysokoškolských študentov nezmeniť sa o dianie na Slovensku, menovite v Bratislave, ktoré vošlo do dejín pod názvom Študentské udalosti roku 1956. Pod vplyvom maďarskej revolúcie a poznanských udalostí sa zobudili aj vysokoškoláci v Bratislave. Pravda, razancia ich vystúpenia, ako aj brutálnosť režimu sa s udalosťami v susednom Maďarsku a Poľsku nedá porovnávať. Rovnako je pravdou, že tento akt nenašiel v pospolitom ľude takú odozvu, ako tam. Istá časť historikov to vysvetľuje povahovými vlastnosťami nášho národa, stáročia privyknutého na porobu, iní tým, že v Československu bola v tej dobe pomerne vysoká životná úroveň. Isté však je, že aj keď sa tieto udalosti skrývali za boj o akademické slobody, objavili sa aj prvky vyslovene protikomunistické, napr. zrušenie či obmedzenie prednášok z marxizmu-leninizmu.

Študentské udalosti v 1956 mali svoj počiatok vo vysokoškolskom internáte Mladá garda v Bratislave. Istý skrytý, tichý potenciálny nesúhlas s režimom sa tu dal pozorovať už dávnejšie. Z dnešného pohľadu sa to javí triviálne, ale pamätníci dobre vedia, že v polovici päťdesiatich rokov minulého storočia bola propagácia či uvádzanie čohokoľvek amerického na verejnosti neprípustné a tvrdo potierané. Napriek tejto skutočnosti sa v internáte konali nedeľné čaje o piatej, kde vynikajúca študentská kapela pod vedením Freda Návrata hrávala americký džez. Doposiaľ neviem, prečo to súdruhovia nezatrhli – zrejme nám chceli ponechať ventil. Väčšina

členov kapely si po skončení štúdií zvolila hudbu za profesiu (Miloš Obe-ruč, Imro Kuruc, Piťo Popluhár a ďalší). Spevácku kariéru tu začínala aj vtedy mladučka Oľga Sabová.

V tejto atmosfére, po udalostiach v Maďarsku a Poľsku, členovia rozhla-sového krúžku zvolali do spoločenskej miestnosti bývajúcich v internáte. Výsledkom tohto stretnutia bola rezolúcia, ktorá vyslovila požiadavky štu-dentov a bola vyvesená na oznamovacej tabuli pri vrátnici. Hneď na druhý deň skupina študentov strojárskej fakulty zbadala dve indivíduá, ktoré, kryjúc jeden druhého, strhávali vyvesenú rezolúciu (jeden zo študentov bol môj gymnaziálny spolužiak Štefan Tužinský). Ihneď ich zadržali a zistili, že ide o pracovníkov SÚV ČSM. Zobrali ich do spoločenskej miestnosti a rozhlasom informovali o udalosti. V priebehu 10 minút bola sála napl-nená do prasknutia. Po vecnej diskusii, keď títo súdruhovia nenašli žiadne vecné argumenty proti našim požiadavkám v rezolúcii, sa pod ne podpísali. Rezolúcia sa vzápätí objavila v internáte Horský park a ďalších. To už bolo pre vládnucu moc priveľa. Na ďalší deň v rozhlase vyhlásili, že prišiel pove-reník školstva Sýkora a pozval nás na diskusiu. Naši rozhlasoví pracov-níci to zorganizovali na počkanie, ale skvele. Mikrofón v preplnenej sále putoval z ruky do ruky, takže nedokázali identifikovať, kto práve hovorí. Straníci z radov študentov boli dezorientovaní, nakoľko nik ich nesti-hol orientovať. Po krátkom incidente, keď ktosi zahlásil na povereníkove sľuby: to je mlátenie prázdnej slamy, sa tento chcel porúčať, no nakoniec zostal. Keďže nenašiel proti rezolúcii žiadny vecný argument rovnako, ako deň predtým dvaja pracovníci SÚV ČSM, súhlasil, že rezolúciu uverejní mládežnícky denník Smena. Skutočne, na druhý deň prišli do internátu kameloti a rozdávali Smenu s rezolúciou na prvej strane. Ako sme následne zistili, v meste predávali výtlačky, kde rezolúcia bola nevýrazná a ukrytá hlboko v denníku. V mimobratislavských výtlačkoch nebola vôbec.

V nasledujúcich dňoch sa uskutočnil mohutný sprievod študentov, pochodujúcich cez stred mesta s heslami z rezolúcie a transparentmi – dnes by sme ho nazvali demonštrácia. Po rozchýrení správy o sprievode boli súdruhovia vystrašení a mobilizovali hasičské striekačky (vodné delá) do dvora Stollwercku oproti internátu MG, odkiaľ sprievod vyšiel, aby mohli v prípade potreby zasiahnuť. Na druhý deň pred internát napocho-dovalo niekoľko oddielov Ludovej milície, vyzbrojených ostro nabitými samopalmi, ktorí nás bohato častovali nadávkami a okrikovali vyhráž-kami, ktoré by sa dali zhrnúť asi do takejto vety: „*Vy banda študentská, študujete za peniaze našej robotníckej triedy a ešte budete rebelovať – vykrú-time vám krky.*“ Našťastie k streľbe nedošlo, pretože nik zo študentov sa

nedal vyprovokovať. Nepochybujem, že by neboli váhali použiť zbrane. Dôsledkom týchto udalostí bola perzekúcia a vylúčenie zo štúdií desiatok študentov, napr. nášho kapelníka Fredyho Návrata.

Summary

The author deals with the anticommunist demonstration in 1956 in Bratislava perceived from the point of view of an active participant. That march was a reaction to the anticommunist events taking place in Hungary and Poland in that year. The consequence was the persecution and dozens of students were excluded from the schools where they studied.

Zoznam použitých skratiek/Abbreviations

- ABN – Antiboľševický blok národov
- ACC – Allied Control Commission (Spojenecká kontrolná komisia)
- AV – Akadémia vied
- BANU – Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (Bulharská agrárna národná únia)
- BBC – British Broadcasting Company (Britská vysielacia spoločnosť)
- BIL – International Bureau of Labour
- BND – Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service in West Germany)
- BWP (c) – Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists) [Bulharská robotnícka strana (komunistická)]
- BWSDP – Bulgarian Workers Social Democratic Party (united) [Bulharská robotnícka sociálno-demokratická strana (spojená)]
- BSSR – Belarus Soviet Socialistic republic (Bieloruská sovietska socialistická republika)
- CDHR – Comité pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme de Roumanie (Committee for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania)
- CDN – Ciąg Dalszy Nastąpi (To Be Continued)
- CDU – Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union)
- CDUCE – Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (Kresťanská unie strední Evropy)
- CIA – Central Intelligence Agency (Ústredná spravodajská služba USA)

- CIC – Counterintelligence Corps (Americká vojenská rozvedka)
- CMEA – Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
- CP(b)U – Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine [Komunistická strana (boľševická) Ukrajiny]
- CSCE – Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Konferencia o bezpečnosti a spolupráci v Európe)
- CSEMADOK – Cultural Association of Hungarian Workers' of Czechoslovakia (Kultúrny spolok pracujúcich Maďarov v Československu)
- ČKDH – České křesťansko-demokratické hnutí
- ČNV – Český národní výbor
- ČSA – Československé aerolinie
- ČSFR – Česká a Slovenská federatívna republika
- Čsl. – československý
- ČSNRA – Československé národní rady americké
- ČSR – Československá republika
- ČSSR – Československá socialistická republika
- DGSE – Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (General Directorate for External Security in France)
- DS – Demokratická strana
- EP – Európsky parlament
- ERU – Economic Research Unit (Jednotka ekonomického vývoja)
- ETUC – forum uniting West European trade union organizations
- FEC – Free Europe Committee
- FEN – Fédération de l'Education Nationale (French Federation of the National Education)
- FIDESZ – Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Young Democrats)
- FIDH – Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme (International Federation of Human Rights)
- FMV – Federálne ministerstvo vnútra
- FMW – Federation of Fighting Youth (Federácia bojujúcich mladíkov, študentská organizácia v Poľsku)
- FO – Force ouvrière (Workers' force)
- FRG – Federal Republic of Germany

- GAC – Gospodarie agricola colectiva (collective farm in Romania)
- GAS – gospodarie agricola de stat (state farms in Romania)
- GNA – Grand National Assembly
- GZ – Generálne zhromaždenie
- HCP – Hungarian Communist Party (Maďarská komunistická strana)
- HG – Hlinkova garda
- HM – Hlinkova mládež
- HNO – Hrvatski Narodni Odbor (Croatian National Committee)
- HOS – Hnutie za občiansku slobodu
- HSLS – Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana
- HSWP – Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Maďarská socialistická robotnícka strana)
- GDR – German Democratic Republic (Nemecká demokratická republika)
- ICFTU – International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
- ILO – International Labor Organization
- IRO – International Refugee Organisation (Medzinárodná utečenecká organizácia)
- IRD – Information Research Department
- ISP – Independent Smallholders Party (Nezávislá živnostenská strana)
- JNV – Jednotný národný výbor
- JRD – Jednotné roľnícke družstvá
- JZD – Jednotné zemědělské družstvo
- KAV SNF – Krajský akčný výbor Slovenského národného frontu
- KGB – Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (Výbor pre štátnu bezpečnosť)
- KgU – Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit (Fighting Group against Inhumanity)
- KKP – National Coordinating Commission
- KOR – Komitet Obrony Robotników (Workers' Defence Committee)
- KNV – Krajský národný výbor
- KPMS – Komitet Porozumienia Międzyzakładowego "Solidarność" ("Solidarity" Inter-factory Agreement Committee)

- KPN – Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej (Confederation of the Independent Poland)
- KPU – Komunistická strana Ukrajiny
- KSČ – Komunistická strana Československa
- KSS – Komunistická strana Slovenska
- KSSZ (KSSS) – Komunistická strana Sovietskeho zväzu (Komunistická strana Sovětského svazu)
- KV – Krajský výbor
- KV StB – Krajské veliteľstvo Státní bezpečnosti
- KV ZNB – Krajské veliteľstvo Zboru národnej bezpečnosti
- LDHR – Ligue pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme de Roumanie (The League for the Defence of Human Rights of Romania)
- LM – Ludové milície
- MDF – Hungarian Democratic Forum
- MG – Mladá garda
- MIS – Military Intelligence Service (vojenská spravodajská služba USA)
- MKK – Międzyzakładowy Komitet Koordynacyjny “Solidarność” (“Solidarity” Inter-factory Coordinating Committee)
- MKS – Mazowiecka Konfederacja “Solidarność” (“Solidarity” Mazowsze Confederacy)
- MKWS – Międzyzakładowy Komitet Współpracy “Solidarność” (“Solidarity” Inter-factory Cooperation Committee)
- MNB – Ministerstvo národnej bezpečnosti
- MNO – Ministerstvo národnej obrany
- MNV – Miestny národný výbor
- MPS – Międzyzakładowe Porozumienie „Solidarności” „Unia” (“Unia” “Solidarity” Inter-factory Agreement)
- MRKS – Międzyzakładowy Robotniczy Komitet “Solidarności” (Inter-factory Workers’ “Solidarity” Committee)
- MS – Matica slovenská
- MSS – Międzyzakładowa Struktura „Solidarności” (Inter-factory “Solidarity” Structure)
- MSW – polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (poľské ministerstvo vnútra)

- MSZMP – Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party)
- MV – Ministerstvo vnútra
- MV KSČ – Mestský výbor Komunistickej strany Československa
- NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Severoatlantická aliancia)
- NB – Národná bezpečnosť
- NCFE – National Committee for a Free Europe later renamed the FEC
- NDH – Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Independent State of Croatia)
- NDR – Nemecká demokratická republika
- NEM – New Economic Mechanism
- NF – Národný front
- NGO – Non-governmental organization (mimovládne organizácie)
- NKVD – Narodnyy komissariat vnutrennidh del (Ľudový komisariát vnútra)
- n. p. – Národný podnik
- NPP – National Peasant Party (Národná roľnícka strana)
- NSZZ – Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy (Nezávislé samosprávne odbory)
- NTS – Narodno-Trudovoi Soyuz (People's Labour Alliance)
- NZS – Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów (Independent Students' Association)
- OAV SNF – Okresný akčný výbor Slovenského národného frontu
- OBZ – Obranné spravodajstvo
- ONV – Okresný národný výbor
- OPC – Office of Policy Coordination
- OSN – Organizácia spojených národov
- OUN – Orhanizatsiya Ukrayinskykh Natsionalistiv (Organizácia ukrajinských nacionalistov)
- OV KSS – Okresný výbor Komunistickej strany Slovenska
- OZK – Odbor zahraničnej kontrarozviedky
- PCU – Polish Composers' Union (Združenie poľských skladateľov)
- PLR – Polska Rzeczypospolita Ludowa (People's Republic of Poland)
- PO HG – Pohotovostné útvary Hlinkovej gardy

- PPS – Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Polish Socialist Party)
- PRON – Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Narodowego (Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth)
- PS – Pohraničná stráž
- PSL – Polish Peasant Party (Poľská roľnícka strana)
- PTP – Pomocné technické prápory
- PZPR – Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (United Polish Workers' Party)
- RFE – Radio Free Europe (Rádio Slobodná Európa)
- RCP – Romanian Communist Party
- RCP (b) – Russian Communist party of Bolsheviks (Ruská komunistická strana boľševikov)
- RIAS – Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor (Radio in the American Sector)
- RKW – Regionalna Komisja Wykonawcza (Regional Executive Commission)
- ROH – Revolučné odborové hnutie
- RPR – Romanian Peoples Republic
- RSČ – Rada svobodného Československa
- RSFSR – Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Ruská sovietska federatívna socialistická republika)
- SAV – Slovenský akčný výbor
- SB – Służba Bezpieczeństwa (Polish State Security)
- SBONR – Union of the Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia
- SČDF – Sdružení českých demokratických federalistů
- SD – Staatssicherheitsdienst (Security Service in Nazi-Germany)
- SIS – Secret Intelligence Service
- SKS – Svetový kongres Slovákov
- SLOMR – Sindicatul Liber al Oamenilor Muncii din România (The Free Trade Union of the Working People in Romania)
- SIÚC – Slovenský úrad pre veci cirkevné
- SNP – Slovenské národné povstanie
- SNR – Slovenská národná rada
- SNRvZ – Slovenská národná rada v zahraničí
- SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)

- SPÖ – Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of Austria)
- SR – Slovenská republika
- SRO – Slovenský revolučný odboj
- SS – Schutzstaffel (Defence Corps in Nazi Germany)
- SSO – Strana slovenskej obrody
- SSR – Slovenská socialistická republika
- Stasi – Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry of State Security)
- STO – Slovenská tajná ochrana
- SÚC – Štátny úrad pre veci cirkevné
- SÚV ČSM – Slovenský ústredný výbor Československého sväzu mládeže
- SVU – Společnosti pro vědy a umění
- SZDSZ – Alliance of Free Democrats
- SZETA – The Fund for Supporting the Poor
- ŠtB/StB – Štátna bezpečnosť/Státní bezpečnost
- TIB – Történelmi Igazságtétel Bizottsága (Committee on Historical Justice)
- TKK – Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna (Provisional Coordinating Commission)
- TKZ – Tajne Komisje Zakładowe (Underground Factory Commissions)
- TNP – Tábory nútených prác
- TsOPE – Central Union of Post-war Emigrants from the USSR
- UK – Univerzita Komenského
- UKP – Ukrainian Communist Party
- USDRP – Ukrainian Social-Democratic Working Party (Ukrainska Social-Demokratychna Robotnycha Partia, Ukrajinská sociálnodemokratická robotnícka strana)
- USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (Sovietsky zväz)
- UW – Uniwersytet Warszawski (Warsaw University)
- ÚAV SNF – Ústredný akčný výbor Slovenského národného frontu
- ÚDE – Ústředí demokratického exilu
- UHNj – Ujedinjeni Hrvati Njemačke (United Croats of West Germany)
- UHA – Ukrajinská helsinská skupina
- UPA – Ukrajinska Povstanska Armiya (Ukrajinská povstalecká armáda)

- UVHR – Ukrajinská hlavná oslobodzovacia rada
- ÚML – Ústav marxizmu-leninizmu
- ÚV – Ústredný výbor
- VB – Verejná bezpečnosť
- VIS – Victoria i „Solidarność“ (Victory and “Solidarity”)
- VOS – Vereinigung der Opfer des Stalinismus (Association of Victims of Stalinism)
- VPN – Verejnoscť proti násiliu
- VPO – Vereinigung Politischer Ostflüchtlinge (Association of Political Refugees from the East)
- VVŠ HM – vyššia vodcovská škola Hlinkovej mládeže
- WCL – World Confederation of Labor
- WiN – Wolność i Niezawisłość (Freedom and Independence)
- WWII – World War II (druhá svetová vojna)
- YMCA – Young Men’s Christian Association (Zväz mladých kresťanských mužov)
- ZHP – Zwi¹zek Harcerstwa Polskiego (Polish Scouting and Guiding Association)
- ZKR – Zahraničná kontrarozviedka
- ZNB/SNB – Zbor národnej bezpečnosti
- ZOB – Zemský odbor bezpečnosti
- ZSMP – Związek Socjalistycznej Młodzieży Polskiej (Polish Socialist Youth Union)
- ZSSR – Zväz sovietskych socialistických republík
- ZZK – Związek Zbrojnej Konspiracji (Armed Underground Association)

O autoroch

Alexandra AFTARUK, M. A. (1983), poľská historička. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa zaoberá zahraničným kontextom pôsobenia poľského hnutia *Solidarita* v 80. rokoch. V súčasnosti je študentkou doktorandského štúdia na Ústave dejín a archívnych vied Univerzity Mikuláša Kopernika v Toruni. Zároveň študuje doktorandské štúdium aj na Univerzite vo Fribourgu vo Švajčiarsku. Je autorkou viacerých vedeckých a populárnych článkov o dejinách a medzinárodných vzťahoch.

Magdolna BARÁTH, PhD. (1965), maďarská historička a archivárka. V súčasnosti pôsobí ako riaditeľka výskumného oddelenia v Historickom archíve štátnobezpečnostných služieb v Budapešti. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa venuje moderným maďarským dejinám, predovšetkým obdobiu po 2. svetovej vojne, ako aj vzťahom medzi Maďarskom a Sovietskym zväzom. Pôsobí aj ako univerzitná pedagogička na Univerzite Eötvösa Loránda v Budapešti. Je členkou redakčných rád dvoch vedeckých historických časopisov. Publikovala niekoľko desiatok vedeckých štúdií v maďarských aj zahraničných časopisoch a periodikách.

Petr BLAŽEK, PhDr., Ph.D. (1973), český historik. Vo svojej vedeckej činnosti sa zaoberá dejinami komunistického režimu v Československu a československo-poľskými vzťahmi v druhej polovici 20. storočia. V súčasnosti pracuje v Ústave pro soudobé dějiny Akademie věd České republiky a v Ústave pro studium totalitních režimů. Je editorom a spoluautorom viacerých odborných publikácií, ako napr. *Opozice a odpor proti komunistickému režimu v Československu 1968 – 1989* (2005), *Polsko a Československo v roce 1968* (2006, spoločne s Ľ. Kamińským a R. Vévodou), *Kolektivizace venkova v Československu 1948 – 1960 a středoevropské souvislosti* (2008, spoločne s M. Kubálkem), *A nepozdvihne meč....*

Odpírání vojenské služby v Československu 1948 – 1989 (2008), *Nejcitlivější místo režimu. Výbor na obranu nespravedlivě stíhaných (VONS) pohledem svých členů* (2009, spoločne s J. Pažoutem) a *Jan Palach '69* (2009, spoločne s P. Eichlerem a J. Jarešem). Autor monografií *Lennonova zeď v Praze. Neformální shromáždění mládeže na Kampě 1980 – 1989* (2003, spoločne s F. Pospíšilem a R. Laubem) a *Živá pochodeň na Stadionu Desetiletí. Protest Ryszarda Siwiece proti okupaci Československa v roce 1968* (2008). Okrem toho je autorom niekoľkých desiatok vedeckých štúdií, publikovaných v zborníkoch a vedeckých časopisoch či populárnych článkoch.

Ján BOBÁK, PhDr., CSc. (1950), slovenský historik, pracovník sekcie vedeckého výskumu Ústavu pamäti národa. Vo svojej vedecko-výskumnej činnosti sa venuje výskumu Slovákov v zahraničí, menšinovej otázke na Slovensku, slovenskej štátnosti v 20. storočí a slovenskej politickej emigrácii po roku 1945. Výsledky svojich výskumov publikoval najmä v zborníku *Slováci v zahraničí* a v časopise *Historický zborník* a prezentoval na rôznych vedeckých konferenciách. Je autorom štyroch samostatných prác. Zostavil a spolupodielal sa na zostavení početných zborníkov a historických dokumentov. V rokoch 1997 – 2011 vykonával funkciu riaditeľa Slovenského historického ústavu Matice slovenskej v Bratislave. Od roku 1996 vykonáva funkciu hlavného redaktora *β*.

Peter BORZA, PhD., (1975), slovenský historik. Pôsobí ako vysokoškolský pedagóg na Katedre historických vied Gréckokatolíckej teologickej fakulty Prešovskej univerzity. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa venuje predovšetkým dejinám Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi na Slovensku v 20. storočí. Na túto tému napísal dve vedecké monografie (*Dejiny Gréckokatolíckej cirkvi na Slovensku v období II. svetovej vojny* a *Blahoslavený Vasil' Hopko, prešovský pomocný biskup*). Okrem toho publikoval niekoľko vedeckých štúdií a populárnych článkov v domácich aj zahraničných časopisoch.

Alexandra BOTYÁNSZKI, M. A. (1983), maďarská politologička. V súčasnosti študuje na postgraduálnom štúdiu na Katedre politických vied na Fakulte právnych a politických vied Univerzity v Szegede. Jej vedecká tvorba je zameraná na problematiku maďarskej demokratickej opozície v 80. rokoch, ale aj otázky kultúrnej pamäte, predovšetkým na pamäť revolúcie v roku 1956.

András BOZÓKI, Univ. Prof., PhD. (1959), maďarský politológ a politik. Pôsobí ako profesor politických vied na Stredo európskej univerzite v Budapešti. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa venuje problematike demokratickej, politickým ideám, stredo európskej politike, politickým a kultúrnym elitám a postaveniu inteligencie v politike.

Je autorom troch vedeckých monografií vydaných v Maďarsku a spoluautorom dvoch monografií publikovaných v zahraničí a jednej v Maďarsku, zároveň aj editorom 14 vedeckých zborníkov publikovaných v Maďarsku a šiestich v zahraničí. Okrem toho napísal desiatky vedeckých štúdií a odborných článkov, publikovaných v rôznych jazykoch a štátoch. Medzi jeho najdôležitejšie diela patria: *Anarchism in Hungary: Theory, History, Legacies* (co-author), *The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy* (editor), and the *Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe* (editor).

V rámci svojej pedagogickej dráhy prednášal okrem súčasného pracoviska aj na univerzitách v USA (Columbia University, Smith College, Mount Holyoke College), vo Veľkej Británii (Nottingham), v Nemecku (Tübingen), Taliansku (Bologna) či v Maďarsku (Univerzita Eötvösa Loránda). Vybrané témy prednášal na rôznych svetových univerzitách od Harvardu až po univerzitu v Hong Kongu. Ako vedecký pracovník absolvoval stáže vo viacerých vedeckých inštitúciách po celom svete, napr. na University of California, Los Angeles, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, European University Institute vo Fiorentíne či v Sussex European Institute v Brightone vo Veľkej Británii.

V rokoch 2003 – 2005 pôsobil ako predseda maďarského Spolku politológov a v rokoch 2002 – 2008 bol členom výkonného výboru Európskej siete politických vied. Od roku 2008 je členom výkonného výboru Európskej konfederácie združení politológov. Patril medzi zakladajúcich členov časopisu *Politikatudományi Szemle* (1992 – 1999), ktorý bol vedeckým periodikom maďarského Spolku politológov. Od roku 2000 je členom redakčnej rady tohto časopisu. Popri tom je členom redakčných rád viacerých európskych politologických časopisov, ako napr. *European Political Science*, the *CEU Political Science Review* či *Journal of Political Science Education*. V rokoch 2005 – 2006 bol ministrom kultúry Maďarska.

Catalin CRISTOLOVEANU, (1986), rumunský historik. V súčasnosti študuje na Indiana Univerzity, Bloomington, USA a zároveň pôsobí v Ruskom a východoeurópskom ústave na tejto univerzite. Venuje sa

moderným rumunským dejinám so zameraním na kolektivizáciu rumunského poľnohospodárstva.

Patrik DUBOVSKÝ, PhD. (1965), slovenský historik a archivár. Vyštudoval odbor archívnictvo na Filozofickej fakulte Univerzity Komenského v Bratislave. Postgraduálne štúdium zo slovenských dejín ukončil obhájením dizertačnej práce *Metódy a praktiky ŠtB v perzekučnej politike KSCĎ proti Katolíckej cirkvi v rokoch 1948 – 1963*. Autor pôsobil v Archíve Ústavu pamäti národa a na oddelení Oral History a audiovizuálnej tvorby ÚPN. Vo svojej vedeckej činnosti sa venuje prenasledovaniu cirkvi a občianskej rezistencii počas vlády komunistického režimu, ako aj pádu tohto režimu v roku 1989.

Je autorom viacerých vedeckých štúdií a populárnych článkov s tematikou likvidácie mužských a ženských reholí na Slovensku v 50. rokoch, zásahu ŠtB proti františkánom v 80. rokoch, Sviečkovej manifestácie v roku 1988 či činnosti cirkvi pred a počas novembra 1989. Popri tom spolupracoval na príprave dokumentárnych filmov o Sviečkovej manifestácii 1988, likvidácii mužských reholí na Slovensku, likvidácii ženských reholí na Slovensku, o biskupovi Vasilovi Hopkovi, Janovi Palachovi, prenasledovaní náboženských laikov v 50. rokoch či o disidentovi Alexandrovi Mušinkovi.

George ENACHE, PhD. (1974), rumunský historik. Vyštudoval históriu na Univerzite Al. I. Cuza v Iași. V súčasnosti pôsobí ako vysokoškolský pedagóg na Fakulte histórie, filozofie a teológie Univerzity Dunărea de Jos v rumunskom meste Galati. Medzi hlavné predmety jeho vedeckého záujmu patria cirkevné dejiny, obdobie komunizmu v rumunských dejinách a v širšom kontexte kultúrnej dejiny. Je autorom vedeckej monografie *Ortodoxie și putere politică în România contemporană. Studii și eseuri (Orthodoxy and Political Power in Contemporary Romania. Studies and Essays*, Bucharest 2005) a spoluautorom ďalších štyroch monografií. Okrem toho publikoval desiatky vedeckých štúdií a populárnych článkov v Rumunsku aj v zahraničí.

Alexandra GEROTA, M. A., pôsobí ako postgraduálna študentka na Univerzite vo Versailles vo Francúzsku. Vo svojom vedeckom výskume sa zameriava na problematiku disidentského hnutia v štátoch sovietskeho bloku so zameraním na Poľsko, Rusko a Rumunsko a tiež na postoje Francúzska voči týmto hnutiam. Publikovala niekoľko článkov a štúdií v Poľsku aj vo Francúzsku.

Elena GLUŠKO, M. A. (1983), ruská historička. Vyštudovala odbor slovanská filológia na Moskovskej štátnej univerzite. Štúdium si rozšírila na Stredoeurópskej univerzite v Budapešti. V súčasnosti absolvuje postgraduálne štúdium na Ruskej akadémii vied. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa zameriava na otázku českého a slovenského disentu. Na túto tému publikovala už niekoľko štúdií a článkov.

Ryszard GRYZ, Dr. Hab., Univ. prof. (1963), poľský historik. História vyštudoval na Pedagogickej univerzite v Kielciach, kde následne pôsobil ako odborný asistent a ako univerzitný pedagóg. Titul Ph.D. obhájil v roku 1998. V roku 2008 dosiahol akademický titul profesor a od roku 2009 pôsobí ako profesor na Univerzite Jana Kochanovského v Kielciach. Je autorom dvoch vedeckých monografií: *Państwo a Kościół w Polsce 1945-1956 na przykładzie województwa kieleckiego*, (Štát a cirkev v Poľsku na príklade provincie Kielce; Kraków 1999) a *Pozwolić czy nie? Władze PRL wobec budownictwa katolickich obiektów sakralnych w latach 1971 – 1980*, (Dovoliť či nie? Orgány Poľskej ľudovej republiky a ich postoje k budovaniu katolíckych cirkevných objektov v rokoch 1971 – 1980; Kielce 2007) a spoluautorom jednej monografie, zároveň zostavovateľom jednej kolektívnej monografie a autorom viacerých vedeckých článkov zameraných na problematiku vzťahu medzi Katolíckou cirkvou a komunistickým režimom v Poľsku.

Zdeněk HAZDRA, Mgr. (1983), český historik. Pracuje ako vedecký pracovník Katedry stredoevropských štúdií Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Karlovy v Prahe. Predmetom jeho vedeckého výskumu sú moderné české dejiny v kontexte stredoeurópskeho vývoja v 19. a 20. storočí. Užšie sa zameriava na problematiku šľachty v období medzi dvoma svetovými vojnami a v časoch totalitných režimov, ako aj na problematiku protinacistického odboja a komunistickej perzekúcie v 50. rokoch 20. storočia. Je autorom niekoľkých vedeckých štúdií a popularizačných článkov. Venuje sa aj písaniu scenárov k hudobno-literárnym programom a spolupracuje s Českou televíziou a Českým rozhlasom.

Jan CHOLÍNSKÝ, Mgr. (1965), český historik a pedagóg. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa zaoberá problematikou českého exilového hnutia v rokoch 1948 – 1989, spoločenskou reflexiou komunistickej minulosti a dejinami ideí. V súčasnosti pôsobí ako stredoškolský učiteľ, zároveň pracuje ako externý

spolupracovník Ústavu pro studium totalitních režimů a šéfredaktor časopisu *Securitas Imperii* vydávaného týmto ústavom v Prahe.

Viliam JABLONICKÝ, (1948), slovenský publicista, kritik, historik kultúry. Absolvent estetiky, vied a dejín kultúry a umenia na Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Komenského v Bratislave. Redigoval literárne a kultúrne rubriky *Hlas ľudu*, *Revue svetovej literatúry*, *Film a divadlo*, *Slovenský denník*, *Most – štvrťročník pre slovenskú kultúru* založený v Clevelande 1954. Publikoval v mnohých ďalších časopisoch a médiách vo všetkých publicistických žánroch vrátane reportáže a eseje tak doma, ako aj v zahraničí. Je a bol členom viacerých kultúrnych, vedeckých, historických a spisovateľských spoločností, v súčasnosti napr. člen výborov Slovenského PEN centra či člen redakčnej rady *Libri Historiae Slovaciae*. Samostatne vydal dielo *Filmár Viktor Kubal* (1993), spoluautorsky sa podieľal na vyše troch desiatkach titulov zameraných na históriu filmu a umenia, kultúrno-historické témy (slovensko-rakúsko-maďarsko-české a poľské vzťahy), eseje s dôrazom na úlohu osobností v našich dejinách ako Ľudovít Štúr, kardinál Ján Chryzostom Korec, Peter Mihálik, Martin Rázus, Andrej Žarnov, Ladislav Hanus, T. G. Masaryk, Vincent Šabík, Jozef Čongva, Rudolf Dilong, Ferdiš Juriga, Ivan Dérer, Egon Bondy, Dalimil Hajko, Cyril a Metod (2011). Podnecoval a dotváral písanie rodinných a iných memoárov, napr. Bela Pollu, Jozefa Baču či Williama Schmidta. Spoluautorsky sa podieľal na dokumentárnych filmoch *Papierové hlavy* (1995), *Ludia z Hauerlandu*, *Prežili sme gulag* (2008), *Drotár za kamerou* (2010).

Aleksandar JAKIR, Univ. Prof., PhD. (1966), chorvátsky historik. Vyštudoval históriu a slavistiku na univerzite v Norimbergu, kde mu bol v roku 1997 udelený titul PhD. Krátko na to pracoval ako externý pracovník na univerzitách v Jene, Bazileji a napokon v Marburgu v Nemecku. Od roku 2007 až do súčasnosti pôsobí ako vysokoškolský pedagóg na Katedre histórie Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity v Splite. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa venuje dejinám 20. storočia vo východnej a juhovýchodnej Európe so zameraním na Chorvátsko. Je autorom dvoch vedeckých monografií (*Dalmatien zwischen den Weltkriegen. Agrarische und urbane Lebenswelt und das Scheitern der jugoslawischen Integration*, Mníchov 1999; *Europas Tragik. Ex-Jugoslawien zwischen Hoffnung und Resignation*, Münster 2003) a desiatok vedeckých štúdií a populárnych článkov, publikovaných predovšetkým v nemecky hovoriacich krajinách a v Chorvátsku.

Leo JANSONS, MSc. (1977), lotyšský historik práva. Vyštudoval moderné dejiny na Lotyšskej univerzite v roku 2010. V súčasnosti na tej istej univerzite študuje postgraduálne štúdium so zameraním na širšiu problematiku moderných dejín východnej Európy a pobaltských štátov. Bližšie sa špecializuje na otázky právnych dejín pobaltských štátov, dejiny a vývoj doktríny neuznania anexie pobaltských štátov Sovietskym zväzom a na vývoj medzinárodného práva počas diskusie o postavení pobaltských štátov v rokoch 1945 – 1991. Na túto tému publikoval v Lotyšsku aj v anglicky hovoriacich krajinách niekoľko štúdií. Tiež sa venuje systematickému zbieraniu prameňov a literatúry pochádzajúcich z USA a západných štátov o právnej, sociálnej a politickej interpretácii pobaltskej otázky.

Valeri KATZOUNOV, PhD. (1953), bulharský historik. Pôsobil v Bulharskej akadémii vied a na univerzite v Sofii. Od apríla 2007 do súčasnosti pôsobí ako člen Výboru pre zverejňovanie a oznamovanie príslušníkov bulharskej Štátnej bezpečnosti a spravodajských služieb Bulharskej národnej armády. V rámci práce v tomto výbore sa venuje výskumu bulharských komunistických spravodajských služieb. Je spoluautorom publikácie *Dejiny Bulharska v dátumoch* (2004) a autorom viacerých vedeckých štúdií publikovaných v časopisoch, zborníkoch a na internete.

Anatolij KLJUČKOVIČ, doc., PhD. (1978), ukrajinský historik a politológ. História vyštudoval na Užhorodskej národnej univerzite v Užhorode, doktorandské štúdium absolvoval na tej istej univerzite na katedre politológie. V roku 2008 mu bol udelený akademický titul docent na katedre politických vied. V tejto hodnosti pôsobí v súčasnosti na katedre politológie Užhorodskej národnej univerzity. Popri tom zastáva funkciu námestníka riaditeľa Agentúry pre sociálny výskum *Sotsyum Karpat*. Publikoval niekoľko vedeckých štúdií a populárnych článkov na Ukrajine aj v zahraničí.

Petr KUBÍK, Mgr., PhD. (1963), český historik. Absolvent Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Karlovy Praha, odbor história. Dlhodobo vyučoval dejepis na strednej škole v Prahe. V roku 2009 dokončil doktorský študijný program na Filozofickej fakulte Univerzity Karlovy prácou *Slovensko-italské vzťahy 1939 – 1945*. V súčasnej dobe pôsobí ako nezávislý historik. Venuje sa predovšetkým medzinárodným politickým a vojenským otázkam v 30. a 40. rokoch 20. storočia. Je autorom dvoch monografií (*Rudé stíny. Sovetské válečné zločiny 1941-1945*, 2003; *Slovensko-talianske vzťahy*

1939 – 1945, 2010). Popri tom napísal viacero vedeckých štúdií a študijných textov pre študentov stredných škôl.

Dumitru LACATUSU (1982), rumunský historik. V súčasnosti pracuje ako vedecký pracovník Ústavu vyšetrovania komunistických zločinov a pamäti rumunského exilu v Rumunsku. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa zameriava na výskum zločinov komunistického režimu v Rumunsku.

Paul MADDRELL, Ph.D. (1965), anglický historik a vysokoškolský pedagóg. Absolvent univerzity v Cambridge, kde získal aj titul Ph.D. V súčasnosti pôsobí ako univerzitný pedagóg na Katedre politiky, dejín a medzinárodných vzťahov na Loughborough University vo Veľkej Británii. Jeho prednášky sa zameriavajú na dejiny Nemecka a Sovietskeho zväzu v 20. storočí a na spravodajské služby. Predtým pôsobil ako prednášajúci pedagóg na Aberystwyth University a Salford Universities, obe vo Veľkej Británii. Na týchto univerzitách prednášal o všeobecných dejinách a spravodajských službách, najmä v období studenej vojny. Tieto problematiky sú aj bližším zameraním jeho vedeckého výskumu. Je autorom monografie *Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945 – 1961* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) a popri nej napísal desiatky vedeckých článkov a statí v monografiách zameraných na nemecké dejiny a spravodajské služby. Je členom britskej Kráľovskej spoločnosti historikov.

Daniel Atanáz MANDZÁK, SEOLic., CSsR (1972), slovenský gréckokatolícky kňaz a rehoľník – člen Kongregácie Najsvätejšieho Vykupiteľa (redemptoristi). Študoval filozofiu v Krakove (Wyższe Seminarium Duchowne Redemptorystów) a teológiu v poľskom Tuchove a v Ríme – na Pápežskej univerzite sv. Urbana a na Pápežskom východnom inštitúte. V súčasnosti pôsobí v kláštore redemptoristov v Michalovciach. Vo svojom historickom výskume sa zaoberá predovšetkým dejinami gréckokatolíckej viceprovincie redemptoristov na Slovensku, pričom spolupracoval aj na procese blahorečenia gréckokatolíckeho redemptoristu Metoda Dominika Trčku i ukrajinských gréckokatolíckych mučeníkov (Čarneckej a spol.). Je autorom monografií: *Redemptoristi v Stropkove v rokoch 1921 – 1999* (1999); *Blahoslavený Metod Dominik Trčka, prvý protoigumen gréckokatolíckych redemptoristov na Slovensku 1945 – 1950* (2006); „Agent a špión Vatikánu“, *Redemptorista Ján Ivan Mastiliak – slovenský účastník monsterprocesu proti A. A. Machalkovi a spol.* (2008), *Známy neznámy. Život a dielo redemptoristu Jána Ivana Mastiliaka (1911 – 1989)* (2009)

a *Dokumenty k procesu s Augustinom A. Machalkom a spol.* (2009). Je spoluautorom publikácií: *Smrť za mrežami* (2006) a *Život za mrežami* (2007). Okrem toho publikoval viacero vedeckých štúdií.

Pavel MAREK, Prof., Ph.D., PhDr., PaedDr., (1949), český historik. Je absolventom odboru história –ruský jazyk na Palackého univerzite v Olo-mouci. V 80. rokoch pôsobil ako historik v Muzeu Prostějovska, v ktorom bol začiatkom 90. rokov riaditeľom. Od roku 1991 pracuje na Palackého univerzite, najskôr na katedre politológie a európskych štúdií ako vedúci katedry. V súčasnosti pôsobí ako vysokoškolský pedagóg na katedre histórie. Zároveň je vedúcim Centra dejín kresťanskej politiky. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa venuje moderným českým dejinám od polovice 19. storočia až do súčasnosti. Je autorom a spoluautorom dvoch desiatok monografií (napr. *České živnostnictvo 1945-1960. Likvidace živnostníků, řemeslníků a obchodníků v českých zemích*, 2006; *Prostějovská „sametová revoluce“*. *Příspěvek k počátkům demokratizace české společnosti v letech 1989 – 1990*, 2009). Popri tom je zostavovateľom viac ako 30 zborníkov a autorom približne 200 odborných štúdií a príspevkov.

Michal MIKLOVIČ, Mgr. (1979), slovenský politológ, absolvent politológie na Trnavskej univerzite. Pracuje v sekcii dokumentácií Ústavu pamäti národa. Predmetom jeho vedeckého výskumu sú totalitné režimy a ideológie. Užšie sa špecializuje na problematiku pôsobenia Štátnej bezpečnosti s dôrazom na Hlavnú správu rozviedky. Je autorom viacerých vedeckých štúdií, publikovaných najčastejšie v časopisoch *Pamäť národa* a *Paměť a dějiny*.

Agata MIREK, Ph.D. (1970), poľská historička. V súčasnosti pôsobí ako univerzitná pedagogička na Fakulte humanitných štúdií Katolíckej univerzity Jána Pavla II. v Lubline. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa zameriava predovšetkým na postavenie rehoľníčok v období vlády komunistického režimu v Poľsku. Je autorkou monografie *Nuns in the labour camps in Poland between 1954-1956*, (Mníšky v pracovných táboroch v Poľsku 1954 – 1956; Lublin 2009) a spoluautorkou a editorkou ďalších publikácií, ako napr. *Atlas of Female Orders on Polish Territories in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, (Atlas ženských rehoľných rádov na poľskom území v 19. a 20. storočí; Lublin 2007) či *Female Orders in the People's Republic of Poland. Studies and materials for the recent history of female congregations in Poland* (Ženské rehoľné rády v Poľskej ľudovej republike. Štúdie a materiály k moderným dejinám

ženských rehoľných rádov v Poľsku; Lublin 2008). Vedecké štúdie publikuje v Poľsku aj v zahraničí. Popri tom je koordinátorkou výskumného projektu *Ženské rehoľné rády v Poľskej ľudovej republike*.

Miklós MITROVITS, Ph.D. (1978), maďarský historik, politológ, a polonista. História vyštudoval na Univerzite Eötvösa Loránda v Budapešti. Popri štúdiu úspešne absolvoval aj odborné kurzy so špecializáciou na historickú rusistiku a modernú soviétológiu. V roku 2009 mu bol udelený titul Ph.D. na Doktorandskej škole východoeurópskych dejín 19. a 20. storočia. V rokoch 2004 – 2008 študoval na Katolíckej univerzite Petra Pázmaňa odbory poľské štúdie a stredoeurópske štúdie. Od roku 2006 pracuje ako vedecký pracovník na Ústave politických dejín v Budapešti. Vo svojom vedeckom výskume sa venuje dejinám východnej Európy po 2. svetovej vojne.

Christopher MOLNAR, M. A. (1975), americký historik. V súčasnosti študuje postgraduálne štúdium na Indiana University, Bloomington, USA v odbore história. Popri tom prednáša na univerzite problematiku emigrácie do Európy po 2. svetovej vojne. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa venuje predovšetkým moderným dejinám západnej Európy a Nemecka. Témou jeho dizertačnej práce je problematika juhoslovanskej emigrácie v Nemecku po 2. svetovej vojne. Zároveň pôsobí ako redakčný asistent časopisu *American Historical Review*.

Ľubomír MORBACHER, Ph.D. (1973), slovenský historik. Absolvent Pedagogickej fakulty Univerzity Komenského v Bratislave. V súčasnosti pracuje ako riaditeľ sekcie dokumentácie v Ústave pamäti národa. Vo svojej vedeckej činnosti sa zaoberá obdobím komunizmu v slovenských dejinách a personálnou a organizačnou rekonštrukciou útvarov Štátnej bezpečnosti. Svoje vedecké štúdie najčastejšie publikuje v časopise *Pamäť národa*. Popri vedeckých štúdiách je aj autorom scenárov k výstavám a dokumentuje prípady občanov usmrtených na hraniciach v rokoch 1948 – 1989.

Kamil NEDVĚDICKÝ, JUDr. (1977), český právnik a historik práva. Absolvent Právnickej fakulty Univerzity Karlovy, kde mu bol v roku 2007 udelený titul JUDr. V súčasnosti študuje postgraduálne štúdium v odbore Teoretické právne vedy, s užšou špecializáciou na Ústavné právo a štátovedu. Pracuje na Ministerstve vnútra Českej republiky, odbor azylovej a migračnej politiky. V rámci práce zastupuje MV ČR pred príslušnými

súdmi vo veciach medzinárodnej ochrany a v širokej škále cudzineckých káz. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa venuje dejinám práva v období komunistického režimu. Je spoluautorom kolektívnej monografie *Tretí odboj. Kapitoly z dějin protikomunistické rezistence v Československu v padesátých letech 20. století* (Praha 2010) a autorom viacerých štúdií a článkov publikovaných najčastejšie v časopise *Securitas Imperii*.

Sergej PAKHOMENKO, doc., PhD. (1973), ukrajinský historik a politológ. Absolvent Mariupolskej štátnej univerzity. Titul PhD. v odbore histórie mu bol udelený v roku 2003 na Ústave ukrajinských dejín Ukrajinskej národnej akadémie vied. Od roku 2004 do súčasnosti pôsobí ako vysokoškolský pedagóg na Mariupolskej štátnej univerzite, kde prednáša problematiku medzinárodných vzťahov, zahraničnú politiku a históriu. Krátko pôsobil ako vedecký pracovník Ukrajinskej národnej akadémie vied. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa venuje problematike dejín strednej a juhovýchodnej Európy a bližšie sa venuje situácii národnostných menšín na Ukrajine v 20. storočí. Je autorom viacerých vedeckých štúdií, publikovaných predovšetkým na Ukrajine.

Olena PALKO, M. A. (1983), ukrajinská historička. V súčasnosti študuje postgraduálne štúdium na Ústave politických a etnických štúdií I. A. Kurasa Ukrajinskej národnej akadémie vied. Svoj vedecký výskum orientuje na problematiku postavenia Ukrajiny v Sovietskom zväze a na politiku ukrajinských komunistov a ich vzťahy s politbyrom a centrálnou vládou v Moskve.

István PAPP, PhD. (1979), maďarský historik. Vyštudoval históriu a politické vedy, titul PhD. obhájil v roku 2007. Pôsobil v Ústave dejín literatúry Maďarskej akadémie, od roku 2005 pracuje v Historickom archíve štátnobezpečnostných služieb. Predmetom jeho vedeckého výskumu sú osudy maďarského poľnohospodárstva po roku 1956 a história maďarskej Štátnej bezpečnosti 1956 – 1962. Publikoval viaceré vedecké štúdie v Maďarsku aj v zahraničí.

Vasil PARASKEVOV, PhD. (1972), bulharský historik. Pôsobí ako univerzitný pedagóg na Univerzite Konstantina Preslavského v Šumeni. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa venuje moderným bulharským dejinám so zameraním na britsko-bulharské vzťahy v období studenej vojny.

Jan PEŠEK, Doc., PhDr., DrSc. (1949), slovenský historik. Pracuje ako vedecký pracovník Historického ústavu Slovenskej akadémie vied v Bratislave. Zaoberá sa dejinami Slovenska a Československa po 2. svetovej vojne, najmä ich politickými a mocenskými súvislosťami. Zameriava sa predovšetkým na problematiku komunistického prevratu vo februári 1948, ale tiež na formovanie a fungovanie totalitného politického systému, politické perzekúcie, štruktúru a aparát Komunistickej strany Slovenska, pôsobenie Štátnej bezpečnosti, vzťahy štátu a cirkví či fungovanie satelitných politických strán. Je autorom a spoluautorom viacerých monografií (o. i. *Štátna bezpečnosť na Slovensku 1948 – 1953; Nástroj represie a politickej kontroly; Slovensko na prelome 50. a 60. rokov*), veľkého počtu štúdií publikovaných vo vedeckých časopisoch a zborníkoch na Slovensku aj v zahraničí.

Anna G. PIOTROWSKA, PhD. (1973), poľská muzikologička. Absolvovala štúdium hudobných vied na Jagelovskej univerzite v Krakove. Neskôr absolvovala študijný pobyt na Durham University vo Veľkej Británii a v roku 2002 obhájila dizertačnú prácu a bol jej udelený titul PhD. V súčasnosti pracuje na Ústave muzikológie na Jagelovskej univerzite v Krakove. Jej výskum sa sústreďuje na problematiku európskej a americkej hudobnej kultúry. Popri tom sa zameriava aj na sociologické a kultúrne aspekty hudobných diel.

Partyk PLESKOT, PhD. (1980), poľský historik. V súčasnosti pracuje v Ústave národnej pamäti vo Varšave na oddelení verejného vzdelávania. Venuje sa poľským dejinám v období vlády komunistického režimu so zameraním na pôsobenie študentského hnutia.

Natalia PRYSTUPA, doc., PhD., (1978), bieloruská historička. Vyštudovala na Bieloruskej štátnej pedagogickej univerzite v Minsku odbor história – anglický jazyk. Na tejto univerzite absolvovala aj postgraduálne štúdium histórie, ktoré ukončila v roku 2003 obhájením dizertačnej práce na tému *Národno-socialistická koncepcia československej Národnej socialistickej strany v 30. a 40. rokoch 20. storočia*. V súčasnosti pôsobí ako univerzitná pedagogička na Bieloruskej štátnej pedagogickej univerzite M. Tanka v Minsku, kde prednáša slovanské dejiny a metodológiu historickej vedy.

Pavol RAKOVSKÝ, Ing. (1936), aktívny účastník demonštrácie bratislavských študentov v roku 1956. Krátko po vyštudovaní projektant,

následne výskum. Podstatnú časť aktívneho života pracoval ako ústredný investor, o. i. na Ministerstve obchodu a cestovného ruchu SR.

Tadeusz RUZIKOWSKI, Ph.D., (1975), poľský historik. V súčasnosti pracuje ako vedecký pracovník na oddelení vedeckého výskumu Ústavu národnej pamäti vo Varšave. Jeho vedecký výskum sa zameriava na sociálne a politické aspekty moderných poľských dejín, predovšetkým z obdobia Poľskej ľudovej republiky. Tiež sa venuje otázke fenoménu tajných spolupracovníkov poľskej politickej tajnej služby v období komunizmu. Je autorom jednej vedeckej monografie *Stan wojenny w Warszawie i województwie stołeczym 1981–1983* (Stanné právo vo Varšave a Varšavskej provincii 1981 – 1983; Varšava, 2009). Zároveň napísal aj viacero vedeckých štúdií a populárnych článkov.

Beatrice SCUTARU, M. A. (1983), francúzska historička. V súčasnosti študuje postgraduálne štúdium na univerzite v Angers, kde jej v roku 2007 udelili magisterský titul. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa venuje predovšetkým francúzsko-rumunským vzťahom v druhej polovici 20. storočia.

Jerguš SIVOŠ, Ph.D. (1979), slovenský historik. Vyštudoval Pedagogickú fakultu Univerzity Komenského v Bratislave, odbor história – etická a občianska výchova. Doktorandské štúdium v odbore slovenské dejiny absolvoval na Filozofickej fakulte Trnavskej univerzity v Trnave. Je pracovníkom sekcie dokumentácie Ústavu pamäti národa a redaktorom časopisu *Pamäť národa*. Vo svojej práci sa zameriava na obdobie komunizmu, najmä na pôsobenie Štátnej bezpečnosti a ďalších represívnych štátnych zložiek. Je autorom monografie *Bez rozsudku! Pracovné tábory, sústreďovacie tábory a tábory nútenej práce na Slovensku v rokoch 1945 – 1953* (Bratislava 2011), editorom zbierky dokumentov *XII. správa ZNB. Dokumenty k činnosti Správy kontrarozvedky v Bratislave v rokoch 1974 – 1989* (Bratislava 2008). Je spoluautorom publikácií *Biografický slovník predstaviteľů ministerstva vnitra v letech 1948 – 1989. Ministři a jejich náměstci* (Praha 2009) a *V stopách „železného Felixá“*. *Štátna bezpečnosť na Slovensku v rokoch 1945 – 1989* (Bratislava 2012). Popri vedeckých štúdiách je autorom populárnych článkov a scenárov výstav (*Štátna bezpečnosť na Slovensku*, 2011).

Michal ŠMIGEL, doc., Ph.D., PhDr. (1975), slovenský historik. Pôsobí ako univerzitný pedagóg na Katedre histórie Fakulty humanitných vied Univerzity Mateja Bela v Banskej Bystrici, kde prednáša svetové dejiny

19. a 20. storočia. Zároveň pracuje ako externý pracovník Inštitútu sociálnych a kultúrnych štúdií UMB. Vo vedeckom výskume sa orientuje na národné, regionálne a nadregionálne dejiny, venuje sa migračným procesom v strednej Európe a na Slovensku v 20. storočí, problematike rusínskeho obyvateľstva na Slovensku v povojnovom období, pôsobení oddielov UPA (banderovcov) na území Slovenska (1945 – 1948) a problematike povojnového antisemitizmu na Slovensku v rokoch 1945 – 1948. Je autorom a spoluautorom niekoľkých vedeckých monografií a viacerých odborných štúdií publikovaných doma a v zahraničí.

Igor ŠNICER, doc., PhD. (1979), ukrajinský historik. Študoval na Užhorodskej národnej univerzite a v roku 2005 obhájil dizertačnú prácu na tému Slovenské autonomistické hnutie v I. Československej republike. Od roku 2003 pracuje na Katedre najnovších a novovekých dejín Užhorodskej národnej univerzity. V roku 2006 bol menovaný docentom. Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa zaoberá modernými ukrajinskými dejinami v kontexte medzinárodných vzťahov.

Detlef W. STEIN, PhD. (1961), nemecký historik. Je zakladateľom (1998) a riaditeľom Východoeurópskeho centra Berlín, ktoré sa nachádza v múzeu Stasi na mieste bývalého veliteľstva východonemeckej tajnej služby. Pri centre pôsobí vydavateľstvo OEZ Berlin-Verlag, ktoré bolo založené v roku 2008 a publikuje diela o európskych dejinách, so zameraním na obdobie komunizmu vo východnej Európe.

Detlef Stein sa vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe zameriava predovšetkým na dejiny balkánskych štátov v 20. storočí a na históriu Nemeckej demokratickej republiky. Je spoluautorom vedeckej monografie *Die Kirchen in Osteuropa im Kommunismus* a dvoch zbierok dokumentov o vzťahoch východonemeckej Stasi a bulharskej tajnej služby. V rokoch 1985 – 1989 patril medzi aktivistov protirežimných skupín vo východnom Berlíne a od septembra 1989 bol členom občianskeho hnutia Neues Forum (Nové fórum). Od januára 1990 sa ako hovorca tohto hnutia zúčastňoval v Berlíne rokovaní tzv. okrúhleho stola. Zároveň patril medzi aktivistov občianskej komisie Normannenstrasse, ktorá po zániku Nemeckej demokratickej republiky kontrolovala materiály a aktivity Stasi.

Jacek TEBINKA, univ. prof. (1964), poľský historik. Univerzitné štúdium histórie ukončil na Univerzite v Gdaňsku v roku 1988 a štúdium politológie na tej istej univerzite v roku 1991. V súčasnosti pôsobí ako univerzitný

profesor na Univerzite v Gdaňsku ako vedúci oddelenia moderných dejín na katedre politických vied. Pôsobí aj na Námornej akadémii v Gdyni. V rokoch 2006 – 2007 pôsobil ako hosťujúci profesor na Hebrejskej univerzite v Jeruzaleme na čele oddelenia poľských dejín.

Vo svojej vedeckej tvorbe sa zameriava predovšetkým na poľsko-britské vzťahy v 20. storočí a poľskú otázku počas 2. svetovej vojny a dejiny studenej vojny. Je autorom troch vedeckých monografií: *Polityka brytyjska wobec problemu granicy polsko-radzieckiej 1939-1945*, (Britská politika a problém poľsko-sovietskych hraníc 1939 – 1945; Varšava 1998), *Nadzieje i rozczarowania. Polityka Wielkiej Brytanii wobec Polski 1956 – 1970*, (Nádeje a rozčarovania. Politika Veľkej Británie voči Poľsku 1956 – 1970; Varšava 2005) a *Uzależnienie czy suwerenność? Odwilż październikowa w dyplomacji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej 1956-1961* (Závislosť alebo nezávislosť? Odras októbra v poľskej diplomácii počas studenej vojny 1956 – 1961; Varšava 2010). Spolu s Marekom Kamińskim bol editorom zbierky dokumentov o schôdkach predsedov vlád Veľkej Británie a Poľska v období 2. svetovej vojny (*Na najwyższym szczeblu. Spotkania premierów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Wielkiej Brytanii podczas II wojny światowej*, Na najvyššej úrovni. Stretnutia premiérov Poľskej republiky a Veľkej Británie počas 2. svetovej vojny; Varšava 1999).

Jiří URBAN, Mgr. (1981), český historik. V súčasnosti je pracovníkom oddelenia výskumu komunistickej totalitnej moci v Ústave pro studium totalitných režimů v Prahe, kde pracuje od roku 2009. Popri tom študuje postgraduálne štúdium histórie na Ústave historických vied Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity v Pardubicich. Predmetom jeho vedeckého výskumu je obdobie komunizmu v českých dejinách so zameraním na kolektivizáciu vidieka, perzekúcie proti roľníkom a odpor obyvateľov proti násilnej kolektivizácii. Je autorom jednej vedeckej monografie (*Venkov pod kolektivizační knutou. Okolnosti exemplárního „kulackého“ procesu*; Praha 2010) a spoluautorom ďalších troch kolektívnych monografií. Okrem toho napísal viacero vedeckých štúdií a populárnych článkov a autorsky sa podieľal na piatich výstavách.

Vladimír VARINSKÝ, prof., CSc., PhDr. (1954), slovenský historik a vysokoškolský pedagóg. Vyštudoval históriu a filozofiu na Filozofickej fakulte Univerzity Komenského v Bratislave. Za profesora v odbore slovenské dejiny bol prezidentom Slovenskej republiky menovaný v roku 2004. Pôsobí ako vysokoškolský pedagóg na Fakulte humanitných vied UMB v Banskej Bystrici. Vedecko-výskumne sa orientuje na výskum národných

dejín po roku 1945 v oblasti agrárnej politiky, represii pofebruárového režimu a slovenského exilu po roku 1945.

Václav VEBER, doc., PhDr. (1931), český historik. V súčasnosti pracuje v Ústave historických vied Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity v Pardubiciach a zároveň úzko spolupracuje s Ústavom pro studium totalitních režimů v skupine výskumu protikomunistického odboja a odporu. Špecializuje sa na najnovšie dejiny, moderné dejiny Ruska a Sovietskeho zväzu, dejiny Európskej únie a dejiny Československa. Je autorom viacerých vedeckých monografií (napr. *Komunistický experiment v Rusku 1917 – 1991 aneb Malé dějiny SSSR*, Praha 2001; *Dějiny sjednocené Evropy*, Praha 2004 a 2009; *Osudové únorové dny 1948*, Praha 2008) a zostavovateľom kolektívnych monografií (predovšetkým *Třetí odboj. Kapitoly z dějin protikomunistické rezistence v Československu v padesátých letech 20. století*; Praha 2011) a zborníkov. Popri tom napísal množstvo vedeckých štúdií a populárnych článkov uverejnených v Českej republike aj v zahraničí. V poslednom období publikuje najčastejšie v časopise *Paměť a dějiny*.

Marek WIERZBICKI, PhD. (1964), poľský historik a politológ. V súčasnosti pracuje v Ústave národnej pamäti a zároveň prednáša politické vedy na Katedre politológie na Katolíckej univerzite v Lubline. Venuje sa moderným poľským dejinám so zameraním na postavenie a činnosť poľských študentov v rokoch 1945 – 1989.

Aristid ZELENAY, Ing. (1930), dlhoročný predseda Spolku Slovákov vo Švajčiarku. V rokoch 1948 – 1953 absolvoval Slovenskú Vysokú školu technickú v Bratislave, odbor inžinierskeho staviteľstva a v roku 1953 bol promovovaný za stavebného inžiniera. V roku 1968 sa po okupácii vojskami Varšavskej zmluvy nevrátil z dovolenky v zahraničí a odišiel do Švajčiarska. V roku 1979 mu Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej socialistickej republiky odňalo v rozpore s medzinárodne prijatými záväzkami štátu občianstvo Slovenskej socialistickej republiky, nakoľko sa angažoval v emigrantskom hnutí a „zúčastnil sa zhromaždenia predstaviteľov emigrantských organizácií v Európe“. Pretože aj orgány Slovenskej republiky odmietli zrušiť protizákonne rozhodnutie o odňatí občianstva z roku 1979, prijal v roku 1996 švajčiarske štátne občianstvo.

Vo Švajčiarsku pracoval ako meračský technik, stavbyvedúci a projektant – statik vo firme špecializovanej na výstavbu mostov a napokon ako vedúci inžinier konštrukčného oddelenia v inžinierskej kancelárii

špecializovanej na projektovanie prefabrikovaných priemyselných a veľkpanelových stavieb. Projektuje stavby po celom svete.

Bol členom prípravného výboru pre založenie samostatného slovenského spolku vo Švajčiarsku, pomáhal organizačne zabezpečovať zakladajúce valné zhromaždenie nového spolku, ktorého bol členom od založenia *Združenia priateľov Slovenska* (premenovaného neskôr na *Združenie Slovákov vo Švajčiarsku*) až do roku 2009. V tomto spolku býval zvolený do výboru, zastával funkciu organizačného referenta, bol viackrát podpredsedom, tajomníkom a štyrikrát bol zvolený za predsedu. Zastupoval švajčiarskych Slovákov v Pracovnom spoločenstve národov zo strednej a východnej Európy vo Švajčiarsku a informoval švajčiarske vládne kruhy pred belehradskou konferenciou KBSE o situácii na Slovensku. Bol spoluiniciátorom myšlienky, aby Slováci na Slovensku a v zahraničí konali v jeden deň demonštráciu za slobodu Slovenska, z čoho vznikla v roku 1988 Sviečková demonštrácia.

Bol spoluautorom viacerých výziev, memoránd a vyhlásení ku krajanom i slovenským štátnym orgánom, zastupoval Združenie Slovákov vo Švajčiarsku na stretnutiach predstaviteľov Slovákov z rôznych krajín. Podporoval myšlienku vzniku Svetového kongresu Slovákov a je jeho doživotným členom. Od zakladajúceho valného zhromaždenia býval zvolený až do roku 1990 do jeho predsedníctva. Býval členom komisie pre úpravu stanov a pod jeho predsedníctvom sa komisii podarilo konečne presadiť medzi ciele kongresu obnovenie slovenskej demokratickej štátnosti namiesto hmlistých rečí o práve každého národa na sebaurčenie. Na zakladajúcom valnom zhromaždení Svetového združenia Slovákov v zahraničí v roku 2002 bol členom komisie, ktorá pripravila návrh stanov tejto organizácie. V roku 2003 bol zvolený do generálnej rady a do výkonného výboru a mal na starosti finančnú evidenciu. V roku 2006 bol opäť zvolený do generálnej rady, ale pre svojvoľný postup vedenia a očividné porušovanie stanov sa vo Svetovom združení Slovákov v zahraničí prestal angažovať. Popri tom bol predsedom pastoračnej rady Slovenskej katolíckej misie v Zürichu.

ISBN 978-80-89335-50-3

